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CRISIS, PLANNING, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE: MANAGING THE NEW
HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SPACE AND SOCIETY

by Manuel Castells

1. Introduction: Urbanism, Crisis, and the Quality of Life

Ours is an epoch of crisis--not only economic, but cultural and political as well.¹ Social perception of crises often takes the form of collective feelings about the deterioration of the quality of life. Since the material form of our everyday life has adopted the spatial shape of what we call the metropolitan region,² the modern city and the process of urbanization in general have come to be associated with many of our social, economic, and ecological evils. They have even been blamed as their potential cause. Ten years ago I criticized such a concept and showed that spatial forms do not determine social relationships;³ they just intervene in a complex network of variables, fundamentally dominated by relations of production, gender, and power.⁴ Thus, neither the metropolitan form nor industrial growth, even less technological progress, are responsible per se for the process of economic decay, social alienation and political delegitimation we are observing in our world.⁵ Such a remark is not a mere academic debate, since only if we are able to pinpoint the sources of crisis can we invent new policies able to overcome it. Yet, from the critique of the "spatialist theory" of social crises it does not follow that space is unimportant and that the spatial dimension of the crisis should be

ignored. Quite the contrary! Societies exist only in time and space. And the particular spatio-temporal forms they take are among the most powerful structures conditioning human action. Furthermore, it is my hypothesis that one of the fundamental processes at work in the current world crisis is the formation of a new historical relationship between space and society. This relationship, if developed, could lead to consequences that would be potentially destructive for all kinds of social relationships. I believe we are on the edge of a major socio-spatial catastrophe, but not, as the ecologists say, because of the process of metropolitanization and consumption of natural resources. It is because the new dominant interests and the new social revolts tend to dissociate the space of organizations and the space of experience. On the one hand, the space of power is being transformed into flows. On the other hand, the space of meaning is being reduced to micro-territories of new tribal communities. In-between, cities and societies disappear. Information tends to be dissociated from communication. Power is being separated from political representation. And production is increasingly dissociated from consumption, while both processes (production and consumption), are themselves piecemealed in a series of spatially distinct operations whose unity is only recomposed by a hidden abstract logic. The horizon of such a historical tendency is the destruction of human experience, therefore of communication, and therefore of society. Even if space is not the determinant of such a process, the emerging spatial forms are powerful indicators of the world taking shape in front of our eyes. This paper explores some hypotheses about these new spatial forms, about their social determinants and their potential outcomes. It also will try to go further, suggesting ways of altering the course of historical events through policies which are able to bring

together lucidity and courage to produce an alternative model of city, thus enhancing the quality of life. To be sure, such an alternative spatial model presupposes a number of social and political conditions. But too often analysts (including myself) spend their energy enumerating the obstacles to any real structural reform without ever coming to the point of proposing the content of the new path we are calling for. In this paper I would like to walk some preliminary steps along this hazardous path, because the time of crisis is also a time of potential change. Uncertainty goes along with innovation. After the end of all political and intellectual certainties that were the backbone of our lives we must accept the challenge to innovate, to discover, and to experiment, if we wish to overcome the unbearable dilemma between cynical nihilism and dogmatic routine.

2. The New Historical Relationships Between Space and Society

It has been a custom in the recent literature of urban studies to use the formula according to which space is the expression of society. While such a perspective is a healthy reaction against the technological determinism and short-sighted emphasis too frequently predominant in the space-related academic disciplines, it is clearly an insufficient formulation of the problem, besides being too vague a statement. Because space is not a "reflection of society," it is society! It is one of its fundamental material dimensions, and to consider it independently from social relationships, even with the intention of studying their interaction, is actually to separate nature from culture and, thus, to destroy the first principle of any social science: that matter and consciousness are interrelated, and that this fusion is the essence of what history and science are about. Therefore, spatial forms, at least on our planet, will be produced, as all

other objects, by human action. They will express and perform the interests of the dominant class according to a given mode of production and to a specific mode of development. They will express and implement the power relationships of the state in a historically defined society. They will be realized and shaped by the process of gender domination and by state-enforced family life. At the same time, spatial forms will also be earmarked by the resistance from exploited classes, from oppressed subjects, and from abused women. And the work of such a contradictory historical process on the space will be accomplished on an already inherited spatial form, product of former history and support of new interests, projects, protests, and dreams. Finally, from time to time social movements will arise challenging the meaning of a spatial structure and therefore attempting new functions and new forms. Such are the urban social movements, the agents of urban-spatial transformation, the highest level of urban social change.

We cannot explore here the production of spatial forms and urban meaning across time and cultures. But we can introduce in the discussion some recent historical trends of the transformation of spatial forms that underlie the production of new urban meaning by urban social movements in our societies.

We know that the dominant interests of the capitalist mode of production, during its industrial model of development, led to a dramatic restructuring of the territory and to the assignment of new social meaning to the city. Four socio-spatial fundamental processes account for such a transformation:

(1) The concentration and centralization of the means of production, units of management, labor power, markets, and means of consumption in a new form of the gigantic and complex spatial unit known as the metropolitan area.⁶

(2) The specialization of spatial location according to the interests of capital and to the efficiency of industrial production, transportation, and distribution.⁷

(3) The commodification of the city itself, both through the real estate market (including land speculation) and in the form of its residential areas, for instance, triggering suburban sprawl as a form of opening up construction and transportation markets, and of creating a form of household designed to stimulate individualized consumption.⁸

(4) The basic assumption that for such a model of metropolitan development to be accomplished necessitated the mobility of the population and resources, shifting to where they were required for profit maximizing. It followed massive migration, disruption of communities, and regional cultures, unbalanced regional growth, spatial mismatching between existing physical stock and need for housing and equipment, and a self-spiraling process of urban growth, beyond the limits of collective efficiency and short of the minimum space-time requirements for the maintenance of patterns of human communication.⁹

Such a model led to a generalized urban crisis, in housing, services, and social control, as we have shown and analyzed elsewhere.¹⁰ The action of the state to cope with the urban crisis led to the increasing politicization of the early type of urban movements.¹¹

The response of the dominant interests of a given system to a structural crisis is always two-fold. On the one hand, it is political: repression and integration. Such was the experience in all capitalist countries in the 1960-80 period, with different results depending upon the specific social situations. On the other hand, it is technological: shifting gears toward new systems of management and new techniques of production. Thus, the informational mode of development created the conditions for a new restructuring of a spatial form in crisis, at the same time it needed new spatial conditions for its full expansion.¹² The main spatial impact of the new technology, based upon the twin revolution in communication systems and micro-electronics is the transformation of spatial places into flows and channels—what amounts to the de-spatialization of the processes of production and consumption.¹³ Not only information can be transmitted from individual sender to individual receiver across distance, but the consumption process can also be individualized and transformed into the exchange of a Cable TV image against a telephone-recorded number of a credit card. Technically speaking, shopping-centers are already obsolete. To be sure, shopping is more than buying. But the dissociation of the economic and symbolic functions leads to the differentiation of their spatial form and, thus, potentially, to the transformation of both functions into non-spatialized flows (entertainment through images and drugs at home; buying through advertising and telephone-connected home computers).¹⁴ There are four limits to such a tendency towards the de-spatialization of production and consumption, from the point of view of the dominant class:

(1) An enormous amount of capital stock is in fixed assets in the gigantic concentrations they had created during the preceding phase. Manhattan, or the City of London, cannot be written off as easily as the

South Bronx or Erixton.¹⁵

(2) Some cultural institutions, historical traditions, and interpersonal networks, in the high places of the ruling elites must be preserved and improved, since "capital" means capitalists, managers, and technocrats, that is people are culturally defined and oriented, and certainly not ready to become flows themselves.¹⁶

The spatial process that the dominant class has designed to deal with these two problems is a well-known device: urban renewal, that is the rehabilitation, revitalization, improvement, and protection of a limited exclusive space of residence, work and leisure, insulated from its immediate surroundings by a computerized army of bodyguards, and related to the other islands of the elite (including some resort islands) by increasingly protected air communication (private jets and airport VIP rooms), and tele-conference systems.

(3) Yet, the informational mode of development requires some concentrated centers of production of knowledge and storage of information, as well as centers of emission of images and information. So, universities, laboratories, scientific design units, news centers, information agencies, public service, financial centers, managerial units, with all their corresponding technicians, workers, and employees, must still be spatially concentrated in some places.

(4) Furthermore, the informational mode of development is absolutely intertwined with the industrial mode of development, including industrialized agriculture, mining, and crop-collection around the world. Thus, factories, fields, housing, and services for workers and peasants cannot be

de-spatialized.

The spatial process designed, from the point of view of the dominant class, to cope with these third and fourth obstacles to the de-structuring of space, is the emphasis on increasing hierarchy and specialization of spatial functions and forms, according to their location. What the informational mode of development allows is the decomposition of the process of work and management, so that different tasks can be performed in different places and assembled through signals (in the case of information) or through advanced transportation technology (assembly standardized pieces shipped away from very remote points of production). Work at home or in community centers, regional differentiation of production, and concentration of the units of management and production of information in some privileged spaces could be the new spatial model of the capitalist-technocratic elite. Furthermore, the expansion and integration of the capitalist mode of production at the world level accelerates the international division of labor and organizes hierarchically the process of production in a world assembly-line; opens up a world market; imports and exports labor where it is convenient in a particular time for a particular purpose; and transforms the flows of capital in accounting procedures internal to the bookkeeping systems of multinational corporations, reaching the final limit of immateriality of the major power in the capitalist system: money. The spatial project of the new dominant class tends towards the de-connection between people and spatial form, therefore between peoples' lives and urban meaning. Not that people will not be in places or that cities will disappear. On the contrary: the process of urbanization will accelerate in most countries, and the search for housing and services will be increasingly the most dramatic problem for people. Yet, what tends to disappear is the

meaning of places in people's consciousness. Each place, each city, will receive its actual social meaning from its location in the hierarchy of a network whose control and rhythm will escape from each place and even more from the people of each place. Furthermore, people will be shifted according to the continuous re-structuring of an increasingly specialized space. Unemployed blacks in Detroit are already invited to go back to "their" now booming, industrial cities in the deep South. Mexicans will be brought into the U.S. and Turkish will remain in Germany, until General Motors develops its production in Mexico, and Japan takes over the European market once controlled by the German cars through such measures as acquiring the ailing Spanish automobile factories. The new space of a world capitalist system, combining the informational and the industrial modes of development, is a space of variable geometry, formed by locations hierarchically ordered in a continuously changing network of flows: flows of capital, of labor, of elements of production, of commodities, of information, of decisions, of signals. The new urban meaning of the dominant class is the absence of any meaning based on experience. The abstraction of production tends to become total. The new source of power relies on the control of the entire network of information. Space is dissolved into flows; cities are shadows that explode or disappear according to decisions that their dwellers will always ignore. The outer experience is cut off from the inner experience. The new tendential urban meaning is the spatial and cultural separation of people from their product and from their history. It is the space of collective alienation and individual violence, transformed by undifferentiated feedbacks into a flow that never stops and never starts. Life is transformed into abstraction, cities into shadows.

Yet, this is not the spatial form to emerge or the urban meaning to be imposed without resistance by the new dominant class. Because space and cities, as well as history, are not the products of the will and interests of the dominant classes, genders, and apparatuses, but, rather, the result of a process in which they are resisted by dominated classes, genders, and subjects, and in which they are met by alternative projects of new emerging social actors. So, the spatial blueprint of capitalist technocracy is historically being challenged by the alternative urban meaning projected by labor, by women, by citizens, by urban social movements, along a series of dimensions that we must point out.

Each spatial re-structuring attempted by the new dominant class, each urban meaning being defined by the capitalists, managers, and technocrats is being met by conflicting projects of urban meaning, functions, and forms, coming from a variety of social actors. To use the terms of Charles Tilly,¹⁷ some movements are reactive to the disruptions operated in their space by the dominant class, some are proactive by proposing new forms of relationship between space and society. Let us outline the basic tendencies of this new historical struggle over the definition of urban meaning

For the sake of clarity, we will enumerate the different contradictory relationships established between the spatial project of the dominant class and the alternative meaning proposed by popular classes and/or social movements:

A) The adaptation of old spaces to new dominant functions through the process of urban renewal, and the regional re-structuring on the basis of a new specialization of the territory, are met by resistance from neighborhoods that do not want to disappear, by regional cultures that want to

cluster together, and by people that, previously uprooted, want to create new roots. Very recently, the most lucid publication of the American corporate establishment, Business Week, just realized the problem. Its issue of July 27, 1981, is dominated by a cover titled, "America's New Immobile Society,"¹⁸ to call attention to a special report where one can read that:

America's celebrated "mobile society" is putting down roots. After a quarter-century in which 20% of the population changed addresses each year, the percentage is dropping. It fell to 17.7% in the last Census Bureau study in 1976 and is continuing to decline, according to census officials . . . Larry E. Long, the bureau's chief migration specialist, says the U.S. is very unlikely to return to the mobility of the 1950s and 1960s. That easy mobility--which had been both evidence and a cause of the nation's freewheeling ways and innovative economy--has ended. Dealing with the effects of this change will be one of the top challenges of the 1980s for U.S. industry . . . Evidence that Americans are staying put is as close as the next house or office. Tied down by dual-career marriages, housing costs, inflation, and a growing emphasis on leisure and community activities--the "quality of life"--workers are resisting relocation.¹⁹

Business Week, mobility, a major spatial pre-requisite of the industrial mode of development, and, to some extent, of the informational mode, is being challenged by the defense of neighborhoods and the search for a "quality of life."

B) A somewhat more complex pattern appears to be happening at the level of the new international division of labor. On the one hand, the penetration of the national economies by the multinational corporations, the "green revolution," and the international financial networks, entirely disrupts the pre-existing productive structure and triggers the process of accelerated rural-urban and urban-metropolitan migrations. On the other hand, once in the big city, the newcomers try to settle in stable communities, build up neighborhoods, and rely on local networks. The world's rootless economy and the local cooperative community are two faces of the same process, leaning towards some potential decisive confrontation.

C) The third major debate over the city concerns the spatial consequences of information and knowledge as a major source of productivity, actually founding a new model of development.²⁰ The major social problem with the reliance on information is that because of the power and class relationships that dominate the framework within which information develops, their monopoly becomes a major source of domination and control. Therefore, in the context of a class and statist society, the more that information develops, the more that the communication channels must be controlled. In other words, for information to become a source of control, information and communication must be disjointed, the monopoly of the messages must be ensured, and the sending of images must be programmed, as well as their feed-back. Here again, the source of the new form of domination is neither the computer, the video, nor the mass-media. Interactive systems of communication and computerized dissemination of knowledge on technologies have developed enough to dramatically improve, instead of reduce, the amount of communication and information among people, as well as the cultural diversity of their messages.²¹ Yet, the monopoly of the

messages by capital-controlled or state-controlled mass-media, as well as the monopoly of information by the technocracy, has generated a reaction by local communities emphasizing the construction of alternative cultures and patterns of communication through face-to-face interaction and the revival of oral tradition. The de-spatialization of communication and culture by centralized one-way information flows is being met by the localization of communication networks on the basis of territorially rooted cultural communities and social networks. The cultural uniformity of mass media is met by the cultural specificity of spatially based inter-personal networks. The informational technocrats dissolve the space in their flows. Distrustful people increasingly tend to rely on experience as their basic source of information. The potential breaking of two-way communication would create a dramatic gap in the symbolic legitimacy of our informational society.

D) The grass-roots movements triggered by the acceleration of the restructuring of space by the informational mode of development and the new international division of labor, have come to rejoin urban protests stemming from other structural contradictions of the capitalist city. Foremost among these urban movements is what we name collective consumption trade-unionism. The economic and spatial concentration of production led to the socialization of consumption under conditions such that most of these collective means of consumption (like housing, schools, health centers, and cultural amenities), were insufficiently profitable for private capital investment unless the state provided the conditions for a risk-free market or took direct responsibility for the delivery and management of urban services. The conditions of living in the city became a crucial part of the social wage, itself a component of the welfare state. While these developments released pressure on demands over direct wages and created a

framework of relative social peace between capital and labor, they also led to the formation of a new type of demand movement dealing with the standards, prices, and ways of living as conditioned by urban services. When the economic crisis of the 1970s expressed the structural limits of the untenable contradiction of a capitalist economy relying increasingly on an ever-expanding state sector of service-distribution,²² the urban fiscal crisis in America²³ and the austerity policies in Europe²⁴ had to meet the popular demands for collective means of consumption that had become the material basis for everyday life. The re-commodification of the city had to challenge the collective demand for a "good city" as a social service to which all citizens were entitled.

E) Another major tendency of the capitalist mode of production in its new industrial development at the world level was to incorporate workers from different ethnic and cultural origins in such a way that they would be much more vulnerable, socially and politically, to capital's requirements, than the native-citizen workers of core countries.²⁵ Furthermore, the split introduced within the ranks of labor had the possibility of leading toward the ethnic fragmentation of the working-class that had been so successful in the formation of American capitalism, paving the ground for the complete victory of business over labor.²⁶ In fact, experience has shown that immigrant workers were less submissive than anticipated and in some countries, like Switzerland and Germany, have been at the forefront of a new wave of social struggle.²⁷ Yet the economic mechanism of overexploitation of immigrants still works, both in the U.S. and Western Europe, in spite of widespread unemployment and increasing immigrant labor militancy. As a consequence, the ethnic structure of major capitalist cities has undertaken another major transformation in the last two decades, and the process is

expanding. Combined with the classical process of spatial segregation, racial discrimination, and segmented housing markets, territorially-based ethnic communities are becoming more than ever a distinctive trend. The recent development of an "informal economy" in the metropolitan area, based on cheap labor and illegal conditions of work and living, are expanding the size of the phenomenon and the harshness of the newcomers' existence. The very basis of their usefulness for the new economy is their defenseless situation, which requires the maintenance of a situation of dependency and of disorganization in relationship to the labor market, to the state institutions, and to the city's mainstream life. On the other hand, for the new urbanites to survive, they need, more than ever, to reconstruct a social universe, a local turf, a space of freedom, a community. Sometimes the community is built on the basis of the reconstruction of the social hierarchy and economic exploitation of the society they left behind, like in San Francisco's Chinatown, dominated by the six companies, or in Miami's Cuban community dominated by the exiled Cuban bourgeoisie. In other cases, ethnic-based community organizations have mobilized a neighborhood, both for their urban needs and against institutionalized prejudice, for example Latinos in Los Angeles, Puerto Ricans in New York, or West Indians in London. Most often, the self-organization, particularly among youth, takes the form of "clubs," "gangs," or "groups," where in-group identity is tied to collective survival, where the drug-economy and the underworld find their manpower, and where the territorial boundaries of a gang's turf become at the same time the material proof of their power over "something" and the actual shop-floor of their source of income. Sometimes, all these elements come together into major outbursts of revolts, when all the exits are closed down and the inner cities are still burning in the furnace of

the process of re-structuring the service economy. To the segregated space of ethnic fragmentation, cultural strangeness, and economic over-exploitation of the new "post-industrial" city, the inner-city communities countervail with the defense of some identity, the preservation of their culture, the search for their roots, and the earmarking of their newly acquired territory. Sometimes, also, they display their rage, and they attempt to devastate the institutions that they believe devastate their daily lives.

F) Space has always been connected to the state. This is even more evident in the new urban forms and functions of the capitalist system. The management of urban services by state institutions, while demanded by the labor movement as a part of the social contract reached through class struggle, has been one of the most powerful and subtle mechanisms of social control and institutional power over everyday life in our societies, as the researchers of the C.E.R.F.I., a Paris-based research center directed by Michel Foucault, have established both theoretically and empirically.²⁸ Furthermore, the centralization of the state, the increasing role of the executive branch, the shrinkage and bureaucratization of the political system, and the reduction of fiscal resources and legal power for local governments, have led to a situation where the exercise of democracy is limited to some isolated, though crucial, votes, choosing between a limited number of alternatives whose generation has been largely removed from public information, consciousness, opinion, and decision.

The gap between civil society and the political system is widening because of the rigidity of the political parties and their difficulty to be receptive to the values and demands expressed by the new social movements:

feminists, ecologists, counter-cultural youth, etc. The "crisis of legitimacy" of the democratic state²⁹ has convinced the experts of the Trilateral Commission that democracy should be restricted and limited, so that people will not take excessive liberties.³⁰ On the other hand, there are growing tendencies towards "political tribalism," calling for the abandonment of democratic life and the withdrawal into the wilderness of squatter houses, free communes, and alternative institutions.³¹ A fundamental debate over the state is going on at the very core of our civilization, and, surprisingly enough, it tends to use a territorial language. The new capitalist technocratic elite calls for a state without boundaries, without territories, without limits: again, for a state governing over flows. Its program includes informational control over the entire population by electronic means and storage of files in interconnected memories, softening of the national boundaries, state-centralizing of energy, under the form of nuclear power, concentration of decisions in small cabinets and ad hoc groups, themselves relying on powerful bureaucratic machineries, and having local governments considered as "parochialists" and incompetent to view the overall picture, and thus undeserving of their responsibilities. This new form of enlightened despotism calls for a de-spatialized world order where the representation of citizens on the basis of the membership of their cities must be replaced by the comptrollers of know-how, who take a broader look at the problems of this planet from the carpeted meeting room of a space-shuttle.*

* To be sure, we are not referring to specific societies but pointing out historical tendencies of the new dominant class. For instance, the Reagan Administration emphasizes the role of local governments, both to dismantle the welfare State and on the confidence of a conservative opinion in most of the segregated communities of suburban America. Yet, when local governments pass rent control laws, the Reagan Administration threatens them with

To this urban system increasingly penetrated and controlled by a centralized state by the means of insulated bureaucracies, people of all classes have opposed alternative views of the relationship between the city and the state. On the one hand, when the German squatters ask for a place to live and a modest state allowance to survive in the place of their free territory, namely, when they explicitly ask to be placed in an urban reservation, they are jumping to the ultimate step in the disintegration of the relationship between the state and civil society.³² The "Christiania" commune in Copenhagen, the "indiani metropolitani" in Italy, some of the Dutch squatters, certain tendencies of the Californian gay community, and certainly the youth of Zurich, all share a similar attitude: if the city cannot get rid of the state, let's ask the state's agreement to get rid of a small part of the city, on the condition that it should be a real city neighborhood, with intense urban life, and historical tradition, and not just a piece of land in some anonymous suburban apartment complex.

On the other hand, all over the world, the tendency toward State's centralism and domination by the State over the city is being opposed by a massive popular appeal for local autonomy and urban self-management. The revival of democracy depends upon the capacity of connecting the new demands, values, and projects to the institutions that manage society (that is, the State) on the basis of its increasing penetration by civil society, starting at the level and in the place where people can most actively participate in the process of decision-making: the communal institutions of local government,³³ as much decentralized as possible under the form of neighborhood councils, a way opened twenty years ago by the experience of withdrawing federal funds.

Bologna. Between the state and its undifferentiated hinterland, on the one hand, and the demand for urban reservations, on the other hand, a new project of self-management appears to be able to reconstruct the relationship between the state and the city on the basis of their mutual grass-roots.

3. The Quality of Life and the Political Management of the Crisis

The preceding analysis merely emphasizes historical tendencies. Yet "people" can act on such tendencies—to alter them, to transform them, and to produce a different space and a different time according to their interests, values, projects, and dreams.

It is when we enter into the debate of deciding the kind of future we want to build, or which social interests or values we want to defend, that the concept of the "quality of life" becomes questionable, at first glance. We know that there is no such thing as an "objective, scientific," neutral measure of the quality of life. It has been demonstrated that social indicators, the methodological tools most often used to reach such measures, are culturally biased and politically determined.³⁴ Each social indicator is the result of a conflictual social process for defining the cultural categories that frame the field of social policies for decisionmaking bodies. This is not to say that social indicators are useless. They can be effective policy tools, but they do not objectively measure the quality of life. They systematize and classify the code of values that a given society or a given institution considers desirable in a particular historical moment.

We also know that needs, desires, and values are historical products,³⁵ as shown by the very rich intellectual debate on this matter in

backwardness (to be integrated by progress) or as subversion (to be repressed by the state). Recent historical experience shows the exact opposite as the dominant trend. Societies are increasingly plural and conflictual, and the sources of conflict and historical change are more and more diversified. Class-conflict by itself does not allow us to understand the dynamics of modern societies. Gender opposition, ethnic struggles, counter-cultural protest, citizen movements, autonomous communication, dependent states' liberation, etc. are all creating new sets of values, defending new interests, setting up new standards, and therefore continuously re-defining the meaning of the quality of life.

Under these historical conditions one can espouse the interests and values of a particular social actor and therefore define the quality of life under a particular perspective. Such a position is not only acceptable but also necessary. Only if each actor plays his/her role without trying to "understand" the other, refusing to accept the superior logic of the totality, can our societies keep their diversity and their dynamics, because such is our historical specificity. In fact, such is the web of tendencies we have identified in our analysis of the new spatial trends emerging under the variety of social interests and mobilizations.

Yet we have also observed in our specific field of analysis, that left to themselves all the current tendencies of re-organization of space, go toward a major collision whose results will not be the triumph of one or another, but the disintegration of our societies into war encampments patrolled by computerized satellites and resisted by underground habitats.

The recognition of diversity and conflict must accompany the creation of institutional mechanisms that establishes the necessary connections for

Italy in recent years.³⁶

Yet, from such an important analytical statement, a questionable practical conclusion has often been drawn. If the "quality of life" has to be measured in accordance with a model which is a socio-cultural product, and if society is divided between socio-cultural models corresponding to each of several antagonistic social actors, the most important task is to impose one's preferred model by creating a favorable power relationship. Once power is seized (either at the summit of the state or in the narrow trench of a free commune) then a coherent model can be established, internalized, and measured. Then, we will know what the "quality of life" is, and we will be able to mobilize our energies to approach the model.

Thus, policies and politics relying on the cultural definition of needs on the basis of some specific social interests tend toward a unified vision of society and culture, and toward the collective fulfillment of the goals recognized by such a culture as desirable. This is equally true for the myth of scientific rationality of the technocracy as for the myth of spontaneous freedom of counter-cultural communities. The parallel is even more obvious between the apologists of capitalism, defining human needs in terms of profitable markets, and the believers in socialism, programming these needs as a public service in which the state decides what Human Nature is about and how much of it History allows for redistribution in each particular moment.

The trouble with these conceptions is not even that they implicitly tend toward a uniform (some would say totalitarian) model of society; more simply, they rely on false historical premises. They pre-suppose a social situation under which consensus is the rule and conflict can be treated as

social coexistence, communication, innovation, production, consumption, and collective decisionmaking. We have lived for centuries (at least) trying to suppress class conflict, either by maintaining the status quo, or by striving for a classless society after a magic revolutionary breakdown. Instead, the progress of humankind has brought a multiplication of sources of conflict and new values while maintaining the process of class struggle. Therefore, a superior political system will be the one that recognizes the specificity of our societies and allows for the expression and influence of all historical actors without surrendering to the momentum of any one of them. Such a proposal is not the traditional liberal pluralist theory of the state (that is based upon individuals and interest groups, and not upon necessary conflictual historical actors) but the recognition of the new political horizon created in our world by the interaction between the political system and social movements.³⁷ The new state must be shaped in such a way that: a) All interests and values can be expressed, b) Different interests and values will be weighed in terms of the actual hegemony they have reached in the civil society, c) They will be articulated by parties that are founded on political programs more than on class interests (as in fact they already are in Europe), d) There will be maintained an openness in the political system, such that non-dominant interests can still struggle, oppose, and to some extent, change (and dynamize) the system, and e) A major institutional distance must be kept between the political system and social movements, in order that the latter can maintain their autonomy and their creativity, while the state can develop policies that consider the whole picture of society, without conceding everything to social movements that, while being the sources of social creation, cannot be the legitimate institutions of political management.³⁸

Only if this new dynamics between political parties and social movements takes place can we stop the process of de-legitimation of the democratic institutions and the crisis of the state. Only if technological innovation works along with the improvement of social relations can we overcome the crisis in productivity. And only if space becomes meaningful again, by incorporating a new historical meaning adapted to our societies, will cities be able to become social fabrics of human communication.

The schematic proposals that follow presuppose this strategy and political position. Above the author's subjective preference for social movements, there is a responsibility of the urban analyst and planner to develop state and municipal policies that will help the process we have outlined to take the shape of the new spatial forms. We need a new space that, on the basis of the actual current historical process, stimulates urban and regional self-government, allows for technological innovation, enhances productivity, raises consumption, and restores communication.

4. New Life, New Spaces: Toward Alternative Urban-Regional Policies

The most innovative spatial policies are not those that follow the current technological revolution without taking care of the current breakdown of society. The most progressive urban policies are not those that favor the interests of the working-class but those that enhance productivity, redistribution, and freedom, while fundamentally preserving civilization. Civilization is an outdated notion that suddenly becomes alive and important when it reaches the status of an endangered species in our planet of superpowers and self-glorifying terror.

The most revolutionary urban-regional policies hic et nunc are those that restore human communication and expand democratic decisionmaking, while preserving productivity and enhancing equality in our historical conditions. It is easy to agree on such a recipe, and almost impossible to cook it. Yet, at least we know what we (urban analysts and planners) should be trying to do. Let us try to open some would-be windows over the unknown land of this new frontier of urban research.³⁹

To start with, we need a new instrument of political management--an institutional device that closely connects the state and civil society through local self-government, administrative decentralization, and citizen participation. There is an abundant literature on the subject,⁴⁰ yet with the major exception of Italy (in spite of all its shortcomings!), little actual practice of participatory democracy. Obviously, to be democratic does not solve the problems, but at least establishes a link between people and democratic institutions--a link of confidence, a link of information, a link of initiative and eventually, of mobilization. However tempered by the powers that be, a link of popular control will help to correct authoritarianism, inefficiency, corruption, and bureaucracy. The problem is to keep popular control outside the sphere of democratic decisionmaking. As Norberto Bobbio and Nicos Poulantzas have sometimes suggested, the "soviets" are the first step toward Stalinism. Thus, it is important to:

- a) Increase the powers and competence of local governments, the ones that more closely connect state and civil society⁴¹

b) To decentralize these local governments extending their powers to neighborhood elected councils.⁴²

c) To organize citizen participation at two levels:⁴³

c.1) Unorganized participation in open meetings of municipal institutions

c.2) Organized advisory participation of representative voluntary associations at different levels, and in the institutional assemblies as well as in ad hoc committees.

Without such a flexible, controlled, and democratic form of government, all reforms will end up reinforcing bureaucracy and the crisis of legitimacy will deepen. On the contrary, if such a mechanism is established and maintained for a period long enough to be tested, the day-to-day control over the public institutions will end up not only restoring confidence and smoothing (while keeping) conflicts, but also enhancing efficiency.

The problem of most efforts of municipal democratization (including the Italian experience) is that they have redistributed influence without actually increasing power because of the lack of financial resources and administrative competence of most local governments.⁴⁴ Furthermore, many administrative reforms have referred to an abstract notion of democracy without creating a new content for urban policies. This is why, though political reform is a prerequisite for urban reform, it is the content of these urban policies that will decide the success or failure of the instrument created to implement them.

What is such a content? From our perspective, it is the actual response that has to be provided to the demands and interests being expressed in spatial terms by the historically dominant actors and the new social movements. We must find policies that, taking into consideration the actual power relationships, allow cultural and technological changes to develop, while maintaining the structural pattern of human communication and political bargaining.

We have to respond to the growing demand for collective consumption services. But such a demand is too often understood in terms of more public housing and social services. It is crucial to consider it in terms of different kinds of services and urban amenities. We must also remember that the current long period of economic austerity makes demagogic many programs that require more of the same kind of public finance that has largely failed in the last two decades.⁴⁵ What we need is to enhance the use-value of urban amenities by changing the management of the services that re-uses the space in a more sensible manner. We need a housing policy based on rehabilitation and maintenance rather than on extensive development. We need schools that work 16 hours a day, seven days a week, with different personnel, to serve the community. We need private offices that become tax-deductible cultural centers in the evening. We need mansions that become subsidized child-care centers. We need neighborhood health centers that practice preventive medicine and improve the health of a city with 1/4 the cost of operating one major hospital. We need youth running public facilities on the basis of new responsibilities overcoming old craft privileges of entrenched bureaucracies. We need a transportation system that combines time and space in a flexible manner to organize traffic; that creates walking paths (and not pedestrian zones) through the city, to

restore human energy as a means of auxiliary transportation; that uses bicycles; that combines electric power and gasohol; that articulates private cars and mass transit for different times, activities and populations. We need a land-use plan that encourages conservation and maximization of uses; that eliminates land speculation as the only capitalist activity that has nothing to do with the progress of humankind; and that orientates growth when and where it is necessary, so that bargaining is always possible between private developers and public authorities. In sum, with the same budget and similar legal instruments, many reforms are possible when there is a firm political will and a clear planning policy based upon the principle that the existing city and its gradual development have to be preserved and managed as a collective use-value, rather than superseded before time to subordinate it to privately appropriated exchange-value.

Yet all the urban services in the world will not save us from barbarism if we do not restore communication in our metropolises. I have mentioned in this paper that a reaction is in process, all over the world, against the monopoly of messages by mass media, against the penetration-destruction of national, ethnic, or local cultures by uniform codes, and against the structural limits of face-to-face interaction. Most of these reactions take the form of subcultural communities that close the doors behind them and oppose all the messages from the outside. Such a process is most threatening because it actually shatters human interaction among a myriad of fragments of existence that, developing in autonomous and separate ways, will become unable to understand each other. When the "outsider" becomes a foreigner, an "alien," he is a potential danger, maybe an enemy; the breaking of the cultural code of communication is the matrix of

spiraling urban violence.

Furthermore, mass media (TV in particular) have failed in their attempt to create a homogeneous culture. Such a culture (that effectively exists) is only part of people's experience. Besides some vanguards that organized themselves as anti-TV counter-cultural communities, most reacted by switching-off when their needs of communication were not fulfilled by one-way information flows. The dynamism of capitalism is transforming this frustration into a new (and fantastic) market: cable TV and video.(*). The media is becoming increasingly decentralized and the monopoly of messages is coming to an end. And yet, communication is not restored. We can even think that we are facing a communication disaster through two parallel evils that, for the sake of provocation, we will call the "American model" and the "Italian model." In the "American model," the big TV networks disinvest in their national programs, start massive video production, and buy and develop a huge decentralized network of thousands of community-cable TV. The message is now diversified according to the needs of an increasingly segmented market. Yet, the monopoly of the code is still there, and the one-way model continues, maintaining and actually deepening the crisis of communication between individuals and subcultures.

In the "Italian model," the subcultures go "high-tech." Since the technology is there, since people have quit forever the "Gutenberg Galaxy," since decentralized sending of visual messages is now possible, local radio stations and subcultural cable TV's will take over the communication field.

(*) Most of the subsequent analysis is based on the knowledge and expertise of Dr. Francoise Sabbah, of the Broadcasting and Communication Arts Department, San Francisco State University.

But since such a process takes place along the lines of free-market competition, and without having restored the social patterns of communication, the result is the technological reinforcement of cultural tribalism. Not only are TV waves clashing over the borders of too narrow space-frequencies, blurring the reception, but also the definition of autonomous captive audiences traces the lines of the new micro-culture, fractioning ever more the cultural frame of reference of different social groups. The net result is the coexistence of both the monopoly of messages by the big networks and the increasingly narrow codes of local micro-cultures around their parochial cable TVs. Communication not only disappears but is replaced by a myriad of non-transferable codes.

If the city is also a communication network, if human interaction conditions the economy, the politics, and social institutions, no metropolitan policies of our age can avoid dealing with the management of information and communication. To do so, we must start from the assumption that the new audio-visual technologies are here to stay and develop. What are we to do about it and with it?

The first element of an urban communications policy is to recall the fact that we are trying at the same time, to maintain the diversity of autonomous or semi-autonomous cultures, and to make possible their capacity of communicating between each other and with the "global culture" (meaning the culture institutionalized by the state and economic powers).

Therefore, we must actively support neighborhood culture, and even emergent counter-cultures. The support, from the point of view of the state, takes basically the form of non-repression, but may also include financial and administrative support, as well as public recognition of

their legitimacy and interest.

On such a basis, it is important to allow, and if necessary, stimulate community cable TV, in order to keep the big networks out of the new system, otherwise the whole dialectic between the local and the global collapses. Such community cable TV stations must be well-equipped technically; they need experts. The idea that people can do their own visual production is a populist myth. What can be done is that under experts' guidance, people participate in the production and distribution of their visual culture, particularly if video-training, which appears more urgent than ever, is introduced to the next generation at the primary school level.

Within the form of a network of local cable TV stations, three problems have to be solved to develop a new diversified, interactive, yet visual culture:

a) The connection between the video-culture and people's social interaction must be made. A possible formula could be to connect the local TVs with community centers in which people gather to produce programs as well as to watch them, on the basis of a two-way interactive system. This formula obviously pre-supposes the existence of people's grassroots organization.

b) The connection between different local cable TV stations must be made. It could be accomplished by a combination of interactive systems between viewers and their station, and by a connection via intra-metropolitan satellite between stations made several times a week or on special occasions.

c) The connection between the national networks and local stations must be made. It could be realized by reserving some network programming time for production coming from local stations, and, on the other hand, by requiring local stations to connect with national networks (or to release their frequency for them) for the coverage of special events.

The techniques are diverse and can be easily adjusted. What matters is the basic purpose: to stimulate a powerful development of grassroots autonomous culture; to recognize the fact that such a culture in our society is audio-visual; to interconnect these cultural expressions to avoid tribalism; to organize connections among the major cultural senders to avoid localism; and finally, to introduce interactive systems at as many levels as possible to establish the two-way flow that is the material precondition of any process of communication.

Maybe then our cities and our neighborhoods will be able to overcome their isolation. At least, if public policies cannot create human emotion, they can let it flow under the conditions we specified. Such a set of new urban policies aimed at public services, grassroots communication networks and local self-government must be articulated with a parallel development of new regional policies that deal with the new spatial conditions of the process of production, and particularly with the international and inter-regional segmentation of such a process.

We must also start from the assumption that this situation will be a lasting tendency and that the problem must be handled correctly—not just by morally denouncing the behavior of the multinationals. Furthermore, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with industrializing the Third World, with increasing international competition, or with forcing outdated and

parasitic giant industries, such as that of the American automobile, to innovate and adapt to the new conditions of social values and energy resources. Since we are, and increasingly will be, in a world economy, it is inevitable that the process of production and distribution will expand across the planet by taking advantage of the new technologies of transportation and communication. It will be interesting to observe the restructuring of industries, organization, and power that such a process is going to produce in many countries. Perhaps there will be an increased chance for technological innovation, economic efficiency, and social change.

The major problem with the formation of a world wide productive space does not seem to be the phenomenon by itself but rather the fact that the de-spatialization of the process removes existing mechanisms of social control. In other words, the multinationals succeed in keeping the unity of management and the centralized control of capital flows, while fractioning work (and therefore workers), location (and therefore residential communities), markets (and therefore consumers) and states (and therefore political control). We have pointed out that the consequences of such a tendency can be tremendously disruptive both socially and politically, which, in the last analysis, would also lead to economic chaos and halt technological innovation. Economies and societies have to be re-connected if we want to manage the tensions in a creative manner, instead of trying to win a decisive edge over rivals, an edge that will plunge all of us into an abyss.

We need regional policies that, while keeping the productivity gains from a new spatial division of labor, will be able to establish new forms

of social control over the process of production, both in terms of an effective allocation of economic resources and, more important, in terms of an effective power of workers, citizens, and political institutions over economic organizations. This statement seems to be wishful thinking since it is difficult to imagine an effective international organization of labor and communities, and even less, a supra-national democratic state. Nevertheless, very often the possibility of social control over the operations of a multinational does exist, because local communities, organized labor or public authorities, in a particular region, can actually put decisive pressure on a particular company. The information about the connections between the local operations and the world network is generally missing. A relatively common strategy is also missing for labor and citizens who are spatially and culturally separated but economically and politically connected, through processes that they largely ignore. It is a major historical task to create institutions that collect and disseminate information on the new international division of labor, unite concerned social actors into the elaboration of common goals, and provide feasible alternatives of development which integrate economic efficiency and social well-being. Thus, technical and informational conditions for a renewed social control of the production process can be created at the international level, while the grassroots control and political implementation of this general strategy will be the result of national or regional initiative by existing organizations and institutions.(*). A new era of regional

(*)A very good example of the efforts to create new research-action bodies is the international group formed by automobile labor unions in Italy and the U.S., under the intellectual leadership of Paolo Ceccarelli and Ben Harrison.

policies has begun. It is up to us to recognize the transformation of the problematic and meet the challenge.

A similar effort of imagination must take place to face another major tendency of the new spatial division of labor, which is fundamentally altering the process of work and the organization of everyday life in our societies. At the same time that production is being internationalized, the process of work is shrinking in space and becoming domestic again. The development of the "informal economy" (basically, economic activities not regulated by the state) and its most important expression, work at home, is shaking the foundations of our social fabric. Here again, the prospects of economic evolution in the forthcoming years will tend to increase this phenomenon all over the world, since it represents the final consequence of the general crisis of the Welfare State. Meanwhile, the technological revolution that is underway will make it feasible to develop this tendency by decentralizing service jobs and linking them centrally through telecommunication. Thus, homework and the informal economy may foreshadow the next stage of capitalist rationality instead of being the remnants of small business that are surviving the crisis. No regional policy can ignore this phenomenon; to deny it will not eliminate the question. Once again, the crucial matter is to restore the social control of the process of work that is being lost under the present circumstances. The provision of social services and public health coverage to people working at home could be a device that would begin to regroup and organize these workers, while respecting their own specific conditions and the dynamics of their relationship to the productive process. The connection between home-workers, (informal) small business, and community residents, to define and control their local spatial development could give a social meaning to the

historical reunion of places of work and residence. The connection between women's services and organizations (including informal solidarity networks) and home-workers (most of them being women) could probably trigger the connection between women's issues and the new conditions of working women. In sum, new regional-metropolitan policies must recognize the reality of the informal economy, take advantage of the entrepreneurial skills being developed in it, push further the re-integration of work, residence and community, while re-organizing workers collectively and re-establishing social control over the productive process under the new historical conditions, that is, reconstructing and reinforcing the labor movement.

However superficial the level of these proposals might be for new urban-regional policies, our aim is to emphasize the need of recognizing the trends that are undermining our institutions and blurring the lines of social communication without necessarily bringing about social change. The new relationships between space and society could lead to the destruction of urban meaning and to the dissolution of cultures and regions into abstract flows of technocratic decisions. If this tendency continues, the emerging technocracy will have to act as an occupation army on the vast hinterland of the whole planet. Yet, to act against this tendency is not only a matter of resistance; it requires social mobilization and political will on the basis of the recognition of the actual historical tendencies and with the consideration of the real powers with whom we will have to bargain. If we succeed in turning the crisis into a process of change, it will not be the revolution of our dreams that historical experience has, in fact, turned into actual nightmares; it will be an experiment into new ways of work, consumption, and politics. We will not recover the lost paradise of a quality of life that never existed except for an aristocratic elite,

but we will control the development of a new history, based on the creative expression of a diversity of social actors, and on the dynamic management of the conflicts arising in the process. Maybe we will then be reaching the true quality of life: when life will be able to flow and irrigate our experience without fear and without limits.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a justification of such a strong statement, see: Manuel Castells, The Economic Crisis and American Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press, and Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
2. For a re-appraisal of current issues of metropolitan regions, see: Robert W. Burchell and David Listokin (editors), Cities Under Stress, Piscataway, N.J.: The Center for Urban Policy Research, 1981, for the U.S.; Michael Parloe and Elizabeth Le Bas (editors), City, Class and Capital, London: Edward Arnold, 1981 _____ for Europe; and F.H. Cardoso et aliter, Sao Paulo: Crescimento e Pobreza, Sao Paulo: Edicoes Loyola, 1975, for an example of the recent metropolitan process in newly industrialized countries.
3. La Question Urbaine, Paris: Maspero, 1972.
4. For a full development of this problematic, see my last book: M. Castells, The City and the Grass-roots, London: Edward Arnold, and Berkeley: University of California Press, 550 pages, forthcoming.
5. For a critique and an empirical analysis of this ideology see the doctoral thesis of my former student: Monique Dagnaud, Le mythe de la qualité de la vie et la politique urbaine en France, Paris: Mouton, 1976.
6. See: Peter Hall, The World Cities, London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1966; Peter Hall (editor) Europe 2000, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977; Ctis D. Duncan et aliter. Metropolis and Region,

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964.

7. See, for recent developments: George Sternlieb and James W. Hughes (eds.), Post-Industrial America: Decline and Inter-Regional Job Shifts, New Brunswick, NJ: Center for Urban Research, 1976.
8. See: David Harvey "The Political Economy of Urbanization in Advanced Capitalist Countries: The Case of the U.S." in Urban Affairs Annual Review, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975.
9. See the collection of essays edited by Larry Sawyers and William Tabb, Marxism and the Metropolis, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.
10. Manuel Castells, Crisis Urbana y Cambio Social, Madrid and Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1981.
11. M. Castells, City, Class and Power, London: MacMillan, 1978.
12. See John Mollenkopf, The North-East and the South-West: Paths Toward the Post-Industrial City, in R.W. Burchell and D. Listokin (eds.), op. cit., 1981.
13. An evolution that was foreseen, many years ago, by Richard Meier, A Communication Theory of Urban Growth, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1962.
14. Alvin Toffler, in a somewhat superficial but perceptive manner, has popularized these themes in his best-seller The Third Wave, New York: William Morrow and Co., 1980. A good simple description of the new technologies under way can be found in Adam Osborne, Running Wild. The Next Industrial Revolution, Berkeley: Osborne/McGraw Hill, 1979. For a broader view on the subject, see: James Martin, Telomatic

Society: A Challenge for Tomorrow, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981. For a preliminary assessment of the spatial impact of such a development, see: Thomas M. Stanback, Understanding the Service Economy. Employment, Productivity, Location, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. We also benefited for the analysis of the relationship between the new technologies and the process of spatial re-structuring, from oral presentations given by Ann Markusen, in her process of completing a major book on regional political economy.

15. As Roger Friedland explains in his analysis of American central cities, Class, Power, and the Central City, London: MacMillan, 1982.
16. A trend clearly appearing in the remarkable research monograph by Anna Lee Saxenian on the process of formation of the "Silicon Valley," the largest concentration of micro-electronics industry in the world, around Santa Clara (California) and Stanford University. See: Anna Lee Saxenian, Silicon Chips and Spatial Structure: The Industrial Basis of Urbanization in Santa Clara County, California, Unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of City Planning, U.C. Berkeley, 1980. In relationship to the more urban-oriented managerial and professional elite, such a cultural pattern seems to underlie the so-called "back to the city movement" that, in the United States, sees a tendency middle-class professionals to dwell in places of active urban life. See: D. Laska and R. Spain, Back to the City, New York: Pergamon Press, 1980.
17. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1977.

18. Business Week, July 27, 1981
19. Business Week, July 27, 1981, page 58.
20. See Stanback, op. cit., 1979;
21. See: Francoise Sabbah, A Communication Model for Citizen Participation, Department of Broadcasting and Communication Arts, San Francisco State University, 1981. on this subject, to Francoise Sabbah, from the Department of Broadcasting and Communication Arts, San Francisco State University.
22. See: Manuel Castells, The Economic Crisis and American Society, Princeton University Press, 1980.
23. See: Roger Alcala and David Mermelstein, op. cit., 1977.
24. See: for instance, Conference of Socialist Economists' State Group. Struggles Over the State. Cuts and Restructuring in Contemporary Britain, London: C.S.E. Books, 1979.
25. See: M. Castells "Immigrant Workers and Class Struggle," Politics and Society, 2, 1975. The analysis appears to be verified, in its main lines, for the United States in the statistical and historical research on immigration currently undertaken by Alejandro Portes, Professor of Sociology at Johns Hopkins University.
26. See: Stanley Aronowitz, False Promises, 1973.
27. See: Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe, London: Oxford University Press, 1973.

28. See: for instance: Michel Fourquet et al., Les équipements du pouvoir, Paris: Cerfi, Research Monograph, 1973; or: Lion Murard and Patrick Zylbermann, Ville, Habitat et Intimité, Paris: Cerfi, Research Report, 1976. The main theoretical inspiration of all this work comes from Michel Foucault, and most directly from his book Surveiller et Punir, Paris: Gallimard, 1975.
29. See: Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, Boston: Beacon Hill, 1973.
30. See: Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington, J. Watanuk, The Crisis of Democracies. Report on the Governability of Democracies, New York: Columbia University Press, 1975.
31. For instance, in the experience of the "Christiania" commune we observed, located in the core of Copenhagen, in the buildings formally occupied by the Army. Or, in the powerful movements of squatters in Holland. See, for instance: Gerard Anderiesen, "Tanks in the Streets: the Growing Conflict Over Housing in Amsterdam," in International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 5, N. 1, March 1981.
32. See Margit Mayer "Urban Squatters in Germany," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, forthcoming.
33. See: Manuel Castells, "Local Government, Urban Crisis and Political Change," in Political Power and Social Theory, A Research Annual, Volume 2, 1981 (Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press). See also Rafaella Nanetti, Citizen Participation and Neighborhood Councils in Bologna. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1977.

34. See Judith De Neufville, Social Indicators and Public Policy. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1975.
35. Particularly on the basis of the research conducted by Agnes Heller and by Paul-Henry Chombart-De-Lauwe.
36. See for instance different articles on the subject published during these last years by the journal, Inchiesta (Bologna).
37. On this major theme of the new relationship between political parties and social movements, see: Alain Touraine, L'Après-socialisme. Paris: Grasset, 1980.
38. Our reflection on the current developments of the State has been helped by the reading of the manuscript of the new book by Martin Carnoy: The State: Theories for a New Society, forthcoming. He develops the line of thinking opened by Nicos Poulantzas in his last book: L'Etat, le Pouvoir, le Socialisme. Paris: P.U.F., 1978.
39. There are obviously courageous urban researchers trying to work in this direction. See for instance: Norman Glickman, "Emerging Urban Policies in a Slow-Growth Economy," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 5,4, 1981. See also the work by William Goldsmith, Pierre Clavel, Ben Harrison, Ray Pahl, Paolo Ceccarelli, Giuseppe Campos Venuti, etc.
40. See, for instance: Gian Franco Elia, La Partecipazione Tradita. Milano: Sugarco, 1977; Cossutta et al., Decentramento e Partecipazione, Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1977; E. Bettinelle, E. Renzi et al., Alternativa ed elementi di socialismo nelle comunità locali. Milano:

Feltrinelli, 1977.

41. M. Castells, "Local Government, Urban Crisis and Political Change," in Political Power and Social Theory, Vol. 2, 1981.
42. See: Collective Author, I Consigli di Quartiere. Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1973.
43. I have myself formulated a detailed model of citizen participation in a paper prepared at the request of the City of Madrid: M. Castells, Bases Teoricas y Metodologicas para la Participacion Ciudadana, Gerencia de Urbanismo, Ayuntamiento de Madrid, December 1978.
44. See, for instance: Franco Ferraresi and Pietro Kemeny, Classi Sociali e Politica Urbana: destra e sinistra nelle amministrazioni locali. Roma: Cfficina Edizioni, 1977.
45. Remember the arguments by Giuseppe Campos Venuti in Urbanistica e Austerita. Milano: Feltrinelli, 1978. See also: Pierre Clavel, John Forester, William W. Goldsmith (editors) Urban and Regional Planning in an Age of Austerity. New York: Pergamon Press, 1980.