

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

**Contesting Citizenship: Race, Gender, and the Politics of Participation
in the U.S. and Japanese Welfare States, 1962-1982**

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in
History

by
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Contesting Citizenship:

Race, Gender, and the Politics of Participation in the U.S. and Japanese Welfare States,
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Contesting Citizenship compares African American welfare activism in Los Angeles with the *zainichi* Korean battles for welfare rights in Kawasaki during the 1960s and 1970s. A comparison of these two struggles affords us unique insights into the contested nature of citizenship during the period of welfare state expansion in the U.S. and Japan.

It investigates both institutional discourses and the ways in which they were challenged by grass-roots organizations. It puts the case of the American Community

Action Program (CAP), a core program of President Lyndon B. Johnson's "War on Poverty," in a transnational context by introducing the case of the Japanese Model Community Program (MCP). Both CAP and MCP were political responses to perceived national "crises" brought about by social movements in the 1960s. Also, both programs produced gendered and racialized notions of citizenship and "community." Nevertheless, CAP and MCP yielded different results for black Angelenos and Kawasaki Koreans, respectively. In CAP, the idea of the program as a vehicle for fostering the participation of African Americans and the "poor," coexisted with the notion that "maximum feasible participation" would simply be a symbolic gesture. Black Angelenos took advantage of this ambiguous aspect of CAP. Once the programs were initiated, they fought to transform the concept of "maximum feasible participation" into a pathway through which new political opportunities could be pursued. The MCP, on the other hand, became an apparatus in recreating a racialized national orthodoxy. While the Japanese government utilized citizenship as an excuse to deny former colonial subjects access to the expanding welfare state, Kawasaki Koreans asserted their citizenship rights in the fields of welfare and education. Furthermore, antiracist networking with African American church leaders had empowered Kawasaki Koreans to contest the narrow definition of citizenship in postwar Kawasaki and Japan.

African Americans and *zainichi* Koreans stood at the center of debates about citizenship and welfare during an era of massive welfare expansion. I argue that the scholarship on the welfare state must register the agency of subjugated individuals, and locate them as historical actors in the formation of welfare programs and policy.

Introduction

On April 3, 1966, three hundred and fifty people gathered to protest the dismissal of an African American social worker and activist named Opal C. Jones from her position as the executive director of the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project (NAPP), one of the most popular and influential anti-poverty programs in Los Angeles.¹ In the operation of its programs, NAPP aimed at providing training and employment opportunities for adults, as well as making the voices of “the poor” heard. Jones worked closely with African American politicians like Augustus Hawkins, who was elected to the U.S. Congress in 1962, and Thomas Bradley, who won the election for city council in the following year. Together with black politicians, activists, and her black and brown colleagues, Jones carried on the struggle against the official community action agency, the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles (EYOA). Jones demanded that the EYOA incorporate voices from the “poor” into the program. Yet, as she became a “principal watchdog of the representation of the poor,” she also became a political threat to the EYOA and city hall.² At the demonstration, protestors rallied to

¹ Memo, Paul Weeks to Edgar May, 3 April 1966, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1966 – May 1966,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Paul Weeks to Marvin R. Fullmer, 7 April 1966, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1966 – May 1966,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Paul Weeks to Edgar May, 25 April 1966, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1966 – May 1966,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Dick Fullmer and C. B. Patrick to Edgar May, 27 April 1966, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1966 – May 1966,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; “Negro Elected Officials Want Opal Jones Back,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 28 April 1966.

² “Los Angeles Report based on trip, February 26-27,” undated (1965), File “Los

Jones, demanding her reinstatement. Armed with the “maximum feasible participation” clause of the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, they also insisted on their economic, education, and welfare rights --- not only *de jure* but also *de facto* rights to participate and enjoy the benefits of the expanding American welfare state.

Almost seven years later, on April 28, 1974, Kawasaki Koreans gathered in support of Park Chong-Seuk, who filed a lawsuit against a Japanese electronics company, Hitachi, which dismissed him due to his ethnic origin.³ After four years of struggles, Park and his supporters were about to win a major victory over Hitachi, thus setting in motion an epoch-making trial in the history of the *zainichi* Koreans’ battle for citizenship.⁴ African American leaders gave Park and his supporters financial and moral

Angeles (EYOA), January 1965 - March 1965,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives.

³ Iwabuchi Hideyuki, “Kawasaki shi ni okeru zainichi gaikokujin kyōiku to Seikyūsha,” in *Tomoni ikiru: Seikyūsha sōritsu 20 shūnen kinen*, ed. Seikyūsha (Kawasaki city: Seikyūsha 1985), 29; Kanagawa Shinbunsha Shakaibu, *Nihon no naka no gaikokujin: Hitosashi yubi no jiyū o motomete* (Yokohama: Kanagawa Shinbunsha, 1985), 183-184.

⁴ “*Zainichi*” means “resident in Japan.” As Erin Aeran Chung suggests, there are several ways of naming Koreans in Japan, reflecting divisions among Koreans by national identities (Japanese/North Korean/South Korean), regional ties (the Kansai and Kanto regions in Japan and the Kyongsang, Cholla, and Cheju regions in Korea), class, and generations. Some Koreans prefer calling themselves according to their nationalities, *zainichi Kankokujin* (South Korean) or *zainichi Chōsenjin* (North Korean). Others just use the abbreviation “*zainichi*” or “*zainichi* Koreans” because of its neutrality and reference to Koreans as an ethnic group. In this dissertation, I use “*zainichi*” or “(resident) Koreans in Japan.” Following Fukuoka Yasunori’s study, I define “*zainichi*” as (1) ethnic Koreans who came to Japan before or during WWII and have lived in Japan ever since, (2) their offspring who have been born and raised in Japan and regard Japan as their permanent place of residence. See Erin Aeran Chung, “Exercising Citizenship: Koreans Living in Japan,” *Asian Perspectives* 24, no. 4 (2000), 163-164; Fukuoka Yasunori, *Lives of Young Koreans in Japan*, trans. Tom Gill (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2000), 271.

support. Moreover, black liberation struggles and theology offered a significant framework for constructing their own challenge to narrow definitions of citizenship. At the gathering, some of the participants questioned why *zainichi* Koreans were denied the right to apply for the city's allowance for dependent children. Other attendants nodded in agreement: why were they --- former colonial subjects and their descendants --- classified as "non-citizens" and stripped of their welfare rights? In fact, they were about to initiate a long struggle for education and welfare rights, searching for their rights as citizens in the expanding Japanese welfare state.

This dissertation investigates how African American activists in Los Angeles and *zainichi* Korean activists in Kawasaki forcefully challenged the official welfare institutions that attempted to produce racialized and gendered notions of citizenship. It investigates both institutional discourses and the ways in which they were problematized by grass-roots organizations. A comparison of the African American and *zainichi* Korean struggles for welfare rights during the 1960s and 1970s affords us unique insights into the contested nature of citizenship during the period of welfare state expansion.

The Community Action Program (CAP), along with its famous and controversial goal to secure the "maximum feasible participation" of residents, was created as a core program of President Lyndon B. Johnson's "War on Poverty." The "War on Poverty" was officially launched in August 1964 with the signing of the Economic Opportunity Act and the establishment of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The "War on Poverty" created and administered many kinds of novel programs, but CAP, designed to "help urban and rural communities to coordinate and mobilize their resources to combat

poverty,” was its most important and unique feature. CAP established more than one thousand Community Action Agencies and required the involvement not only of representatives of public and private agencies involved in anti-poverty programs, but also representatives of “the poor” themselves in policy planning and execution.⁵ This dissertation first examines the question of CAP’s origins and analyzes how CAP was created based on racialized and gendered definitions of community and citizenship. It explores the shifting and dynamic processes in which CAP, especially its famous and controversial goal to secure the maximum feasible participation of “the poor,” was conceived by a taskforce for the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964.

I then put the case of the Community Action Program in a transnational context by introducing the case of the Model Community Program (*Moderu komyunitī jigyo*) in Japan in comparison with CAP. A group of Japanese scholars turned their attention to CAP and its participatory schemes in recreating national communities in the early 1970s. Similar discourses concerning the participation of residents in welfare policies were employed for different ends in two national settings. A comparison of the two programs shows how the U.S. and Japanese governments created “community” programs in order

⁵ The Economic Opportunity Act consisted of six sections: Youth Programs (Title I), Urban and Rural Community Action Programs (Title II), Special Programs to Combat Poverty in Rural Areas (Title III), Employment and Investment Incentives (Title IV), Work Experience Programs (Title V), Administration and Coordination (Title VI). 78 Stat. 508. Office of Economic Opportunity, *Catalog of Federal Programs for Individual and Community Improvement* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1965); Office of Economic Opportunity, *Community Action Program Guide: Instructions for Developing, Conducting, and Administering a Community Action Program, as Authorized by Sections 204 and 205 of Title II-A, Economic Opportunity Act of 1964* (Washington, D.C.:GPO, 1965), 7.

to deal with perceived national “crises” brought about by social movements in the 1960s and the 70s.

Finally, I consider African American activists in Los Angeles and Korean activists in Kawasaki, and analyze how they appropriated these welfare programs, invested them with new definitions, and transformed them into vehicles for social change. By providing a significant critique of both national and local welfare systems, these activists refashioned the meaning of “community” and citizenship. I attempt to show the ways in which race, class, and gender intersected in the careers of local welfare activists in a period of massive liberal reform in the United States and Japan.

The dissertation also explores the dynamic connection that existed between two types of activism. Transnational networks with black church leaders in the U.S. offered a significant framework through which Korean activists in Japan could challenge limited notions of citizenship in the early 1970s. By examining the interactions and exchanges between black leaders in the U.S. and Korean activists in Japan, I argue that a transnational interethnic anti-racism network enabled a subjugated people to voice alternative visions of citizenship.

My dissertation covers two decades of welfare state expansion in the U.S. and Japan.⁶ While my dissertation’s analysis of CAP in the U.S. and the black Angeleno

⁶ In the U.S., the “Great Society” programs launched by the Johnson administration greatly expanded the preexistent welfare state. While the Social Security Act and other New Deal programs laid the groundwork for American welfare policies in the 1930s, the “Great Society” programs not only extended social services and increased government social spending, but also linked the welfare state with the pursuit of racial equality during the 1960s and early 70s. Michael B. Katz has summarized the impact this “improvement and extension of social welfare” had on the “poor” and African Americans

struggles over citizenship focuses on the 1960s and the early 70s, its discussion of MCP in Japan and the Kawasaki Korean pursuit for citizenship rights centers on the period between the late 1960s and the early 1980s. This time gap reflects the differences in the height of each program's activism. As I will discuss at greater length, however, there was another reason for this time gap. Both at the levels of policymaking and grassroots activism, Japanese policymakers and Korean activists learned from struggles in the U.S., and sought to turn these lessons to their advantage.

Politics of Participation in Community Action Program in the U.S.

thus: “new expanded government programs, much more than economic growth, reduced poverty, hunger, malnutrition, and disease; increased the access of the poor to important social services; lowered barriers to political participation; employment, housing, and education for black Americans.” In a similar fashion to the U.S., the 1960s and early 70s were times of massive welfare expansion in Japan. By the mid-1960s, the government established both national health insurance and a national pension system. In addition, it enacted three new acts: The Intellectually-Disabled Welfare Law (1960), the Elderly Law (1963), and the Maternal, Child, and Widow Welfare Law (1964). Along with three older acts legislated in the 1940s and 50s (The Living Protection Law, which was originally enacted in 1946 and revised in 1950, the Child Welfare Law of 1947, and the Physically-Disabled Welfare Law of 1949) it established the “six welfare acts” regime. As I explain in Chapter 2, with pressure from residents' movements and “progressive” mayors and governors, government social spending continued to increase. Yet as the so-called oil shock hit the economy and the time of high economic growth screeched to a halt in 1973, the administration headed by Tanaka Kakuei reversed its position, emphasizing the importance of “people's individual efforts, families, and communities,” rather than government spending, in social welfare. Michael B. Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America, Revised and Updated* (New York: Basic Books), 263; Furukawa Koujun, “Shakai fukushi no kakudai to dōyō: 70 nendai no dōkō sobyō,” in *Shakai fukushi no gendaiteki tenkai: Kōdo seichō ki kara tei seichō ki e*, ed. Nihon shakai jigyō daigaku (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1986), 19-36; Shimoebisu Miyuki, “Kazoku seisaku no rekishiteki tenkai: Ikuji ni taisuru seisaku taiō no henshen,” in *Gendai kazoku to shakai hoshō*, ed. Shakai Hoshō Kenkyūjo (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), 257; Jimi Kim, *Fukushi kokka taisei kakuritsu ki ni okeru jichitai fukushi seisaku katei* (Tokyo: Kōjinsha, 2006), 59.

Scholars have debated what the Community Action Program, especially its famous phrase, “maximum feasible participation,” signified. Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act specified that CAP could be administered by either a public or private nonprofit agency but that it must be “developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served.”⁷ Daniel P. Moynihan, the former assistant secretary of the Department of Labor, contended that the inclusion of the phrase “maximum feasible participation” in CAP was nothing but an accident and a misunderstanding. Moynihan joined the task force for the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964. He subsequently argued that it was a small number of idealistic social reformers who gave CAP a structure that “neither those who drafted it, those who sponsored it, nor those who enacted it ever in any way intended.” Moynihan stressed that the “maximum feasible participation” phrase was designed simply to “ensure [that] persons excluded from the political process in the South and elsewhere would nonetheless participate in the *benefits*.” In his view it was not meant to mobilize the “poor” as agents in social policy.⁸

⁷ 78 Stat. 508. In 1966 the Economic Opportunity Act was amended to specify the role of the “poor” in the programs. It required that “the poor” should comprise at least a third of the Community Action Agency board’s membership and representatives of the “poor” should live in the area they represented and be selected by the residents in areas of concentration of poverty. 80 Stat. 1457. The 1967 Green amendment gave control of CAP to public officials by stating that local governments had the responsibility of establishing community action agencies and that a third of the board members were to be public officials. 81 Stat. 691 and 693.

⁸ Daniel P. Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 86-87, 98; Paul E. Peterson and J. David Greenstone, “Racial Change and Citizen Participation: The Mobilization of Low-Income Communities through Community Action,” in *A Decade of Federal*

Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, along with David Zarefsky, have challenged Moynihan's view and claimed that CAP was a political strategy developed by the Democratic Party. They argued that leading Democratic party officials created CAP in order to deal with "the political problems created by a new and unstable electoral constituency, namely blacks." These Democratic leaders believed that CAP could offer a way to "prod the local Democratic party machinery to cultivate the allegiance of urban black voters" by providing a greater share of services to them, and "to do this without alienating urban white voters." In other words, Piven and Cloward understood the "War on Poverty" programs administered through CAP as an apparatus designed to conceal the Democrats' political goal of appealing to an urban African American constituency.⁹ Zarefsky emphasized the importance of urban African American voters for the Democratic party as well. He argued that the Democrats attempted to solidify the loyalty of urban African Americans by making them "the beneficiaries of federal largesse."¹⁰ Far from arguing that CAP came to embrace a characteristic nobody in the taskforce originally intended, Piven and Cloward, along with Zarefsky, stressed that the Democratic party leaders created CAP and the "War on Poverty" in order to accumulate urban African American votes.

Antipoverty Programs: Achievements, Failures, and Lessons, ed. Robert H. Haveman (New York: Academic Press, 1977), 249-251.

⁹ Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: the Functions of Public Welfare* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), 249, 254-256; David Zarefsky, *President Johnson's War on Poverty: Rhetoric and History* (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1986), 27-28.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Since the publication of Piven and Cloward's analysis of the "War on Poverty," several studies have attempted to explore the origins of that "war" from different perspectives. According to David J. Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, Jill Quadagno, Nancy Naples, and Kent B. Germany, what needs to be examined is not the intention of the Democratic Party but the results CAP produced. These scholars have emphasized the crucial connections between CAP and the fight for racial and gender equality. They have shown how CAP became a vehicle for social change, fostering the political participation of people of color (especially African Americans) and women in local politics.¹¹

¹¹ Greenstone and Peterson, for example contended that the participation of "the poor" through CAP helped African Americans and other people of color participate in local politics and develop community organizations. Quadagno emphasizes, as do Greenstone and Peterson, the results of the CAP rather than its origins. Whereas Quadagno agrees with Piven and Cloward that African American migrants from the South posed "a political problem" for the Democrats, she argues that the debate about origins obscures "the crucial linkages" that developed between the "War on Poverty" and the civil rights movement once the programs began. Quadagno emphasizes that the civil rights movement subsumed programs targeting the "poor," particularly the African American "poor." Naples explores the role of gender and women's involvement during the operation of CAP. By closely examining how women working in CAP developed their careers and fought inequality and discrimination, Naples has demonstrated the ways in which race, class, and gender were intertwined in CAP workers' political biographies. Germany explores the connections between the southern civil rights movement and the "War on Poverty," especially the Community Action Program. He stresses the fact that CAP injected local African Americans into the Great Society framework, providing them with "long-term structure to the fight for equality and access." J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, *Race and Authority in Urban Politics: Community Participation and the War on Poverty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973); Peterson and Greenstone, 254-255; Jill Quadagno, *The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 27-28; Jill Quadagno, "Promoting Civil Rights through the Welfare State: How Medicare Integrated Southern Hospitals," *Social Problems* 47, no. 1 (February, 2000): 68-89; Nancy A. Naples, *Grassroots Warriors: Activist Mothering, Community Work, and the War on Poverty* (New York: Routledge, 1998); Kent B. Germany, *New Orleans after the Promises: Poverty, Citizenship, and the Search for the Great Society* (Athens: University of Georgia

Barbara Cruikshank challenges Piven and Cloward's study in a different way. For Cruikshank, it is the participation of the "poor" in federal welfare programs itself that should be carefully examined. Cruikshank insists that, whether Democratic leaders created CAP with such an intention or not, democratic self-government was still a mode of exercising power. Power, in her view, only works by requiring the active participation of the "poor" in programs on the local level, programs that transform the "poor" into "self-sufficient, active, productive, and participatory citizens." These "technologies of citizenship" are the means by which "government works *through* rather than against the subjectivities of citizens," and can be traced back to the "War on Poverty" programs of the 1960s. In other words, Cruikshank argues that the participation of the "poor" in the decision-making processes itself was a strategy of the government to transform them into productive and useful citizens.¹²

These studies made important contributions toward the reinterpretation of CAP, yet they also leave room for further critiques and analysis. This dissertation adds three critical perspectives by investigating the racialized and gendered characteristics of the welfare state, incorporating transnational perspectives into the study of U.S. welfare policies, and registering the agency of welfare activists at the local level.

Racialized and Gendered Characteristics of Citizenship

Press, 2007), 97-103.

¹² Barbara Cruikshank, *The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 1-5, 69.

First, instead of locating racism and sexism “within and subordinate” to class dynamics in significance, this dissertation will place emphasis on the role played by race and gender in the Community Action Program.¹³ There has been a significant number of studies exploring the issues of race and gender in U.S. welfare programs. Theda Skocpol, for example, was among the first scholars to analyze in detail how gender was central to the development of the American welfare state. In *Protecting Mothers and Soldiers*, Skocpol argues that the United States did not follow other Western nations on the road toward a paternalist welfare system. Instead, America instituted a “maternalist welfare state,” with female-dominated public agencies implementing regulations and benefits for the good of women and their children. According to Skocpol, middle-class women played a pivotal role in securing social spending for mothers and protecting labor regulations for women workers.¹⁴

While Skocpol’s analysis of differences between paternalist and maternalist

¹³ Kenneth J. Neubeck and Noel A. Cazenave, *Welfare Racism: Playing the Race Card against America’s Poor* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 17-18.

¹⁴ Skocpol argues that, whereas very little paternalist labor legislation was passed in the early twentieth-century, the story was different when it came to what might be called “maternalist” legislation. Most states enacted restrictions on women’s hours of employment, minimum-wage laws and special safety regulations for mothers’ pensions. The U.S. federal government established a Children’s Bureau, and created federally subsidized clinics to disseminate health-care advice to mothers. Skocpol contends that the answer to this question lies in the “heights of social organization, ideological self-consciousness, and political mobilization achieved by American middle-class women (317-318).” The widespread, gender-specific women’s organizations of the turn of the century succeeded in extending woman’s influence into the public realm by “building upon the concept of separate spheres (340).” Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), x, iv, 2-5, 317-318, 340.

welfare policies certainly provides a vantage point for viewing variations among welfare states, several scholars have challenged her thesis, arguing that it analyzes gender relations from the viewpoints of middle-class, native-born, women. For example, Gwendolyn Mink and Molly Ladd-Taylor pay closer attention to racial and class aspects of middle-class women's activities in the early twentieth-century. Instead of emphasizing the "universal" interests that women shared across race and class as Skocpol does, Mink and Ladd-Taylor argue that its appeal cannot be understood apart from the white Protestant alarm over "race suicide" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. They contend that early-twentieth-century "maternalist" legislation can not be separated from the racial and class anxieties of reformers.¹⁵

Far from relegating issues of race to the margin, several scholars stress that race relations have played a critical role in the development of the U.S. welfare state. Jill

¹⁵ Gwendolyn Mink argues that the socialization of motherhood found its logic in the prevailing gender ideology and found its force in the "race anxieties of what was white men's democracy." Mink contends that a woman was assigned a weighty political significance as the "guardian of male virtue and reproducer of the (white) republican order." According to Mink, what was distinctive about the American pattern was that "it was drawn by race and mediated by gender." Molly Ladd-Taylor joins Mink in her attention to racial and class aspects of "maternalist" activities. See Gwendolyn Mink, "The Lady and the Tramp: Gender, Race, and the Origins of the American Welfare State," in *Women, the State, and Welfare*, ed., Linda Gordon (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 93, 97, 99; Gwendolyn Mink, *The Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare State, 1917-1942* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Gwendolyn Mink, *Feminism and Inequality* (New York: Routledge, 2008); Molly Ladd-Taylor, *Mother-Work: Women, Child Welfare, and the State, 1890-1930* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994). Rebecca Jo Plant explains how the cultural basis which supported these maternalist activities had eroded after World War I and had finally collapsed when the nation entered World War II. See Rebecca Jo Plant, "The Repeal of Mother Love: Momism and the Reconstruction of Motherhood in Philip Wylie's America" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2002), 9.

Quadagno analyzes why the U.S. failed to develop a more generous welfare state, compared to European countries. Quadagno critiques studies of “American exceptionalism” for paying insufficient attention to “a key ingredient --- race,” by arguing that the means-tested programs of the American welfare state had less to do with maintaining class divisions than with maintaining racial segregation. Quadagno contends that the core issue is “how working-class politics have been weakened by racial divisions, both in the workplace and in the community.”¹⁶ Neubeck and Cazenave also emphasize the role of “welfare racism” in the U.S. welfare state. They criticize scholars of U.S. welfare policies for concluding that racism does not play a significant role in the formation and implementation of welfare policy in the United States. Neubeck and Cazenave assert that a “racism-centered approach” enables one to understand how nation states, along with other institutions such as mass media, have historically supported white racial hegemony through welfare policy. They attempt to overcome the politics of denial regarding racial oppression and place the problem of welfare racism at the center of welfare policy discourse.¹⁷

¹⁶ Quadagno, *The Color of Welfare*, 7-9.

¹⁷ Kenneth J. Neubeck and Noel A. Cazenave, vi, vii, 12. David Theo Goldberg pays close attention to a shift in state technologies of racial rule. Goldberg argues that from the late nineteenth century on, there is something distinctively new in the manifestation of whiteness. With abolition and the changed conditions it represents, confidence in the positions of whites waned. In the face of these challenges, whiteness no longer could be so safely assumed, white superiority so easily taken as a given of nature. Whiteness, in short, needed to be “renegotiated, re-affirmed, projected anew.” Goldberg stresses that it was from this moment that the state explicitly, deliberately, and calculatingly took the lead in “orchestrating the various instrumentalities in the definition and materialization of whiteness.” By providing a complex, sophisticated, and dynamic analysis regarding the role of the modern states, Goldberg maintains that race was inseparable from the

These studies that explored the development of U.S. welfare policies have thus shown how race and gender have played a pivotal role in the history of the U.S. welfare state. What needs to be examined, then, are the ways in which the “War on Poverty” programs, especially CAP, have produced racialized and gendered, as well as class-specific, meanings of citizenship. Chapter 1 provides a detailed analysis of the ways in which CAP and its doctrine of the “maximum feasible participation” of the “poor” emerged in the early 1960s. I examine how the discourses of “cultural deprivation” colored the creation of CAP.¹⁸ I also explore how CAP and the War on Poverty became part of America’s cold war strategies and proof of America’s dedication to equality and justice.¹⁹ I argue that the “War on Poverty” programs defined women’s roles in the programs in volunteer terms, stressing their support roles, not their leadership roles. Finally, the “War on Poverty” muted the question of race, rather than linking the issue of racial inequality with the problem of poverty. In other words, policy makers avoided mentioning racism as a cause of poverty explicitly. Policy makers who created CAP were divided as to the extent to which “the poor” and people of color were to be

emergence, development, and transformation of modernism and liberalism. David Theo Goldberg, *The Racial State* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 175-176.

¹⁸ Alice O’Connor has shown how theories of cultural deprivation became a theoretical foundation for the “War on Poverty.” Alice O’Connor, *Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse*, 264.

¹⁹ Michael Bernstein, *A Perilous Progress: Economists and Public Purpose in Twentieth-Century America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 248. See also Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).

incorporated into state programs. Consequently, the original concept of CAP was caught between schemes of inclusion and exclusion.²⁰

The Creation of “National Communities”: Transnational Perspectives

CAP was not exceptional in producing racialized and gendered meanings of citizenship. While analyzing the processes surrounding the creation of CAP, this project introduces the case of the Model Community Program in Japan. By examining how the concepts of community action and resident participation were adopted for different purposes in Japan, as well as how they were colored by race and gender, my study locates the story of CAP in a broader transnational context.

There is a significant amount of literature on the welfare state in advanced capitalist societies. The “three worlds of welfare capitalism” thesis developed by Gosta Esping-Andersen is one of the most influential studies. It established contemporary typologies of welfare state regimes. According to Esping-Andersen, welfare states cluster around three ideal typical regime types, liberal, conservative, and social democratic.²¹ Esping-Andersen develops this typology of welfare regimes by using the

²⁰ O’Connor, 203-210.

²¹ First, there is the ‘liberal’ welfare state, which is dominated by the logic of the market. Here, benefits are modest, means-tested, and stigmatizing (typical examples are the U.S., Canada, and Australia). The second one is the conservative/ ‘corporatist’ welfare state, where the emphasis of social rights is upon upholding existing class and status differentials and where redistributive effects are ‘negligible.’ (typical examples are Austria, France, Germany, and Italy). Finally, there exists the ‘social democratic’ welfare state, which is envisaged as ‘a welfare state that would promote an equality of the highest standards, rather than an equality of minimal needs.’ Here the state is seen as the principal means of realizing the social rights of all its citizens (typical countries are

concept of “de-commodification.” He argues that the problem of commodification lay at the heart of Marx’s analysis of class development in the accumulation process: the transformation of independent producers into property-less wage-earners. He, then, introduces the concept of “de-commodification,” which refers to the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a “socially acceptable standard of living” independent of market participation. According to Esping-Andersen, “de-commodification” occurs when a service is rendered as a “matter of right,” and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market. By using the notion of “de-commodification,” Esping-Andersen argues that welfare states are not all of one type.²²

While Esping-Andersen’s thesis is foundational to the exploration of comparative welfare policies, there is still room for critique. Gendered and racialized aspects have been alienated from its paradigms.²³ Furthermore, by developing a typology, the “three worlds of welfare capitalism” thesis obscures the similarities that “different welfare

Sweden and Norway).

²² Gosta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 3-32, 37; Christopher Pierson, *Beyond the Welfare State?: The New Political Economy of Welfare* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 186-187.

²³ Esping-Andersen stresses that the history of “class coalitions” is the most decisive cause of welfare-state variations. He does not fully discuss how other significant factors, such as gender relations and processes of racialization, impacted the development/undevelopment of the welfare regimes. Nor does Esping-Andersen examine the everyday tactics of welfare activists at the local level. As I already discussed, many scholars argued that studying the racialized and gendered nature of U.S. welfare policies, as well as local activists’ grass-roots challenges to these policies, should be placed at the center of future research on the American welfare state.

regimes” may share. What needs to be examined is not only the differences among welfare capitalisms but also the similar techniques welfare capitalist countries employed in order to reconstruct the nation state. This project investigates how CAP in the U.S. and the Model Community Program in Japan represented each nation as a “national community,” and how these welfare programs produced racialized and gendered notions of citizenship. Etienne Balibar develops Benedict Anderson’s concept of the “imagined community” and explores the role played by the state in constructing the “imaginary singularity of national forms.” Balibar contends that the creation of the imagined community is based on the “projection of individual existence into the weft of a collective narrative, on the recognition of a common name and on traditions lived as the trace of an immemorial past.” According to Balibar, the fundamental question one needs to ask is what makes the people produce itself continually as “national community.” Balibar calls these state projects of creating imagined community the “delayed nationalization of society.”²⁴

Chapter 2, therefore, introduces the case of another country, namely Japan, as a

²⁴ Benedict Anderson critically examines how the nation came to be conceived as a “deep horizontal comradeship,” regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1989); Étienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology,” in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, eds. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1991), 92-93. In *We, the People of Europe?*, Balibar explores how the concepts of European citizenship should be reconstituted in an increasingly multiracial society. He stresses that in contemporary Europe, the “question of the interior exclusion of “immigrants” constitutes a genuine test of truth for the nation-form and for the “community of citizens” to which it gives a name.” See Étienne Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 61.

way to examine how different capitalist countries employed similar technologies regarding community action and citizen participation. It analyzes the ways in which the participatory schemes employed by one government existed in another country, but with different results.

Similar to CAP in the U.S., “communities” became the main target of social welfare enterprises in Japan in during late 1960s and early 1970s. In April 1971, the Ministry of Home Affairs initiated the “Model Community Program” (MCP), establishing community centers in 83 local areas by 1973. Other ministries followed the example of MCP, creating similar types of “community” programs.²⁵ The “community” approach acquired a cardinal significance in the expanding Japanese welfare state in the early 1970s. As I will discuss, it was not a mere coincidence that policies resembling “community programs” were created in Japan in the late 1960s and early 70s. Political scientists and sociologists affiliated with the Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs translated and implemented American technologies for the purpose of reconstructing “communities” during a period of a perceived national crisis. They reshaped these

²⁵ The Ministry of Health and Welfare established the Central Social Welfare Council in December 1971, and published a document titled “Community Formation and Social Welfare.” The Ministry of Education started improving the conditions of public halls (*kōminkan*), which were created in 1949 to encourage educational/art/cultural activities. The National Land Agency granted a subsidy to local governments in such places as depopulated areas, isolated islands, and heavy snowfall areas for the purpose of establishing “community centers” since 1971. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries has created a variety of centers (Mountain Village Development Centers, Centers for the Environmental Improvement of Rural Villages / Work Opportunities) since 1970. Finally the Ministry of Labor improved the conditions of the Centers for Working Women and Homes for Working Young People. See Matsubara Haruo, “Jichishō moderu komyunitī shisaku,” in *Komyunitī kenkyū hōkoku*, ed. Jichishō Komyunitī Kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Jichishō Komyunitī Kenkyūkai, 1977), 22-33.

technologies to suit different political ends in Japan.

Scholars in Japan have debated why local and national governments turned their attention to these “community programs” in the late 1960s. Furukawa Koujun discussed several reasons for the government’s interest in them including: the increasing attention to “new social welfare needs” (the elderly, disabled people, mothers, and children) along with the decreasing need for services for the unemployed during the boom years of Japan’s “Economic Miracle”; the collapse of traditional family and local networks brought about by a rapid increase in urban populations and the necessity of recreating the “community” from above; and the increase in welfare programs led by left-wing local government leaders who became influential in the 1960s. Furukawa explained that conservative politicians created these “community” programs in order to counteract locally initiated programs developed by left-wing governors and mayors.²⁶ Kawai Katsuyoshi and other scholars emphasized this third aspect of “dealing with the left-wing governors and mayors” by arguing that these “community” policies had particular political intentions, for instance, absorbing social movements that had succeeded in electing left-wing mayors and governors. In fact, so-called left-wing local governments rapidly increased in number from only ten in 1960 to more than one hundred in 1971.²⁷

²⁶ Furukawa Koujun, “Sengo Nihon ni okeru shakai fukushi s̄abisu no tenkai,” in *Fukushi kokka 6: Nihon no shakai to fukushi*, ed. Furukawa Koujun (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyūjo, 1985), 218-229.

²⁷ Kawai Katsuyoshi, “Chiiki fukushi no seisaku tenkai: Sengo Nihon no chiiki seisaku to chiiki fukushi,” in *Chiiki fukushi*, eds., Makisato Tsuneji, Noguchi Sadahisa, Kawai Katsuyoshi (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1995), 82-83. See also Hayase Noboru, “Fukushi to iu s̄ochi,” in *Ekkyo suru chi 4: S̄ochi - kowashi kizuku*, eds., Kurihara Akira, Komori Yoichi, Sato Manabu, and Yoshimi Shunya (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2000), 199-221.

The Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) created “community programs” to counter the ascendancy of residents’ movements as well as oppositional left-wing power. As Shimada Shuichi argues, residents’ movements --- which had expanded significantly since the 1960s, and had pressured the LDP into committing to issues like *kōgai* (environmental pollution), prices, and welfare --- exercised a huge influence on both national and local politics. According to Shimada, the Model Community Program was developed to deal with the Japanese people’s criticisms of increased social chaos brought about by the government’s policies of high economic growth. In other words, these programs were created to solve these problems by “promoting mutual understanding and cooperation among residents at the community level.” The program performed the function of “dividing and restraining a sense of rights and autonomy among residents,” so that the consciousness among residents would remain at the local level and not pressure the national government. Like CAP in the U.S., these policy makers and scholars regarded the Model Community Program as an apparatus designed to co-opt radical residents’ movements and transform them into “negotiable” local organizations.²⁸

Both “community programs” were initiated by the Japanese and American governments to counteract movements from below. In fact, as Alice O’Connor explains, OEO official John Wofford later noted that CAP was an attempt to “reach community

²⁸ Seven scholars in various fields such as public administration, sociology, urban engineering, and urban/rural planning constituted the Ministry of Home Affairs’ Community Study Group. Shimada Shuichi, “Chihō jichi to jūmin no shutai keisei,” *Kagaku to shisō* 32 (1979): 686-702; Sato Atsushi, “Jūmin undō to jichitai gyōsei” *Chiiki kaihatsu* 154 (1977): 43-55.

consensus at a time when race, politics and poverty were pulling communities and the nation apart.” I argue that “community action” programs in both countries can be understood as part of the larger movement towards state re-creation of the “national community,” and that it was a reaction to a perceived national “crisis” brought about by social movements in the 1960s.²⁹

By analyzing the official discourses on community action and resident participation in the U.S. and Japan, this project attempts to go beyond the paradigm of “American exceptionalism” and write a transnational history of the welfare state and grass-roots activism in welfare. Recently, many historians have begun to challenge the assumed centrality of the nation-state and stress the significance of transnational perspectives on U.S. history and the history profession itself.³⁰ By introducing the case

²⁹ Anderson; Balibar, “The Nation Form”; O’Connor, 164.

³⁰ Robin D. G. Kelley, “But a Local Phase of a World Problem”: Black History’s Global Vision,” *The Journal of American History* 86, no.3 (December, 1999): 1045-1077; David Thelen, “The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History,” *The Journal of American History* 86, no.3 (December, 1999): 965-975; See other articles in “The Nation and Beyond: A Special Issue” *The Journal of American History* 86, no. 3 (December, 1999); David W. Noble, *Death of a Nation: American Culture and the End of Exceptionalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Thomas Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Donald E. Pease and Robyn Wiegman, eds., *The Future of American Studies* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002); Thomas Bender, *A Nation among Nations: America’s Place in World History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006). As Robin D. G. Kelly has shown, incorporating a transnational perspective into the scholarship of African American history is not necessarily new. Many scholars have made efforts to narrate the experiences of African Americans in transnational terms since the late 19th century, firstly because the question of African American citizenship had not been resolved, and secondly, because these scholars were trying to resist the nationalist, racist narratives of the era by demonstrating the international implications of black struggles for freedom. Their attention to a transnational lens for understanding the experiences African Americans offered a critique of mainstream narratives of American history that upheld

of the Model Community Program in Japan in comparison with CAP, this project tries to overcome the paradigm of “exceptionalism” and interrogate how “different” welfare states employ similar techniques of producing racialized and gendered notions of citizenship.

Recasting welfare at the local level: Black Los Angeles and Korean Kawasaki

The complexity of race and gender relations in both U.S. and Japanese welfare policies, however, can not be fully understood without incorporating the experiences and the everyday tactics of welfare activists at the local level. This project focuses on the role played by these welfare activists in particular cities, African Americans in Los Angeles and Koreans in Kawasaki, and investigates how they appropriated CAP and MCP, and transformed them into vehicles for social change. It also shows how African American and Korean women became the vanguards of their races. It combines local stories --- the case of Los Angeles and Kawasaki in the late 1960s and the 70s --- with national and transnational debates.

There are two reasons why I focus on Los Angeles. The first reason is the impact of the 1965 Watts uprising on the “War on Poverty” programs. The Watts uprising, one of the most significant urban uprisings in twentieth-century America, shocked the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson and led to the organization of the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” task force as well as increases in federal

the idea of American exceptionalism.

anti-poverty funds coming into Los Angeles and other cities. Los Angeles became a city of special concern for the Johnson Administration. Therefore, Los Angeles provides an important case study for analyzing how African American activists recast anti-poverty programs by using funds available from the OEO.³¹

Moreover, Los Angeles was at the forefront of anti-poverty and racial liberation struggles, and a “local study” offers the benefit of observing how these programs operated at the grassroots level. This project emphasizes, as do earlier studies that explored race relations in 20th century Los Angeles, the question of race and its spatial dimensions in the history of the City of Angels.³² It examines how Los Angeles became

³¹ Studies of the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” through CAP have produced two interpretations. First, Dale Rogers Marshall participated in the board of the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles (EYOA) in 1968, and conducted interviews with the thirty-two board members. Marshall’s work is valuable since there are not many sources available today that focus on the EYOA board members. But her work concentrated on the impact of the participation of the “poor” on the EYOA board. Therefore, she did not examine how activists outside EYOA challenged the local and federal welfare agencies. Second, Robert Alan Bauman examined the history of the implementation of the “War on Poverty” in Los Angeles. He focused not only on the EYOA but also on the Watts Labor Community Action Committee, which was founded by labor unionists in the Watts area. Dale Rogers Marshall, “The Politics of Participation in Poverty: A Case Study of the Board of the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1969); Dale Rogers Marshall, *The Politics of Participation in Poverty: A Case Study of the Board of the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Robert Alan Bauman, “Race, Class, and Political Power: The Implementation of the War on Poverty in Los Angeles” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1998).

³² Regarding the history of black Los Angeles, see Lawrence B. De Graaf, “The City of Black Angeles: Emergence of the Los Angeles Ghetto, 1890-1930,” *Pacific Historical Review* 39, no.3 (August, 1970): 323-352; David O. Sears and John McConahay, *The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Lonnie G. Bunch, “A Past Not Necessarily Prologue: the Afro-American in Los Angeles,” in *20th Century Los Angeles: Power, Promotion, and Social Conflict*, eds. Norman M. Klein and Martin J. Schiesl (Claremont, California: Regina Books,

a remarkable and significant arena of struggle over the denotation of community and citizenship in postwar America.

The Los Angeles Community Action Program formally started soon after the Watts uprising in 1965. The central task force of the Los Angeles “War on Poverty,” the EYOA, was established in September 1965. In Chapter 3, I investigate how African American leaders forcefully challenged the city government and voiced alternative visions of citizenship in the early 1960s. More specifically, I examine how African American leaders insisted on the right to realize the participation of “the poor” in the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” by establishing their organization, the Economic Opportunity Federation, and providing opportunities for residents to join the Community Action Agency. I will demonstrate how these same individuals used the anti-poverty program

1990), 101-130; Lynell George, *No Crystal Stair: African-Americans in the City of Angeles* (London: Verso, 1992); Gerald Horne, *Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s* (1995, reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1997); Susan Anderson, “A City Called Heaven: Black Enchantment and Despair in Los Angeles,” in *The City: Los Angeles and Urban Theory at the End of the Twentieth Century*, eds. Allen J. Scott and Edward W. Soja (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 336-364; Lawrence B. De Graaf, Kevin Mulroy, and Quintard Taylor, eds., *Seeking Eldorado: African Americans in California* (Los Angeles: Autry Museum of Western Heritage in association with University of Washington Press, 2001); Becky M. Nicolaides, *My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920-1965* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002); Josh Sides, *L.A. City Limits: African American Los Angeles from the Great Depression to the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Daniel Widener, “Something Else: Creative Community and Black Liberation in Postwar Los Angeles,” (Ph. D. diss., New York University, 2003); Regina Freer, “L.A. Race Woman: Charlotta Bass and the Complexities of Black Political Development in Los Angeles,” *American Quarterly*, Special Issue (Los Angeles and the Future of Urban Cultures) 56, no. 3 (September, 2004): 607-632; Douglas Flamming, *Bound for Freedom: Black Los Angeles in Jim Crow America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); João H. Costa Vargas, *Catching Hell in the City of Angeles: Life and Meanings of Blackness in South Central Los Angeles* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).

as a way to politically confront Mayor Samuel Yorty and other government officials who sought to secure control of the anti-poverty programs at the expense of poor people themselves. These black leaders refashioned the principle of “maximum feasible participation” that had been the foundation of original anti-poverty legislation. I contend that these efforts resulted in a change in the political status of African American residents in Los Angeles.

In Chapter 4, I focus on the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project (NAPP), which became a major point of contestation regarding the participation of “the poor,” people of color, and women in the Los Angeles Community Action Program. It was one of a few programs targeted at adults, and was directed by a female African American social worker, Opal C. Jones. Through NAPP, Jones attacked racial discrimination, criticized middle-class “experts” for muting the voices of “the poor,” and contested notions of what constituted “appropriate female roles,” which were held by the federal anti-poverty agency (OEO), and the Los Angeles Community Action Agency (EYOA). Moreover, Jones constituted a challenge to the EYOA’s perception of the programs as being dominated by the local anti-poverty agency rather than the local residents. I argue that Jones transformed the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project into something sharply different from the project originally set up by the OEO or the EYOA, into a weapon in a battle over the right to determine the meaning of “maximum feasible participation” and welfare.

I then examine two organizations which sought to foster the political participation of the “poor” in Watts neighborhood, and addressed the inadequacies of the welfare

system: the Watts Labor Community Action Committee (WLCAC), and the Aid to Needy Children (ANC) Mothers Anonymous. I pay particular attention to activists Ted Watkins of the WLCAC and Johnnie Tillmon of ANC Mothers Anonymous, who played critical roles in each organization.

The WLCAC was organized early in 1965 by labor-union members living in the Watts area, with financial support from the OEO, the AFL-CIO, and the Department of Labor. The WLCAC emerged from the campaign to bring a hospital to Watts. I will analyze how these unionists in the WLCAC created oppositional discourses against negative representations of Watts and refashioned the “War on Poverty” to bring the programs closer to the residents in the neighborhoods. I will also examine the criticism the WLCAC received from within South Central.

Johnnie Tillmon established one of the first organizations created by and for welfare recipients in the nation, the ANC Mothers Anonymous, in 1963. Tillmon fought for both “decent jobs with adequate pay” and adequate income to support the lives of welfare recipients. Tillmon joined the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project, and through NAPP, she found a new opportunity. She expanded her activism from the local level to the national level, from ANC Mothers Anonymous in Watts to the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) in Washington, D.C. In both ANC Mothers Anonymous and the NWRO, Tillmon struggled to establish a system that guaranteed women’s autonomy in decision-making and controlling their own lives--- whether they preferred working outside the house, remaining at home to devote themselves to

child-rearing and housework, or both.³³ The examples of Ted Watkins and Johnnie Tillmon show how African American activists in Watts interpreted the “maximum feasible participation” concept, and redefined it to suit their needs.

Rethinking the rise of African American political power in Los Angeles leads to the reassessment of the meaning of postwar American cities. Scholars have debated why American cities became entangled with numerous social and economic “crises,” such as poverty, unemployment, and residential segregation. These studies offer a very significant framework within which to understand the reconfiguration of the ghettos in postwar urban America.³⁴ As Heather Ann Thompson has explained, however, urban

³³ Regarding the NWRO, see Lawrence Bailis, *Bread or Justice: Grassroots Organizing in the Welfare Rights Movement* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972); Nick Kotz and Mary Lynn Kotz, *A Passion for Equality: George A. Wiley and the Movement* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977); Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (1977; reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1979); Guida West, *The National Welfare Rights Movement: The Social Protest of Poor Women* (New York: Praeger, 1981); Martha F. Davis, *Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993); R. Shep Melnick, *Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994); Martha F. Davis, “Welfare Rights and Women’s Rights in the 1960s,” *Journal of Policy History* 8, no. 1 (1996): 144-65; Felicia Kornbluh, “To Fullfill Their ‘Rightly Needs’: Consumerism and the National Welfare Rights Movement,” *Radical History Review* 69 (fall 1997): 76-113; Deborah Gray White, *Too Heavy a Load: Black Women in Defense of Themselves, 1894-1994* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 212-42; Anne Valk, “Mother Power: The Movement for Welfare Rights in Washington, D.C., 1966-1972,” *Journal of Women’s History* 11, no.4 (winter 2000): 34-58; Premilla Nadasen, *Welfare Warriors: The Welfare Rights Movement in the United States* (New York: Routledge, 2005); Felicia Kornbluh, *The Battle for Welfare Rights: Politics and Poverty in Modern America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Kazuyo Tsuchiya, “Tillmon, Johnnie,” “Wiley, George Alvin,” “National Welfare Rights Organization, 1966-1975,” BlackPast.org.: An Online Reference Guide to African American History, Directed by Quintard Taylor, <http://www.blackpast.org> [accessed May 25, 2008].

³⁴ One of the most influential studies, Arnold R. Hirsch’s *Making the Second Ghetto*, analyzed how the black ghetto was continually being “renewed, reinforced, and

reshaped” in the post-WWII period, supported by the government, white “ethnics” defending their neighborhoods, downtown elites eager to protect the value of their real estate, and “liberals” in Hyde Park and at the University of Chicago who devised a program of neighborhood conservation and urban renewal. While there is a large literature that documents the origins and development of ghettos in the prewar period, Hirsch argued that little attention had been given to developments after WWII. By exploring how the ghetto’s boundaries were redrawn and reinforced in the 1940s and 1950s, Hirsch proposed a “second ghetto” thesis that would come to have a great influence upon later debates about postwar urban America. Arnold R. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960* (1983; reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). See also *Journal of Urban History* 29, no.3 (March, 2003). William J. Wilson examined the ways in which the social conditions of the urban “underclass” deteriorated after the mid-1960s. Rather than stressing the role of white racial hostility in reshaping the ghetto as Hirsch does, Wilson emphasized how urban restructuring processes, along with the presence of a large African American population, played a significant role in creating the “underclass.” Wilson argued that these “problems” of the inner city could not be explained simply in terms of racial discrimination or in terms of a culture of poverty. For Wilson, these “problems” had to be understood as having “complex sociological antecedents” that included the flow of migrants, changes in the age structure of African Americans in the central cities, and economic changes. There is much value in Wilson’s thesis that the problem of joblessness and urban restructuring processes should have been a top-priority issue. Wilson, however, almost denied persistently high levels of racial discrimination as a central cause of residential segregation in postwar America, although he modified his position in his later work and acknowledged that race was an “important variable” in the experiences of African American residents. Kenneth L. Kusmer suggested that Wilson’s analysis resulted in a “too positive evaluation” of the situation of middle-class African Americans. Kusmer argued that Wilson’s focus on the negative impact of structural changes in the economy on the black poor since 1970 ignored both the earlier stages of that development as well as the external factor of racism in hiring practices. Secondly, Wilson’s arguments shifted the focus of the debate away from issues of racial discrimination, which other authors such as Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton regarded as the fundamental force behind the creation and maintenance of urban ghettos in the first place. See William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987); Wilson, *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor* (1996; reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1996); Kenneth L. Kusmer, “African Americans in the City Since World War II: From the Industrial to the Post-Industrial Era,” *Journal of Urban History* 21, no.4 (May, 1995): 458-504; Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (1993; reprint, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). Instead of stressing the impact of structural economic changes after the mid-1960s, Thomas J. Sugrue suggested that the origins of the urban crisis lay much earlier than social scientists like Wilson have recognized, “its roots deeper, more tangled, and perhaps more intractable.” Sugrue’s work provided a

historians' exclusive focus on "urban decline" has rendered unclear other "equally important" postwar urban experiences and has resulted in the dismissal of inner cities from postwar urban history.³⁵ While it is certainly undeniable that inner cities faced economic decay and physical deterioration, these same cities had also become places where African Americans could gain political and economic control after WWII, especially in the 1960s. My dissertation sheds more light on the role of black leaders in shaping the future of postwar cities. By taking the role of African American leaders seriously, my dissertation considers them as historical actors, rather than as passive victims of "urban deterioration." This emphasis on the agency of African American activists does not necessarily mean ignoring the issues they could not untangle, or even the problems they themselves created. I argue, however, that crucial shifts in African American political power occurred during the 1960s.

In the case of the Japanese Model Community Program, while "Japanese" citizens were provided with a new political space, "minority" residents remained outside of

vantage point from which to examine the "complex and interwoven histories" of race, economics, and politics in the postwar era. He showed that class segregation took place within the confines of systematic discrimination in housing. He also developed Hirsch's analysis in examining the role of working-class "white" ethnics in reinforcing residential segregation, discussing how ideas of homeownership became intertwined with racial inequality in Detroit. Thomas J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

³⁵ Heather Ann Thompson, *Whose Detroit?: Politics, Labor, and Race in a Modern American City* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 5, 219. See also Wendell Pritchett, *Brownsville, Brooklyn: Blacks, Jews, and the Changing Face of the Ghetto* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 7.

assumed “communities.” MCP in Japan shared a similar goal with CAP in the U.S., – that of reconstructing “communities” through the active participation of local residents in a period of perceived national “crises” and massive reform. In addition, both of them failed to address the question of racial and ethnic inequality. However, there was one significant difference between CAP and MCP. While CAP eventually created new terrain where local welfare activists of color could intervene, Japanese “community” programs in the early 1970s consistently excluded non-Japanese residents from these functioning “communities,” thereby reinforcing the equation between ethnonational identity and citizenship.³⁶ In fact, MCP turned out to be only one in a long line of welfare programs which redefined the boundary between “citizen” and “non-citizen.”

This does not mean that non-Japanese citizens did not challenge the government’s exclusionary welfare policies. After Japan concluded the San Francisco Treaty with the Allied Powers, the government of Japan, free to use its own discretion regarding domestic and international matters, formally declared its Korean residents to be “aliens” and put them under the surveillance of the Alien Registration Law. Korean residents, who once had rendered service to Imperial Japan, were deprived of legal rights.³⁷

³⁶ Kashiwazaki Chikako critically examines a historical process by which interactions between political actors generated an equation between the concept of nationality and ethnonational identity in postwar Japan. She locates the legal status of *zainichi* at the center of the postwar reconfiguration of Japanese citizenship. She argues that, while Koreans experienced inequality in citizenship “due to the status of the colonized” during WWII, “the nationality status justified their inequality and exclusion” after the war. See Kashiwazaki Chikako, “The Politics of Legal Status: The Equation of Nationality with Ethnonational Identity” in *Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin*, ed. Sonia Ryang (London: Routledge, 2000), 13-31.

³⁷ Onuma Yasuaki delved into the implications of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952.

Thereafter the Japanese government constantly used citizenship as a pretext for the exclusion of Koreans from social security programs. By the early 1970s, however, more than three-fourths of the Koreans in Japan were Japanese-born, and this new generation of Koreans initiated a series of political struggles against the Japanese government and major Japanese companies, demanding their rights as citizens.

I have focused my investigation on Kawasaki (See Figure 1). Kawasaki city, a hub for the defense industry before and during WWII, was home to a large number of Korean workers and their descendants who were enlisted by the Japanese government to construct military factories. After the war, Kawasaki city became the center of the Keihin industrial belt, ranking third (after Tokyo and Osaka) in the value of shipped manufactured goods by 1960. It created diversified neighborhoods and a multiethnic work force. It also evolved into a major working-class town with strong roots of labor activism. A chairman of the city officials' labor union, Ito Saburo, won the mayorship in 1971. Calling for the "creation of a humanitarian city (*Ningen toshi no sōzō*)," Ito's "progressive" policies placed great emphasis on welfare, anti-pollution measures, and the rights of resident non-nationals.³⁸ Korean activists appropriated Mayor Ito's

Onuma argued that it was an "illegal action to deprive as many as five hundred thousands Koreans of their citizenship" based on a *koseki* system (family register), which was employed to demarcate those of Japanese ancestry from nationals of colonial origin in the prewar period. According to Onuma, the real intention of the 1952 treaty was to "disavow the Japanese invasion of Asia." Onuma Yasuaki, *Zainichi Kankoku/Chōsenjin no kokuseki to jinken* (Tokyo: Tōshindō, 2004), vi-vii, 3-13. The articles in this book were originally published in 1979 and 1980.

³⁸ "Kakushin 10nen: Ito Kawasaki shisei no kiseki," *Kanagawa shinbun*, 26 May 1981, 27 May 1981; Kawasaki shigikai, *Kawasaki shigikai shi*, vol 3 (Tokyo: Daiichi Hōki Shuppan, 1985), 271-73; "Zassō no 18 nen: Ito Kawasaki shisei o furikaeru," *Kanagawa*

“progressive” narratives to advance their education and welfare rights. After they achieved a victory in the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial, Kawasaki became a center for *zainichi* Korean welfare struggles, and an arena of struggle over the meaning of citizenship.³⁹

Chapter 5 and 6 focus on the *zainichi* Koreans’ struggles in Kawasaki city and analyze how they sought to establish a kindergarten called the Sakuramoto Nursery School for both Korean and Japanese children in 1969 and eventually founded a social welfare organization called Seikyūsha in 1974. Chapter 5 discusses how southern Kawasaki emerged as a major *zainichi* Korean district near Tokyo, and later as the center of *zainichi* activism in the late 1960s and the early 70s. The Kawasaki church, and the nursery school which opened inside the chapel, provided *zainichi* activists with a social space to contest the racialized processes of differentiation by the Hitachi company, one of the largest electronics corporations in Japan and the world.

Chapter 5 also explores the exchanges and interconnections between black liberation struggles and the efforts of Koreans in Japan to pursue citizenship rights. African American church leaders inspired *zainichi* Korean activists and helped them

shinbun, 26 September 1989; Kawasaki chihō jichi kenkyū sentā, *Kawasaki shimin jichi no jikken 1971-2001: Shiryō Ito/Takahashi shisei* (Kawasaki: Kawasaki Chihō Jichi Kenkyū Sentā, 2003), 7-9. See also Tsuchiyama Kimie, “Kawasaki ‘Senku jichitai’ no rekishi teki ichi,” in *Kawasaki shisei no kenkyū*, eds. Uchikoshi Ayako and Uchiumi Mari (Tokyo: Keibundo, 2006), 43-108.

³⁹ Under pressure from these activities, Kawasaki-city took the initiative in abolishing the citizenship requirement for National Health Insurance and public housing, as well as providing an allowance for children by using city sources of revenue when the Japanese government still denied resident Korean these rights.

expand citizenship rights in postwar Japan. It examines how Korean activists in the Kawasaki church were influenced by black theology and invested it with new meaning; how they encountered African and African American leaders through world-wide religious organizations such as the World Council of Churches (WCC), and searched for common ground; and how *zainichi* Koreans won a victory in the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial --- a watershed in the history of the Korean struggle in Japan during the postwar period --- with help from black leaders.

Chapter 6 shows how Kawasaki Koreans challenged the city's and the nation's exclusionary local and national welfare policies, asserted their welfare rights, and voiced alternative visions of citizenship. Seikyūsha's determination to create a new vision of citizenship resulted in the formation of the Kawasaki Association for Promoting *zainichi* Koreans' Education (*Zainichi kankoku chōsenjin kyōiku o susumeru kai*) in 1982 and the establishment of a "community" center for both Korean and Japanese residents in 1988, called *Fureaikan*. Seikyūsha not only succeeded in changing Kawasaki city's welfare policies toward *zainichi* Koreans but also had a great impact on other local governments' programs for "minority" citizens. They created an alternative vision of a "model" community. Korean residents succeeded in transforming Kawasaki into a bastion of equal rights, forging the so-called "Kawasaki system," whereby a city government preceded the central government in abolishing the nationality clause (or *kokuseki jōkō*), which was used as a pretext for the exclusion of Koreans and other former colonial subjects from welfare programs before WWII. In addition to stressing how they reshaped the city's welfare policies, the chapter also details the criticism they endured

from within southern Kawasaki. By so doing, it will show the complexity of their struggles for citizenship.

Through the examination of *zainichi* Koreans' struggles in Kawasaki, this dissertation explores how the status of Koreans in Japan stood at the center of a great national debate regarding the parameters of citizenship in the postwar period. Until the 1960s, most of the scholarly work on *zainichi* history concentrated on the prewar period, exploring how Koreans were subjugated under Japanese colonial rule as well as the ways in which they resisted and fought for their liberation.⁴⁰ Since the late 1960s, however, scholars have moved beyond the colonial period and began to focus an increased amount of attention on the postwar period, scrutinizing how ethnicity became the grounds for citizenship in postwar Japan, and how Koreans were stripped of their legal and welfare rights.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Tonomura Masaru, *Zainichi Chōsenjin shakai no rekishigakuteki kenkyū* (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 2004), 4-15.

⁴¹ For example, scholars have demonstrated how the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), participated in the marginalization of Koreans during the U.S. occupation by failing to protect former colonial subjects' civil rights. Others examined the ways in which Koreans, who once had rendered service to Imperial Japan, were deprived of legal rights, and how the Japanese government used foreign citizenship as an excuse to exclude them from social security programs. Richard H. Mitchell, *The Korean Minority in Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 100-18; Kim Il-Wha, "Zainichi Chōsenjin no hōteki chii," in *Zainichi Chōsenjin: Rekishi, genjō, tenbō* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1995), 175-212; Yoshioka Masuo, *Zainichi Chōsenjin to shakai hoshō* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 1978), 15; see also Yoshioka Masuo, *Zainichi Chōsenjin to jūmin undō: Chiiki, minzoku, shakai hoshō* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 1981); Yoshioka Masuo, *Zainichi gaikokujin to shakai hoshō: Sengo Nihon no mainoritī jūmin no jinken* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 1995); Changsoo Lee, "The Legal Status of Koreans in Japan," in *Koreans in Japan: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation*, eds. Changsoo Lee and George De Vos (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

Since the 1990s, several studies have sought to shed light upon the multilayered and evolving lives of the *zainichi* in postwar Japan. Spurred by the fact that by the mid-1970s more than three-fourths of the Koreans in Japan were Japanese-born, and that these new generation Koreans were engaged in a series of political struggles in the 1970s and 80s, scholars constructed a more nuanced portrait of *zainichi* life. While both the Japanese government and leading Korean organizations such as the pro-South organization *Mindan* (*Zai Nihon Daikanminkoku Mindan*, or Korean Residents Association in Japan) and the pro-North organization *Chongryun* or in Japanese *Sōren* (*Zai Nihon Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai*, or General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) considered Koreans in Japan as either foreigners or sojourners, this younger generation of scholars contested the narrow definition of citizenship, contending that they were entitled to social security by right. These studies demonstrate that during the 1970s and 1980s, crucial shifts had occurred in Japan's political consciousness regarding the Koreans, and also in the government's position on the *zainichi*.⁴²

Furthermore, this new generation of scholars complicated the understanding of the trajectory of citizenship in postwar Japan. They critically examined the link between ethnonational identity and citizenship after World War II. Takashi Fujitani has explained that it became imperative for Japanese elites to deter overt acts of racism during the war. In order to mobilize Koreans for the war effort and to wage total war,

⁴² Kim Chan-jung, *Zainichi Korean hyakunenshi* (Tokyo: Sangokan, 1997), 10-14; Fukuoka; Tonomura, 10-11, 469-475; Fujiwara Shoten Henshūbu, *Rekishi no naka no "zainichi"* (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2005).

they felt increasingly bound to proclaim equality, acting as if they regarded Koreans as the equals of Japanese. When the war was over, according to Oguma Eiji, the primary discourse of the Japanese nation was converted from the militaristic multi-national empire to a “peace-loving homogeneous state.” The myth of the “homogeneous” nation became a dominant discourse in postwar Japan. Kang Sang-jung and Hyun Mooam showed how Koreans came to be classified as “sojourners, nomads, the homeless, and blockade runners” as they lost citizenship in the postwar regime. These studies all demonstrated how the status of Koreans was of cardinal significance in the re-mapping of citizenship in postwar Japan.⁴³ In addition, a number of studies sought to rescue women from invisibility, considering Korean women as historical actors in the drama of *zainichi* empowerment. Jung Yeong-hae and Sonia Ryang have argued that Korean women’s stories did not fit easily into the standard narrative of *zainichi* history, and analyzed how

⁴³ T. Fujitani, “Senka no jinshushugi: dainiji taisenki no ‘Chōsen shusshin Nihon kokumin’ to ‘Nikkei Amerikajin’,” in *Kanjō, kioku, sensō, Iwanami kōza: Kindai Nihon no bunkashi*, vol. 8, ed. Narita Ryuichi, et al. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002), 235-280; T. Fujitani, “Korosu kenri, ikasu kenri: Ajia-taiheiyō sensōka no Nihonjin to shite no Chōsenjin to Amerikajin to shite no Nihonjin,” in *Dōin, teikō, yokusan, Iwanami kōza: Ajia-taiheiyō sensō*, vol. 3, ed. Kurosawa Aiko, et al. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006), 181-216; Oguma Eiji, *Tanitsu minzoku shinwa no kigen: Nihonjin no jigazō no keifu* (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1995), 299, 316; See also *A Genealogy of ‘Japanese’ Self-images*. Trans. David Askew (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2002); Oguma Eiji, *Nihonjin no kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen: Shokuminchi shihai kara fukki undō made* (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1998); Oguma Eiji, *‘Minshu’ to ‘Aikoku’: Sengo Nihon no nashonarizumu to kōkyōsei* (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2002); Yoon Keun-cha, *Nihon kokumin ron: Kindai Nihon no aidentitī* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1997), 121-22; Kang Sang-jung, *Orientalizumu no kanata e* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 229; Kashiwazaki, 13-31; John Lie, *Multiethnic Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Hyun Mooam, “Mikkō, Ōmura shūyōjo, Saishūtō: Osaka to Saishūtō o musubu “mikkō” nettowāku,” *Gendai shisō* 35, no. 7 (June, 2007): 163. See also other articles in “Tonari no gaikokujin: Ikyō o ikiru,” *Gendai shisō* 35, no. 7 (June, 2007).

they simultaneously opposed racism *and* sexism.⁴⁴ My dissertation locates *zainichi* Koreans at the heart of the contestations over Japanese citizenship in the 1970s and the 80s. It also sheds light on the role of Korean women, especially second-generation *zainichi* mothers, in the history of their pursuit for citizenship.

Following scholars who emphasize that the struggles over racial equality and welfare rights take place not only in formal politics but also in streets, churches, schools, and local community organizations, this project stresses the everyday forms of protest developed by welfare activists, and the new social visions they created in Los Angeles and Kawasaki.⁴⁵ It examines how local activists, both in Los Angeles and Kawasaki, forcefully challenged the official welfare institutions, created oppositional discourses and movements, and voiced alternative visions of citizenship. By so doing, it tries to rescue local activists from invisibility and consider them as historical actors, rather than as passive victims of a racist and sexist state.⁴⁶ By writing a transnational history of

⁴⁴ Jung Yeong-hae, *Tamigayo seishō: Aidentitī, kokumin kokka, jendā* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003); Sonia Ryang, “Inscribed (Men’s) Bodies, Silent (Women’s) Words: Rethinking Colonial Displacement of Koreans in Japan,” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 30, no. 4 (1998): 3-15; Sonia Ryang, *Korian diaspora: Zainichi Chōsenjin to aidentitī*, (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2005).

⁴⁵ George Lipsitz, *A Life in the Struggle: Ivory Perry and the Culture of Opposition* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 135-40; Robin D. G. Kelly, *Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 7, 36; Robin D. G. Kelly, *Freedom Dreams* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 8.

⁴⁶ I conducted interviews with several activists and community workers in South Central Los Angeles and southern Kawasaki. Oral histories would be helpful in order to capture what motivated and sustained these local activists’ struggles to recast “community” programs. The use of oral historical evidence, however, requires special caution. As

grassroots activism against racial and ethnic inequality, this project also explores “interethnic antiracist alliances,” and delineates how activists with “similar but nonidentical experiences” were able to forge a transborder network.⁴⁷

Nancy A. Naples points out, scholars who consult oral histories need to counter their privileged position as storyteller. Furthermore, it is necessary to contextualize the interviewees’ narratives. I will attempt to locate local activists’ stories in other published and unpublished sources, in order to historicize and verify their narratives. Naples, *Grassroots Warriors*, 8-11.

⁴⁷ George Lipsitz explains why it is important for scholars in ethnic studies to explore “interethnic antiracist alliances” and the “interconnectedness of oppressions,” rather than a “one-group-at-a-time story of exclusion and discrimination.” See George Lipsitz, *American Studies in a Moment of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 118-122.

Chapter I

“The Definition of Community Action was Purposely not Spelled Out”:

The Community Action Program (CAP) in the U.S, 1961-1968

I now examine the ways in which the Community Action Program (CAP) and its doctrine of “maximum feasible participation” of the “poor” emerged. I am particularly concerned to analyze how the goals of CAP have changed over time, up until the 1964 passage of the Economic Opportunity Act.¹ Then I chronicle how the “War on Poverty” became an apparatus in transforming the “poor” into productive and participatory citizens for the sake of the development of economic wealth and the war against Communism.

¹ The Economic Opportunity Act consisted of six titles: Youth Programs (Title I); Urban and Rural Community Action Programs (Title II); Special Programs to Combat Poverty in Rural Areas (Title III); Employment and Investment Incentives (Title IV); Work Experience Programs (Title V); and Administration and Coordination (Title VI). 78 Stat. 508. As for the Economic Opportunity Act, see Richard Blumenthal, “The Bureaucracy : Antipoverty and the Community Action Program,” in *American Political Institutions and Public Policy*, ed., Allam P. Sindler (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), 169-172 ; James L. Sundquist, “Origins of the War on Poverty,” in *On Fighting Poverty: Perspectives from Experience*, ed. James L. Sundquist (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1969), 6-33; Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), 248-284; Michael B. Katz, *The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 79-123; James T. Patterson, *America’s Struggle Against Poverty 1900-1994* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 99-115; Jill Quadagno, *The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Michael L. Gillette, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996); Office of Economic Opportunity, *Catalog of Federal Programs for Individual and Community Improvement* (Washington, D.C.:GPO, 1965); U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, Community Action Program, *Community Action Program Guide: Instructions for Developing, Conducting, and Administering a Community Action Program* (Washington, D.C.:GPO, 1965), 7.

CAP and the “War on Poverty” were attractive to the architects of the Economic Opportunity Act because they could be effective tools to expand the number of “poor,” especially the African American “poor,” who qualified for military service; they could serve as useful anti-Communist propaganda; and they could even offer jobs --- calming down the angered ghettos --- for African American veterans.

I also analyze how the “War on Poverty” defined women’s roles in terms of volunteerism, stressing their support roles. By considering women as dependents and perpetuating their marginal position, the “War on Poverty” assigned women to what Alice Kessler-Harris has called “a secondary citizenship.”

Finally, in this chapter, I show how CAP triggered tension between city hall and the Community Action Agencies by fostering the political participation of the “poor.” I demonstrate that the specific goals of CAP were left ambiguous because there was no clear consensus among policymakers as to the extent to which “the poor” and people of color were to be incorporated into the state. Accordingly, the original concept of CAP was suspended between the rubrics of inclusion and exclusion. Local activists made the best of this ambiguous character of CAP. Yet, precisely because the “poor” started asserting more control over the programs through CAP, the OEO came under fierce attack. CAP was increasingly cast in a negative light as urban uprisings erupted throughout the nation and as the assumed connection between the “War on Poverty” and urban insurrections grew in critics’ minds.

1.1 Transforming the “Poor” into Productive and Participatory Citizens

The “Rediscovery of Poverty”

“The poor” became an object of social policy in the early 1960s. The problem of poverty was largely ignored during the post-WWII period. Social welfare legislation held low priority during the years after WWII, and no important laws were enacted except modification in minimum wages, extension of coverage under unemployment insurance, and the establishment of Old-Age Survivors, and Disability Insurance. In fact, until 1964, the word “poverty” did not appear as a heading in the index of the Congressional Record or the Public Papers of the President. Yet, the problem of poverty, along with the category of “the poor,” suddenly attracted enormous attention.²

The so-called “rediscovery of poverty” had its origin in the publication of several books and articles. Most prominent in the 1950’s was John Kenneth Galbraith’s *The Affluent Society*. Galbraith argued that there were two main components of the “new poverty”: case poverty and insular poverty. “Case poverty” existed in any community, rural or urban, however prosperous that community or the times. Galbraith called attention to another type of poverty named “insular poverty,” located in areas like the Appalachians or the West Virginia coal fields, where an entire region became economically obsolete. Here the “community” perpetuated its handicaps through “poor schools, evil neighborhood influences, and bad preparation for life.” By discussing the new character of modern poverty, Galbraith called for steps to reduce poverty, such as

² Sar A. Levitan, *The Great Society’s Poor Law: A New Approach to Poverty* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 11-12; Sundquist, 6.

investment in schools.³

Influenced by Galbraith's work, Michael Harrington published *The Other America* in 1962, which had a significant impact on the Kennedy administration. *The Other America* described the poverty of unskilled workers, migrant farm workers, the aged, minorities, and others who lived in the "economic underworld" of American life. His work reached the White House. Charles L. Schultz, who served as assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget from September 1962 to February 1965, later noted that President Kennedy had read Harrington's book, and "it impressed him."⁴ Harrington certainly succeeded in appealing to readers' "ethical" positions by arguing that in a nation with a technology that could provide every citizen with a decent life, it was "an outrage and a scandal" that there should be such social misery. Yet Harrington's book also contributed to isolating "the poor" as "the other America." Harrington argued that the real explanation of poverty lay in the fact that "the poor" made the mistake of "being born to the wrong parents, in the wrong section of the country, in the wrong industry, or in the wrong racial or ethnic group." And once the "mistake" has been made, they would never even have had a chance to get out of "the other America." "The poor" were caught in "a vicious circle," in other words, "a culture of poverty." Here poverty was depicted as a "culture, institution, a way of life." As Cruikshank discusses,

³ John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958), 325-333; O'Connor, 146-153.

⁴ Charles L. Schultze. Interview by Davide G. McComb, in *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 3.

Harrington did more than anyone to identify “the poor” as a group and define their subjectivity. According to Harrington, only the larger society, with its help and resources, could really make it possible for “the poor” to emerge out of “the other America.”⁵

In addition to the two books noted above, an article by Dwight MacDonald that appeared in the January, 1963, edition of *The New Yorker* contributed to the “rediscovery of poverty.” The article, “Our Invisible Poor,” reviewed the major literature on poverty issues, including Galbraith’s and Harrington’s books. As Harrington did, MacDonald identified “the poor” as a group by arguing that “the poor” were different “both physically and psychologically.” Then he contended that the extent of poverty had “suddenly become visible,” and that the federal government was the “only purposeful force” that could reduce the numbers of “the poor” and make their lives more bearable. Through MacDonald’s article, as well as books written by Galbraith and Harrington, the phenomenon of “mass poverty in a prosperous country” received increased national attention.⁶

Along with the publication of a series of books and articles that contributed to the “rediscovery of poverty,” community-based projects were launched by private

⁵ Michael Harrington, *The Other America: Poverty in the United States* (1962; reprint, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), 10, 21-24. Here, Harrington was quoting anthropologist Oscar Lewis’s theory of the “culture of poverty.” See Alice O’Connor, *Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 150-151.

⁶ Dwight MacDonald, “Our Invisible Poor,” *The New Yorker*, 19 June 1963, 82-132.

foundations and government agencies. The “community approach” became central to the anti-poverty efforts through two antecedent models. They were “Gray Areas” projects funded by the Ford Foundation and antipoverty initiatives sponsored by the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (PCJD). The Ford Foundation initiated the “Community Development Program” in New Haven, Oakland, Boston, Philadelphia, and the state of North Carolina from 1959 to 1963 under the leadership of Paul N. Ylvisaker, the head of The Ford Foundation’s Public Affairs Program. The PCJD also had a significant impact on the later community action programs. Kennedy asked an old friend and campaign associate, David Hackett, to organize the PCJD in 1961. PCJD awarded research grants to organizations such as the Mobilization for Youth (MFY) developed by Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin of the Columbia University of Social Work, for developing comprehensive plans of community organization to attack the causes of juvenile delinquency and youth crime. PCJD increasingly became involved in antipoverty programs. Sugarman noted that the original concern with the problem of juvenile delinquency broadened into a larger strategy because of the relationship between “juvenile delinquency and the much broader problem of poverty.” In fact, Jule Sugarman, who served as chief of budget and management planning at the Department of State’s Bureau of Inter-American Affairs from 1962 to 1964 and later became associate director of Head Start, noted that many of the basic concepts did grow out of the PCJD.⁷ The ground rules for the later community

⁷ Jule Sugarman, Interview by Stephen Goodell, in *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 19; Sunquist, 9-13; Blumenthal, 133-135.

action programs would be created out of these Ford Foundation's "Gray Area Projects" and the PCJD programs.

Both the PCJD and the Ford Foundation were under the great influence of Cloward and Ohlin at Columbia University, who published *Delinquency and Opportunity* that laid the theoretical base for the "community organization approach." Cloward and Ohlin analyzed juvenile delinquency not as an individual problem but as *community* pathology. For them, the focus of remedial public policy had to be "the social setting" that gave rise to delinquency. Through their theoretical framework, "community" was destined to be the primary target of anti-poverty programs.⁸

Theories of Cultural Deprivation and the Question of Race

Theories of cultural deprivation became the backbone of a series of research projects on poverty and community-based programs, and later became a theoretical foundation for the "War on Poverty." Alice O'Connor has shown how poverty came to be represented as a sign of cultural deprivation and pathology in the 1930s and 40s.

⁸ Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquency Gangs* (Crencoe: Free Press, 1960). Yet, there were significant differences between Cloward and Ohlin's understandings of antipoverty efforts and Ylvisaker's and Hackett's opinions of what constituted appropriate anti-poverty programs. According to Richard Blumenthal, the critical division between these investigators was the question of "conflict versus consensus." While Hackett and Ylvisaker saw "community action" as a means of nurturing more effective cooperation and alliances between the Establishment and "the poor," Cloward and Ohlin valued disruption and conflict as ends in themselves. Furthermore, they advocated creating new and separate institutions so that "the poor" would be able to express dissent and challenge local officials. While these different understandings about the nature of antipoverty programs were still under the surface, they would be significant once the creation of community action programs in the "War on Poverty" began. See Blumenthal, 137-142.

Theories of cultural deviance and social disorganization were first synthesized by Chicago sociologists, such as Charles S. Johnson and E. Franklin Frazier, and then later reformulated by scholars like sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, anthropologist Oscar Lewis, journalist Michael Harrington, and Assistant Secretary of Labor, Daniel P. Moynihan.⁹ These analyses of poverty as a cultural pathology had several theses in common. First, poverty was supposedly perpetuated by family. Black poverty, in particular, was assumed to be caused and reinforced by a matriarchal family structure, which was interpreted as an accommodation to slavery and the joblessness of black males. Finding jobs for men would thus be the first step in alleviating poverty. Men could then take up their “proper” positions as the heads of patriarchal families. Second, once people found themselves in poverty, they would be caught up in a “vicious circle” --- one that passed poverty on from generation to generation --- and its psychological effects. In order to break this “vicious circle” of cultural deficiencies, the government was required to intervene and alter the psyches of “the poor” so that they could partake of the opportunities enjoyed by an affluent society. As poverty and juvenile delinquency were thus increasingly viewed as “community pathology,” the government was assumed to have an obligation to initiate programs not only for individual families but also for communities as a whole. Theories of cultural deprivation therefore cast the “poor” as “deviants,” different from “normal” mainstream America. Michael B. Katz and Alice

⁹ See O’Connor’s discussion of Charles S. Johnson, E. Franklin Frazier, Gunnar Myrdal, Oscar Lewis, Michael Harrington, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan in chapter 3, 4, and page 203-210 in her book, *Poverty Knowledge*.

O'Connor have shown how these views focused on the internalized psyches of individual families and communities, drawing attention away from such structural barriers as the lack of job opportunities, the gendered division of labor, and racial segregation.¹⁰

The question of racial barriers was largely omitted in Kennedy's PCJD. Black liberation struggles had an impact on the Kennedy administration, for sure, since economic deprivation was a significant part of the over-all discrimination African Americans and other people of color experienced. Charles L. Schultze noted that in addition to the "rediscovery" of pockets of poverty, there was "the recognition on the part of the civil rights people that legal remedies were not going to be enough." In order to understand why the Kennedy administration paid increased attention to issues of poverty, one needs to take a closer look at the Democratic Party of the 1960s. As Piven and Cloward have demonstrated, 90 percent of all African Americans were concentrated in 10 of the most populous Northern states in 1960, and as a result black voting power in national elections grew steadily. At the same time, black liberation struggles resulted in the dissolution of the North-South Democratic coalition. By 1960, the disarray in the Southern wing of the party had become visible, since in the three previous presidential elections, only three Southern states had consistently given their electoral votes to the Democratic presidential candidate. While Southern support declined, the political importance of the big cities in the North in presidential contests increased. In this way,

¹⁰ O'Connor; Michael B. Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America, Revised and Updated* (New York: Basic Books), 264. See also Ruth Feldstein, *Motherhood in Black and White: Race and Sex in American Liberalism, 1930-1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

Kennedy made a vigorous appeal to the African American vote in the North by pledging to deal with civil rights and poverty.¹¹

Appealing to the African American vote did not necessarily mean, however, that the Kennedy administration tackled the issues of civil rights immediately. Kennedy signed an Executive Order barring discrimination in federally subsidized housing, but did not do anything to implement it, nor did he send substantial civil rights legislation to Congress. In fact, as Piven, Cloward, and other scholars have pointed out, while the Democrats attempted to solidify the loyalty of African American voters, it was important for them that white voters not be alienated. Anti-poverty programs initiated by the Democrats had to be ambiguous on the question of race. Democratic Party leaders thus muted the question of race, rather than linking issues of racial inequality with the problem of poverty.¹²

“The Definition of Community Action was Purposely not Spelled Out”

The discussion of what later became the “War on Poverty” within the Kennedy Administration began in the spring of 1963. Robert Lampman, who was a staff member on the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) and “one of the distinguished experts in the field of income distribution,” performed a significant role in bringing poverty to the attention of the administration at an early stage. On April 25, 1963, Lampman wrote a

¹¹ Charles L. Schultze, 3; Piven and Cloward, 250-256.

¹² Ibid.; Zarefsky, 27-28.

memorandum to Walter Heller, chairman of CEA, on changes in the distribution of wealth and income through 1961-1962. Lampman called the attention of Heller and others to the fact that past or pending administrative measures would do little to help “the poor.” He also demonstrated that a decline in poverty had stopped after 1956. They were influenced by so-called “human capital theory,” which stressed the significance of individual investments in improving productivity and creating economic growth. For Lampman and Heller, attacking poverty was part of their strategy to develop economic wealth. The memorandum sent to President Kennedy on May 1 started a wide discussion about anti-poverty programs.¹³

The discussions were soon divided on the very point of the definition of poverty. The discussions, led by Lampman, first took place during informal Saturday “brown bag” lunches. These meetings included members from various agencies and departments, such as the CEA, the Labor Department, HEW, Housing and Home Finance Agency, and the Bureau of the Budget. According to Lampman, these agencies had very different approaches to the whole question of poverty. Some people said poverty obviously meant a “lack of money income.” Yet for others, it was “a participation-in-government concept”; or it was “a lack of some kind of self-esteem”; or it really had to do with race; or a “lack of opportunity” in general. Yet all immediately recognized that poverty was not *a* problem. These different definitions were intertwined with each other in some

¹³ William M. Capron, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 9; Robert J. Lampman, interview by Michael L. Gillette, 24 May 1983, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Robert Lampman, interview by Michael L. Gillette, *Ibid.*, 5; Blumenthal, 143; Levita, 14; O’Connor, 139-46.

way.¹⁴ As William M. Capron, then a staff member with the CEA and later assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget, recalled, poverty was “a whole constellation of problems with very different sources.”¹⁵ Yet the ambiguous definition of poverty had lingering effects on the creation of what later became community action programs, since as Lampman pointed out, “difference in concept was also later on reflected in the kinds of remedies that people would come up with.”¹⁶

There was another division among the Administration’s advisers with regard to the political appeal of anti-poverty programs. Several believed that fighting poverty would lack political appeal, and hence should be delayed until after the 1964 election campaign. Kennedy’s close political advisers pointed out that “the poor don’t vote” --- and probably many of those who did vote, voted Democratic anyway. Kennedy refrained from committing himself to such a program until his last meeting with Heller, on November 19, 1963 because of this “advice.”¹⁷ On November 5, Heller circulated a memorandum titled “Widening Participation in Prosperity” to the heads of the major

¹⁴ Robert J. Lampman, interview by Michael L. Gillette, 24 May 1983, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Lampman, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 6.

¹⁵ Capron, *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁶ Robert J. Lampman, interview by Michael L. Gillette, 24 May 1983, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Lampman, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 6.

¹⁷ *Ibid*; Blumenthal, 144; Levitan, 16. Lampman recalled that the political interests turned around the question of “which parts of the nonpoor would be attracted.” The Kennedy administration attempted to receive support from women, especially “church women and League of Women Voters people.” In fact, these women’s organizations would become the main targets of what later became the “War on Poverty.”

departments and agencies involved in administering anti-poverty programs. This November 5 memorandum marked a major turning point, since it shifted responsibility from the CEA to the Bureau of the Budget, and led to the first consideration of community action.¹⁸

At this early stage, “community action” meant bringing various anti-poverty programs together for the sake of greater efficiency. The community action program was originally created under the leadership of the Budget Bureau, as a new administrative device to coordinate diverse existing and proposed federal programs under the umbrella of what later became the “War on Poverty.” In a memorandum dated December 28, the most important new ingredient of the proposed program to attack poverty, “the development of a coordinated ‘community action plan’,” was announced. Through this plan, the resources of existing public and private organizations could be committed in a “coordinated long range effort to improve educational, training, health, and other services for the poor.” These community action programs were to be concentrated in certain “target areas,” and controlled by local governments.¹⁹ William M. Capron recalled that

¹⁸ This memorandum, tentatively titled “Widening Participation in Prosperity,” had three objectives: minimizing “handouts” and maximizing “self-help”; emphasizing the prevention of poverty, particularly among the young; and concentrating on relatively few groups and areas where “problems” were most severe and “solutions” most feasible. Heller and other members were preoccupied with achieving maximum effects at minimal costs even at this early stage. James L. Sundquist, interview by Stephen Goodell, 7 April 1969, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; James L. Sundquist, interview by Stephen Goodell, in *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 13; Sundquist, “Origins of the War on Poverty,” 20-21; Blumenthal, 145-146.

¹⁹ “How the Poverty Program Might Work in an Urban Slum and a Poor Rural Area,” 28 December 1963, Executive File, WE 9, Box 25, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

part of the problem was that existing anti-poverty programs were terribly “unintegrated.” They were “little bits and pieces that didn’t really hang together.” Capron said, “what we’d struggled for through November of 1963 was an organizing theme...it was the Community Action Program, which we viewed as a device to focus many different federal local programs to match the needs in particular localities.”²⁰ William Cannon, the assistant chief of the Legislative Reference Division, the Bureau of the Budget, also noted that the Community Action Program was originally created “to put a legislative package together and try to figure out a way to unify, politically and intellectually, things that were very different – and organizing it around a political appeal that I thought would be very effective and would sell on the Hill, which was localism.” In other words, at this early period, the Community Action Program had less to do with organizing “the poor” than coordinating diverse federal programs for greater “efficiency.”²¹

On November 19, Kennedy gave Heller a yes to the question whether anti-poverty programs would be in the 1964 legislative agenda. According to Heller, Kennedy told him the following: “Yes, Walter, I am definitely going to have something in the line of an attack on poverty in my program. I don’t know what yet. But yes, keep your boys at

²⁰ William M. Capron, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 12-13.

²¹ William B. Cannon, interview by Michael L. Gillette, 21 May 1982, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; William B. Cannon, interview by Michael L. Gillette, *Ibid.*, 20; Blumenthal, 146-149. For example, James Sundquist, then deputy undersecretary of Agriculture, wrote that an outline of staff thinking as of January 21 specified “only that a community should have, preferable, a single organization or official with authority to coordinate public and private efforts.” Sunquist argued that “it made no mention of organizing the poor for self-assertion.” See Sunquist, “Origins of the War on Poverty,” 24.

work, and come back to me in a couple of weeks.” It was a few days before his tragic death.²²

Kennedy’s death did not arrest development of the anti-poverty program. The new President’s response was “favorable and immediate.” President Johnson told Heller that “that’s my kind of program...I’ll find money for it one way or another.”²³ As many scholars have argued, the new President had a significant impact on the design of the Community Action Program. Johnson wanted to make the program as visible as possible. Johnson had endured the “pro-longed post-assassination worship of Kennedy,” and needed to establish an identity. The anti-poverty efforts were perfect for someone like Johnson, who was “a Roosevelt type of liberal.”²⁴

While Johnson wanted the program to be large, he also wanted it to be frugal. In contrast to Johnson’s promises of an “unconditional war,” the outlay suggested by the Bureau of the Budget was only \$500 million. One solution was that single-purpose programs, then pending before Congress, were included in the newly created anti-poverty programs. According to Blumenthal, this “legerdemain” would not only increase the apparent size of the program at no extra cost, but would also broaden its appeal (as for funds from other new legislation and existing programs, see Table 1).

Johnson also transformed the Community Action Program from pilot projects

²² Walter Heller, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 16.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Blumenthal, 150-153; Zarefsky, 22-24.

concentrated in a few targeted areas to major new programs that spread throughout the country. Capron later noted that “we were not talking about a massive War on Poverty that fall at all...that was very much the Johnsonian impact.” Johnson emphasized that poverty was a “national problem --- a problem which need to be attacked and conquered in every private home, in every public office, in every local community throughout the Nation.” As a result, the Community Action Program became a set of huge nation-wide programs that even included single-purpose programs.²⁵

Furthermore, departmental infighting also had an enduring effect on the concept of the program. One question arose over the components of the community action programs. Levitan explains that once the decision to ask Congress for an appropriation of \$500 million was reached by January 4, 1964, departments and agencies intensified their lobbying for the maximum feasible share of the program.²⁶ A more significant issue was over the administrative structure of the new program. Capron later recalled that the big debate that went on through that fall was “whether or not you did some restructuring of programs and agencies, within particularly Labor and HEW, or whether you needed something bureaucratically separate from those.” Heller leaned toward the second in order to give a public “visibility and distinctiveness” to CAP as well as be

²⁵ Memo, Lyndon B. Johnson to Robert L. Mallatt, Jr., Mayor of Keene, 23 January 1964, Executive File, WE 9, Box 25, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Memo, Kermit Gordon to Lyndon B. Johnson, 22 January 1964, Subject File, FG11-15, Box 124, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Capron, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 22; Blumenthal, 152-153.

²⁶ For example, spokesmen for the HEW worried that the Community Action Program would absorb or substitute for their existing programs. At the same time, the Department of Labor opposed the inclusion of a youth work component in CAP.

clearly identifiable as the “Johnson Attack on Poverty.”²⁷

All these controversies, along with the transformation of the meaning of CAP under President Johnson, made the contents of CAP increasingly unclear. Kermit Gordon, then the director of the Bureau of the Budget, and Heller wrote the “Outline of a Proposed Poverty Program” and circulated it through the secretaries of the departments involved in the anti-poverty programs in January, 1964. In it, they just mentioned that the central purpose of the new poverty program was to “launch an intensive and coordinated attack upon basic causes of poverty in specific local areas, urban and rural.” The basic concept would be a “locally-initiated, comprehensive community action program.” The specific programs that would be operated through CAP were left unexamined.²⁸

Ironically enough, this ambiguous design of CAP was exactly what some members of the original taskforce wanted. Frederick O’R Hayes, then an assistant commissioner in the Urban Renewal Administration and later assistant director of CAP, noted that “the definition of Community Action was purposely not spelled out” so that it would remain flexible.²⁹ Hayes certainly wanted to leave CAP open-ended in order to

²⁷ Capron, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 23; Memo, Walter W. Heller to Theodore Sorensen, 6 January 1964, Executive File, WE 9, Box 25, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Levitan, 21-29.

²⁸ Memo, Kermit Gordon and Walter W. Heller to Secretary of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, HEW, Interior, and Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, 6 January 1964, Executive File, WE 9, Box 25, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Levitan, 21-29.

²⁹ Blumenthal, 162-163.

maximize local initiatives once the programs began operating. This unclear nature of CAP helped to conceal divisions among departments involved in the anti-poverty programs as well as the distance between Johnson's promises of an "unconditional war" and the minimal budget available. As I will discuss in detail, the ambiguous character of CAP also masked the connection between welfare and warfare, as well as inconsistencies in the drafters' treatment of the extent to which "the poor" and people of color were to be incorporated into the state.

The Creation of the "Maximum Feasible Participation" Concept

Since the contents of CAP remained vague, it would be vital to have "a strong federal agency" that could set a clear policy. Sundquist noted that the CEA had reached the conclusion independently that "we needed someone with stature and political appeal to handle the salesmanship of this program to the Congress."³⁰ On February 1, 1964, Johnson announced that he was appointing R. Sargent Shriver, President Kennedy's brother-in-law and then the organizer and first director of the Peace Corps, to resolve the controversies and plan the "War on Poverty."³¹

³⁰ James L. Sundquist, interview by Stephen Goodell, 7 April 1969, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Sundquist, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 24.

³¹ Letter, Lyndon B. Johnson to Sargent Shriver, 12 February 1964, Subject File , FG11-15, Box124, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; R. Sargent Shriver, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 31; Levitan, 28. Shriver later recalled that he was appointed because Johnson thought "it was going to be difficult to get it through Congress and he thought I could help get it through." The "War on Poverty" Task Force, headed by Shriver, included such a variety of members as Richard Boone (from PCJD), Wilbur Cohen (from the HEW), Michael Harrington (the author of *The Other America*), Walter

The appointment of Shriver had a significant impact on the nature of the Community Action Program. First of all, in spite of opposition from the Bureau of the Budget, Shriver succeeded in establishing the “War on Poverty” agency in the Executive Office.³² Furthermore, Shriver contended that community action was not enough. Adam Yarmolinsky, Special assistant to the secretary of Defense, later recalled that Shriver’s immediate reaction was that “this just wouldn’t fly,” since you wouldn’t get results “soon enough, clear enough, to be able to carry it forward in the successive years and get appropriations the second year.”³³ Cannon agreed with Yarmolinsky that Shriver wanted something “glamorous, easily understood, apparent in its workings, and

Heller (from the CEA), Daniel P. Moynihan (from the Department of Labor), Norbert A. Schlei (from the Office of Legal Counsel), Charles Schultze (from the Bureau of the Budget), James Sundquist (from the Department of Agriculture), W. Williard Wirtz (from the Department of Labor), Adam Yarmolinsky (then special assistant to the secretary of Defense), and Paul N. Ylvisaker (from the Ford Foundation). Moynihan, 82-86; Sundquist, “*Origins of the War on Poverty*,” 25.

³² Shriver contended that the fledgling federal unit would not survive without the direct, personal backing of the president. John Baker, then assistant secretary of Agriculture, shared his opinion. He later noted that “if you really wanted to put it upstairs instead of being buried down in the hierarchy somewhere, the thing you had to do was to put it in the White House.” Consequently, the Office of Economic Opportunity was given a special location in the Executive Office. On the other hand, Kermit Gordon, the director of the Bureau of the Budget, recommended to the President that the OEO be established as an independent agency outside the Executive Office. He argued that if it were established in the Executive Office, such a location would bring the day-to-day decisions of the office so close to the President “as to risk involving him directly in the occasional errors and failures.” Memo, Kermit Gordon to Lyndon B. Johnson, 7 March 1964, Subject File , FG11-15, Box124, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; John Baker, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 54.

³³ Adam Yarmolinsky, Interview by Paige Mulhollan, 13 July 1970, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; and Interview by Michael L. Gillette, 21 October 1980, 22 October 1980, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Adam Yarmolinsky, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 32.

which you could succeed at.”³⁴ The concept of community action was “much too complex and diffuse.” Shriver searched for additional suggestions from departments and agencies, state and local governments, and business and private organizations. As a result, five more titles were added to the draft, including youth-employment programs such as the Job Corps and the Neighborhood Youth Corps, and Volunteers for America (subsequently changed to Volunteers in Service to America, or VISTA). CAP, which was meant to be the only program for the “War on Poverty,” was squeezed into Title II.³⁵

On February 4, the Shriver task force began drafting the Economic Opportunity Act. The writers left the provisions as flexible as possible. John Steadman, who helped author the Economic Opportunity Act, recalled that he was told by Shriver to “make the language as general as possible.” Steadman wrote them in “extraordinarily general language,” with the preamble to say “we’re going to do all kinds of good things.”³⁶ Sundquist also noted that the bill was “deliberately drafted to grant the broadest possible discretion to the administrator.” As the original design of CAP was

³⁴ Cannon, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 31-32.

³⁵ Shriver later noted that “I just wasn’t of the opinion that the U.S. government could spend \$500 million intelligently in one year in that way or according to that formula...Of course, I still think that decision was correct, to make community action an essential part but not the whole of the War on Poverty.” R. Sargent Shriver, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 34-36; Blumenthal, 163-66; Sunquist, “Origins of the War on Poverty,” 25-29.

³⁶ John M. Steadman, interviewed by Stephen Goodell, 5 April 1985, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; John M. Steadman, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 56-57.

left vague, so were the contents of the Economic Opportunity Act.³⁷

The task force members also neglected to discuss the provision which caused the most controversy --- the “maximum feasible participation” clause. One of the three criteria in Section 202 (a)(3) stated that the program must be “developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served.” While Cannon and Schlei argued that these phrases came from the pen of Harold Horowitz, there was no consensus regarding the origins of the phrase.³⁸

Although the provenance of these words was not clear, it was evident that the member most responsible for the inclusion of the “maximum feasible participation” provision was Richard Boone of PCJD. Boone noted that CAP was “an attempt to move administrative authority closer to people directly affected by federal legislation.” According to Boone, concern over neglect of “the poor” by public and private programs, their oppression by political design, the “insensitivity of service systems” were some of the reasons for the creation of CAP.³⁹ Frank Mankiewicz, then director of the Peace

³⁷ Sundquist, 27

³⁸ The actual drafters of Title II (CAP) were Harold Horowitz, associate general counsel at HEW, and Norbert Schlei, assistant attorney general. William B. Cannon, interview by Michael L. Gillette, 21 May 1982, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; William B. Cannon, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 79; Norbert A. Schlei, interview by Michael Gillette, 15 May 1980, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Norbert A. Schlei, interview by Michael Gillette, *Ibid.*, 82; Harold W. Horowitz, interview by Michael L. Gillette, 23 February 1983, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Harold W. Horowitz, interview by Michael L. Gillette, *Ibid.*, 81; Blumenthal, 167.

³⁹ Richard W. Boone, “Reflections on Citizen Participation and the Economic

Corps in Peru and a member of the Shriver task force, shared Boone's opinion. Mankiewicz later noted that one of the things of which they were conscious when they were drafting the legislation was "to keep it *out* of city hall," since the municipal government was "in large part responsible for the problem." Mankiewicz argued that this concept of CAP as an "essentially revolutionary activity" was "pretty clearly understood by us."⁴⁰ In other words, for some drafters such as Boone and Mankiewicz, the chief goal of CAP was to encourage the participation of "the poor" so that they would challenge and reform the established public/private welfare institutions.

Whereas some members interpreted CAP as a revolutionary activity, there were many drafters who later argued that they did not envision the extent to which CAP would be under the control of "the poor." Frederick O'R Hayes, one of the chief authors of the bill, argued that the "maximum feasible participation" requirement was not seen, at that point, as potentially controversial. Hayes noted that "we were not talking about any radical shift of authority to the poor." For him, the clause simply meant improving what business would call "'customer relations" by doing a better job of listening to, responding to, and communicating with their clients." Hayes contended that the task force members were inclined to regard the participation of "the poor" as a "more symbolic than substantive form." This view was shared among other task force

Opportunity Act," *Public Administration Review* 32 (September, 1972), 445.

⁴⁰ Frank Mankiewicz, interview by Stephen Goodell, April 18, 1969, 1 May 1969, May 5, 1969, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Frank Mankiewicz, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 75-76.

members.⁴¹ Schlei, who drafted Title II with Horowitz, argued that he did not envision the extent to which these programs would wind up being under the control of “the poor.” For him, the key idea of CAP was to coordinate diverse anti-poverty programs, not putting “the whole thing under the control of poor people.”⁴² Yarmolinsky also contended that “it never occurred to us that local government would get into a big fight with the community.” His conception of what the maximum feasible participation meant was that “you involved poor people in the process, not that you put them in charge.”⁴³ Even President Johnson did not clearly understand the meaning of this clause. The task force members were clearly divided on the matter of the participation of “the poor” in CAP.

There was also no consensus on the impact of black liberation struggles among the “War on Poverty” task force members. On the one hand, Richard Boone, for example, argued that all those working in Washington were “keenly aware of the civil rights struggle and growing demands by blacks and their allies for first-class citizenship.” According to Boone, those responsible for the inclusion of the “maximum feasible

⁴¹ Frederick O’R Hayes, interview by Michael L. Gillette, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 70-71, 74-75, 86-87.

⁴² Norbert A. Schlei, interview by Michael Gillette, 15 May 1980, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Norbert A. Schlei, interview by Michael Gillette, *Ibid.*, 72-73, 76, 82.

⁴³ Adam Yarmolinsky, Interview by Paige Mulhollan, 13 July 1970, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; and Interview by Michael L. Gillette, October 21 and 22, 1980, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Adam Yarmolinsky, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 73-74, 77-78.

participation” in the Act were “deeply influenced by the movement.”⁴⁴ Yet on the other, members like William B. Cannon emphasized that CAP and the “War on Poverty” in general were “not black-designed, minority-designed programs....[t]hey weren’t designed to deal with that problem specifically.”⁴⁵ Policymakers were divided and opposed to each other regarding the question of race.

Although there was no agreement on that matter, both sides shared one trait: they did not discuss the relationship between poverty and racism. Task force members avoided explicit mention of racial discrimination as a cause of poverty. By so doing, they attempted to redefine racial inequality simply as an economic problem.⁴⁶

The Congress Affirms

Today for the first time in all the history of the human race,
a great nation is able to make and is willing to make
a commitment to eradicate poverty among its people
-President Lyndon B. Johnson⁴⁷
(On the Economic Opportunity Act, August 20, 1964)

The anti-poverty bill was introduced in Congress on March 16, 1964. The proposed Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 consisted of six titles (See Table 2). The

⁴⁴ Boone, 446-447.

⁴⁵ William B. Cannon, interview by Michael L. Gillette, 21 May 1982, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; William B. Cannon, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 81.

⁴⁶ Zarefsky, 27; O’Connor, 154-155.

⁴⁷ Howard B. Furer, ed. *Lyndon B. Johnson, 1908-: Chronology – documents - Bibliographical Aids* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1971), 87.

task force members were firmly confident of the bill's passage from the start.⁴⁸ In fact, the proposed Act was enacted within five months and signed into law on August, 20. There were some significant amendments to CAP, such as the agreement to allow funds for parochial schools and the elimination of comprehensive plans. The Republicans attempted to splinter the proposed Act by denouncing it as a "throwback to the 1930s," calling Shriver an authoritarian "Poverty Czar." Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey drafted a substitute, that was a state-run program costing half of the estimated amount, yet it attracted little support. Shriver knew that the anti-poverty bill contained "a number of errors which [had to] be corrected by amendment." Far from being disempowered, Shriver showed "extraordinary achievement, skill, imagination, and energy" in talking down the opponents. Both Houses approved the act by wide margins: the Senate in July, 61 to 34, and the House in August, 226 to 185.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ William P. Kelly, Jr., who later became the acting director of CAP as well as the director of the Job Corps, noted that the task force members were always "optimistic" about the bill. Kelly pointed out that there was "an excellent esprit de corps" in the task force. Shriver gave the following testimony before the House Education and Labor Committee on March 17: "this country, with its enormous productivity, its advanced technology, the mobility of its people, and the speed of its communications has both the resources and the know-how to eliminate poverty" since "we now have a far greater understanding of the complex causes of poverty." Shriver and other task force members were sure of their rapid victory in Congress. Statement by Sargent Shriver, 17 March 1964, Subject File , FG11-15, Box124, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; William P. Kelly Jr., interviewed by Stephen Goodell, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 61.

⁴⁹ One of the major questions on CAP in the House was the issue of aid to parochial schools. The House Education and Labor Committee agreed to allow aid to private schools for special remedial education programs and other noncurricular activities open to all children in a neighborhood. Another question was on the development of plans. Edith Green persuaded the committee to remove any phrases that suggested the development of comprehensive plans before funding. See Blumenthal, 169-71. Adam

Yet, one significant issue was never resolved on the Hill: the objectives of Community Action. Many task force members later recalled that the “maximum feasible participation” clause was ignored entirely. Donald M. Baker, then counsel to the Senate Select Subcommittee on Poverty, later thought if the members read community action and understood what it meant, it would never get through. Sunquist also wrote that one could search the hearings and debates in their entirety and find “no reference to the controversial language regarding the participation of the poor in CAP.”⁵⁰ Not only the Shriver task force but also Congress never clarified the meaning of the participation of “the poor” in CAP.

One of the most significant clauses was neglected because many did not envision that CAP would leave their control. According to C. Robert Perrin, who later became acting deputy director of OEO, the bill was generally straightforward except for community action, which he believed “anyone really fully understood then” other than some ideas that were “floating around.” The participation of “the poor” never became the subject of much discussion during the legislative process. Perrin explained that it

Yarmolinsky, Interview by Paige Mulhollan, 13 July 1970, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; and Interview by Michael L. Gillette, 21 October 1980, 22 October 1980, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Adam Yarmolinsky, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 116; Memo, Sargent Shriver to Lyndon B. Johnson, 29 June 1964, Subject File, FG11-15, Box124, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, S. Rept. 88-1218, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1964, 69-79; Sunquist, 28; Levitan, 46-47.

⁵⁰ Donald M. Baker, interview by Stephen Goodell, 24 February 1969, 5 March 1969, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Donald M. Baker, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 124; Sunquist, 29; Moynihan, 89-91.

was because “every time you use[d] the word “feasible,” you ha[d] the option of going as far as you want[ed] to or stopping as short as you want[ed] to....“feasible” would control how far you had to go.” Put differently, task force members left the definitions of CAP vague so that they would keep the programs under control whenever necessary.⁵¹

1.2 Between Inclusion and Exclusion: Race, Gender, and Citizenship

Welfare and Warfare

The ambiguous character of CAP also had the effect of obscuring linkages between the “War on Poverty” and the war against Communism. Both the welfare state and the warfare state expanded under the slogan of “guns and butter,” considering these elements as two sides of the same coin. Zarefsky has discussed how the military imagery penetrated public discourse and the war metaphor sustained national interest and participation for the “War on Poverty.” It was certainly the case that President Johnson repeatedly deployed the war metaphor both in the framing of the “War on Poverty,” as well as in his speeches.⁵² Yet, the link between the “War on Poverty” and the military was not just at the metaphorical level. Some members of the Johnson administration intended to employ CAP in order to educate the “poor” unqualified for military service.

In January 1964, the Task Force on Manpower Conservation, originally appointed

⁵¹ C. Robert Perrin, interview by Stephen Goodell, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 128-129.

⁵² For instance, when he sent the special “War on Poverty” message to Congress on the 16th of March, he made following remarks: “[o]n similar occasions in the past we have often been called upon to wage war against foreign enemies which threatened our freedom...today we are asked to declare war on a domestic enemy which threatens the strength of our Nation and the welfare of our people.” Furer, 84.

by President Kennedy in September 1963, released a controversial report demonstrating that one-third of the youth who reached draft age would be found unqualified on the basis of the standards set up for military service. When the Department of Defense carefully studied records between August 1958 and June 1960, it found that the actual "over-all" rejection rate was 31.7 percent. In May 1963, however, the department modified the mental aptitude test criteria, and estimated that the rejection rate had increased to about 35 or 36 percent. Of these, about one-half were rejected for medical reasons. The remainder failed through the inability to qualify on the mental and medical tests. The mental test included questions on word knowledge, arithmetic, mechanical understanding, and the ability to distinguish forms and patterns. All men who scored below the "10th percentile" on this test --- roughly corresponding to a fifth grade level of educational attainment --- were disqualified for military service. The report concluded that the majority appeared to be "victims of inadequate education and insufficient health services." Especially regarding the persons who failed the mental test, a major proportion of these young men were the "products of poverty." W. Willard Wirtz, the chairman of the taskforce and the Secretary of Labor, wrote to the President saying that "this level of failure [stood] as a symbol of the unfinished business of the Nation." President Johnson expressed "utmost concern," quickly making a statement that he would present to the Congress a program designed to attack the roots of poverty, so that "no young person, whatever the circumstances, shall reach the age of twenty-one without the health, education, skills that will give him an opportunity to be an effective citizen and a self-supporting individual." The "War on Poverty" would be a perfect means to educate

the “poor” and stir up desire among them to participate in the Democratic Party and the war against Communism.⁵³

There was one public official who was particularly interested in making use of the “War on Poverty” in order to decrease the rejection rates among “poor” youth: Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Robert Lampman noted that Moynihan was interested in using “the Department of Defense to some extent...as a kind of recovery device for kinds who were really ineligible for the draft.” Moynihan had done a research on “the percentage of rejectees who were in some sense from very disadvantaged backgrounds.” According to Lampman, this idea of using the anti-poverty programs to increase the draft among “the poor” in fact “attracted a lot of people” in the initial task force. Moynihan continued to argue that the administration should utilize the “War on Poverty” to expand the number of the “poor” --- especially the African American “poor” --- who could qualify for service. Moynihan wrote to Harry McPherson as follows: “it seems clear what we should do. First say nothing. Second, quietly adjust the Armed Forces Qualifications Test in order to compensate for the general difficulty of Negroes (and Southerners generally) to handle such questions...Third, start a hard, steady Manpower Development and Training Program and Job Corps program to qualify men for the Armed Forces.” The warfare

⁵³ Memo, W. Willard Wirtz to Lyndon B. Johnson, 1 January, 1964, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Box 21, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; The President’s Taskforce on Manpower Conservation, “One-Third of A Nation: A Report on Young Men Found Unqualified for Military Service,” 1 January 1964, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Box 21, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; “Statement by President Johnson on Report “One-Third of A Nation,” 5 January 1964, Office Files of H. McPherson, Box 21, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

state and the welfare state were clearly linked in the minds of President Johnson and some task force members like Moynihan.⁵⁴

In addition, the administration engaged in a continuous effort to project the Great Society to an international audience as part of its anti-Communist agenda. Mary L. Dudziak has shown how race matters became a matter of international concern in postwar America. She argues that the federal government attempted to tell a “particular story...a story of U.S. moral superiority” regarding civil rights during the 1960s. The Great Society could also make an impact on Cold War affairs. A memorandum with a title, “Why should conservatives support the War on Poverty?,” for instance, stated that one of the reasons was “because it [wa]s *American* (emphasis added).” It contended that the “War on Poverty” would preserve “our basic national principles of equal opportunity, local initiative, voluntary service, federal-state-local cooperation, and of public and private cooperation.” Therefore, it was “one of our most effective tools in the war against Communism.” The memorandum emphasized that “our international stature [would] be immeasurable enhanced if we succeed[ed] in becoming the first great nation to enter the anti-poverty race.” The “War on Poverty” was part of America’s cold war strategies to make capitalism look superior. The U.S. Information Agency also suggested that the administration make the Great Society “meaningful to foreign

⁵⁴ Memo, Daniel Patrick Moynihan to Harry McPherson, 16 July 1965, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Box 21, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Robert J. Lampman, interview by Michael L. Gillette, 24 May 1983, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Lampman, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 8; Zarefsky, 28-44.

audience groups” because an understanding of the Great Society was “fundamental to an understanding of the U.S. of today and of the future.” The Great Society, including the “War on Poverty,” would be an effective propaganda tool because it could convince the foreign audience that “a nation so committed to the Great Society could not strive less energetically for peace or refrain more steadfastly from aggression or aspirations for territorial gain or political domination.” The U.S. Information Agency, however, gave the following caution to the administration: (1) “Never suggest that the United States promises to bring the fruits of the Great Society to all people, everywhere, lest the Great Society be interpreted as some sort of vast foreign aid project”; (2) “Use extreme care in projecting “the American standard of living” as requiring improvement, for that standard is considered beyond the hopes and expectations of numerous peoples especially in the developing countries.” With caution in mind, the federal government was advised to publicize the Great Society as a proof of America’s commitment to equality and justice. Once again, a linkage between welfare and warfare was forged.⁵⁵

Finally, there was not only an idea of making use of the “War on Poverty” in order to mobilize the “poor” into warfare, but also of sending Vietnam veterans, especially black officers, to the Community Action Agencies in urban ghettos. While the share of

⁵⁵ “Why Should Conservatives Support the War on Poverty?,” Memo, Bill Moyers to President Johnson, Jenkins, Valenti, O’Brien, Wilson, and Manatos, 6 January 1964, Executive File, WE 9, Box 25, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Memo, U.S. Information Agency to All USIS Posts, 6 October 1965, Confidential File, WE9, Box 98, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Michael Bernstein, *A Perilous Progress: Economists and Public Purpose in Twentieth-Century America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 248.

the military budget was on the rise from 43.2 percent in 1966 to 45.99 percent in 1968, the percentage of social security decreased from 15.38 percent to 13.39 percent. Whereas the Vietnam war expanded and consumed more and more of the nation's resources, urban uprisings flared throughout the major cities, bringing on a severe backlash against the anti-poverty programs. In these situations, a confidential report titled "political stability, national goals and [the] negro veteran," prepared by the National Strategy Information Center INC, suggested that the administration make plans to retrain and employ as many as 1,000 selected African American Vietnam veterans in diversified Community Action programs at the grass roots level. It listed following five objectives: to open the doors of civilian opportunity for those "who ha[d] served their country so well in Vietnam"; to seed into metropolitan slum areas mature "father figures" and symbols of authority; to "generate (informally) a new source of Civic Initiative whose natural leaders, as they identif[ied] themselves in constructive service, w[ould] not be inclined to link the cause of civil rights in America with the Communist doctrine of "anti-imperialist wars of national liberation"; to dispel the widespread myth that military service and patriotism [we]re incompatible with humanitarian ideals and concern for the poor; and to prevent the "Maoists from driving more wedges between whites and Negroes and harnessing unemployed Negro servicemen to sinister causes." It emphasized that it was imperative for the Johnson administration to "break the link" between the "War on Poverty" and "defense against Communist aggression" since Communists and their allies were seeking to forge a connection. The "War on Poverty" was linked up with actual warfare not only because it would decrease the number of

“poor” unqualified for military service and reconstitute them as productive citizens for the sake of the war against Communism, but also because it could provide services for discharged veterans seeking re-entry into civilian life. These discharged veterans were then supposed to infuse the urban ghettos with patriotism.⁵⁶ This idea of mobilizing African American veterans into ghettos was not put to practical use. It shows, however, how the Johnson administration perceived the black ghettos where uprisings flared, how transnational anti-imperialist networks could be forged as a threat to the normative order, and how government officials tried to co-opt radical youth through the “War on Poverty.” Also, seeing as the Moynihan report (entitled *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*) represented the matriarchal black family as the “fundamental problem” causing poverty and “restoring the Negro American Family” as the solution to the “tangle of pathology,” it is no surprise that its authors emphasized the significance of establishing a “normal” and stable family structure by sending “father-figures” to back to the ghettos.

The “War on Poverty” was entangled with the war on Communism in several ways. It was regarded as an apparatus to decrease military rejection rates among the “poor” youth. It was utilized as propaganda for U.S. moral supremacy. There was even an idea of mobilizing discharged veterans in the urban ghettos to sever linkages between black liberation struggles and anti-imperialist movements. Whereas the extant literature on the “War on Poverty” seldom discusses how the anti-Communist agenda was

⁵⁶ National Strategy Information Center, INC., 1 May 1967, Memo, Morris I. Leibman to Joseph A. Califano, Jr., 20 June 1967, Confidential File, WE9, Box 98, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

embedded in the architecture of the anti-poverty programs, it is imperative to understand how the Johnson administration intended to transform the “poor” into self-sufficient and productive citizens through the “War on Poverty.” In this sense, the welfare state and the warfare state were inherently linked.

Incorporating Women as Volunteers

Neither the staff members on the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), nor the Shriver task force discussed gender as dimension of poverty. They muted the question not only of race but also of gender. The “feminization of poverty,” however, was already taking place in the 1960s and the early 70s. According to Diane Pearce, the so-called “feminization of poverty” was under way even though other trends, such as the increase in women’s labor-force participation, the mandating of affirmative action, and the increasing employment of better-educated women, would suggest the potential for improving women’s economic status. In 1976, nearly two out of three of the 15 million poor persons over 16 were women. Yet policymakers failed to understand this trend, and as a result, gender was not considered as a significant analytical framework.

While policymakers passed over the issue of gender in silence during their discussions regarding poverty, the OEO attempted to incorporate women (mainly white middle-class women) into the “War on Poverty” through various techniques once the programs began. When feminist theorists like Quadagno and Fobes analyzed how the welfare state influenced gender relations, they explained that there were three ways of reproducing male dominance. Welfare policies could reinforce gender inequality by

recreating market inequality through eligibility rules that closely connected benefits to wages. They might also reproduce inequality by providing greater rewards for benefits earned through paid work than for those granted on the basis of family membership. Finally, they could recreate the subordination of women by failing to intervene – by excluding women from welfare programs, because women were less competitive in the labor market if they could not find child care or take paid leave when they had children. Quadagno and Fobes emphasized that the welfare state reinforced the gendered division of labor in the household as well as in the market through these mechanisms.⁵⁷

OEO's strategy for defining women's roles in the "War on Poverty" was not based on the exclusion of women but rather on their mobilization. Techniques of "mobilization," as well as those of "exclusion," played an important role in recreating the subordination of women. OEO held two conferences in Washington D.C. in May 1967 and 1968 in order to clarify the roles of women in the anti-poverty programs. At the 1967 conference, Sargent Shriver, the director of OEO, emphasized how indispensable women were to that "war." Shriver pointed out that fifty thousand women served on local community boards and advisory councils in the "War on Poverty" and that more than 10,000 women volunteers from all religious and racial groups had joined an organization called Women in Community Service. But he quickly added that despite this record of participation and involvement among women the OEO had only begun to

⁵⁷ Jill Quadagno and Catherine Fobes, "The Welfare State and the Cultural Reproduction of Gender: Making Good Girls and Boys in the Job Corps," *Social Problems* 42, no.2 (May, 1995), 172.

“scratch the surface.” Put differently, with Head Start, OEO was reaching only 30 percent of the “poor” children who needed that program; with the Neighborhood Youth Corps and Job Corps combined, only 32 percent of the teenagers who needed job training were covered by the “War on Poverty.” Therefore, Shriver contended that women’s involvement in the anti-poverty programs was absolutely necessary. Shriver noted, “these statistics show you how large the need actually is and from that you can easily see why we have called you to Washington.” Bill Crook, the director of the Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), also emphasized the important roles of women in the “War on Poverty.” At the conference, Crook noted, “I believe that the feminine influence upon the national character of this country has been a dominant factor in the conception of the War on Poverty and it should be, I think, a driving force behind its application.” Both Shriver and Crook repeatedly referred to the importance of the roles of women in the “War on Poverty.”⁵⁸

OEO aimed at mobilizing women into the anti-poverty efforts through these conferences because OEO needed strong support from women in order to pass the “War on Poverty” legislation. In a memo to President Johnson, Shriver clearly noted in 1967 that one of the purposes of this day-long conference was “mobilizing the various women’s organizations for legislative backing.” At the conference Theodore Berry, the director of Community Action Program, called women to “tell your congressman back

⁵⁸ Office of Economic Opportunity, *Conference Proceedings: Women in the War on Poverty* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967), 4-6, 52.

home that you [were] interested...and you support[ed] OEO.”⁵⁹ These conferences were clearly designed by OEO to organize women for the anti-poverty programs.

In 1969, OEO published a report entitled “Women in the War on Poverty.” In this report too, OEO emphasized that American women had long been active in efforts to help the “poor,” as individuals and through various organizations. The report declared that many kinds of anti-poverty programs, such as CAP, Head Start, and the Job Corps, offered the chance for women to use “their ingenuity and creative talents, to reinspire and reshape lives, and to participate in an urgent challenge to wipe out poverty.”⁶⁰

There are two significant themes in this report. First, the report stressed that women of all ages and from all walks of life volunteered for the anti-poverty programs. It did not specify the differences among “women” in the anti-poverty efforts. At the conference too, OEO officials had emphasized that women of all kinds were vigorously involved in the “War on Poverty.” Yet some women who participated in the conference objected to this notion of women as a coherent group. For example, Frances Flores, a delegate from the League of Mexican-American Women, suggested that most of the women who were at the conference were members of established organizations dominated by white females. She pointed out that Mexican-American women were not

⁵⁹ Memo from Sargent Shriver to President Johnson, 20 April 1967, Confidential File, Box 129 (Reel 13) in *The Presidential Documents Series, The War on Poverty, 1964-1968: Part 1: The White House Central Files. Selections from the holdings of the Lyndon B. Johnson Library*, ed. Mark I. Gelfand (Frederick, M.D.: University Publications of America, 1986), Microfilm.; OEO, *Conference Proceedings*, 57.

⁶⁰ Office of Economic Opportunity, *Women in the War on Poverty* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1969), 1-2.

part of some of the established general groups and, consequently, they usually did not receive the opportunity to attend the conferences on the “War on Poverty.” Dorothy Height, a delegate from the National Council of Negro Women, also stressed the particular conditions for women of color, mostly African-American women. She suggested that for the African-American woman poverty was “a condition that has plagued her all her life.” Height added that although she spoke primarily of African-American women, what she said had bearing for “all women of minority groups.” While the OEO looked upon women as a coherent group disregarding racial/class differences, these women on the floor questioned whether all women were suffering poverty problems on the same level, and whether they were equally involved in anti-poverty programs.⁶¹

Second, although OEO endeavored to mobilize women into the “War on Poverty,” it tried to incorporate women into the anti-poverty efforts not as paid workers but as volunteers. Nancy A. Naples also suggested that OEO continued to define women’s roles in the “War on Poverty” in volunteer terms, stressing their important support roles, not their leadership roles. In the report, OEO emphasized that more than twenty million women volunteers, either individually or as part of an organization, had participated in programs related to the “War on Poverty.” Of the more than 500,000 individuals who had volunteered for Head Start, for example, the majority had been women. Why did OEO stress the roles of women as volunteers? Naples pointed out that by constructing

⁶¹ OEO, *Conference Proceedings*, 1-2, 20-21, 40-41.

the pathway to prevention of poverty through expanding employment opportunities for poor men, women's employment needs and their actual contributions needed to be ignored or marginalized.⁶² As I discussed before, theories of cultural pathology, which became the philosophical backbone of the "War on Poverty," interpreted "matriarchy" as a major factor in perpetuating poverty among the lower-class. Securing jobs for males was thus viewed as the first step in the fight against poverty, as it would help reconstitute "proper" patriarchal families. In other words, it was important for OEO to keep women as volunteers in order to secure the paid-jobs for poor men.

In order to reinforce the roles of women as volunteers, the OEO invented "a homemaker program" where women were trained in homemaking skills. The goal of this program was to train about 10,000 local women as "sub-professional homemaker aides." These women would go to the homes of the "poorest of the poor" to instruct them in nutrition, sewing, home management, and the like.⁶³ The creation of the "homemaker program" shows that OEO not only attempted to limit women's roles to domestic matters but also tried to reformulate women's subordination by assigning women the roles of aides. OEO endeavored to mobilize women into the "War on Poverty," emphasizing that women of all kinds were vigorously involved in the programs, but it located women as dependents, not as main agents of the programs. By so doing, it

⁶² OEO, *Women in the War on Poverty*, 3; Naples, 5-6.

⁶³ Memo, Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, to the President, 19 August 1968, Executive File, WE9, Box 32, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Memo to President Johnson, 23 August 1968, Subject File, Box 32 (Reel 6) in *The Presidential Documents Series, The War on Poverty*.

assigned women to what Alice Kessler-Harris called “a secondary citizenship” based on their roles as family members and dependents.⁶⁴ Women involved in CAP, however, refused to passively accept these racialized/gendered visions. Once the programs began, some of the women, such as Opal C. Jones and Johnnie Tillmon, struggled against them and asserted their rights in the Community Action Program.

Between Inclusion and Exclusion

The ambiguous aspects of CAP were the necessary outcomes of the contradictory attitudes policy makers had toward “the poor” and black liberation struggles. Sociologists Kenneth J. Neubeck, and Noel A. Cazenave pointed out that a significant change occurred in the racialization of “the poor” in the mid-1960s. As for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Neubeck and Cazenave explained that both eligibility rules and benefits for AFDC recipients were liberalized in the late 1960s. In this way, “racial exclusion” from the rolls began to be increasingly replaced with “racial inclusion.”⁶⁵ CAP and the “War on Poverty” were in the middle of a transition, and policy makers could not resolve several dilemmas. On the one hand, CAP was regarded as an apparatus to transform “the poor” into active, productive, and participatory citizens for the sake of the development of economic wealth and the war against Communism. Yet on the other, task force members were not sure of the extent to which “the poor”

⁶⁴ Alice Kessler-Harris, *In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 12.

⁶⁵ Neubeck and Cazenave, 120-121.

would control CAP. Some policy makers mentioned that they were clearly influenced by black liberation struggles, whereas others denied its impact and completely neglected to mention the relationship between racial inequality and poverty. Rather than being consistent on CAP, these policy makers were divided and constantly changing their views --- on the extent to which “the poor” and people of color were to be incorporated into state programs.

Local welfare activists kept their eyes on precisely this ambiguous character of CAP. As Quadagno argued, the crucial linkages developed between the “War on Poverty,” black liberation struggles, Chicano movement, and the women’s movement once the anti-poverty programs began. The appointment of Jack Conway as director of CAP strengthened these linkages between the anti-poverty programs and social movements. Conway, a labor organizer in Detroit during the early days of the United Automobile Workers (UAW), used the phrase, “maximum feasible participation,” for more radical purposes. Later, Conway noted that he foresaw the degree of the conflict between CAP and local governments.⁶⁶ With support from Conway, local welfare activists created oppositional movements against policy makers who were caught between inclusion and exclusion and could not articulate the significance of racism and

⁶⁶ Jack T. Conway, interview by Michael L. Gillette, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 86; Blumenthal, 173-174. The CAP Guide, published in February, 1965, under the leadership of Conway, officially declared that “a vital feature of every community action program is the involvement of the poor themselves.” – the residents of the areas and members of the groups to be served – in planning, policy-making, and operation of the program.” Office of Economic Opportunity, *Community Action Program Guide: Instructions for Developing, Conducting, and Administering a Community Action Program, as Authorized by Sections 204 and 205 of Title II-A, Economic Opportunity Act of 1964* (Washington, D.C.:GPO, 1965), 7.

sexism in the poverty issue. The CAP program guide, distributed in July 1964 and published in February 1965, suggested that the “poor” would not only participate in the anti-poverty programs, but would also challenge and revise some of the decisions made by the decision-making board. It stated that residents would be provided with “meaningful” opportunities, either as individuals or in groups, to “protest or propose additions to or changes” in the ways in which a Community Action program was being planned or undertaken. In places like Los Angeles, local welfare activists would attempt to recast anti-poverty programs and provide an alternative way of understanding welfare issues.⁶⁷

It was precisely this aspect of CAP --- fostering the political participation of the “poor” --- that triggered tension between local public officials and the Community Action Agencies. Many mayors asserted that CAP was setting up a competing political organization in their own backyards, with help from the OEO. They felt that they were being bypassed in the implementation of anti-poverty activities. Mayors’ organizations, such as the United States Conference of Mayors, with its 600 affiliated cities and mayors, and the National League of Cities, with its 13,000 members, adopted resolutions urging the OEO to recognize agencies endorsed by city hall as the proper channel for the “War on Poverty” programs. As a result, the OEO took several actions to calm down the angered mayors. The administration appointed Vice-President Humphrey as their liaison to local officials. The OEO created a Public Officials Advisory Council where

⁶⁷ Ibid., 16; Blumenthal, 174.

mayors, governors, county officials and city managers would meet with OEO personnel to review the agency's guidelines, publications, pending amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act, and so on. The OEO also tightened up its administrative control over the Community Action Agencies by setting up "national emphasis programs." For example, appropriations for Head Start, one of the "national emphasis programs," increased from 180 million dollars (27.5 percent of the total funds for CAP) to 327,117,000 dollars (40.6 percent) in 1967. Appropriations where the funds for major programs were deducted --- open to utilization for each Community Action Agency ---, on the other hand, were decreased from 315,202,000 dollars (48.2 percent) to 255,796,000 dollars (31.7 percent). All these changes in the management of CAP resulted in stripping the Community Action Agencies of their power to foster the political participation of the "poor."⁶⁸

It was not local public officials' opposition alone, however, that caused disfavor with CAP and that eventually limited its scope. The representation of CAP as a facilitator not only of the participation of the "poor" but also of the urban uprisings in

⁶⁸ Memo, Buford Ellington, Office of Emergency Planning, Executive Office of the President, to the President, 2 August 1965, Executive File, WE9, Box 98, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Memo, Charles L. Schultze, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, to the President, 18 September 1965, Executive File, WE9, Box 98, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Office of Economic Opportunity, *The Quiet Revolution: 2nd Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: OEO, 1967), 9 ;Office of Economic Opportunity, *The Tide of Progress: 3rd Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: OEO, 1968), 7; Donald H. Haider, "Governors and Mayors View the Poverty Program," *Current History* 61, no. 362 (October 1971): 277-276; John J. Gunther, *Federal-City Relations in the United States: The Role of the Mayors in Federal Aid to Cities* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990), 223-225.

major cities brought on a severe backlash against the program. As massive uprisings occurred in almost all of the major cities --- more than 329 instances in 257 cities between 1964 and 1968 ---, the OEO tried to respond to need in the ghettos and meet the grievances of the residents, although their programs were severely underfunded and increasingly limited in scope. As political scientist James W. Button has suggested, the uprisings, after all, were directed not only at the local repressive officers and city halls, but also the federal government. And they were successful to a certain degree, at least in their early years. The OEO reacted to the uprisings, which were interpreted as cries of despair asking for immediate action from the urban ghettos. The city of Los Angeles, for instance, received more than a sixfold increase in funds from the OEO in the year following the Watts uprising. As the escalation of the uprisings became a national security crisis in the 1960s, and as the OEO directed more and more attention to need of the residents in the areas, however, it was bombarded with criticisms from mayors, Southern Democrats, and Republicans. All of these critics were concerned that “the “War on Poverty,” especially CAP, was rewarding violence.”⁶⁹

⁶⁹ James Button compared post-riot expenditure increases to the sample of 40 riot cities with the overall OEO budget outlay increase over the same period. According to Button, urban uprisings had a “greater direct, positive impact” than any other independent variable (such as size of city, number of African Americans, the percentage of the poor, crime rate, etc) upon total OEO expenditure increases in the latter 1960s, as well as upon most individual poverty program increases. The “War on Poverty” became more and more an urban ghettos-oriented program. James W. Button, *Black Violence: Political Impact of the 1960s Riots* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), 9-12, 27-37; J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, “Reformers, Machines, and the War on Poverty,” in *City Politics and Public Policy*, ed. James Q. Wilson (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), 288; Paul Bullock, ed. *Watts: The Aftermath* (New York: Grove Press, 1969), 51-54.

The OEO faced severe criticism as the uprisings intensified. The big-city mayors especially blamed CAP for its assumed role in fomenting the outbursts. Mayor Hugh J. Addonizio of Newark, made a statement on August 22, 1967, that “[t]he cities were flat on their backs and the OEO came along and instead of helping us, as Congress intended, it decided we were a bunch of bullies and it gave a club to the so-called powerless to help beat us as we lay on the ground.” Some Republicans and Southern Democrats joined the mayors in attacking the “War on Poverty.” By quoting an article in a local news paper in Greenville, South Carolina, Republican senator Strom Thurmond, for example, argued that the riots had been “tolerated” and even “encouraged” by persons in high places on the national level and in many State and local governments. The OEO also faced allegations that CAP workers helped to provoke the outburst throughout the U.S.⁷⁰ Moynihan described the assumed connection between CAP and the uprisings as follows: “[a]s Negro rioting grew endemic, the association between community action and violence also grew in the minds of the legislators...In no time at all, the antipoverty program was in trouble in Congress, and the focus of this trouble was community action and the provision for “maximum feasible participation” of the poor.” The more the OEO tried to fund the anti-poverty programs in the curfew areas to alleviate the causes of

⁷⁰ Democrat senator Robert C. Byrd stated furiously that it was the time to avert “incidents such as had wracked Detroit, Newark, and New York was before they start[ed].” He contended that “we must not let firebrands go uncontested or uninvestigated, especially when those same firebrands draw their salaries from moneys provided by the taxpayers who bear[ed] the costs of repairing and rebuilding the damage left behind by those who inspire[d] and cause[d] trouble and mass civil unrest.” U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Byrd speaking for “Antipoverty Official and the Riots,” 90th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 113, pt.15 (27 July 1967): 20410-20411.

the uprisings, the more it was bombarded with criticisms that it was supporting “rioters” and “disrespect for law and order.”⁷¹

The OEO investigated thirty-two cities that experienced the uprisings in the summer of 1967, and found that only 16 out of 30,565 workers were arrested. It insisted that “not one mayor or police chief...accused anti-poverty workers of stirring up trouble, or of encouraging violence.” Instead, the office found that the anti-poverty programs “helped reduce tensions and played an important role in preventing or minimizing racial disturbances.” The OEO continuously published reports, such as “OEO and the Riots” and “Myths and Facts about OEO,” and made desperate efforts to prove the value of the anti-poverty programs in alleviating urban tensions. In order to rebuff the attack against CAP and the “War on Poverty,” the OEO constantly made a statement that the poverty workers were “cooling off” the urban tensions instead of aggravating them, and that the poverty program was still a very small effort in relationship to the needs of the cities.⁷²

⁷¹ Hugh J. Addonizio, “The Mayors Speak,” *Nation's Cities* (October 1967), 7-8; U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Thurmond speaking for “L.B.J. on Toleration of Riots,” 90th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 113, pt.15 (27 July 1967): 20468-20469; Moynihan, 150.

⁷² For instance, against the charge that “the recent riots prove[d] that the anti-poverty program ha[d] been a failure,” the OEO stressed that “there [wa]s hard evidence that job training and educational programs, aimed at taking people out of poverty, buil[t] peaceful alternatives to disorder”; it also rejected the charge that “Detroit got all the money they wanted to eliminate the sources of poverty and they still had a riot,” arguing that Detroit received only 14 percent of what it requested from OEO. Memo, Sargent Shriver to Lyndon B. Johnson, 27 July 1967, Confidential File, Box129, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Memo, Sargent Shriver to Lyndon B. Johnson, 7 September 1967, Confidential File, Box129, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Memo, Sargent Shriver to Lyndon B. Johnson, 12 September 1967, Subject File , FG11-15, Box125, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Memo, Sargent Shriver to Lyndon B. Johnson, 7 March 1968, Confidential File, Box129, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; OEO, “OEO and the

Nonetheless, OEO took actions to set a limit to fostering the participation of the “poor.” As I have already discussed, under the pressure of mayors’ organizations, it set up a Public Officials Advisory Council and established “national emphasis programs,” reducing CAP’s risk-taking nature. Having dim prospects for authorization and facing their dismantlement, the OEO made a behind-the-scenes-effort to pass an amendment proposed by Democrat representative Edith Green for their survival. The so-called Green Amendment placed CAP under the control of a state or local government (as later modified, it provided that a public or private nonprofit agency could be designated by a state or political subdivision of a state). On the surface the OEO stood in opposition to the amendment, but in reality, it was eager to keep CAP within bounds to satisfy big-city mayors, who were concerned with CAP’s assumed role in instigating the uprisings, and Southern Democrats, who feared the participation of African Americans in local politics through CAP. Bertrand Harding, who became deputy director of OEO in May 1966, and acting director in March 1968, later recalled that the Green Amendment was a “conscious effort” on the part of the OEO to satisfy criticisms against the agency. Harding felt that unless “some sort of compromise” was put into the bill, the OEO would have come to a screeching halt. Thus, as the criticism took its toll, CAP no longer

Riots -- A Summary,” Confidential File, Box129 in *The Presidential Documents Series, The War on Poverty, 1964-1968: Part1: The White House Central Files. Selections from the holdings of the Lyndon B. Johnson Library*, ed. Mark I. Gelfand (Frederick, M.D.: University Publications of America, 1986), Microfilm; “Myths and Facts about OEO,” Confidential File, Box129, in *The Presidential Documents Series, The War on Poverty, 1964-1968: Part1: The White House Central Files. Selections from the holdings of the Lyndon B. Johnson Library*, ed. Mark I. Gelfand (Frederick, M.D.: University Publications of America, 1986), Microfilm; Button, 42-44.

worked as a vehicle for organizing the “poor” --- it became a part of the regular local government structure. Ironically enough, big-city mayors, who staunchly opposed CAP at the earlier stage, now expressed “deep concern” with the cutbacks in CAP spending and demanded “adequate funding” of the anti-poverty program.⁷³

In the preceding argument, I have discussed the processes through which poverty was rediscovered, and how theories of cultural pathology came to the forefront of policymaking in the early 1960s. I have analyzed how the Community Action Program, along with its famous doctrine of “maximum feasible participation,” was invented by scholars and officials. The specific goals of CAP were left inherently vague. The ambiguous aspect of CAP concealed not only divisions among government departments and agencies involved in the anti-poverty programs as well as the distance between Johnson’s promises of an “unconditional war” and the minimal budget available, but also the close connection between the welfare state and the warfare state. I have also demonstrated that CAP was deployed in order to educate the “poor” unqualified for military service. CAP and the War on Poverty became part of America’s cold war strategies and proof of America’s commitment to equality and justice. It could also provide jobs for discharged veterans seeking re-entry into civilian life, who were assumed to infuse the urban ghettos with patriotism.

⁷³ “Mayors to Fight U.S. Fund Cutback,” *New York Times*, 28 January 1967; Bertrand M. Harding, interview by Stephen Goodell, 20 November 1968, 25 November 1968, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, 329-330; Haider, 278, 302-303; Levitan, 101-103.

The sometimes confused workings of CAP masked the linkage between racial and gender inequality and poverty. I have shown how the OEO emphasized the role played by women in the “War on Poverty” and endeavored to mobilize women’s support for the anti-poverty efforts. While the OEO stressed that women were indispensable to the anti-poverty efforts, it located women as volunteers, and dismissed racial and class differences among them.

I have also demonstrated that the concept of CAP was left ambiguous because there was no consensus among policymakers as to the extent to which “the poor” and people of color were to be part of the American welfare state. The original concept of CAP was suspended between inclusion and exclusion. CAP provoked a furious backlash from the city hall precisely because it fostered the participation of the “poor” (especially the black “poor”) in local politics and carved out a social space for the activists to challenge and transgress the boundaries of citizenship. Also, CAP and the “War on Poverty” increasingly came under attack precisely because the participation of the “poor” posed a grave threat to the city hall and the critics of the OEO, as CAP was represented in relation to the uprisings in the cities. By opening up new terrain for “the poor” and people of color to intervene, CAP in the U.S. would take a different trajectory from Japanese “community programs” that would become an apparatus to reinforce a racialized national identity.

Before assessing the legacy of the “War on Poverty,” one needs to see why CAP became so contested and controversial. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on Los Angeles, and explore how the city of Angeles became an arena of struggle over the meaning of welfare

and citizenship. They examine how local activists came to exploit openings in CAP and assert their welfare rights when the programs actually began.

Chapter II.

“The Local Governments Need to Make Efforts to Keep the Residents’ Movements Negotiable”: The Model Community Program in Japan, 1967-1973

I now introduce the case of another country, namely Japan, as a way to examine how different capitalist countries employed similar technologies relating to community action and citizen participation. I analyze the ways in which the participatory schemes produced different results when transplanted to Japan. The “Community programs” in Japan were the Liberal-Democratic Party’s (LDP) political response to the ascendancy of residents’ movements as well as oppositional left-wing parties. The residents’ movements that had been expanding since the mid-1960s, and that had been dealing with various kinds of issues such as *kōgai* (environmental pollution), prices, and welfare, had a great impact on both national and local politics.¹ Indeed, during times of perceived national crises, the Ministry of Home Affairs and affiliated scholars reinvented the tactics of citizen participation, trying to foster “a sense of nationhood” in the masses through a program called the Model Community Program (MCP).

¹ Matsubara Haruo ed, *Jūmin sankā to jichi no kakushin* (Tokyo: Gakuyō Shobō, 1974); Shimada Shuichi, “Chihō jichi to jūmin no shutai keisei,” *Kagaku to shisō* 32 (1979), 686-702.

2.1 Reinventing the Tactics of Citizen Participation

The Rediscovery of “Community Disintegration”

While the so-called “rediscovery of poverty” provided a foundation for the conceptualization of the Community Action Program in the United States, it was the rediscovery of “community disintegration” that became the pretext for the inception of MCP in Japan. The architects of MCP repeatedly emphasized that rapid urbanization had resulted in a profound deterioration of the living environment and the “disintegration of community,” which caused numerous social problems in the nation’s cities.²

It was certainly the case that the rapid expansion of the Japanese economy in the postwar period --- especially in the 1960s --- transformed people’s everyday lives. Between 1955 and 1973, the real GNP expanded at an annual rate of 10 percent in Japan, increasing more rapidly than in any other industrial economy in the world. People rushed into major cities such as Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto and Kobe, searching for new employment opportunities. Such dramatic urbanization processes caused several changes in family life. The average family size, which remained at a little under five persons from the 1920s down through the mid-1950s, dropped to 3.45 in 1975. The nuclear family now became widespread, due to the fall in birth rate after the initial postwar “baby boom” and the decline in the number of three-generation

² Kimura Hitoshi, “Komyunitī taisaku nit suite,” in *Komyunitī dokuhon*, ed. Chiho Jichi Seido Kenkyukai (Tokyo:Gyōsei, 1973), 120; Matsubara Haruo, *Komyunitī no riron to jissen* (Tokyo: Gakken, 1976); Matsubara Haruo, “Komyunitī shisaku o hitsuyō to shita haikai” in *Komyunitī kenkyū hōkoku* (Tokyo: Jichishō Komunitī Kenkyūkai, 1977).

households.³

Changing gender roles and family structures heightened the sense of an emergent social crisis. The prevalence of the nuclear family had both progressive and repressive impacts on women's lives. While the concept of the family as a continuing corporate household (ie) was weaker in the city than in the countryside, the separation of workplace and living space, along with the limited employment opportunities outside the home and the lack of day care facilities, confined women to the domestic sphere. In fact, the percentage of women who became housewives increased during the so-called era of the "economic miracle." Women were assumed to sustain high-priced male labor, which in turn supported rapid economic growth. It was only after 1975 that the number of working women began to rise.⁴ According to the architects of MCP, the rapid changes in family life caused by urbanization made families more isolated and anonymous, resulting in a weakening sense of "community." The policy makers of MCP argued that in order to counteract the effects of urbanization, the central government had to take the initiative in rebuilding these disintegrating "communities."

³ Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 3-6; Peter Duus, *Modern Japan*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), 291-296, 303-307.

⁴ A house became, in Historian Nishikawa Yuko's words, a "place to exhibit women's cultural works." Nishikawa Yuko, "Otoko no ie, onna no ie, seibetsu no nai heya: Zoku sumai no hensen to "katei" no seiritsu," in *Jendā no Nihon shi: Shutai to hyōgen, shigoto to seikatsu*, eds. Wakita Haruko and S. B. Hanley (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1995), 609-644. See also Ochiai Emiko, *21 seiki kazoku e: Kazoku no sengo taisei no mikata/koekata* (Tokyo: Yuhikaku Sensho, 1994), 22; Shimoebisu Miyuki, "Kazoku seisaku no rekishiteki tenkai: Ikuji ni taisuru seisaku taiō no hensen," in *Gendai kazoku to shakai hoshō*, ed. Shakai Hoshō Kenkyūjo (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), 264.

Equally significant in the creation of MCP, however, was the ways in which the surge of so-called “residents’ movements (*jūmin undō*)” had transformed the national political landscape. In the 1958 general elections, while the LDP received 61.6 percent of the total vote, only 48.9 percent of votes went to the party in 1976. As environmental pollution caught public attention, left-wing governors and mayors, who attacked the LDP for its pursuit of a policy of “economism” and its neglect of environmental safety, were elected in the metropolitan areas. The reputed Big Four pollution cases ignited fury among the public.⁵ Popular discontent was manifested in “residents’ movements,” where pollution victims and their allies used demonstrations, sit-ins, local election campaigns, and court struggles to pressure the government in taking remedial action. The supporters of these “residents’ movements” turned away from LDP candidates and helped send “progressive”(*kakushin*) left-wing governors into office in major prefectures like Tokyo, Osaka, Kanagawa. As a result, “progressive” mayors were elected in more than 120 out of 639 entire cities. The landslide victory of Minobe Ryōkichi --- a professor at the Tokyo University of Education (*Tokyo kyōiku daigaku*) and a son of the famous constitutionalist Minobe Tatsukichi --- as a governor of Tokyo exemplified this

⁵ The Big Four cases were the “Minamata disease” (mercury-filled effluents from a Nippon Chisso Corporation plant in Kumamoto prefecture); the “Niigata Minamata disease” (mercury-filled effluents from the Shōwa Denkō Corporation in Niigata); the “ita-itai (meaning “it hurts, it hurts”) disease (cadmium-filled effluents from a Mitsubishi Mining Corporation refinery in Toyama); and the “Yokkaichi disease” (asthma caused by air pollution near the petrochemical industrial complex in Yokkaichi city, Mie). Kamioka Namiko, *Nihon no kōgaishi* (Tokyo: Sekai Shobō, 1987); Frank K. Upham, “Unplaced Persons and Movements for Peace,” in *Postwar Japan as History*, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 325-346.

power shift from the LDP to the “progressive” governors and mayors.⁶

The newly elected governors and mayors like Minobe expanded welfare, medical, and education programs. For instance, they increased the number of day nurseries under the slogan, “create as many nurseries as mailboxes” and in addition provided free health care for the elderly. They organized an association in 1965, proposing that *kakushin* local governments “encircle” the central government controlled by the LDP. They urged the LDP to change its economy-centered policy, foster political participation of the residents, and pay more attention to their welfare needs --- in order for both capitalists *and* workers to reap the benefits from the “economic miracle.”

As a result, instead of fixating on promoting economic growth, the LDP-controlled central government was forced to respond to the criticisms made by “progressive” governors, mayors, and their supporters by advancing its welfare policy. The cabinet, headed by Tanaka Kakuei, made an announcement that they would establish the Ministry of the Environment and improve its environmental policy, provide free health care for the elderly who were older than 65 years old, and set up aid for children. They called 1973 “the first year of welfare (*fukushi gannen*),” a watershed in the history of the Japanese welfare state. Furthermore, they came to assert the significance of

⁶ Goto, 211; Shindo, 224-225. See also Abe Hitoshi, “Jūmin undō to chiiki seiji,” *Chiiki kaihatsu* 154 (1977): 56-69; Nakamura Kiichi, “Jūmin undō no soshiki to kōzō,” *Chiiki kaihatsu* 154 (1977): 22-32; Omori Wataru, “Jūmin undō no tenkai katei,” *Chiiki kaihatsu* 154 (1977): 13-21; Sato Atsushi, “Jūmin undō to jichitai gyōsei,” *Chiiki kaihatsu* 154 (1977): 43-55; Yamamoto Eiji, “Jūmin undō no hassei yōin,” *Chiiki kaihatsu* 154 (1977): 2-12; Yasuhara Shigeru, “Jūmin undō ni okeru rīdā sō no seikaku,” *Chiiki kaihatsu* 154 (1977): 33-42.

“citizen participation” in the implementation of welfare policies and programs.⁷

It was thus not only a “disintegration of community” but also a political shift brought about by urbanization and residents’ movements that provoked policy makers to consider inventing a new MCP during the early 1970s.⁸ “Community” programs would be an effective technology not only to meet the welfare needs of the residents but also to reunite societies divided by oppositional movements from below.

The Creation of the Community Approach

Similar to CAP in the U.S., “community programs” became one of the major social welfare enterprises in Japan during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The creation of community programs in Japan had its origin in 1967, with official statements by the Tokyo metropolitan government and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Social Welfare Council of the Tokyo metropolitan government released a document entitled, “About the Development of Community Care in Tokyo,” in September 1969. It emphasized the significance of supporting “communities” as a whole in order to implement welfare programs geared towards children and elderly people, rather than confining these groups to institutions such as kindergartens and homes for the elderly. It called for an “active

⁷ Ibid.; Shinohara Hajime, *Shimin sanko* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977), 3.

⁸ While the LDP failed to win a majority of the vote, it managed to control the cabinet through the electoral districting system, whose boundaries had not been redrawn since the early postwar period when half of the population still lived in the countryside. See Duus, 315-318.

participation of residents in local areas” to promote such “community care” programs.⁹

Influenced by the Tokyo metropolitan government’s initiative, the National Life Council of the Ministry of Home Affairs published a famous document, “Community: The Recovery of Humanity in Everyday Life.” In January 1968 Prime Minister Sato Eisaku established the National Life Council in order to secure “healthy Japanese people’s lives.” The chairman of the Council, Matsukuma Hideo, declared that “now was the time to recognize the necessity of building communities and making efforts to develop them.” The National Council expanded the notion of “community” from a term that encompassed mainly children and the elderly to a much broader concept targeted towards all residents in designated areas.¹⁰

In the same fashion as CAP, the “community approach” became a primary mechanism. “Community: The Recovery of Humanity in Everyday Life” defined “community” as a group designed to meet the residents’ various demands and creative impulses based on “residents’ willingness and responsibility.” According to the document, there existed four obstacles to community action: (1) the residents’ lack of interest in local activities, (2) the scarcity of community facilities, (3) the problems

⁹ Tokyooto Minseikyoku, *Komyunitī kea no suishin ni tsuite: Dai ikkai hōkoku* (Tokyo: Tokyooto Minseikyoku, 1977).

¹⁰ Professors in various fields such as sociology, law, education, and engineering constituted the subcommittee of community problems in the National Life Council. Along with the Community Study Group established by the Ministry of Home Affairs later, it became the main taskforce for “model community programs.” Kokumin Seikatsu Shingikai, *Komyunitī– Seikatsu no ba ni okeru ningensei no kaifuku* (Tokyo: Ōkurasyo Insatsukyoku, 1969); Memo, “Koremade no komunitī o meguru ugoki,” n.d., Gyōseika, Sōmushō.

created by rapid urbanization, and (4) the “connection” between some neighborhood self-governing bodies and “particular political parties” (meaning the Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party). It emphasized that “the more a community broke down, the more people recognize[d] its necessity.” In other words, “community programs” were crucial precisely because “communities” were crumbling in the late 1960s. “Community” was regarded as “the last place to recover humanity” --- a space in which to solve a wide range of problems, including issues of environmental protection, juvenile delinquency, children’s safety, the need for leisure, the issues of the elderly, and the status of women.¹¹

Translating the Technology of Citizenship

It was not pure coincidence that similar types of “community programs” were brought into existence in Japan during the late 1960s and early 70s. Leading scholars in political science, such as Omori Wataru and Nishio Masaru, conducted research on CAP at the time it was implemented in the U.S.¹² Omori published a detailed account of CAP in 1974. According to Omori, CAP functioned less as a program of allocating welfare services and more as a function of transforming the traditional way of understanding

¹¹ Kokumin Seikatsu Shingikai, *Komyunitī*, vi, 13-14.

¹² Omori Wataru, “Gendai gyōsei ni okeru ‘jūmin sankā’ no tenkai: 1960 nendai America ni okeru ‘komyunitī katsudō jigyō’ no dōnyū to henyō,” in *Gendai gyōsei to kanryō sei vol.1*, ed. Taniuchi Yuzuru (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974), 267-325; Nishio Masaru, *Kenryoku to sankā: Gendai Amerika no toshi gyōsei* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1975).

poverty and challenging prejudice against the “poor.” The significance of CAP lay in the ways in which it problematized the system that had deprived the “poor” of their confidence, self-esteem, and identities --- and in the process, it shook the powerbase of political elites. CAP came under attack and it was easy, argued Omori, to see why. CAP came to be regarded as a program targeting African Americans, and failing to gain support from the white “poor.” CAP also experienced an internal dilemma while fighting against the (local) government with financial help from the (federal) government. The federal government maintained the power of allocating and withdrawing funds, as well as deciding how the funds were going to be used. Having less and less room available for each Community Action Agency, the representatives of the “poor” were disenchanted and frustrated with CAP. Omori demonstrated that regardless of its innovative policies, CAP was caught up in insoluble political contradictions and foundered in the end.¹³

Nishio’s *Power and Participation* also made reference to CAP. According to Nishio, CAP exemplified programs aiming to foster the participation of residents and in the process produced complicated conflicts and rivalries. It “emerged from turmoil and enlarged turmoil,” yet it also fostered the “development of the organizations and cultivated the leaders at the bottom of the black community.” Nishio acknowledged that what was going on in Japan, such as the prevalence of residents’ movements, the concept of citizens’ participation, and the development of communities, had influenced his book,

¹³ Omori, 311-315.

although he had accomplished a significant amount of research by the time MCP was initiated by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Through his examination of CAP and other programs aimed at fostering the participation of residents, he tried to capture “what was unique to America,” such as the impact of black liberation struggles on the concept of the participation, and “the universal trends,” which would be applicable to the Japanese case.¹⁴

Omori and Nishio published their articles with Sato Atsushi, a core member of the Community Study Group charged with designing the Model Community Program in Japan. Sato served as a chairperson of the Tokyo Model Community Program’s Committee on Citizen Participation from the 1973 to 1977. Nishio became a chairperson of the same committee in 1982.¹⁵ In a moment of perceived Japanese national crisis, these leading political scientists introduced the states’ technologies for re-creating “communities.”

It was not only these political scientists who turned their attention to CAP. Okuda Michihiro, an urban sociologist and one of the members of the Community Study Group, referred directly to the CAP’s “maximum feasible participation” clause when fleshing out his ideas for the Model Community Program. He stressed that the goal of community policy in Japan boiled down to how the “participation of residents” could be realized. According to Okuda, there were three stages to the realization of the

¹⁴ Nishio, iii, v, 69.

¹⁵ Musashino city, *Musashino shi no komyunitī: Komyunitī no kihon gensoku* (Tokyo: Musashino city, 1998), 13-20.

“participation of residents.” The first stage was simply providing information concerning the role of the government in community programs; the second stage was allowing residents to commit themselves to the decision-making processes; the third and final stage was letting the residents not only make decisions, but also administer and manage the programs. Okuda argued that “whereas in our country, the third stage was still at its planning stages, it was no longer at the experimental level in the U.S. --- it was called ‘maximum feasible participation,’ and in the middle of being implemented in several cities.”¹⁶ For Okuda, CAP in the U.S. was therefore an excellent example to follow. In fact, as Majima Masahide argues, CAP was one of the models used for the conceptualization of the Japanese Model Community Program --- it demonstrated how the federal government could seize the initiative in fostering the political participation of residents through community programs.¹⁷

In addition, Okuda contended that while CAP dealt with “African American issues that were specific to the U.S.,” the expansion and institutionalization of the residents’ participation could be understood as a government’s response to the “rise of citizens’ power (including black power).”¹⁸ Okuda’s argument showed how the

¹⁶ Okuda Michihiro, “Komyunitī keisei o meguru gyōsei to jūmin,” *Jūmin sankā to jichi no kakushin*, ed. Matsubara Haruo (Tokyo: Gakuyō Shobō, 1974), 201-203.

¹⁷ Majima Masahide, “Komyunitī to jichitai nai bunken: Jūmin jichi no kiso tani no saikouchiku,” *Kōiki to kyōiki no gyōsei seido*, ed. Ito Yuichiro, ed. (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997), 356.

¹⁸ Okuda Michihiro, “Shimin undō to shimin sankā,” in *Iwanami toshi kōza gendai toshi seisaku II: Shimin sankā*, ed. Shinohara Hajime (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1973), 103-105.

architects of the Japanese Model Community Program construed the issues of race as something relevant only to the American society, and how they interpreted the CAP's "maximum feasible participation" clause as a reasonable governmental response to the challenge posed by movements from below.

There was, however, a notable difference between CAP in the U.S. and MCP in Japan regarding the technology of participation. Whereas in the U.S. fostering the participation of the residents was perceived as a "revolutionary" activity by some of the "radical" members of the "War on Poverty" taskforce, there was nothing revolutionary about it in the Japanese case. As Omori Wataru made clear in the interview, MCP was so embedded in the power-structure that it did not become a site of contestation.¹⁹ While CAP generated a conflict, provoking controversy throughout the nation, the later-developed MCP would turn out to be a moderate community-building project. It is well worth examining why.

The Model Community Program: Rights and Obligations

In April 1971, the Ministry of Home Affairs officially announced that it would launch model community programs throughout the nation, and as a result "community centers" were established in 83 local areas by 1973. MCP turned out to be a program focusing on establishing a wide range of facilities and centers for the designated districts: (1) facilities that would secure traffic safety (such as pedestrian roads, bicycle tracks, and

¹⁹ Omori Wataru, Interview by the author, 23 December 2005, Arcadia Ichigaya Shigakukaikan, Tokyo.

street lights) with side trees and flowers along the streets; (2) places that would conserve the environment in areas such as pastures, public restrooms, junkyards, facilities for crime/fire-prevention, and evacuation areas; (3) cultural centers such as meeting places, citizens' public halls (*kōminkan*), libraries, centers for children (*jidōkan*), and training centers; (4) clinics and health centers; (5) social welfare facilities, such as day nurseries/day-care centers and nursing homes for the elderly; (5) gymnastic and recreational sites, such as parks, playgrounds for children, recreational ground, gyms, pools, and recreational farms; and finally, community centers that would be the epitome of MCP. The local governments were charged with the tasks of conferring with their residents and creating these facilities. Each designated "model community" received an average amount of 100 million yen as municipal bonds in three years. By the spring of 1977, four hundred and ten facilities were established in the "model communities" throughout the nation (See Table 3).²⁰

In the same year that it launched MCP, the Ministry of Home Affairs established the Community Study Group, its main taskforce. Seven scholars in various fields such as public administration, sociology, urban engineering, and urban/rural planning joined the group. Together with public officials in the Ministry of Home Affairs, they did

²⁰“Komunitī (kinrinshakai) ni kansuru taisaku yōkō,” Jichishō jimu jikan (Administrative vice-minister of the Ministry of Home Affairs) to governors, 3 April 1971, in *Komunitī dokuhon*, 241-44; Matsubara, *Komyunitī no riron to jissen*; Morimura Michiyoshi, *Komyunitī no keikaku gihō* (Tokyo: Shokokusha, 1978), 25; Jichi Sōgō Sentā, *Komunitī kankei yōkō tou shiryōshū* (Tokyo: Jichi sōgō sentā, 1979); Memo, “Koremade no komunitī o meguru ugoki,” n.d., Gyōseika, Sōmushō.

intensive research on MCP and shaped the contours of the program.²¹ Their discourses on “resident participation” and “community” offer crucial insights with respect to the political and social history of the Japanese welfare state.

Some architects of MCP did not hide their intentions to use it as an apparatus to co-opt the residents’ movements. They rationalized MCP by contending that residents’ movements were too egoistic in nature. In the report “Community: The Recovery of Humanity in Everyday Life (1969),” Shimizu Keihachiro stressed that the *raison d’être* of community [wa]s to build organizations where residents would not only make demands for self-government but also for a relationship that would make clear both their “rights and obligations.”²² Matsubara Haruo and Sato Atsushi agreed with Shimizu. Matsubara contended that community-building should overcome the egoism demonstrated by residents’ movements and advance cooperativeness. Sato explained as follows: “through cooperation in the community, residents [wer]e expected to go into

²¹ Jichishō Komyunitī Kenkyūkai, *Komyunitī kenkyūkai chūkan hōkoku* (Tokyo: Jichishō Komyunitī Kenkyūkai, 1973); Jichishō Komyunitī Kenkyūkai, *Komyunitī kenkyūkai hōkoku* (Tokyo: Jichishō Komyunitī Kenkyūkai, 1977); Memo, “Koremade no komunitī o meguru ugoki,” n.d., Gyōseika, Sōmushō. The following scholars joined the Community Study Group: Higasa Tadashi (professor at the Department of Engineering, University of Tokyo), Ishida Yorifusa (associate professor at the Department of Engineering, Tokyo Metropolitan University), Ito Shigeru (associate professor at the Department of Engineering, University of Tokyo), Kurasawa Susumu (associate professor at the Department of Humanities, Tokyo Metropolitan University), Matsubara Haruo (associate professor at the Department of Education, University of Tokyo), Morimura Michiyoshi (associate professor at the Department of Engineering, University of Tokyo), and Sato Atsushi (professor at the Department of Law, Seikei University).

²² Shimizu Keihachiro, “Komyunitī hōkoku nit suite,” in *Komyunitī: Seikatsu no ba ni okeru ningensei no kaifuku*, ed. Komyunitī Mondai Shōiinkai (Komyunitī Mondai Shōiinkai, 1969), iv-v.

training in order to be responsible governmental subjects or agents. The isolation of residents, the rise of the egoistic nature of residents' demands, and their increased dependency on the government --- egoism and regionalism like this prevailed among the local and national politics, turning residents into irresponsible beneficiaries easily influenced by others."²³ For these scholars, the creation of the community programs was an urgent matter because they would transform residents into subjects or agents willing to take responsibility for the government, rather than simply making "unreasonable" demands.

According to these architects, residents' movements became egoistic due to their isolation and alienation from society. Miyazawa Hiroshi's following statement was a typical example of their interpretations: "[N]owadays, there [wa]s a lack of communication, or mutual understanding, among people, as words like "alienation," "rupture," and "loneliness" illustrate[d]. Community should be the place where people would recover their humanity and their sense of social solidarity."²⁴ One of the members of the community study group, Kurasawa Susumu, knew that this justification of MCP was under attack. According to the critics of MCP, the lack of mutual understanding did not exist; that the Home Ministry officials and the community study group put too much emphasis on the emotional aspects of the community programs; and

²³ Matsubara Haruo, "Komyunitī shisaku o hitsuyō to shita haikei," in *Komyunitī kenkyū hōkoku*, ed. Jichishō Komyunitī Kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Jichishō Komyunitī Kenkyūkai, 1977), 7; Sato Atsushi, "Gyōsei shisaku to shite no komyunitī," in *Komyunitī kenkyū hōkoku*, 15-17.

²⁴ Miyazawa Hiroshi, "Komyunitī ni tsuite," *Chihō jichi* 266 (1970), 4-5.

that their programs would nurture artificial cooperation among residents.²⁵ The architects, however, explained the rise of the residents' movements as an indicator of the lack of community-consciousness among the residents, rather than of systemic problems posed by the policy of "economism" adopted by LDP government.

Elevating community-consciousness was the tactical response to the rise of the oppositional movements. According to Matsubara Haruo, the real intention of MCP was to "channel residents' voluntary power" into the development of community. MCP was a "strategy to let residents internalize a sense of community." He suggested that the groundwork for residents' movements was basically the same foundation on which they could create MCP.²⁶ In the face of the rise of residents' movement, the notion of a "sense of community" could no longer be perceived without a certain degree of ambivalence. MCP was a technology of reconstructing the nation through creating a "sense of community" in a moment of a perceived national crisis.

Turning to "community-consciousness" was not necessarily a new technology for the Ministry of Home Affairs. Sheldon Garon examined the "century of the moral suasion behavior," demonstrating how government officials made "extraordinary efforts" to transform the Japanese into active participants in the state's projects. According to

²⁵ Kurasawa Susumu, "Jūmin katsudō kara mita komyunitī," Jichishō Komyunitī Kenkyūkai, *Komyunitī kenkyū hōkoku*, 104-105.

²⁶ Matsubara, "Komyunitī shisaku o hitsuyō to shita haikai," 5; Matsubara Haruo, "Komyunitī shisaku no tenbō – shakai keikaku no tachibakara," in *Komyunitī kenkyū hōkoku*, ed. Jichishō Komyunitī Kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Jichishō Komyunitī Kenkyūkai, 1977), 139, 141. See also Matsubara, *Komyunitī no riron to jissen*, 77-79.

Garon, they fostered “a sense of nation” in the masses and create a national orthodoxy with help from “popular” (*minkan*) ideologues during the pre-war and post-war periods.²⁷ MCP found itself echoed in other campaigns initiated by the Ministry of Home Affairs which also targeted the Japanese masses and sought to transform them into active, productive, and participatory subjects.

It is thus clear that the Model Community Program was developed to deal with the Japanese people’s criticisms of increased social chaos brought about by the government’s policies of high economic growth. In other words, these programs were created to solve such problems by promoting mutual understanding and cooperation among residents at the community level. The program performed the function of “dividing and restraining a sense of rights and autonomy among residents,” so that consciousness among residents would remain at the local level without pressuring the national government.²⁸ Sato Atsushi stressed that the local governments needed to keep the residents’ movements “negotiable,” “adopt” the criticisms raised by the residents, and “co-opt” their efforts. These policy makers and scholars regarded the Model Community Program as an apparatus designed to co-opt radical residents’ movements and transform them into “negotiable” local organizations.²⁹

As a new technology focused on internalizing a “sense of community” in the

²⁷ Sheldon Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 8, 17-18.

²⁸ Shimada, “Chihō jichi to jūmin no shutai keisei,” 692-693.

²⁹ Sato Atsushi, “Jūmin undō to jichitai gyōsei,” *Chiiki kaihatsu* 154 (1977), 43-55.

Japanese masses, MCP became a model for numerous programs in the early 1970s. According to Matsubara, other ministries and agencies rushed to create and reinforce similar types of “community” programs.³⁰ The “community” approach emerged as the key concept of Japanese social welfare programs in the early 1970s.³¹

The technology of participation had different consequences when translated into the Japanese Model Community Program. Policy makers invented MCP to respond to the criticisms made by the advocates of the residents’ movements and to counteract “progressive” governors, mayors, and their supporters. It became an effective tactic of fostering “a sense of nationhood” in times of perceived crises. While CAP generated a conflict that shook the nation, MCP did not become an arena of contestation. It would turn out to be another community-building program initiated by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

2.2 Redrawing the Boundaries of Communities: Race, Gender, and

³⁰ The Ministry of Health and Welfare established the Central Social Welfare Council in December 1971, and published a document titled “Community Formation and Social Welfare.” The Ministry of Education started improving the conditions of public halls (*kōminkan*), which were created in 1949 to encourage educational/art/cultural activities. The National Land Agency had granted a subsidy to local governments in such places as depopulated areas, isolated islands, and heavy snowfall areas for the purpose of establishing “community centers” since 1971. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries created a variety of centers (Mountain Village Development Centers, Centers for the Environmental Improvement of Rural Villages / Work Opportunities) since 1970. Finally the Ministry of Labor improved the conditions of the Centers for Working Women and Homes for Working Young People. Matsubara Haruo, “Jichishō moderu komyunitī shisaku,” *Komyunitī kenkyū hōkoku*, ed. Jichishō Komyunitī Kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Jichishō Komyunitī Kenkyūkai, 1977), 22-33.

³¹ Memo, “Koremade no komunitī o meguru ugoki,” n.d., Gyōseika, Sōmushō.

Citizenship

Disconnection and Continuity with WWII

While there were some members who openly endorsed the idea of MCP as a means to co-opt residents' movements, others were anxious about the criticisms made by opponents of MCP. They made desperate attempts to assuage these critics, assuring them that MCP would not become a type of program where the government simply exhorted the masses to do what it wanted them to do.³² Kimura Hitoshi acknowledged that it would be dangerous to have a fixed idea about a model community and the way it should be created. He contended, however, that “our nation [wa]s far behind other countries in maintaining the local environment,” and that it would be “extremely effective for the local government to present some idea of a community and develop facilities that would improve the local environment.”³³ Kurosawa Susumu agreed with Kimura. He argued that while the government “should not normally get involved in this,” MCP “required the government to stimulate the program and sprinkle water on what [wa]s already growing.” Both stressed that what mattered most was that the residents made the decisions, not the government. MCP conditioned residents to vigorously participate in the programs and act in their own interest.³⁴ These members took great pains to

³² *Komyunitī– Seikatsu no ba ni okeru ningensei no kaifuku*, vi; Chuō Shakai Fukushi Shingikai, *Komyunitī keisei to shakai fukushi (Toben)* (Tokyo: Chuō Shakai Fukushi Shingikai, 1971), 8, 19; Miyazawa Hiroshi, “Komyunitī ni tsuite,” *Chihō jichi* 266 (1970), 2-9.

³³ Kimura Hitoshi, “Komyunitī taisaku ni tsuite,” 119.

³⁴ Kurasawa Susumu, “Komyunitī to wa nani ka,” in *Komyunitī dokuhon*, 23.

differentiate MCP from the top-down militaristic program mounted by the Home Ministry in the pre-war period. The “notorious” *chōnaikai/burakukai* (neighborhoods’ and/or villages’ associations) were still fresh in the memories of the critics of MCP. Not surprisingly, the issue of neighborhoods’/villages’ associations was a “taboo subject” in the Home Ministry.

The *chōnaikai/burakukai* became widespread during WWII. In 1940, the Ministry of Home Affairs officially became involved in organizing them, and in 1942 they were put under the control of the *Taisei yokusan kai* (Imperial Rule Assistance Association, which was created by the 2nd Konoe Fumimaro cabinet in 1940). Occupying the lowest level of Imperial Japan’s government hierarchy, they were utilized for mobilizing the Japanese masses into the war effort as well as disciplining their behaviors with help from the police and local “bosses.” Since the *chōnaikai/burakukai* were closely related to Japanese imperialism, they were regarded as a barrier to democratization of Japan during the occupation period. While the Ministry of Home Affairs desperately tried to make them survive, the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ-SCAP) issued more and more stringent guidelines for the *chōnaikai/burakukai* --- first, they purged the heads of the associations and promoted elections; second, they demanded the abolishment of the associations; finally they began to punish those who still attempted to get involved with them. The *chōnaikai/burakukai*, however, continued to exist by taking on a different name and shape. That was precisely why the critics were skeptical of the “new” program initiated by the Ministry of Home Affairs; and why the architects felt the need to use the *katakana*

word (that is, a foreign loan word), community (*komyunitī*), instead of a Japanese word like *chōnaikai/burakukai*. This was in order to signify that the new program was not “indigenous” to Japan.³⁵ It was imperative for the architects of MCP to demonstrate that their project was completely different from old, top-down organizations like neighborhoods’/villages’ associations.

Kimura emphasized that new community organizations should be open and based on the “residents’ voluntary wills and responsibilities.” He also added that it should be punished to re-organize the old neighborhoods’/villages’ associations that lacked spontaneity.³⁶ Kurosawa also stressed the difference between MCP’s new “community” and the old, militaristic neighborhoods’/villages’ associations. In MCP, he claimed, each member should follow their ideas and participate “voluntarily and spontaneously --- and this was a new type of community, different from the old Japanese *mura* (village).”³⁷ That was why he insisted the government should limit its participation to building

³⁵ Yoshihara Naoki, *Sengo kaikaku to chiiki jūmin soshiki* (Mineruba Shobō, 1989), 48-50; Kurasawa Susumu and Akimoto Ritsuo, eds., *Chōnaikai to chiiki shūdan* (Tokyo: Mineruba Shobō, 1990); Kwon Young-Joo, “Chōnaikai no sengo kaikaku (1),” *Hōgaku ronsō* (Department of Law, Kyoto University) 135, no. 1 (1994): 45-67; Kwon Young-Joo, “Chōnaikai no sengo kaikaku (2),” *Hōgaku ronsō* (Department of Law, Kyoto University) 135, no. 6 (1994): 67-89; Omori Wataru, Interview by the author, 23 December 2005, Arcadia Ichigaya Shigakukaikan, Tokyo.

³⁶ Kimura Hitoshi, “Komyunitī taisaku nit suite (1),” in *Komyunitī dokuhon*, 119. See also Kimura Hitoshi, “Komyunitī taisaku.” *Chihō jichi* 275 (October, 1970): 12; Kimura Hitoshi “Komyunitī taisaku no mondaiten.” *Chihō jichi* 276 (November, 1970): 31; Kimura Hitoshi, “Komyunitī taisaku no kinkyō to kadai.” *Chihō jichi* 286 (September, 1971): 28-29; Kimura Hitoshi, “Shōwa 47 nendo no komyunitī taisaku ni tsuite.” *Chihō jichi* 295 (June, 1972): 59.

³⁷ Kurosawa Susumu, “Komyunitī to wa nanika,” in *Komyunitī dokuhon*, 19.

physical facilities. Another member of the community study group, Higasa Tadashi, agreed with Kimura and Kurasawa. The government, he argued, should never impose a community program from above. It should care only about providing information regarding the development of communities and helping residents indirectly. Higasa contended that while there was such a thing as “denying the private and obeying the public (*messhi hōkō*) during WWII, what people need[ed] today [wa]s to respect and make oneself a useful member of society, which was “respecting the private and obeying the public (*risshi hōkō*).³⁸ It was crucial that the government should not force residents to participate, and instead should step back as they joined voluntarily and actively in their own decision-making process. Involved residents would participate and act in their own interest --- in other words, residents could be made to act as participatory citizens.

In contrast to these explanations, however, there was little actually to distinguish the postwar community-building campaigns from their prewar roots. Some observers noted that *chonaikai/burakukai* controlled MCP in several cities. As Omori noted, people had the old neighborhoods’ and/or villages’ associations in mind when they involved themselves with MCP. The ideal of “residents’ participation” and self-control was “unsubstantial” in many localities.³⁹ Formally, MCP was supposed to represent all the residents served by a given area; in reality, it was dependent on the neighborhoods’

³⁸ Higasa Tadashi, “Komyunitī shisetsu no keikaku ni atatte no kihon jōken,” in *Zoku komyunitī dokuhon*, ed. Chihō Jichi Seido Kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1975), 6.

³⁹ Omori Wataru, Interview by the author, 23 December 2005, Arcadia Ichigaya Shigakukaikan, Tokyo.

and/or villages' associations, preventing residents not affiliated with these organizations from participating into the projects.⁴⁰ It was immensely ironic that the architects had to differentiate MCP from the *burakukai/chōnaikai* precisely because MCP not only reminded the critics of these militaristic associations but also depended upon them for their actual operations.

Incorporating Women as Volunteers

The architects of MCP recognized the value of women as guardians of “communities.” The report “Community: The Recovery of Humanity in Everyday Life (1969)” represented women as the “moving force” behind MCP. Through their involvement in MCP, the report claimed that women would be able to “locate themselves and their families in the context of the broader society, and take pleasure in social activities.”⁴¹ Here, women were assigned a political significance as wives and mothers. Matsubara Haruo explained that the destruction of traditional local communities led to two different types of communities: the “metropolitan community” and the “neighborhood community.” The “metropolitan community” was a “husbands’/fathers’ community, or an eccentric-circle-community,” which was diffused in one’s workplace, the production center. Neighborhood community was a “wives’/children’s community, or a concentric-circle-community,” which tended to converge on one’s permanent home,

⁴⁰ For more information on the role of the *chōnaikai* and *burakukai* in MCP, see Sato Atsushi, ed., *Komyunitī o meguru mondai jirei* (Tokyo: Gakuyō Shobō, 1980), 60, 171.

⁴¹ Kokumin Seikatsu Shingikai, *Komyunitī*, 16.

the consumption center.⁴² The Model Community Program was based on a vision of women as housewives, not workers.

Highly gendered concept of family and work was represented as “healthy” guides to the construction of community. Washimi Takeshi wrote that the establishment of “healthy families” was the basis for a “community,” and one of the chief goals of MCP.⁴³ As wives and mothers, women were supposed to take care of their homes, nurture male labor, and support MCP whose efforts were targeted towards the “wives’/children’s community.” The pursuit of “healthy” families was not unique to MCP. The 1960 “economic and social development plan” report, prepared by *Keizai shingi kai* (Economic council) stressed the “necessity of building a warmhearted society with a strong sense of solidarity, based on a regional society surrounding healthy families.” Strengthening a nuclear family headed by *sararīman* (company employees) was the core of the social security policy during the era of high economic growth.⁴⁴ The “community,” then, was interpreted as an extension and a complement to the nuclear family, which was founded upon a traditional sense of family and work. Policy makers stressed the significance of “healthy families,” where women were expected to perform traditional gender roles, as a

⁴²Matsubara Haruo, “Komyunitī no seikaku to igi,” in *Zoku komyunitī dokuhon*, 31; Matsubara, *Komyunitī no riron to jissen*, 35.

⁴³ Washimi Takeshi, “Komyunitī taisaku no genjō to kadai,” in *Zoku komyunitī dokuhon*, 119.

⁴⁴ Shimoebisu, 257. When the so-called oil shock hit the economy and the era of the “economic miracle” came to an end, the LDP-dominated central government shifted the responsibility of social security onto “people’s self efforts, families, and communities,” calling this a “Japanese style of welfare society.” In Shimoebisu’s words, now families were assumed to support social security, instead of vice versa. Shimoebisu, 257.

prerequisite for the construction of a new “community.”

While women were regarded as the mainstays of families and new “communities,” they were regarded as volunteers, not as main agents of social programs. This resembled CAP, which stressed the role of females as aides in the programs. As Omori Wataru and Kimura Hitoshi made clear in interviews, women were involved in the operation of the programs --- Omori noted that “without their assistance, most of the programs could not exist” --- yet almost all the leadership positions were taken by men. The policy makers were not interested in challenging traditional images of family.⁴⁵ The question of gender equality was simply not of concern to the architects of MCP.

The Boundaries of Communities

In the case of the Japanese Model Community Program, opening up new terrain for “Japanese” citizens meant closing the door to “minority” residents. “Community” programs in Japan not only shared a similar goal with CAP in the U.S. – that of reconstructing “communities” through the active participation of residents and an ambiguous definition of “community” – they similarly muted and avoided the question of racial/ethnic inequality. There was, however, one significant difference between CAP in

⁴⁵ Omori Wataru, Interview by the author, 23 December 2005, Arcadia Ichigaya Shigakukaikan, Tokyo; Kimura Hitoshi, Interview by the author, 27 January 2006, Sangiin kaikan (the building for the House of Councilors), Tokyo. Even though the Model Community Program reinforced women’s marginal position in the wage-labor market, housewives were assigned a political significance as the guardian of “communities.” Local women asserted their rights in public spaces, with a special emphasis on environmental issues, education, and welfare.

the U.S. and MCP in Japan. While CAP eventually opened up space where local welfare activists of color could intervene, Japanese “community” programs in the late 1960s and early 1970s consistently excluded non-Japanese citizens from “community” efforts by equating the term “residents” with “Japanese people.” Policy makers asserted that the nation was “not only the aggregate of Japanese people but also the aggregate of communities.”⁴⁶ These “community” programs were literally created to “make Japanese people’s lives the first priority” -- therefore they completely dismissed the fact that there were many non-Japanese residents, mostly former colonial subjects and their descendants, living in these supposed “communities.”

More than 87 percent of the total resident “non-citizens” in Japan identified themselves as “Koreans.” As I discussed in my introduction, these Korean residents, who had once rendered services to Imperial Japan, were deprived of legal rights in the postwar period. As I will explain in detail in chapter 5 and 6, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty ended the Allied occupation and gave Japan full sovereignty in 1952, the government abruptly declared its Korean residents to be aliens and put them under the surveillance of the Alien Registration Law. The Japanese government thereafter used citizenship as an excuse to insure the exclusion of resident Koreans and other “non-citizens” (with some exceptions) from major social security programs, such as National Health Insurance, state pensions, public housing, the House Loan Corporation, and allowances for dependent children.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ *Komyunitī: Seikatsu no ba ni okeru ningensei no kaifuku*, 3, 16.

⁴⁷ These discriminatory practices continued up to 1981, when the International

“Community” programs in Japan, by implicitly equating “residents” with “Japanese people,” became another social welfare program that marginalized resident “non-citizens.” The architects appeared to not even have a consciousness of their exclusion of former colonial subjects and their descendants. As both Omori and Kimura explained in their interviews, non-Japanese residents were simply “out of the realm of concern” for the policy makers.⁴⁸

MCP was based on the notion that Japan was a “mono-ethnic” country. In Miyazawa Hiroshi’s words, “the community” could and should be interpreted as a place where “the majority of the Japanese people (*kokumin*) could calm down and live in peace.”⁴⁹ Endo Fumio, former chief of the Ministry of Home Affairs’ administrative office, wrote that it would not be difficult for local governments’ officials to collect residents’ opinions through assemblies since “we, as a mono-ethnic people, share[d] similar feelings and our local societies d[id] not have conflicts of interest.” According

Convention on the Status of Refugees was ratified by the Japanese government. This agreement required ratifiers to provide non-citizens social security on equal terms with citizens. The Japanese government therefore abolished the provisions that denied foreign citizens’ access to social security programs. See Kim Il-Wha, “Zainichi Chōsenjin no hōteki chii,” in *Zainichi Chōsenjin: Rekishi, genjō, tembō* (Dai ni ban), Chong-Myong Park ed. (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1999), 184-193; Shin Yong-Hong, “Zainichi Chōsenjin to shakai hoshō,” *Ibid.*, 265-271; Yoshioka Masuo, *Zainichi Gaikokujin to shakai hoshō: Sengo Nihon no mainoritī jūmin no jinken* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 1995); Tanaka Hiroshi, *Zainichi gaikokujin: Hō no kabe, kokoro no kabe* (Shinban) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 66-76, 160-166.

⁴⁸ Omori Wataru, Interview by the author, 23 December 2005, Arcadia Ichigaya Shigakukaikan, Tokyo; Kimura Hitoshi, Interview by the author, 27 January 2006, Sangiin kaikan (the building for the House of Councilors), Tokyo.

⁴⁹ Miyazawa Hiroshi, “Komunitī ni tsuite,” *Chihō jichi* 266 (1970), 9.

to Endo, however, the Japanese still lacked a sense of public spirit. He stressed that, in order to strengthen public spirit among the Japanese, there was no other way than disciplining the public through the development of community programs.⁵⁰ The Model Community Program reinforced a discourse of a “homogeneous” nation by regarding “the Japanese” as the only worthy residents.

MCP conditioned involved (Japanese) residents to commit themselves to the decision-making processes and act in their own interest. By so doing, it claimed to be different from top-down, militaristic organizations like neighborhoods’ and/or villages’ associations, although it relied on them for its actual operations. It assigned (Japanese) women a political significance as wives and mothers, and tried to incorporate them into the programs as volunteers and aides. Finally, it strengthened a myth of a “mono-ethnic” country by equating “residents” with “Japanese nationals” and marginalizing former colonial subjects and their descendents, especially Koreans in Japan.

I, however, do not mean to argue that there were no “community” programs among Koreans in Japan. Inspired by black liberation struggles and the black theology of liberation, Koreans in Japan engaged in battles for equal rights and eventually made claims for alternative visions of citizenship and community. In Chapters 5 and 6, I focus on the *zainichi* Koreans’ struggles in Kawasaki city, one of the major Korean residents’ districts around the Kanto-area. I will show how Korean activists like them, who remained outside of the states’ “community” programs, struggled to carve out a

⁵⁰ Endo Fumio, “Chiikiteki rentai ishiki to komyunitī,” *Chihō jichi* 294 (1972): 2-14.

unique social space and thus challenge governmental authority, in a welfare state that pursued projects of “progressive” mobilization as well as manipulative co-optation, of purported inclusion as well as tacit yet obstinate exclusion.

Chapter III.

Making Claims to Citizenship: Race and the Politics of Welfare in Los Angeles, 1962-1965

“This “Umbrella” group [the Economic Opportunity Federation]
is a thinly disguised effort to sabotage Los Angeles’ advanced plans
for the anti-poverty effort.”

Mayor Samuel Yorty, 25 September 1964

“Public officials are grabbing federal money
and channeling it into the old ways of doing business.”

Augustus Hawkins, 22 July 1965

Through a case study of the “War on Poverty” in Los Angeles, this chapter investigates how African American leaders forcefully challenged the city government and voiced alternative visions of citizenship in the 1960s.¹ During this time, black middle-class leaders transformed the “War on Poverty” programs, especially the Community Action Program (CAP), into a significant channel through which new political opportunities could be pursued. These efforts resulted in a change in the political status of African American residents in Los Angeles. While analyzing how these African American leaders embraced and reshaped the “War on Poverty,” I also discuss such issues as divisions among the black residents and the feminization of poverty in Los Angeles. By so doing, I shed light on the complexity of the struggle for political access in Los Angeles. I regard Los Angeles as a contested political space

¹ An earlier version of this chapter was presented to the Kyoto American Studies Summer Seminar (Kyoto, Japan) in 2005. I wish to thank all the participants for comments and suggestions.

where multiple political actors fought for their visions of the “War on Poverty.”

3.1 Revisiting Black Los Angeles in the 1960s

In the field of African American urban history, northern and northeastern cities such as New York and Chicago have been treated as the epitomes of American cities. Yet, in terms of the impact the 1965 uprising made on the civil rights movement, the OEO, and the Johnson administration, Los Angeles was far from marginal. Los Angeles thus provides a significant case study for the black urban experience in the 1960s.

In the early 20th century, Los Angeles was labeled a city called “heaven” for African Americans. In 1913, W. E. B. Du Bois, the senior officer in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), wrote that “Los Angeles [wa]s wonderful. Nowhere in the United States [wa]s the Negro so well and beautifully housed, nor the average efficiency and intelligence in the colored population so high.” In fact, in 1910, Los Angeles showed one of the highest percentages of homeownership for African Americans. While 36.1 percent of black Angelenos owned their homes in the City of Angels, only 2.4 percent of black residents in New York City were homeowners. Central Avenue became a “hub” for black residents, providing space to black businesses, the offices of black physicians and dentists, jazz clubs, and the famous Hotel Somerville, later renamed the Dunbar Hotel. Lonnie G. Bunch thought of Los Angeles from 1900 to the stock market crash in 1929 as a “Golden Era” for black Angelenos, explaining that the “quantity and quality of the black owned homes” was one of the key elements in the high reputation of L.A.

Yet racial discrimination was persistent, and in fact, with the large-scale influx of black and white migrants from the South, residential segregation hardened. Du Bois also noted that “Los Angeles [was] not paradise...the color line [was] there and sharply drawn.”² In 1926, a local court decided to take no action on a Los Angeles city policy that restricted the use of bath-houses and pools by “colored groups.” In 1929, the California Supreme Court declared that residential restrictions were valid, legitimizing restrictive covenants that were widely used to keep people of color out of white neighborhoods. While the 1920s was a remarkable period of a musical and literary movement, it was also a time of spatial segregation for black Angelenos.³

The 1930s and 1940s saw a massive increase in the African American population in Los Angeles. During the Great Depression, many black migrants joined in the journey to California, searching for better economic opportunities. In Los Angeles County, the black population increased from 46,425 (2.1 percent of the total population) in 1930 to 75,209 (2.7 percent) in 1940. The number of migrants continued to grow when A. Philip Randolph organized the March on Washington to protest job

² *The Crisis* (August, 1913):192.

³ Lonnie G. Bunch, “A Past Not Necessarily Prologue: The African American in Los Angeles,” in *20th Century Los Angeles: Power, Promotion, and Social Conflicts*, eds. Norman M. Klein and Martin J. Schiesl (Claremont, California: Regina Books, 1990), 101-130; Susan Anderson, “A City Called Heaven: Black Enchantment and Despair in Los Angeles,” in *The City: Los Angeles and Urban Theory at the End of the Twentieth Century*, eds. Allen J. Scott and Edward W. Soja (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 336-364; Quintard Taylor, *In Search of the Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West 1528-1990* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1998), 222-250; Josh Sides, *L.A. City Limits: African American Los Angeles from the Great Depression to the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 11-35.

discrimination by defense industries. As a result, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, which ordered defense contractors to eliminate discrimination in their hiring practices. Since Los Angeles was a regional center for defense production, black workers pursued opportunities there. Between 1940 and 1950, 130 thousand black migrants headed to Los Angeles. In 1950, the number of African American residents in Los Angeles County rapidly increased to 217,881 (5.2 percent). Yet Los Angeles became at the same time a much more highly segregated place in the 1950s. The African American population in Los Angeles County rose to 461,546 (7.6 percent) in 1960, with 334,916 people (13.5 percent) in the city of Los Angeles alone. According to the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, in the city of Los Angeles, 93.7 percent of these residents lived in one of four districts. By 1970, the city of Los Angeles was rated as one of the nation's most segregated cities, following Chicago and Gary, Indiana (see Figure 2).⁴

During the early 1960s, residential segregation was renewed and reinforced in the Golden State. Even so, in California, a fair housing act was made law on June 21, 1963, a year before the "War on Poverty" started. A decisive victory of the California Democratic Party in the 1958 general election and the 1962 re-election as governor of

⁴ Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, *Population and Housing in Los Angeles County: A Study in the Growth of Residential Segregation* (Los Angeles: Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, 1963), 1-5; Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, *Patterns of Social Change: Los Angeles County, 1960-73: A Statistical Review* (Los Angeles: Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, 1974); Bunch, 115-20; David M. Grant, Melvin L. Oliver, and Angela D. James, "African Americans: Social and Economic Bifurcation," in *Ethnic Los Angeles*, eds. Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996), 381-382; Sides, 176-181.

Edmund G. “Pat” Brown, a man who stressed the need for legislation to combat discrimination, enabled state politicians to enact the fair housing code. On February 14, 1963, one of the state’s leading African American politicians, W. Byron Rumford, introduced the fair housing bill with other assemblymen.⁵ The Rumford Act was intended to extend the ban on discrimination beyond publicly assisted housing, as well as to secure administrative enforcement of the Act through the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC).⁶

Yet as soon as the Rumford Act was passed, it came under fierce attack from the California Real Estate Association and the California Apartment Owner’s Association.

⁵ Thomas W. Casstevens, “California’s Rumford Act and Proposition 14,” in *The Politics of Fair-Housing Legislation: State and Local Case Studies*, eds. Lynn W. Eley and Thomas W. Casstevens (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), 237-284; Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein, “The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting,” *The American Political Science Review* 62, no.3 (September 1968): 753-769.

⁶ The Rumford fair-housing act declared that “discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry” in housing accommodation was against public policy in California. The principal innovation in the Rumford Act was “the assignment to FEPC of responsibility for administrative enforcement and for conducting a program of education and affirmative action to eliminate discrimination in housing.” FEPC operated four offices including 7 commissioners, associate legal counsels, assistant education offices, consultants, and clerical employees. The commission performed a quasi-judicial function by hearing the consultant’s presentation of the evidence of discrimination and home owner’s evidence to the contrary, and then rendering a decision. FEPC dealt with 192 cases during the first year. State of California, Division of Fair Employment Practices (FEPC), *Questions and Answers about the California Fair Housing Law* (San Francisco: FEPC, 1963), 1; “First-Year Case Experience Under Rumford Fair Housing Act,” in *Materials on Proposition 14, the initiative constitutional amendment relating to sales and rentals of residential real property, including positions pro and con, which was submitted to the voters of California on Nov. 3, 1964*, comp. University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), School of Law (Los Angeles: UCLA, School of Law, 1964).

These two groups formed the Committee for Home Protection to sponsor an initiative for a constitutional amendment, Proposition 14.⁷ While civil rights groups, AFL-CIO, and other numerous organizations formed a statewide anti-Proposition 14 group, they were defeated. Proposition 14 was approved by voters in the November 3rd election by a 2-1 margin. The passage of Proposition 14 was a clear message to black Los Angeles, that left many residents filled with anger and disappointment.⁸

⁷ The formal name of Proposition 14 was “Sales and Rentals of Residential Real Property Initiative Constitutional Amendment.” It prohibited “state, subdivision, or agency thereof from denying, limiting, or abridging, rights of any person to decline to sell, lease, or rent residential real property to any person as he chooses.” The California Real Estate Association advised as follows: “State appointed bureaucrats may force you, over your objections, to deal concerning your own property with the person they choose...Fair Employment Practices Commission becomes investigator, prosecutor, jury, and judge.” “Excerpts from Spike Wilson’s Speech of June 27, 1964, to the California Real Estate Association,” in *Materials on Proposition 14; The California State Employee*, 4 September 1964.

⁸ Other than civil rights organizations and the AFL-CIO, “Californians Against Proposition 14” included following organizations: Japanese-American Citizens League, Chinese-American Citizens Alliance, Mexican-American Political Association, The State Bar of California, The Catholic Social Justice Committee, The Democratic Party organizations, and The Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission, among others. The pamphlet of “Californians Against Proposition 14” advised as follows: “The most important issue on your November 3 ballot is Proposition 14, the scheme by multi-billion dollar real estate interests to write hate and bigotry into our California Constitution...you must have to combat effectively this attempt to turn California into another Mississippi or Alabama.” Total votes on Proposition 14 were cast by 6,922,207 (84.6 percent) of the state’s 8,184,143 registered voters. There was 4,526,460 “Yes” votes (65.4 percent) and 2,395,747 “No” votes (34.6 percent) on Proposition 14. “Vital Questions and Answers on Proposition 14,” in *Materials on Proposition 14; Crisis: A Record of the Darker Races* 71, no.1 (1964): 25; Casstevens, 264-269; “ELA Realtors Group To Oppose Prop.14,” *Eastside Sun*, 24 September 1964; Gerald Horne, *Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s* (1995; reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1997), 224; Becky M. Nicolaidis, *My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920-1965* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 306-315; Daniel Widener, “Something Else: Creative Community and Black Liberation in Postwar Los Angeles,” (Ph. D. diss., New York University, 2003), 90-92.

Whereas spatial segregation made it difficult for black Angelenos to find homes in the suburbs, black workers were also facing fewer job opportunities in and around their neighborhoods. Deindustrialization was already underway in Los Angeles during the early 1960s because of the rise of overseas competition. Reacting to intense competition from overseas, manufacturing firms had started leaving the central city to reduce their tax burden, extend their plant size, and explore new markets. In South Los Angeles, which includes Watts, Central, Avalon, Florence, Green Meadow, Exposition, and Willowbrook, the unemployment rate was markedly higher than that of the city as a whole throughout the 1960s. According to an analysis prepared by the State of California, the unemployment rate for males in South Los Angeles in 1960 was 11.3 percent while the rate for males residing in the whole city was 5.3 percent (See Table 4). In 1965, the unemployment rate dropped 1 percent, to 10.3 percent, yet it remained much higher than the rest of the city. More than one-quarter of all families in South Los Angeles, 26.8 percent, had incomes below the “poverty level” (\$3,130 per year for a family of four). In the Watts area in particular, 41.5 percent of all families had incomes below the poverty level. All these statistics show why South Los Angeles, especially Watts, would become one of the major “target areas” for the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” when the programs began.⁹

⁹ South Los Angeles includes Watts, Central, Avalon, Florence, Green Meadows, Exposition, and Willowbrook. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, 90th Cong., 1st sess., May 12, 1967, 3778-3793; Edward W. Soja and Allen J. Scott, “Introduction to Los Angeles: City and Region,” in *The City*, 11-17; Sides, 176-181.

One needs to take, however, a close look at these records of unemployment and poverty in South Los Angeles. It was certainly the case that both the unemployment and poverty rates for black Angelenos were much higher than those for white residents. Yet those statistics were marked not only by race but also by gender. The analysis by the State of California did not forget to point out that the proportion of families headed by women was on the rise, from 19 percent in 1960 to 26 percent in 1965. While the unemployment rate for men fell 1 percent, among women, the rate actually increased from 10.4 to 11.5 percent. It was also the case that the poverty rate was much higher among families headed by women. While 18.2 percent of persons living in families headed by a man had incomes below the poverty level, 58.9 percent of those in families headed by a woman were in poverty (See Table 5). These statistics show that what Diana Pearce would later call “feminization of poverty” was already taking place in South Los Angeles in the early 1960s. In other words, female-headed families formed an increasingly large proportion of all poor families.¹⁰

¹⁰ According to Diane Pearce, the “feminization of poverty” took place in the 1960s and the early 70s even though other trends, such as the increase in women’s labor-force participation, the mandating of affirmative action, and the increasing employment of better-educated women, would suggest the potential for improving women’s economic status. In 1976, nearly two out of three of the 15 million poor persons over 16 were women. While Pearce is among the first scholars to employ the term “feminization of poverty” and deserves wide reading, her analysis of poverty does not explore racial inequalities in poverty. Although Pearce acknowledges that “disadvantages suffered by poor women are exacerbated by race and prejudice for minority women,” she maintains that “for a woman race is a relatively unimportant consideration in determining economic status.” Diane Pearce, “The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work, and Welfare,” *The Urban and Social Change Review* 11, no. 1 and 2 (1978): 28-36; Gertrude Schaffner Goldberg and Eleanor Kremen, “The Feminization of Poverty: Discovered in America,” in *The Feminization of Poverty: Only in America?*, eds. Gertrude Schaffner Goldberg and Eleanor Kremen (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 5; *Examination of the War on*

Many black Angelenos could not expect unions and traditional civil rights organizations to support their daily struggles against residential segregation, unemployment, and poverty in the early 1960s. According to historian Gerald Horne, Red Scare restrictions, exemplified by the Taft-Hartley bill, made it difficult for unions to organize the black migrants from the South. COINTELPRO, the Counter-Intelligence Program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, launched in 1956 designed to obliterate radical political organizations, made the situation worse. Horne argued that many black Angelenos were out of touch with trade union politics by 1965. Furthermore, traditional civil rights organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) failed to win popularity among black residents. Membership in the local chapter dropped from 14,000 in 1945 to 2,500 by 1950. There was a slight increase in the membership during the 1950s (5,800 members in 1961), yet the NAACP continued to be deemed a middle-class organization. This issue of the failure of unions and civil rights groups to reach the “masses” in South Central came to the forefront when the Watts uprising occurred in 1965.¹¹

Furthermore, black residents could not expect much from Mayor Samuel Yorty, a “renegade Democrat rapidly moving toward the right,” who served as mayor of Los Angeles from 1961 to 1973.¹² In his 1961 campaign, Yorty formed a coalition of San

Poverty, 3783, 3785-3787.

¹¹ Horne, 7-16, 171-176.

¹² Mike Davis, 126.

Fernando Valley homeowners and people of color in central cities. On the one hand, he tried to gain suburban homeowners' votes by assuring them that he would end the separation of trash. On the other hand, Yorty promised to fight the police violence against people of color when he ran for election. However, the mayor would soon disappoint black Angelenos by standing behind Chief William Parker of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), who openly made racist comments about African Americans and other people of color. Yorty was also a staunch anti-Communist. When the Watts uprising occurred, Yorty blamed "outside agitators" and Communists for causing it. Yorty supported President Johnson's policies in Vietnam even when "some of the other people were backing off." As a Democrat who backed Republican Richard Nixon for president in 1960 instead of John F. Kennedy, however, the mayor had a strained relationship with Johnson-Kennedy Democrats, especially "the Kennedy group left" in the Johnson administration, exemplified by people in the OEO.¹³ As I will explain later, Yorty, who tried to take control of the local "War on Poverty," was at odds with people in the OEO and the Johnson administration, who criticized the lack of representation of the "poor" and people of color in the Los Angeles anti-poverty efforts.

Yet there was also a sign of change for black Angelenos in the early 1960s. Augustus F. Hawkins, the first black Democratic member of the California State

¹³ Samuel Yorty, interview by Joe B. Frantz, 7 February 1970, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Memo, Bill Haddad to Sargent Shriver, 15 June 1965, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1965 – July 1965," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; John C. Bollens and Grant B. Geyer, *Yorty: Politics of a Constant Candidate* (Pacific Palisades, CA: Palisades Publishers, 1973); Bauman, 118-20; Widener, 92-94.

legislature, was elected to the U.S. Congress in 1962. Hawkins, a graduate of Jefferson High School and UCLA, represented the 29th Congressional District of California, which included South Central. A black candidate, Mervyn Dymally, replaced Hawkins in the California State legislature in 1962. 1963 was also a watershed for black Los Angeles: three African American representatives were elected to the city council. Thomas Bradley, a UCLA and Southwestern University graduate and former police officer, was elected in the 10th District, a residential area northwest of South Central primarily inhabited by the black middle class and liberal whites. In 1968, Bradley ran against Mayor Yorty. He was not successful in this first attempt, yet with help from a strong biracial coalition network, he became the city's first African American mayor in 1973. Bradley's success in the earlier city council election was soon followed by the election of two other African American candidates. Billy Mills, who attended Compton College and UCLA, represented the 8th District, which consisted mainly of the black working class in South Central. Gilbert Lindsay was elected in the 9th District, an area northeast of South Central which was evenly divided between its African American and Latino populations. Lindsay was chosen as candidate when Edward Roybal, a Latino Council member, resigned to run successfully for Congress in 1962. These African American elected officials, especially Hawkins, Bradley, and Mills, would have a strong influence over the implementation of the Los Angeles "War on Poverty."¹⁴

¹⁴ "Positions taken by Councilman Thomas Bradley," undated, File 27, Box 4727, Thomas Bradley Administrative Papers, 1963-1993, Department of Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles; "Augustus Hawkins" in *Black Americans in Congress, 1870-1989*, the Commission on the Bicentenary by the Office of the Historian, U.S. House of Representatives; J. Gregory Payne and Scott C. Ratzan, *Tom Bradley: The*

The execution of the Los Angeles anti-poverty programs would soon show that the African American political leadership in Los Angeles was far from monolithic. Hawkins and Bradley would work together, stressing the role of representatives of poverty areas and grass-roots activists. Dymally and Mills, on the other hand, were close to powerful state legislative leader Jesse Unruh, who at that time shared Mayor Yorty's opposition to Governor Brown. The implementation of the local "War on Poverty," especially the Community Action Program, would soon become a major site of dispute for these black and white politicians in Los Angeles, Sacramento, and Washington D.C.¹⁵

3.2 Contestations over the Los Angeles "War on Poverty"

In order to understand debates about the Los Angeles anti-poverty programs, one needs to review the history of the Youth Opportunities Board (YOB). The YOB was established in April 1962 as one of fifteen urban centers across the nation to receive a federal grant from the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (PCJD). The Committee had been set up by President John F. Kennedy in May 1961. The idea of establishing an organization targeted at youth was proposed by Robert Goe,

Impossible Dream (Santa Monica: Roundtable Publishing Inc., 1986); Raphael J. Sonenshein, *Politics in Black and White: Race and Power in Los Angeles* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 40-46; Bauman, 124-128.

¹⁵ "Los Angeles Report based on trip, February 26-27," undated (1965), File "Los Angeles (EYOA), January 1965 - March 1965," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Greenstone and Peterson, 275-278; Sonenshein, 56-58; Horne, 295-298.

Executive Assistant to Mayor Yorty, at a Conference on Youth called by County Supervisor Ernest Debs. The YOB was known for a “peculiar governmental structure” that brought it into existence. The “five powers” --- the city of Los Angeles, the city schools, the county of Los Angeles, the county schools, and the state of California --- operated the YOB together under a “Joint Powers Agreement,” an agreement which in California law enabled various governmental bodies to work together. The YOB conducted various kinds of programs targeted at the youth, such as youth training and employment projects, education, community development, volunteer programs, the establishment of a “delinquency prevention clinic,” and recreation services. The federal government provided most of the funding for the operation of these programs: In October 1962, the YOB received \$252,906 from the Federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare and \$88,621 from participating agencies.¹⁶

The YOB was established with a clear purpose --- to discipline unemployed and out-of-school youth and attack juvenile delinquency. According to a statement prepared by the YOB, the YOB came into existence because of increasing concern felt throughout the nation and within the Los Angeles area about problems associated with large numbers of unemployed and out-of-school youth, and with rapidly increasing rates of juvenile

¹⁶ Memo, Samuel Yorty to Council of the City of Los Angeles, 22 October 1962, File “Youth Opportunities Board: 1962 (1 of 2),” Box C-1007, Samuel Yorty Collection, Records Management Division, Office of the City Clerk, City of Los Angeles; “Informational Statement Number 1 – Youth Opportunities Board of Greater Los Angeles,” December 1962, File “Youth Opportunities Board: 1962 (1 of 2),” Box C-1007, Samuel Yorty Collection, Records Management Division, Office of the City Clerk, City of Los Angeles; Youth Opportunities Board of Greater Los Angeles, *The Los Angeles “War Against Poverty”: A Proposal Submitted for Funding* (Los Angeles: Youth Opportunities Board, 1964), 1-10; Marshall, 13-15; Bauman, 128-134.

delinquency and youth crime. The number of juvenile court referrals for delinquency reasons increased more than 57 percent in the period 1955 – 1960. The YOB emphasized that young people were disproportionately represented in incidences of crime and delinquency, and that there was a “direct relationship” between the “idleness” of school-age youth and delinquency.¹⁷ According to the YOB, this demanded coordinated governmental action because these young people were the ones who would retain a pattern of job instability in later life, who would “fail as human beings” to realize their maximum potential, and who would tend to “perpetuate problems” of deprived social and economic status into a later generation.¹⁸ Whereas the YOB stressed that their programs were conducted with the participation of a wide range of voluntary community youth-serving agencies, governmental bodies were in full control of the YOB. They regarded it as a training ground in which to transform these youth into self-sufficient and productive citizens. Mayor Yorty would attempt to gain control of the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” through the YOB.¹⁹

When the Economic Opportunity Act was enacted and anti-poverty programs officially began in August 1964, local African American leaders fought for their visions

¹⁷ Memo, Samuel Yorty to Council of the City of Los Angeles, 3 April 1962, File “Youth Opportunities Board: 1962 (2 of 2),” Box C-1007, Samuel Yorty Collection, Records Management Division, Office of the City Clerk, City of Los Angeles.

¹⁸ “Informational Statement Number 1 – Youth Opportunities Board of Greater Los Angeles,” December 1962, File “Youth Opportunities Board: 1962 (1 of 2),” Box C-1007, Samuel Yorty Collection, Records Management Division, Office of the City Clerk, City of Los Angeles.

¹⁹ Memo, Bill Haddad to Sargent Shriver, 15 June 1965, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1965 – July 1965,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives.

of the “War on Poverty.” As early as in April 1964, Hawkins stressed the significance of bringing the “War on Poverty” to the grassroots level and fostering local leadership. Tom Bradley did not take his eyes off the implications of participation in the Community Action Program either. In August, Bradley made a statement that “we [had to] work cooperatively with community agencies which [were] active in the neighborhood front lines of the war on poverty.”²⁰ The major newspaper for Black Los Angeles, the *Los Angeles Sentinel* agreed: it stressed that “we [had to] make sure that some of its benefits come to communities like ours where its objectives [were] vitally needed.”²¹ A group of African American leaders began to meet at 1122 Manchester Street, the home of Opal C. Jones, an African American social worker at the Avalon-Carver Community Center. As I will discuss in the next chapter, Jones, who was what the OEO called a “principal watchdog of the representation of the poor” in Los Angeles, would be one of the central figures in bringing the anti-poverty programs to the grassroots level.²² Concerned that Mayor Yorty might try to take control of the local anti-poverty programs and hinder poor people from participating in the decision-making processes, these African American leaders decided to fight against the Joint Powers board. They succeeded in persuading a local welfare agency named the Welfare Planning Council to create an agency called the

²⁰ “Poverty Fight Mapped at Community Level,” *Los Angeles Times*, 7 April 1964; “Bradley Initiates Anti-Poverty Move,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 27 August 1964.

²¹ “Poverty War,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 27 August 1964.

²² “Los Angeles Report based on trip, February 26-27,” undated (1965), File “Los Angeles (EYOA), January 1965 - March 1965,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Bauman, 136.

Economic Opportunity Federation (EOF) in September 1964, an organization to compete with the YOB for the “War on Poverty” funds. Several Congress members from Los Angeles, such as Hawkins, Edward Roybal, James Roosevelt, and George Brown, supported the EOF. On September 3rd 1964, James E. Ludlam, then president of the Welfare Planning Council, wrote to Mayor Yorty, arguing that there was “every indication” that the Director of the OEO desired the creation of “a local group, broadly representative of public and private interests, to act as a screening and coordinating body.”²³ When these leaders held a Hall of Administration luncheon, more than eighty representatives of government and private agencies supported their plan to coordinate requests for nine million dollars in federal funds. A running battle over the implementation of the Community Action Program, a struggle that would have a tremendous impact on the future of local politics, had just begun.²⁴

Yorty was quick to fight back. Furious about the creation of the EOF, an organization that would compete with the YOB for the Los Angeles “War on Poverty,” Yorty wrote to Ludlam, contending that “it [was] my conviction that an appropriate structure [had] already been established to act as a coordinating agency.”²⁵ Yorty

²³ Memo, James E. Ludlam to Mayor S. Yorty, 3 September 1964, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), August 1965 – September 1965,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives.

²⁴ As for the competition between YOB and EOF, see Marshall, 15-16; Greenstone and Peterson, 30-34, 140-42; Bauman, 135-148; Kazuyo Tsuchiya, “Race, Class, and Gender in America’s “War on Poverty”: The Case of Opal C. Jones in Los Angeles, 1964-1968,” *The Japanese Journal of American Studies* 15 (2004): 213-236.

²⁵ Memo, Samuel Yorty to James E. Ludlam, 8 September 1964, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), August 1965 – September 1965,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives.

insisted that there was no need to develop a new organization to administer the anti-poverty programs. Yorty also complained to the White House. He wrote to President Johnson's assistant Walter Jenkins as follows.

This "Umbrella" group is a thinly disguised effort to sabotage Los Angeles' advanced plans for the anti-poverty effort; and I would like the Administrator's cooperation to prevent obstruction to our plans for City effort if anti-poverty is to be kept a sincere effort and not just a political football.²⁶

In October, the YOB submitted proposals to the OEO, claiming that they should be the main Community Action Agency for Los Angeles.

The OEO intervened in the dispute in January 1965, and proposed the merger of the EOF and the YOB and the involving of more representatives of the "poor" on the board. The OEO proposed a new organization to expand the members of the board to twenty-two, ten from the governmental bodies, six from private organizations, and six from the representatives of the "poor." While twelve members were going to be elected by ten persons appointed by the public agencies, still the merger was appealing to African American leaders like Council member Bradley and Congress member Hawkins since a majority of the membership would be composed of persons who did not belong to governmental entities.²⁷

²⁶ Memo, Samuel Yorty to Walter Jenkins, 25 September 1964, Ex LG/Los Angeles, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Youth Opportunities Board of Greater Los Angeles, *The Los Angeles "War Against Poverty."*

²⁷ Memo, Sam Hamerman, Chairman of YOB and Joseph L. Wyatt, President of EOF, to L. E. Timberlake, President of Los Angeles City Council, 11 February 1965, File

On February 8, the YOB and the EOF approved the merger plan at a joint meeting and decided to form a new organization to be called the Economic and Youth Opportunity Agency of Los Angeles County (EYOA). Meanwhile, Hawkins continued to stress the importance of community organizations and the involvement of local people in CAP. He took the initiative and organized a mass meeting for the implementation of the “War on Poverty” in February. It seemed like the dispute between the EOF and the YOB had been brought to a satisfactory settlement with the establishment of this new organization, the EYOA.²⁸

Yorty did not, however, follow the merger plan. Instead, he countered it with his own proposal, in which the board would have nine members, all from governmental bodies. Yorty especially resented the fact that more than half of the total members (twelve) on the board would be private citizens, whom Yorty regarded as “not responsible to the people as...elected officials.”²⁹ Yorty, once again, argued that the YOB had served as a “nationwide model for later agencies in other areas” and therefore that it

#122706, Box A-1888, City Council File, Records Management Division, Office of the City Clerk, City of Los Angeles.

²⁸ Ibid.; Memo, Roger Arnebergh to Thomas Bradley, 3 March 1965, File #122706, Box A-1888, City Council File, Records Management Division, Office of the City Clerk, City of Los Angeles; Memo, C. Erwin Piper to Mayor S. Yorty and State, County and Federal Affairs Committee of the City Council, 26 March 1965, File #122706, Box A-1888, City Council File, Records Management Division, Office of the City Clerk, City of Los Angeles; “Anti-poverty Meet Set for Feb. 28,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 28 February 1965; “What are the Answers to Poverty,” by Congress member Gus Hawkins, *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 18 March 1965; Bauman, 138-139.

²⁹ Memo, Samuel Yorty to Council of the City of Los Angeles, 23 April 1965, File #122706, Box A-1888, City Council File, Records Management Division, Office of the City Clerk, City of Los Angeles; Bauman, 139-140.

should be a central Community Action Agency for Los Angeles.³⁰

The real question was who would gain control of the local anti-poverty programs through CAP. As historian Gerald Horne has argued, African American leaders as well as Yorty were concerned with the question of “where money would flow, who would supervise the flow, and what strengthened constituencies would result.”³¹ The OEO knew that Yorty opposed the merger plan because the proposed new organization might move out from under his control and even be a challenge to the City Hall. A confidential memo noted that “Yorty [did not] really care how many people [sat] on the board – as long as he appoint[ed] the majority,” and that if Yorty succeeded in making the YOB a Community Action Agency, he could “kill any program which might tend to build organizations.” It concluded that the OEO had to find some way to “keep YOB under constant surveillance to insure that it [did] not become a political tool for Yorty.”³² The number of non-public officials on the Community Action Agency was a critical issue for both African American leaders and Mayor Yorty precisely because it would determine where the anti-poverty funds would go.

Hawkins, Bradley, and other leaders expressed deep resentment of Yorty’s opposition to the merger and his counter proposal. Bradley charged that Yorty was dragging his feet in implementing the anti-poverty programs. The editors of the *Los*

³⁰ “Yorty Claims Leadership in Poverty Fight,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 25 February 1965.

³¹ Horne, 51-52.

³² Memo, Bill Haddad to Sargent Shriver, 15 June 1965, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1965 – July 1965,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives.

Angeles Sentinel criticized the under-representation of the “poor,” especially low-income people of color on the YOB board. Governor Brown also gave full support to the merger plan and criticized Yorty’s new alternate plan of ruling out community participation. Hawkins and other Congress members from the Los Angeles area strongly urged approval of the proposed merger agreement, noting that the idea was at least a workable beginning. In order to fight Yorty’s new proposal, Hawkins created an organization called the Community War on Poverty Committee, together with church and civil rights leaders like Reverend Hamel Hartford Brookins of the United Civil Rights Committee and Tony Rios of the Community Service Organization. The Committee, comprising more than three hundred local activists, proposed an alternative to Yorty’s plan, whereby the board would be expanded to thirty-two members, with sixteen from the poverty areas, ten from the public agencies, and six from private agencies. These leaders in the City, State, and Congress were outraged by Yorty’s resistance to the participation of the “poor” and the further delay in implementing anti-poverty programs caused by his rejection of the merger plan.³³

³³ Memo, Bill Haddad to Sargent Shriver, 7 May 1965, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1965 – July 1965,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; “‘Uneasiness’ Noted in Poverty War Support,” *Los Angeles Times*, 28 April 1965; “Brown to Back Merger of Anti-Poverty Boards,” 27 April 1965, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1965 – July 1965,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Augustus F. Hawkins to President, Los Angeles City Council, 28 May 1965, File “Anti-Poverty Programs. Misc.,” Box 91, Augustus F. Hawkins Papers, 1935-1990, Department of Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles; Memo, H. Hartford Brookins, Community War on Poverty Committee, Los Angeles County, to Samuel W. Yorty, 7 June 1965, File “Anti-Poverty Programs. Misc.,” Box 91, Augustus F. Hawkins Papers, 1935-1990, Department of Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles; Memo, Augustus F. Hawkins to Sergeant Shriver, 25 June 1965, File “Anti-Poverty Programs. Misc.,” Box 91, Augustus F. Hawkins Papers, 1935-1990, Department of Special

Overtaken by a storm of criticism, Yorty came up with another plan. He released plans for the enlargement of the YOB to nineteen members, including six representatives from poverty areas on the board. Furthermore, Yorty appointed African American City Council member Billy G. Mills to replace Robert Goe as the city's representative on the YOB.³⁴ Mills was close to the state legislative leader Jesse Unruh who stressed that "the poverty war...should be run through local government."³⁵ While Hawkins argued that the board would still be under city control, Mills ignored other leaders' criticisms and appealed to the OEO for the release of funds. Because of his stand in the anti-poverty dispute, Mills would face a recall campaign in late July. Yorty's "divide and rule" strategy caused further confusion and delay in the implementation of anti-poverty programs.³⁶

Almost a year had passed since the enactment of the Economic Opportunity Act --- Los Angeles, however, was still without its own Community Action Agency.

Collections, University of California, Los Angeles; "U.S. Blocks Poverty Funds in Personnel Row," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 May 1965; "Anti-Poverty Pitfalls," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 27 May 1965; "Outsiders Running War on Poverty," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 27 May 1965; Payne and Ratzan, 70; Marshall, 15; Bauman, 140-141.

³⁴ "Yorty: Poverty Fund Won't Be a 'Pork Barrel'," undated, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1965 - July 1965," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives.

³⁵ Jesse M. Unruh to Jack Valenti, Special Assistant to the President, 18 August 1965, File "HU2/ST5 10/12/65-4/14/66," General HU2/ST5, 6-11, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

³⁶ "Yorty Compromise Rejected, Peters May Be Named to YOB," 24 June 1965, *Los Angeles Sentinel*; "No Solution Seen for Poverty Program Bog," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 1 July 1965; "Yorty Forces Come Up with New Poverty Plan," *Los Angeles Times*, 17 July 1965; "Mills Backed on Poverty by Pastors: Debate Recall," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 22 July 1965; Greenstone and Peterson, 276-277; Bauman, 143-144.

According to Hawkins, the situation had reached a “crisis stage.”³⁷ Hawkins continued to argue that the involvement of the “poor” should be included at every stage of anti-poverty activities. Yet, according to Hawkins, public officials were “grabbing federal money and channeling it into the old ways of doing business...these misguided officials [saw] themselves threatened politically.”³⁸ Congress members Hawkins, Roosevelt, Roybal, and George E. Brown, Jr. urged the OEO to bypass the Community Action Agency and grant directly to projects in Los Angeles. The OEO followed their request. In June, they funded the Los Angeles Unified District directly in order to permit an urgent program to move forward. When the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors passed Yorty’s 19-member board plan on July 13, civil rights groups and Mexican representatives organized massive demonstrations under the leadership of Reverend H. H. Brookins in protest. Brookins also received support from Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. who endorsed his 32-member board plan.³⁹ The “War on Poverty” had indeed reached a crisis in Los Angeles --- it was not until one of the nation’s worst urban uprisings

³⁷ “Know Your Congressman: Crisis in the War on Poverty,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 10 June 1965.

³⁸ “Hawkins Asks Letters on Poverty Goal,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 22 July 1965.

³⁹ “OEO – For Release,” 10 June 1965, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1965 – July 1965,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Augustus F. Hawkins to Mr. William Bassett, Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, 7 June 1965, File “Anti-Poverty Programs. Misc.,” Box 91, Augustus F. Hawkins Papers, 1935-1990, Department of Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles; “L.A. Area Warned It May Lose Poverty Funds,” *Los Angeles Times* 26 May 1965; “Poverty Unity Needed,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 10 June 1965; “Poverty Grant Given Directly to City Schools,” *Los Angeles Times*, 11 June 1965; “Mass Poverty Demonstrations,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 15 July 1965; “32-Member Poverty Bd. Backed by King,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 15 July 1965; Bauman, 144-148.

occurred that the City of Angels could finally establish its own anti-poverty agency.

3.3 The Watts Uprising and the Establishment of the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles

On August 11, a white California Highway Patrolman asked Marquette Frye, a 21-year old African American driver, and his older brother, Ronald, a passenger, to pull their car over at 116th and Avalon near the Watts area. The officer suspected Frye of drunk driving. A scuffle involving Marquette and Ronald, their mother, and the patrolman followed, attracting a large crowd. When three more policemen arrived on the scene and put Frye and his brother and mother under arrest in a violent manner, anger in the crowd escalated. Many started throwing rocks, stoning automobiles, and attacking a police field command post. These events sparked an uprising that continued for five days, spreading throughout the Watts area and beyond. By the time the smoke had cleared, 34 people were dead, 1,032 injured, and 3,952 arrested. Approximately 600 buildings were damaged and \$40,000,000 in property destroyed. The Watts uprising would be a watershed in the history of Los Angeles as well as in the history of black liberation struggles. It showed that the civil rights movement led by middle-class African American leaders had failed to reach the ghettos in Northern and Western cities. As Gerald Horne has argued, it would also soon be the case that in the wake of Watts, black Los Angeles would face the “two sharply contrasted tendencies” of black nationalism and a reactionary white backlash. The Watts revolt would also have a

tremendous impact on the stalled Los Angeles “War on Poverty.”⁴⁰

Politicians, scholars, and civil rights activists attempted to explain why the uprising occurred in Los Angeles. Governor Brown appointed John McCone, a former CIA director, to head a Commission to make an “objective and dispassionate” study of the revolt. On December 2nd, the McCone Commission released its report titled “Violence in the City – an End or a Beginning?” The Commission argued that the fundamental causes of the Watts uprising stemmed from the lack of job opportunity, the low level of scholastic attainment, and a resentment of the police as symbols of authority. In addition, there was a series of aggravating events, such as “unpunished violence and disobedience to law,” the passage of Proposition 14, and finally controversy over the mechanisms to handle the anti-poverty program in the city. According to the McCone Commission, all these factors together produced the “dull, devastating spiral of failure” in the ghettos.⁴¹

Civil rights activists and scholars, however, were quick to challenge the McCone Commission’s findings and recommendations. According to Robert M. Fogelson, they criticized the McCone report for failing to understand that a much larger and more

⁴⁰ The Governor’s Commission on the Los Angeles Riots [McCone Commission], “Violence in the City – An End or a Beginning?,” in *The Los Angeles Riots: Mass Violence in America*, comp. Robert M. Fogelson (New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969); Robert M. Fogelson, “White on Black: A Critique of the McCone Commission Report on the Los Angeles Riots,” in *The Los Angeles Riots: Mass Violence in America*, 113; Nathan E. Cohen, “The Context of the Curfew Area,” in *The Los Angeles Riots: A Socio-psychological Study*, ed. Nathan Cohen (New York: Praeger, 1970), 41; Horne, 3; Bauman, 150.

⁴¹ McCone Commission, 1-25.

representative segment of the ghetto residents joined the uprising, that these people participated in it because they could not passively accept conditions any more, that the uprising was an articulation of genuine grievances and meaningful protests, and that to maintain public order in Los Angeles demanded fundamental changes not only in the segregated ghetto but also in the white metropolis as well. These civil rights activists and scholars argued that “Violence in the City” regarded people involved in the uprising as “lawless” criminals who were willing to take the “most extreme and even illegal remedies,” and therefore ignored the deep resentment among Watts residents over the police in particular and life in the segregated ghetto in general.⁴²

Other analysts questioned whether middle-class civil rights leaders might have reached the alienated residents in South Central Los Angeles at all. In this vein, Horne has pointed out that the Watts revolt was not only an uprising against a white elite, but also against ineffective black leaders as well. Civil rights organizations had failed to play a major role in challenging Mayor Yorty and Police Chief Parker and improving life chances for black Angelenos. For example, when Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. visited Los Angeles after the revolt, he saw no “sensitive and determined leadership to solve the problem.” King noted that while there were serious doubts about whether white Angelenos were in any way willing to accommodate their needs, there was also a “growing disillusionment and resentment toward the Negro middle class and the leadership it has produced.”⁴³ When King had a stormy closed meeting with Mayor

⁴² Ibid.; Fogelson, “White on Black,” 115-116.

⁴³ “L.A. Lacks Leadership on Rights, King says,” *Los Angeles Times*, 21 August 1965.

Yorty on the 19th of August, he urged the mayor to acknowledge police brutality and asked for the resignation of Parker. What King received instead was an accusation. Yorty staunchly defended Parker, contending that there was “no excuse to find fault in law enforcement.” The mayor severely criticized King for performing what he called “a great disservice to the people of Los Angeles and the Nation.”⁴⁴ Visiting Los Angeles made King reconsider his understanding of civil rights. King admitted that “we as Negro leaders – and I include myself – [had] failed to take the civil rights movement to the masses of people,” and that the “North, at best, stood still as the South caught up.”⁴⁵ The Watts uprising showed that the civil rights movement, which was oriented toward the South, did not necessarily bring about a dramatic and discernible change in people’s lives in the Northern and Western ghettos.

While civil rights leaders were in the middle of re-conceptualizing their strategies, Los Angeles encountered black nationalism on the one hand and white backlash on the other. After the uprising, two “Black Nationalist” groups emerged. One was a group of “political nationalists” exemplified by Hakim Jamal influenced by Malcolm X and the Black Panther Party. The other was a group of “cultural nationalists” represented by Maulana Karenga, which stressed the need for African-Americans to recover their

⁴⁴ “King Assailed by Yorty After Stormy Meeting,” *Los Angeles Times*, 20 August 1965; Memo, Lee White to President Johnson, 20 August 1965, Office Files of Lee White, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

⁴⁵ Horne, 183. See also “James Farmer to Amsterdam News,” 28 August 1965, Vol. 15, Reel 18, *The Papers of the Congress of Racial Equality 1941-1967* (Stanford, North Carolina: Microfilming Corporation of America, A New York Times Company, 1980).

“African” heritage and emphasized that “cultural evolution was indispensable to the political struggle.” The latter group, led by Karenga, would play a significant role in the local anti-poverty programs, utilizing grants from the OEO for their own activities.⁴⁶

The Watts revolt was also accompanied by a profound white backlash. According to the “White Reaction Study,” 71 percent of the respondents thought that the uprising increased the gap between the races. In addition, 68 percent agreed that “Negroes should stop pushing so hard.”⁴⁷ This reactionary tide turned in some politicians’ favor. A prominent state legislative leader for example, Jesse M. Unruh, tried to speak as the voice of “innocent Caucasians.” Unruh contended that “unless the majority [was] protected and convinced that such protection [was] forthcoming from physical excesses of minorities,” it would become difficult to convince these “innocent Caucasians” to pay the economic costs of wiping out “second-class citizenship.”⁴⁸ Yet no one could beat Mayor Yorty in representing himself as an enforcer of laws and

⁴⁶ Maulana Karenga, interview by author, 25 September 2000, California State University, Long Beach, Long Beach, California; Horne, 185-212; Bruce Michael Tyler, “Black Radicalism in Southern California, 1950-1982” (Ph. D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1983); Paul Bullock, ed., *Watts: The Aftermath: An Inside View of the Ghetto by the People of Watts* (New York: Grove Press, 1969).

⁴⁷ Richard T. Morriss and Vincent Jeffries, “The White Reaction Study,” in *The Los Angeles Riots: A Socio-psychological Study*, 480-601. Morriss and Jeffries chose a sample of 600 whites in six selected areas (Baldwin Hills, Pacific Palisades, Leimert Park, Reseda, Central Long Beach, and Bell) in Los Angeles, with 100 white residents drawn from each place. The areas were chosen on the basis of socioeconomic status, indexed by occupation, education, income, and the degree of integration, using 1960 Census figures.

⁴⁸ Memo, Jesse M. Unruh to Jack Valenti, 18 August 1965, Gen HU2/ST5, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

“anything but a coddler of criminals.”⁴⁹ The Mayor’s staunch law and order position attracted many white Angelenos. Indeed, as Democratic National Committee Deputy Chair Louis Martin admitted, Yorty was a “maverick who [knew] how to divide and rule the various groups and communities that [made] up Los Angeles.”⁵⁰ Yorty placed the blame not only on civil rights workers for provoking black residents’ resentment but also on Governor Brown. The Mayor announced a “growing sentiment in the Democratic party to demand new leadership” and called for an end to “influence peddling, false promises, favoritism, and power politics.”⁵¹ Yorty’s challenge to Brown in the Democratic primary, as well as white backlash against the uprising, lent a hand to Ronald Reagan, who was a steadfast critic of civil rights measures. Reagan, who opposed not only the Rumford Fair Housing Act but also the 1964 federal civil rights laws, attracted hundreds of thousands of Democratic voters and won election as a new Republican governor.⁵²

The repercussions of the Watts uprising went far beyond Southern California, reaching the White House. The President would soon notice that his “close identification with the cause of black Americans” would accord him some responsibility

⁴⁹ Bollens and Geyer, 154.

⁵⁰ Memo, Louis Martin to John Bailey and Cliff Carter, 23 August 1965, Office Files of Lee White, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Bollens and Geyer, 149-162.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Gary Orfield, “Race and Liberal Agenda: The Loss of the Integrationist Dream, 1965-1974,” in *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States*, eds. Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 327-330; Horne, 280-282, 290-292, 301-302; Nicolaidis, 322-326.

for the revolt.⁵³ Yet President Johnson stressed the significance of attacking the “deep-seated causes of riots” rather than appealing to “law and order.”⁵⁴ Johnson announced the appointment of Deputy Attorney General Ramsey Clark to head a special task force to report on the causes and solutions for the Watts uprising. Then a week later, following the recommendations of the task force, the President authorized more than forty-five employment, health, education, and housing programs totaling 29 million dollars for Los Angeles. After much delay, the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” had begun.⁵⁵

The confusion over the establishment of the Community Action Agency, in fact, was one of the chief causes of the Watts revolt. As Nathan Cohen has noted, there were almost no resources available to alleviate unemployment in Watts before the uprising. As the battle between the YOB and the EOF continued, most funds for the local anti-poverty programs were either withheld or delayed, while some educational programs were funded directly from the OEO.⁵⁶

While it was Mayor Yorty’s staunch refusal to agree with a merger plan that caused a serious delay in the implementation of the “War on Poverty,” some pointed their

⁵³ Horne, 281.

⁵⁴ James W. Button, *Black Violence: Political Impact of the 1960s Riots* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 30-31.

⁵⁵ Memo, Ernest C. Friesen, Jr. to Lawrence E. Levinson, 4 October 1965, Ex HU2/ST5, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Horne, 281-287.

⁵⁶ Cohen, “The Context of the Curfew Area,” in *The Los Angeles Riots: A Socio-psychological Study*.

fingers at black middle-class leaders. The Watts Community Action Group, established by Earline A. Williams, a life long resident of Watts and an assistant librarian, complained to the OEO that there was no visible evidence of accomplishment and that some of the community leaders were self-seeking.⁵⁷ According to the *Los Angeles Times*, not only Yorty but also Hawkins earned blame for leaving the poor waiting outside, since they “accuse[d] each other of attempting to seize political control of the program.”⁵⁸ The *Los Angeles Sentinel* also regarded “distrust over political power plays which [was] holding up some help from anti-poverty program” as one of the key issues leading to the Watts revolt.⁵⁹ While CAP certainly became a strategy for increasing black representation in the City of Angeles, African-American leaders were criticized for the length of time it took to reach an agreement about the Community Action Agency.

African American leaders were not simply standing around without taking any action. Bradley saw the uprising as an opportunity to struggle for better educational and economic opportunities for the “poor.” Together with King, Bradley harshly criticized Police Chief Parker and the LAPD. Soon after the revolt, Bradley helped the City Council establish a Human Relations Board to improve the relationship between the police and black Angelenos. Bradley was not the only official to use the uprising to

⁵⁷ Memo, Dick Fullmer to Bob Clampitt, 27 September 1965, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), October 1965 – December 1965,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives.

⁵⁸ “Poor Wait Outside in Poverty War,” *Los Angeles Times*, 11 August 1965.

⁵⁹ “The Poverty Issue,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 12 August 1965; “Why – The Rioting?,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 19 August 1965; Bauman, 154-162.

demand more educational and economic opportunities for the “poor.”⁶⁰ On the 17th of August, Louis Martin, the Deputy Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, had a meeting with the elected black public officials including Hawkins, Dymally, Mills, and Maurice Weiner, one of Bradley’s deputies. They agreed that unemployment was a major factor in the uprising, and most blamed lack of anti-poverty funds on political conflicts among public officials, with some attacking Mayor Yorty in particular.⁶¹ Hawkins, whose “leadership was generally acknowledged by the other officials,” wrote to President Johnson that “if tensions [were] to be removed...those who [lived] in the community and who [were] directly concerned [had to] be brought into [the] decision making and planning.”⁶² Hawkins spoke most forcefully for the participation of the “poor” in the local anti-poverty programs after the revolt.

Mayor Yorty, who had come under fire for his opposition to the merger plan, aimed attacks at Sargent Shriver, the director of the OEO. Yorty contended that the OEO’s “deliberate and well-publicized cutting of poverty funds to the city” was one of

⁶⁰ Sonenshein, 83; Payne and Ratzan, 74.

⁶¹ Memo, Louis Martin to John Bailey and Cliff Carter, 23 August 1965, Office Files of Lee White, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

⁶² Memo, Augustus F. Hawkins to President Johnson, 23 August 1965, File “Anti-Poverty Programs. Misc.,” Box 91, Augustus F. Hawkins Papers, 1935-1990, Department of Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles; Memo, Augustus F. Hawkins to William J. Williams, 31 August 1965, File “Anti-Poverty Programs. Misc.,” Box 91, Augustus F. Hawkins Papers, 1935-1990, Department of Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, who investigated the causes of the uprising, also found that unemployment was one of the most severely felt concerns for black residents. George Lipsitz, *The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), 40.

the main contributing factors to the uprising. He claimed that the city continued to be subjected to “federal whims which [were] confusing, changing, and arbitrary.”⁶³ Shriver was quick to challenge Yorty, calling the charge “intemperate and unfounded.” Shriver argued that \$17 million had already been approved for Los Angeles in spite of the city’s inability to comply with the OEO guidelines for the participation of the “poor.” He maintained that Los Angeles was the only major city without a “well-rounded community action program because of the failure of local officials to establish a broad-based community action board representing all segments of the community.” For Shriver, it was Yorty’s resolute opposition to the participation of the “poor” and people of color that had brought about a serious delay in the allocations of the “War on Poverty” funds.⁶⁴

On 18th August, President Johnson dispatched Leroy Collins, Undersecretary of Commerce and former governor of Florida, to solve the dispute over CAA in Los Angeles and get anti-poverty programs started. When Collins arrived in Los Angeles, he found the “air was more filled with tension than smog. Everyone was criticizing and blaming everyone else.”⁶⁵ According to President Johnson’s aide Joseph Califano, Mayor Yorty was again the “stumbling block.” Califano reported to the President that it took all of Collins’ skill, and finally discussions with Jesse Unruh (“Yorty’s man behind the scenes”),

⁶³ Memo, Senator George Murphy to Sargent Shriver, 17 August 1965, File “General: United States Gov., Economic Opportunity, 1965,” Box D-25, Samuel Yorty Collection, Records Management Division, Office of the City Clerk, City of Los Angeles.

⁶⁴ “Yorty Raps Shriver over Poverty Funds,” *Los Angeles Times*, 19 August 1965; Bollens and Geyer, 152; Horne, 290.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 284.

to bring the parties together.⁶⁶ Collins managed to get agreement on a 25-member board which would be known as the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles, EYOA. EYOA would consist of twelve public agency members, seven community representatives elected by the “poor,” six private agency members, and two non-voting members from the L.A. Chamber of Commerce and League of Cities. It was nothing but a compromise between the YOB and the EOF. While the YOB side was satisfied, since Collins’ plan would give public agency members dominance in voting power on the board, the EOF side also succeeded in letting community representatives be elected by the “poor,” rather than being appointed by government officials. The OEO approved the agreement and announced that grants amounting to \$12,979,000 would be made in two weeks. The lingering contestation over the establishment of a Community Action Agency looked as if it were coming to an end.⁶⁷

The Establishment of the EYOA, however, was just the beginning of another battle, a battle over the implementation of the anti-poverty programs. At first, the Community Anti-Poverty Committee, which included 2,000 members of labor, church and social groups, was not happy with Collins’ proposal because he had consulted only

⁶⁶ Memo, Joseph A. Califano, Jr. to the President, 11 September 1965, Ex LG/Los Angeles, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

⁶⁷ Memo, LeRoy Collins to Sargent Shriver, 23 August 1965, Ex HU2/ST5, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; Memo, Sargent Shriver to Joseph Califano, Jr., 23 August 1965, EX HU2/ST5, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; “Los Angeles: Help From U.S. Task Force,” *Los Angeles Times*, 29 August 1965; Button, 30- 31; Horne, 281-285; Bauman, 168-177.

with public agencies and then passed it on to them for mere approval.⁶⁸ Hawkins was not satisfied with the compromise either. He persuaded Collins in attending a meeting in the Watts area to discuss the future of the Los Angeles “War on Poverty.” While Hawkins agreed with the general thrust of Collins’ proposal, he was also considering the possibility to advance the participation of the “poor” by bypassing the EYOA. Based on Congressional hearings conducted in the Los Angeles area, Hawkins wrote to the OEO director Sargent Shriver that the image of city hall in Los Angeles was “at an all-time low” among people of color, and that there existed “overwhelming sentiment” for resident involvement and self-determination. In the end, Hawkins made several recommendations, including the building of leadership through the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project directed by Opal C. Jones, more involvement of residents at the policy level, and recognition of other Community Action Agencies as well as single-purpose agencies. While Hawkins tried to increase the power of residents in the “poor” areas on the EYOA board, he also attempted to prevent the EYOA from taking full control of all the anti-poverty programs in L.A.⁶⁹ Yorty criticized Hawkins’

⁶⁸ “Collins’ Proposal Rejected,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 26 August 1965.

⁶⁹ Memo, Augustus F. Hawkins to Sargent Shriver, 2 September 1965, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), August 1965 – September 1965,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Dick Fullmer to Bob Clampitt, 27 September 1965, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), August 1965 – September 1965,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Augustus F. Hawkins to William J. Williams, 31 August 1965, File “Anti-Poverty Programs. Misc.,” Box 91, Augustus F. Hawkins Papers, 1935-1990, Department of Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles; Memo, Augustus F. Hawkins to Louis J. Ambler, Jr., 13 September 1965, File “Anti-Poverty Programs. Misc.,” Box 91, Augustus F. Hawkins Papers, 1935-1990, Department of Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles; “Hawkins Attacks Anti-Poverty Pact,” *Los Angeles Times*, 26 August 1965; “Causes of Riot Still Prevail, Hawkins Says,” *Los Angeles Times*, 21

attempts as a “phase of the strong arm tactics employed against us.”⁷⁰ Shriver, on the other hand, welcomed his recommendations. Shriver agreed with Hawkins that there was a growing attitude in favor of resident participation and that Los Angeles was too large to have only one “octopus size” Community Action Agency.⁷¹ Hawkins continued to argue that the people who were in poverty areas should be given a dominant role to play in the anti-poverty program.

Struggles over the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” moved to another phase after the Watts uprising. The battles were no longer over the establishment of a Community Action Agency. They would be over the actual implementation of each anti-poverty program. The struggles of African American leaders like Bradley, Hawkins, and Jones, however, continued. In fact, their fight for increasing the power of residents in poor areas and bringing the anti-poverty programs to the grassroots level was about to begin.

This chapter has shown how African American leaders insisted on the right to realize the participation of the “poor” in the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” by establishing the EOF and providing opportunities for residents served to join the Community Action Agency. It has also demonstrated how these same individuals used

September 1965; Bauman, 172-177.

⁷⁰ Memo, Senator George Murphy to R. Sargent Shriver, 17 August 1965, File “General: United States Gov., Economic Opportunity, 1965,” Box D-25, Samuel Yorty Collection, Records Management Division, Office of the City Clerk, City of Los Angeles.

⁷¹ Memo, Sargent Shriver to Augustus F. Hawkins, undated, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), August 1965 – September 1965,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives.

the anti-poverty program as a way to politically confront Mayor Yorty and other government officials who sought to secure control of the anti-poverty programs at the expense of poor people themselves. These black leaders appropriated and refashioned the principle of “maximum feasible participation” that had been the foundation of original anti-poverty legislation.

While thus emphasizing the agency of the black middle-class in voicing alternative visions of CAP, this chapter does not treat black leadership in Los Angeles as monolithic. On the contrary, it sheds light on the intricacy of their struggles by paying close attention to differences within the leadership of black Los Angeles as well as the complexity of their relationships with multiple political actors like Mayor Yorty, Governor Brown, the OEO, and the Johnson administration. A new class of black leadership emerged within the context of electoral rivalries between the Yorty-Mills-Unruh coalition and the forces allied with Hawkins, Bradley, and Brown. Los Angeles black leaders transformed CAP into a contested political space where new political opportunities for the “poor” and African American residents could be pursued.

Chapter IV.

Voicing Alternative Visions of Citizenship from “Inside” the American Welfare State: the Los Angeles Community Action Program, 1965-1973

With the establishment of the Community Action Agency, the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles (EYOA), the “War on Poverty” officially began. In this chapter, I examine how local activists in South Central Los Angeles turned the concept of “maximum feasible participation” into a weapon in the battle for welfare rights. They forcefully challenged the official federal/local anti-poverty institutions --- OEO and EYOA --- and created oppositional discourses that could work against them.

In the first section, I focus on one of the major anti-poverty programs in Los Angeles: the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project (NAPP). It was funded by the OEO through the EYOA, and came to be at the center of a great debate over the implementation of the Los Angeles “War on Poverty.” Among the anti-poverty programs administered by the EYOA, NAPP was the only one aimed at providing training and employment opportunities for adults. It was one of a few programs operated by an African-American woman. A black female social worker, Opal C. Jones, served as the executive director of the NAPP from its inception in April, 1965. Soon, it became a major point of contestation regarding the participation of the “poor” and the people of color in the Los Angeles Community Action Program. I analyze how Jones

and NAPP became a political threat to mayor Samuel Yorty and EYOA. I also examine how she was actively engaged in recasting the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” programs by both stressing the role racial inequality played in creating poverty and providing an incisive critique of the role of assumed “professional” anti-poverty workers.

Then, I explore two organizations which insisted on realizing the participation of the “poor”: the Watts Labor Community Action Committee (WLCAC) and the Aid to Needy Children (ANC) Mothers Anonymous. I focus on activists Ted Watkins of the WLCAC and Johnnie Tillmon of ANC Mothers Anonymous, who played crucial roles in each organization, and bring their discourses forward as representative voices of local welfare activists in South Central Los Angeles. These local activists creatively appropriated anti-poverty programs, and invested them with new meaning. The examples of Ted Watkins and Johnnie Tillmon give insight into the interaction of race, class, and gender relations in the “War on Poverty” programs.

Watts formed the roots of both the WLCAC and the ANC through their involvement in a campaign to bring a hospital to the area after the Watts uprising itself. They occasionally intersected with each other, although the direction of each organization’s activism had its own particular significance and led to different consequences. The Watts Labor Community Action Committee (WLCAC) was organized early in 1965 by labor union members living in the Watts area with financial support from the OEO, the AFL-CIO, and the Department of Labor. Ted Watkins, an African American international representative on the staff of United Auto Workers (UAW), became its first chairman in March 1965. I explore how union activists sought

to bring the “War on Poverty” to the grassroots level by launching a wide range of projects, such as initiating the Community Conservation Corps, establishing the Credit Union, developing a nursery for community beautification, leasing a service station, and promoting political links between Watts and other areas in the city. They also turned Watts into a national model for poverty activists, although they did not simply follow the directions set by the OEO. Like Opal Jones, Watkins forcefully argued that poverty could not be eliminated unless federal and local anti-poverty agencies provided the “poor” not only with education and job training opportunities but also accessible jobs.

The ANC Mother Anonymous was organized in 1963 by one of the black Angelenos who joined the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project: Johnnie Tillmon. It was one of the oldest organizations established by and for welfare recipients in the nation. It was not administered by the EYOA, nor did it receive local anti-poverty funds. Tillmon served on NAPP’s board of directors, and found a new political opportunity through the NAPP. Tillmon’s leadership potential soon caught Opal Jones’ attention. Jones nominated Tillmon to attend the Citizen’s Crusade Against Poverty, held in Washington, D.C., in April 5, 1966. There she met a former CORE activist, George Wiley, who sought to bring together local welfare recipient groups and transform them into a national movement. On June 30, 1966, the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) was established, and Tillmon quickly emerged as a leader. She became the chairperson of the NWRO in August 1967, and eventually the director in January 1973, replacing Wiley. She transformed the notion of “maximum feasible participation” into a weapon in the battle for welfare rights.

Through examining the cases of the NAPP, the WLCAC, and the ANC Mothers Anonymous, I explore how these activists' efforts resulted in expanding the roles available to the "poor," people of color, and women in the Los Angeles "War on Poverty," thereby providing a significant critique of the local and federal welfare systems that ignored race/class/gender differences, and restoring welfare activists to the status of fully empowered historical agents.

4.1 Recasting the Community Action Program at the Local Level: The Neighborhood Adult Participation Project

EYOA and the Los Angeles Community Action Program

Before exploring how Opal C. Jones initiated her struggles against the EYOA, the Los Angeles Community Action Agency, I briefly discuss the characteristics of the EYOA and its anti-poverty programs. The EYOA was made up of three parts: a board of directors that decided upon EYOA policies, the director, and the employees who actually managed the programs. As a Community Action Agency and a component of the "War on Poverty" designed to promote the "maximum feasible participation" of the "poor" in the planning, policy-making, and operation of the anti-poverty program, EYOA required the participation of the "poor" on the board of directors. The board of directors originally consisted of three representatives from each of four public government bodies (the City of Los Angeles, the County of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Unified School District, and the Los Angeles County Schools); one representative from each of six local organizations (United Way, AFL-CIO, The Welfare Planning Council, The Los Angeles

County Federation of Coordinating Council, The Chamber of Commerce, and The League of California Cities); and seven representatives elected by the residents of the “poor” areas. Joe Maldonado, a Mexican-American with a background in social work and who had been the executive director of the Youth Opportunities Board, became the first executive director of EYOA. On the 31st of October in 1966, the number of employees stood at 245. EYOA continued to function as a comprehensive planning and coordinating body, thereby retaining certain administrative responsibilities for the programs.¹

Although EYOA required the participation of representatives of the “poor” in its decision making process, the amount of actual power wielded by these representatives on the board of directors was severely limited. Dale Rogers Marshall participated on the board in 1968 and conducted interviews with the thirty-two board members. Marshall pointed out that while the participation of the “poor” had a significant influence on their careers, these representatives of the “poor” could not gain power over the decisions made by the board. In other words, whereas the increase in confidence, efficacy, participation, interest in community work, self-esteem, and leadership aspirations among the representatives of the “poor” certainly showed that they were motivated by their

¹ At first, the EYOA was the only Community Action Agency in Los Angeles County. Four new agencies were created in late 1966 and early 1967 in Los Angeles County. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Review of the Community Action Program in the Los Angeles Area under the Economic Opportunity Act: Report to the Congress on the Office of Economic Opportunity* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1968), 5-6; Mary Kaye, *Distribution of Poor Youths in Los Angeles County* (Los Angeles: EYOA, 1967), v; Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, 90th Cong., 1st sess., May 12, 1967, 3844.

experiences on the board, they were unable to match the predominant influence on the board exercised by public agencies.² Thus the EYOA board was ultimately dominated by public officials. Opal C. Jones and other local leaders would criticize this point later on.

There were two significant aspects concerning the funding of the EYOA. First, almost half of the funds went to educational programs like Head Start, which was a child development program geared towards preschool children (See Table 6). Second, the funding for job training and other employment programs was only 22 percent of the overall grant, and most of this money was aimed at youth, except in the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project (NAPP). This was because the “War on Poverty” originally placed more emphasis on youth development as a measure “to prevent entry into poverty.” Although EYOA created 48,797 temporary and permanent jobs for “poor” people, providing the skills and experiences necessary for “poor” adults, NAPP was the only program geared towards adults who had already entered into “poverty.”³ Overall, about 9 percent of the funds were aimed at adults. While most of the anti-poverty funds were channeled into programs for teenagers, Opal Jones would launch significant critiques against the EYOA, using NAPP as a vehicle for social change.

² Dale Rogers Marshall, *The Politics of Participation in Poverty: A Case Study of the Board of the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 135-136.

³ U.S. General Accounting Office, 1-23; Patterson, 136. In addition to the educational and employment programs, Teen Post, which consisted of 150 recreational and cultural programs for teenagers in “poverty” areas, was one of the most popular programs in the Los Angeles “War on Poverty.”

How did EYOA decide on the eligibility of its program participants? Based on the eligibility criteria issued by OEO in its CAP program guide, EYOA established their own standards for each program, but as for the definition of “poverty” in the election, the “poor” were defined as those with a family income of less than \$4,000 regardless of the number of dependents. In 1960, “whites” comprised 73 percent of those below the poverty line in Los Angeles County. But a strikingly different picture emerges when the statistics are analyzed by racial/ethnic group. Only 17 percent of “white families (excluding Spanish speakers)” were below the poverty line, while 34.7 percent of “non-white families” and 25.7 percent of “families with Spanish surnames” earned less than \$4,000 annually.⁴

The main focus of the EYOA programs was not the white “poor,” who composed more than 70 percent of the “poor,” but African-American and Latino “poor.”⁵ One of the major reasons why most of the anti-poverty funds flowed towards people of color lay in the Watts uprising, which had led to the organization of the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” task force as well as to the provisioning of federal funds. Mexican-American leaders demanded equal opportunities for Mexican-Americans, and as a result

⁴ U.S. General Accounting Office, 8-10; Memo, Robert L. Goe to Irvin Walder, 10 January 1966, File #126307, Box A-1938, City Council File, Records Management Division, Office of the City Clerk, City of Los Angeles, California; Senate, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, 3845.

⁵ Some people questioned this point during the hearing on Examination of the War on Poverty in Los Angeles in May 1967. For example, George Knox Roth, a research director at the General Research Consultants in Pasadena, stated that “the Negro and Mexican-American poor have been favored both with jobs and assistance with an almost total disregard for the other segments of the poor equally in need of assistance.” Senate, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, 3986.

anti-poverty money went into Latino areas as well. The other reason was that EYOA didn't administer anti-poverty programs directly to each "poor" family, but instead identified "major poverty areas." (See Figure 3 and Table 7) And it so happened that these "major poverty areas" were the predominantly African American and Latino neighborhoods.⁶ The fact that the main focus of EYOA programs was on African-American and Latino areas meant that the "War on Poverty" had to attack not only poverty problems in general, but also the relationship between racial inequality and poverty.⁷ However, EYOA did not make clear how poverty issues and racial issues were intertwined, but rather left local residents to tackle the racial issues by themselves. This would be another significant issue Opal C. Jones would critique later.

Bringing the "War on Poverty" to the Grass-roots Level: The Neighborhood Adult Participation Project (NAPP)

The executive director, Opal C. Jones, intended to bring the anti-poverty programs closer to the people and to mobilize "poor" adults in their neighborhoods. Since the early 1950s, Jones had been at the Avalon-Carver Community Center, established in 1940 to provide multi-service resources to low-income residents in south central L.A. Jones worked with distinguished social workers such as Mary Henry, who later founded the nation's first urban pediatric telemedicine center.⁸ Having had an

⁶ Ibid., 3895-3898.

⁷ Senate, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, 3979-3980, 3986.

⁸ Mary Henry, Sharron A. Eason, and Thyra Chushenberry, Interview by author, 30

experience as a professional social worker in south central, Jones was nominated as the executive director of the NAPP.

NAPP started its operation on 1 April, 1965, with ten neighborhood “outposts” located in Los Angeles County and 400 aides trained there. Soon the number of “outposts” had grown to 15: Avalon, Boyle Heights, Canoga Park, Compton-Willowbrook, El Monte, Exposition, Florence-Graham, Lincoln Heights, Long Beach, Los Angeles Central, Pacoima, San Pedro, Venice-Mar Vista, Watts, and Wilmington-Harbor City. According to a NAPP pamphlet, the program’s chief purpose was to link the anti-poverty programs with the people who were served by the programs, and to bring these anti-poverty programs to the grass-roots level, so that people in “poor” communities could have a louder voice in the operation of the “War on Poverty.”⁹

The program of NAPP was three fold: Career Development, Neighborhood Development, and Information and Referral. Career Development was established for providing job opportunities for neighborhood adults in “poor” areas as aides at NAPP “outposts.” Through the Career Development program, these neighborhood adults were able to seek a new career and demonstrate their abilities as staff colleagues who could

September 2002, tape recording, The Avalon-Carver Community Center, Los Angeles, CA.

⁹ Neighborhood Adult Participation Project, *This is N.A.P.P.!: A Little Reader about the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project*, in Box 1, Neighborhood Adult Participation Project, Inc., California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, University of Southern California (USC) , Los Angeles, California; N.A.P.P., *NAPP Now: An Explanation of the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project Incorporated*, in Box 1, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC; N.A.P.P., *This is the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project Story in A Capsule*, in Box 2, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC.

help improve the agencies' services. The NAPP outposts helped neighborhood people find jobs and served as a liaison between the neighborhood adults and the anti-poverty agencies. Neighborhood Development was for organizing neighborhoods and their people to work on their own behalf "toward self-help, self-determination and total improvement." NAPP also helped people improve their neighborhoods through various kinds of activities: offering residents English speaking classes, adult education classes, civil service instructions, and hot lunch for school children; helping neighborhood people install street/traffic lights and obtain crossing guards, boulevard stop signs, and pedestrian cross-walks; establishing a Saturday Clinic and expanding services in Public Health Centers. Finally, Information and Referral was formed to link neighbors with the services for which they were entitled. For adults in "poor" communities, NAPP acted as an important link to the EYOA in order to get these various services enacted. NAPP became one of the most popular programs for "poor" communities among the Los Angeles "War on Poverty" activities.¹⁰

NAPP, in fact, would stand at the heart of a great debate over political participation after the Watts uprising. As I have already discussed, there were prolonged battles over the establishment of a Community Action Agency in Los Angeles. These struggles emerged between African-American leaders like Congress member Augustus F. Hawkins and Council member Thomas Bradley, and government officials such as Mayor Samuel Yorty. With EYOA in operation, the Hawkins-Bradley group sought to increase

¹⁰ NAPP, *This is the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project Story in A Capsule*.

the power of residents in poor areas through the implementation of each anti-poverty program, with particular emphasis on NAPP. Before scrutinizing how NAPP became a unique vehicle for the “poor,” one needs to understand the political biography of Opal C. Jones.

“It’s the Same Old Soup Warmed Over Unless We Become Agents of Change”: Opal C. Jones

Jones wrote various kinds of pamphlets to explain the character of NAPP.¹¹ This paper focuses on three sites in which Jones sought to address poverty: the connection between poverty and racial discrimination; the importance of the role of the people who were served by the programs; and the critique of professional anti-poverty workers. Jones did not explicitly discuss women’s rights or women’s roles in the anti-poverty programs. What Jones achieved as one of few female directors of color, however, resulted in the expanding of women’s roles in the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” programs. By raising the three critical issues noted above, Jones forcefully challenged EYOA’s perceptions of what women should and should not do.

Jones paid particular attention to the connection between poverty and racial

¹¹ Although the pamphlets written by Jones were valuable sources, readers should note that there is a methodological problem concerning the use of her pamphlets. These pamphlets are important since they would help readers understand the character of the NAPP and Jones’ viewpoints toward the anti-poverty programs. Also, these pamphlets are significant because there are not many resources available today about a specific program funded by OEO through EYOA. Many of the pamphlets, however, do not have specific dates, so it is difficult to put them in chronological order and examine how her views changed after 1965.

discrimination. She was invited to the hearing on the Examination of the War on Poverty held in Los Angeles in May 1967. In her statement, she criticized some people involved in the “War on Poverty” for ignoring the link existing between “poverty and discrimination,” and “housing [discrimination] and other forms of segregation.” In a pamphlet titled *Strategy and Strategists*, Jones wrote that anti-poverty workers had to tackle “all of the forces at work in the neighborhood,” including racism. Jones was fully aware that the EYOA and public officials involved in the “War on Poverty” failed to confront issues of racial discrimination seriously, especially those regarding residential segregation. Even though many anti-poverty programs targeted the districts inhabited by people of color, only poverty issues were discussed, and issues of race were usually left unexamined. Jones repeatedly emphasized that the issue of racial discrimination could not be separated from the causes of poverty.¹²

Jones also vigorously encouraged the participation of the “poor” and believed their involvement and their perspectives were indispensable to the effective functioning of the program. In a report titled *A New Look in Community Service*, she pointed out that there were plenty of non-professional and neighborhood staff – “ready, anxious, willing and able to work, to serve and become members” of the staffs of local social agencies, or to serve as neighborhood workers in the schools. Jones wrote, “I have discovered that for a long time they [neighborhood residents] have wanted to work with

¹² Senate, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, 3949-53; Opal C. Jones, *Strategy and Strategists*, 28 May 1968, in Box 3, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC; Opal C. Jones, *How to Work With People of All Ethnic Groups*, in Box 4, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC.

us – side by side in our social institutions.” Jones also conducted research on what neighborhood mothers wished their children’s teachers would do, and introduced these mothers’ opinions into discussions of NAPP. For example, one mother wanted her child’s teacher to educate him in “the role of the Negro in world history, especially the history of the United States.” Another mother hoped that teachers would become more involved in community activities. Under the leadership of Jones, many mothers, including Johnnie Tillmon, developed their careers. Jones regarded the people who joined NAPP not only as recipients of the anti-poverty programs, but also as coworkers who would have innovative ideas and suggestions.¹³

Finally, Jones was critical of the “experts” involved in anti-poverty programs or the “professional” anti-poverty workers who lacked “sincerity,” as evidenced by her picture book titled *Guess Who’s Coming to the Ghettos?*. In the first segment, Jones provided a critique of the “experts” in “poverty problems,” who were mostly middle-class well-educated whites. Jones wrote:

They saw us as problems – as clients, as the poor...
 They all became experts – with advice given free!...
 They soon made studies; They researched us to death...
 They kept up the old “maximum feasible line.”...
 They sat back and waited for it all to take place...
 With its new leadership, new voices, new plans, they cried –
 oh, the neighborhood is out of our hands!...
 And so, they got busy and made new plans to determine

¹³ Opal C. Jones, *A New Look in Community Service*, in Box 4, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC; Opal C. Jones, *I Wish My Child’s Teacher Would...*, in Box 4, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC.

the target – back in their hands (See Figure 4).¹⁴

Jones also critiqued the “professional” anti-poverty workers, who had seldom paid attention to the ghettos in the past but suddenly became “professional” workers in the “War on Poverty”:

Passed us each day with her head in the air.
 Lived near us and never seemed to care...
 So, finally the war on poverty came here...
 The neighbor became an expert in health and disease,
 the ghetto’s problems and the ghetto’s needs...
 To be an authority in health, law, and crime, but tell us,
 dear lady, where have you been all this time?¹⁵

Jones was concerned about the absence of dedication on the part of anti-poverty workers. Jones was surely intent on critiquing “white middle-class experts” here, yet Jones also directed her critique at her own professional practices as well. Having worked as a professional settlement worker, Jones had always been interested in the relationship between the “experts” and people served by the programs. Jones emphasized that in order to ensure the participation of the “poor” in the anti-poverty programs, the “experts” or “professional” anti-poverty workers, including herself, had to change. She wrote in another pamphlet that “we must listen more and talk less, we must ask more and tell less, we must learn more and teach less, we must release control of

¹⁴ Opal C. Jones, *Guess Who’s Coming to the Ghettos?*, in Box 2, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC, 2-11.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 14-21.

some of the ideas that we have held as the “only way to fly.”” Jones stressed that if NAPP workers were only content with the status-quo and would not be “agents of change” then all of the programs and every project would be “the same old soup warmed over.”

“How Much Do You Really Care?”: the Dismissal of Jones and the Reorganization of EYOA

Los Angeles Mayor Samuel Yorty and the EYOA executive director Joe Maldonado saw Opal C. Jones and NAPP as a political threat. Mayor Yorty was especially concerned with Jones’ close affiliation with Congress member Hawkins, who had been in a running battle with the mayor over the establishment of the anti-poverty agency. As early as the summer of 1965, Maldonado ordered Jones to stay away from the community and civil rights meeting, as Jones and other NAPP workers struggled to have a part in the formation of an Anti-Poverty group in Los Angeles.¹⁶

The Yorty-EYOA coalition and Jones came into direct conflict when the EYOA

¹⁶ Opal C. Jones, *I Wonder Why Some People Don’t Like Me?*, 1 April 1966, in Box 2, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC; Memo, Dick Fullmer to Bob Clampitt, 27 September 1965, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), August 1965 – September 1965,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Bauman, 195. Jones reacted to Maldonado’s orders by writing a picture book titled *New Committee in the Zoo*. Jones compared the power politics in Los Angeles “War on Poverty” to a zoo containing big mean animals (the “powerful” who tried to dominate anti-poverty programs for themselves), big kind animals (the “powerful” who tried to bring the programs closer to the people), small mean animals (the “powerless” who collaborated with big mean animals), and small kind animals (the “powerless” who tried to recast the anti-poverty programs based on the experiences of the poor people). Opal C. Jones, *The New Committee in the Zoo*, in Box 2, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC.

required in December 1965 that all but five community aides be pulled out of each outpost to work in public and private agencies. This ran contrary to Jones' view that NAPP should be a vehicle for the participation of the "poor" in local anti-poverty programs. Jones opposed the idea of pulling NAPP aides out of community development and placing them in agencies, contending that it would force the program to move "people out of the community" and leave aides "brainwashed into the power structure."¹⁷

African-American leaders like Hawkins and Bradley had complained that Mayor Yorty was trying to take over NAPP. Hawkins regarded NAPP as an arena to build more "indigenous leadership" in poor neighborhoods. Bradley, who thought of NAPP as "one of the successful anti-poverty programs" in Los Angeles, contended that NAPP should have been taken away from the EYOA. Bradley asked Samuel F. Yette of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to send some "responsible" OEO persons to visit Los Angeles and investigate the EYOA's involvement in NAPP. These black leaders were concerned that Yorty was preventing NAPP from mobilizing the "poor."¹⁸

¹⁷ Memo, Paul R. Weeks to Dick Fullmer, 2 February 1966, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), January 1966 – February 1966," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Paul R. Weeks to Edgar May, 30 March 1966, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), March 1966," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives.

¹⁸ Memo, Augustus Hawkins to Sargent Shriver, 2 September 1965, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), August 1965 – September 1965," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Paul R. Weeks to Marvin R. Fullmer, 13 January 1966, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), January 1966 – February 1966," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Samuel F. Yette to Sargent Shriver and Bernard Boutin, 14 January 1966, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), January 1966 – February 1966," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives.

In February 1966, there was a rumor that EYOA would fire Opal C. Jones. One of the core newspapers for African-American residents in Los Angeles, *The Los Angeles Sentinel*, reported that Maldonado had allegedly said at the meeting that someone was causing confusion in the city's poverty program and Robert Goe, Mayor Yorty's representative on the EYOA board, had advised Maldonado to fire Jones. *The Sentinel* stated that this was because Jones and the successful operation of NAPP had become a "threat to the power structure of EYOA." Bill Riviera, Public Affairs Director of the EYOA, argued that "an anti-Yorty bias [was] transferred to our organization" through NAPP. Mayor Yorty and the EYOA regarded Jones' NAPP as the stumbling block precisely because it became a significant arena to build political organizations against the government officials.¹⁹

The conflict reached its climax in March 1966. Jones expressed her opinion that NAPP should be separated from the EYOA, and be operated for the benefit of the community. Maldonado contended that NAPP should work through the EYOA to help produce jobs. When Jones proceeded with a public meeting in March intended to clarify the role of NAPP in the Los Angeles "War on Poverty" and improve the relationship between Mexican workers and African-American workers, EYOA ordered Jones to cancel it. The 400 NAPP workers staged a protest march to the EYOA

¹⁹ Memo, Paul R. Weeks to Dick Fullmer, 2 February 1966, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), January 1966 – February 1966," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Edgar May to Sargent Shriver, 13 February 1966, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), January 1966 – February 1966," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; "Opal Jones Remains in Poverty Position, but Job Still in Doubt," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 17 February 1966; Bauman, 195-196.

headquarters in support of Jones' leadership on March 28th. Jones refused to cancel the meeting. Subsequently, Maldonado fired Jones at the end of March.²⁰

There were two grounds for the dismissal of Jones, according to EYOA. First, Jones was fired for "insubordination" after she refused to cancel the meeting. Maldonado explained that the decision to fire Jones was the result of the "unanimous agreement of the EYOA board members in attendance." However, *The Sentinel* reported that this was not quite true. Rather, the seven representatives of the "poor" expressed as much surprise and shock at the dismissal of Jones as the rest of the community. Samuel Anderson, one representative of the "poor," said that all of the representatives were "disturbed and concerned about the dismissal of Opal C. Jones." Secondly, Maldonado also accused Jones of having solicited funds from her aides for an unauthorized trip to Washington, D.C in September, 1965. Yet, Ursula Gutierrez, another poverty representative, explained that the EYOA board had no evidence of any wrongdoing by Jones. Gutierrez questioned Maldonado's claim that he did not learn about the trip until February and had not brought the matter to the attention of the board "because of vacations and the time required to gather evidence." Jones told *The Sentinel* that she had gone to Washington D.C. during her own vacation time in October and at her own expense to plead with the OEO to make NAPP a separate agency from EYOA. *The Sentinel* concluded that the real and recurring issue between Jones and the EYOA was the "philosophy behind the operation of her NAPP program."²¹ *The Sentinel*

²⁰ Ibid.; "Poverty War Flares Over Bill Nicholas," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 31 March 1966.

²¹ "For Immediate Release," Information Services Dept., EYOA, 31 March 1966, File

suggested that the EYOA dismissed Jones because she tried to recast the anti-poverty programs to incorporate the voices of the “poor.”

In addition to these charges against Jones, some media represented the firing of Jones as a “black-Latino conflict.” The editor of *the Herald-Dispatch*, for example, contended that the “battle between Mrs. Jones and the Maldonado office” would become a “threat to the peace and unity presently existing between Negroes and Mexican-Americans.” The underrepresentation of Latinos was attracting increasing attention. Some Latino activists pointed a finger at NAPP because predominantly African-American residential areas held ten out of the thirteen NAPP posts.

There were criticisms from Mexican-American residents that they had not been adequately served by the OEO. As some scholars have pointed out, the Watts uprising, which led to the organization of the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” task force, brought about a reallocation of anti-poverty funds to the predominantly black neighborhood of Los Angeles, South Central. Latino leaders like Congress member Edward Roybal demanded equal opportunities for Mexican-Americans. Roybal, who graduated from Roosevelt High School in East Los Angeles and became the first Mexican-American elected to the U.S. Congress in 1962, charged that the Mexican-American community received “only token attention” in anti-poverty programs even though “Spanish-speaking Americans face[d] the same economic problems and ha[d] suffered the ravage of discrimination” as African-American residents. Dr. Ernesto Galarza, the

“Los Angeles (EYOA), March 1966,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives;
“Hearing on Dismissal Set Wednesday,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 7 April 1966.

Mexican-American EYOA program developer, also noted that black residents had a greater voice in making their demands felt. These Latino leaders argued that East Los Angeles had not received their fair share of the funding from anti-poverty programs.²²

What the media did not reveal, however, was that Jones was in the middle of responding to Mexican-American residents' criticisms against the Los Angeles "War on Poverty" when she got fired. The meeting the EYOA ordered her to cancel was, in fact, a "community relations conference" in order to improve the relationships between black and Latino Angelenos. When Jones was dismissed, several Mexican-American leaders, such as Tony Rios, the NAPP outpost director, and Al Romo, Mexican-American poverty area representative, sided with her. Jones argued that the press and politicians were "fanning the flames" of racial conflict between the two groups.²³

²² Memo, Nick Kostopulos to Dick Fullmer, 4 February 1966, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), January 1966 – February 1966," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Dick Fullmer to Edgar May, 14 May 1966, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), March 1966," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; "Economic Hardships Faced by ELA Neighborhoods," *Eastside Sun*, 26 August 1965; "Equal Opportunities Demanded by Rep. Roybal in House," *Eastside Sun*, 23 September 1965; "Neglect of Mexican-American Group," *Los Angeles Times*, 1 August 1966; Biliiana C. S. Ambrecht, *Politicizing the Poor: The Legacy of the War on Poverty in a Mexican-American Community* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976); Rodolfo F. Acuna, *A Community Under Siege: A Chronicle of Chicanos East of the Los Angeles River 1945-1975* (Los Angeles: Chicano Studies Research Center, University of California, 1984), 107-177; Bauman, 208.

²³ Jones would be caught in difficult situations when she fired a Latino director later. Jones fired Gabrile Yanez, a Mexican-American outpost director, for not attending meetings called by Jones and contributing to the split between Latino and black residents. Jones was criticized by Latino residents, and she thus rehired Yanez and promised to plan more outposts in Mexican-American areas. Memo, Dick Fullmer to Edgar May, 16 March 1966, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), March 1966," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Paul Weeks to Edgar May, 30 May 1966, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), March 1966," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Paul Weeks

African-American leaders quickly took action and demanded that Jones be re-hired. When about 350 people rallied in support of Jones on the 3rd of April, Hawkins, the principal speaker of the demonstration, demanded the reinstatement of Jones. Bradley, chairman of the Conference of Negro Elected Officials (which consisted of all 22 elected African-Americans in the Los Angeles county area), also took the initiative and asked for Jones' reinstatement. Hawkins and Bradley filed a protest against the dismissal of Jones, a director who was in charge of one of the most popular and influential anti-poverty programs in Los Angeles.²⁴

Jones also received support from other African-American activists involved in the local anti-poverty efforts. Mary Henry, member of the OEO National Citizens Advisory Committee and one of Jones' colleagues at the Avalon-Carver Community Center, requested the EYOA board to reconsider the firing of Jones. Maulana Karenga and Tommy Jacquette, leaders of black nationalist groups who organized the Watts Summer Festival, also joined the demonstration. Furthermore, when the EYOA board voted its confidence in its executive director, Joe Maldonado, five of the seven poverty area representatives abstained. Objecting to the EYOA's handling of Jones as well as the

to Marvin R. Fullmer, 7 April 1966, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1966 – May 1966," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; "March or Be Fired, NAPP Workers Told," *Herald-Dispatch*, 31 March 1966; "Opal Jones Fires Aide for "Ineffectiveness," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 6 October 1966. For a detailed analysis of the relationship between African-American and Latino residents in the Los Angeles "War on Poverty," see Bauman, 206-215.

²⁴ Memo, Paul Weeks to Edgar May, 3 April 1966, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1966 – May 1966," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; "Negro Elected Officials Want Opal Jones Back," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 28 April 1966.

representatives of the “poor” who were constantly being outvoted by members of government and private agencies, they left the meeting in protest. One participant in the walk-out, Evelyne Copeland argued that “evidently something [had] come up that [had] not been ‘maximum feasible participation’ and that people in poor neighborhoods “should have [had] the opportunity to do something for themselves.” Jones was not the only black female activist who had forcefully challenged a local anti-poverty agency under the control of local government officials.²⁵

Jones did not hold her tongue. Jones was fully aware that she was easily dismissed because she was one of the very few female directors. She said in *The Sentinel*, “I will fight for my own right and reputation as a social worker and for NAPP to become an independent, vital, community action program.” Then she continued by saying that Maldonado should treat her “not only as a woman, but as a staff member.”²⁶ Jones thus demanded that Maldonado and EYOA change their perceptions of “appropriate women’s roles.”

Jones then wrote a pamphlet titled *I Wonder Why Some People Don’t Like Me?*, and sent it to Maldonado on the day she was fired. She wrote:

²⁵ Memo, Paul Weeks to Marvin R. Fullmer, 7 April 1966, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1966 – May 1966,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Paul Weeks to Edgar May, 25 April 1966, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1966 – May 1966,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; Memo, Dick Fullmer and C. B. Patrick to Edgar May, 27 April 1966, File “Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1966 – May 1966,” Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives.

²⁶ “Hearing on Dismissal Set Wednesday,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 7 April 1966.

You will remember that our neighbors began to read the Community Action Guidelines and they discovered all about that “feasible participation.” But, although you always talked about your belief in the idea, I never really felt or thought you really meant it. Why? Because from time to time you expressed your lack of high expectation of neighborhood people; you expressed your doubts and you always seemed to shy away from conflict, criticism and “unsanded down” or real opinions. You always seemed to be on the side of the powerful, and you always seemed to protect the “powerful” more than you seemed to “look out” for the “powerless.”²⁷

Jones asked Maldonado, who was once a social worker like Jones, a very fundamental question: “how much do you really care?” Jones knew that she was dismissed because she challenged the “powerful” and had done her best to bring the anti-poverty programs closer to the “poor” people.²⁸

The story did not end there. Jones actually succeeded in recovering her position as the director of NAPP. She even achieved her goal of wresting control of NAPP from EYOA. As more and more of the media in Los Angeles covered the controversy over the Jones dismissal, OEO, afraid of the negative impact on the “War on Poverty” programs, took action in order to settle the dispute. Sargent Shriver, the director of OEO, got Mayor Yorty and Maldonado to agree to rehire Jones as long as NAPP was divested from EYOA. On the 7th of April, Daniel Luevano, regional director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, issued a directive divesting EYOA from direct control over NAPP. On the 25th of April, Jones was rehired as interim director of NAPP in a

²⁷ Opal C. Jones, *I Wonder Why Some People Don't Like Me?*, 1 April 1966, in Box 2, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC, 2.

²⁸ Ibid.

temporary truce until EYOA could turn over control of NAPP to the Los Angeles Federation of Settlement and Neighborhood Centers Inc. in July 1966.²⁹

The controversy over the dismissal of Jones had a significant impact on the organization of EYOA itself as well as its control over NAPP. Luevano also issued a directive stripping EYOA of its sole control over the Community Action Program, although he declined to link his directive to the uproar over the battle for control of NAPP. EYOA was directed to reorganize and decentralize its operation. Four new agencies were created in late 1966 and early 1967 in Los Angeles County.³⁰ Jones' critique of EYOA led to the reorganization of EYOA in the end.

While local activists welcomed the new directive to decentralize the Los Angeles Community Action Agency, Mayor Yorty was filled with anger. Reverend H. H. Brookins, chairman of the United Civil Rights Committee, for instance, thought highly of the directive, contending that it would be a "first step in bringing the poverty program back to the people."³¹ Yorty, on the other hand, argued that the "War on Poverty" was "in danger of collapsing" because of "ill-considered actions taken by the Office of

²⁹ "Rights Official Hails Poverty War Shake-up," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 April 1966; "Ousted Poverty Aide Rehired in Stormy Session," *Los Angeles Times*, 26 April 1966; "EYOA Reinstates Mrs. Opal Jones," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 28 April 1966; Bauman, 197-198.

³⁰ "Los Angeles CAP to Be Reorganized, De-Centered," Office of Economic Opportunity, 8 April 1966, File "Los Angeles (EYOA), April 1966 – May 1966," Box 8, Entry 74, RG 381, National Archives; "Legal Fight Seen in Poverty War," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 14 April 1966; "Clarified Rules Sought in Poverty War Here," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 May 1966.

³¹ "Rights Official Hails Poverty War Shake-up," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 April 1966.

Economic Opportunity and because there [had] been a deliberate attempt to sabotage the program on the part of some federal officials.” Yorty especially cast blame on Hawkins for “continuously misleading the community by stating that I [ran] the program and that I [was] preventing the poor from realizing its benefits.”³²

Placed in a political predicament, Yorty came up with another plan to prevent the Hawkins’ side from taking control of the “War on Poverty.” When Council member Billy G. Mills, who served as a representative of the City of Los Angeles on the EYOA board, resigned his seat in protest against the new directive issued by Luevano, Yorty announced that Edward Hawkins, older brother of Congress member Augustus Hawkins, would be a new city representative. Ed Hawkins, named by Yorty to a \$15,240-a-year job on the Board of Public Works before, had been at odds with his brother over the anti-poverty program. Once again pursuing his “divide and rule” strategy, Yorty noted, “[n]ow let’s see if he [Augustus Hawkins] wants to fight with his brother.”³³ Augustus Hawkins argued that Yorty’s appointment was “nothing more than an attempt to confuse the issues,” and that “as far as I [could] see, Yorty [was] just playing games.”³⁴ The

³² Memo, Samuel Yorty to President Lyndon B. Johnson, 25 April 1966, Ex LG/Los Angeles, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin; “Yorty Attacks Hawkins Again, to Ask Probe,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 28 April 1966; “Yorty Warns Johnson of Antipoverty Collapse,” *Los Angeles Times*, 28 April 1966.

³³ Memo, Edward A. Hawkins to Augustus F. Hawkins, 6 August 1965, File: Edward A. Hawkins, Box D-27, Samuel Yorty Collection, Records Management Division, Office of the City Clerk, City of Los Angeles; “Angry Mills Quits Poverty War Post,” *Los Angeles Times*, 19 April 1966; “Mills Exits EYOA, Charges Poverty Program Patronage,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 21 April 1966; “Yorty Appoints Brother of Bitter Critics to Poverty Post,” *Los Angeles Times*, 21 April 1966; Bauman, 182-187.

³⁴ “Hawkins Hits at Yorty Over Poverty Post,” *Los Angeles Times*, 26 April 1966;

Hawkins group and the Yorty followers collided once again as the controversy over the dismissal of Jones resulted in the reorganization of the EYOA.

Jones, in spite of all these difficulties, succeeded in keeping NAPP moving forward. In 1971, Jones received recognition for her achievements in NAPP, and was elected President of the Los Angeles Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers. The Los Angeles Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers was one of the most important delegate agencies of the Los Angeles “War on Poverty.” Jones regarded this promotion as “an honor and a privilege” and made efforts to make the organization a vital instrument for attacking poverty. By 1976, NAPP had become one of the largest and oldest poverty programs in Los Angeles.³⁵

Whereas OEO did not specify racial/class differences among “women” in the “War on Poverty,” Jones saw the workers who participated in the “War on Poverty” as a diverse group comprised of people of varied social and economic status and race. Jones repeatedly referred to the relationship between racial discrimination, especially residential segregation, and poverty. She also paid close attention to the class differences between people who were served by the programs and the “experts” involved in poverty programs. By criticizing “professional” anti-poverty workers whom she

“Congressman Hits Ed’s Appointment,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 28 April 1966.

³⁵ Mary Henry, Sharron A. Eason, and Thyra Chushenberry, Interview by author, 30 September 2002, tape recording, The Avalon-Carver Community Center, Los Angeles, CA; Opal C. Jones, “President’s Report, 1971-1972,” 24 January, 1973, in *Minutes (70s)*, The Los Angeles Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers, Inc., California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC.

believed lacked dedication, Jones provided a significant critique of the local welfare system that prevented the people from playing an active role. Attacking racial discrimination, critiquing middle-class “experts” for ignoring the voices of the “poor,” and contesting EYOA’s notions of “appropriate women’s roles” were inseparable commitments in Jones’ political career.

Furthermore, Jones was not passive in her response to the dominant discourse constructed by the local anti-poverty agency, EYOA. As historian Deborah G. White argued, local welfare activists involved in the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” like Opal C. Jones certainly refused to “internalize” the official discourse. What was equally significant was that Jones vigorously challenged and recast the official discourse by writing various kinds of pamphlets and documents herself. Opal C. Jones was not a powerless victim, but a historical actor who provided an alternative way of understanding the meaning of welfare through the eyes of the people who were served by the programs.

4.2 From “Maximum Feasible Participation” to Welfare Rights: The Watts Labor Community Action Committee and the ANC Mothers Anonymous

Watts as a National Model: The WLCAC

In the spring of 1965, labor union members in Watts created the WLCAC under the leadership of Ted Watkins. Watkins was born in Mississippi in 1912, and moved to Los Angeles in the late 1920s. Originally working for the Ford Motor Company, Watkins joined the local chapter of the UAW and later became the international representative. With his organizing skills and experiences, Watkins was chosen as the

first chairman of the WLCAC.³⁶

A WLCAC pamphlet explained that the purpose of WLCAC projects was to “transform the community into a place where anyone of any background or life style would want to live,” and “to kindle the fire of pride and self-respect in its people.” It emphasized that economic power was the first step toward bringing community stability. WLCAC acted for improvement in such areas as health and hospital facilities, jobs, housing, transportation, education, consumer protection, welfare rights, voter registration and participation, street maintenance and lighting, and trash collection.³⁷

While the WLCAC took responsibility for administering the “War on Poverty” programs such as the Neighborhood Youth Corps, it also created its own original programs. One of the most successful programs was a three-month “Community Conservation Corps (CCC)” project which provided recreational, educational, and community service activities and jobs for approximately 2,100 youth between the ages of 7 and 21. It was funded in July 1966 by the Dept. of Labor and by labor unions with

³⁶ “The Watts Labor Community Action Committee,” in the Watts 65 Project Collection, Southern California Library (SCL); Watts Labor Community Action Committee (WLCAC), “To Serve the Present Age – Youth Parade,” in the Watts 65 Project Collection, Southern California Library (SCL), Los Angeles; Malaika Brown, “WLCAC’s Ted Watkins Leaves Valuable Living Legacy,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 11 November, 1993; WLCAC, *1967 Report* (Los Angeles: WLCAC, 1967).

³⁷ *Ibid.*; WLCAC, *Community Conservation Corps* (Los Angeles: WLCAC, 1967); WLCAC, *WLCAC: Changing...Moving...The Lives of a People* (Los Angeles: WLCAC, 1969).

³⁷ WLCAC, *Community Conservation Corps*, ix-7, 41-44; “Saluting CCC,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 8 September 1966; “Watts Labor Community Action Committee Get Praise, \$260,806 Grant from OEO,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 13 July 1967; “Watts Labor Leader Turns U.S. Upside Down for Kids,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 17 August 1967.

about \$375,000. One of the most popular activities in the CCC project was the neighborhood clean-up and park development in the Watts area. In the neighborhood clean-up, CCC crews planted flower beds and trees around the WLCAC buildings. They also cleaned up the street distributing the following memo: “To: Watts Community Residents...We are seeking to build an understanding among over young people of the fact that this is their community also and that they have a responsibility to it as well as reasons for being proud of it.” In its park development activities, CCC leased neglected and unused property from public and private owners, and cleaned it up, and developed it into “vest-pocket” sized parks and recreational playgrounds. As a result of these efforts, as many as 12 parks were built through June 1967 in the Watts area. *The Los Angeles Sentinel*, praised its efforts, reporting, for example, that the WLCAC turned the “U.S. upside down for kids.” According to *the Sentinel*, the WLCAC effort was “one of the most phenomenal programs ever attempted.”³⁸

WLCAC pointed out that its major accomplishment had been to bring union organizational skills back into Watts and to change the image of labor among the youth. One of the enrollees in CCC chanted as follows: “Lift your heads and hold them high: CCC is marching by!...We’re from Watts: mighty, mighty Watts!” WLCAC emphasized that many CCC enrollees were beginning to feel and demonstrate “a sense of

³⁸ “The Watts Labor Community Action Committee,” in the Watts 65 Project Collection, SCL; WLCAC, *Community Conservation Corps*, ix-7, 41-44; “Saluting CCC,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 8 September 1966; “Watts Labor Community Action Committee Get Praise, \$260,806 Grant from OEO,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 13 July 1967; “Watts Labor Leader Turns U.S. Upside Down for Kids,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 17 August 1967.

community,” and this “sense of community” would be a tool for “the treatment and cure of...widespread human alienation and despair.”³⁹

A “sense of community” for the members of CCC was not necessarily exclusive of non-black residents. Although a majority of the enrollees and staff of CCC were African Americans, there were substantial Mexican American enrollees and staff members as well as a number of white staff. In CCC classes, in addition to remedial teaching in English and mathematics, Mexican American cultural heritage as well as Black cultural heritage, and conversational Spanish were taught. The most important criteria in choosing the staff of CCC were whether they were residents of the areas or residents of adjacent and similar communities, and whether they had grown up under conditions similar to those common to the youth in the program. Although these activists stressed “community control,” they remained open to people of other racial/ethnic groups.

The CCC was certainly a male-oriented project, reinforcing the notion that fathers should be the primary breadwinners and leaders. *The 1967 Report*, for example, stressed that by bringing men out of union shops to work with the boys and girls in the program, the Committee was able to “break down the status quo relationship of mothers as the major influence over young men and to reestablish the role of men as their leaders and models.” The WLCAC endorsed gender conservatism which regarded the matriarchal family structure as a causal factor of poverty.⁴⁰

³⁹ WLCAC, *1967 Report*, 15; WLCAC, *Community Conservation Corps*, xii-xiii.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 5; Ruth Feldstein, *Motherhood in Black and White: Race and Sex in American*

It is significant, however, to understand the complexities of WLCAC programs. Some women played crucial roles in the organization. For example, Delores McCoy served as a financial secretary, Josephine Whitfield as a corresponding secretary, Rosa Smith as an assistant treasurer, and Wilma Barnes as a NYC liaison. One of the female WLCAC members, Carolee Gardner, emphasized that it became a major site of fostering new black leadership in Watts. Gardner explained as follows: “In the past, ‘leadership’ in poor communities had come from outsiders. Professionals working in poverty areas ha[d] been middle class intellectuals whose role was seen by their clients as one of ‘telling poor people what was wrong with them.’ The organization of a community by its residents, under the independent leadership of members of that community, [was] a new kind of urban poverty area development which the WLCAC exemplifie[d].” Ted Watkins agreed. He stated that “the only way people [could] be proud of their community [was] if they ha[d] a part in building it and a part of owning it.”⁴¹

WLCAC designed a wide range of projects. First, it established a WLCAC Credit Union using the OEO grant, and provided free check cashing for every credit union member, emphasizing the importance of consumer savings. It also developed a WLCAC nursery for general community beautification and planted more than \$100,000 worth of plants and trees. CCC enrollees prepared vacant lots for an agricultural project to grow vegetables and fruits. Furthermore, WLCAC leased a newly-constructed Mobil

Liberalism, 1930-1965 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

⁴¹ WLCAC, *1967 Report*, 24-25.

Oil service station. It was “the first new economic facility built in Watts” since the 1965 revolts and became a job-training center for residents. Finally, WLCAC acted as a liaison between the Watts youth and people living in other areas of Los Angeles, so that Watts youth could visit families elsewhere who were interested in WLCAC programs.⁴²

The WLCAC facilities also became a site for the Watts Summer Festival, which was initiated by local activists, such as Maulana Karenga and Tommy Jacquette, to honor those who died during the Watts revolts, and to remember the uprising as a positive “revolt.” Karenga was born in Maryland in 1941 and had a Master’s degree in Political Science from UCLA. He taught Swahili and African history at the Westminster Neighborhood Association, which was initiated by the United Presbyterian Church, and started programs with a grant from EYOA and OEO to improve health, housing, education, and employment problems as well as to eradicate poverty in Watts. Karenga stated that one of the problems in Watts was that established organizations such as the National Urban League (NUL) and the National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People (NAACP) had not paid sufficient attention to the “cultural” aspects in solving the problems after the Watts uprising. He established the organization Us in September 7, 1965.⁴³ Tommy Jacquette worked at the Westminster Association as a coordinator, introducing the programs there to the Watts youth, and was twenty-two years

⁴² Ibid., 8-9, 48.

⁴³ Maulana Karenga, interview by author, 25 September 2000, California State University Long Beach (CSULB), Long Beach, California; Paul Bullock, ed., *Watts: The Aftermath: An Inside View of the Ghetto by the People of Watts* (New York: Grove Press, 1969); Tyler, 225; Horne, 181, 200.

of age when he was involved in organizing of the Watts Summer Festival in 1966. Jacquette organized “Self Leadership For All Nationalities Today (SLANT)” in October 1966 to attack unemployment problems among black youth and to promote “political empowerment.” SLANT had three hundred members and became the city’s “largest Black Nationalist group” by 1970.⁴⁴ WLCAC provided a unique social space for these black nationalists in Watts.

With assistance from the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission, Karenga, Jaquette, and other activists organized the Watts Summer Festival to remember the uprising in positive terms and as a “revolt.” The first festival was held in August 1966 in Will Rogers Park, and it was estimated that upwards of 130,000 people attended. The Jordan High School Alumni Association served as the official sponsor of the festival. Opal C. Jones expressed her approval for the festival, writing a pamphlet entitled “Pride and Progress, Watts Festival.” R. Sargent Shriver, who was the director of OEO, led the parade.⁴⁵

The festival was a great success, with various kinds of activities such as jazz concerts, a symphony concert, live drama, films, social and artistic discussion, and even an exhibition of paintings and sculptures by Watts artists. An editorial in *the Los*

⁴⁴ “Westminster Reports on Watts,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 3, 10, 24 November; Tommy Jacquette, interview by author by phone, 27 September 2000, Long Beach, California; Tommy Jacquette, interview by author, note taking, 9 August 2002, WLCAC, Los Angeles, California.

⁴⁵ Karenga, interview by author; Jacquette, interview by author; The Neighborhood Adult Participation Project, “Featuring NAPP and what is it all about? Pride and Progress, Watts Festival,” in Box 1, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC; Tyler, 226, 229-230.

Angeles Sentinel reported that the festival was designed to bring to the area “a brighter new look and an escalated feeling of pride,” and that it was “symbolic of progress, interracial cooperation, and hope for a better future.” *The Los Angeles Times* declared that the festival gave “drive to the new spirit of the community.”⁴⁶

It did not mean, however, that all the black nationalist groups supported the Watts Summer Festival. Some regarded it as a pacification program. Bruce M. Tyler criticized the County Human Relations Commission for cultivating “a group of cooperative anti-riot Black Nationalists to repress pro-riot advocates. . . the bargain was sealed with money and jobs.”⁴⁷ For the critics of WLCAC and the Watts Summer Festival, its programs were nothing but a well-designed project by the federal government for the purpose of “counter-insurgency and pacification.” after the 1965 uprising.⁴⁸ In fact, as historian Gerald Horne has argued, the festival was designed by the HRC and other entities to draw youth militancy from these “political nationalists” who belonged to the Black Panther Party.⁴⁹

Karenga and Jacquette, however, did not simply follow the OEO nor were they always supportive of the “War on Poverty.” Karenga stated that he was aware that the

⁴⁶ “The Watts Festival,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 11 August, 1966; “Watts Festival Opens Mon.: Thousands Look for Surprise,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 11 August, 1968; *Los Angeles Times*, 13 August 1967; Tyler, 232; Horne, 204.

⁴⁷ Tyler, 225.

⁴⁸ Black Committee of Inquiry, *The Truth About the Watts Summer Festival* (Los Angeles: Black Committee of Inquiry, 1972), 18,

⁴⁹ Horne, 203-204.

“War on Poverty” officials intended to cool down the uprising and co-opt efforts by the black nationalists, but he also claimed that he used anti-poverty programs “in another way.” Jaquette criticized the OEO for giving up their anti-poverty efforts and leaving the “poor” in poverty too soon. He acknowledged that the “War on Poverty” had empowered African Americans in Watts and developed their skills. He argued, however, that it stopped its efforts halfway and did not finish the job.⁵⁰ Even after the “War on Poverty” was gone, they managed to continue to hold the festivals so that younger generations would remember what happened in 1965.⁵¹

The high reputation of WLCAC projects led to the transformation of the representation of “Watts.” Anti-poverty activists heralded the WLCAC as a national model for community action agencies. The projects of WLCAC caught the attention of anti-poverty activists in other cities, too. Eighty project directors and administrators from all of the Neighborhood Youth Corps projects in Southern California and Arizona visited WLCAC centers. Watkins also convinced senators (including Robert Kennedy of New York) to visit WLCAC facilities.⁵² As Olympic gold medalist and WLCAC project leader Ulis Williams described, WLCAC programs like CCC became “stepping

⁵⁰ Bullock, 66-67; Quintard Taylor, *In Search of the Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West 1528-1990* (New York: W.W.Norton, 1998), 309; Karenga, interview by author; Jaquette, interview by author.

⁵¹ “After Absence, Festival Comes Back to Watts, Where It Began,” *Wave*, 4 October, 1993.

⁵² “Laudable Approach in Poverty War,” *Los Angeles Times*, 19 December 1966; “Kennedy, Murphy, Clark Visit Watts Project,” *Star Review*, 18 May 1967; WLCAC, *Community Conservation Corps*, 85-88.

stones” to reformulate the negative images promulgated by the mass media after the Watts Revolt.⁵³ Moreover, after the funding of WLCAC, the East Los Angeles Community Union (TELACU) was established by local unionists in February 1968 with the aid of EYOA, OEO, and the UAW. Inspired by the WLCAC’s efforts to bring the “War on Poverty” to the grass-roots level, Latino activists created an organization in East Los Angeles to suit their needs.⁵⁴ WLCAC transformed Watts into a “model community” for other localities.

Although the WLCAC made a formidable contribution, still one might wonder whether these programs were inside the purview of what poverty warriors envisioned. While Watkins and WLCAC turned Watts into a national model, Watkins was not simply a tool of the OEO. He sharply questioned one of the most neglected features of the “War on Poverty”: the lack of accessible jobs. The “War on Poverty” originally targeted

⁵³ “Watts kids accept Robert’s rule,” *San Luis Obispo County Telegram-Tribune*, 26 August, 1967. An editorial of the *Los Angeles Times* acknowledged that the CCC program deserved to be and would become a “model for use across the nation.” The City Council of the City of Los Angeles also raised their voices in praise of the WLCAC and Ted Watkins for the development of a “self-help program.” Los Angeles City Council Resolution, 21 February 1968, Los Angeles City Council File #138000, Box A2102, Records Management Division, Los Angeles City Archives.

⁵⁴ After the funding of WLCAC, Glenn O’Loane, a local member of the UAW in East Los Angeles, pressed for similar aid. Esteban Torres, a native of East Los Angeles and the first executive director of TELACU, explained that they had also been systematically excluded from social, economic, educational and political advancement, and that drawing economic resources into the area was indispensable in changing the situation in East Los Angeles. *El Alambre* (the Newspaper of the East Los Angeles Community Union) 1, no.1(1972): 1, 2; *El Alambre* 2, no.1(1973):1; “New Name for E.L.A. Labor Action Committee,” *Eastside Sun*, 3 April, 1969; Marguerite V. Martin, *Social Protest in an Urban Barrio: A Study of the Chicano Movement, 1966-1974* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1991), 171-199; Chavez, 77-92.

youth as its major focus in the attack on poverty by emphasizing the need to “prevent entry into poverty.” In Los Angeles, almost half of the funds went to educational programs. The funding for job training and other employment programs was only 22 percent of the overall grant, and most of this money was aimed at youth, except in the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project (NAPP). While the EYOA created 48,797 temporary and permanent jobs for poor people, the number of jobs was far from sufficient for the “poor” residents.⁵⁵

In addition to the OEO’s lack of attention to the question of access to jobs, employment opportunities for African American workers were increasingly narrowed due to the process of deindustrialization. Manufacturing firms started leaving South Central Los Angeles in the 1960s. Ever since the 1960s, Los Angeles had gradually shifted from being a highly specialized industrial center focused on aircraft production to a more diversified and decentralized industrial/financial metropolis. While Los Angeles experienced a characteristically “Sunbelt” expansion of high technology industry and associated services, centered around electronics and aerospace, there was an almost Detroit-like decline of traditional, highly unionized, heavy industry. There occurred a deindustrialization of a huge industrial zone stretching from downtown Los Angeles to the twin ports of San Pedro and Long Beach. When the plants in the auto, tire, and civilian aircraft sectors disappeared, the highly unionized and relatively high-paying jobs

⁵⁵ U.S. General Accounting Office, 1-23; James T. Patterson, *America’s Struggle Against Poverty 1900-1994* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 136; Robert O. Self, *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 233-242.

employing large numbers of people of color also followed suit.⁵⁶

It was precisely this beginning process of deindustrialization that Watkins brought into question. According to Watkins, with the old railroad lines gone, the “vital connection” between Watts and the rest of the cities was also severed. At the 1967 Los Angeles hearing on the examination of the “War on Poverty,” which occurred in May of that year, Watkins argued that the “War on Poverty” had to start with the question of job opportunities and transportation needs so that residents would be given a “chance to at least get out to jobs that might become available in other areas.”⁵⁷

Watkins and the WLCAC also sought to create job opportunities for residents through the use of anti-poverty funds. The campaign to have a “Watts hospital” led to the establishment of L.A. County Southeast General Hospital (M. L. King Hospital) in 1968, which provided not only health care services but also job opportunities for the residents.⁵⁸ Yet the more the WLCAC came to shoulder responsibility for creating accessible jobs for residents, the more the WLCAC started taking on the form of a

⁵⁶ Edward Soja, Rebecca Morales, and Goetz Wolff, “Urban Restructuring: An Analysis of Social and Spatial Challenge in Los Angeles,” *Economic Geography* 59 (1983), 195-230; Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographers: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989); Becky M. Nicolaides, *My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920-1965* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 227, 329-330; Josh Sides, *L.A. City Limits: African American Los Angeles from the Great Depression to the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 176-189.

⁵⁷ Statement of Ted Watkins, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, 3935-3938.

⁵⁸ “New Watts Hospital Named in Honor of Dr. M. L. King, Jr.,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 18 April 1968; WLCAC, *Community Conservation Corps*, 77-83; “The Watts Labor Community Action Committee,” in the Watts 65 Project Collection, SCL, Los Angeles.

business corporation. Gerald Horne, for example, has acknowledged that the WLCAC left a significant legacy for residents in Watts. Nevertheless, he denounced the WLCAC for remaining within the hegemonic discourse of private enterprise and free markets, pointing out the irony in the WLCAC's apparent separation from its labor movement roots.⁵⁹ With all of the problems they left unresolved, however, the WLCAC endeavored to suit the needs of residents in South Central Los Angeles. It is vital to situate Watkins and other unionists' struggles in the context of the "War on Poverty," which failed to provide enough job opportunities for poor residents when the processes of white flight and deindustrialization were already underway.

From "Maximum Feasible Participation" to Welfare Rights: The ANC Mothers

Anonymous

When Watkins and the WLCAC launched a campaign to bring a hospital to South Central Los Angeles, Johnnie Tillmon and her organization, the ANC Mothers Anonymous, insisted that a childcare center be built at the hospital site. They argued that even if there were plenty of job opportunities, it would be impossible for poor women with dependent children to work at the newly established hospital without childcare.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Horne, 278; John R. Chavez, *Eastside Landmark: A History of the East Los Angeles Community Union, 1968-1993* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 29-30.

⁶⁰ "Preliminary Proposal for Child Care and Development Center at Los Angeles County-Martin Luther King, Jr., General Hospital," n.d., Records of the National Welfare Rights Organization [the collection is unprocessed, 11/01/2004] (hereafter NWRO Papers), Manuscript Department, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University, Washington D.C.

Tillmon was born in Scott, Arkansas, in 1926. A migrant sharecropper's daughter, she moved to California in 1959 to join her brothers, and worked as a union shop steward in a Compton laundry. Tillmon organized workers and became involved in a community association called the Nickerson Garden Planning Organization which was established to improve living conditions in the housing project. Tillmon became ill in 1963, and was advised to seek welfare. She was hesitant at first, but decided to apply for assistance in order to take care of her children. She immediately learned how welfare recipients were harassed by caseworkers who went to their apartments looking for evidence of extra support, and who controlled how they should spend money. Tillmon later explained that she thought she had to do something for her and her neighbors in the housing project: "I felt it was part of my responsibility for people not to get run around. I was seeing the women around me --- their experience and hardship --- not having a person to call, not having an organization to offer support, that gave an idea."⁶¹ In order to fight against prejudice and harassment, Tillmon organized groups of women on welfare, and in 1963 founded one of the oldest grassroots organizations, ANC Mothers Anonymous.⁶²

⁶¹ Johnnie Tillmon, interview by Sherna Berger Gluck, February 1984 and Spring, 1991, Special Collections, California State University, Long Beach (hereafter CSULB), Long Beach.

⁶² "Biography of Mrs. Johnnie Tillmon," n.d., NWRO Papers, Manuscript Department, Moorland-Spangarn Research Center, Howard University, Washington D.C. See also Guida West, *The National Welfare Rights Movement: The Social Protest of Poor Women* (New York: Praeger, 1981), 92; Sherna Berger Gluck in collaboration with Maylei Blackwell, Sharon Cotrell, and Karen S. Harper, "Whose Feminism, Whose History?: Reflections on Excavating the History of (the) U.S. Women's Movement (s)," in

Tillmon and her allies used the term “anonymous” in their organization name to show the dehumanizing effects of welfare. She explained: “we understood that what people thought about welfare recipients and women on welfare was that they had no rights, they didn’t exist, they was[sic] a statistic and not a human being.”⁶³ Upon establishing ANC Mothers Anonymous, Tillmon interviewed women on welfare in the Watts housing project to see what was an urgent issue for them. She found out that most of the women wanted to go into training and find jobs, rather than seeking welfare. As a result, ANC Mothers Anonymous called not only for an adequate amount of AFDC/ADC payments, but also for decent jobs and training for women on welfare. Tillmon and her allies enumerated the following objectives for their organization: “to obtain decent jobs with adequate pay for those who c[ould] work, and to obtain an adequate income for those who c[ouldnot] work – an annual income to properly include the poor in our democratic society.” Under this banner, the organization provided “information, legislative, and action service for the welfare recipients of Watts.”⁶⁴

Given that the lack of child care provision was a major obstacle for women on

Community Activism and Feminist Policies: Organizing Across Race, Class, and Gender, ed. Nancy A. Naples (New York: Routledge, 1998), 31-56; Deborah Gray White, *Too Heavy a Load: Black Women in Defense of Themselves, 1894-1994* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 19-20, 224-226; Premilla Nadasen, *Welfare Warriors: The Welfare Rights Movement in the United States* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 19-20; Kazuyo Tsuchiya, “Tillmon, Johnnie,” “National Welfare Rights Organization, 1966-1975,” BlackPast org.: An Online Reference Guide to African American History, Directed by Quintard Taylor, <http://www.blackpast.org> [accessed May 25, 2008].

⁶³ White, 224.

⁶⁴ “ANC-Mothers Anonymous, Fact Sheet,” NWRO Papers, Manuscript Department, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University, Washington D.C.

welfare who wished to participate in job training, establishing child care centers in Watts was one of their first priorities. When the Martin Luther King Jr. General Hospital was being established as a response to the need for health resources, the ANC Mothers Anonymous persuaded HEW to construct a child care center at the hospital site. Within the hospital service district, 26 percent of the population (approximately 83,000 residents) was less than 10 years of age, yet only a total of 1,480 children were provided with day care. Furthermore, there were no facilities to care for children under 2 and half years of age, and no facilities within the district were available twenty-four hours to meet any emergency.⁶⁵ The ANC Mothers Anonymous played a central role in establishing a center. They developed an original proposal. In June of 1972, they held a Child Care Seminar at the Watts Labor Community Action Committee, in order to stimulate and develop interests among local residents. The pamphlet for the seminar explained as follows:

“[R]arely has the Black Community been deeply involved at the point of conception of any ideas and plans for the satisfaction of it’s needs. The Child Care Center, to be built at the Martin Luther King Jr. Hospital site, was conceived of and the original proposal written by ANC Mothers Anonymous, the forerunners of National Welfare Rights Organization. ANC Mothers Anonymous and other members of the community from various walks of life have been continually involved in all phases of the procedure which brought us to the point of organizing this seminar, for now our committee

⁶⁵ “Preliminary Proposal for Child Care and Development Center at Los Angeles County-Martin Luther King, Jr., General Hospital,” NWRO Papers, Manuscript Department, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University, Washington D.C. ; West, 92.

recognizes the need to stimulate massive community awareness and involvement in the balance of the planning along with the entire future of the Child Care Centers in Our Community.”⁶⁶

For Tillmon, a child care center at the MLK Hospital was a touchstone for the “maximum feasible participation” clause. It was imperative for local residents, especially women with dependent children, to get involved in the whole process and make their voices heard. Tillmon noted,

Community Action Agencies across the country seem to be under attack now from without and within, that’s all a part of “Community Action.” Our primary concern is to have full participation in the planning of the Child Care Center.⁶⁷

In 1974, their tireless efforts bore fruit. A child care center was finally opened.

Even after Tillmon moved her base from ANC Mothers Anonymous in Watts to the national office of NWRO in Washington, DC, she and her allies continued pursuing the same goal and struggled for “decent jobs with adequate pay for those who [could] work, and adequate income for those who [could] not.” For critics of “welfare dependency,” such as California Governor Ronald Reagan, “welfare” meant public assistance only. He regarded this narrow definition of “welfare” either as a gift or a

⁶⁶ “Program: ANC Mother’s Anonymous[sic] Child Care Seminar,” 17 June 1972, NWRO Papers, Manuscript Department, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University, Washington D.C.

⁶⁷ Memo, Johnnie L. Tillmon to Barbara L. Jacquette, 20 April 1972, NWRO Papers, Manuscript Department, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University, Washington D.C.

favor, justifying welfare cuts and workfare. In September 1967, Reagan contended that welfare should no longer be considered as an “inalienable right” of the poor. He argued that welfare was “something of a gift granted by people who earn[ed] their own way to those who c[ould]not, or in some cases even to those who w[would] not?... it [wa]s one government program whose success c[ould] only be measured by a decline in the necessity for continuing it.”⁶⁸ For Tillmon and the women of the NWRO, “welfare” included the right to work, and it was not a charity but a right --- a prerequisite for citizenship. Tillmon and NWRO argued that getting decent jobs with adequate pay and social security for those who were unable to work was part of their rights as “Americans to a fair share in the good things of our national life.”⁶⁹ For them, “welfare rights” did not simply mean a right to public assistance. It embodied a set of rights as American citizens --- adequate income, dignity, justice, and democratic participation.

While the NWRO was officially run by welfare recipients, the middle-class staff managed the finances and administered the national office under the direction of Wiley, thereby wielding great influence over the organization. Tillmon and her allies strongly raised objections against Wiley and the middle-class staff (generally made up of white males paid through CAP or VISTA programs) who tended to give priority for securing

⁶⁸ “Public Welfare System a Failure, Reagan Says,” *The Washington Post*, 20 September 1967.

⁶⁹ NWRO in cooperation with United Church Board for Homeland Ministries, “Six Myths about Welfare,” 14, NWRO Papers, Manuscript Department, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University, Washington D.C; “Goals of the National Welfare Rights Organization,” *NOW!: Publication of the National Welfare Rights Organization*, 21 August 1968.

jobs to unemployed males, rather than to mothers who received AFDC, and dismiss the child-care issue. They criticized the (implicit) goals of “welfare for women” and “jobs for men” pursued by Wiley and his followers. Tillmon later explained the disagreements she had with Wiley regarding the goals of NWRO. According to Tillmon, what mattered to Wiley was not to offer women jobs but to secure money in their checks and a respectful treatment for them. For Tillmon, however, welfare was something that “you used...for whatever you needed it for, until you could do better.”⁷⁰ As Guida West suggested, NWRO women fought for the “freedom of choice to determine whether to work in the home caring for their children or to work in the labor market or to do both.”⁷¹ Tillmon forcefully argued that child-rearing and housework constituted real work, yet poor women on welfare were always classified as “unproductive.” She emphasized the necessity to expand the definition of “work” and “welfare.”

Through NWRO, Tillmon struggled both for decent jobs with adequate pay and adequate income. When the Work Incentive Program (WIN), the first mandatory work requirement for AFDC recipients, was added into the social security amendments in 1966, Tillmon and NWRO argued that it would deprive recipients of choices. Instead, it would force mothers to accept low-paid, dead end jobs and inadequate training or else be cut off from welfare. NWRO argued both that standard quality day care must be

⁷⁰ Johnnie Tillmon, interview by Sherna Berger Gluck, February 1984 and Spring 1991, Special Collections, CSULB, Long Beach.

⁷¹ West, 86-92. See also White, 237-239; Nadasen, 125-155.

provided first, and that recipients must continue to fight for decent jobs and training.⁷²

President Nixon proposed the Family Assistance Plan on August 8, 1969, which would guarantee 1,600 dollars a year for a family of four with no working members. It also promised that a family of four with an employed household head would receive benefits combined with annual earnings up to a total income of 3,920 dollars. The NWRO contended that most AFDC families would get less money under this plan, and proposed that they needed at least 5,500 dollars in 1969 (6,500 dollars in 1971) to get out of poverty. Using the same expressions that Jones employed, Tillmon said that the Nixon plan was “nothing but the same old soup warmed over.”⁷³

When the number of recipients rapidly increased and the NWRO was under fierce attack, the internal conflict between the staff members and welfare recipients came to the forefront. While Wiley and his advisors attempted to mobilize and integrate the working poor --- especially white blue-collar workers --- into the welfare rights movement, welfare mothers led by Tillmon came to believe that such a direction would marginalize the needs of women and children, as well as weaken their own influence within the national office.⁷⁴

⁷² “The 1967 Anti-welfare Social Security Amendments Law – A Summary,” *NOW! : Publication of the National Welfare Rights Organization*; Johnnie Tillmon, “Where We’ve Come from...,” *The Welfare Fighter* 1, no. 1 (September 1969); West, 87.

⁷³ “Hard Hitting Speeches from Chairman & Director,” *The Welfare Fighter* 2, no.2 (November, 1970). See also “NWRO Raps on Nixon Plan (Family Assistance Plan),” *The Welfare Fighter* 1, no. 1 (September, 1969); “NWRO Adequate Income Plan,” *The Welfare Fighter* 2, no. 5 (February, 1971).

⁷⁴ “Power to Recipients,” n.d., NWRO Papers, Manuscript Department, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University, Washington D.C; West, 93,

As a result, Tillmon sought instead to align with the women's movement and gain support from feminist organizations such as the National Organization for Women (NOW). In 1972, Tillmon published an article in *Ms* magazine entitled "Welfare Is a Women's Issue," articulating how the welfare system controlled the lives of women on welfare and constantly placed them under the scrutiny of government authorities. She also contended that NWRO women were the front-line troops in the struggle for women's freedom. Here, I focus on the three questions that Tillmon raised in her article. First, she argued, once again, that mother-work was a full-time job. Tillmon commented:

If I were president...I'd just issue a proclamation that women's work is real work. In other words, I'd start paying women a living wage for doing the work we are already doing – child-raising and housekeeping. Housewives would be getting wages – a legally determined percentage of their husband's salary – instead of having to ask for and account for money they've already earned."⁷⁵

AFDC recipients, however, were classified as unproductive, and their child-raising and housework were considered to have no value. Tillmon called for expanding this narrow definition of "work." She tried to broaden the horizon of the feminist movement by redefining poverty as a "women's issue," and by so doing, win the feminists over to her side.⁷⁶

115-117; Nadasen, 126-130.

⁷⁵ Johnnie Tillmon, "Welfare is a Women's Issue," *Ms. Magazine* (Spring, 1972): 11-16; Reprinted, *Ms. Magazine* (July/August, 1995): 55.

⁷⁶ West, 89-92; Tsuchiya, "Tillmon, Johnnie."

Second, she demonstrated how race, class, and gender were intertwined in producing discourses of “welfare dependency.” Tillmon argued that the notion of the American “work ethic” possessed a double standard. It did not apply to all women. Tillmon said, “[i]f you’[we]re a society lady from Scarsdale and you spen[t] all your time sitting on your prosperity paring your nails, that’s O.K. Women [we]ren’t supposed to work. They’[we]re supposed to be married.”⁷⁷ She pointed out that affluent white women were free from the assumed “work ethic.” The poor women of color were the main targets for it, and they were charged with “being unproductive.”

Finally, Tillmon drew attention to the fact that AFDC women were the nation’s source of cheap labor. Tillmon noted,

The president keeps repeating the “dignity of work” idea. What dignity?...There is no dignity in starvation. The problem is that our economic policies deny the dignity and satisfaction of self-sufficiency to millions of people – the millions who suffer in underpaid dirty jobs and still don’t have enough to survive.⁷⁸

She emphasized that the fundamental problem was that there were no jobs and if some of the welfare recipients were lucky enough to find an occupation, it was usually an intermittent, low-paying, dead-end job. They would never be able to lift themselves out of poverty. While the critics regarded “welfare” as a notion diametrically opposed to “work,” for Tillmon, “to obtain decent jobs with adequate pay for those who c[ould]

⁷⁷ Tillmon, “Welfare is a Women’s Issue,” 52.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

work” did not contradict “to obtain an adequate income for those who c[ould] not work” --- they were simply different sides of the same coin --- of life with dignity.⁷⁹

In this chapter, I have discussed how local activists in south central Los Angeles appropriated the anti-poverty programs and transformed them into vehicles for social change. Opal C. Jones, a female welfare activist of color in Los Angeles, carried on the struggle against the official anti-poverty agency, the EYOA. Like the female CAP workers in Philadelphia and New York depicted by Nancy A. Naples, Jones did not passively accept the subordinate role in the anti-poverty programs which OEO originally expected women to play. Jones was neither the tool of the OEO nor the EYOA. Rather, Jones vigorously encouraged the participation of the “poor,” and succeeded in bringing the anti-poverty programs closer to the residents in the neighborhoods. Jones constituted a challenge to the OEO’s official representation of women. Moreover, she also challenged the EYOA’s vision of the programs as being dominated by the local anti-poverty agency rather than local people.

By appropriating the funds granted by the “War on Poverty” and constituting multiple forms of resistance, the activists in WLCAC carved out a unique social space for Watts residents. They used the “War on Poverty” funds not just for economic programs

⁷⁹ When Wiley resigned in December 1972, Tillmon was chosen as the new Executive Director of the NWRO. The funding for the organization, however, had become depleted by the time she became the director. After the NWRO folded in 1975, Tillmon returned to Los Angeles, continuing her struggle for welfare rights at the local and state levels. In 1995 Tillmon passed away at the age of 69. “Welfare Rights Pioneer Tillmon-Blackston Dies,” *Los Angeles Times*, 25 October 1995.

but also for the development and elaboration of community control. These activists' struggles were crucial to broadening the scope of the Los Angeles Community Action Program. These activists refashioned the meanings of the anti-poverty programs, and sent back a new programmatic model that stressed "community control."

The OEO was abolished in 1974, and the EYOA was replaced by an organization called the Greater Los Angeles Community Action Agency in 1973. It was later terminated in 1978. Nonetheless, the abolition of the OEO and EYOA did not mean that the WLCAC had no further impact on the residents in South Central Los Angeles. The WLCAC continues to carry on projects such as Manpower Training and General Watts Transportation to this day. Even though OEO and EYOA ceased to operate, these programs continue to have a significant impact on the everyday struggles waged by residents in Watts and beyond.⁸⁰

Finally, Johnnie Tillmon, through her struggles in the ANC Mothers Anonymous and the NWRO, contested the narrow definitions of "welfare" endorsed by the critics of AFDC. Tillmon asserted that the welfare recipients should get either "decent jobs with adequate pay" or adequate income to support their lives. She argued that child-raising and housework were a full-time job and insisted that mothers (and fathers) had the right to receive financial aid. Tillmon sought to construct a system where women on welfare could make a choice --- whether they preferred working outside the house, or remaining

⁸⁰ "After Absence, Festival Comes Back to Watts, Where it Began," *Wave*, 4 October 1993, in the Los Angeles Subject File / Watts File, Southern California Library (SCL), Los Angeles, CA; Button, 52-53; Gillette, 359-60; Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, *26th Report: The Demise of the Greater Los Angeles Community Action Agency*, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, 1-7; *La Causa* 1, no.1 (1993).

at home and devoting themselves to child-rearing and housework. For Tillmon and the ANC Mothers Anonymous, “welfare rights” meant the right to find a decent job with adequate payment, the right to receive social security for those who could not work, and the right to make crucial decisions on matters related to their own lives.

Portions of Chapter 4, have been published previously, in revised forms, in Kazuyo Tsuchiya, “Race, Class, and Gender in America’s “War on Poverty”: The Case of Opal C. Jones in Los Angeles, 1964-1968,” *The Japanese Journal of American Studies* 15 (2004): 213-236, and in Kazuyo Tsuchiya, “Jones, Opal C.,” “National Welfare Rights Organization, 1966-1975,” “Tillmon, Johnnie,” “Wiley, George Alvin,” *BlackPast org.: An Online Reference Guide to African American History*, Directed by Quintard Taylor, <http://www.blackpast.org> [accessed May 25, 2008].

Chapter V.

Making Claims to Citizenship: Race and the Politics of Welfare in Kawasaki City, 1969-1974

Chapters 5 and 6 of this study shed light on the welfare struggles of the new generation of Koreans in the 1970s and early 80s and the impact of their activism on the re-organization of citizenship. Through a case study of Kawasaki, with a special focus on the movement led by Korean churches and the Seikyūsha organization, I investigate how Korean residents redefined themselves in the Japanese welfare state, and created an alternative model of “community.” I demonstrate how they succeeded in transforming Kawasaki into a bastion of equal rights, forging the so-called “Kawasaki system,” whereby a city government preceded the central government in abolishing the nationality clause (*kokuseki jōkō*).

Regarding the Seikyūsha movement, a few books and dissertations have been written in Japanese in the fields of linguistics and education, and some monographs have recently been published by city government officials recently.¹ Most of the extant

¹ Saruhashi Junko, “Tagengo kyōseigata gengo keikaku to sono hattendankai shosō no shakai gengogakuteki kenkyū: Nihon no teijū gaikokujin ni yoru gengo iji doryoku to gyōseifu tonō sōgo sayō o jirei to shite (A Sociolinguistic Study of Multilingual and Symbiotic Language Planning and Its Developmental Processes: With Special Reference to Language Maintenance Efforts by Foreign Residents and Their Interaction with National and Local Governments in Japan)” (Ph.D. diss., Aoyama gakuin university, 2004); Hoshino Osami, *Jichitai no henkaku to zainichi Korian: Kyōsei no shisaku zukuri to sono kunō* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2005); Kim Yun-jeong, “Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin no aidentitī keisei to tabunka kyōsei kyōiku ni kansuru kenkyū: Kawasaki shi fureaikan no setsuritsu to shakai kyōiku katsudō no tenkai o chūshin ni” (Ph.D. diss., University of Tokyo, 2006). Kim Yun-jeong, *Tabunka kyōsei to aidentitī* (Tokyo: Akashi

literature today, however, tends to put primary emphasis on the post-1982 period and delineates the birth and development of the Kawasaki Fureaikan (or “Fureai hall” --- “*fureai*” means “having contact with others” in Japanese), an innovative community center for cultural exchange between Korean and Japanese residents.² The struggle of Korean activists for welfare rights, which started at a much earlier stage, has received inadequate scholarly attention and remains under-studied. Drawing upon numerous primary sources, chapter 5 documents the growth of Korean neighborhoods in the southern part of Kawasaki city, the emergence of a “progressive” local government (*kakushin jichitai*) and its influence on *zainichi*’s livelihood, and the implications of Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial which represented a watershed in the history of the Korean struggle in Japan during the postwar period. These chapters combine a local story with national debates, demonstrating how notions of welfare were contested on the ground, as well as how a subjugated people’s local struggles became a major issue on the public agenda.

The next chapter also places the global within the local. It examines the interconnections between black church leaders in the U.S. and *zainichi* Koreans’ pursuit for extending citizenship. I examine how Korean activists in the Kawasaki church were

Shoten, 2007).

² “Shi fureaikan ōpun: “Rinjin” kōryū no kyoten ni,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, 15 June 1988; “Minzoku sabetsu kaishō no yakata,” *Kanagawa shinbun*, 21 February 1988. See Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, *Daremoga chikara ippai ikiteiku tameni: Kawasaki shi fureaikan 4 nenkan no ayumi, 1988-1991* (Kawasaki city: Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, 1993).

influenced by black theology and invested it with new meaning; how they encountered African and African American leaders through world-wide organizations such as the World Council of Churches (WCC), and searched for common ground; and how black church leaders helped Koreans in Kawasaki and other parts of Japan win a victory in the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial. Transnational networks with global church leaders, especially with African American leaders, offered a significant framework for Korean leaders in Japan to contest a narrow definition of citizenship.

5.1 Revisiting Koreans in Kawasaki in the 1960s

The Making of Korean Kawasaki

The Sakuramoto/Ikegami/Hamachō districts, located along coastal industrial areas in the southern part of Kawasaki, housed almost half of the entire Korean population in the city. These Korean laborers were enlisted by the Japanese government to establish military factories and were mobilized into the war effort during WWII. The Sakuramoto/Ikegami/Hamachō districts quickly became a hub for the military industry when Nihon Kōkan Kabushikigaisha (NKK – currently operated as part of the JFE group), one of the major steel industrial companies, undertook the building of a factory in a portion of reclaimed land in 1913. Other factories followed NKK, and the districts witnessed a rapid increase in their Korean population. In addition, when the Tamagawa ballast railway (presently Japan Railway's Nanbu line) was constructed in 1919, many Koreans took on ballast collection work along the railroad. Between 1923 and 1939, the Korean population in Kawasaki city grew from 569 to 5,343 people, and from 0.58

percent of city's total population to 2 percent. Many of them lived near the military factories. With a rapid rise in the number of Korean workers, the Sakuramoto/Ikegami/Hamachō districts gradually turned into a multi-ethnic neighborhood.³

When the Japanese war effort escalated in the 1930s, the state coercively recruited more Korean workers. According to historian Pak Kyeong-sik, as many as 1,113,000 Koreans were conscripted to work in mining, construction, and other branches of manual labor throughout the nation. With a limited command of the Japanese language and only a few skills, most of them were engaged in manual work and lived together in ethnic neighborhoods like the Sakuramoto/Ikegami/Hamachō districts. When the state enlisted Koreans, first under the name of “contract workers (*boshū*),” then as “officially set-up (*kan assen*),” and finally as “conscripted laborers (*chōyō*),” the NKK purchased the present Ikegami district and built a military factory. Several hundred Koreans found their homes in this district, living in temporary quarters close to their workplace. It has been said that these Korean laborers, who took on demanding, and dangerous manual

³ The Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 led to a rapid rise in the number of tenant farmers who lost their land, thus creating a large landless class in Korea. These tenant farmers left their homes, searching for better economic opportunities in the metropole. Seikyūsha, *Kawasaki shi Sakuramoto chiku seishōnen mondai chōsa kenkyū hōkoku* (Kawasaki: Seikyūsha, 1985), 24-29, 32-37; Kanagawa Shinbunsha Shakaibu, *Nihon no naka no gaikokujin: Hitosashi yubi no jiyū o motomete* (Yokohama: Kanagawa Shinbun, 1985), 103-129; Kawasaki city Tajima Fukushi Jimusho, *Tajima no kurashi* (Kawasaki city: Tajima Fukushi Jimusho, 1985), file “Kawasaki jittai chōsa hōkoku,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; Kanagawa to Chōsen no kankeishi chōsa iinkai, *Kanagawa to Chōsen* (Yokohama: Kanagawaken kōshōbu, 1994), 157-169; Mitchell, 27-28; Chung, 173; John Lie, *Multi-ethnic Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 106-107.

labor, created the following rhyme: “working for NKK is to sacrifice one’s life for the company (*Nihon kōkan wa inochi no kōkan*).” And even though they were mobilized into the war effort as Japanese nationals, they were differentiated from those of Japanese ancestry through the koseki system, experiencing inequality and discrimination.⁴

After the war, Korean workers living in transitory quarters or factories’ dormitories quickly filled the void left by the Japanese employees who retreated to their homes in the countryside. Kawasaki city, especially the southern part of Kawasaki called the Sakuramoto/Ikegami/Hamachō districts, became a center for Korean laborers and a port of entry for new migrants. Together with Korean workers who had been conscripted during the war, new arrivals crowded Kawasaki city and found shelter there. In 1955, the Korean population stood at 6,969, making up 1.56 percent of the total population of the city (see Table 8). With limited access to other types of jobs and increasing competition with Japanese laborers, many of them were engaged in self-employment, such as running restaurants and selling copper and iron to big companies like NKK (see Table 9).⁵

While Kawasaki experienced tremendous growth as the center of the Keihin

⁴ Nihon kōkan, *Nihon kōkan kabushiki gaisha yonjūnenshi* (Tokyo: Nihon kōkan, 1952); Pak Kyeong-sik, *Nihon teikokushugi no shokuminchi shihai* (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1973); Seikyūsha, *Kawasaki shi Sakuramoto chiku seishōnen mondai chōsa kenkyū hōkoku*, 27-29; Kanagawa Shinbunsha Shakaibu, *Nihon no naka no gaikokujin*.

⁵ Seikyūsha, *Kawasaki shi Sakuramoto chiku seishōnen mondai chōsa kenkyū hōkoku*, 29-31; Pamphlet, Kanagawaken Daini Aisen Hōmu, “Kawasakishi Ikegamichō ni okeru jūmin to hōmu no fukushi kankei,” 1968, file “Kawasaki jittai chōsa hōkoku,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; Higuchi Yuichi, “Kawasaki shi Oohin chiku Chōsenjin no seikatsu jōkyō: 1955 nen zengo o chūshin ni,” *Kaikyō* 20 (2000), 62-71.

industrial belt, and even though workers benefited from the postwar boom, poverty remained pervasive in the Sakuramoto/Ikegami/Hamachō districts. In Japan, between 1955 and 1973, the real GNP expanded at an annual rate of 10 percent, increasing more rapidly than in any other industrial economy in the world. In Kawasaki, real economic growth remained high in the late 1960s, rising at an annual rate of 12-13 percent. During this era of the so-called “economic miracle,” wages and personal income rose at a surprisingly rapid rate. Poverty persisted, however, in places like the Ikegami district. In 1969 in Ikegami, about 28.3 percent of the total residents (604 residents out of 2,129 in total--- 281 were Japanese and 323 were Korean) were on public assistance. Yet, only 1 percent of the population received welfare in the entire city.⁶

Furthermore, residents were continuously exposed to environmental pollution. With the rapid expansion of the huge petrochemical complex along the coastal industrial areas, the southern part of Kawasaki witnessed a rise in pollution. Sooty smoke, smog, and exhaust fumes darkened the skies along the industrial belt. A study by a social welfare organization described the Ikegami district in the 1960s as follows: “Like flurries of snow, black smoke coming out of as many as three thousand factory chimneys fell on the laundry dried under the eaves and piled up on *tatami* mats and furniture. Iron powder and cement dust fluttered in the air. Black smoke has been in decline since 1963, yet with the replacement of coal with heavy oil, the town [wa]s now facing a new

⁶ Seikyūsha, *Kawasaki shi Sakuramoto chiku seishōnen mondai chōsa kenkyū hōkoku*, 29-31; Kawasaki shi, *Kawasaki shi shi: Tsūshi hen*, vol. 4, no.2 (Kawasaki: Kawasaki shi, 1997), 293-304; Peter Duus, *Modern Japan*, 2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998), 291-300.

devil called sulfur dioxide.” Sociologist Tashiro Kunijiro called the Ikegami and Sakuramoto areas “slums...not suitable for the survival of human beings.” Sakuramoto/Iketgami/Hamachō residents were forced to face social contradictions produced by rapid economic growth.⁷

From a “Polluted City” to a “Humanitarian city”: the Birth of a Progressive City Government

There was, however, a sign of change for *zainichi* workers in Kawasaki. Unlike in Los Angeles, where African American activists involved in CAP worked with the federal government to launch an attack on the conservative mayor Samuel Yorty, in cities like Kawasaki, *zainichi* activists gained support of the newly elected left-wing mayors and challenged the LDP-dominated central government. Korean activists used left-wing mayors’ “progressive” narratives to extend citizenship rights.

Environmental pollution caught the public’s attention in the 1960s. Voters voiced discontent with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which prioritized economic growth and neglected issues of public health and environment. While the LDP continued to dominate the central government, voters started to brush off LDP candidates at the local government level. As I have discussed in Chapter 2, backed by the

⁷ Kawasaki shi Eiseikyoku, *Kawasaki shi ni okeru taiki osen* (Kawasaki: Kawasaki shi Eiseikyoku, 1965); Tashiro Kunijiro, *Fukushi mondai kenkyū*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Dōshinsha, 1966): 2-34; Pamphlet, Kanagawaken Daini Aisen Hōmu, “Kawasakishi Ikegamichō ni okeru jūmin to hōmu no fukushi kankei,” 1968, file “Kawasaki jittai chōsa hōkoku,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; Serizawa Kiyoto and Machii Hiroaki, *Ningen toshi e no fukken* (Tokyo: Gōdō Shuppan, 1975), 75-76; Duus, 318.

Socialists and the Japanese Communist Party, left-wing mayors and governors were elected in major urban centers like Tokyo, Osaka, and Kanagawa. Minobe Ryokichi, a Tokyo University professor, for instance, won the governorship in Tokyo in 1967 with a slogan that called for “blue skies over Tokyo.” Passing anti-pollution regulations and regarding the welfare of local residents as the most pressing matter, these left-wing governors and mayors criticized the national government’s fixation on economic growth.⁸

Kawasaki was no exception to this trend in the ascendancy of “progressive” local governments. Located in the middle of the Keihin industrial belt, Kawasaki served as a major working-class town and a hub for labor activism near Tokyo. The city hall, however, had been dominated by a conservative mayor, Kanazashi Fujitaro, since the end of WWII. A major breakthrough came in 1971. Supported by the Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Party, Ito Saburo, who was a city employee and a chairman of city officials’ labor union, won the mayorship with a promise to bring back “blue skies and white cloud” to a “polluted city.” Ito would serve as a Kawasaki mayor for eighteen years until his resignation in October 1989.⁹

⁸ Frank K. Upham, “Unplaced Persons and Movements for Peace,” in *Postwar Japan as History*, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 325-346; Duus, 322-323.

⁹ “Kakushin 10 nen: Ito Kawasaki shisei no kiseki,” *Kanagawa shinbun*, 26 May 1981, 27 May 1981; Kawasaki Shigikai, *Kawasaki shigikai shi*, vol 3 (Tokyo: Daiichi Hōki Shuppan, 1985), 271-273; “Zassō no 18 nen: Ito Kawasaki shisei o furikaeru,” *Kanagawa shinbun*, 26 September 1989; Kawasaki Chihō Jichi Kenkyū Sentā, *Kawasaki shimin jichi no jikken 1971-2001: Shiryō Ito/Takahashi shisei* (Kawasaki: Kawasaki Chihō Jichi Kenkyū Sentā, 2003), 7-9. See also Tsuchiyama Kimie, “Kawasaki ‘Senku jichitai’ no rekishi teki ichi,” in *Kawasaki shisei no kenkyū*, eds. Uchikoshi Ayako and Uchiumi Mari (Tokyo: Keibundo, 2006), 43-108.

Calling for the “creation of a humanitarian city (*Ningen toshi no sōzō*),” Ito enacted several anti-pollution measures and placed great emphasis on welfare. Ito took a number of steps: the expansion of the Bureau of Pollution in order to regulate contaminating firms; the legislation of a rigid city regulation against pollution in 1972; the compensation of pollution-related victims by establishing special funds provided by forty-three contaminating firms and the city government in 1973 and 1974; and the creation of special schools for asthmatic children. Ito was also determined to expand welfare programs by increasing the number of nursery schools, schools for disabled children and adults, and cultural centers for the elderly. The Ito administration not only launched an attack on polluting firms but also vigorously promoted redistribution policies.

Furthermore, in response to the *zainichi* activists’ demands for equal rights, Ito’s slogan that promised the “creation of humanitarian city” would eventually encompass the provision of aid to the dependent children of Korean residents and the abolishment of a nationality clause for the applicants of city public housing. In the mid-1980s, when *zainichi* activists struggled to amend the foreign registration law and abolish the fingerprinting requirement for permanent residents, Ito sided with Koreans and refused to denounce those who refused to be fingerprinted. Ito, in fact, was the first mayor who officially expressed sympathy for the anti-fingerprinting movement. During his mayorship, Kawasaki became a bastion of Korean residents’ struggle for equal rights.¹⁰

¹⁰ “Kakushin 10 nen: Ito Kawasaki shisei no kiseki,” *Kanagawa shinbun*, 28 May 1981, 29 May 1981; Ito Saburō, *Nomi to kanaduchi* (Tokyo: Daiichi hōki Shuppan, 1982), 247; Kawasaki shigikai, *Kawasaki shigikai shi*, vol 3 (Tokyo: Daiichi hōki shuppan, 1985),

5.2 Translating Black Theology into Korean Activism: From the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial to the Struggles for Welfare Rights

More than anything else,
the struggles against Hitachi revealed the realities of discrimination,
oppression, and assimilation in the Japanese society.
The Association to Protect *Zainichi* Koreans in Kawasaki¹¹

The Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial, which started in 1970, represented a watershed in the history of *zainichi* Koreans' struggles for extending citizenship rights in postwar Japan. Neither *Mindan* nor *Chongryun*, which continued to regard *zainichi* Koreans as sojourners (people who were supposed to belong to their divided "home" countries, whether it be North or South Korea), supported this alternative movement. The Hitachi Trial generated a new type of movement that focused on resident Koreans' political rights in Japan, creating a unique coalition between young Japanese-born Koreans and Japanese activists who were committed to anti-discrimination struggles.

There are several reasons why this new type of movement took place in the early 1970s. First, crucial shifts in resident Korean political consciousness had occurred as a result of the generation shift. By the mid-1970s, over three-fourths of *zainichi* Koreans

339-360, 396-403; "Zassō no 18 nen: Ito Kawasaki shisei o furikaeru," *Kanagawa shinbun*, 27 September 1989, 2 October 1989.

¹¹ Kawasaki Zainichi Dōhō no Jinken o Mamorukai, *Kawasaki ni okeru chiiki undō: Minzoku undō to shite no chiiki katsudō o mezashite* (Kawasaki: Kawasaki Zainichi Dōhō no Jinken o Mamorukai, 1975), 7.

were Japanese-born. In Kawasaki city, for instance, seventy-eight percent were of the second or third generation. These young Koreans struggled to find who they were and where they belonged in the places where they grew up, not just in North or South Korea. Second, as Bae Joong Do, who would be the first director of Fureaikan in the late 1980s, suggested, these Japanese-educated young Koreans were strongly influenced by the Japanese students' revolt and anti-war movement in the late 1960s. They worked together with members of the radical student organization, *Zenkyōto* (the All Student Joint Struggle Councils), and also *Beheiren* (the Japan "Peace for Vietnam!" Committee), a major popular organization which protested against the war in Vietnam in Japan. As a result, they gained support from these student organizations. Finally, as I will explain later, a transnational network was forged among Christian leaders representing subjugated people. This alliance played a significant role in supporting the *zainichi* Korean battles for equality. All of these factors, along with the emergence of "progressive" local governments, led to Korean activists' successful fight against the Hitachi company and eventually the transformation of exclusionary welfare programs at the local level.¹²

¹² "Zainichi' 50 nen o kataru," *Seikyū* 23 (Fall 1995), 64-76; Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, *Daremoga chikara ippai ikiteiku tameni*, 44; Lie, 108-109. With regard to the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial, see Takenoshita Hirohisa, "Hitachi shūshoku sabetsu jiken o meguru zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin no shakai undō: Park kun o kakomukai ni kansuru jirei kenkyū (M.A. Thesis, Keio University, 1995); Katsuyama Masae, "Hitachi shūshoku sabetsu saiban shien katsudō ni okeru Nihonjin seinen no kenkyū: Shinriteki kattō to jiko henkaku no katei," (M.A. thesis, Ochanomizu University, 2004). For a brief discussion of the Hitachi Trial in English, see Fukuoka, 296-297; Chung, 169-170.

Interactions, Exchanges, and Translations: The Korean Church as a Vehicle for Social Change

Ethnic discrimination against *zainichi* Koreans...
 is very much a “Japanese problem,”
 just like racial discrimination in the U.S.
 is not a black problem but a “white problem.”
 Lee In Ha (1987)¹³

For Korean laborers and their descendants in these areas, the church became the vehicle for social change. The Korean church functioned not only as a house of worship, but also as an advocate for the advance of education and a social space for welfare rights. When ethnic organizations like *Mindan* and *Chongryun* were divided along national lines - reflecting the division of Korea itself - and continued to regard Korean residents (even second and third generations Koreans) as sojourners, the church and its welfare organization afforded them an arena in which to contest the local and central governments' narrow definition of citizenship. It also became a site of interracial cooperation.

The Korean church in Kawasaki has its roots in a Presbyterian church called the Hamachō kyōkai established for Korean laborers in August 1936. Due to suppression by the Japanese police, it operated without a minister until a Japanese minister, Kuramochi Yoshio, was inducted in February 1941. While most of the members were Korean, the church had some Japanese followers, functioning as a site of interracial

¹³ Lee In Ha, *Asuni ikiru kiriyū no tami* (Tokyo: Shinkyō shuppansha, 1987), 67.

companionship. Despite being destroyed by the U.S. air raid attack in April 1945, the church building reopened in November 1947. It then became part of the Korean Christian Church in Japan (KCCJ, or *Zainichi Daikan Kirisuto Kyōkai*) in 1951, and a year later, a new chapel was established in Sakuramoto district, which became a hub for extending citizenship rights in the 1970s.¹⁴

One can not tell the story of the Kawasaki church's welfare struggles without mentioning the role played by Reverend Lee In Ha. Born in Korea's North Kyongsang Province in 1925, Reverend Lee moved to Kyoto in 1941, married a Japanese woman named Sakai Sachiko, and finished the Nihon Kirisutokyō Shingaku Senmon Gakkō (today's Tokyo Union Theological Seminary) in 1952. After spending two years at the Knox College in Toronto, Canada, Reverend Lee became the first minister assigned to the Kawasaki church in March 1959, serving there for 37 years.¹⁵ He quickly became a key figure both in the Korean Christian Church in Japan and the National Christian Council in Japan (NCC). The latter group held a central role in organizing Protestant churches in Japan and establishing relationships with other churches throughout the world.

Under the leadership of Reverend Lee, the Kawasaki church opened a nursery school inside the chapel in April 1969. This endeavor was executed under the guidance

¹⁴ Seikyūsha, *Tomoni ikiru: Seikyūsha sōritsu 10 shūnen kinen* (Kawasaki city: Seikyūsha 1985), 14-18; Kawasaki Kyōkai, *Kawasaki kyōkai 50 nenshi* (Kawasaki city: Kawasaki Kyōkai, 1997), 45-60; Zainichi Daikan Kirisuto Kyōkai, *Senkyō 90 shūnen kinenshi, 1908-1998* (Tokyo: Zainichi Daikan Kirisuto Kyōkai, undated), 44-49.

¹⁵ Kawasaki Kyōkai, 45-60; Lee In Ha, *Kiryū no tamino sakebi* (Tokyo: Shinkyō Shuppansha, 1979); *Asuni ikiru kiryū no tami* (Tokyo: Shinkyō Shuppansha, 1987); *Rekishī no hazama o ikiru* (Tokyo: Nihon Kirisuto Kyōdan Shuppankyoku, 2006).

of the Korean Christian Church in Japan, which adopted a resolution in 1968 that it would pay more attention to the plight of Korean residents and their day-to-day difficulties. The Sakuramoto nursery school also owed its existence to Reverend Lee's personal experience. When he tried to enroll his daughter in a public nursery school in Kawasaki, he was denied access first because according to the public official "he was from the other side of the world." (It is also interesting to note that his daughter was later given special treatment and was allowed to enter the public nursery school because "she was a daughter of a minister.") Because of this disheartening experience, he came to realize that it was vital to establish a nursery school for Korean families who were placed in a similar situation.¹⁶

The Sakuramoto nursery school promoted the concept of the "ethnic nursery (*minzoku hoiku*)," which was designed to advance minority group members' political consciousness to fight against discrimination, although it remained open to any children regardless of their nationality, ethnicity, religion, or faith. It provided service for families in the neighborhood, serving seven Korean children and twenty-seven Japanese children during the first year.¹⁷ As I will reveal in the next chapter, the concept of an "ethnic nursery" would become the basis for demanding education rights. The

¹⁶ Lee In Ha, Interview by author, Song Kwon, and Tonomura Masaru, 4 September 2005, note taking, Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; Kawasaki kyōkai, *Kawasaki kyōkai 50 nenshi*, 60-64; Seikyūsha, *Tomoni ikiru: Seikyūsha sōritsu 10 shūnen kinen*, 14-18; Kim Yun-jeong, 45-46.

¹⁷ Kawasaki kyōkai, *Kawasaki kyōkai 50 nenshi*, 60-64; Seikyūsha, *Tomoni ikiru: Seikyūsha sōritsu 20 shūnen kinen* (Kawasaki city: Seikyūsha 1995), 17-20.

Sakuramoto nursery school would evolve into a welfare organization called Seikyūsha, which would become a unique vehicle for the battles fought by Korean residents against the discriminatory welfare system.

Korean activists in the Kawasaki church, like Reverend Lee, were strongly influenced by African American church leaders committed to black liberation struggles. They embraced what they learned from black ministers, and reshaped these lessons to suit their needs. When Martin Luther King Jr. organized the monumental Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955, Reverend Lee was in Toronto, “feeling black people’s pursuit for liberty keenly.”¹⁸ Later, he joined a study group on King, and explored how King fought for black liberation in the light of the Christian gospel.

Reverend Lee and other members of the Kawasaki church were also inspired by a black theologian named James H. Cone, then a junior professor at Adrian College in Michigan. Cone, one of “the most creative and pace-setting contemporary black theologians,” published his first book, *Black Theology and Black Power*, in 1969.¹⁹ Cone forcefully argued that Christianity was not alien to Black Power, but rather, Black Power was “Christ’s central message to twentieth-century America.”²⁰ Cone published his second book, *A Black Theology of Liberation*, in 1970, and sought to construct a new

¹⁸ Lee, *Rekishī no hazama o ikiru*, 190, 198.

¹⁹ Rufus Burrow, Jr., *James H. Cone and Black Liberation Theology* (Jefferson: McFarland and Company, Inc., 1994), xvii.

²⁰ James H. Cone, *Black Theology and Black Power* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1969), 38.

perspective in viewing the discipline of theology, using the Bible and the black struggle for liberation as its chief sources. Cone contended that Christianity was a theology of liberation. He maintained that “American white theology” gave religious sanction to the “genocide of Amerindians and the enslavement of Africans.” The task of black theology, then, was to analyze the nature of the Christian gospel in the light of subjugated blacks so that they would see the gospel as “bestowing on them the necessary power to break the chains of oppression.”²¹

Here, I would like to discuss two themes in Cone’s Black Theology that caught Japanese Christian leaders’ attention. First, Cone did not deny the relevance of Christianity to black liberation. According to Cone, there was a tendency to argue that “Christianity ha[d] nothing to do with black self-determination,” in view of its misuse in the interests of slavery and white supremacy. Cone, however, maintained that Black Theology should be built on the foundation laid by Martin Luther King, Jr., who preached black liberation in the light of Christianity.²² This emphasis on the role of the church in struggles for freedom appealed to ministers in Japan, who sought to engage in movements geared towards social change.²³

²¹ James H. Cone, *A Black Theology of Liberation*, 1970, reprint, 20th anniversary ed. (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1990), 1, 4, 5; James H. cone, *God of the Oppressed* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975).

²² Cone, *A Black Theology of Liberation*, 37.

²³ Kajiwara Hisashi, “Saikin no burakku seorojī rikai eno ichi shiron (An Effort to Understand the Recent Black Theology),” *Nagoya gakuin ronshū* 11, no. 1 (1974), 59-60; Kajiwara Hisashi, “The Meaning of Heaven in Cone’s Theology,” *Nagoya gakuin ronshū* 11, no.2 (1974), 127.

Cone also argued that the focus on blackness did not mean that only blacks suffered as victims of racial discrimination. Rather, he stressed that blackness symbolized oppression and liberty in any society, and also stood for all victims of oppression as follows:

The focus on blackness does not mean that only blacks suffer as victims in a racist society, but that blackness is an ontological symbol and a visible reality which best describes what oppression means in America.²⁴

This emphasis on black theology as the “theology of the oppressed” inspired Christian leaders in various parts of the world, especially in Latin America and Asia. Pablo Richard contended that *A Black Theology of Liberation* has served as “a fount from which living water keeps on running,” enabling the poor to interpret their struggles at home by relating them to African Americans’ fight for freedom.²⁵ In addition, according to K.C. Abraham, Cone’s statements struck a “sympathetic chord in the minds and hearts of many oppressed groups in India.”²⁶ In the case of the *zainichi* Koreans’ struggle, it

²⁴ Ibid., 7. Cone later noted that his encounters with Christian leaders in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, had a profound impact on his intellectual and spiritual development. In his biography, Cone once again stressed that “we must never absolutize a particular struggle (whether black, African, Asian, or Latin) to the exclusion of others.” Then he asked, “[h]ow could I say that the black liberation struggle in the U.S. is a more valid expression of the gospel than the Korean liberation struggle in Japan? Or the struggles of the poor in Latin America? Or the Native American struggle in the U.S.?” James H. Cone, *My Soul Looks Back* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2005), 12, 99.

²⁵ Pablo Richard, “Black Theology: A Liberating Theology in Latin America,” *A Black Theology of Liberation*, 20th anniversary ed., 171-172.

²⁶ K. C. Abraham, “Black Theology: A Reflection from Asia,” *A Black Theology of*

offered a significant framework by which they could contest a narrow definition of citizenship in Japan.²⁷

Korean church leaders were exposed to Black Theology through the works of a Japanese minister, Kajiwara Hisashi, who was an associate professor at Nagoya Gakuin University. Kajiwara was a key figure in introducing the lives and the struggles of Martin Luther King, Jr., and James H. Cone to the Japanese audience. He established the study group on King which Reverend Lee attended; he translated Cone's major works, such as *A Black Theology of Liberation*, *God of the Oppressed*, and *Martin and Malcolm and America* into Japanese. Kajiwara argued that Cone had "successfully resystematized Christian theology from the perspective of the oppressed black community."²⁸ Cone's works afforded ministers in Japan like Kajiwara an opportunity to critically examine the current practice of the church organizations, and engage in battles for the subjugated people in Japan. According to Kajiwara, Japanese Christians tended to be individualistic under the totalitarian oppression of *Tenno* (Emperor) system. They only concerned themselves with the "salvation of their own souls," not the conditions of the marginalized people. He discussed that Cone's theology gave Japanese Christians "a light to overcome [their] individualistic constitution of faith" and made it possible for them to see the "problems of suffering and discriminated minority

Liberation, 20th anniversary ed., 185.

²⁷ Kajiwara, "Saikin no burakku seorojī rikai eno ichi shiron," 55.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 35-36.

groups in this society like Ainu, Koreans [sic], Mikaiho Buraku [the former outcast group], etc.”²⁹ Through Kajiwara’s works, Korean activists in Kawasaki came to embrace Black Theology. Members of the Kawasaki church not only read Cone’s books on black theology, but also asked him to give lectures for the church members. In 1975, Cone was invited by the Korean Christian Church in Japan to lead a three-week workshop on the theme “The Church Struggling for the Liberation of the People.” By shedding light on the role of the church in fighting for the marginalized people, Black Theology helped to constitute a new discursive realm for social activism in Japan.³⁰

There was another occasion where an unexpected alliance was forged between *zainichi* Korean activists and African American Christian leaders. Reverend Lee played an active part in world-wide anti-discrimination struggles, and encountered African American leaders in the process. Crucial shifts in the stance of Japanese church organizations concerning WWII had occurred during the late 1960s, which strengthened

²⁹ Kajiwara, “The Meaning of Heaven in Cone’s Theology,” 135.

³⁰ Lee In Ha, Interview by author, Song Kwon, and Tonomura Masaru, 4 September 2005, note taking, Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; Lee, *Rekishī no hazama o ikiru*, 216-217. See also Kajiwara Hisashi, “Daisan sekai to kaihō no shingaku (The Third World and Theology of Liberation),” *Nagoya gakuin ronshū* 17, no. 1 (1980): 23-42; Kajiwara Hisashi, “On the Social Responsibility of Christians: A Response to Liberation Theology,” *Nagoya gakuin ronshū* 17, no. 2(1981): 59-70; Kajiwara Hisashi, “Jeimuzu Kōn no “kokujin shingaku” ni okeru monogatari no kōō nit suite (Regarding corresponding to the narratives of James Cone’s Black Theology),” *Jitsuzon shugi* 86 (1979): 64-74; Kajiwara Hisashi, “Kaihō no shingaku ni okeru kunan no igi (On the Significance of Suffering in Liberation Theology),” *Nagoya gakuin ronshū* 20, no.1 (1983): 97-110; J. H. Cone, *Iesu to kokujin kakumei*, trans. Osumi Keizo (Tokyo: Shinkyō Shuppansha, 1971); J. H. Cone, *Kaihō no shingaku: kokujin shingaku no tenkai*, trans. Kajiwara Hisashi (Tokyo: Shinkyō Shuppansha, 1973); J. H. Cone, *Yokuatsu sareta mono no kami*, trans. Kajiwara Hisashi (Tokyo: Shinkyō Shuppansha, 1976); James H. Cone, *My Soul Looks Back* (1982; reprint, Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 2005), 111.

Reverend Lee's leading position. Church organizations in Japan sought to respond to the so-called ecumenical movement, which aimed to bring various religious organizations together as one group under organizations like the World Council of Churches (WCC). In the name of its moderator, Suzuki Masahisa, The United Church of Christ in Japan (Nihon Kirisuto Kyōdan), in March 1967, made a confession of responsibility during WWII. It openly acknowledged that the United Church of Christ in Japan "neglected to perform its mission as a "watch man"" when Japan committed war crimes, and sought for the "forgiveness of the people of all nations, particularly in Asia." It actively endeavored to cooperate with church organizations in Asia, especially in Korea.³¹ Influenced by the United Church's official statement, the NCC established a Committee on Ethnic Minority Issues, and he was chosen as its member. Through this position, he was not only selected as one of four representatives from Asia to the WCC's Program to Combat Racism (PCR) but was also named as its vice chairperson. Through PCR, Reverend Lee encountered African American leaders like Andrew J. Young, Jr., who would ultimately be mayor of Atlanta and the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and black leaders from various African countries. Serving as a vice chair on the PCR not only helped him establish connections with black church leaders but also enabled him to understand racism in a transnational perspective, and to compare Koreans' experiences in

³¹ Suzuki Masahisa, "Kyōdan no sensō sekinin kokuhaku o ninatte" and "Dainiji taisenka ni okeru Nihon kirisuto kyōdan no sensō sekinin ni tsuiteno kokuhaku," *Fukuin to sekai* 24 (1969): 1-8; Nakahira Kenkichi, "Zainichi Kankokujin mondai to kirisutosha no sekinin," *Fukuin to sekai* 11 (1969): 43-52. Regarding the United Church of Christ in Japan's confession of responsibility during WWII, see <http://www.kohara.ac/church/kyodan/schuldbekenntnis.html>

Japan with what was going on in the U.S. and Africa.³²

Through exchange with Reverend Lee, African American church leaders gained a new perspective on racism. While much of the PCR's attention was focused on Africa and black liberation struggles in the U.S., Reverend Lee explained how former colonial subjects, mostly Koreans and Taiwanese, experienced discrimination on the basis of their ethnic origin in Japan. According to Rev. Lee, his speech seemed to have an influence on the black leaders of the PCR. He wrote,

African Americans and African representatives tended to view racial discrimination as a black and white issue. I wonder if that understanding came from their shared historical experience, where they underwent systemic discrimination that had been continuously perpetuated by the controlling white majority in Europe and the U.S. That was why they translated "racism" into "white supremacy." I introduced the case of a *zainichi* Korean youth who was dismissed by a Japanese company due to his ethnic origin. Then, the black representatives, one after another, said that it sounded very much like the type of discrimination that black people experienced every day. They expressed feelings of solidarity and support for *zainichi* Koreans and their struggles against ethnic discrimination.³³

By connecting the Koreans' fight for extending citizenship rights to black liberation struggles and Africa's battle for independence, Reverend Lee sought to create a

³² Lee In Ha, "Jinshu sabetsu to tatakau kyōkai," *Chōsen kenkyū* 100 (1970): 41-46; Lee, *Rekishī no hazama o ikiru*, 179-187; Lee In Ha, Interview by author, Song Kwon, and Tonomura Masaru, 4 September 2005, note taking, Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; Programme to Combat Racism, World Council of Churches, Ans J. van der Bent, ed., *Breaking Down the Walls: World Council of Churches Statements and Actions on Racism, 1948-1985* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1986).

³³ Lee In Ha, *Rekishī no hazama o ikiru*, 184-185.

common language among subjugated people, thereby revealing the interconnectedness of oppressions. This linkage would help the Korean activists' fight with Hitachi company in the early 1970s, which would be a watershed in the history of the Korean struggle for welfare rights in Japan.³⁴

Breaking the Ice: The Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial and its Repercussions

Park Chong-Seuk was born in Nishio city, Aichi prefecture, as a Japanese-educated second-generation Korean. He was raised as “Shoji Arai” (his Japanese alias), and did not even know how to pronounce his own Korean name. After he graduated from a local public high school in 1970, he worked in a small company --- his high school teacher recommended that he seek employment on this company because “it would hire even Koreans.” One day he saw a classified ad for a clerical job at the Hitachi software firm in Totsuka in Kanagawa prefecture. Aspiring to work at Hitachi, one of the biggest consumer electronics companies in Japan and in the world, he applied for this position in August 1970, hiding his Korean identity by using his Japanese alias and reporting his birthplace as his *koseki* (family register --- *koseki* is different from *jūminhyō* which registers current addresses). Park passed the entrance exam, and was offered a job as one of seven successful candidates out of thirty-two applicants.³⁵

³⁴ Ibid.; Lee, “Jinshu sabetsu to tatakau kyōkai,” 41-46.

³⁵ Wada Jun, “Saiban no keika to hanketsu no imi,” in *Minzokusabetsu: Hitachi shūshoku sabetsu kyūdan*, ed. Park kun o kakomu kai (Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 1974), 129-130; Park kun o kakomu kai, *Park Chong-Seuk shūshoku sabetsu saiban shiryōshū*, no. 6 (Kawasaki: Park kun o kakomu kai, 1974).

The Hitachi company ordered him to turn in *koseki tōhon* (a full copy of one's family register which includes the names of relations beyond one's own parents) on September 4. Park could not get a copy because his *koseki* was in Korea, so he called the Hitachi company on September 15. Learning of his Korean identity, the Hitachi panicked and told him that they would suspend his employment notice and “call him tomorrow.” Park waited, but got no reply, so he called the company again. Then Toma Takeshi, the manager of the labor division, gave a curt answer that the company would not hire “foreigners in general (*ippan gaikokujin*),” and that if Park wrote his true identity in his CV, he would have never been offered a job in the first place.” Park, who was dismissed without formal explanation, asked for help from his high school teacher and the Labor Standard Supervision Office. Under the pressure of Hitachi, his high school teacher attempted to persuade him to give up his efforts, giving a cold-hearted answer that it was “too unfortunate” that he was born as a Korean, and that “he had to accept his fate.”³⁶

Angered by Hitachi's unfair treatment, he went to visit the firm in Totsuka with his sister and young Japanese supporters. Japanese followers later helped to form a group called “*Paku kun o kakomu kai* (the Association Surrounding Mr. Park).” Toma, once again, replied that the company would not hire “foreigners in general.” While Hitachi repeatedly made an excuse that they would not hire “*ippan gaikokujin*,” it later changed its position and justified itself by explaining that Park was dismissed because he

³⁶ Ibid.; Wada, 130-131.

turned in a deceitful work record (using his Japanese alias). Waiting for two more months, Park did not get a satisfactory reply from Hitachi. Therefore, he decided to file a suit against the company.³⁷

The Trial created a unique coalition between young Korean activists and Japanese students/intellectuals. Park asked for help from Keio university students who were involved in *Beheiren* (the Japan “Peace for Vietnam!” Committee) at the Yokohama station in October 1970. Soon, a young leader of the Kawasaki church, Choi Seungkoo, joined their group and other members of the Kawasaki church followed him. Reverend Lee and other Christian leaders, activists, professors --- both Korean and Japanese --- established the Association Surrounding Mr. Park in April 1971. The Association claimed that what Park went through was only “the tip of the iceberg,” and that even this “tip” was forgotten and hushed up because of ignorance and indifference among the Japanese.³⁸ The Association was a “forerunner of a unique citizens’ movement” which created a partnership between Korean and Japanese youth.³⁹

It was precisely this novelty that traditional ethnic organizations, *Mindan* and

³⁷ Ibid.; Park kun o kakomu kai, *Park Chong-Seuk shūshoku sabetsu saiban shiryōshū*, no. 6.

³⁸ Following seven people called for support for the Association surrounding Mr. Park: Ozawa Yusaku (associate professor, Tokyo Metropolitan University), Osawa Shinichiro (essayist), Sato Katsumi (the management director of *Nihon Chōsen Kenkyūjo*), Lee Won-jik (novelist), Lee In Ha (the minister of the Korean Christian Church in Japan), Yamashita Masanobu (the minister of the United Church of Christ in Japan), and Tagawa Kenzo (lecturer of Wakayama University). “Park kun o kakomu kai eno yobikake,” *Genkainada*, no. 1 (April 1973), 10.

³⁹ Kawasaki kyōkai, *Kawasaki kyōkai 50 nenshi*, 64.

Chongryun, found problematic. For members of these two organizations, employment in a major Japanese company was simply another step toward assimilation. There was a powerful backlash against *zainichi* Koreans who were involved in the anti-Hitachi struggles. Choi Seungkoo of the Kawasaki church, for instance, was forced to resign from his position as a representative of young people in the Korean Christian Church in Japan (KCCJ) because he was branded “as a traitor, as an assimilationist.”⁴⁰ For members of *Mindan* and *Chongryun*, *zainichi* Koreans who supposedly belonged to North or South Korea should be concerned with their status in “home” countries rather than their citizenship rights in Japan.

Since Park’s filing of a lawsuit on December 8, 1970, twenty-two trials were held before the verdict was announced. In addition to some members of the Association surrounding Mr. Park, historians Pak Kyeong-sik and Kajimura Hideki appeared as witnesses for the prosecution. There were two issues of law: first, in terms of labor contract, whether it was the cancellation of an informal appointment or a dismissal; second, whether or not it was an unfair discharge based on Park’s ethnic background.⁴¹

Forging an Activist Network: Effects of Transnational Organizing

Zainichi Korean activists linked their battles against Hitachi to anti-discrimination

⁴⁰ Choi Seungkoo, “Yugamerareta minzokukan,” *Shisō no kagaku* 59 (1976), 2-8; Lee, *Kiryū no tamino sakebi*, 125-126, 150; Lee In Ha, “Seikyūsha: Minzoku sabetsu to tatakai ningen shutai no kakuritsu o mezashite,” *Kaihō kyōiku* 135 (April 1981), 56-68.

⁴¹ Wada, 132-144; “Inogare o danjite yurusuna,” *Genkainada* 8 (November 1973), 4.

struggles worldwide. Several key figures helped to fashion this transnational activism. The bonds of solidarity created among Christian activists in Korea, the U.S., and the world had enabled Koreans' equal rights advocates to challenge one of the world's leading electronics companies on a global scale.

Choi Seungkoo, who was forced to resign from his position as a representative of the Korean youth in the KCCJ, left for Korea to study at Seoul University. There, he got acquainted with Korean students and women in church organizations. Together they launched a campaign against Hitachi. The Korean Student Christian Federation (KSCF), for example, made a statement in early 1974 that the Japanese government should abolish discrimination against *zainichi* Koreans immediately. Church Women United denounced employment discrimination against Park, and called for a boycott of Hitachi goods in April 1974. Through Choi's networking efforts, Christian activists in South Korea joined the *zainichi* Koreans' battle against the Hitachi company.⁴²

Reverend Lee also played a significant role in translating Park's struggles into battles for racial and ethnic equality on a supra-national scale. The World Council of Churches' Program to Combat Racism gave a donation amounting to four million, five hundred thousand yen (about sixteen thousand eight hundred U.S. dollars) to the Association surrounding Mr. Park in 1972 and 1973.⁴³ At a conference held in the

⁴² "Hitachi o utsu: Sokoku to no rentai ni atatte," *Genkainada* 12 (March 1973), 5; "Kankoku no Hitachi fubai undō ni kotae shōri ni mukete zenshin shiyō," *Genkainada* 15 (June 1974), 1; Lee In Ha, *Kiryū no tamino sakebi*, 128; Takenoshita, 109-111.

⁴³ Sources give the amount in yen, and sixteen thousand and eight hundred dollars is only an estimate. In 1949 the value of the yen was set at 360 yen per US \$1 through a United States plan, part of the Bretton Woods System. That exchange rate was kept

Netherlands in April and May of 1974, the PCR also made a resolution to boycott Hitachi company goods. Through the PCR, Rev. Lee sought to organize anti-discrimination struggles across borders, linking a specific case of the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial to a transnational fight against racism.⁴⁴

The Yokohama district court finally announced the verdict on June 19, 1974, upholding Park's claim almost entirely. It ruled that Park was under labor contract to the Hitachi company, therefore his dismissal was a breach of contract. It also held that Hitachi owed Park the payment of the wages in arrears, and that Hitachi should pay financial reparations to Park.⁴⁵

It was for several reasons, an epoch-making verdict. The court officially found evidence of discrimination against Koreans, and admitted that what Hitachi had done was emblematic of Japanese companies that had constantly allowed discrimination on the

until 1971, when the U.S. abandoned the convertibility of the dollar to gold and imposed a 10 percent surcharge on imports. In December 1971, the G-10 Finance Ministers met at the Smithsonian Museum in Washington, DC, and agreed to readjust the exchange rates and resume a fixed exchange rate. Under this Smithsonian Agreement, the Japanese yen appreciated from the previous fixed rate of 360 yen to 308 yen to the dollar. In February and March 1973, Japanese and other European nations gave up the fixed rate system. As a result, as of early 1973, the Japanese yen had appreciated to around 260 yen per dollar.

⁴⁴ Lee In Ha, "Jinshu sabetsu to tatakau kyōkai," 41-55; Lee, *Kiryū no tamino sakebi*, 121, 128-129; Lee In Ha, *Rekishhi no hazama o ikiru*, 179-186; Programme to Combat Racism, 15; Takenoshita, 111-112. See also Paul Bock, *In Search of a Responsible World Society: The Social Teachings of the World Council of Churches* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974), 177.

⁴⁵ Wada, 144-147; "Sabetsu naki shakai eno tegakari," in *Minzokusabetsu: Hitachi shūshoku sabetsu kyūdan*, ed. Park kun o kakomu kai (Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 1974), 261-280.

grounds of ethnicity. The verdict became a weapon in a battle over the right to demand equal rights and abolish the nationality clause. Second, it was a life-changing experience for Japanese supporters who were fighting against the discriminatory Alien Registration Law but who seldom had had first-hand experience of discrimination. The Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial generated a very unique alliance between young Korean activists and Japanese students/intellectuals, and eventually led to the establishment of *Mintōren* (*Minzoku sabetsu to tatakau renraku kyōgikai* --- the National Council for Combating Discrimination against Ethnic Peoples). Finally, for Park himself, the result was much more than a legal victory over Hitachi. At first, he contended that he was no different to a Japanese applicant, so that Hitachi should have treated him the same. Gradually, however, he emerged with a clearer sense of his Korean identity. During the testimony, he made a statement that whatever the verdict turned out to be, he had won because he had finally become Park Chong-Seuk, not Arai Shoji.

For me, the biggest change was that I have decided to live as a Korean using my Korean name, even if it means experiencing discrimination because of that change...Hitachi gave me an opportunity to spend the rest of my days as a Korean, thereby humanizing my life. As such, I believe that I have already won the case. I would have no regrets, even if I lost.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Park kun o kakomu kai, *Park Chong-Seuk shūshoku sabetsu saiban shiryōshū* 6, *saishū junbi shomen jōshinsho Park Chong-Seuk shōgenshū* 5 *Park Chong-Seuk shōgen zenroku* (Kawasaki: Park kun o kakomu kai, 1974), 96-97.

After the trial, he took up residence in Kawasaki, and established community programs for Korean children with other members of the Kawasaki church. Kawasaki ultimately evolved into a laboratory for *zainichi* Koreans' struggles for welfare rights.⁴⁷

Furthermore, even after the verdict was announced, the Association Surrounding Mr. Park established bonds of solidarity with African American church leaders, and succeeded in persuading Hitachi to change its policy. Black leaders put pressure on Hitachi, demanding fair treatment of Korean employees like Park. When the Korean Christian Church in Japan (KCCJ) held a meeting named a "Strategic Missionary Meeting on Minority People," Christian leaders representing subjugated people in America and Asia joined them. From the U.S., African American, Native American, and Mexican American leaders attended the meeting. At the meeting, an African American minister, who served as the president of the National Council of Churches (NCC), USA, W. Sterling Cary, promised to support the Association's battle against the Hitachi company. He kept his word. When Hitachi refused to accept the Association's suggestion to establish a consultative committee regarding the employment of non-Japanese employees, he sought to persuade the company with other Christian leaders representing NCC and the Japan-North American Commission on Cooperative Mission (JNAC). They visited Hitachi's New York branch in August 1974, and handed the company a letter saying that they were interested in Park Chong-Seuk who was subjected

⁴⁷ Lee, *Kiryū no tamino sakebi*, 114, 123; Wada Jun, "Park kun no 'shūshoku sabetsu saiban' no keika to mondaiten," *Chōsen kenkyū* 106 (1971): 18-29; Lee, *Rekishī no hazama o ikiru*, 198-199; Yamada Takao, Interview by author, 28 April 2006, note taking, Nakahara Shiminkan, Kawasaki city.

to unfair treatment, and that church leaders in the U.S. would continue to monitor discrimination by the company. It was reported that the president of Hitachi's New York branch hurriedly went to visit the Tokyo head office of Hitachi in Tokyo on August 15. As a result, Hitachi bowed to the pressure and agreed to establish a consultative committee.⁴⁸

Transnational activist networks and transborder activities, forged among Korean students and women, the World Council of Churches' Program to Combat Racism, and American church leaders under the direction of a black minister Rev. W. Sterling Cary, helped Park win a victory over one of the largest electronics companies in Japan and in the world. By so doing, it challenged the hegemonic ideology of big Japanese companies that had excluded former colonial subjects from job opportunities and had relegated them to the margins.

This chapter examined how Kawasaki city, located in the heart of the "Keihin kogyōchitai" --- one of the largest arsenals of the prewar period, and also one of the gigantic industrial belts of postwar Japan --- emerged as a major *zainichi* Korean district near Tokyo. For Korean residents in southern Kawasaki, the church functioned as an advocate for the advancement of their citizenship rights. Reverend Lee In Ha of the Kawasaki Korean church became a key figure in promoting Korean residents' citizenship. Under the leadership of Reverend Lee, the Kawasaki church opened a nursery school

⁴⁸ Lee, *Kiryū no tamino sakebi*, 129-130; Kawasaki kyōkai, *Kawasaki kyōkai 50 nenshi*, 66; Takenoshita, 112.

inside the chapel in April 1969.

When the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial started in 1970, the Kawasaki church and the Sakuramoto nursery school became the hub of *zainichi* activism. There, Reverend Lee and young *zainichi* activists were immersed in the works of African American church leaders committed to black liberation struggles, such as Martin Luther King, Jr., and James Cone. African American church leaders inspired Kawasaki Koreans and helped them engage in battles for equal rights. Transnational networks of global Christian leaders, especially with black church leaders in the U.S., offered a significant framework through which Korean activists in Japan could eventually challenge the narrow definitions of citizenship under which they lived. With help from these black church leaders, *zainichi* Koreans won an epoch-making victory at the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial, which represented a watershed in the history of the Korean struggle in Japan during the postwar period. Armed with their victory over Hitachi, Korean activists in Kawasaki would challenge the city and the nation's exclusionary local and national welfare policies, asserting their welfare rights and voicing alternative visions of citizenship.

Chapter VI.

Voicing Alternative Visions of Citizenship from “Outside” the Japanese Welfare State: The “Kawasaki-system” of Welfare, 1974-1982

This chapter explores how the Kawasaki Koreans’ struggles over citizenship signaled a new phase after the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial. Kawasaki Koreans expanded their activism by establishing a welfare foundation named Seikyūsha, and developing the Sakuramoto School which supported its graduates. With the Seikyūsha and the Sakuramoto School, they sought to abolish the nationality clause, thereby challenging the narrow definition of Japanese citizenship. First they aimed for specific welfare and education programs that had historically excluded Koreans, such as an allowance for dependent children, the right to public housing, a bulletin of elementary schools, and the right to apply for scholarships. In so doing, they turned Kawasaki city into a bastion of equal rights. They then established the Kawasaki Association for Promoting *Zainichi* Koreans’ Education (*Zainichi kankoku chōsenjin kyōiku o susumeru kai*), and strived to transform the city’s education policies. The Association of Mothers led by a second-generation Korean, Song Puja, became a vanguard for challenging the city’s board of education. They eventually succeeded in persuading the city to enact a policy towards resident non-nationals --- a landmark for the education rights of *zainichi* Koreans and other non-nationals. In addition, they successfully pressured the city into creating a youth community center called Fureai Hall. The *burakumin* (people from historically discriminated communities) became a source of inspiration to them.

“Living together” became the slogan for their activism, although it was challenged by some original members who left the Seikyūsha organization in the early 1980s. The enactment of an education policy toward resident non-nationals and the establishment of Fureai Hall came to represent the “Kawasaki system of welfare,” a different community vision from the one pursued by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

6.1 Contestations over Welfare, Housing, and Education

The Establishment of the Seikyūsha Foundation

It [a local movement] is not based on a particular platform or position. Rather, it tries to capture the realities of our fellow citizens (*dōhō*) who had been dropped from such platforms or positions, and to do something that any kind of political movement should be grounded in --- that is, learning from the people (*minshū*) and living with the people with all of one’s heart.”¹

The Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial offered a framework for voicing alternative visions of citizenship. Under the influence of the Hitachi Trial, *zainichi* teachers and activists of the Sakuramoto nursery school initiated a movement geared towards letting children use their Korean names as opposed to their Japanese aliases. They promoted what they called an “ethnic nursery (*minzoku hoiku*)” so that children would respect their ethnic backgrounds without succumbing to discrimination.² In order

¹ Kawasaki Zainichi Dōhō no Jinken o Mamorukai, *Kawasaki ni okeru chiiki undō: minzoku undō to shite no chiiki katsudō o mezashite* (Kawasaki: Kawasaki Zainichi Dōhō no Jinken o Mamorukai, 1975), 9, file “Minzoku undō toshite no chiiki katsudō,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city.

² Seikyūsha Katsudōsha Kaigi, ed., “Minzoku sabetsu to tatakau chiiki katsudō o

to extend their efforts in supporting *zainichi* children, they reorganized the nursery school. First, the school separated from the Kawasaki church and developed into a welfare foundation called Seikyūsha (the term *Seikyū* signified Korean peninsula) in October 1973. It was authorized as a Kawasaki city welfare agency in February 1974. With seventy students and fifteen staff members, it started organizing several educational programs. Seikyūsha would develop into a crucial social space for challenging exclusive social security programs and fighting for Korean children's rights to education.³ Furthermore, the nursery school itself was expanded. In April 1975, the Sakuramoto Nursery School developed into the Sakuramoto school (*Sakuramoto gakuen*), educating not only preschoolers but also students in elementary school, junior high school, and high school. The nursery school teachers and parents thought that it was imperative to expand the nursery school so that *zainichi* children would continue to receive support after graduating from the nursery, and that they would continue to be able to assert themselves as *zainichi* Koreans without hesitation. With the establishment of the Sakuramoto school, the “ethnic nursery” became an “ethnic education.”⁴ The

mezashite,” 2-5, file “Minzoku hoikuen kankei shiryō (3) 1981- Sakuramoto hoikuen,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; Lee In Ha, “Seikyūsha no ayumi o kaerimite,” in Seikyūsha, *Tomoni ikiru: Seikyūsha sōritsu 10 shūnen kinen* (Kawasaki city: Seikyūsha 1985), 14-18.

³ Seikyūsha, *Tomoni ikiru: Seikyūsha sōritsu 10 shūnen kinen* (Kawasaki city: Seikyūsha 1985), 16; Seikyūsha, *Tomoni ikiru: Seikyūsha sōritsu 20 shūnen kinen* (Kawasaki city: Seikyūsha 1985), 17-20; Kawasaki Kyōkai, *Kawasaki kyōkai 50 nenshi*, 62-63; Kim Yun-jeong, “Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin no aidentitī keisei to tabunka kyōsei kyōiku ni kansuru kenkyū,” 50-52.

⁴ Kawasaki Zainichi Dōhō no Jinken o Mamorukai, *Minzoku undō toshite no chiiki katsudō* 3, 7, file “Minzoku undō toshite no chiiki katsudō,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall,

Sakuramoto School afforded *zainichi* Korean children and their parents a social space from which they could launch a challenge against the city and the central government. Armed with the Sakuramoto School and its “ethnic education,” they came to assert more control over the education of Korean children.

Supporters of Park initiated new programs for *zainichi* Korean children in Kawasaki, transforming the monumental victory over Hitachi into a weapon in the fight for welfare and education rights. Korean activists created several organizations in the midst of the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial. Mothers at the Sakuramoto nursery, for instance, established the Association of Mothers Watching out for Children (*Kodomo o mimamoru omoni no kai*) in April, 1975. Later they would play a critical role in advancing Korean students’ rights in Kawasaki public schools. Also, in November 1974, the Association surrounding Mr. Park evolved into an organization called the National Council for Combating Discrimination against Ethnic Peoples (*Mintōren*), a networking organization created among Korean and Japanese activists united against ethnic discrimination. The Korean branch of the Association, in particular, established the Association to Protect *Zainichi* Koreans in Kawasaki (*Kawasaki Zainichi Dōhō no Jinken o Mamorukai*) under Park’s leadership. In order to maintain the spirit of anti-Hitachi struggles, the Association to Protect *Zainichi* Koreans in Kawasaki initiated special educational and recreational programs for children in the Ikegami district, one of the poorest neighborhoods in southern Kawasaki. They

Kawasaki city; Seikyūsha unei iinkai kōhōbu, ed., “Chiki ni micchaku shita kyōiku jissen o mezashite,” 6-7.

explained why they launched children's programs in southern Kawasaki.⁵ Its leaders declared:

“The employment discrimination against Park was only the tip of the iceberg --- a well-known, common experience for *zainichi* Koreans in Kawasaki. Weren't we used to accepting discrimination as something inescapable? ... We have been watching Mr. Park for three years. After floundering and writhing, he sometimes looked as if he were crushed sometimes, but he grew and eventually emerged with a stronger sense of ethnic identity, and openly made a testimony that he regained his confidence through the trial...He did that by fighting against discrimination, which was so common to Koreans that many of them felt hopeless about it...The roots of the problems are deep, and that is why we need to look at the concrete realities that Korean residents are facing at the local level.”⁶

Park, too, wrote the following message to his supporters in Korea.

“We, the youth section of the Kawasaki church held a meeting for children in the Ikegami district, a place located in the middle of Kawasaki's industrial zone in Kawasaki, where our fellow Korean citizens (*dōhō*) gathered to live. People lead their lives without any kind of support from the Japanese society...Now, after continuously holding meetings for the children, they started calling themselves by their Korean names and began talking to the older generation in the neighborhood. We want them to have confidence in themselves as Koreans. We will continue to make efforts,

⁵ *Genkainada* 17 (October 1974); Kawasaki Zainichi Dōhō no Jinken o Mamorukai, *Minzoku undō toshite no chiiki katsudō* 3 (Kawasaki: Kawasaki Zainichi Dōhō no Jinken o Mamorukai, 1977), 3-4; Fukuoka, 50-51, 272; Kim Yun-jeong, “Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin no aidentitī keisei to tabunka kyōsei kyōiku ni kansuru kenkyū,” 52-54.

⁶ “4.28 Hitachi to chiiki o kangaeru Kawasaki shūkai hōkoku,” *Genkainada* 15 (June 1974), 3.

until the day our fellow citizens become free.”⁷

What these different organizations had in common was that they wanted young Koreans to be able to stand up to discrimination and poverty, just as Park Chong-Seuk had done. The basic principles of their activism lay in the Hitachi employment discrimination struggle. Their day-to-day activities were conducted at the Kawasaki church, especially at the Sakuramoto School.⁸ These *zainichi* Korean activists would soon demand equal treatment in welfare programs from the city government, crafting a tradition of political activism called the “Kawasaki system.”

Contesting the Definition of Citizenship: Fighting for Allowances for Dependent Children and Public Housing

The struggles over the Hitachi Trial became the cornerstone of addressing alternative visions of citizenship for Koreans in Kawasaki. In addition to developing educational programs for Korean children, Park’s supporters launched campaigns to demand an allowance for dependent children and the right to public housing. When they held a meeting in Kawasaki in April of 1974, two months before the Yokohama district court announced the final verdict, some of the attendees brought up the question

⁷ “Hongoku no omoni tachi e,” *Genkainada* 17 (October 1974), 7.

⁸ Seikyūsha, *Tomoni ikiru: Seikyūsha sōritsu 10 shūnen kinen* (Kawasaki city: Seikyūsha 1985), 17; Seikyūsha, *Tomoni ikiru: Seikyūsha sōritsu 20 shūnen kinen* (Kawasaki city: Seikyūsha 1985), 28-29; Seikyūsha Katsudōsha Kaigi, ed., “Minzoku sabetsu to tatakau chiiki katsudō o mezashite,” 2-5; Seikyūsha Unei Iinkai Kōhōbu, ed., “Chiiki ni micchaku shita kyōiku jissen o mezashite,” 4-5.

of why *zainichi* residents were not covered by the city government's allowances for dependent children and public housing programs.⁹ Since then, they began to set their sights on the issues of child welfare and public housing.

The Japanese government had used the nationality clause as a justification for excluding *zainichi* Koreans from financial aid (in the form of allowances) for dependent children and public housing programs. Allowances for dependent children started in January of 1972, providing assistance to families with three or more children under the age of 18 (with one or more under the age of 15). In addition to the income restriction, the Child Allowance Law, which was enacted in May 1971, held the condition that applicants must be *Japanese nationals* who currently had addresses in Japan [emphasis added].¹⁰ Due to this nationality clause, Koreans in Japan were denied access to the child allowances.

As for public housing, there were two types: those administered by the Japan Housing Public Corporation, or Nihon Jūtaku Kōdan, and those operated by the local government. The former housing complex (*danchi*) functioned under the nationality clause, and excluded resident non-nationals. The latter was dependent on the local authorities' discretion, yet the infamous bulletin titled, "Regarding the Treatment of

⁹ Iwabuchi Hideyuki, "Kawasaki shi ni okeru zainichi gaikokujin kyōiku to Seikyūsha," in Seikyūsha, *Tomoni ikiru: Seikyūsha sōritsu 20 shūnen kinen*, 29; Kanagawa Shinbunsha Shakaibu, *Nihon no naka no gaikokujin: Hitosashi yubi no jiyū o motomete* (Yokohama: Kanagawa Shinbunsha, 1985), 183-184.

¹⁰ RAIK Zainichi Kankokujin Mondai Kenkyūjo, *Jidō teate no shikyū, kōei jūtaku nyūkyō tō no seikatsuken yōgo undō no kiroku* (Tokyo: RAIK Zainichi Kankokujin Mondai Kenkyūjo, n.d.), 1.

Foreign Applicants for Public Housing” sent by the Housing Bureau of the Ministry of Construction, was used as an excuse for limiting public housing access to Japanese only.

It declared:

“The aim of public housing is...intended to provide low-income families, who have difficulties finding affordable housing, with apartments and inexpensive rent, to secure the lives of Japanese nationals (*Nihon kokumin*), and to contribute to the expansion of social welfare. The constitution of Japan guaranteed this right to Japanese nationals only, therefore non-nationals cannot make demands for this as their entitlement... However, under special circumstances, such as the removal of housing units for the renovation of deteriorated areas, it is appropriate that even non-nationals are given the right to apply.”¹¹

In October, 1972, the Ministry of Construction revised their bulletin, once again making clear that, except “under special circumstances,” “non-nationals” were not able to demand the right to public housing.¹² Similar to the way that financial aid for dependent children was used to reaffirm boundaries between “non-nationals” (especially former colonial subjects) and “Japanese nationals,” public housing was utilized to demarcate the former from the latter.

In July of 1974, *zainichi* activists sent an open letter to the mayor of Kawasaki and the head of the bureau of social work, demanding that “resident non-nationals in Japan” (*zainichi gaiokujin*) be given the right to receive allowances for dependent

¹¹ Ibid., 2-3.

¹² Ibid., 4.

children and public housing. Much to their surprise, city hall was quick to respond and accepted their demands on July 30. The Ito administration replied that, from 1975 on, the non-nationals living in Kawasaki would be entitled to an allowance for dependent children and public housing.¹³ Park's supporters then pressed the city to revise its ordinances so that *zainichi* residents would be formally included in the city's social security programs. They also petitioned the city council to put pressure on the central government to revise its national social security legislations so that not only residents of Kawasaki, but also those of other cities would be able to enjoy these rights. They sent the following letter to the council in February 1975:

“To the city council...we urge Kawasaki City to strongly recommend that the central government amend the law on allowances for dependent children, and repeal the nationality clause with regards to the occupation of public housings. If that happens, the Kawasaki city government would be the nation's first city to achieve this epoch-making accomplishment.”¹⁴

The city council agreed to meet these demands. It asked the central government to change its policy regarding the status of non-nationals living in Japan, issuing the following statement.

¹³ Ibid., 10; “Zeikin onaji, kenri ha sabetsu,” *Mainichi shinbun*, 16 July 1974; “Jidō teate ya shiei nyūkyo kawasakishi mo mitomeru,” *Mainichi shinbun*, 31 July 1974; “Jidō teate, raishunkara” *Kawasaki yomiuri shinbun*, 31 July 1974; “Gaikokujin nimo sabetsu senu,” *Asahi shinbun*, 31 July 1974.

¹⁴ “Kawasaki shi no keneki undō ato hitooshi ‘jidō teate,’” *Tōyō keizai nippō* 14 February 1975; RAIK, *Jidō teate no shikyū, kōei jūtaku nyūkyo tō no seikatsuken yōgo undō no kiroku*, 15-16.

“To the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Justice, Finance, Health, Labor, & Welfare, and Home Affairs...So many non-nationals live in our country, yet they are entitled to almost no protection under the laws that govern their lives. While they are obligated to pay taxes just like the Japanese citizens, they are not granted the right to receive an allowance for dependent children...it is an extremely unfair system against these foreign residents.”¹⁵

There was a reason why the Ito administration raised no objection to the *zainichi* activists' demands. Providing welfare services to Korean residents would enhance the Ito administration's "progressiveness," serving as a form of propaganda that demonstrated the progressive local government's moral superiority over the LDP-dominated central government. Korean activists knew this, and that was why they stressed that Kawasaki should seize the initiative in guaranteeing resident non-nationals' welfare rights. It would also bolster the image of Ito as an advocate of welfare and human rights, and they were well aware that the Ito administration was willing to take such risks. Equally significant was the fact that providing these welfare services to Korean residents in Kawasaki did not cast a heavy financial burden on city hall. As Yamada Takao pointed out in an interview, an allowance for dependent children was granted only to families with three or more children, and protecting the *zainichi* Koreans' rights to public housing was not costly as their number was relatively small.¹⁶ The

¹⁵ Ibid., 17-18; "Jidō teate tsuini kakutoku!," *Tōyō keizai nippō*, 4 April 1975.

¹⁶ Yamada Takao, Interview by author, 28 April 2006, note taking, Kawasaki shi Nakahara Shiminkan, Kawasaki city.

Kawasaki government in turn adopted a pro-*zainichi* policy as part of its progressive agenda, as *zainichi* activists used the local government's progressive rhetoric surrounding welfare and human rights to contest the narrow definitions of citizenship.

Once Kawasaki Koreans succeeded in breaking a hole in the wall which barricaded them from the full rights of citizenship, other cities followed. In places like Osaka, Amagasaki, Kobe, Kyoto, Nagoya, and Kitakyushu, *zainichi* Koreans initiated their struggles to eliminate the nationality clause in the child welfare and public housing policies. While Kawasaki was not the first city to provide resident non-nationals with financial aid for dependent children and the right to move into public housing (Tokyo had already granted both and Yokohama, the former only), Kawasaki was a remarkable case because Koreans achieved these rights by themselves. Kawasaki Koreans took the lead in abolishing the nationality clause in welfare. Their activism held the spotlight, and was called the “Kawasaki *hōshiki* (Kawasaki system).”¹⁷

The Question of Education Rights: Struggling for the Bulletin of Elementary Schools and the Rights to Apply for Scholarship

Armed with their victory at achieving allowances for dependent children and public housing, *zainichi* mothers, nursery school teachers, and activists affiliated with the Korean church now turned their attention to *zainichi* children's rights to education. As many of them were involved in the Sakuramoto school, devoting themselves to protecting

¹⁷ “Zeikin wa onaji kenri wa sabetsu “kawasaki hōshiki” de kakutoku e,” *Tōyō keizai nippō*, 4 October 1974.

Korean children's education rights on a day-to-day basis, this was no surprise. They held a meeting with the Kawasaki Board of Education on November 24, 1976, urging it to send a bulletin listing elementary schools for *zainichi* preschoolers. To Japanese families with preschool-aged children, city hall usually sent out bulletins in early January, listing the names of the schools, the first dates, and the dates for physical check-ups. *Zainichi* families, however, received no information because, according to the city officials, they were "non-nationals," and therefore not subject to compulsory education. *Zainichi* Korean families with preschoolers had to ask their Japanese neighbors themselves about the detailed information for schools.¹⁸

Not so long ago, government officials had created the excuse that Koreans were not covered by Japan's compulsory education policy due to their status as "non-nationals." During the prewar period, it was mandatory for Korean children to be present at the Japanese schools as "Japanese imperial subjects," although the law was not strictly enforced due to the fact that many Korean children were working to support their families. When WWII was over, and Japan was under the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), the question of citizenship of Koreans remaining in Japan was left ambiguous. In a directive issued in November of 1945, SCAP stated that Koreans were to be treated as "liberated nationals" as long as they did not become a matter of military security. In some cases, however, they would be regarded as "enemies" given that they had also been Japanese imperial subjects. SCAP

¹⁸ "Nyūgaku annai o dashite," *Yomiuri shinbun*, 25 November 1976; "Shūgaku tsūchi o dashite," *Tōyō keizai nippō*, 3 December 1976.

and the Japanese government continued to take this ambiguous and dual position on the legal status of Koreans.¹⁹

On the one hand, Koreans in Japan were regarded as “aliens.” When the Alien Registration Law was enacted in May 1947, they were required to carry registration cards. As “aliens” belonging to *Chōsen*, meaning Korea, although neither the Republic of Korea nor the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea existed back then, so *Chōsen* therefore signified not a nationality but rather an ethnicity.²⁰

On the other hand, Koreans were ordered to abide by Japanese education laws as “Japanese nationals.” Koreans remaining in the nation established the League of Koreans in Japan in order to protect their rights, and put forth efforts in constructing ethnic schools for Korean children. When they began teaching Korean history and language with their own textbooks, SCAP, worried about the Koreans’ becoming a security concern, declared that Koreans should be treated as Japanese nationals in December, 1946. Accordingly, the Japanese Ministry of Education declared that Koreans in Japan had to submit to compulsory education. In January 1948, SCAP tightened its policies and commanded the Ministry of Education to issue an official

¹⁹ Bae Joong Do, ““Shūgaku annai” yōkyū undō ni tsuite no sankō iken,” file “Kawasaki shūgaku tsūchi (annai) yōkyū undō 1976 11.24-,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; Kim Il-Wha, “Zainichi-Chōsenjin no Hōteki Chii,” in *Zainichi-Chōsenjin: Rekishi, Genjō, Tenbō*, ed. Pak Chonmin (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1995), 188; Kim T’ae-gi, *Sengo Nihon seiji to zainichi Chōsenjin mondai* (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1997), 159-162; Inokuchi Hiromitsu, “Korean ethnic schools in occupied Japan, 1945-52,” in *Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin*, ed. Sonia Ryang (London: Routledge, 2000), 145; Erin Aeran Chung, “Exercising Citizenship: Koreans Living in Japan,” *Asian Perspectives* 24, no. 4 (2000), 165-166.

²⁰ Kim Il-Wha; Chung, 165-166; Kim T’ae-gi.

statement that all Korean schools should abide by Japanese education laws. This meant that Korean schools had to give up both their own curriculum and the Korean language education program, or they would not be counted as official schools. The League of Koreans in Japan fought vigorously against this order, urging the government to take into consideration their special needs. The Minister of Education, however, asserted that if unregistered Korean schools failed to be closed by April --- the time when the new school year officially began --- the government would not rule out using force against them. Tensions between Korean activists and SCAP/the Ministry of Education escalated. With police and government officials enforcing the expulsion of Korean children from schools, and Korean activists and Japanese supporters holding mass demonstrations, violent conflict finally erupted in Kobe and Osaka. The U.S. military commander of the Kobe area declared a state of emergency, and started randomly arresting the protestors. Over 1,700 people were taken into custody. In Osaka, a U.S. military officer allowed the governor to use firearms against the protestors. A teenage Korean boy was shot to death, and nine were severely wounded. Most of the media, censored by SCAP, put the blame on the League of Koreans in Japan, not the U.S. military officer nor the Japanese police. The League was ordered to dissolve, along with their “ethnic schools.”²¹ Many remembered the Kobe and Osaka incidents as brutal incidents, suppressing Koreans’ rights to education by both the U.S. and Japanese governments. SCAP and the Japanese

²¹ Inokuchi, 146-154; Yi Wol-sun, “Zainichi Chōsenjin no minzoku kyōiku,” in *Zainichi Chōsenjin: Rekishi, genjō, tenbō*, ed. Park Chong-Myong (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1999), 146.

government increasingly regarded the existence of Koreans in Japan as a security issue, and sought to solve the “problem” of former colonial subjects through forced assimilation policies.

With the conclusion of the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty, however, the government of Japan officially declared its Korean residents to be “aliens.” In 1952, Koreans lost their citizenship, and as “non-nationals in general,” they were no longer covered by the mandate of compulsory education. While Korean schools were reconstructed by the pro-North organization *Chongryun* (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), they were classified as “miscellaneous schools” by the Ministry of Education, losing financial assistance from the Japanese government.²²

On February 11, 1953, the Ministry of Education sent the following bulletin to each local government: “if Korean children apply for Japanese schools, they will be allowed to attend just as it had been before 1952. The government, however, will not urge them to enter school and finish compulsory education. The principle of free and compulsory education will not be applied to them.”²³ In 1965, when the Republic of Korea - Japan Normalization Treaty was signed, only people with South Korean nationality were entitled to the right of permanent residence. The Japanese Ministry of Education changed its policy, and only children affiliated with South Korea would

²² Bae Joong Do, ““Shūgaku annai” yōkyū undō ni tsuite no sankō iken,” 1-5; Inokuchi, 154-155.

²³ Monbushō shochū kyokuchō (tsūtatsu), “Chōsenjin no gimu kyōiku shōgakkō e no shūgaku ni tsuite,” 11 February 1953 in *Gaikokujin shitei no kyōiku ni tsuitenno shomondai*, ed. RAIK (Tokyo: RAIK, 1975), 1.

receive school bulletins if they applied, and they would be covered under the policy of free and compulsory education.²⁴ Many researchers argued that this change in policy only intensified the tension between residents affiliated with North Korea and those affiliated with South Korea. The question of *zainichi* Koreans' education rights - once again - had been left ambiguous for authorities to use at their own discretion.

After holding several meetings with the city Board of Education, *zainichi* mothers, nursery school teachers, and activists affiliated with Seikyūsha won a string of government concessions. While the city government replied that they would not be able to send a bulletin to every *zainichi* family that year due to a “lack of time,” they agreed to make an announcement of the same information for *zainichi* preschoolers on the city news report, and promised to get rid of the previously mentioned notorious statement concerning the applications for non-Japanese preschoolers. Several local governments, including Kawasaki, forced matriculating *zainichi* children to sign a statement saying, “I will obey the Japanese laws while attending schools,” before entering the public elementary schools system. They were coerced to do this in spite of the strong opposition generated by Korean parents, who considered this treatment humiliating. Brandishing their victories over the school bulletin and statement issues, *zainichi* activists in southern Kawasaki became the front-line troops in the struggle for educational rights

²⁴ Monbu jimū jikan (tsūtatsu), “Nihon koku ni kyojū suru Daikanminkoku kokumin no hōteki chii oyobi taigū ni kansuru Nihon koku to Daikanminkoku tonō aida no kyōtei ni okeru kyōiku kankei jikō no jisshi ni tsuite,” 28 December 1965, in *Gaikokujin shitei no kyōiku ni tsuitenō shomondai* (Tokyo: RAIK, 1975), 4-7.

for non-Japanese children in Japan.²⁵

They also demanded the right to apply for scholarships. *Zainichi* activists affiliated with the Seikyūsha turned their attention to the issue of scholarships and loans for low-income families with dependent children. In January 1977, they sent a letter to Mayor Ito and the director of the Social Work Bureau, questioning the exclusion of Korean residents from the scholarships and loans for families on welfare. They held several meetings with officials in charge, yet their negotiations broke off because of irreconcilable differences. In order to break the ice, they visited families in southern Kawasaki (Ikegami, Sakuramoto, and Hamachō), asking them to sign a petition against the exclusion of low-income Korean families from the fellowships and loan programs. With help from Kawasaki City's teachers' union, they collected as many as 3,700 signatures. Their continuous efforts bore fruit: the Social Work Bureau finally abolished the nationality clause for its fellowship and loan programs.²⁶ Since then, regardless of their nationality, all children qualified to receive public assistance are able to apply for the fellowships and loans. Through their struggles for welfare, housing, and education rights, *zainichi* mothers, teachers, and activists affiliated with Seikyūsha began to make significant steps towards eliminating the nationality clause, thereby gradually changing

²⁵ “Shisei dayori de nyūgaku annai o,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, 19 December 1976; “Raishū e ketsuron enki,” *Tōyō keizai nippō*, 12 December 1976.

²⁶ Seikyūsha unei iinkai kōhōbu, *Chiiki ni micchaku shita kyōiku jissen o mezashite – Seikyūsha undō no kiroku*, November 1978, 8-9, file “Minzoku undō toshite no chiiki katsudō,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, *Daremoga chikara ippai ikiteiku tameni: Kawasaki shi fureaikan 4 nenkan no ayumi, 1988-1991* (Kawasaki-city: Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, 1993), 96.

the city and nation's definition of citizenship.

6.2 Kawasaki as an Alternative Model: Establishing the Kawasaki Association for Promoting Zainichi Koreans' Education and the Fureai Hall

The year 1982 represented a watershed in the *zainichi* Korean struggle in Kawasaki. The Kawasaki Association for Promoting *Zainichi* Koreans' Education emerged. *Zainichi* activists also made a request to the city hall for a community center, which would become a symbol of the "Kawasaki system of welfare." Through these efforts, Korean activists turned Kawasaki into a bulwark for citizenship rights.

The Kawasaki Association for Promoting Zainichi Koreans' Education

Zainichi activists in southern Kawasaki now strived for a fundamental change in education, that is, transforming Japanese public schools. There were several reasons why they targeted public schools. Through the Sakuramoto Nursery School and later the Sakuramoto School, they sought to establish an environment where Korean children in Kawasaki would not hesitate to assert themselves as *zainichi*. Using Korean names and not Japanese aliases, was a significant symbolic gesture. Yet even though these activists supported the children in their fight against everyday acts of discrimination, they knew that Korean children would be continuously harassed unless they attacked the Japanese public school system itself.²⁷

²⁷ Choi Seungko, "Honmei o nanoraseru kyōiku jissen no kadai to seika," 26 December 1978, file "Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai (jun) 82.1-6," Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; "Kawasaki shi kyōi (kyōiku iinkai) kōshō ni mukete," 1

Zainichi activists also discovered that Korean children and Japanese pupils in southern Kawasaki were experiencing similar difficulties, such as poverty, lack of educational opportunities, environmental pollution, and the breakup of families due to divorce. Schoolteachers tended to leave “troubled” schools in southern Kawasaki, because of the low-level of scholastic achievement and the high rate of juvenile delinquency, searching for “better” schools in northern Kawasaki. In cases where teachers decided to stay, they were so busy in giving supplementary lessons, visiting families, and supporting students that, save for a handful of outstanding teachers, they did not have time to go beyond maintaining the status quo. Korean activists in the Seikyūsha, Japanese supporters, and school teachers recognized the necessity of fighting for education rights at the “community” level and changing public schools for both Korean and Japanese children in southern Kawasaki.²⁸

In June, 1982, they organized the Kawasaki Association for Promoting *Zainichi* Koreans’ Education (hereafter referred to as the Association). It worked towards building a coalition among parents, teachers, and activists; encouraged Kawasaki citizens to learn the history of *zainichi* Koreans’ history; and transformed the city’s education policies. One of the goals of the Association was to make the Kawasaki Board of Education acknowledge that within the public school system, Korean children suffered

October 1981, file “Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai (jun) 82.1-6,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; “Kawasaki shi kyōi (kyōiku iinkai) kōshō ni mukete,” 5 November 1981, file “Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai (jun) 82.1-6,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city.

²⁸ Ibid; “Kawasaki shi kyōi (kyōiku iinkai) kōshō ni mukete,” 1 October 1981.

discrimination due to their ethnicity and nationality, and that it was the Board's responsibility to prevent it from happening again. They argued that unless the city Board of Education understood what was going on with Korean children, and dedicated itself to cracking down on discrimination based on ethnicity, things would remain the same --- it would be the same soup warmed over again.²⁹ The city Board of Education, however, continued insisting that no cases of discrimination were reported at school, and that *zainichi* students were getting along with Japanese children. The Association's strategy was to present officials in charge with concrete evidence about what was actually happening in these schools.³⁰

Whose "Human Rights"?: Song Puja and the Association of Mothers

Zainichi mothers took the lead in confronting the city Board of Education, turning

²⁹ ""Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai" junbikai," 20 May 1982, file "Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai (jun) 82.6-12," Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; "Susumeru kai kessei shushibun," 20 June 1982, file "Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai (jun) 82.6-12," Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; "Kawasaki Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai kessei shūkai ni sankā o!," 26 June 1982, file "Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai (jun) 82.6-12," Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; ""Zainichi dōhō kyōiku o susumeru kai" o kessei," *Tōitsu nippō*, 20 June 1982; Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, *Daremoga chikara ippai ikiteiku tameni*, 82-86.

³⁰ "Nihon no gakkō ni zaiseki suru zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin seito no kyōiku ni kansuru yōbōsho (an)," file "Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai (jun) 82.6-12," Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; ""Nihon no gakkō ni zaiseki suru zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin seito no kyōiku ni kansuru yōbōsho" o shi kyōi (kyōiku iinkai) ni teishutsu," file "Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai (jun) 82.6-12," Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; "Nihon no gakkō ni zaiseki suru zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin seito no kyōiku ni kansuru yōbōsho," file "Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai (jun) 82.6-12," Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city.

their negotiations into weapons in the fight for the right to education and welfare. Here, I focus on one of these *zainichi* mothers, Song Puja, who became the president of parents' association of the Sakuramoto Nursery School and also served as the president of the Association of Mothers Watching out for Children for six years, thereby becoming a representative voice for Korean mothers in southern Kawasaki.³¹

Song was one of the *zainichi* Koreans who came to assert her Koreanness through her involvement in the Hitachi employment discrimination struggles and the Seikyūsha movement that followed. Born as a second-generation Korean in a *buraku* neighborhood in Nara prefecture in 1941, Song moved to southern Kawasaki in 1961 to get married. While her Korean husband helped with his father's ironwork, Song prepared meals for the employees in her stepfather's factory. She gave birth to four children, and raised them in Kawasaki. She used to go by her Japanese alias, Iwai Tomiko. "Iwai" was her husband's Japanese alias, and "Tomiko" (meaning "rich girl," pronounced as "puja" in Korean) was a nickname that her father gave her with hopes that she would marry a rich man and be happy. She did not even know how to pronounce her name in Korean until she got involved with the Sakuramoto Nursery School, where her children studied. There she met Reverend Lee and other Christian activists, both Korean and Japanese, who struggled for Korean children's education and welfare rights.

³¹ Song Puja, *Aisuru toki kiseki wa tsukurareru: Zainichi sandai shi* (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobō, 2007); Lee In Ha, "Seikyūsha – Minzoku sabetsu to tatakai, ningen shutai no kakuritsu o mezashite," *Kaihō kyōiku* 135 (April, 1981), 58-60; Lee In Ha, "Seikyūsha no nijūnen o kaerimite," in *Tomoni ikiru: Seikyūsha sōritsu 20 shūnen kinen*, ed. Seikyūsha (Kawasaki city: Seikyūsha 1985), 22-23; Hoshino Osami, *Jichitai no henkaku to zainichi korian – kyōsei no shisaku dukuri to sono kunō* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2005).

As she learned about *zainichi* Korean history (which was taught at the Kawasaki church) and got involved in demonstrations against the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial, she started questioning why she had to call herself by her Japanese name, even though she was a second-generation Korean. She regarded her Japanese name as a “*slave* name.” She believed that discarding her Japanese alias and using her real name should be the first step at accepting and asserting her Korean identity. Song not only began to call herself “Song (her maiden surname) Puja,” instead of “Iwai Tomiko,” but also suggested that her children use Korean names even though her husband opposed that idea.³²

Then she saw her children being continuously harassed by Japanese schoolmates. Her daughter would return home crying, saying that her classmates told her that “Koreans should go back to their own country.” Song later wrote that having her children use Korean names in a Japanese public school was like “sending them out as sheep in the midst of wolves.” She gradually learned how ignorance of *zainichi* history had led to insults and prejudice against Korean children. She also came to realize that if the Japanese public schools did not change, her children and other *zainichi* children would be “squashed” by the school system.³³

³² Song. Lǚ Xùn, one of the major Chinese novelists of the 20th century, said that slaves would become slaves when they do not know that they are slaves. When Song came across this author, she came to strongly believe that her Japanese alias was a “*slave* name,” and that using real names would be the first step at fighting against inequality. *Ibid.*, 204.

³³ *Ibid.*, 168, 210.

As the president of the Association of Mothers, she had negotiated with school teachers several times, asking them to pay more attention to *zainichi* children's needs and understand why they used Korean names. For instance, when her friend's son was harassed by his classmates, Song visited the principal's office and said,

Aren't teachers supposed to embrace each student's heart, and help all the students grow?... Everyday, Korean children were oppressed and bullied at Japanese schools. In order to correct the Japanese children's twisted sense of superiority and disdainful attitudes, and in order to take away that sense of inferiority that Korean children are forced to have, aren't schools and teachers supposed to teach what actually happened in the past, setting up an environment where Korean children are able to live, accept and even be proud of what they are?³⁴

Yet most of the teachers simply ignored their voices. All these experiences, once again, made her recognize that the public school system itself should be transformed.

She played a critical role in organizing the Kawasaki Association for Promoting *Zainichi* Koreans' Education. During negotiations with the city hall, Song used Mayor Ito's progressive narratives --- the creation of a humanitarian city --- to challenge their education policies and assert *zainichi* children's education rights.³⁵ Song asked whose

³⁴ Ibid., 206-207.

³⁵ “Kyōi (kyōiku iinkai) chō tonō mendan,” 24 July 1982, file “Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai (jun) 82.6-12,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; “Shi kyōi (kyōiku iinkai) kōshō,” 24 September 1982, file “Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai (jun) 82.6-12,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; “Shi kyōi (kyōiku iinkai) kōshō,” 9 November 1982, file “Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai (jun) 82.6-12,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city.

“human rights” the Kawasaki city promised to protect. Song recalled,

Usually about ten members from the Association of Mothers attended the negotiations. They took front seats, and appealed to the city board of education. They explained what was happening to Korean children at Japanese schools, sometimes in tearful voices. They knew that Korean children’s lives were dependent on these meetings.³⁶

Song and the Association claimed that Kawasaki should be a “humanitarian city,” not only for Japanese residents but for Korean residents as well. She and the Association of Mothers appropriated leverage --- “human rights” --- supplied by the progressive Kawasaki city government, and transformed it into a vehicle for social change.

While Song used motherhood to boost their moral authority and to enlarge *zainichi* Korean citizenship rights, her activism was not simply based on a vision of women as mothers. She also contested perceptions of what constituted “appropriate women’s roles,” which were held by the male church leaders. In the mid-1980s, when Song was denied the right to apply for a position as a reverend because she was a woman, she did not hesitate to quit the Kawasaki church in protest. Although Song was eventually reconciled with the leaders of the Kawasaki church, she argued that she could not stand the way the church leaders assigned women to secondary roles, and that turning down female applications for the position as reverend was only the tip of the iceberg. In fact, she was not the only woman who brought the issue of sexism to the Seikyūsha

³⁶ Song, 218.

movement. A group of members held a meeting to discuss how *zainichi* women had been affected by the fetters of double oppression --- ethnic *and* sexual discrimination.³⁷ These Korean women problematized both ethnic and gender subjugation, opposing them as a whole.

Korean mothers led by Song, some Japanese schoolteachers, and local activists sought to pressure the city government into enacting a policy to protect *zainichi* children's educational rights through the Kawasaki Association for Promoting *Zainichi* Koreans' Education. They sought to recast education for Korean children "not as a charity but as a right," and as a prerequisite for citizenship.³⁸

In March of 1986, Korean activists successfully convinced the city to enact an epoch-making policy toward resident non-nationals, called the Basic Education Policy toward Resident Non-nationals (*Zainichi-gaikokujin kyōiku kihon hōshin*). It represented a watershed in the history of *zainichi* Koreans and non-Japanese residents, and an alternative "model community" --- a different "community" vision from the one pursued by the Ministry of Home Affairs. It promised to (1) secure education rights for all children, regardless of their nationality or ethnicity, (2) respect different cultures and support non-national residents' participation in various fields, and (3) strive towards the

³⁷ Ibid., 242; "Josei no kai' ima made no hōkoku," n.d. 1978, File "Josei no kai" Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city.

³⁸ "Susumeru kai" jimukyoku - Shi kyōi (kyōiku iinkai) kōshō ni mukete," 15 October 1982, file "Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai (jun) 82.6-12," Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; "Shi kyōi (kyōiku iinkai) jimu sesshō," 15 December 1982, file "Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin Kyōiku o Susumeru Kai (jun) 82.6-12," Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city.

realization of a “humanitarian city,” overcoming its past assimilation and exclusionary policies.³⁹ It became a cornerstone of Kawasaki City’s policies toward non-national residents. Using the progressive government’s “human rights” narratives, Korean activists in Kawasaki transformed the city into a pioneer in the field of education policies toward *zainichi* and other resident non-nationals in Japan.

Establishing Fureai Hall: From the Burakumin Liberation Movement to Korean Activism in Kawasaki

In addition to organizing the Kawasaki Association for Promoting *Zainichi* Koreans’ Education, Korean activists in Kawasaki requested the city to establish a community center for the youth called *Fureai* Hall in Sakuramoto, the heart of *zainichi* activism in Kawasaki, in September 1982. The center was aimed at promoting cultural exchange between Korean and Japanese youths as well as improving their living and working conditions. Along with the enactment of the Basic Education Policy toward Resident Non-nationals, it would eventually come to represent the “Kawasaki system of welfare,” symbolizing Kawasaki hopes for an alternative community.⁴⁰

³⁹ Kawasaki city, *Kawasaki shi tabunka kyōsei shakai suishin shishin* (Kawasaki: Kawasaki city, 2005); 37-39; Iwabuchi; Kim, “Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin no aidentitī keisei to tabunka kyōsei kyōiku ni kansuru kenkyū,” 74-75.

⁴⁰ Seikyūsha, *Kawasaki shi Sakuramoto chiku seishōnen mondai chōsa kenkyū hōkoku* (Kawasaki: Seikyūsha, 1985); Kawasaki city Fureai Hall, “To let everyone live up to their potential --- “Fureai” Hall,” Kawasaki city Fureai Hall, Kawasaki City; Iwabuchi, 30-34; *Nihon no naka no gaikokujin*, 6, 21-27, 30-36, 44, 76; Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, *Daremoga chikara ippai ikiteiku tameni*; Kim, “Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin no aidentitī keisei to tabunka kyōsei kyōiku ni kansuru kenkyū,” 77-94.

The establishment of a community center was the culmination of years of efforts in assisting children and their families, both Korean and Japanese, at the local level. There were several reasons why activists associated with Seikyūsha worked towards pressuring the city to create a community center in their district. The Sakuramoto nursery expanded into an educational institution that covered the elementary, junior high, and high school levels. The Kawasaki church chapel and the spare room in the nursery were by no means large enough to manage all of these activities. In addition, the school was burdened by a lack of financial support, as well as neighbors' complaints about noise from school. In order to continue with their battle over the right to education and welfare, the school was in urgent need of a larger space.⁴¹

Mayor Ito's progressive policies also buttressed their efforts to establish a community center. The Ito administration was in the middle of creating a children's hall (*jidōkan*) in every junior-high-school district. In Sakuramoto, however, no public facility for that purpose existed, except for the schools themselves. City hall was willing to help them set up a center for children.⁴²

However, besides special problems and the city's progressive policies, another factor helped Kawasaki Koreans achieve a community center. Just as Korean activists forged a network with African American leaders --- people with "similar but nonidentical

⁴¹ Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, *Daremoga chikara ippai ikiteiku tameni*, 86-87; Kim, "Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin no aidentitī keisei to tabunka kyōsei kyōiku ni kansuru kenkyū," 78.

⁴² *Ibid.*

experiences” --- challenging the narrow definition of citizenship with their help, they forged networks with another subjugated people, the *burakumin* (people from discriminated communities) of Japan. The *burakumin* liberation movement became a source of inspiration for Korean activists in southern Kawasaki. In the next section, I will explore the impact of the *burakumin*’s struggles on *zainichi* activism.

The liberation movement led by a former group of outcasts in Japan, called the *burakumin*, or *hisabetsusha* (the discriminated), provided a radical critique of postwar Japanese society, and offered a framework in which Korean activists in Kawasaki could challenge the narrow definitions of citizenship. Although the *burakumin* became “free new commoners (*shin heimin*)” through the 1871 Emancipation Decree, they were still differentiated from “commoners (*heimin*)” through the family registry system. Also, because of residential segregation, they were forced to live in “special communities (*tokushu buraku*)” with inferior infrastructures. Poverty persisted in these areas, and they were excluded from major companies and marriages with “mainstream” Japanese. In 1922, an organization for protecting the rights of the *burakumin*, called Suiheisha (Leveling Society), was founded. After the war, Suiheisha expanded into what came to be known as the Buraku Kaihō Domei (Buraku Liberation League), which included the more moderate supporters of the Japanese government’s assimilation policy. Learning from world-wide struggles against racism and imperialism, including black liberation struggles in the United States, they succeeded in winning over concessions from the Japanese government in the 1960s and 70s. In 1969, the government launched special programs to improve *burakumin* welfare, education, and living conditions, spending

about 6 billion yen between 1969 and 1981. While former colonial subjects had been pushed outside the boundaries of citizenship and denied their rights to welfare since 1952, the *burakumin*, who had been deprived of their social and welfare rights, started breaking down the doors to citizenship in the 1970s.⁴³

And in the mid-70s the *burakumin* liberation movement started paying attention to the discrimination suffered by their Korean neighbors. For instance, the *Buraku kaihō* (*Buraku* liberation) magazine, published by Buraku Kaihō Kenkyūjo, covered “Koreans in *Buraku*” in February and March of 1974. *Burakumin* activists acknowledged that Koreans in Japan were forced to live at the bottom of Japanese society, facing discrimination based on ethnicity *and* poverty, and that the Japanese government had set up legal barriers to “drive the *zainichi* to despair,” leaving them with no social security or job. *Buraku Kaihō* regarded attacking discrimination against Koreans as part of the “total liberation of *buraku*.”⁴⁴ For activists involved in the *buraku* liberation movement, fighting prejudice against Koreans became inseparable from their quest for equality in citizenship.

Korean activists in Kawasaki, for their part, looked to the *burakumin* liberation

⁴³ Watanabe Toshio, *Burakushi ga wakaruru* (Osaka: Kaihou Shuppansha, 1998), 102; Kurokawa Midori, *Ika to dōka no aida: Hisabetsu buraku ninshiki no kiseki* (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1999), 305-313; Yukiko Koshiro, “Beyond an Alliance of Color: The African American Impact on Modern Japan,” *positions: east asia cultures critique* 11, no. 1 (Spring, 2003): 203; John Lee, 86-88. See also Akisada Yoshikazu, *Buraku no rekishi: Kindai* (Osaka: Kaihou Shuppansha, 2004); Teraki Nobuaki and Noguchi Michihiko eds., *Buraku mondai ron eno shōtai* (Osaka: Kaihou Shuppansha, 2006).

⁴⁴ ““Buraku kaihō o zen jānarisuto ni” nit suite – jiko hihan to ketsui -,” *Buraku kaihō* 52 (March, 1974): 14-17; See also other articles in *Buraku kaihō* 51 (February, 1974); *Buraku kaihō* 52 (March, 1974).

movement for inspiration and guidance. In 1978, four nursery school teachers from the Sakuramoto School attended their first national convention on the “social integration of child care (*dōwa hoiku*).” Upon learning how *burakumin* nursery school teachers educated children to fight against discrimination, they formed a study group on “ethnic education” after returning to Kawasaki.⁴⁵ Other Korean activists in Kawasaki also visited the *buraku* districts in west Japan, exchanging ideas with them and learning from their struggles. Bae Joong Do, a key figure in the National Council for Combating Discrimination against Ethnic Peoples (*Mintōren*) and the Seikyūsha, who eventually became the first *zainichi* director of the Kawasaki Fureai Hall in 1990, noted that “whenever we visited the *buraku*, we found a center for the youth...we thought we should have this type of center in Sakuramoto.”⁴⁶ Reverend Lee In Ha of the Kawasaki church also explained as follows:

As the *burakumin* liberation movement succeeded in making the government establish day nurseries, *burakumin* activists found *zainichi* children outside the gate of their nursery schools, chewing at their fingernails and gazing at *burakumin* children... The *burakumin* leaders raised the issue of *zainichi* Koreans who lived close to their neighborhoods, and argued that if the *burakumin* neglected the problems that the *zainichi* Koreans faced, their liberation movement would be nothing but hypocritical and deceitful...Inspired by this *burakumin* liberation movement, we struggled for freedom, searching for a new type of local

⁴⁵ Seikyūsha Katsudōsha Kaigi, ed., “Minzoku sabetsu to tatakau chiiki katsudō o mezashite,” 31, file “Minzoku hoikuen kankei shiryō (3) 1981- Sakuramoto hoikuen,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city.

⁴⁶ Bae Joong Do, Interview by author, 24 September 2005, 1 October 2005, 2 November 2005, note taking, Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city.

community.⁴⁷

Korean activists affiliated with the Seikyūsha learned how *burakumin* activists created community centers and day nurseries in the neighborhoods. They took their cue from the *burakumin*'s struggles for their welfare and education rights, and sought to reshape these activities to suit their needs in southern Kawasaki.

The Banner of "Living Together" and Critical Voices from Within

The *burakumin* liberation movement regarded the fight against the prejudice inflicting their Korean neighbors as part of the "total liberation of *burakumin*."⁴⁸ Along those same lines, activists affiliated with the Seikyūsha interpreted improving the living conditions of their Japanese neighbors as part of the liberation of *zainichi* Koreans. Under the banner of "living together (*kyōsei*)," they sought to create a common ground with their Japanese neighbors. For instance, they paid attention to issues of environmental pollution in southern Kawasaki, and supported children in their struggle to overcome asthma. They also held classes for the disabled children in their neighborhood. They argued that the deeper they dug into the *particular* problems for *zainichi* Koreans, the more they would open their eyes toward the issues that troubled both Korean and Japanese residents in southern Kawasaki, such as the poor living and

⁴⁷ Lee In Ha "Seikūsha – minzoku sabetsu to tatakai, ningen shutai no kakuritsu o mezashite," *Kaihō kyōiku* 135 (April, 1981): 58-60.

⁴⁸ "“Buraku kaihō o zen jānarisuto ni” nit suite – jiko hihan to ketsui -,” 17.

working conditions, and the lack of cultural facilities for disabled and non-disabled children.⁴⁹

While opening the Fureai Hall did not go smoothly due to the opposition of local Japanese residents, it was their principle of “*kyōsei*” that broke the ice. It took the Seikyūsha four years to negotiate with city officials, and one more year to persuade Japanese neighbors. Neighborhood associations (*chōnaikai*) and children’s associations of Japanese residents in and around Sakuramoto took the lead in opposing the establishment of Fureai Hall, arguing that Korean residents had not been discriminated in their neighborhoods, and that the city, not the Seikyūsha, should run the center. One of the representatives of the neighborhood associations, however, later noted that when he visited the Sakuramoto school and attended one of their programs for disabled children, he decided to retract his opposition to the establishment of Fureai Hall. After a year of intense conversation, activists affiliated with Seikyūsha, the city, and local Japanese residents finally reached an agreement. The city opened the Fureai Hall community center and the Children’s Culture Center as a joint facility in June of 1988, and their management was entrusted to the Seikyūsha. Along with the Basic Education Policy toward Resident Non-nationals, Fureai Hall became a symbol of the “Kawasaki system of

⁴⁹ Kawasaki Zainichi Dōhō no Jinken o Mamorukai, *Kawasaki ni okeru chiiki undō: minzoku undō toshite no chiiki katsudō o mezashite* (Kawasaki: Kawasaki Zainichi Dōhō no Jinken o Mamorukai, 1975), 6, 27, file “Minzoku undō toshite no chiiki katsudō,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; Kawasaki shi no Shōgakukin Seido ni okeru Minzoku Sabetsu o Tadasu Iinkai Jimukyoku, ed. *Minzoku sabetsu to wa nani ka: Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin no tatakai no keishō hatten ni sokushite*, February 1977, 15, file “Kawasaki shōgakukin tōsō naibu tōgi shryō,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; Bae Joong Do, Interview by author, 24 September 2005, 1 October 2005, 2 November 2005, note taking, Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city.

welfare.”⁵⁰

The legacy of their struggles continued, reaching far beyond the 70s and the early 80s. The Basic Education Policy toward Resident Non-nationals led up to the establishment of the Kawasaki City Representative Assembly for Foreign Residents in 1996, and the enactment of the Multicultural Society Promotion Guide in 2005.⁵¹ Fureai Hall continues to serve local residents --- Korean, Japanese, and other resident non-nationals --- with a variety of educational and cultural programs, and has become a reservoir of information for scholars and activists who are interested in *zainichi* Korean history as well as the fight against prejudice based on race, nationality, and disability in postwar Kawasaki. The Basic Education Policy toward Resident Non-nationals and Fureai Hall represented an alternative community vision, which valued the welfare and education rights of resident non-nationals.

The Korean activists’ fight for citizenship, along with their emphasis on “living together” with their Japanese neighbors, were not entirely free from criticism. Ethnic organizations, especially the pro-North organization *Chongryun* which created Korean schools after the League of Koreans in Japan was dissolved, resisted the idea of pressuring the local government into guaranteeing *zainichi* children the rights to attend Japanese public schools. *Chongryun* regarded this as a step towards assimilation into

⁵⁰ Kawasaki City *Fureai* Hall, *Daremoga chikara ippai ikiteiku tameni*, 87-94; Iwabuchi.

⁵¹ Kim, “Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin no aidentitī keisei to tabunka kyōsei kyōiku ni kansuru kenkyū,” 103-112.

Japanese society, reversing the trend of promoting ethnic education (*minzoku kyōiku*).⁵²

Activists affiliated with the Seikyūsha contended that established ethnic organizations like *Chongrun* and the pro-south organization, *Mindan*, failed to address issues that were significant for *zainichi* residents in the realm of their daily lives, such as discrimination in Japanese public schools and workplaces, education and welfare rights for Japanese-born Korean children. The Seikyūsha's movement symbolized the coming age of second and third generation Korean activists, who primarily saw themselves as *zainichi*, Koreans in Japan, rather than North Koreans or South Koreans.⁵³

Also, some members within the movement criticized the Seikyūsha and its banner of “living together.” In the early 1980s, a few original members, also second-generation Koreans, dissented from the Seikyūsha and left the organization. Among them was Choi Seungko, who played a critical role in building networks with church organizations in Korea during the Hitachi trial and was a representative of the Korean youth in the Kawasaki church; Cho Kyong-hi, the former Sakuramoto nursery school teacher and Choi's partner; and Park Chong-Seuk himself. While the conflict between the two had been dismissed as both a power struggle within the organization and a personal conflict,

⁵² Bae Joong Do, ““Shūgaku annai” yōkyū undō ni tsuite no sankō iken,” 4.

⁵³ Kawasaki shi no Shōgakukin Seido ni okeru Minzoku Sabetsu o Tadasu Iinkai Jimukyoku, ed., “Minzoku sabetsu to wa nani ka: Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin no tatakai no keishō hatten ni sokushite,” February 1977, 6, file “Kawasaki shōgakukin tōsō naibu tōgi shryō,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; Lee In Ha, Interview by author, Song Kwon, and Tonomura Masaru, 4 September 2005, note taking, Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city; Bae Joong Do, “Renzoku zadankai “Zainichi” 50 nen o kataru,” *Kikan seikyū* 22 (Summer, 1995): 66; Bae Joong Do, Interview by author, 24 September 2005, 1 October 2005, 2 November 2005, note taking, Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city.

they symbolized the diverging paths of each side. Whereas the Seikyūsha stressed the importance of uniting as one organization to mount an attack against the city government, they made an appeal to the Seikyūsha that the Seikyūsha should pay more attention to different opinions coming from within, including those of the Korean and Japanese mothers who sent their children to the nursery. They criticized the organization for “leaning too much on the government,” and “becoming part of the establishment.” The latter group was also critical of the Seikyūsha’s for paying more and more attention to its negotiations with the local government, rather than day-to-day activities.⁵⁴

Once the activists affiliated with the Seikyūsha achieved major victories, such as the Basic Education Policy toward Resident Non-nationals and the establishment of Fureai Hall in the late 1980s, and become an increasing presence in the media, Choi and Cho (who left the organization in the early 80s) formulated a challenge against it. They especially regarded the Seikyūsha’s emphasis on “living together” as a problem, given that “living together” and the rhetoric of multiculturalism became the official slogan of many localities in the 1990s, and even the national government in the 2000s.⁵⁵ By questioning the Seikyūsha’s movement and slogan, they sought to delineate another aspect of “Korean Kawasaki” history.

The critical voices of the people who left the organization, however, could not

⁵⁴ Choi Seungko, ““Hitachi tōsō towa nan datta no ka,” in *Nihon ni okeru tabunka kyōsei towa nanika*, eds. Choi Seungko and Kato Chikako (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2008), 64-73; Cho Kyong-hi, ““Minzoku hoiku” no jissen to mondai,” in *Ibid.*, 126-150.

⁵⁵ Choi, ““Kyōsei no machi Kawasaki o tou,” in *Ibid.*, 169; Kato Chikako, ““Tabunka kyōsei” eno dōtei to shin jiyūshugi no jidai,” in *Ibid.*, 11-13.

reverse the accomplishments that Koreans in southern Kawasaki --- including themselves --- had made since the establishment of the Sakuramoto Nursery School and the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Struggles. Rather, they presented significant questions for Koreans and other resident non-nationals that persist to this day: what should one do when the government tries to turn “equality” and “welfare rights” into a façade, and an inclusionary “polite racism” --- that expressly disavowed any racist intent --- became an official government policy?⁵⁶ And in what way can a city continue to be a bastion of equal rights?

Korean activists in southern Kawasaki crafted a tradition of activism that challenged the narrow definition of citizenship in postwar Japan. After the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial, the small nursery school established inside Kawasaki church evolved into a welfare organization called the Seikyūsha. Korean activists successfully pressured the city into eliminating the nationality clause, which was formerly a prerequisite to receiving an allowance for dependent children, the right to public housing, the bulletin of elementary schools, and the right to apply for scholarships. They then convinced city hall to enact an epoch-making education policy toward resident non-nationals, and to establish a community center for the youth. As they expanded their efforts into new areas, putting emphasis on banding together for the sake of their

⁵⁶ Takashi Fujitani, “Right to Kill, Right to Make Live: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans During WWII,” *Representations* 99 (Summer, 2007): 17. See David Theo Goldberg, *The Racial State* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002).

struggles against the local and central governments, they also confronted criticisms from within. While they succeeded in transforming governmental policies, they were accused of having become part of the establishment, and of losing their original fighting spirit through use of their “living together” slogan. Nevertheless, these critical voices strengthened, rather than weakened, the position of Korean Kawasaki as a very special site for citizenship and welfare rights. They helped deconstruct the postwar myth of Japan as a “homogeneous” nation, and provided an alternative vision of “community,” where ethnicity and nationality were not the basis for citizenship.⁵⁷ Together with these voices, they changed not only the city, but also the nation’s education and welfare policies toward *zainichi* Koreans and other resident non-nationals.

⁵⁷ Bae Joong Do, Interview by author, 24 September 2005, 1 October 2005, 2 November 2005, note taking, Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city.; Kashiwazaki Chikako, “The Politics of Legal Status: The Equation of Nationality with Ethnonational Identity,” in *Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin*, ed. Sonia Ryang (London: Routledge, 2000), 13-31.

Conclusion

Despite the divergent directions, strategies, and outcomes of discourses on “community” and citizenship in the Community Action Program (CAP) and the Model Community Program (MCP), comparable frameworks have offered an opportunity to see some parallels. Both CAP and MCP were political responses to perceived national “crises” brought about by social movements in the 1960s. Transforming dissenters into active and participatory citizens was the main answer to those “crises.” Policymakers and scholars introduced this tactic of participation, and used it as a main strategy for the construction of “community” programs.¹ Consequently, these “community” programs reconstituted what Etienne Balibar once named the “imaginary singularity of national forms” --- the incorporation of individuals into the “weft of a collective narrative.”²

Also, both CAP and MCP produced gendered notions of citizenship and community. While they regarded women as playing prominent roles in each of the programs, this standing was based on a vision of women as volunteers and aides, not as paid workers and main agents. By so doing, they assigned women to what Alice Kessler-Harris called “a secondary citizenship” based on their roles as family members

¹ Barbara Cruikshank, *The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999).

² Étienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology,” in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, eds. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1991), 92-93; Étienne Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

and dependents.³

Furthermore, I have not only compared CAP with MCP and found some parallels, but also explored points of intersection between American and Japanese policy making. Japanese scholars affiliated with the Ministry of Home Affairs introduced CAP and the “technology of citizenship,” but they changed it to suit different political needs --- to counter the ascendancy of residents’ movements and oppositional left-wing power. Some Japanese policymakers were quite aware that CAP generated a conflict between local residents and the city government, so they sought to transform it into a moderate community project. The literature on the history of the welfare state should not only deploy the comparative framework, but also explore the linkages “different welfare regimes” may have developed.

CAP and MCP, however, yielded different results for black Angelenos and Kawasaki Koreans. In the Community Action Program, the idea of CAP as a vehicle for fostering the participation of the “poor” and African Americans, coexisted with the notion that “maximum feasible participation” would simply be a symbolic gesture. Policymakers’ approaches toward CAP reflected the uncertain attitudes they displayed regarding how to incorporate the “poor” and people of color into the American welfare state. The CAP’s working rhetoric was suspended between the languages of inclusion and exclusion. As I have shown in this dissertation, African American activists in Los Angeles took advantage of this ambiguous aspect of CAP. Once the programs were

³ Alice Kessler-Harris, *In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 12.

initiated, they fought to realize their visions of CAP, transforming the concept of “maximum feasible participation” into a pathway through which new political opportunities could be pursued. In the 1960s, they addressed the inadequacies in the welfare system, and sought to reconstitute citizenship from “inside” the American welfare state.

MCP, on the other hand, became another apparatus in recreating a racialized national orthodoxy. MCP reinforced the traditional boundaries of citizenship through the simultaneous inclusion of Japanese nationals and exclusion of former colonial subjects. Whereas the Japanese government utilized citizenship as an excuse to deny former colonial subjects access to the expanding welfare state in the 1960s and 70s, Kawasaki Koreans contested this limited notion of citizenship. Armed with their victory in the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Struggles, they problematized the demarcation between “citizens” and “non-citizens” in the fields of welfare and education. They mobilized alternative visions of citizenship from “outside” the Japanese welfare state.

Black Angelenos and Kawasaki Koreans developed different strategies in dealing with their city and the federal/national governments. With support from the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the federal anti-poverty agency, African American activists in Los Angeles like Opal C. Jones, Augustus Hawkins, and Thomas Bradley staged a protest against the local Community Action Agency, the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles (EYOA). They questioned the EYOA’s vision of the programs as being dominated by the local anti-poverty agency rather than

local people. They mounted an attack on city hall, and carved out a political path for African Americans and the “poor.”

In contrast to black Angelenos who struggled against city hall with the assistance of the federal government, *zainichi* activists won the left-wing Kawasaki city government over to their side. In order to extend their education and welfare rights, they appropriated Mayor Ito Saburo’s “progressive” agenda, such as his declaration of the creation of a “humanitarian city.” They challenged the narrow interpretations of citizenship adopted by the central government, with support from the “progressive” local government which claimed to be an advocate of human rights.

The different strategies developed by black Angelenos and Kawasaki Koreans reached beyond the era of massive welfare expansion, and continued to shape the political landscape in Los Angeles and Kawasaki city through the 1970s. The Community Action Program opened up new possibilities for black Angelenos. African American leaders insisted on the right to realize the participation of the “poor” in the Los Angeles “War on Poverty,” and used the anti-poverty program as a way to politically confront Mayor Samuel Yorty and other government officials who sought to secure control of the anti-poverty programs at the expense of poor people themselves. They appropriated and reshaped the principle of “maximum feasible participation” that had been the foundation of the Community Action Program.

It was certainly the case that poverty persisted long after CAP had either disappeared or become part of regular local welfare activities. The “War on Poverty,” which focused on education and training, did not itself create enough accessible jobs for

the poor. Consequently, people who were trained in the “War on Poverty” were forced to engage in a struggle over meager resources.⁴ Furthermore, African American leaders witnessed, as soon as they acquired meaningful political power, a rapid increase in poverty and inequality based on divisions of race, ethnicity, nativity, and gender. As a result of the dramatic decline in industrial employment, especially the loss of unionized, skilled and semi-skilled, well-paid jobs, poverty became concentrated in South Central Los Angeles in the 1970s. While there was an increasing demand for services geared towards the poor, the tax base was narrowed due to the outward migration of middle-class families from the central city.⁵ Reflecting on all these challenges for newly-elected black leaders, one could argue that their impact on unemployment and poverty may indeed have been modest.

Nor did their alternative discourses of welfare and citizenship remain powerful after the 1970s. The black Angelenos’ struggles for ensuring the participation of the “poor,” African Americans, and women exemplified an effort to revise the New Deal

⁴ J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, *Race and Authority in Urban Politics: Community Participation and the War on Poverty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), xv; Robert O. Self, *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 237.

⁵ Paul M. Ong et al, *The Widening Divide: Income Inequality and Poverty in Los Angeles* (Los Angeles: Graduate School of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of California, Los Angeles, 1989); Edward W. Soja and Allen J. Scott, “Introduction to Los Angeles: City and Region,” *The City: Los Angeles and Urban Theory at the End of the Twentieth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 11-17; Jeffrey S. Adler, “Introduction,” in *African-American Mayors: Race, Politics, and the American City*, eds. David R. Colburn and Jeffrey S. Adler (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 1-22.

legacy that reinforced racial and gender inequality.⁶ Their activism in the 1960s and early 70s represented a struggle to constitute what Jill Quadagno termed an “equal-opportunity welfare state.”⁷ However, it was precisely black leaders’ success in bringing to the forefront the question of racial and gender inequality that undermined the support for the welfare state in the later period. Their ingenuity in appropriating the CAP and its anti-poverty efforts --- in addition to providing alternative visions of welfare and citizenship --- became the prime source of the backlash against “welfare” from the 1960s onward.⁸

I argue, however, that the advancement of their leadership represented a significant turning point. The 1960s was a crucial era in the rise of political power among African American leaders, and the legacy of these leaders’ struggles continued

⁶ Many scholars have discussed how the New Deal welfare state reinforced racial inequality by excluding agricultural workers and domestic servants --- most of whom were African American men and women in the South --- from both old-age insurance and unemployment compensation. Instead, they were pushed towards the public assistance programs, where local officials set up benefit levels and eligibility rules.” Jill Quadagno, *The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 20-21. See also, Michael B. Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America, Revised and Updated* (New York: Basic Books), 215; Kenneth J. Neubeck and Noel A. Cazenave, *Welfare Racism: Playing the Race Card Against America’s Poor* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 46-59.

⁷ Quadagno, 9. See also Jill Quadagno, “Promoting Civil Rights through the Welfare State: How Medicare Integrated Southern Hospitals,” *Social Problems* 47, no. 1 (February, 2000): 68-89.

⁸ Martin Gilens explores how support for the “poor” and the “War on Poverty” shrank as popular images of the “poor” came to focus on African Americans, reinforcing the racialization of welfare and poverty in the mid-1960s. Martin Gilens, *Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999).

well into the 1970s. For instance, the struggles over CAP set the stage for the emergence of formal black political leadership in Los Angeles, exemplified by the victory of Tom Bradley as mayor in 1973. The simple labels of “failure” or “success,” so common in the extant literature on the subject of CAP, are not able to capture the complexity of this history. Additionally, the thesis of “urban decline,” an idea that tends to cast the inner cities in an unrelentingly negative light, does not allow us to adequately appreciate how a metropolis like Los Angeles could become an arena of struggle over the meaning of the participation of the “poor” and of people of color in the welfare programs of the 1960s. Rather than simply dismissing the metropolis as a deserted, poverty-stricken inner city, historians of postwar urban America need to interrogate how African American leaders gained political control on contested terrains during the 1960s.

Unlike black Angelenos who wielded significant political power in the 1960s, *zainichi* Korean political influence was severely restricted as they were denied the right to vote both at the local and national levels. In addition, as their banner of “living together (*kyōsei*)” became the official agenda, pursued not only by the “progressive” local government but also by the LDP-controlled national government, some of the original members contended that it had become a mere cosmetic slogan hiding the government’s racism and inequality.⁹

⁹ This criticism was aimed not only at Seikyūsha’s slogan of “living together” per se. It was also targeted at what Tessa-Morris Suzuki has called “cosmetic multiculturalism” where multicultural discourses were adopted by the government not to extend citizenship, but to disclaim everyday acts of prejudice and discrimination against Koreans and other non-nationals in Japan, and incorporate them into the status quo. See Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Hihanteki sōzōryoku no tameni: Gurōbaruka jidai no Nihon* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2002), 154-156; Hayao Takanori, “‘Nise Nihonjin’ to ‘nise Yudayajin’,”

Kawasaki Koreans, however, also became the vanguard for refashioning the concept of citizenship in postwar Japan. They successfully transformed Kawasaki into a bastion of equal rights, especially in the fields of education and the political participation of resident non-nationals. They helped constitute the “Kawasaki system of welfare,” and turned the city into a model for eliminating the nationality clause in public housing, child welfare, and compulsory education. In fact, the struggles of the local Korean population --- along with Japan’s ratification in 1979 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on the Status of Refugees in 1981 --- resulted in the abolition of the nationality clause in major social welfare programs at the national level.

These *zainichi* Koreans problematized the equation of citizenship with nationality in postwar Kawasaki and Japan. They advanced their rights as Kawasaki and Japanese *citizens* without necessarily becoming Japanese *nationals*. In other words, they could be North Korean, South Korean, Japanese, and other *nationals* --- but they insisted on their rights as Kawasaki and Japanese *citizens*. For instance, the 1996 establishment of the Kawasaki City Representative Assembly for Foreign Residents (*Kawasakishi Gaikokujin Shimin Daihyōsha Kaigi*) was a major breakthrough in guaranteeing resident

soshite ‘honraiteki kokumin,’” *Gendaishisō* 35, no. 7 (June, 2007): 205; Song An-jong, “‘Koria kei Nihonjin’ka purojekuto no isō o saguru,” *Gendaishisō* 35, no. 7 (June, 2007): 225-239. See also Takashi Fujitani’s discussion on “polite racism” in Japan. Takashi Fujitani, “Right to Kill, Right to Make Live: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans During WWII,” *Representations* 99 (Summer, 2007): 17; David Theo Goldberg, *The Racial State* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002).

non-nationals the right to participate in the local government's policies.¹⁰ The very name of the assembly highlights their unique political status in Kawasaki. The phrase “*gaikokujin shimin*” was officially translated into “foreign residents” in English, but it basically combined two denominations into one, meaning “non-nationals and citizens.” It shows that Kawasaki Koreans and other non-nationals were “*gaikokujin* (non-nationals)” in terms of their nationality, and “*shimin* (citizens)” in terms of their citizenship. Kawasaki Koreans' struggles produced an alternative vision of citizenship, where national state membership would not be the rule for citizenship rights. By so doing, they provided a radical critique of the postwar Japanese dichotomy between citizens/nationals and non-citizens/non-nationals.¹¹ The status of *zainichi* Koreans, and their alternative visions, should be placed at the heart of any discussion of the re-mapping of citizenship in postwar Japan.

African Americans and *zainichi* Koreans stood at the center of debates about citizenship and welfare during an era of massive welfare expansion. As such, they were

¹⁰ In June, 2008, following the recommendations put forward by the Kawasaki City Representative Assembly for Foreign Residents, the city of Kawasaki granted resident non-nationals voting rights in referendums. This was a significant victory for Koreans and other non-nationals who were fighting for the right to vote. See Jūmin tōhyō seido kentō iinkai, “Jūmin tōhyō seido o sōsetsu shimashita,” http://www.city.kawasaki.jp/20/20bunken/home/site/jichi/touhyou/report/committee/juumintouhyou_index.htm [accessed, September 21, 2008]; “Seiji sanku tsuduku tesaguri,” *Asahi shinbun*, 21 September 2008.

¹¹ See Kashiwazaki Chikako, “The Politics of Legal Status: The Equation of Nationality with Ethnonational Identity” in *Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin*, ed. Sonia Ryang (London: Routledge, 2000), 14.

well-positioned to display the inadequacies in the welfare systems, and assert alternative visions of welfare and citizenship. These subjugated individuals were not passive in their responses to the dominant discourse. The scholarship on the welfare state must not only address the question of race and gender, but also register the agency of these subordinated individuals, and locate them as historical actors in the formation of welfare programs and policy.¹²

The agency of African Americans and *zainichi* Koreans cannot be fully explored without investigating their day-to-day experiences as well as the oppositional discourses they developed at the local level. I have shown how local activists in South Central Los Angeles and southern Kawasaki appropriated official “community” programs, and developed them according to their own political visions and aspirations. African American and *zainichi* women, particularly, played critical roles in advancing their citizenship rights. These subjugated people redrew what Margaret R. Somers has called the “internal borders of exclusion within the nation state.”¹³ Together, they changed Los Angeles and Kawasaki into arenas of struggles over the definitions of welfare and citizenship.

Furthermore, I have explored interactions, exchanges, and translations that took

¹² Linda Gordon, “The New Feminist Scholarship on the *Welfare State*,” in *Women, the State, and Welfare*, ed. Linda Gordon (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 28; Linda Gordon, “Who Deserves Help? Who Must Provide?,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 577 (September, 2001): 12-25.


¹³ Margaret R. Somers, *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 20.

place at the level of grassroots activism. Activists with “similar but nonidentical experiences” forged a transborder network, forming “interethnic antiracist alliances.”¹⁴ Antiracist networking among Christian leaders, especially with black church leaders, had empowered Kawasaki Koreans to contest the narrow definition of citizenship in postwar Kawasaki and Japan. And this network eventually challenged the racialized “processes of differentiation” by Hitachi, one of the largest electronics corporations in the world, and laid the groundwork for Korean struggles for welfare and education rights in the 1970s and 80s.¹⁵ The stories of both African American and *zainichi* Korean mobilization in the 1960s and the 70s powerfully show why it is necessary for historians to overcome the nation-centered approach. Only by transnational investigation is it possible to completely document the intersecting histories of welfare and the pursuit of citizenship rights.


¹⁴ George Lipsitz, *American Studies in a Moment of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 118-122.

¹⁵ Lisa Lowe discusses how capital had maximized its profits through what she called “processes of differentiation.” Lisa Lowe, *Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 27-28.

APPENDIX



Nihon Kōkan Kabushikigaisha (NKK)



Kawasaki Church and the Sakuramoto Nursery School

Figure 1: Southern Part of Kawasaki City

Pamphlet, Kanagawaken Daini Aisen Hōmu, “Kawasakishi Ikegamichō ni okeru jūmin to hōmu no fukushi kankei,” 1968, file “Kawasaki jittai chōsa hōkoku,” Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, Kawasaki city.




Figure 2: Percentage of African American Population in Los Angeles County, 1950 / 1960 / 1970

Los Angeles County Commission of Human Relations, *Population by Major Ethnic Groupings: Negro Population, Los Angeles County, 1950, 1960, 1970* (Los Angeles: County Commission of Human Relations, 1950, 1960, 1970).




Figure 3: Los Angeles County Health Districts by EYOA
(Shaded regions indicate “major poverty areas”)

Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, 90th Cong., 1st sess., May 12, 1967, 3900.



Figure4: Opal C. Jones' Critique of the "Professional" Anti-Poverty Workers

Opal C. Jones, *Guess Who's Coming to the Ghettos?*, in Box 2, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC.

Table 1. Estimated Funds in 1965 Budget for Use in the Poverty Program

	Expenditures (in millions)
“Anti-poverty” bill	250
Funds from other new legislation	98
Funds from existing programs	238
Total	586

Memo, Kermit Gordon to Lyndon B. Johnson, 22 January 1964, Executive File, WE 9, Box 25, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

Table 2: OEO Request and Congressional Authorization, Fiscal 1965

Programs by Title		Administration Request	Congressional Authorization
Title I	Youth Opportunity Programs	412.5	412.5
	A Job Corps (OEO)	190	190
	B Work-Training Program (Dept. of Labor)	150	150
	C Work-Study Program(HEW)	72.5	72.5
Title II	Community Action Program (CAP) (OEO, local communities)	315	340
Title III	Rural Economic Opportunity Programs (Dept. of Agriculture)	50	35
Title IV	Employment and Investment Incentives (Small Business Administration)	25	*
Title V	Family Unity Through Jobs(HEW)	150	150
Title VI	Volunteer in Service to America (VISTA) (OEO)	10	10
Total		962.5	947.5

*No special funds were authorized.

Office of the White House Press Secretary, "The White House, Economic Opportunity Act of 1964: A Summary," 16 March, 1964, Subject File, FG11-15, Box124, Lyndon B. Johnson Library; "A Summary of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964," 26 August, 1964, Executive File, WE 9, Box 25, Lyndon B. Johnson Library; Sar A. Levitan, *The Great Society's Poor Law: A New Approach to Poverty* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 46.

Table 3: Types and Numbers of Facilities Created Through the Model Community Program by Spring, 1977

Types of Facilities	Number of Areas Which Established These Facilities
Community Centers and Citizens' Public Halls	81
Centers for Children	3
Centers for the Elderly	9
Community Streets	48
Facilities to Enhance Traffic Safety	28
Street Lights	23
Facilities for Fire-prevention	19
Lights for Crime-prevention	13
Public Restrooms	8
Side Trees and Flowers for Streets	12
Junkyards	5
Day-care Centers and Preschools	27
Parks and Recreational Ground (larger than 2,500 m ²)	58
Parks and Playgrounds for Children (smaller than 2,500 m ²)	47
Pools	12
Gyms	17

Morimura Michiyoshi, *Komyunitī no keikaku gihō* (Tokyo: Shokokusha, 1978), 25.

Table 4: Percentage of African American Population and Joblessness
in South Los Angeles, 1960-1965

	Los Angeles City, 1960	South Los Angeles	
		1960	1965
African American Population as a Percentage of Total Population	13.5	69.7	81.0
Unemployed Persons as a Percentage of Civilian Labor Force (Males) (Females)	5.3	11.3	10.1
	NA	10.4	11.5

Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 12 May 1967, 3780-3781, 3784.

Table 5: Income of Families in South Los Angeles, 1960-1965

Area	Families		Percentage with income below poverty level	
	Median income (1965)	Percentage below poverty level	Male head of family	Female head of family
South Los Angeles	\$4,736	26.8	18.2	58.9
Watts	3,803	41.5	27.1	66.6

Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 12 May 1967, 3786.

Table 6: EYOA Programs, Amount of Grant from OEO, and
Principal Delegate Agencies

Program	Amount of Grant (millions of U.S. dollars)	Principal Delegate Agencies
Educational	\$10.3	The Los Angeles Unified School District, The Los Angeles County Schools
Head Start	\$8.6	The Los Angeles Unified School District, The Los Angeles County Schools, The Los Angeles Area Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers, Inc.
Neighborhood Adult Participation Project(NAPP)	\$2.9	EYOA, The Los Angeles Area Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers, Inc.
Teen Post	\$3.6	The Los Angeles Area Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers, Inc.
Training and employment for youth	\$2.3	Westminster Neighborhood Association, Inc., etc.
Employment and vocational training	\$2.9	National Urban League(NUL), etc.
Community services	\$1.7	Westminster Neighborhood Association, Inc., etc.
Legal services	\$0.5	The Los Angeles Area Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers, Inc.
Cultural and recreational	\$0.6	
Administration and other	\$3.2	
Total	\$36.6	

U.S. General Accounting Office, *Review of the Community Action Program in the Los Angeles Area under the Economic Opportunity Act* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1968), 2-13; Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare., Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 12 May 1967, 3865-3894.

Table 7: Population Characteristics of Los Angeles County, Total Funds from EYOA, and Funds from EYOA for Each “Poor” Family by 25 Health Districts

	a. Total Population	b. Race/Ethnic Groups(%)			c. Percentage of Families With Annual Income - Less than \$4000 (%)	d. Total Funds from EYOA (U.S. dollars)	e. Funds from EYOA for Each “Poor” Family
		White	Black	“Spanish- Surnames”			
Alhambra	234,332	91.01	0.11	7.82	15.57	962,619	95.5
Bellflower	304,940	91.84	0.24	7.41	14.02	532,611	61.0
Central	201,733	70.95	5.41	15.28	33.82	5,234,106	353.5
Compton	221,626	63.06	27.25	8.73	21.39	5,738,030	513
East L.A.	145,146	40.98	0.31	55.89	25.12	3,821,227	425.5
East Valley	255,963	87.87	3.60	7.39	15.05	1,590,544	151.2
El Monte	199,817	83.53	0.54	15.57	16.81	1,861,033	226.8
Glendale	363,367	95.59	0.60	3.93	15.44	122,275	9.1
Harbor	117,982	76.10	4.42	16.81	23.63	1,659,376	23.6
Hollywood- Wilshire	340,491	88.70	4.09	3.91	22.54	580,711	28.0
Inglewood	375,209	93.23	0.28	4.73	13.77	820,669	57.7
Long Beach	247,104	91.25	3.51	3.54	24.67	2,037,080	90.8
Monrovia	224,435	91.03	2.31	5.89	16.00	659,962	70.9
Northeast	193,810	45.00	4.35	46.07	30.68	4,702,922	338.4
Pasadena	111,927	79.32	13.03	4.64	21.87	1,470,153	222.6
Pomona	208,155	92.79	0.61	6.08	14.54	1,255,337	169.0
San Antonio	255,181	93.39	0.55	6.70	17.92	654,962	51.7
San Fernando	184,855	88.92	1.51	8.69	12.40	1,020,331	183.3
Santa Monica, West	454,497	90.37	2.34	5.15	15.93	2,370,448	121.9
South L.A.	139,164	19.19	65.69	14.11	37.79	6,594,273	526.1
Southeast L.A.	115,383	9.14	81.47	7.61	46.35	3,435,832	265.9

Table 7 Continued

<i>Southwest L.A.</i>	291,292	44.13	40.83	6.91	26.02	3,346,504	160.1
Torrance	244,694	93.39	0.53	5.18	12.69	584,991	74.3
West Valley	395,198	95.60	0.12	3.87	11.29	749,567	64.6
Whittier	234,380	86.19	0.65	3.09	10.69	1,032,281	163.6
Total	6,000,682	80.70	7.68	9.58	19.04	52,837,874	177.0

Notes:

EYOA used health districts for statistical measurement. The total districts were twenty-six, but EYOA excluded the Vernon district, an area primarily devoted to industrial land uses. The districts written in Italics were the places EYOA identified as “major poverty areas.”

Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 12 May 1967, 3899-3902.

Table 8: Korean Population of Kawasaki City, 1955-1985

	Total Population of the Kawasaki City	Korean Population	The Share of the Korean Population (%)
1955	445,520	6,969	1.56
1970	973,486	9,371	0.96
1985	1088,624	8,964	0.82

Kawasaki shi Sōmukyoku Sōmubu Tōkeika, *Kawasaki shi tōkeisho* (Kawasaki: Kawasaki city, 1958-1970); Kawasaki city, *Kawasaki: Sūji de miru hanseiki* (Kawasaki: Kawasaki city, 2001), 1.

Table 9: Type of Business of Korean Merchants in Kawasaki City (1957)

Type of Business	Number	Share (%)
Restaurant	143	45.3
Copper and Iron	74	23.4
Saccharin	24	7.6
Pachinko (and other amusement services)	17	5.3
Hospital and Pharmacy	5	1.5
Organization	6	1.9
Real Estate and Hotel	5	1.5
Factory	5	1.5
Others	40	12

Higuchi Yuichi, “Kawasaki shi Oohin chiku Chōsenjin no seikatsu jōkyō: 1955 nen zengo o chūshin ni,” *Kaikyō* 20 (2000), 62-63.

Table 10: A Chronological Table of *Zainichi* Activism in Kawasaki-city, 1951-1982

year	date	
1951	September	The Koreans' Church in Kawasaki-city broke off from the Tokyo Church.
1959	March 19	Reverend Lee In Ha became the director of the Koreans' Church in Kawasaki-city
1969	April 1	The Establishment of the Sakuramoto Nursery School in the Kawasaki Koreans' Church
	May	Rev. Lee became a member of the WCC's Committee to Fight Against Racial Discrimination (He will serve as a member for 14 years).
1970	Dec. 8	Park Chong-Seuk filed a lawsuit against the Hitachi company (the Hitachi Employment Discrimination Trial).
1971	April	Supported by the Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Party, Ito Saburo won the mayorship, calling for the "creation of a humanitarian city (<i>Ningen toshi no sōzō</i>)."
	April	The " <i>Paku kun o kakomu kai</i> (the Association Surrounding Mr. Park)" was established.
1973	Oct. 4	The Social Welfare Foundation, <i>Seikyūsha</i> , was established.
1974	April 28	<i>Zainichi</i> activists held a meeting in Kawasaki, and began to set their sights on the issues of child welfare and public housing.
	June 19	The Yokohama district court announced the verdict, upholding Park's claim almost entirely.
	July 30	<i>Zainichi</i> activists sent an open letter to the mayor of Kawasaki and the head of the bureau of social work, demanding that "resident internationals in Japan" be given the right to receive allowances for dependent children and public housing (the Kawasaki city government assured that they would guarantee

Table 10 Continued

	August	<p>their rights in April, 1975).</p> <p>W. Sterling Cary visited Hitachi's New York branch, and handed the company a letter saying that they were interested in Chong-Seuk Park who was subjected to unfair treatment, and that church leaders in the U.S. would continue to monitor discrimination by the company.</p>
	November	The Association surrounding Mr. Park evolved into an organization called the National Council for Combating Discrimination against Ethnic Peoples (<i>Mintōren</i>).
1975	<p>April 16</p> <p>April 19</p> <p>n.d.</p>	<p>The Sakuramoto Nursery School developed into the Sakuramoto school.</p> <p>The Association of Mothers Watching out for Children (<i>Kodomo o mimamoru omoni no kai</i>) was established.</p> <p>James H. Cone was invited by the Korean Christian Church in Japan to lead a three-week workshop on the theme "The Church Struggling for the Liberation of the People."</p>
1976	Nov. 24	<i>Zainichi</i> activists started holding meetings with the Kawasaki Board of Education, urging it to send a bulletin listing elementary schools for <i>Zainichi</i> preschoolers.
1977	<p>January 10</p> <p>May</p>	<p><i>Zainichi</i> activists started holding meetings with the Social Work Bureau, questioning the exclusion of Korean residents from the scholarships and loans for families on welfare.</p> <p><i>Zainichi</i> activists conducted "Teach-in" (giving lectures on ethnic (<i>minzoku</i>) discrimination).</p>
1978	March 23	<i>Zainichi</i> activists started holding meetings with the Kawasaki Credit Association, fighting for the abolishment of discrimination against resident non-nationals who borrowed money from the

Table 10 Continued

		Kawasaki Credit Association.
1979	April 13	<i>Zainichi</i> activists started holding meetings with the Jacks company, fighting for the abolishment of discrimination against resident non-nationals who borrowed money from the Jacks company.
1982	June 20	The Establishment of The Kawasaki Association for Promoting <i>Zainichi</i> Koreans' Education
	August 7	The director of the <i>Seikyūsha</i> refused to be fingerprinted.
	Sept. 30	<i>Zainichi</i> activists made a demand for the creation of a community hall for the younger generation in Kawasaki city (In 1988, a community center named Fureaikan was established).

Seikyūsha 10 shūnen Kinenshi Kankō Iinkai, ed., *Shakai fukushi hōjin Seikyūsha Sakuramoto hoikuen, gakuen oyobi undō kankei nenpyō, 1969-1984* (Seikyūsha 10 shūnen Kinenshi Kankō Iinkai, 1984); Kawasaki City Fureai Hall, *Daremoga chikara ippai ikiteiku tameni: Kawasaki shi fureaikan 4 nenkan no ayumi, 1988-1991* (Kawasaki-city: Fureaikan, 1993), 96-97.

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