

UCLA

UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

Constructing the Imperial Frontier: Colonization, Migration, and the Built Environment in the Polish-German Borderlands, 1886-1914

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9nj6v5jt>

Author

Ball, Roi

Publication Date

2021

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Constructing the Imperial Frontier:

Colonization, Migration, and the Built Environment in the Polish-German Borderlands,

1886-1914

A dissertation completed in partial satisfaction

of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in History

By

Roi Ball

2021

© Copyright by

Roi Ball

2021

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Constructing the Imperial Frontier:
Colonization, Migration, and the Built Environment in the Polish-German Borderlands,
1886-1914

by

Roi Ball

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, Los Angeles, 2021

Professor David Sabeau, Chair

My dissertation explores the administrative practices and social dynamics of imperial settlement in the German-Polish borderlands before WWI. Between 1886 and 1914, Prussia, the dominant Power in Imperial Germany, invested a billion Marks in settling about 120,000 Germans in small farms in its majority Catholic and Polish border region. By bringing in new populations and tying them to the land, the state attempted to shift the ethnic composition and reshape political loyalties in the region. Against the backdrop of the anti-Catholic *Kulturkampf*, increasing tensions with the Russian Empire, and an intransigent Polish national movement, settlement was a pivotal strategy for buttressing Prussian-German imperial authority, which was increasingly defined in national terms.

Rather than a matter of state policy, as most of the existing scholarship suggests, German settlement in Polish Prussia was a multifaceted and contradictory social process. The state's settlement agency, the Prussian Colonization Commission, purchased large estates, divided them into small and medium plots, and recruited German-speaking, predominantly Protestant farmer families to settle the land. Looking at the interplay between the administrative practices and the social dynamics of colonization, the dissertation shows that the creation of a frontier of settlement in the imperial border region involved multiple historical actors as well as a range of institutional and personal networks that stretched across Imperial Germany. Working-class children and their families, welfare officials, municipal politicians, and radical Pietist villagers played an active role in settlement and assert their own interests within the range of possibilities available to them. Notably, they often contested and subverted official policies and the hegemonic, ethnically exclusive notion of Germanness that underpinned them.

The dissertation focuses on three strategic sites in which the terms of social production and reproduction of a German settler society in Polish Prussia were negotiated. First, I examine how the commission recruited different German-speaking populations and analyze the ways in which settlers negotiated the terms of their settlement and even made claims that undermined their prescribed roles. Using the case of a group of Württemberg farmers who collectively negotiated their terms of settlement with the commission, I show the importance of kinship and a local Pietist tradition in shaping alternative migration options, and how these alternatives were used by prospective settlers as resources for claim-making. In these negotiations, the Colonization Commission's ability to enforce a hegemonic definition of Germanness based on loyalty to the Prussian state was at stake, as non-Prussian settlers often did not see themselves as extensions of Prussian power.

The second focus of the dissertation is the spatial organization of social life. Arriving in Prussian Poland, settlers had to set up new farms in villages that had already been planned in detail by the Colonization Commission. I examine the political, social, and economic considerations that underpinned the commission's planning of new built environments, and how they related both to administrative strategies of control and to settlers' own expectations. Examining the relationship between the commission's economizing imperative and its deployment of architectural ideas about *Heimat*, the dissertation explicates how architectural expertise were deployed to articulate and reproduce cultural and social hierarchies not only between Germans and Poles, but also among Germans from different home regions and between German farmers and workers.

The third focal point of this study relates to the attempt by the Colonization Commission to secure German workers for the construction of villages and for settlers' farms is. I explore the material, institutional, and legal infrastructures that the commission utilized to ensure both supply and control of workers. Focusing on a little-known scheme coproduced by the Colonization Commission and the Pan-German League, I examine how working-class Protestant children were taken from their families by welfare officials in urban centers, designated as orphans, sent to an orphanage in Polish Prussia, and later distributed to settler-families. The dissertation demonstrates that the children were not only used as a temporary labor force but in fact were brought into a set of legal arrangements that earmarked them as future domestic servants (*Gesinde*) in settler households, where they were supposed to replace Polish workers. The dissertation shows how placing and displacing children came to be used as a strategic tool to intervene in settler families and promote separation between Germans and Poles. Children and their families in western Germany, however, often asserted their agency and resisted separation.

Moreover, the pan-imperial infrastructure that was put in place through the commission's cooperation with municipalities gave rise to new modalities of power that allowed multiple historical actors – welfare officials, working-class families, and political parties active in municipal elections – to partially shape the terms of social reproduction in Polish Prussia and even to undermine the state's Germanizing agenda.

More broadly, the dissertation demonstrates how empire-making and nation-making coalesced at the intersection of settlement as a state project and a social process. Showing how settlement in the border region was intertwined with the imperial heartland to the west, the dissertation also re-centers the eastern periphery of Prussia in the historiography of Imperial Germany and thereby highlights an internal colonial trajectory in the history of modern Germany, present not only in cultural representations of otherness but in concrete institutions and practices of settlement.

The dissertation of Roi Ball is approved.

Gadi Algazi

Caroline Cole Ford

Matthew Norton Wise

David Sabean, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract of the Dissertation	ii
List of Figures, Tables, and Maps	viii
Acknowledgements	ix
Vita	xiv
Introduction	1
Chapter 1	
Negotiating the Terms of Settlement	57
The Recruitment of Settlers and the Contestation over Prussian Frontier Citizenship	
Chapter 2	
Workers' Housing, Internal Colonization, and Social Reform	134
Chapter 3	
<i>Heimat</i> -Building: German Farmhouses and Social Hierarchies	217
Chapter 4	
"Give Us a Child for Christmas"	287
Nationalizing Children and the Politics of Child	
Displacement	
Chapter 5	
Colonizing Families: Orphaning, Fostering, and Children's Work	332
Conclusion	382
Bibliography	397

LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES, AND MAPS

Figure 1.1	Partial Kinship Diagram of the Rossnagels in Möglingen	107
Table 2.1	The Building Activity of the Colonization Commission, 1895–1905	191
Table 2.2	Costs and Breakdown of the Commission’s Building Activity	192
Figure 2.1	The Settlement Plan of the Ruchocin and Lipe Estates, ca. 1890	172
Figure 2.2	The ‘Small Settlement Village’ in the East-German Exhibition, 1911	208
Figure 3.1	Walter Gropius, Granary on the Jankowo Estate, ca. 1900s	232
Figure 3.2	Walter Gropius, Workers’ Dwelling on the Jankowo Estate, ca. 1900s	232
Figure 3.3	Paul Fischer, Postcard with a Peasant House Sketch, 3.10.1896	249
Figure 3.4	<i>Neues Bauernland</i> : Masthead of Title Page, 1898	261
Figure 3.5	<i>Neues Bauernland</i> : Masthead of Title Page, 1904	261
Figure 4.1	Szumański’s Census and Schoolchildren Map, 1911	324
Figure 4.2	Langhans Map of the Colonization Commission’s Activities, 1907	326
Figure 5.1	A Geometric Sketch of the Neuzedlitz Institution, ca. 1903	367
Figure 5.2	The Neuzedlitz Institution with Children and Staff, ca. 1903	368
Figure 5.3	Land Purchase by the Colonization Commission, 1895–1906	371

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I embarked on the life trajectory that brought me to write this dissertation, I had little idea about the challenges to come. I am grateful to many supportive friends, welcoming strangers, and generous colleagues for making this dissertation possible. I am humbled by the kindness and helpfulness of so many people along the way.

I was fortunate in the members of my doctoral committee at UCLA, who were always there to encourage me while offering incisive critique of my work. I cannot thank you enough. I had an inimitable advisor in David Sabean. Resolute in his dedication to all of his students, I always knew that I could rely on his wise advice, good heart, and timely interventions. David allowed me to find my own way and yet insisted on scholarly rigor and a broad intellectual commitment. He often trusted me more than I trusted myself. I was and continue to be deeply inspired by his scholarship, some of which we read and discussed in memorable weekly reading groups over wine and pasta. Equally important, I found in his mentorship and insistence on community-building a model that I hope to emulate.

In Caroline Ford I found a steadfast intellectual and institutional guide throughout my time at UCLA. Caroline read everything from fellowship applications to chapter drafts, offered crucial comments, and guided me as I dived into a series of new scholarly fields. Caroline was always there to discuss ideas, keep me grounded, offer encouragement, and gently point me in the right direction. I am also grateful for Caroline's extraordinary sensitivity to the challenges faced by international students at UCLA. In Norton Wise I found an extraordinary teacher and a kindred spirit. His seminar on narrative transformed my understanding of history-writing. Much that is successful in the dissertation grew out of that experience. I am grateful for his incisive reading of the dissertation and his exceptional kindness. Gadi Algazi has long supported my

work and I was very fortunate to have him on my committee. In fact, it was his Tel-Aviv University seminar on colonization and frontier societies that sparked my initial interest in the internal colonization in Polish Prussia. Gadi's generosity and mentorship are unique. His active support during the last phase of writing, under conditions of global pandemic, was invaluable.

Apart from my official doctoral committee, I would like to thank two scholars who have deeply shaped my experience at UCLA. I am grateful to Robin D.G. Kelley for being such a consequential presence in my time at UCLA. His methodological seminar and our many discussions over the years have profoundly shaped my own thinking. Robin's frank clarity about the things that really matter continues to inspire me. I was privileged to learn from Sanjay Subrahmanyam during my graduate studies. His historiographical seminar was a true masterclass that transformed my understanding of history-making and pedagogy. Our conversations continue to inform my engagement with key historiographical questions. I am grateful for his generous advice and encouragement.

At UCLA, I was privileged to share a beautiful campus with a bustling academic community. Ted Porter and Soraya de Chadarevian generously read my work, offered incisive advice, and were especially supportive and openhearted, each of them in their own way. I would also like to thank Benjamin Madley, David Myers, Debora Silverman, William Worger, and Katsuya Hirano for their readily engagement with my ideas and work. Outside the History Department, Rogers Brubaker, Gail Kligman, and in particular Susan Slyomovics, generously offered their thoughts on my project on multiple occasions. Being a graduate student at UCLA is a privilege that comes with its own set of challenges. Navigating the institution, especially as an international student, required both patience and opportunities to discreetly vent one's

frustrations. I would like to thank Peter Stacey, Muriel McClendon, Hadley Porter, Eboni Shaw, and Asiroh Cham for making me feel welcomed, understood, supported, and not judged.

I would like to thank all those who became friends and supportive colleagues during my time at UCLA but can name here only a few. I cannot imagine how I would have managed the first years without the enduring friendship of Scottie Buehler and Maia Woolner. Ceren Abi and Sam Anderson welcomed me to UCLA and shared their friendship and experience. Marjan Wardaki's generous friendship transcended geographies and time-zones. I am also grateful for the friendship of Juan Pablo Morales Garza, Lisl Schöpflin, Madina Thiam, Dong Yan, Lindsay King, Preston McBride, Sohaib Baig, Michael O'Sullivan, Shir Alon, and Roni Hirsch. I was fortunate to find an intellectual companion in Eric Hounshell and great readers in Sam Keeley, and in particular in Jesse Sadler, whose thoughtful comments made me write so much better.

My teachers and mentors at Tel-Aviv University, where I spent seven tumultuous, formative years, encouraged me to pursue a scholarly career and challenged me to be daring in thought and diligent in writing. I carry your teachings with me ever since. I am grateful to Billie Melman and Sagie Schaefer for their unwavering support, as well as to Sylvie Honigman, Gerardo Leibner, Snait Gissis, Dafna Hirsch, Shulamit Volkov, Iris Rachamimov, and finally, Boaz Neumann, who passed away too soon. I would also want to thank Iris Agmon and Ayelet Ben-Yishai for the long talks and encouragement.

Over the years, numerous scholars were kind to offer their advice and discuss my work. Among them, I would like to thank, in no particular order, to Dörte Lerp, Isabel Heinemann, Susan McKinnon, Andrew Zimmerman, Elizabeth Drummond, Geoff Eley, William Hagen, Paul Lerner, Dirk Moses, Kenny Cupers, Meike Lehmann, Gregor Feindt, Felix Ackermann, Mathias Niendorf, Jörg Hackmann, Torsten Lorenz, Uwe Müller, Daniel Benedikt Stienen, and Alina

Hinc. I am particularly indebted to Dorothee Wierling and Norbert Finzsch for their generous, wise advice. On the road, travelling between Los Angeles, Israel, Germany and Poland, and in multiple cities, towns, and villages as well as in numerous archives and libraries, I encountered much good will. In particular, I would like to mention the great generosity of Walter Reichert in Möglingen and the staff of the Polish National Library in Warsaw and the Gniezno Branch of the Polish State Archive in Poznań.

Institutionally, my research and writing owe a great deal to UCLA, and in particular to the History Department. At UCLA, I was generously supported by the Institute for European and Eurasian Studies (language study, research, and writing fellowships), the Center for Jewish Studies, the International Fieldwork Study Award, the Graduate Research Summer Mentorship, multiple Graduate Research Travel Grants, and the UCLA Dissertation Year Fellowship. The History Department supported my studies and research in numerous ways. These included a funding package, departmental research and conference travel grants, and generous grants from the Eugen Weber Chair and the Peter Reill Chair. Beyond UCLA, I would like to thank the DAAD for funding my research fellowship at the University of Cologne's a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for the Humanities (2017), the German Historical Institute in Warsaw for funding a research stay in Poland (2018), and the Leibniz Institute for European History in Mainz for awarding me a Dissertation Writing Fellowship (2020), thereby allowing me to finally complete the present manuscript.

Graduate school took me away from friends and family. I am grateful to them for putting up with my absence. I would like to thank Aviv Derri for her close friendship and allyship over the years, and to Shira Pinhas, Rola Agbaria, Irit Naaman, Lera Frossin, Elad Zamir, Reuven Abargel, and many others that I see in my minds' eye but cannot fit in these pages. In Berlin, I

found a home away from home and three life-long friends: Silvia Vormelker, who was the best roommate and the best friend I could ask for during challenging times; Shira Wachsmann, who rekindled in me the love of art; and Daphne Rozenblatt, who reintroduced me to the joys of opera. I am also thankful to Sung Un Gang, who generously played the host in Cologne on multiple occasions.

Sevi Bayraktar read almost every word of this manuscript with razor-sharp eyes and bore the brunt of my insecurities. I cherish your imaginative spirit, lucid judgment, and loving companionship.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Judith and Doron, and my sister, Barith, for their support. The work on this dissertation took me away from them for many long years. I dedicate it to them, and to the memory of my only aunt, Ruti, who passed away as I was writing.

VITA

EDUCATION

- 2015 Master of Arts in History, University of California, Los Angeles.
- 2012 Bachelor of Arts in History (summa cum laude), Tel-Aviv University.

UCLA TEACHING EXPERIENCE

- 2014 Western Civilization 1750-2000.
- 2015 Western Civilization 1750-2000.
- 2016 History of Science 1800-2000.
- 2018 History of Mass Incarceration in Los Angeles.
- 2018 Twentieth-Century U.S. History.

SELECTED CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

- 2019 “Internal Colonization and Child Displacement: Global, Imperial and Local Entanglements in the German-Polish Borderlands before World War I.” German Studies Association Annual Conference, Portland, Oregon.
- 2019 “Indebted Settlement: Rural Credit, National Segregation, and ‘Internal Colonization’ in the German-Polish Borderlands before World War I.” European History Colloquium, UCLA.
- 2018 “Give Us a Child for Christmas”: Nationalizing Children and Colonizing Families in the German-Polish Borderlands, 1890s-1920s.” German Historical Institute, Warsaw.
- 2018 “The Double Life of ‘Little Heinrich’: Nationalizing Children and Colonizing Families in the German-Polish Borderlands, 1890s-1920s.” German Historical Institute in Washington, Pacific Office Inaugural Workshop, UC Davis.
- 2017 Pre-circulated paper: “Orphans into German settlers: Children and Settler-Colonialism in the German-Polish Borderlands, ca. 1880s-1920s.” Kinship and Politics Summer School, the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF), Bielefeld University.

SELECTED HONORS AND AWARDS

- 2020 Doctoral Fellowship, Leibniz Institute for European History, Mainz.
- 2019 Dissertation Year Fellowship, UCLA.
- 2018 Fellow at the German Historical Institute, Warsaw.

- 2018 Dissertation Research endowed award, UCLA Center for European and Russian Studies.
- 2018 Fieldwork Fellowship, UCLA International Institute.
- 2017 ARTES/DAAD Guest Researcher, Historical Institute, University of Cologne.

Introduction

The dissertation studies the interplay between agrarian colonization, nation-making, and imperial expansion and consolidation in the German-Polish borderlands in the period between the establishment of Imperial Germany and the First World War. It elucidates how the Prussian state, settlement officials, experts, and radical nationalists attempted to nationalize land and settle ethnic Germans in the majority Polish imperial border region. This settlement process relied on existing legal frameworks and imperial structures of domination and yet profoundly transformed them, as new institutions and forms of administration came into being to Germanize – or to transform political loyalties in – the border provinces of Poznania and West Prussia. At the same time, different groups of migrants, earmarked by officials as “human material” for settlement, registered their own interests, strategies, and expectations about settlement, which at times confounded and challenged official intentions. Scholars have traditionally focused on the political history of Prussia’s Germanization policies within the framework of the nation-state and seen these policies as underpinned by an exclusivist ethnic nationalist ideology. This study takes another route. It approaches settlement as an imperial rather than a nationalist strategy and contends that analyzing the social dynamics of settlement is crucial for understanding the imperial state’s strategic choices, how they affected social reality, and the limits of their transformative capacity.

After 1871, Prussia, the dominant power in the newly unified German state, embarked on a course of internal imperial expansion, promoting the homogenization of the population and seeking to enhance and reconfigure the terms of political belonging and loyalty within the new polity. A national idiom was supposed to forge stronger links between the state and its multiethnic population, whose loyalties were seen by the political class as fragmented across

national, linguistic, regional, and confessional lines. Slavophone Catholics constituted the largest and most politically active minority on the margins of Protestant Prussia. There were around three million Slavophone Catholics in Prussia (10% of Prussia's population), concentrated in Prussia's formerly Polish provinces, on the border with the Russian Empire. Although Prussia had ruled over a large, confessionally and ethnically diverse population for about a century, anxieties about imperial authority in the border region were increasingly framed in national terms in the last third of the nineteenth century. Facing a resilient Polish national movement and strained relationship with the Russian Empire, the Prussian state implemented policies that aimed to reshape the political loyalties and, beginning in the 1880s, the ethnic composition of the region. These Germanization policies not only promoted cultural and political assimilation but also encouraged the settlement of migrants from elsewhere in Germany who were deemed more loyal to the state than the existing multiethnic population of the border region. In 1886, the state began to purchase land from large Polish landowners and import German farmer families to create purely German settler-villages in the hope of supplanting the political power of Polish elites and transforming social relationship and political loyalties long into the future.

To bring about this cultural, political, and social transformation in the Polish-German borderlands the Prussian state embarked on a generously funded, bureaucratic-led settlement project. Since there was no cheap land available for settlement in Polish Prussia, the state ended up investing over a billion Marks during the next three decades, purchasing landed estates and transforming them into village communities of small and medium-sized farms inhabited by ethnic Germans. A newly established state agency, the Prussian Colonization Commission, bought the land, prepared estates for settlement, planned their division into smaller plots, recruited and selected settlers, and put in place a regime of supervision and dependence based on

a new form of land tenure that combined ownership with long-term lease. An important ideological principle of the Colonization Commission's "modern colonization" was the establishment of compact, closely-knit, and almost invariably Protestant German village communities in rural areas whose population was mostly comprised of Polish-speaking Catholics. From the start, the commission relied on Polish workers for the running of estates and their transformation into villages, and settlers normally employed Polish workers in their households and farms. Fearing that integration into the local rural society would undermine settlers' political loyalty, the Colonization Commission had come to regard the employment of Polish labor as an urgent problem. To effect greater spatial and social separation between settler families and local Poles, the commission experimented with different methods of importing German workers in addition to German farmers, including the displacement of working-class German children from the imperial heartland to the contested border region.

The 21,700 German settler-families who lived in over 800 villages established by the commission in Poznan and West-Prussia between 1886 and 1914 bears witness to the sustained efforts of the Prussian Colonization Commission and the Prussian state to alter the ethnic composition of the border region. As settlement activities grinded to a halt with the outbreak of WWI, there were between 120,000 and 150,000 people in the border region which the commission considered as settlers, although the precise number is unknown since the commission kept records only on plots and families, not individuals. These numbers should be seen in a broader context of German imperial expansion. They exceeded five-fold the entire settler population in Southwest Africa, Germany's only African colony of settlement. But in the context of Polish Prussia, they were clearly not enough to achieve the kind of transformation hoped for by the nationalist activists and politicians. The census of 1890 counted 1,433,000

people in West Prussia and a further 1,750,000 individuals in Poznan. Though the neat categorizations of official population statistics obfuscated a complex social reality in which confession, language, and political loyalties intersected in multiple ways, West-Prussia was about two-thirds German speaking and one-third Polish speaking, while the ratio was reversed in Poznan. The later censuses of 1900 and 1910 show little change over time in the ratio of German to Polish speaking or Protestant to Catholic.¹

¹ The confessional and language-use categorization of the population of West Prussia according to Prussian official statistics is given below. On the pitfalls of Prussian statistics see Morgane Labbé, “Institutionalizing the Statistics of Nationality in Prussia in the 19th Century: From Local Bureaucracy to State-Level Census of Population,” *Centaurus* 49:4 (November 2007), pp. 289–306. West-Prussia’s population according to the contemporary indexes for ascribing nationality (language use and confession):

Language	1890	1900	1910
German	929,980	1,007,400	1,097,943
Polish	483,949	537,525	583,052
Bilingual	18,960	17,593	19,192
West-Prussia Total	1,433,681	1,563,658	1,703,474
Confession	1885	1900	1910
Protestant	668,255	730,685	789,081
Catholic	701,842	800,395	882,695
Other	13,438	14,308	16,899
Jewish	24,654	18,226	13,954
West-Prussia Total	1,408,229	1,563,658	1,703,474

Source: Kazimierz Wajda, “Stosunki ludnościowe na ziemiach pomorskich w latach 1850–1914,” in Stanisław Salmonowicz (ed.): *Historia Pomorza*, vol. 4:1 (Toruń, 2000), pp. 123, 125–126.

For Poznan, I use William Hagen’s computation of the category of “nationality.” As it did not appear in official statistics, he calculated it out of the language and confessional statistics. In Poznan, the correlation between supposed German nationality and the Protestant confession was much more pronounced than in West-Prussia, and so I preferred not to extend his calculation method to the latter province. The political imperative of counting more Germans than Poles, the inherent problems of defining language use (which also changed between the censuses), and the individual decisions taken by census-takers on the ground as they faced the ambiguities of social reality, all

The Prussian Colonization Commission failed not only to change the make-up of the region's population, but also to decisively Germanize land ownership by buying out the Polish landed nobility. Instead, the state's colonization policies galvanized Polish national associations and landbanks to organize civil resistance, which effectively prevented the Colonization Commission from purchasing Polish-owned land from the mid 1890s. This forced the Colonization Commission to concentrate its efforts on buying land mainly from Germans. Although the commission bought about five percent of the agricultural land in the province of West Prussia and over ten percent in the province of Poznania over the course of its existence, the lion's share of the land was bought from German estate owners. Throughout the period, the price of land generally remained too high to lure in larger numbers of settlers.²

The commission's work was finally undone in the aftermath of World War I, as over 90% of the settled area became part of the new Polish republic and most of the settlers left for Germany within the space of a few years. Despite the historical failure to Germanize Polish Prussia, the Prussian settlement project had a lasting impact on bureaucratic practices, political ideologies, and on the terms of political participation in both Germany and Poland. It also became a model for new states in interwar Southern and Eastern Europe who sought to assert

lead to the conclusion that these numbers must be regarded as indicative only. See Labbé, *Institutionalizing the Statistics of Nationality*, for a detailed discussion.

"Nationality"	1871	1890	1910
Poles	966,000 (61%)	1,112,650 (63.6%)	1,352,650 (64.7%)
Germans	556,000 (35.1%)	594,650 (33.9%)	720,650 (34.0%)
Jews	62,000 (3.9%)	44,300 (2.5%)	26,500 (1.3%)
Poznania Total	1,584,000	1,752,000	2,100,000

Source: Hagen, *Germans, Jews, and Poles*, pp. 97–98, 324.

² Cf. Scott M. Eddie, "The Prussian Settlement Commission and Its Activities in the Land Market, 1886–1918," in Robert L. Nelson (ed.), *Germans, Poland, and Colonial Expansion to the East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 39–63.

their sovereignty in the new age of nation-states by increasing the ethnic homogeneity in parts of their territory.³

This dissertation explores the relationship between Prussia's bureaucratic project of settlement and its complex social dynamics. This relationship unfolded as part of a process of colonization, which involved the appropriation of land, its redistribution to the exclusion of non-Germans, and the institution of a broad range of discriminatory measures against the Polish population.⁴ The relationship between the Prussian state and its Polish minority had many of the hallmarks of colonialism as a relationship of domination throughout the nineteenth century, but bringing in new populations, different from the majority local population in confession, culture, and language was a clear break from previous strategies of rule. In choosing settlement as a strategy of expansion and consolidation of its authority, Prussia set in motion a process of profound social transformation in its majority-Polish border region.

³ See the commission's report to the Prussian *Landtag*, summing up the project after the establishment of an independent Polish state: Königliche Ansiedlungskommission, *Denkschrift über die Ausführung des Gesetzes, betreffend die Beförderung deutscher Ansiedlungen in den Provinzen Westpreußen und Posen... in den Jahren 1919 und 1920*, pp. 2–7; William W. Hagen, "National Solidarity and Organic Work in Prussian Poland, 1815-1914," *Journal of Modern History* 44:1 (1972), pp. 38-64; Christoph Kleßmann and Johannes Frackowiak, "Die Polenpolitik des Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871–1918," and Uwe Müller, "Wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen der Polenpolitik in der Zeit des Deutschen Kaiserreich," both in: Johannes Frackowiak (ed.), *Nationalistische Politik und Ressentiments: Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), pp. 24-38, 39–62.

⁴ By colonization I broadly mean the production of new social relationship based on appropriation and redistribution of land and labor, the importation of new populations, and the marginalization of local inhabitants. Colonization processes typically entails the institutionalization of exclusive conditions of access to land.

I largely draw on Jürgen Osterhammel's categorization here, due to its simplicity, flexibility, and attention to everyday language. He suggests a differentiation between *colonization* as a process of land appropriation, *colony* as political and social association of persons, and *colonialism* as relationship of domination. This is a "relationship between collectives in which fundamental decisions about the way of life of the colonized are made and actually enforced by a culturally different minority" who seek to buttress their otherness, see themselves as culturally superior, and give priority their interests. Their position of power over local populations is constructed around a more or less immutable difference. Hierarchical otherness, but not necessarily racialized otherness, is thus constructed as an ideological underpinning of colonial power. Colonialism may exist without official colonies, as in the case of internal marginalization of a population within a state. Jürgen Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2002 [1995]), pp. 7-22, quote on p. 21.

This study focuses on three strategic parameters of colonization to explore how the Prussian state sought to utilize settlement to reshape the conditions of social reproduction in the border region: the recruitment of settlers and the negotiation over the terms of settlement, including how such terms were defined, enforced and contested; the spatial organization of social life, including planning villages and building farms; and the provision of German workers for the commission's estates and for settler farms, including the state's attempts to ensure long-term labor supply. By looking at the interplay between state strategies and social dynamics across these three interconnected parameters of settlement, the dissertation weaves together local and regional aspects of colonization in the majority-Polish imperial periphery with developments and historical actors across the continental empire. This perspective brings out how colonization and the creation of a bureaucratic frontier of settlement within the political borders of Imperial Germany were central to German state-making and nation-making in the decades before World War I. These were fraught processes whose willing and unwilling participants insisted on negotiating the terms of their participation, thereby challenging colonizing officials to come up with new administrative strategies and ideological justifications for their project. These contestations, in turn, reveal the contradictions between the national-political and economic imperatives of settlement and the incongruities of national belonging in the multiethnic imperial border region.

Presentation of Argument

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, Imperial Germany set out on a double course of expansion and consolidation. At the same time that it sought to consolidate its continental empire in central Europe by national homogenization, it undertook colonial expansion and settlement overseas. Due to the traditional tendency to write German history as if

it was a nation-state from its “unification,” it is important to highlight that the new federal polity established in 1871 was a continental empire with growing imperialist or global expansionist aspirations.⁵ The historically specific forms that the often-contradictory processes of imperial expansion and national homogenization took were intricately related to each other, but until recently their relationship has been ignored. Historians have traditionally seen Imperial Germany’s overseas expansion as taking place on a different ideological and historical stage than the history of the European polity and its Polish minority. Even as overseas colonialism came to be recognized by historians as an important factor shaping German society and politics, not only during the period of official colonial rule but also before and after that time, most scholars continue to adhere to a “blue water” understanding of colonialism as taking place principally outside Europe, leading them to ignore the particular forms of rule Polish Prussia.⁶

Groundbreaking works that discuss Polish Prussia in colonial terms mainly concentrate on locating what Kirstin Kopp calls “discursive colonialism” in the cultural production for the literary mass market, through which Polish Prussia and Slavophone Eastern Europe more broadly were constructed as a “colonial space.”⁷ These works, however, generally give

⁵ Imperialism denotes a project of empire-making which is geared towards global expansion, in which different strategies, such as colonization, opening of markets and investment opportunities, and the establishment of extractive colonies can play a central role. Cf. Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus*, pp. 27-28. For Prussia and imperial Germany as continental empires, see Philipp Ther, “Deutsche Geschichte als imperiale Geschichte: Polen, slawophone Minderheiten und das Kaiserreich als kontinentales Empire,” in Jürgen Osterhammel and Sebastian Conrad (eds.) *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt, 1871–1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2004), pp. 129-148.

⁶ Robert L. Nelson, “Introduction: Colonialism in Europe? The Case against Salt Water,” in idem (ed.) *Germans, Poland, and Colonial Expansion to the East*, pp. 1–10; Sebastian Conrad, translated by Sorcha O’Hagen, *German Colonialism: A Short History* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012 [2008]), pp. 153–168; Geoff Eley, “Empire by Land or Sea: Germany’s Imperial Imaginary, 1840–1945,” in: Bradley Naranch and Geoff Eley (eds.) *German Colonialism in a Global Age* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), pp. 19–45.

⁷ Susan Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770-1870* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); Sara Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox, and Susanne Zantop (eds.) *The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Kristin Kopp, *Germany’s Wild East: Constructing Poland as Colonial Space* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012).

institutional practices short shrift. A few scholars offer pathbreaking new syntheses that ground the colonization of Polish Prussia in a global and transnational context of labor mobility, imperial expansion, and racialization of work, but their empirics did not delve into the workings of settlement on the ground.⁸ Finally, one important new research explicitly analyzes German colonial policies in Southwest Africa and in Polish Prussia within the same interpretative framework of settlement in imperial border regions, but it focuses on population politics and does not look into the practices of rural settlement in Polish Prussia.⁹ This dissertation joins this budding body of literature in arguing that imperial expansion overseas and Prussia's internal colonization of the Polish border region should be seen as part of the same historical development and within the same interpretative framework.

The empirical findings of this study, however, go beyond the current literature by drawing on local and non-state archives in the border region and across Germany to study the interplay between administrative practices and social dynamics of colonization in Polish Prussia. This research exposes the multiplicity of historical actors beyond the state bureaucracy that were involved in colonization, reveals how settlers, displaced children, and other Germans contested and subverted the state's colonization strategies, shows the ambiguities and indeterminacies of Germanness, and highlights the discrepancies between the ideologies of nation-making and the lived reality of the social process of settlement. Prussia's colonization of its eastern border region, this study argues, drew in various historical actors from across Germany's continental empire and shaped that empire in important ways well into the twentieth century. It was a social

⁸ Sebastian Conrad, translated by Sorcha O'Hagen, *Globalization and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010[2006]); Andrew Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South* (Princeton University Press, 2010).

⁹ Dörte Lerp, *Imperiale Grenzräume Bevölkerungspolitik in Deutsch-Südwestafrika und den östlichen Provinzen Preußens 1884-1914* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus 2016).

process in which the contours and internal hierarchies of Germanness were negotiated and defined not on the level of ideology or citizenship laws alone, but in relation both to new institutional strategies and to existing political and social structures in the imperial border region. The political structures and parameters of belonging to Imperial Germany and the German nation were significantly shaped by the interests, choices, and contestations that tied different individuals and social institutions into the process of German settlement in the Polish-German borderlands. In the three decades before the First World War, nation-making and empire-making coalesced in a bureaucratic colonization in the heart of Europe, but the partiality of the reconstruction of the Polish-German borderlands into an imperial frontier of German settlement served to demonstrate the limitations of the transformative capacity of the state.

Germany as an Empire and the ‘Colonial East’

The terminology of empire regarding Germany between 1871 and 1918 requires clarification. A starting point for this dissertation is that Germany is best understood as an empire, whose political legitimacy and definitions of belonging were increasingly articulated through the idiom of the nation. Philipp Ther has suggested seeing Prussia and Prussia-Germany as a “nationalizing empire,” particularly in relation to its changing strategies of rule in the Polish provinces. Starting in the late eighteenth century, some imperial elites in Central and Eastern Europe sought to reimagine core areas of dynastic empires as “national territories.” These projects were usually expansionist in the sense that they also claimed certain peripheral or more ethnically diverse regions for an exclusively defined nation. “Nationalizing empires” were those

empires which adopted the political projects and geopolitical perceptions of these national movements.¹⁰

The fruitfulness of Ther's argument lays in the apparent contradictions in the terminology of empire and nation. Scholars working within a national framework have traditionally seen empires as backward and pre-modern, destined to be replaced by nation-states as the basis for political legitimacy and rights. At the same time, national historiographies tended to emphasize the historical and moral uniqueness of their nation and to project the nation backwards, on historical actors and polities that had little to do with the of ideal type of the nation-state. To counter this dominant narrative of the nation-state, scholars such as Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper suggest the interpretative framework of empire and argue for empires' continuing significance into the modern period. Empires, ruling vast territories and diverse populations, were not destined to collapse or be replaced by nation-states, they argue, and while some empires had come to see themselves as nations or to be replaced by nation-states, some nation-states sought to create an empire.¹¹ As an interpretative framework, empire helps us to better integrate transregional power structures into transnational histories, but in the final analysis, the distinction between empires and nations-states is more at the level of the abstract or ideal-type. The complex interplay between imperial strategies of developing differential forms of rule for different groups and the homogenizing tendencies of nation-making must be studied in its historical specificity.

¹⁰ The argument for an imperial Prussia and a nationalizing Prussian-German empire was made by Philipp Ther, "Deutsche Geschichte als imperiale Geschichte. Polen, slawophone Minderheiten und das Kaiserreich als kontinentales Empire," in Conrad and Osterhammel (eds.), *Das Kaiserreich transnational*, pp. 129-148; "Imperial Nationalism as Challenge for the Study of Nationalism," in A. I. Miller and Stefan Berger (eds.), *Nationalizing Empires* (Budapest: EUI Press 2014), pp. 573-593.

¹¹ Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2010).

Viewing Imperial Germany as an empire frames national homogenization as one strategy among many rather than as a self-evident purpose of the unfinished (nation) state. It also allows us to better understand the complexities and contradictions within which historical actors “gauged their political possibilities, pursued their ambitions, and envisioned their societies.”¹² Imperial Germany labelled itself an empire and yet was founded on the premise of being a nation-state, despite the fact that in many ways, it became one only in 1918. The Prussian-dominated federal polity was created in 1871 on the basis of the North German Confederation was called “Das deutsche Reich” (*Reich* may be translated as an empire or a kingdom) and the hereditary imperial crown was symbolically offered by the German princes to the King of Prussia. This symbolism demonstrated that political legitimacy did not come from democratic representation but through the agreement of crowned heads. In the historiography, the new state is often termed “Das Kaiserreich” to differentiate it both from the Holy Roman Empire and from the National Socialist “Third Reich.” In English, “Das Kaiserreich” is translated either as “Imperial Germany” or “the German Empire.” Often, however, even with this terminology in use, scholars still implicitly assume their subject to be a nation-state.¹³ My choice is to retain the capitalized label “Imperial Germany” as the English version for “Das deutsche Reich,” while using the uncapitalized “German empire” or “Prussian-German empire” to emphasize their imperial – rather than national – strategies of rule. I also use “imperial settlement” for the project undertaken by the Prussian Colonization Commission. The German term *Ansiedlung* could be translated into English as either settlement or as colonization. I decided to use “colonization” for

¹² Ibid, pp. 3–4.

¹³ Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s classic book *Das Kaiserreich*, translated as “The German Empire,” would be a case in point, as well as Thomas Nipperdey’s untranslated *Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918*. Cf. Phillip Ther, “Beyond the Nation: The Relational Basis of a Comparative History of Germany and Europe,” *Central European History*, 36:1 (2003), pp. 45-73, pp. 48-52.

the name of the commission, since its activities were explicitly colonial, but “settlers” for the people who were recruited by the commission and signed a “settlement contract” with it. When referring to the broader project, I use both “colonization” or “settlement.”¹⁴

Approaching Imperial Germany as an empire allows us to interpret the Prussian settlement project within a longer history of Prussian expansion, as well as within a transnational imperial framework. It also places Imperial Germany in broader attempts to rule and reshape imperial border regions. As Imperial Germany became both a continental and an overseas empire in the 1880s and 1890s, it employed different and at times parallel strategies of rule in its internal frontiers, imperial borderlands, and possessions overseas. The increasing diversity of the empire’s subjects contributed to making imperial belonging more contested, as demonstrated by the heated debates about the definition of German citizenship that took place from the mid-1890s. These debates were shaped by a range of imperial concerns that related to Polish Prussia, Germany’s colonies in Africa, and German-speaking populations outside the imperial borders. Concerns about miscegenation in Germany’s African colonies and the extent of settlers’ rights in Southwest Africa were thus discussed together with Prussia’s exclusionary policies toward its Polish minority, fears of “Polonization” of Germans in Polish Prussia, and the influx of Polish migrant labor from across the Russian border. These debates were also related to the emergence of a new political category of racialized national belonging that transcended political borders, the “Germans abroad,” which was originally formulated as a tool of German global expansion.¹⁵

¹⁴ *Siedlung* could also refer to signing contracts, planning and establishing villages, and receiving building permits and could also denote a large, multi-building housing complex, a preplanned neighborhood, or a suburb. The 2020 Duden Dictionary provides as synonyms for *Ansiedlung* the words *Dorf* (Village); *Flecken*; *Gehöft* (Farm or Farmstead); *Gemeinde* (Community/Municipality); *Kolonie*; *Niederlassung*; *Ort[schaft]*; *Siedlung*; *Weiler*.

¹⁵ On imperial border regions, see Lerp, *Imperiale Grenzräume*; On the citizenship debates see Dieter Gosewinkel, “Rückwirkungen des kolonialen Rasserechts? Deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit zwischen Rassestaat und Rechtsstaat,” in: Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), *Das Kaiserreich transnational* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2004), pp. 236-256 and in greater detail in *Einbürgern und Ausschliessen: Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Göttingen, 2001) and Lora

The debates about imperial belonging and German citizenship were rooted in an already established set of representations of Polish *otherness* that permeated German public discourse on Polish Prussia since the middle of the nineteenth century. Bernhard Struck, for example, traces a divergence between travelers' descriptions of France and Poland during the 1830s, when literary depictions of the latter increasingly utilized tropes of racialized backwardness and wilderness to mark accounts of the areas formerly under the Polish crown. The debates in the 1848 Frankfurt National Assembly on the inclusion of Polish Prussia in the future German Confederation were inundated with notions of the cultural inferiority of Poles. Looking at popular literary publications from the mid-nineteenth century, Kristin Kopp finds that a growing number of German-language publications depicted a colonial relationship between Germans and Poles in which the two peoples were construed as fundamentally divided by culture and civilization. Beginning with the depiction of Polish lands as a "Wild West" where German middle-class merchant-pioneers faced dangerous encounters with inferior and uncivilized local Poles in Gustav Freytag's 1855 bestseller *Soll und Haben* – "the German colonial novel par excellence," according to Kopp – Polish Prussia and its inhabitants were positioned within a global framework of German imperial expansion and colonial domination.¹⁶

Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884-1945* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001). On the Germans Abroad, see Bradley Naranch, "Inventing the *Auslandsdeutsche*. Emigration, Colonial Fantasy, and German National Identity, 1848-1871, in: Eric Ames, Marcia Klotz, and Lora Wildenthal (eds.), *Germany's Colonial Pasts* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press 2005), pp. 21–40; Stefan Manz, *Constructing a German Diaspora: The "Greater German Empire" 1871–1918* (Oxford: Routledge 2013).

¹⁶ Bernhard Struck, *Nicht West - Nicht Ost: Frankreich und Polen in der Wahrnehmung deutscher Reisender zwischen 1750 und 1850* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006); Kristin Kopp, *Germany's Wild East: Constructing Poland as Colonial Space* (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2012), p. 14.

Prussia's Empire and the Partitions of Poland

Like many other regions in Central and Eastern Europe, the German-Polish borderlands have a long history of inter-imperial rivalry and political, linguistic, cultural, and confessional diversity. In the eighteenth century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth stretched across a vast, heterogenous space between in East Central Europe. It was an elective rather than absolutist monarchy run on a corporatist basis in which the nobility and municipal and religious corporations largely monopolized an extensive array of formal political rights and freedoms. The Commonwealth's relatively participatory and tolerant political structure was successful in integrating diverse political, ethnic, and religious groups, including many German speakers and in instilling long-lasting political loyalties.¹⁷

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ceased to exist as a sovereign polity in the last thirty years of the eighteenth century, when its neighbors, Prussia, Austria, and Russia moved to divide its territory between them in 1772, 1793, and 1795. As the Hohenzollern state increased its territory by about half and extended its administration, and gradually also its laws, to the newly acquired lands, Prussia became, as Philipp Ther argues, both a “de-facto German-Polish state” and a European empire, exercising control over large territories and varied populations of

¹⁷ Coupled with relative religious tolerance, this political structure contributed to making the Commonwealth a popular migration destination for persecuted religious groups, including German speaking ones. Moreover, as scholars such as Karin Friedrich have shown, the Commonwealth's culturally diverse elites developed a strong sense of association and belonging to the polity, and many cultivated their loyalty and longing to the Commonwealth long after it had been wiped from the political map of Europe. See Karin Friedrich, “Introduction: Citizenship and Identity in an Early Modern Commonwealth,” in Karin Friedrich and Barbara M. Pendzich (eds.) *Citizenship and Identity in a Multinational Commonwealth: Poland–Lithuania in Context, 1550–1772* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009), pp. 1–18. On migration to Poland-Lithuania see Joanna Kostyło, “Commonwealth of All Faiths: Republican Myth and the Italian Diaspora in Sixteenth-Century Poland–Lithuania,” in *ibid*, pp. 171–208. On the burghers in the cities of Royal (Polish) Prussia and their corporate republican identification with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, see Karin Friedrich, *The Other Prussia: Royal Prussia, Poland and Liberty, 1569-1772* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

different confessions and tongues.¹⁸ While the lion's share of the population in Prussia's new eastern territories consisted of mostly Catholic Slavophones, there also existed a large German-speaking and mostly Catholic population in the western and northern parts of the partition area. After the partition Prussia moved quickly to settle its new lands with German-speaking and mostly Protestant migrants. It offered different privileges to draw settlers and sent recruiting agents across the German lands and beyond.¹⁹ Despite such attempts to consolidate its rule in the new territory, Prussia's first empire was abruptly brought to an end by Napoleon's victorious armies in 1806/1807 and was only partly restored in the Congress of Vienna in 1815.²⁰

After the Congress of Vienna, Prussia regained much of its Polish territories in addition to large new territories in the west. Faced with the task of consolidating its rule over these diverse regions, Prussia mainly sought to rule its eastern part indirectly through local elites and to co-opt them into its political culture. Under the 1815 settlement, Wielkopolska, the most heavily Polish-populated area accorded to Prussia, was renamed as the Grand Duchy of Poznań

¹⁸ Philipp Ther, "Deutsche Geschichte als imperiale Geschichte: Polen, slawophone Minderheiten und das Kaiserreich als kontinentales Empire," in Jürgen Osterhammel and Sebastian Conrad (eds.) *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt, 1871–1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2004), pp. 129–148, quote on p. 135. A similar argument is made by Michael G. Müller, who also notes that the so-called "German Problem" that would be central for European politics in the nineteenth century was created precisely in the process of annexation of the Commonwealth in which the rival Habsburg and Hohenzollern states collaborated. The "German problem" was thus inexorably linked to the fate and future of Poland. Michael G. Müller, *Die Teilungen Polens 1772, 1793, 1795* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1984), pp. 56–64, 69–90.

¹⁹ The Prussian portion included a vast area. In addition to Royal Prussia and Warmia, which together enabled a territorial contiguity between Brandenburg and Ducal Prussia, Prussia annexed the bulk of Wielkopolska (Greater Poland). The annexed area included not only the area of Poznania (with the city of Poznań as its center) but also extended, after the third partition, as far as Warsaw and Białystok to the east. Müller, *Die Teilungen Polens*, pp. 56–64, 69–90; Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918* (Seattle and London: Washington University Press, 1974), pp. 14–17 and Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 112–138. On Prussian settlement during this period, see David Blackbourn, *The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany* (London and New York: Norton, 2006), pp. 50–62.

²⁰ According to the Treaty of Tilsit (1807), the land annexed by Prussia in the third partition was given to the Polish Duchy of Warsaw, a newly established French satellite state. In the Congress of Vienna, the Duchy of Warsaw was incorporated as a distinct political entity into the Russian Empire. Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland*, pp. 24–64, 68–71.

and became a semi-separate entity unified with the Prussian crown. The Grand Duchy's most senior administrative position was bequeathed to a Polish grandee close to the Hohenzollern royal court; Polish nobles could participate in local governance bodies; and Polish was taught in schools and recognized as an official language of administration alongside German. Pomerelia, which contained more German-speakers and more Protestants than Wielkopolska, was more fully integrated into the state, becoming part of the province of West Prussia.²¹

Changing Strategies of Rule in Prussian Poland

Prussia employed different and often contradictory strategies of rule in its Polish provinces over the course of the nineteenth century, combining indirect rule through the cooptation of elites with some measures of administrative centralization, and insisting first on the acculturation of elites into the state and later, on cultural assimilation.²² Wary of a Polish insurrection after a failed uprising in Russian Poland in 1830, Prussian authorities reduced much of Poznań's special administrative status. A new provincial president, Eduard von Flotwell, was appointed to lead a more aggressive policy in relation to Polish elites. Flotwell sought to integrate the population into the Prussian state through military service and schooling, while limiting the influence of the nobility and the Catholic Church. The state also barred Polish nobles

²¹ In 1824, West Prussia was administratively united with East Prussia, thus reducing the influence of Polish nobles in the provincial parliament. West Prussia was recreated as an administrative unit only in 1878. Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland*, pp. 68-71; William W. Hagen, *Germans, Poles, and Jews*, p. 87. There were also sizeable Slavophone populations elsewhere in Prussia adhering to different denominations. In addition to a large Polish-speaking population in Silesia, there were Sorbians in the Lausitz, and Kashubians, Masurians, and Lithuanians in Pomerania, Pomerania, East Prussia, and the Memel area, also newly added to Prussia after 1815. See Helmut Walser Smith, "An Preußens Rändern oder: Die Welt, die dem Nationalismus verloren ging," in Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871–1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), pp. 149-169.

²² I broadly draw on Philipp Ther's suggestion about four phases of Prussian strategies of rule in its Polish territories, beginning with more indirect rule between 1772-1830 and increasingly more centralized afterwards. Ther, *Imperial instead of National History*.

from participating in the nomination process of county commissioners and created an appointed district-level policing authority (*Distrikt-Kommissar*) that stood between the county commissioners on the one hand and local communities and large estates on the other hand. This extension of the state's reach into the countryside was particular to Poznań and not introduced in the rest of the Prussia's eastern provinces, where the state continued to rely on landowning elites as key intermediates between county commissioners and the rural population. German also became the only official language of administration in Poznań. Mistrustful of the Polish nobility, Flotwell tried to draw settlers from other areas of Prussia to the province. He purchased estates from cash-strapped Polish nobles to sell to more loyal Prussians, often smallholders. Both policies were later seen as precedents for the establishment of the Prussian Colonization Commission in 1886.²³

Prussia frequently changed its approach to the problem of ruling the Polish provinces between the 1840s and 1871. Ascending the Prussian throne in 1840, Friedrich Wilhelm IV wanted to establish what he saw as a scared, paternalist bond between the monarch and the people that would counter liberal and nationalist demands for constitution and greater political representation. Under this new political constellation, Flotwell was dismissed and many of his policies were reversed. A separate Catholic section in the Ministry of Education and Religion Affairs was established in 1842 and took charge of education in the Polish language in elementary schools, which allowed the Catholic clergy a supervisory role with regard to schools in Polish Prussia.²⁴ In the wake of an attempted uprising in 1846 and the Greater Poland uprising

²³ Hagen, *Germans, Poles, and Jews*, pp. 85-95; Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland*, pp. 105-180; Martin Broszat, *Zweihundert Jahre deutsche Polenpolitik* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1972 [1963]), pp. 84-104

²⁴ In contrast to the traditional view about the strong link between the Catholic Church and Polish nationalism, Brian Porter-Szűcs shows that the Church had played an ambivalent role throughout the nineteenth century and that "The strong ideological link between faith and fatherland emerged in full force only at the start of the twentieth century." The Church was an important site for the "enactment of ethnicity" in crucial junctures, e.g. the *Kulturkampf*, but was

of 1848/9, state policies in Prussian Poland again changed. The Grand Duchy was stripped of its partial self-administration powers and formally made into a Prussian province, and the state increased its administrative suppression of Polish organizations. The 1863 uprising in Russian Poland, whose strength seemed to confirm the enduring danger of Polish political aspirations, encouraged Prussian officials to adopt a more consistent policy of political and cultural subjugation in the majority-Polish border region. From the 1860s and to a greater extent after 1871, Prussian policies decisively changed as the state adopted a more confrontational approach, aiming to force the assimilation of Polish elites and to limit the Catholic Church's influence on the population, considered as opposing the interests of the Prussian state.²⁵

In this context, The *Kulturkampf* against institutional Catholicism following the establishment of Imperial Germany took a clear anti-Polish direction in Prussia's eastern provinces. Officials and politicians in Berlin tended to view the Protestant state confession, strongly identified with the German language in Poznania, as pitted against a majority Catholic and Polish speaking population in the border region. Among the *Kulturkampf* era measures particularly important in the Polish-German borderlands were state control over the appointment of school inspectors and the abolishment of the separate Catholic department of the Prussian ministry of Education and Religion. Language policies in the German-Polish borderlands also changed. During the 1870s and 1880s, German became the primary language of school instruction and the official language of administration and the judiciary, while the state tightened

never the only institutional sphere for the (re)enactment and of Polish identity and its position towards the rise of middle-class national democracy after 1863 was even more suspicious than it was towards the insurrectionist nobles who fought for a romantic idea of the 'national spirit' in 1830. See Brian Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Brian Porter-Szücs, *Faith and fatherland: Catholicism, modernity, and Poland* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), quote on pp. 7–8.

²⁵ Hagen, *Germans, Poles, and Jews*, pp. 85-95; Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland*, pp. 105–180; Martin Broszat, *Zweihundert Jahre deutsche Polenpolitik* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1972[1963]), pp. 84–124

its control over teachers' appointments. In 1887, Polish was abolished as a separate subject of instruction in elementary schools with the exception of religion lessons. Further radicalization in these policies took place around 1900, when German was enforced as language of religious instruction as well. The uproar among the Polish-speaking population and the children and parents-led school strikes that followed galvanized the first widespread popular resistance to Prussian rule.²⁶

In a substantial and long-lasting shift of policy, the 1880s also saw the Prussian state beginning to intervene much more directly in the social structures of its eastern border region in order to alter the ethnic and confessional composition of the population. Two events mark this significant change. The first was the 1885/6 expulsions of about 30,000 Polish and Jewish subjects of the Russian Empire who had long lived in Prussia. The expulsions were concomitant with the closure of Prussia's eastern borders to the migration of mostly Polish seasonal farmworkers.²⁷ The second event was the promulgation of the Prussian Settlement Law (*Ansiedlungsgesetz*) in April 1886. With that law, the state adopted large-scale land purchase and settlement as strategies to undermine the political influence of the Polish landed nobility and to settle ethnic German farmers in Poznan and West Prussia. While most Jews and Protestant German-speakers lived in towns, the great majority of the rural population was Catholic and

²⁶ In chapter four, I undertake a detailed discussion regarding the role of children in nationalist politics. For school politics and the *Kulturkampf* see John J. Kulczycki, *School Strikes in Prussian Poland 1901–1907: The Struggle over Bilingual Education* (Boulder Colo. : New York: East European Monographs, 1981), ch. 1; Lech Trzeciakowski, "The Prussian State and the Catholic Church in Prussian Poland 1871–1914," *Slavic Review* 26 (1967), pp. 618-637; idem, *The Kulturkampf in Prussian Poland* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs/New York: Columbia University Press, 1990 [1970]); Helmut Walser Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870-1914* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 169-205; Marjorie Lamberti, *State, Society, and the Elementary School in Imperial Germany* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 109-153.

²⁷ On the expulsion of Russian subjects from Prussia in 1885/6 see Helmut Neubach, *Die Ausweisungen von Polen und Juden aus Preußen 1885/86. Ein Beitrag zu Bismarcks Polenpolitik und zur Geschichte des deutsch-polnischen Verhältnisses* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1967).

Polish speaking. The state's strategic choice to undertake rural settlement of German farmers in the Polish heartland was less about creating a German majority in the province and more about creating local enclaves of Germans beholden to the state. This would prevent political representation from Poles by increasing the number of eligible voters loyal to the state in Polish electoral strongholds.²⁸ Both German settlement and political realignment were dependent on a massive state intervention in the region's land market. Alongside lingering anxieties about its hold over the Polish provinces, there were more immediate economic concerns that prompted the Prussian government to undertake a project of rural settlement in the imperial border region.

The Settlement Law: Land Nationalization, Crisis-Management, and Political Compromise

The immediate background for the 1886 Settlement Law and the consequent establishment of the Prussian Colonization Commission was the grain and potato price slump on the global and internal market in 1885, which indicated that the plummeting of grain prices on the world market was a long-term trend. On top of longer-term structural developments such as increased indebtedness of landed estates and the loss of export markets due to international competition, the price plummet from 1880 to 1885 deepened the sense of an impending insolvency crisis in Prussia's large-scale agriculture and particularly in Poznanian.²⁹ The prospect of impending bankruptcy of many estates led Otto von Bismarck and the Prussian government to

²⁸ I discuss the commission's attempts to force settlers to vote for government-supported candidates in chapter 1.

²⁹ Hannelore Bruchhold-Wahl demonstrates that a particularly drastic fall in prices and rise in bankruptcies among large landowners took place in 1885. The collapse in prices in local markets in 1885 is noteworthy as it had immediate effects and suggested not only that producers had little leeway in avoiding the immediate impact of falling prices, but also that the new agrarian tariffs were not enough to protect agrarian producers from sudden, short-term fall in prices. Also significant was that potato prices, and not just grain, plummeted on the internal market, as it demonstrated the possible scope of the crisis. In Poznanian, potato prices fluctuated between 1881 and 1885 but 1885 saw a steep fall of about 25% from their 1883 levels. Grain prices showed a much clearer trend of steep decline, with wheat and rye falling in a similar rate of 25% during the same period. See Hannelore Bruchhold-Wahl, *Die Krise des Grossgrundbesitzes*, pp. 82-104, 116-129, and for the data on prices see pp. 117-120

seek money from the Prussian parliament to purchase Polish-owned estates in Poznania. As the head of the administrative district of Bromberg/Bydgoszcz, a Bismarck confidant, wrote to the chancellor, here was a golden opportunity for the state to take advantage of the unprecedented low land prices to strengthen its control of Poznania, either through settlement or by transforming privately-owned estates to state leaseholds. Bismarck saw here an opportunity to weaken the political power of the Polish landed nobility, but another likely motivation was the prospect of stimulating the land market and shoring up the insolvent system of rural credit for large estates.³⁰

In order to pass the required financial bill through the Prussian parliament, Bismarck needed the support of both the National-Liberal faction and the conservative parties, who represented diverging interests and political ideologies. The result was a political compromise that brought together starkly different visions for the border region. For the National Liberals, this was a unique opportunity to shape legislation and to promote their program of land and social reform, which called for the settlement of independent farmers to replace what they saw as economically untenable large estates. They proposed tying these farmers to the land through a new form of property regime, the *Rentegut*, which gave a semblance of private proprietorship through unamortizable long-term rent payment.³¹ The National Liberals believed that this program would dampen migration to cities and across the Atlantic and hoped that it could be extended later on to other parts of Prussia. They also assumed that independent farmers would tend to vote for them. The conservative parties, mostly represented by large landowners, cared

³⁰ Ibid, pp. 82-104, 116-129. For the text of the memorandum by the Bismarck confidant and president of the administrative district of Bromberg/Bydgoszcz, Christoph von Tiedemann, see *ibid*, pp. 433–438. Cf. “Auszug aus der Tiedemann’sche Denkschrift: betreffend einige Massregeln zur Germanisierung der Provinz Posen,” Bromberg, 6.1.1886. GStA PK I. HA Rep 90A Nr. 1610 (unpaginated).

³¹ I explain the *Rentegut* form of land tenure and its history, going back to Prussia’s agrarian reforms earlier in the century, in chapter two.

little about settling German farmers. Instead, they were interested in the state purchasing indebted estates and leasing them out without dividing them, thus preventing greater competition over labor and preserving the existing structures of land ownership and political power. At most, they could agree on the settlement of farmworkers and cottagers on existing estates to secure labor supply while maintaining access to seasonal labor. They were not interested in granting full land ownership to workers or in forcing landowners to pay communal poor support for the seasonally employed farmworkers on the estate.³²

As a political compromise, the Prussian parliament passed an exceedingly vague Settlement Law in April 1886 and approved a 100 million Marks budget for the Prussian Colonization Commission, the agency established to carry out the law. The vagueness of the law's final version gave the government and the newly established Colonization Commission large leeway in its interpretation. The commission was tasked with purchasing large estates, dividing them, and facilitating the settlement of Germans on the land in small-hold farms. In order to make sure that German settlers would remain in Polish Prussia, the 1886 Settlement Law allowed the commission to use the *Rentegut* form of limited heritable property, in addition to the leasing or sale of land it purchased.

Although the 1886 Settlement Law kept open the possibility of purchasing land from Germans, land was mainly supposed to come from Polish landowners. Purchase from Germans was only to take place in exceptional circumstances dependent on case-by-case approval by the Prussian cabinet. However, by the mid 1890s, an expanding Polish network of land banks, settlement associations, and credit cooperatives, successfully closed-off the Polish land market to

³² Bruchhold-Wahl, *Die Krise des Grossgrundbesitzes*, pp. 82-104, 116-129. On the shift in the political program of the National Liberals in the 1880s, when they adopted the idea of state-led social policy while pushing for imperial expansionism and more radical nationalism, see James J. Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), esp. ch. 13.

the commission. From the late 1890s the majority of land was bought from German landowners. In 1898 the government officially permitted the commission to buy German estates at its own discretion and the *Landtag* approved another 100 million Marks for the commission (another 150 million Marks followed in 1902), and the extent of land purchase rose sharply. In the years 1898–1903, the number of estates purchased by the commission more than quadrupled in comparison to the previous five years. Of the estates bought in the later period, only 16% were bought from Polish owners.³³ Thus, a law that intended to replace Polish large landowners with German farmers ended up mainly redistributing land among different German-speaking populations.

After 1900, a series of legislative amendments extended the administrative powers of the Colonization Commission. In 1904, the state introduced a new requirement for permission to settle in the areas with the most significant Polish population in the eastern provinces of Prussia, including not only the colonized provinces of West Prussia and Pozania, but also rural areas in the provinces of Silesia, East Prussia, and parts of Brandenburg. From that point on, only settlements that did not contradict the purpose of the 1886 Settlement Law were permissible. This resulted in almost complete denial of Polish requests for building permits. The 1904 law effectively extended the legislated goals of the 1886 Settlement Law beyond the provinces of West Prussia and Poznania and gave the 1886 law a stronger status as a legal norm to be adhered to in other administrative spheres. Against the backdrop of increasing land prices and the failure of the commission to buy Polish-owned land, radical German nationalists around 1900 raised the demand that the state forcefully expropriate land instead of relying on the market. In 1907, after

³³ Bruchhold-Wahl, *Die Krise des Großgrundbesitz*, pp. 144-152, 256-283. Also see the June 1898 memorandum from the president of the Colonization Commission to the Prussian cabinet, reproduced in *idem*, pp. 450-456.

years of deliberation and hesitancy, the Prussian government decided to bring before the Prussian *Landtag* an expropriation law that allowed the commission to expropriate land for its activities, subject to ministerial approval and with compensation according to market prices. The law, passed in early 1908, also included the budgeting of additional 350 million Mark for the commission. The new powers were highly controversial at the time and used sparingly, but uniformly targeted Polish landowners and demonstrated the growing willingness of the Prussian government to limit the constitutional rights of its Polish citizens in the name of a nationalist politics of settlement.³⁴

The political compromise that made the settlement law possible in April 1886 was renegotiated in subsequent years, not only when the commission's budget was up for debate by the *Landtag*, but also within the Prussian bureaucracy. The commission's administrative structure also reflected this political compromise. The commission was established as a separate agency under the authority of the Prussian cabinet. It had a policy-making board that included representatives of different government ministries and the heads of the provincial administration of the two provinces. The commission's board laid out policy and also made specific decisions relating to land purchase and the division of estates in quarterly two-day meetings in Poznań. The commission's president enjoyed wide-ranging autonomy to run the everyday activity of the commission and often disregarded in practice the decisions of the board. Under the president, a considerable bureaucracy developed. By 1914, it numbered over 400 officials and technical staff in the head office in Posen/Pozanań and spread out in the commission's estates.³⁵

³⁴ Lerp, *Imperiale Grenzräume*, pp. 177-182; Broszat, *Zweihundert Jahre*, pp. 129-172. See also Gregor Thum, "Megalomania and Angst: The Nineteenth Century Mythicization of Germany's Eastern Borderlands," in Eric D. Weitz and Omer Bartov, *Shatterzones of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), pp. 42-60, pp. 54-55.

³⁵ The members of the board also included officials from the provincial agrarian credit institutions, the *Landschaften*. The directors of the *Landschaften* for Poznan and West Prussia were the most longstanding

The Commission's Estate Managers: Paternalism on the Bureaucratic Frontier

The activities of the Prussian Colonization Commission were superimposed on existing local structures of authority, most importantly on the existing regime of paternalist governance in the Prussia's eastern provinces, which granted political and policing powers to owners of estates as intermediaries between rural populations and the state. Estate owners and their representatives were the administrative equivalents of self-governing communities, representing the state on their land. They held powers of local governance, civic administration, and broad policing authority over the population of the estate. At the same time, they managed estates as economic entities and employed, either directly or indirectly, most of the people living on their land. When the commission purchased estates, estate managers took on this role and managed the transformation of estates into villages. The estate managers appointed by the commission were also supposed to supervise and discipline settlers, oversee the building plans of farms, monitor their participation in communal life, decide on settlers' eligibility for special loans and subventions, and ensure settlers' loyal participation in elections.

The crucial importance of estate managers for the commission's work, as well as the inherent contradictions between their different duties, is clearly brought out in the unrelenting flurry of instructions, manuals, and reminders sent out by the commission. Estate managers, a 1910 comprehensive manual explained, were supposed to run the estate as a "large-scale agricultural operation" according to economic principles with the aim of maximizing yields. At the same time, the estate was to be prepared for settlement. Plots were supposed to be prepared

members of the commission's plenary and their detailed knowledge of estates' financial situation was crucial for its work. Bruchhold-Wahl, *Die Krise des Grossgrundbesitzes*, pp. 160-170; Jacobczyk, *Pruska komisja osadnicza*, chs. 1, 2. Also see the contemporary critical account of Max Sering, *Die innere Kolonisation im östlichen Deutschland* [=Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik vol. 36] (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot 1893), pp. 38-61.

to allow settlers to establish themselves without undertaking preliminary drainage and amelioration work themselves. Estate managers were to see to it that settlers ran rationally managed farms (*vernünftige Wirtschaftsführung*) that would ensure their economic progress (*das Vorwärtskommen der Ansiedler*). Estate managers were expected to be well acquainted with every aspect of estate management and with local and agricultural conditions, the particular legal situation of the estate and its rights and obligations regarding neighboring communities and usage of land.

As soon as an estate was ready for transfer to future settlers, the estate managers' main task changed. From that point on, settlement was supposed to be the main priority, the "personal task" of the manager, who would be in contact with prospective settlers and assess their suitability. The success of settlement depended on the "personality, skill, determination, and patience" of estate managers, and they were expected to assist settlers in overcoming the initial difficulties of settlement. Estate managers thus were required to look after settlers' "needs and wishes" while distributing "state beneficence" (*staatliche Wohltaten*) equally and without personal prejudice. Finally, managers also needed to act as representatives of the state and its interests and to "protect" state property from settlers' "covetousness" (*Begehrlichkeit*). Those managers who balanced their responsibilities well, the commission promised, would be duly rewarded. The manifold contradictory tasks that the commission delegated to estate managers signify that paternalism on the spot was central to the administrative practice of constructing a frontier of settlement.³⁶

³⁶ *Geschäftsanweisung für die Ansiedlungsvermittler der Königlichen Ansiedlungskommission* (Posen, 1910), pp. 1–2, GStA PK I. HA Rep 212 Nr. 5224.

The conflicting and wide-ranging tasks that the commission defined for its estate managers point to the sheer ambition of its colonizing agenda. Folded into the detailed and conflicting instructions was the vision of a comprehensive social change on the local scale. Estate managers' economic, administrative, policing, and supervisory powers were essential to their ability to navigate conflicting tasks and to manage what was a contested process of social transformation. Ironically, the success of this process also included the dissolving of the estate itself and the transfer of its self-governing powers from the now-redundant estate managers to the new settler community.

The State and the Estate: Rural Credit, Indirect Rule, and Access to Land

The capacity of the state to transform the social reality in Polish Prussia hinged on redefining the conditions of access to land, importing new populations, planning of new villages, and ensuring a supply of German labor for settler farms and the commission's estates. While this dissertation focuses on the last three aspects, it is crucial to understand the conditions that governed the access to land in Polish Prussia and how they were partially transformed by the Colonization Commission. This was a contentious process that unfolded on the local level of the estate and which I propose to see as the highly bureaucratized creation of a frontier of settlement.

Making land available for settlement required that it would be extricated from existing legal, political, and economic obligations, thus unencumbering it before transferring ownership to settlers. But the political imperatives of settlement and the state's intention to supervise and control the process, as well as to maintain oversight over future ownership and use of the land meant that new and old structures of domination were conjoined. There were two basic structures that kept estates together as political-administrative and economic units during the period of the commission's existence and thereby both hindered and facilitated settlement. The first was the

particular powers accorded to estates as autonomous units of administration and political representation. The second was the system of state-backed rural credit that offered estate owners favorable credit opportunities, while requiring them to put up the entire estate as one indissoluble collateral.

Prussian structures of political control over the countryside of its eastern provinces long relied on a system of indirect rule in which local landowning elites had an important intermediary position. Possession of landed estates afforded vast administrative, judicial, policing, and economic powers, some of which were historically rooted in feudal rights independent from the state administration. These powers were first of all excised within the borders of the estate or *Gutsbezirk* – where the entire population of the estate were subjected to them – but also gave landowners a lasting hold on political power in corporate (*Ständisch*) bodies that institutionalized elite participation in county-level and provincial administration. Alongside the political power of the landed aristocracy, there were also fiscal reasons for the persistence of this imperial structure of indirect rule, as the state could run an administration on a shoestring budget throughout most of the nineteenth century.³⁷

Over the course of the second half of the nineteenth century, the originally feudal powers of landowners were reconstituted as the state gradually extended its authority into the countryside.³⁸ In this context, the decentralized regime with minimal administrative apparatus

³⁷ In 1867, for example, the administrative district of Marienwerder, which by 1886 would be part of the province of West Prussia, composed of 36 senior and 85 junior officials and 111 Gendarmes who were in charge of a vast area inhabited by a confessionally and linguistically diverse and predominantly rural population of some 740,000 people. The administrative district was divided into thirteen counties (*Kreise*) headed by a county commissioner (*Landrat*). Each county commissioner had at his disposal on average ten officials. The administrative region included 1700 rural communities (*Landgemeinde*) headed by a mayor (*Schulze*) and 850 estates headed by a *Vorsteher*, namely the owners or their representative. Estates often retained various rights of policing over adjacent village communities even when the latter were recognized as separate communal entities. Patrick Wagner, *Bauern, Junker und Beamte: Lokale Herrschaft und Partizipation im Ostelbien des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005), pp. 47-48.

³⁸ In particular, the agrarian reforms in the first half of the century and the final abolishment of manorial courts (*Patrimonialgerichte*) in the wake of the upheavals of 1848 significantly reduced both landowners' official powers

that emerged as a compromise between the Prussian state and the landowning elite in its eastern provinces during the agrarian reforms of the earlier part of the century was partially replaced by a state apparatus of institutionalized registration, supervision, and taxation of landed property. The wide-ranging changes in land tenure and communal borders during the first half of the nineteenth century exacerbated the traditional lack of reliable and systematic information about the extent and nature of agricultural production and land tenure in Prussian's eastern provinces.³⁹ Starting in the mid 1850s, historians have identified deliberate, if piecemeal, efforts by the state bureaucracy to concentrate in its hands both knowledge making and decision-making powers. Between 1856 and 1886, cadastral maps and agricultural surveys were prepared, county cadaster offices established, and a new land registration system introduced, although local elites continued to have strong influence on the extent and direction of state-making on the ground.⁴⁰ These developments proved vital for the work of the Colonization Commission when it set out to purchase land on a large scale in 1886.

During the twenty-year period preceding the establishment of the Colonization Commission, the political power invested in the estate as a unit of administration and political control underwent important changes, as the extent and worth of landed property rather than the

and the number of people that they directly ruled, as many semi-independent and independent farmers (*Kleinbauern*; *Vollbauern*) formed new village communities and separated from their former lords' estates. On manorial courts as a site of negotiation and contestation between lords, farmers, and the state – instead of a one-sided system of lordly oppression, as many historians and contemporary Liberals had it – see William W. Hagen, *Ordinary Prussians: Brandenburg Junkers and Villagers, 1500-1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Monika Wienfort, *Patrimonialgerichte in Preußen: Ländliche Gesellschaft und bürgerliches Recht 1770-1848/49* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001).

³⁹ County officials often depended on local landed elites for crucial and up-to-date information, important records on land rights were dispersed between state and manorial archives, the state's own records were partial, and officials often did not make special efforts to keep organized records or provide their superiors with useful information about their activities. Entrenched practices of administrative misinformation changed only slowly. In the early 1870s, the Prussian Statistical Office was still complaining that East-Elbian county commissioners were singularly useless in providing systematic reports on their county for state-wide surveys. Wagner, *Bauern, Junker und Beamte*, pp. 57-58.

⁴⁰ For example, the process of reassessing the taxable value of agricultural land that took place in the 1860s was very much controlled by estate owners. Wagner, *Bauern, Junker und Beamte*, pp. 46-65.

legal definition of a specific domain became the hallmarks of political privileges. Against the backdrop of increasing numbers of village communities and large landholders who did not hold the politically privileged status of knights' estate owners (*Rittergutsbesitzer*), a series of new legislative measures reorganized the relationship between estates, rural communities, and the state. These developments broadly accorded estates the same rights and duties as a village community (*Landgemeinde*), with estate owners or their representative invested with communal decision-making, policing, and administrative powers. Estate owners, however, retained their privileged political power in county and provincial representative bodies of administration.⁴¹

The second structural reason for estates' longevity as indissoluble political-administrative and economic units was the particular structure of rural credit in Prussia's eastern provinces. Since the late eighteenth century, Prussia had developed a state-backed credit institution for its large landowners that used the collective surety of all the estates in one province to issue mortgage bonds for individual estates and thereby provide them with credit. The state awarded these institutions, the *Landschaften*, the right to issue bonds and provided them financial backing. As bonds were issued by the *Landschaft* for entire estates rather than for specific plots, the system protected individual estates from bankruptcy and dismemberment, while indirectly converting their political-administrative powers into a form of collateral. The *Landschaften*, therefore, were powerful mediators between creditors and estate owners as well as representatives of the collective or corporate interest of the large landowners.

⁴¹ The definition of an estate as a political unit continued to be vague throughout the period and left room for negotiations and state impositions. On the main legislative piece in the second half of the century, the *Kreisordnung* of 1872, and on the political representation of estate owners, see Paul Nolte, "Repräsentation und Grundbesitz: Die kreisständische Verfassung Preußens im 19. Jahrhundert," in Klaus Tenfelde and Hans-Ulrich Wehler (eds.), *Wege zur Geschichte des Bürgertums* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1994), pp. 78-104; Wagner, *Bauern, Junker und Beamte*, pp. 322-328. On the latest legal regulations following the communal law reform of 1891, see the authoritative, "practical" handbook by Stefan Grenzmer, *Die Landgemeindeordnung für die Sieben östlichen Provinzen der Monarchie vom 3. Juli 1891, nebst dem Zweckverbandsgesetze vom 19. Juli 1911*, 5th Edition (Berlin 1914 [1892]), esp. pp. 212-221 on the status of estates.

The *Landschaften* proved crucial in financing the adaptation of large estates to Prussia's agrarian reforms and to the new developments in agriculture during the century, but over the long run, this credit system tended to create a burden of old debts that impeded investment in production, stifled the land market at times of economic downturn, and heightened estates' vulnerability to short-term economic trends. In the second half of the nineteenth century, as estates increasingly moved to large-scale cultivation of sugar-beets, invested in agricultural machinery, and started using chemical fertilizers, the shortcomings of the *Landschaft* credit system became apparent. The system limited estate owners' ability to take up more debt once they took credit through the *Landschaft* and prevented them from selling or remortgaging parts of the estate. Many landowners were able to negotiate another loan from the *Landschaft* or to seek personal loans, but this meant higher interest rates. As Bernd Ristau points out, the system could work when the market rate for *Landschaft* bonds was stable and agricultural prices were high enough to make investment worthwhile, but a decreasing market rate for bonds and a frozen land market meant that there was little new capital flowing into the East-Elbian debt economy by the 1880s. Max Sering, the leading agrarian economist and government consultant, lent empirical authority to a widespread view among his academic milieu when he argued in the early 1890s that indebted estates became entailed to bondholders and had to be broken up to become economically viable.⁴² In light of the particularly high indebtedness rates among estates in

⁴² Bruchhold-Wahl, *Die Krise des Grossgrundbesitzes*, pp. 105-122, 160-170; Max Sering, *Die innere Kolonisation im östlichen Deutschland* [=Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik vol. 36] (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot 1893), pp. 38-61. On the *Landschaften* as the institutional locus of this "crisis of the large estate-owners" see Bernd Ristau's highly suggestive work: Bernd Ristau, "Adlige Interessenpolitik in Konjunktur und Krise: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der landschaftlichen Kreditkasse Ostpreußens 1788 bis 1835," in *Denkhorizonte und Handlungsspielräume: Historische Studien für Rudolf Vierhaus zum 70. Geburtstag* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1992), pp. 197-234.

Poznania and West Prussia, breaking up estates was necessarily an expensive endeavor, as it involved not only land purchase but also paying the accumulated debts.

Boom and Bust: Agrarian Labor and the “Crisis” of the 1880s

The establishment of the Prussian Colonization Commission in 1886 and its activities in the 1880s and 1890s were tied up in the complex transformation of agrarian production and labor markets in the predominantly agricultural eastern provinces of Prussia. Even more so than the rest of Prussia’s eastern provinces, the economic structure of the provinces of Poznania and West-Prussia was marked by the prevalence of indebted large estates. In 1885, 43% of the agricultural lands in West Prussia and 52% in Poznania were part of estates larger than 100 hectares. In comparison, the figure for the eastern provinces of Prussia as a whole was 41%, and for the western provinces of the kingdom, 9.25%. The large estates in Poznania suffered from particularly high indebtedness and were especially hard hit by the economic downturn that set in the late 1870s. The total nominal value of bonds issued by the Poznania *Landschaft* rose from 163.5 million Marks in 1875 to 233 million Marks in 1885, and the total value of bonds issued by the two *Landschaften* operating in West Prussia rose from 140 million to 223 million Marks during the same period. While most *Landschaften* bonds were issues at a low 3.5% interest, in Poznania there was an unusually high aggregated nominal value of 4% bonds (over 15% of the entire nominal bond value of 268 million Marks in 1897), probably due to estates’ accumulation of several *Landschaft* and other loans. The growing number of insolvency cases in the province also attest to the particular severity of indebtedness in the region.⁴³

⁴³ Bruchhold-Wahl, *Die Krise des Grossgrundbesitzes*, pp. 105-122, 160-170; For the Poznania *Landschaft*, see *Festschrift zur Feier des fünfzigjährigen Bestehens der Posener Landschaft* (Poznań, 1907). The figures on *Landschaft* bonds are drawn from August Meitzen and Friedrich Grossmann, *Der Boden und die landwirthschaftlichen Verhältnisse des Preussischen Staates*, vol. 6 (Berlin, 1901), pp. 402–403, and p. 561 for the percentage of large estates in the agriculture of Poznania and West Prussia.

Landed estates in Poznania were particularly sensitive to fluctuations in the price of grain and vulnerable to short-term price variations in the local and world markets. Falling grain prices and loss of international markets from the 1870s to the 1890s encouraged large-scale agricultural producers in Prussia's eastern provinces to diversify by turning to capital and labor-intensive cultivation of sugar-beets. While the new combination of potatoes, sugar-beets, and grains had been gradually adopted in other provinces in the 1860s and 1870s, it was only in the early 1880s that large producers in Poznania began to shift to the new cultivation system. The sluggish adaptation of the new root-crops system in the province was related to the new capital requirements for machinery and fertilizers that it involved and to the fact that it required different labor regimes than crop rotation based on grains.⁴⁴

The new cultivation system combined root crops and grains based on highly seasonal and labor-intensive work routine. Instead of having most of their labor needs covered by farmworkers who resided in or near the estate, recruiting additional workers only for the grain harvest in the summer, landowners now needed many more workers for intensive handwork in the late fall and in the spring. Even as the demand for seasonal agricultural labor across the eastern provinces of Prussia surged, emigration from the region in search of better-paying jobs in industrial centers in western Germany proceeded apace. In light of the increasingly endemic labor shortage, landowners sought to import workers from Russian and Habsburg Poland, who were mostly Catholic Polish-speakers.⁴⁵ These migrant workers, however, raised the specter of an ever-increasing Polish population. This prospect was seen by the Prussian state as an existential danger. Therefore, reducing the number of Poles in Prussia was a main motivation for

⁴⁴ Bruchhold-Wahl, *Die Krise des Grossgrundbesitzes*, pp. 82-122.

⁴⁵ Ibid. For details on cultivation see Friedrich Aereboe, *Allgemeine landwirtschaftliche Betriebslehre* (Berlin, 1920[1917]), pp. 204-217.

the expulsion of Russian subjects from Prussia in 1885 and the closure of the border to labor. Under heavy pressure from landowners, the Prussian government decided in 1890 to allow labor migration under strict supervision regime. In line with the seasonality of root crops cultivation, during the winter months workers had to leave and cross the border to Russian or Austrian Poland.⁴⁶

State officials and German nationalists agreed that the huge seasonal influx of Catholic Polish-speaking migrant labor augmented the political threat posed by Polish nationalism. They therefore looked for alternatives to bring in non-Polish farmworkers. One solution to the labor question was to import and permanently settle ethnically German workers from the Austrian and mainly the Russian Empires. Another solution was the importation of non-Polish seasonal workers, mainly Orthodox Ruthenians (Ukrainians) from the Habsburg Empire. As I discuss in chapter two, the commission played a central, and at times secretive role in the importation of these two kinds of workers. A third solution proposed by nationalist politicians was to import working-class youngsters from other parts of Germany, whose legal status temporarily but significantly limited their rights of free movement. This scheme of child displacement is the topic of chapters four and five.

⁴⁶ The classic works on the politics of labor in this context are Johannes Nichtweiß, *Die Ausländischen Saisonarbeiter in der Landwirtschaft der östlichen und mittleren Gebiete des Deutschen Reiches. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der preußisch-deutschen Politik von 1890 bis 1914* (East Berlin, 1959), esp. pp. 74-117; and Klaus J. Bade, *Land oder Arbeit? Transnationale und interne Migration im deutschen Nordosten vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Osnabrück, 1979), here esp. pp. 117-141, 244-258. See also idem, "Massenwanderung und Arbeitsmarkt im deutschen Nordosten von 1880 bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg: überseeische Auswanderung, interne Abwanderung und kontinentale Zuwanderung," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 20 (1980), pp. 265-32; Hans-Jürgen Puhle, *Agrarische Interessenpolitik und Preussischer Konservatismus im Wilhelminischen Reich, 1893–1914. Ein Beitrag zur Analyse des Nationalismus in Deutschland am Beispiel des Bundes der Landwirte und der Deutsch-Konservativen Partei* (Hannover: Verlag für Literatur u. Zeitgeschichte, 1967), pp. 246-254; Jens Flemming, "Fremdheit und Ausbeutung. Großgrundbesitz, 'Leutenot' und Wanderarbeiter im Wilhelminischen Deutschland," in: Heinz Reif (ed.) *Ostelbische Agrargesellschaft im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1994), pp. 346-360; Bruchhold-Wahl, *Die Krise des Grossgrundbesitzes*, pp. 82-104, 129-136. On the transnational and global connections of the new labor regime in Prussia's eastern provinces, see Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), ch. 3.

Conceptualizing Colonization: Liberal Reforms and the North American Frontier

Against the backdrop of intensifying competition from Russian and North American agricultural producers on the world market, German social scientists and many Prussian officials came to consider the large estates in the Prussian East as uncompetitive and economically unviable. Instead, they suggested to increase the amount of land cultivated by independent farmers, an undertaking that they labeled “internal colonization” (*Innere Kolonisation*). The term “internal colonization” was already in use in German-speaking Central Europe for rural settlement in the fenlands of Northwest Germany. As I discuss in chapter two, the term was also adopted by Protestant social reformers to discuss housing schemes for workers.⁴⁷ These schemes generally combined self-run organization with moral and economic supervision by external benefactors or state officials. The economist Gustav Schmoller and his fellow academics in the influential Association for Social Policy (*Verein für Socialpolitik*, VfS) repurposed the label to promote a different project, grounded in liberal notions about the independent capitalist farmer as the backbone of the nation. Formulated against the backdrop of the crisis in Prussian large-scale agriculture and the indebtedness of large estates, it involved a full-scale agrarian reform that included the setting up of settlement plots for workers and small and medium farmers on previously under-cultivated land or land previously included in large-scale agrarian production

⁴⁷ As Elizabeth Jones has shown, internal colonization in the German Northwest combined a mission of economic improvement and civilization in the countryside along the North Sea coast, where alleged backward methods of cultivation (such as pit burning) and inhospitable marshland were seen by the officials and experts as hindering development. To remedy the problem, the Prussian agricultural ministry established a commission to manage the establishment of closely regulated agricultural colonies that were aimed at creating permanent settlement using modern cultivation methods. On fenland settlements in Northwest Germany and its connections with the settlement in Polish Prussia, see Elizabeth B. Jones “Keeping Up with the Dutch: Internal Colonization and Rural Reform in Germany, 1800–1914,” *International Journal for History, Culture, and Modernity* 3:2 (2005), pp. 183–194; idem, “The Rural Social Ladder: Internal Colonization, Germanization, and Civilizing Missions in the German Empire,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 40 (2014), pp. 458–492. I discuss the denominational social-reformist notion of internal colonization in more detail in the second chapter, in the context of housing reform and workers’ settlements.

units. Crucially, Schmoller and his associates utilized the term to provide the state bureaucracy with an ideological framework to implement the 1886 Settlement Law.⁴⁸

The Association for Social Policy was established in 1872 to promote greater state involvement in the economy through paternalist social reform that would counter the rise of social democracy and enhance labor discipline. The studies and policy recommendations put forward by the VfS were taken very seriously by Prussian officials and political leadership, including chancellor Bismarck. Leading members of the association such as Gustav Schmoller and Georg Friedrich Knapp worried about the political radicalization of working people under the conditions of capitalist production and nominally free labor, which came in the wake of Prussia's agrarian reforms in the earlier part of the century.⁴⁹ Once the agrarian reforms had officially abolished heritable serfdom, the state's new historical task, Schmoller argued, was "uplifting the working class and conciliating it with our economic order."⁵⁰

In order to address these seemingly contradictory goals, Schmoller and his VfS colleagues drew on Georg Friedrich Knapp's 1887 study of the Prussian agrarian reforms and the historical and economic conditions that brought about the creation of a mobile class of rural workers. According to Andrew Zimmerman, this study offered the VfS a basic template for articulating the relationship between seemingly disparate historical and economic developments. The abolishment of serfdom entailed the conversion of manorial dues and obligations into long-term debt relations between the now-emancipated peasants to their former lord, and the creation

⁴⁸ Zimmerman, *German Sociology and Empire*; Gustav Schmoller "Die preußische Kolonisation des 17. und 18. Jahrhundert," in: Verein für Socialpolitik, *Zur Inneren Kolonisation in Deutschland: Erfahrungen und Vorschläge* (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1886), pp. 1–43.

⁴⁹ Zimmerman, *German Sociology and Empire and Alabama in Africa*; Lindenfeld, *The Practical Imagination*, pp. 217-233.

⁵⁰ See Schmoller's review of Knapp's study on Prussia's agrarian reforms: Gustav Schmoller, "Der Kampf um die Freiheit des Bauernstandes," *Jahrbücher für Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung* 12 (1888), pp. 245-255, p. 254.

of landowning peasantry under regulations that transferred most of the land it formerly tilled to their erstwhile lord. Under these conditions and the heavy-handed labor control of estate-owners, most of the rural population in the areas of manorial lordship (*Gutsherrschaft*) in eastern Germany became landless farmworkers, and many sought their fortunes elsewhere. Knapp argued that mass emigration from Prussia's eastern provinces was the result, with millions migrating to urban industrial centers in western Germany and abroad. These developments exacerbate the miserable working and living conditions of urban workers and encouraged their political radicalization, while creating labor scarcity in Prussian large-scale agriculture and threatening its economic viability. The answer to these developments, Schmoller and his colleagues suggested, was the promotion of rural smallholding across the country. This held particularly for the eastern provinces of Prussia, which were more sparsely populated and whose large-scale agriculture, they argued, became economically unsustainable against the backdrop of intensifying global competition in agricultural produce and the resulting fall in grain prices.⁵¹

Rural smallholding was the linchpin of the VfS ideas for agrarian reform, but there were in fact two kinds of populations that were supposed to be settled: small independent farmers and

⁵¹ This simplified outline of Knapp's work overviews some of the main arguments as they relate to the present discussion. For a detailed critical discussion of Knapp's *Bauernbefreiung* see Harmut Harnisch, "Agrargeschichtsforschung und sozialpolitisches Engagement im deutschen Kaiserreich (Georg Friedrich Knapp)," *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1993), pp. 95-132; Heinrich Kaak, *Die Gutsherrschaft: Theoriegeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Agrarwesen im ostelbischen Raum* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1991), esp. ch. 2, and for the utilization of Knapp's arguments to promote the goals of the Association for Social Policy, see pp. 83-85. Knapp's work appeared as Georg Friedrich Knapp, *Die Bauernbefreiung und der Ursprung der Landarbeiter in den älteren Theilen Preußens* (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1887). Knapp thought that the main reason for the impoverishment of the landed population was the land they directly lost to their former lords, but later research has shown that the loss of access to manorial and communal meadowland and forestland was more significant in this regard, and contributed to an increasing gulf between independent farmers (With a minimum landholding of between 7.5-15 Hectare, depending on soils and land-use) on the one hand and smaller landholders and landless rural workers on the other hand. The latter groups were excluded from the land reforms, remained obligated to estate owners for a longer period, and also lost access to communal lands which were broadly divided between lords and independent farmers. See Dietrich Saalfeld, "Zur Frage des bäuerlichen Landverlust im Zusammenhang mit den preussischen Agrarreformen," *Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie* 11 (1963), pp. 163-171; Hartmut Zückert, *Allmende und Allmendaufhebung: Vergleichende Studien zum Spätmittelalter bis zu den Agrarreformen des 18./19. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2003), pp. 331-333.

workers. As Schmoller declared, “the only absolute bulwark” against social democracy and revolution was to allow a “sufficient number of small people and workers” to enter the ranks of the property-owning class, even if property meant only a “small house and a garden.”⁵² Schmoller suggested a range of 30,000–40,000 farms for independent farmers and 100,000–120,000 small plots for workers, based on his evaluation of what was administratively possible at the time. His projected class of rural workers, it seems, was supposed to take up seasonal employment with the projected class of independent farmers or work for the remaining large estates in the eastern provinces of Prussia. Schmoller’s program for creating a “rural middle class” (*Mittelstand*) elided rather than acknowledged social conflict.⁵³ Against the backdrop of a resurgent Social Democratic Party (SPD) that with its 1890 Erfurt Program embarked on large-scale, if ultimately unsuccessful campaign to win support in the countryside (*Landagitation*), such ideas increasingly appealed to Prussia’s political class.⁵⁴

The United States seemed to German economists to offer a glowing example of how proprietorship of land could lead to the development of an entrepreneurial, capitalist spirit among farmers that also made possible the economic expansion of the United State and the creation of its continental empire. During the 1880s, as emigration from Imperial Germany to North

⁵² As Schmoller wrote, “es giebt nur einen absolut sicheren Schutzwall gegen alle Sozialdemokratie und Revolution, eine entsprechende Zahl der kleinen Leute und Arbeiter hinüberzuziehen in die Klasse der Landeigentümer.” Schmoller, *Der Kampf*, pp. 245ff.

⁵³ On the calculation of the required number of settlers, see Schmoller. *Die preußische Kolonisation*, p. 41. The 1883 “rural middle class” quote is taken from Zimmerman, *German Sociology and Empire*, p. 170. In 1897 Schmoller utilized the 1895 occupation statistics to create broadly defined categories of the new and old *Mittelstand*. Widely accepted at the time in mainstream public discourse, this new population category was neither descriptive nor did it represent any sociological reality. It was, Adam Tooze argues, a normative political category manufactured out of questionable numbers to make society look less proletarian and conflict-ridden. See Adam Tooze, *Statistics and the German State 1900-1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 44–46.

⁵⁴ On the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the agrarian question, and countryside campaigning, see Athar Hussain and Keith Tribe, *Marxism and the Agrarian Question* (London: Macmillan Press, 1983[1981]), pp. 72-101.

America peaked and the North American competition caused grain prices to plummet, learning from the American example seemed a particularly urgent task. German economists evinced growing interest in touring the United States and Canada to study different aspects of their agrarian economies. By the mid 1890s, the United States was seen by German academics both as a potential imperial rival and as a main point of reference for possible economic policies and technological and logistical innovations.⁵⁵

Schmoller's student and protégé, Max Sering, was a key figure in making the North American frontier not just a metaphor or an analogy but a practical model for Germany's agricultural development. At the behest of the Prussian government, Sering went on a fact-finding tour of North America in 1883 and 1884 to study the agrarian economy, composing a comprehensive analysis and a set of policy recommendation for German conditions. This tour allowed him to develop a vision for Prussian agriculture that drew on the North American example but emphasized the ways in which Germany could gain a competitive edge in some sectors despite the United States' size and resources. He suggested that Germany would take advantage of its dense population and smaller landholding to increase specialization in intensive cultivation of high-end crops. Sering's other important lesson from his North American visit was very much in line with Fredrick Turner's famous frontier thesis, first articulated in July 1893.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Erik Grimmer-Solem, *Learning Empire: Globalization and the German Quest for World Status, 1875-1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), ch. 1.

⁵⁶ Fredrick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" [1893], in: idem, *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Henry Holt, 1921), pp. 1–38. Jürgen Osterhammel offers a sober and critical analysis of the frontier concept and its different usages and shows how *unusual* was the frontier and the imperial expansion of the United State in comparison to other imperial settler colonies. Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*, Translated by Patrick Camiller (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2014 (2009)), pp. 322–391. For him, "a frontier is an extensive (not simply local) situation or process where, in a given territory, at least two collectives of different ethnic origin and cultural orientation, usually under the threat or use of force, maintain contacts with each other that are not regulated by a single overarching political and legal order. One of these collectives plays the role of the invader, whose primary interest is in appropriating and exploiting land and/or other natural resources" (p. 326).

Based on the self-confident and entrepreneurial farmers whom he met, who migrated from Germany to take up farms in the American West following the 1862 Homestead Act, Sering saw a key explanation for the economic success of North American agriculture in the independent farmer. Taking this lesson to Prussia's eastern provinces, Sering's 1887 book on North America complemented Knapp's historical narrative with a contemporary comparison that proved that independent farmers are economically and morally superior to large estates and their authoritarian owners. For Sering, North America was the example for successful internal colonization – he repeatedly used this term in his writings – and his main reservation was that the state was not more involved in this process in order to curb land speculation, regulate land acquisition and the provision of rural credit, and to direct the development of infrastructure. Sering's publications between 1885 and 1893 operationalized the North American frontier for empire-making strategies in the German empire and cemented his position as Germany's foremost agrarian settlement expert.⁵⁷

Drawing on the idea of the North American frontier at the moment of its historical closure in the 1890s and its constitutive role in the formation of the imperial nation-state, liberal imperialists of the educated middle classes brought together the historically indeterminant trajectory of westward expansion with the administrative, regulatory, and enforcing capacities of the Prussian state. Only such a state could conduct the kind of bureaucratic, planned, and highly controlled settlement that the Prussian Colonization Commission touted as “modern colonization.” After all, when Schmoller warned in 1886 against leaving internal colonization to

⁵⁷ Robert L. Nelson, “The Archive for Inner Colonization, the German East, and World War I,” in: idem (ed.) *Germans, Poland, and colonial expansion to the East. 1850 through the present* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) pp. 65-94, p. 66; “A German on the Prairies: Max Sering and Settler Colonialism in Canada,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 5:1 (January 2015), pp. 1–19; idem, “From Manitoba to the Memel: Max Sering, Inner Colonization and the German East,” *Social History* 35:4 (November 2010), pp. 439–57.

rowdy “squatters” and advocated instead a planned, expert-focused, state-led project that required settler obedience, he was precisely laying out the *difference* between the historical examples that excited him and his fellow “imperialists of the chair,” and the actual conditions in Polish Prussia.⁵⁸ Internal colonization in Polish Prussia took place on the margins of the continental empire but still well within reach of the imperial heartland. In light of the high labor and land costs, the existing structures of landownership and imperial domination, and in the face of an intransigent Polish-speaking population and Polish national movement, the Prussian state undertook a massive investment in constructing a highly bureaucratized imperial frontier of settlement in its border region, which was fundamentally different from the North American frontier and westward expansion.

The dissertation roughly concludes with the outbreak of World War I, but the continuities of individual careers and the radicalization of administrative strategies during the war and in its aftermath form an important part of the overall argument. The war proved how slippery the transition between internal and external colonization, between consolidation and expansion could be, as expansionist settlement policies and changing wartime borders rendered any definition of internal/external temporary. Wartime also offered unique opportunities for colonizing officials and agrarian experts to use their experiences of bureaucratic internal colonization to undertake planning and building activities on a far larger scale. Until the war, the Society for the

⁵⁸ According to Andrew Zimmerman, German social science was preoccupied with the dialectics of freedom and coercion in the practical context of scientific management of workers and labor regimes. He also noted the centrality of state coercion in the ‘education to work’ and the colonial civilizing mission in sociological thinking at the time. See Andrew Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South* (Princeton University Press, 2010). For a shorter, more recent version of the argument, including a discussion of Schmoller’s 1886 text, see Zimmerman’s “German Sociology and Empire: From Internal Colonization to Overseas Colonization and Back Again,” in: George Steinmetz (ed.), *Sociology and Empire: Colonial Studies and the Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), pp. 166-187; Nelson, “A German on the Prairies” and “From Manitoba to the Memel”; Erik Grimmer-Solem, “The Professors’ Africa: Economists, the Elections of 1907, and the Legitimation of German Imperialism,” *German History* 25:3 (July, 2007), pp. 313–47.

Advancement of Internal Colonization (*Gesellschaft zur Förderung der inneren Kolonisation*), which was established in 1908 with Max Sering as its leading academic figure, sought possibilities for colonization mainly inside Germany's European borders. As Robert Nelson documents, by mid-1915, Sering and other active members decided that there was, in fact, little room for settlement inside the prewar borders of Germany. Instead, they were advocating "internal colonization" in the newly conquered territories to the east and to the west, where military rule could make land more easily available. While Sering was tasked by the leadership of the German Army to come up with settlement plans for the conquered areas on the Eastern Front, the long-time chief architect of the Prussian Colonization Commission, Paul Fischer, could claim unrivaled practical expertise in settlement and seek career advancement in the newly conquered territories.⁵⁹

Research Questions

In order to study the ways in which the Prussian state sought to strategically shape the terms of social reproduction of a German settler society in the Polish-German borderlands in the three decades before World War I, I employ three sets of questions. The first set of questions deals how different German-speaking populations were recruited by the Prussian Colonization Commission and examine the ways in which settlers negotiated the terms of their settlement. In particular, I ask about the kinds of resources they could use to make claims of their own regarding their settlement. Some of these claims even undermined the roles prescribed to them

⁵⁹ I discuss Paul Fischer's career in chapters 2 and 3. For Sering, see Robert L. Nelson, "The Baltics as Colonial Playground: Germany in the East, 1914–1918," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 42:1 (March 2011): pp. 9–19 and idem, "The Archive for Inner Colonization." On Sering's later career and his disagreements with the Nazis, see Irene Stoehr, "Von Max Sering zu Konrad Meyer: ein 'machtergreifender' Generationswechsel in der Agrar- und Siedlungswissenschaft," in Suzanne Heim (ed.), *Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), pp. 57–90.

by the state. At the same time, I look at the ways in which the commission sought to enforce these roles and to ensure that settlers remained in the border region.

The second set of questions deals with the spatial organization of social life in settler villages. Arriving in Prussian Poland, settlers came to villages that were already planned in detail by the Prussian Colonization Commission. They had to set up new farms within an already existing plan and according to the commission's building regulations. I ask what political, social, and economic considerations undergirded the commission's planning of new built environments. I also examine how architecture was utilized by the commission to articulate and reproduce cultural hierarchies between Germans from different home regions and between German farmers and German workers. In particular, I ask how new developments in building design and style during that period were used by the commission as it sought to employ architecture and planning to manage the diverse populations of workers and farmers involved in the process of settlement. The construction of villages and settlers' agricultural production both required workers, and local Polish workers were usually the most readily available.

As the commission aimed to create "purely German" settlements, it increasingly sought ways to replace Polish workers with Germans. The supply and distribution of German workers among settler-villages and settler households form the focus of my third set of questions. I examine the ways in which the commission attempted to create the conditions for social reproduction of an ethnic German working-class, and ask what kinds of material, institutional, and legal infrastructures, both in the border region and throughout Imperial Germany, facilitated and constrained these attempts. Looking in particular at the commission's attempt to import working-class children from western Germany who were removed from their families, I examine children's training and distribution in settler-families as labor. Emphasizing the variety of ways

in which children and their families could and did resist their separation, I ask to what extent displacing children actually shaped the terms of social reproduction of a German settler society in the German-Polish borderlands

Methods and Archives

This dissertation relies heavily on the Prussian bureaucratic archives, especially the surviving documents of the Colonization Commission that are divided between the Prussian State Archive in Berlin and the Gniezno Branch of the Polish State Archive in Poznań.⁶⁰ Many of the commission's head office files did not survive World War II, but there remains a substantial amount of internal procedural documents and circulars.⁶¹ The missing files of the commission can be substituted in part through the files of Prussian ministries that were represented on the commission's board. The most useful and extensive collection of ministerial

⁶⁰ Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (GStA PK, Berlin-Dahlem), Rep. 212, and Archiwum Państwowe w Poznaniu, Oddział w Gnieźnie (APP-Gniezno), Komisja Kolonizacyjna. The catalogues for both collections are not digitized and are available only in their original form, combining machine-typed volumes and hand-written additions and corrections. The catalogues and corrections are written in a mix of Polish and German. In Gniezno there are five hefty volumes, prepared after 1945: Vol. 1: General, Personal, and Communal Files; Vol. 2: Legal Processes and Estate Management; Vol. 3: Land Purchase; Vol. 4: Melioration and Building Activity; Vol. 5: Settlement and Division Plans. In Berlin there is a single weighty volume, a catalogue that was prepared in 1938 and must be specially requested. The Commission's vast archives were first catalogued in 1938 and combined the Berlin material and with the material that used to be in the Poznań archive and is now in Gniezno. In 1940, materials of both archives were utilized for fact-finding studies by Nazi settlement and administration experts. It seems that much of the material used at that time no longer exists. Under APP-Gniezno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Vol. 1: "Generalia" one may find a bundle of loose pages that are all that remains from the second, Poznań volume of the 1938 catalogue. The commission's head office moved to Berlin after WWI, before being officially disbanded in 1924. Some of its remaining files, including technical personnel files, were deposited and are still located in the *Preussische Bau- und Finanzdirektion* collection in Landesarchiv Berlin, A Pr. Br. Rep. 042. Throughout the 1920s, the commission's materials deposited in Berlin were supplemented by materials received from private individuals and organizations, and so the collection continued to grow long after 1924.

⁶¹ These are GStA PK: I. HA Rep 212 Ns. 5126-5136, 5152-5156: General instructions and circulars to estate managers; I. HA Rep. 212 Ns. 5142-5143: Various regulations for settlement; I. HA Rep. 212 Ns. 5144-5147: Legal and administrative rulings; I. HA Rep. 212 Ns. 5148-5151: Administrative procedures; I. HA Rep. 212 Nr. 5266: Senior personnel files. Some of these files are collections of general circulars that were issued by the president of the commission and kept by different departments within the commission. They are thus almost identical in content. This is the case for Ns. 5126-5136 and Ns. 5142-5143, although the latter two diverge in their content after 1911.

files that touches on the settlement project is located in the archives of the ministry of agriculture. The files that pertain to the small number of settler-villages that remained in Germany after 1918 are mostly preserved in Berlin, while the files for the vast majority of over 800 villages that became part of the new Polish republic are in Gniezno, a massive archive of many tens of thousands of village-level files which deal with most aspects of the commission's work.

In addition to these two archives, I draw on municipal archives in Germany and Poland, personal and organizational collections in the German Federal Archives (in Berlin-Lichterfelde and in Koblenz), church, provincial, and county level administration files in Berlin, Koszalin, Poznań, and Gniezno, personal and village archives in Württemberg, and ministerial files in Berlin. An important and neglected source for the history of the settlement project is the personal papers of Alfred Hugenberg, located in the Koblenz branch of the German Federal Archive. Alfred Hugenberg's vast correspondence brings together a range of seemingly disparate fields of activity and allows a glimpse into the process of production of many arguments, documents, and initiatives that receive a very different framing in, or are missing altogether from, the official administrative archive. This dissertation utilizes the Hugenberg correspondence for the first time in connection with the Prussian Colonization Commission.

The dispersed and state-centered nature of most of the archival material posed a range of challenges for my research which informed my methodological choices. The dissertation began as an attempt to use a social history perspective to understand the local, micro-level unfolding of a project of settlement that had been primarily discussed as an issue of high politics and understood within national frameworks. I wanted to look closely at settler-villages established by the Prussian Colonization Commission and how they were transformed into settler villages to

develop insights about the settlement project as a whole. I spent considerable research time trying to figure out what archives were available, how they were structured, and what were the interpretative problems they posed. The archives of the Prussian Colonization Commission, split between Germany and Poland, seemed the obvious starting point and proved to be extensive and challenging in their structure, makeup, and history. The many tens of thousands of files about specific villages, and the existence of roughly fifty to a hundred files for each village, required categories for selection and appraisal of the material. I began by working in the Prussian State Archives in Berlin, combining the files on the commission's administrative procedures with files on villages and files from the higher echelons of the Prussian bureaucracy, in particular the chancellery and agricultural ministry. Once I developed a better understanding of the processes of settlement and of the policies and administrative politics involved, I turned to specific villages in order to learn more on the contestations, negotiations, and blurry political loyalties that I presumed were to be found mostly on the local level.

The attempt to formulate criteria for choosing villages from the depth of the administrative archive proved epistemologically and methodologically problematic. Without knowing much about any particular village from either primary or secondary sources outside of the commission's administrative archive, I ran the risk of unwittingly adopting some of the unsaid assumptions and social categorization of the commission's officials. Nevertheless, due to the charred archival landscape left by Poland's twentieth century, and particularly the lack of village-level sources and court records for many areas formerly controlled by Prussia, I knew that the commission and its archive would have to take a central role in my research. And then again, I did not want to fall prey to officials' perspective on the social world. Drawing on the insight that the social dynamics of settlement was an intensely local affair, I decided to use

village files to investigate specific questions about the strategic use of state resources to create a German settler society.

To tackle some of the biases that resulted from the fact that my sources were primarily state-produced, German-language administrative documents, I adopted three complementary approaches. First, I decided to take up paths from inside the Prussian bureaucratic archive and follow them outside, to other archives, social contexts, and unexpected historical trajectories. This methodology allowed me to draw seemingly disparate local historical developments together around the thread provided by the archives of the Prussian Colonization Commission. Each of the chapters of the dissertation represents such a foray in and out of the bureaucratic archive (and then back again), from municipal welfare policy, guardianship laws and institutional care for children, through the entanglement of piety and kinship practices in the settlers' migration decisions, to housing reforms and architects' professionalizing aspirations. Secondly, for each such foray, I endeavored to explore and reconstruct the range of historical possibilities that became available for different historical actors in the context of settlement, and to uncover unexpected social actors who actively shaped the process of settlement from its margins. In this way, the dissertation recontextualizes the Prussian settlement project as an imperial project grounded in specific legal and institutional infrastructures that span the German continental empire, from Württemberg and Frankfurt am Main through Leipzig and Berlin to Poznan, and back again.

To further analyze the different interests, logics, and power relationships of different institutions and individuals that came to light in relation to each other, I adopted another approach that looks for social logic of administrative practice. Lissa Roberts has suggested considering different social visions and their "future-oriented" formulations as practices in their

own right. She proposes the concept of “imagineering” to highlight the “practices whereby social groups during the second half of the long eighteenth century sought to ‘engineer’ socio-material environments and populations that manifested the norms, values and expectations they held dear.” Although the ways in which social imaginaries “stretch out into the future” are historically specific, attention to this “stretching out” is of methodological importance.⁶² I take this to mean also something less planned or engineered about the language of administrative practice, which includes particular concepts and ways of argumentation that are constitutive of future administrative practice. These insights helped me to ask about the social logic of administrative practice regarding socially embedded strategic choices (where policies become projects).

Overview of Chapters

The dissertation’s five chapters highlight settlement as a social process by identifying and investigating specific sites where the production and reproduction of a settler society were negotiated and where the limitations and contradictions of state actions became palpable. The state’s strategic choices and their effects on social reality are brought out through my analysis of the social dynamics of settlement through three main entry points: recruitment and migration, the spatial organization of social life, and the provision of labor.

In Chapter 1, “Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: The Recruitment of Settlers and the Contestation over Prussian Frontier Citizenship,” I consider the recruitment of settlers as a contested social process and explores how negotiations between settlers and the Colonization Commission partially determined the terms of settlement in Polish Prussia. Drawing on the largely untapped sources on the village level and outside the commission’s bureaucratic archive,

⁶² Lissa Roberts, “Practicing oeconomy during the second half of the long eighteenth century: an introduction,” *History and Technology* 30:3 (2004), pp. 133–148, p. 136.

this chapter reveals how settlers were recruited, how their migration unfolded in practice, and what possible motivations and life trajectories they had in mind when deciding to move to the Prussian border provinces. The chapter recounts how the commission tried to recruit settlers from South Germany in the late 1880s and focuses on a group of prospective settlers from Württemberg who sought to collectively negotiate their term of settlement with the commission, utilizing their relatively strong bargaining position as a group under the aegis of local notables. The ensuing negotiations allow us to see how the commission defined and redefined the goals of settlement and its expectations from settlers, as well as the range of options settlers had at their disposal to influence the terms of their settlement in the Prussian border region. The chapter introduces the concept of “Prussian Frontier Citizenship” to discuss the contested implications of being a German settler in the colonized provinces. While the state developed a normative working definition about these implications, based on the formal acquisition of Prussian citizenship and the *duty* to exercise the political *rights* included therein, the chapter demonstrates that in fact, frontier citizenship was negotiated rather than determined by the state and that settlers’ social practices often did not conform to their assigned role.

The ways in which settlers’ own social context mattered in the process of settlement are brought out in the chapter by zooming in on settlers from one Württemberg village, Möglingen, where a rich village archives allowed a reconstruction of family alliances across several generations. By drawing the kinship practices of settlers and their families going back to the early 1800s, together with the history of Pietist ferment in the village, the chapter highlights the complexity and variety of ways in which religiosity, family, and migration trajectories connected across generations. The chapter complicates our understanding of the commission’s activities by introducing new historical actors and new sets of questions about recruitment and about the

changing and disputed meaning of Germanness in the border region, exposing the contested nature of settlement and the continued tension between the commission's expectations from settlers and settlers' own interests, ideas, resources, and prospects.

The establishment of a bureaucratic frontier of settlement on the local level was shaped not only by settlers' own social context, but also by the land tenure regime they tied themselves into and by the society they joined in coming to Polish Prussia. Once settlers established themselves in the Colonization Commission's estates in growing numbers during the 1890s, the commission found it increasingly necessary to provide German workers instead of the local Polish-speaking workers to promote its vision of German-only village communities. In chapter 2, "Workers Housing, Internal Colonization, and Social Reform," I show how German settlement in Polish Prussia partially grew out of wider concerns about workers' housing and social reform in industrial cities, and also significantly shaped the history of workers' housing reform in Germany well into the interwar period. Looking at the commission's building activity in the 1890s and 1900s, the chapter offers a new perspective on the history of German settlement in Polish Prussia by demonstrating that it served as the first testing grounds for many housing reforms, and thus also forms a part of the histories of housing, regional planning, and modern architecture in Germany.

The chapter looks at the bureaucratic procedures adopted by the commission to shape the spatial organization of social life in its settlements and relates them to the interplay between forms of land tenure, housing design, and the fundamentally different political economies involved in the settlement of workers and farmers. In order to recruit German-speaking workers under conditions of labor scarcity and mass emigration out of rural Eastern Germany, the commission tried to import workers from other parts of Germany and from German-speaking

communities in the Russian and Austrian empires. The new land tenure form that was introduced with the establishment of the Colonization Commission in 1886 (the *Rentegut*) offered settlers land ownership that was combined with a long-term, unamortizable lease. Although it required no upfront payment, prospective settlers had to demonstrate that they had the capital required to set up a farm and pay a fixed annuity. Workers could not afford to establish a house or a farm and hence the commission had to build housing for them and use other forms of land tenure than the *Rentegut*. The chapter shows how the settlement of workers came to be a central problem in the commission's agrarian settlement and how it related to changes in the commission's village planning and architectural designs. By the late 1900s, the commission used most of its building budget for workers' housing and invested increasing resources in collaborating with private associations to establish worker colonies in Polish Prussia, usually in collaboration with large employers. The transition from farmers' settlement to workers' settlement demonstrates some of the discrepancies between the ideological underpinnings of the commission's activities and its economic imperatives and points more broadly to the inherent contradictions in its project of bureaucratic settlement.

The commission's attempts to shape the spatial organization of social life in its settler-villages points to a fundamental paradox in Prussia's bureaucratic frontier-making: the template of a traditional and organically evolved German village that symbolized what a thoroughly German homeland or *Heimat* should look like contradicted the administrative project of planning villages from scratch, partially based on the labor of predominantly Polish workers. Chapter Three, "Heimat-Building: German Farmhouses and Social Hierarchies," explores the relation of the widely used concept of homeland or *Heimat* to its material realization in planning, architecture, and building in the commission's villages. The chapter focuses on the relationship

between nationalist and romanticizing notions of the German peasant farmhouse (*Bauernhaus*) and the construction of difference between different groups of Germans. As political anxieties about the place of multiethnic provinces within the Prussian-German empire were projected onto the landscape of Polish Prussia, the commission increasingly portrayed its activities as a Heimat-building project. Its chief architect, Paul Fischer, used new ideas about how to combine modern architectural methods with traditional, rural, and regional building traditions to craft managerial tools of administration. In 1896, Fischer tried to reduce construction costs and change the unappealing appearance of the commission-built farms to reverse the downturn in the numbers of new settlers. To that end, he undertook a survey of settler farms, from which he hoped to learn what kinds of farm design would appeal to settlers. The chapter argues that Fischer and the commission developed and institutionalized a cultural hierarchy between different kinds of Germans based on assumed regionalist differences in cultural level and on naturalized class difference. This hierarchy was articulated through the idiom of *Heimat* and materialized in architectural designs and village planning. Finally, tracing Fischer's career into the 1920s shows how the expertise he acquired in designing farmhouses and workers' dwellings in settlement villages opened up new career opportunities for him after the outbreak of the war in 1914. Relocating first to East Prussia to lead its reconstruction after the short period of Russian occupation, he later took up senior posts in government ministries in Berlin and partially shaped regulatory reforms in the field of housing and building regulations into the mid-1920s.

The commission never quite managed to bring in and hold onto enough German workers to allow settlers and estate managers to employ only German labor, but it did experiment with a range of innovative strategies of placement and displacement. The fourth chapter, "'Give Us a Child for Christmas': Nationalizing Children and the Politics of Child Displacement," introduces

a hitherto unknown scheme coproduced by the Pan-German League and the Colonization Commission, that brought poor Protestant children, administratively designated as orphans, from cities in western Germany to Prussia's Polish provinces. The children were received by a charitable children's institution established by leading members of the Pan-German League and supported by the state, where they were trained for their assigned future role as workers in settlers' households. In the context of endemic shortage in agricultural labor, these children were to replace Polish household and farm workers within a larger administrative project of separating Poles from Germans. Despite the failure to permanently settle these children in the colonized provinces, the scheme opened up new spheres for administrative action and political imagination regarding the utilization of children in imperial politics, in the context of increased state interest in controlling young people's morals, politics, and everyday lives. Children were at the heart of the Germanization of the imperial border region.

The fifth chapter, "Colonizing Families: Orphaning, Fostering, and Children's Work," continues the story of the Protestant German children sent to Polish Prussia to serve the Prussian-German settlement project, but shifts the focus from children as objects of nationalist politics to their active and often reluctant participation in the colonization project. I trace how children were separated from their families in western German cities and brought to the Neuzedlitz children's institution in Poznan and explicate the placement and inspection regimes that were set up as the Neuzedlitz children were sent to foster families. Based on the fragmented and dispersed sources that are available to us, the chapter reconstructs how children were trained at the institution and argues that their time at the institution was meant to supply city-born working-class children with the skills for household and farm work in households of settlers, junior officials, and pastors. The chapter elucidates how the attempt to tear children from their

families and transplant them to a new set of relations was largely unsuccessful, as most children went back to their hometowns and families as soon as they could. Nevertheless, the provision of children had a considerable impact on the political economies of settlers' households in Poznań, where children worked first while attending school and later as domestic workers or *Gesinde*. These practices of separation, dislocation, training, and placement are indicative of the ambitions entertained by colonizing officials and radical nationalists alike. The chapter contends that the displacement and allocation of children were strategies to reshape the terms of social production and reproduction in Polish Prussia. These strategies were deployed through a pan-imperial infrastructure of laws, welfare organizations, Christian charities, and municipal social reformers that enabled the utilization of children for colonization on the imperial frontier.

Across the chapters, the dissertation brings out the imperial framework that connected, enabled, and constrained the colonization of Polish Prussia, while highlighting the limits of the state's transformative capacity in the face of existing political structures, competing interests, and the tenacity with which many of the people involved sought to assert their own interests and life choices. The construction of an imperial frontier of settlement, despite the power of the state and the commission's determination to meticulously plan villages and categorize their inhabitants, proved to be a fraught process whose limitations became evident on the eve of World War I. Nevertheless, the administrative experiences garnered through the commission's activities proved particularly pertinent during the war and in its aftermath. As empire-making and nation-making were welded together in new ways after the outbreak of war in August 1914, colonization became an instrument of imperial expansion in the rapidly changing geopolitics of war. As the German state adopted the colonization of ethnic Germans as a strategy to buttress its war gains in the East, its aims and techniques both drew on and superseded the activities of the

Colonization Commission in Polish Prussia. At the same time, the commission itself still hoped to bring more German children to settlers' households in Polish Prussia, this time focusing its efforts on war orphans.⁶³ Throughout its existence, the Prussian Colonization Commission significantly contributed to the increasing readiness of the state to experiment with placing and displacing populations, casting a long shadow over the twentieth century.

⁶³ Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), esp. pp. 94-96, 197-198; Annemarie H. Sammartino, *The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914-1922* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). I discuss the Colonization Commission's attempt to recruit war orphans in chapter 4 of the dissertation.

Chapter 1

Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: The Recruitment of Settlers and the Contestation over Prussian Frontier Citizenship

In early June 1890, less than a fortnight after he took up a fifteen-hectare settlement plot in Ustaszewo, a landed estate in Poznanian bought by the Prussian Colonization Commission and undergoing settlement at the time, the settler Johann Müller “vigorously complained” to a visiting commission official about the lack of pastoral care for settlers in the locality. Müller remarked that his family “could not feel at home” (*heimisch*) without regular Sunday church service, access to which was “exceptionally difficult” in Ustaszewo when compared to his Württemberg homeland.⁶⁴ Ustaszewo was located eleven kilometers away from its Protestant parish church in the county town Znin/Żnin, too far to allow regular attendance. In the following days, officials sought a solution for the seventeen settler families present in Ustaszewo, all Protestants from Württemberg who settled in a heavily Catholic area.⁶⁵ Within days of Müller’s complaint, the commission requested the provincial church authorities to provide the settlers with pastoral care and offered to cover the costs of holding a regular Sunday service in the Ustaszewo school building.⁶⁶ The Protestant Consistory complied, and three weeks later a vicar

⁶⁴ “Der Ansiedler Müller auf Stelle Nr. 2 beklagte sich lebhaft über den Mangel kirchlicher Versorgung der dortigen Ansiedler, und bemerkte, dass seine Familie sich in Ustaszewo nicht heimisch fühlen könnte, weil die Möglichkeit des sonntäglichen Kirchenbesuches im Vergleich zu den Verhältnissen seiner bisherigen Heimath außerordentlich erschwert sei...” An apparently identical complaint was made by another settler from Württemberg, Adolf Honecker, who arrived in Ustaszewo in April 1890. See the report by *Regierungsassessor* Hermes on his June 10 visit to Ustaszewo, sent to the president of the Prussian Colonization Commission von Zedlitz, 12.6.1890. APP-Gniezno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Reg. VI Nr. 2899, pp. 1–12, p. 2.

⁶⁵ For the commission’s internal correspondence, in which Müller’s reported words were repeatedly quoted, see APP-Gniezno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Reg. VI Nr. 2899, pp. 1–12. County Znin/Żnin had about 31,500 inhabitants in 1890, only 14% of them Protestants. A narrow-gauge railway would connect the county town with its hinterland only in 1894–1895 in order to transport sugar-beets from large estates to the new sugar refinery there. Regierung- und Baurat Buchholz, “Die Kleinbahn im Kreise Znin,” *Zeitschrift für Kleinbahnen* 1 (1894), pp. 609–612.

⁶⁶ Rudolf von Wittenberg to the Poznanian Provincial Consistory, 15.6.1890. APP, Konsystorz Ewangelicki w Poznaniu, 893 Nr. 8550 (unpaginated), fol. 1.

held a late evening bible-reading circle (*Bibelstunde*) and a Sunday service in Ustaszewo.⁶⁷ Later that year, the commission and the consistory agreed to appoint a special vicar to regularly visit settlements in Poznań. The commission committed to pay for the vicar's expenses and in return, he was to report on the economic situation and the "further development" of the settlements. Moreover, the vicar could be tasked "in individual cases" with facilitating (*Vermitteln*) the communication between settlers and the commission.⁶⁸

Müller's use of pastoral care as an index of comparison between Württemberg and Prussia and his implicit threat to return to Württemberg were attempts to negotiate the terms of his settlement in Polish Prussia. In the strict legal sense, these terms were already set in the contract that settlers had signed with the commission. The contract stipulated the annual payments to the commission for the settlement plot, the terms of contract annulment, the rights that the commission continued to hold in the land, and settlers' entitlements for assistance from the commission in their first years. But settlement contracts were silent on a range of topics which were salient for the signatories, such as pastoral care and election participation. As Müller's story illustrates, there were continuous negotiations over rights, duties, and entitlements between settlers and the commission even after the settlement contract was signed and settlers took up their plot. Unlike most settlers, Müller and his fellow Swabians in Ustaszewo were not Prussian citizens but citizens of Württemberg.⁶⁹ Although the settlement contract did not

⁶⁷ Provincial vicar Hökel to the president of the Colonization Commission von Zedlitz, 7.7.1890. APP-Gniezno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Reg. VI Nr. 2899, p. 4.

⁶⁸ See the official agreement between the Prussian Colonization Commission and the Provincial Consistory from 23.10.1890 in APP, Konsystorz Ewangelicki w Poznaniu, 893 Nr. 8550 (unpaginated), fol. 38–44.

⁶⁹ After 1871, citizenship in Imperial Germany was normally based on residency and citizenship of one of its constituent states, such as Prussia and Württemberg. Legally, there were two kinds of German citizenship, one through the federal states and the other an unmediated citizenship of the *Reich*. The term *Reichsangehörigkeit* was used to broadly designate both kinds of citizenship as well as specifically the second one. The first instance in which the term was made operational was in the case of the French territories of Alsace and Lorraine, which were annexed after the Franco-Prussian war and became the first territory under the immediate sovereignty of Imperial Germany.

mention the issue of citizenship, the commission required every settler to hold or apply for Prussian citizenship. This was primarily because the commission considered settlers' participation in parliamentary elections and in communal administration, both *rights* of Prussian citizens, as central *duties* of German settlers in Polish Prussia. This chapter shows how, by redefining specific citizenship rights as duties and actively enforcing their fulfillment, the Prussian Colonization Commission and the Prussian state created the scaffolding of an evolving variant of Prussian citizenship particular to Polish Prussia. I call this variant "Prussian Frontier Citizenship."

My conceptualization of Prussian Frontier Citizenship draws on a broad understanding of citizenship as dynamic and relational claim-making regarding the terms of belonging and distribution of resources between individuals, groups, and polities. Citizenship is commonly understood as a fixed legal status and a universal set of rights and duties that individuals have in relation to nation-states. Since the 1990s, scholars have expanded this understanding of citizenship to include claim-making by individuals and groups for cultural, social, gender, and other rights, in particular those marginalized in or by a certain polity.⁷⁰ Seeing citizenship as a

Hence, the residents of Alsace and Lorraine became citizens of Imperial Germany. After the arrival of German settlers in the African colonies acquired by Germany in 1884, *Reichsangehörigkeit* was also the term used for settlers' German citizenship as opposed to the indigenous population. The German settlers normally gave up on their citizen-resident status in one of the federal states when they settled in the colonies. See Dieter Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen: die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2001), pp. 162–176. Württemberg's citizenship laws are discussed in detail in section 6 of this chapter.

⁷⁰ Social scientists have long insisted on discussing "modern citizenship" as a fixed personal status that entails universal rights for all the members of a polity. This concept posits an ideal-typical nation-state within a modernization paradigm. See the introduction to Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner (eds.) *Handbook of Citizenship Studies* (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 1–10 and the contributions to Bryan S. Turner (ed.) *Citizenship and Social Theory* (London: Sage 1993), esp. pp. 1–18. A foundational text that posited universal citizenship as the outcome of a historical, whiggish process of the formation of the modern, democratic welfare-state was T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973). For the concept of cultural citizenship that contributed to a significant shift in understanding the demands of marginalized groups for cultural recognition as inherently political, a collective contestation of the terms of citizenship, see Renato Rosaldo, "Cultural citizenship, inequality, and multiculturalism" in Rodolfo D. Torres, Louis F. Miron, and Jonathan Xavier Inda (eds.), *Race, Identity and Citizenship: A Reader* (Malden, MA: Blackwell 1999), pp. 253–261. For a major

site of contestation rather than a universal or homogenous set of rights allowed scholars to problematize the linkage between citizenship, national identities, and nation-states.

Consequently, the concept is used to interrogate power relations across a large variety of polities and can be particularly fruitful for probing moments of social and political crisis in which state legitimacy collapses and the terms of political participation are wrought open.⁷¹

Based on her work on women's political participation in the revolutionary moment of 1918–1920, historian Kathleen Canning suggests the heuristic of “participatory citizenship” to analyze the relationship between political mobilization, contested and new conceptions of citizenship, and political upheaval. Even though the 1871–1914 period did not include a severe crisis of political legitimacy comparable to the moment of 1918, I find Canning's work useful in conceptualizing Prussian Frontier Citizenship in the context of the state's attempts to restructure the relationship between political power and national affiliation in Polish Prussia. Canning proposes three dimensions of what she refers to as “participatory citizenship,” alongside legal definitions of citizenship and normative notions of citizenship. The first dimension is about the “objective” definition and enforcement of the *terms of participation* in specific social and political spaces. The second dimension is citizens' “subjective” sense of having rights, duties,

feminist critique of liberal, universalist citizenship models see Carol Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

⁷¹ Geoff Eley notes the importance for historians of Germany to disengage citizenship from both national identity and the confines of the nation-state and to allow transnational and transregional approaches to problematize precisely such erstwhile natural connections. In this way, citizenship can be particularly useful heuristic for historians of Germany due to the indeterminacy of polities and their boundaries. see Geoff Eley, “Making a Place in the Nation: The Meanings of ‘Citizenship’ in Wilhelmine Germany,” in idem and James Retallack, eds., *Wilhelmism and its Legacies: German Modernities, Imperialism, and the Meaning of Reform, 1890–1930* (New York: Berghahn, 2003), pp. 16–33; “Some General Thoughts on Citizenship in Germany” in Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski, eds., *Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 233–248. For the utilization of citizenship as a heuristic in studies of empires, see e.g. Daniel Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); Bruno Gannerl, translated by Jenifer Walcoff Neuheiser, *Subjects, Citizens, and Others: Administering Ethnic Heterogeneity in the British and Habsburg Empires, 1867–1918* (New York: Berghahn Books 2018 [2010]).

and entitlements, and the third dimension is citizens' attempts to challenge the terms of citizenship in line with their subjective understanding of it.⁷² Drawing on Canning's approach, I take these three dimensions to be dynamic and relational parameters whose interplay was shaped by the available resources and experiences of claim-makers, by the paternalist modes of claim-making and enforcement, and by the extent to which hegemonic and subjective understanding of citizenship overlapped. I propose to consider Prussian frontier citizenship in these terms.

The Prussian Colonization Commission was not only interested in bringing in new German-speakers to Polish Prussia, but also wanted these new people to behave in accordance with its normative understanding of Germanness, which was based on German nationalism with Prussian dominance. The commission had strategically shaped the terms of participation in the colonization of Polish Prussia through recruitment procedures, vetting of applicants, and uniform settlement contracts. It also maintained long-term property rights in the land provided to settlers and had set up an institutional infrastructure to enforce its expectations. Settlers, however, often had their own interests and notions of rights, duties, and entitlements. While the commission claimed the settlers for its political project of Germanization, settlers attributed a range of other meanings to their presence in Polish Prussia. Moreover, although the commission foresaw permanent settlement, settlers often viewed their move as temporary and conditional. Even after settling in the commission's estates, settlers could seek to negotiate the terms of their presence with the commission, as Johann Müller had done. The commission operated with a working definition of Prussian frontier citizenship, and while settlers could and did contest the terms of

⁷² Kathleen Canning, "Reflections on the Vocabulary of Citizenship in Twentieth-Century Germany" in Eley and Palmowski, *Citizenship and National Identity*, pp. 214–32, pp. 223ff. See also Kathleen Canning, "Class vs. Citizenship: Keywords in German Gender History," *Central European History* 37:2 (2004), pp. 225–244.

their settlement, they were seldom in a position to negotiate the basic conditions of participation in the colonization of Prussia's Polish provinces.

In the case of the settlers from Württemberg, who were in contact with the colonization commission in 1888–1889 before migrating to Poznania, we have a rare example in which the terms of participation were collectively negotiated in advance. Normally, individuals who wished to become settlers approached the commission's agents or got in touch directly with estate managers. They needed to undergo administrative scrutiny regarding their political and moral reliability and to prove that they had the required capital. Previous employers as well as local pastors and administrators in their home district were contacted by the commission to attest to settlers' moral character, ability to handle peasant agriculture, military service, and criminal history. The commission also required settlers to hold or apply for Prussian citizenship to make sure that they are able to meet its specific requirements, in particular taking on responsibilities in communal administration and voting in elections.⁷³

In the present case, however, would-be settlers were actively sought out by the commission and this resulted in an extensive correspondence that survives. It recounts a process of mediated bargaining, in which prospective settlers' demands and wishes were put forward collectively and negotiated indirectly between local notables in Württemberg and the president of the Prussian Colonization Commission. Some of these demands related to key stipulations of the settlement contract and to the central parameters of the commission's definition of Prussian frontier citizenship. Swabians, or generally Protestant South Germans, were coveted by the

⁷³ The records of these cases were only partially preserved by the commission at the time and the many "voluminous files" of applications that were mentioned in one 1894 correspondence were not preserved or subsequently lost. In the village files of the commission, located in Gniezno, one could find settlement applications, especially if they evoked some administrative discussion. On the extent of files see President of the Prussian Colonization Commission to the minister of agriculture, 30.4.1894, quoted in Stienen, *Die Anwerbung*, p. 68.

Prussian Colonization Commission on account of their experience and skill in intensive agriculture, their frugality, and their ability to bring in capital to establish themselves.⁷⁴ Taking place less than three years after the commission started its work, the negotiations with the Swabian farmers actually prompted the commission to explicate in writing the contours of Prussian Frontier Citizenship, in part because the farmers were exceptionally well-positioned and had one important Württemberg aristocrat as a local patron.

Just over two years after the commission's establishment, the aristocrat Baron Carl von Varnbüler (1809–1889), a former chief minister of Württemberg, was contacted by senior Prussian representatives to facilitate the recruitment of Swabian settlers. He enlisted a younger local landowner and aspiring politician, Ernst Essich (1855–1935), to conduct the actual recruitment of settlers, and both men undertook negotiations with Prussian officials. After Varnbüler's death in early 1889, Essich continued his involvement in the name of about thirty people interested in leaving Württemberg for Poznania. The two corresponded with the president of the commission, the Prussian career bureaucrat and estate owner Count Robert von Zedlitz-Trützschler.⁷⁵ These negotiations, then, were conducted indirectly between a top Prussian official coming from an important family of the landed aristocracy on the one hand, and a group of prospective settlers from villages located in the Strohgäu area in the Neckar basin North of

⁷⁴ The commission's own experience in the first years of its activity seemed to strengthen what was also a generally accepted notion about the ability of South Germans to bring in capital. The commission reported an average starting capital of 5,166 Marks for settlers from Württemberg and the Protestant part of Bavaria compared to 3,358 Marks on average for all received settlement requests. The numbers, however, are not to be taken at face value. There were only 8 settlement applications from South Germany up to that point, and of the 2785 applications in 1886–1887, 226 were by German colonists in the Russian Empire, who had very little capital (392 Mark on average). See the commission's 1887 annual report, appendix VIII, pp. 53–55.

⁷⁵ On the Württemberg side, the correspondence is partially preserved in Varnbüler's personal papers in Stuttgart: HStA Stuttgart, BW P 10 Bue 591. Although most of the commission's central office files are lost, I was able to locate the originals of the Prussian side of the official correspondence in the files related to the settlement of the Ustaszewo estate in the Polish State Archive in Poznań, Gniezno branch: APP-Gniezno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Reg. VI Nr. 2892.

Stuttgart, on the other hand. The villagers do not speak directly in the documents. Rather, their voices were anonymized and written into a narrative composed by a representative not of their choosing, who belonged to the local elite and operated under the auspices of a prominent aristocrat. The Württemberg notables held an ambiguous position of mediation between the commission and the settlers, which both sides tried to use in the subsequent negotiation over the terms of settlement. Local paternalism, I suggest, could be useful for recruiting groups of settlers for the commission, but could also allow settlers to make collective claims with the support of politically powerful personae, thereby increasing their leverage on the commission.

Some members of the Württemberg group came from one village, Möglingen, whose parish records reveal an extended process of settlement and enduring connections between settlers and their families back in Württemberg. The parish records also reveal how settler families from the village were embedded in a dense structure of marriage alliances across several generations. These alliances formed the social scaffolding for decades of active Pietist presence in the village. Möglingen villagers had close contacts with the nearby Pietist hub in Korntal, which was a center for Pietist attempts to establish colonies outside the state where they would have religious autonomy and better economic opportunities. One Pietist sect that originated in Korntal, the Temple Society, had taken roots in Möglingen and several families from the village participated in the sect's establishment of colonies abroad in the 1860s and 1870s. When settlers from Möglingen arrived in Poznania, they insisted on changing the name of the former estate from Ustaszewo to *Kornthal*, which resonated the devotional landscape of their homeland and suggests what kind of life they sought to lead in the new village. The orthographic resemblance could be confusing: *Kornthal* is used interchangeably with *Korntal* in the sources about the Poznania village. I kept the orthographic anachronism of *Kornthal* to distinguish it from its

Württemberg namesake Korntal. By locating the settlement of Möglingen villagers in Ustaszewo/Kornthal both in a broader history of migration and in their local social context, the chapter reveals that these villagers had exit options and alternatives to settlement in Polish Prussia and used them as resources for making claims on the commission.⁷⁶

This chapter considers the recruitment of settlers not as a question of policy or administration but as a contested social process that partially determined the terms of settlement in Polish Prussia. The scholarship on the Prussian Colonization Commission has hitherto focused almost solely on recruitment policies rather than how recruitment unfolded in practice. This state of the research is partly conditioned on the sources that scholars use. Most works on the commission rely on published government reports and meeting protocols of the commission's board and of the Prussian cabinet. Contributing to this state of affairs is the fact that the commission ceased to preserve information about new applications for settlement in the early 1890s, in part because it decided to direct most of the first-time communication with applicants directly to estate managers. This chapter takes a different path and draws on the largely untapped trove of sources dealing with individual settler-villages in the commission's main archive in Gniezno. It also employs sources outside the official archive, namely personal papers and village archives in Württemberg. By drawing on a varied range of sources outside the commission's bureaucratic archive, this chapter reveals how settlers were recruited and how their migration unfolded in practice. The chapter uses the particular case of the Swabian settlers who came to Ustaszewo to introduce new historical actors and a new set of questions about recruitment,

⁷⁶ For the term "exit option" see Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

exposing the contested nature of settlement and the continued tension between the commission's expectations from settlers and settlers' own interests, ideas, resources, and prospects.

Citizenship as a Nationalizing Tool in Imperial Germany

Citizenship rules in Imperial Germany were a central arena for the nationalization and racialization of political belonging, and the commission's citizenship policies and expectations from settlers were formulated within this context. Since the Swabian settlers coming to Ustaszewo were not Prussians, their citizenship proved a fundamental point of contention in their negotiations with the commission. Before discussing these negotiations, we need to understand how citizenship and the nationalization of political belonging worked in Prussia and Imperial Germany before 1914.

Up to the eve of World War I, federal states and political elites debated the boundaries of German citizenship, who would be excluded outright, how citizenship rights would be extended from one person to another, and more broadly, how the relationship between national belonging and state citizenship would be shaped. Diverging conceptions of the nation, the family, gender relations, colonial rule, and racial difference played into the debate around these questions. One reason for the persistent indeterminacy of these questions was the fact that long after the establishment of Imperial Germany in 1871, the legal contours of German citizenship continued to be based on belonging to a federal state and to a local community, and each state had its own naturalization and residency rules. Moreover, there were areas in Imperial Germany, e.g. the annexed Alsace-Lorraine and the African Colonies, where citizenship was determined directly by imperial authorities rather than a federal state.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Alongside German citizenship acquired or held through a federal state, there was also an unmediated citizenship of Imperial Germany. The term *Reichsangehörigkeit* was used to broadly designate both kinds of citizenship as well as specifically the second one. The first instance in which the term was made operational was in the case of the

Throughout this period, Prussia, the largest and most populous federal state, consistently pushed for a uniform and restrictive imperial citizenship. Previously, all German states shared a territorial definition of citizenship that relied on long-term residency. As Dieter Gosewinkel argues in his study of the nationalization of citizenship in Germany, Prussia consistently utilized Prussian citizenship as a tool to promote the nationalization and the homogenization of Imperial Germany's population. Between the 1890s and 1913, the Prussian government's attempts to regulate and control movement across its eastern border and pressure from radical nationalist groups led the imperial parliament to debate and finally enact a uniform citizenship law that would better serve German empire-building ambitions while shoring up an exclusionary and racialist conception of the nation and reforming the territorial basis for citizenship⁷⁸ At the same time, longer federalist traditions of dynastic allegiance and state-patriotism persisted in other German states, and some states continued to chart partially divergent approaches to citizenship.⁷⁹

New forms of state citizenship were introduced by German rulers alongside existing forms of political belonging in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in the context of the French Revolution and the ensuing continental conflict. During this period, the concept of citizenship had first entered the German political and legal language through the term

French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, annexed after the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian war. They became the only territory under the immediate sovereignty of Imperial Germany. After the establishment of colonies of settlement in Africa, settlers' German citizenship was termed *Reichsangehörigkeit*, as they normally gave up on their residency in one of the federal states. See Dieter Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen: die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2001), pp. 162–176.

⁷⁸ Dieter Gosewinkel, "Rückwirkungen des kolonialen Rassenrechts? Deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit Rassestaat und Rechtsstaat" in Conrad and Osterhammel, *Das Kaiserreich transnational*, pp. 236–256; *Einbürgern und Ausschließen*, pp. 162–176.

⁷⁹ On non-Prussian states and notions of federalism and state-patriotism see Dieter Langewiesche, *Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat in Deutschland und Europa* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2000), esp. ch. 3, 4, 6; Abigail Green, *Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Staatsbürgerschaft. Unlike the concept of the *Untertan* (subject) that denoted a direct and hierarchical relationship between sovereign and subject, *Staatsbürger* (state-citizen) implied a citizen's legal equality and rights of participation in the state's political system. Since medieval times, the term *Bürger* referred to full membership of a local community (the English equivalent would be burgher), and so the new political terminology of state-citizen was in juxtaposition to that older form of relationship, emphasizing the direct connection between citizens and the state. Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg were the first German states to adopt a constitution that introduced citizenship in the first two decades of the nineteenth century.⁸⁰

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the granting of citizenship in German states was primarily channeled through admittance to a specific locality and requests for naturalization referred first of all to the residency or full membership in a particular local community. By granting denizens local residency, communities also committed to supporting them from the communal poor relief fund if needed. Such a commitment was not undertaken lightly, and many people had to contend with an inferior residency status in which they were denied political rights and economic privileges such as operating a business or owning real estate. Being admitted to a local community as resident-citizen usually also meant naturalization as a citizen of the state. With the partial exception of Prussia, whose 1842 citizenship law centralized decision-making powers regarding naturalization, German states generally refused to go against the wishes of

⁸⁰ Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen*, pp. 11–18. A third term, *Staatsangehörigkeit* (state-belonging) could encompass both the terminology of subjecthood and of citizenship, as it did not necessarily and explicitly refer to positive rights within the state, but to belonging in a polity. Belonging here could be interpreted both as formal and legal status that entailed, and in a wider sense that encompasses a sense of paternalist relationship and a moral obligation of the state to those who belong to it. Kathleen Canning formulates the difference between *Staatsangehörigkeit* and *Staatsbürgerschaft* along formalist lines but uses the term *nation* instead of *state*. For her, the first term usually refers to the relationship between citizen and one state that distinguish members of one state from those of another state. The second term refers to the political relationship within states, “based on differential bundle of rights and duties ascribed to distinct categories of citizens.” To these two she suggests adding the notion of participatory citizenship. Canning, *Reflections on the Vocabulary of Citizenship*, p. 214. The paternalist moral obligation of the state, however, strongly resonates in the terminology of belonging.

communities and did not force them to accept new state-citizens. This situation was changed only with the North German Confederation Freedom of Movement Law of 1867. From that point, free movement inside and between states of the confederation was recognized as a universal right of all citizens and the denial of residency based on the possibility that a person might become a burden on the community was ruled out. This law was later incorporated verbatim into Imperial Germany's legal edifice, together with a new citizenship law that enshrined the right of each state to decide on its laws of citizenship. At this point, there was nothing in the legal frameworks for citizenship that relied on national or racial categorization.⁸¹

Prussia had instituted strict controls along its Eastern border starting in the 1880s and early 1890s, as labor migration into Germany was on the rise and as massive transatlantic migrations – migration out of Germany and transit migration from Eastern Europe through the country – were underway.⁸² These movements aroused racial anxieties about epidemics and contamination, as well as fears of depopulation, in the minds of Prussian officials and German

⁸¹ In a series of treaties signed between German states in the first half of the century, states agreed to allow each other's citizens freer movement across their territories and also took on an obligation not to encumber each other by wantonly expelling unwanted people across borders. Such treaties defined connections between individuals and states through a mix of territorial, local-political, descent-based, and social criteria that included, among others, birth, previous residency, military service, and parents' and spouses' state-belonging. Such belonging, in turn, could allow states to make claims over persons and their property and to project such claims across political borders. For example, the requirement of communal approval for marriage in the South German States could extend to community members who were longtime residents of another state. See Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen*, esp. pp. 11–18, 41–60; Bettina Hitzer, "Freizügigkeit als Reformergebnis und die Entwicklung von Arbeitsmärkten," in Jochen Oltmer (ed.), *Handbuch Staat und Migration in Deutschland seit dem 17. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg), pp. 245–289, pp. 249–250; Eli Nathans, *The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: Ethnicity, Utility, and Nationalism* (Oxford: Berg, 2004), ch. 1; Andreas K. Fahrmeir, "Nineteenth-Century German Citizenships: A Reconsideration," *The Historical Journal* 40:3 (September 1997), pp. 721–752. For the 1867 law see "Gesetz über die Freizügigkeit. Vom 1. November 1867," *Bundesgesetzblatt des Norddeutschen Bundes* 1867:7, pp. 55–58, esp. paragraph four of the law.

⁸² During the last mass migration from Germany between 1880–1893, about 1.8 million Germans crossed the Atlantic to the United States, most of them from the northeast. They were joined in the ports of Hamburg and Bremen with more than five million East European migrants who crossed Germany from east to west. Sebastian Conrad and Philipp Ther, "On the Move: Mobility, Migration, and Nation, 1880–1948," in Helmut Walser Smith (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 573–591.

nationalists, and public debates on these topics were rife with alarmist, racist overtones.⁸³ In 1885, Prussia closed the eastern border for migration and undertook unprecedented mass expulsions of well over 30,000 Jews and Poles who had long lived in Prussia with Russian citizenship.⁸⁴ Once labor migration was again allowed across the eastern border in 1890 due to pressure from employers, a new regime of migration controls was put into place, which favored those who were considered of German origin or as racially and culturally closer to Germans, e.g. the Dutch, and opened to them not only residency but also a path to Prussian citizenship. At the same time, this regime excluded non-naturalized Poles and Jews from long-term stay, let alone a path to citizenship.⁸⁵

The 1913 Imperial Citizenship Law, which allowed federal states for the first time to dispute naturalizations by another federal state, was the result of federal states' growing willingness to adopt a more unified policy in line with Prussian demands, cemented by their shared desire to exclude Jews and Poles from citizenship.⁸⁶ The road to this law began in the mid 1890s, when the imperial parliament, the *Reichstag*, began to debate a new citizenship law

⁸³ In the 1890s, against the backdrop of multiple outbreaks, Cholera and other human-transmitted and livestock epidemic diseases were widely seen as coming from the east and migrants from Eastern Europe were portrayed as a public health risk, often in racial terms. The development of germ theory and the discoveries of pathogenic bacteria by German researchers in the 1880s and 1890s had given a new scientific impetus to such notions as well as to the development of institutional strategies for disease control. A system of forced disinfections, quarantines, and segregated transit routes was established to minimize contact between transit migrants and German citizens and to prevent the spread of diseases. See Paul Weindling, *Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe 1890–1945* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

⁸⁴ Lerp, *imperiale Grenzräume*, pp. 64–67. On the 1885–6 deportations, see Helmut Neubach, *Die Ausweisungen von Polen und Juden aus Preussen 1885/86* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 1967).

⁸⁵ Lerp, *imperiale Grenzräume*, pp. 64–67.

⁸⁶ I follow Dieter Gosewinkel's argumentation here. The prerogative of federal states to formulate their own citizenship rules was first limited in 1891, when Prussia demanded and received the right to raise administrative objections to naturalization decisions by other states. In 1911, racial motivations appeared in official Prussian policy for the first time: Jews, even converted Jews, were to be denied citizenship across the board not for religious but racial reasons. On the other hand, Christians of Polish roots, decedents of migrant workers who had been living in Germany for two or three generations, had financial means and language skills, and were committed to army service, could in principle receive citizenship. Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen*, pp. 265–280.

following a campaign by the newly established Pan-German League to institute a unified and racially based citizenship law that would promote the homogenization of the population inside the European borders of Germany and at the same time would seek to incorporate who they saw as members of the national community outside of these borders. Ernst Hasse, the chairman of the Pan-German League and a professor of statistics in Leipzig, was a member of the *Reichstag* for the National Liberal Party at the time. In 1894, Hasse tabled a motion that called on the government to introduce a new citizenship law that would make harder for Germans to lose citizenship by living abroad and to make it easier for German emigrants to re-naturalize, and at the same time make it harder for “foreigners” (*Fremde*) to receive citizenship. He grounded the proposal in detailed statistics that highlighted the scale of migrations into Germany and painted a threatening picture of an increasing proportion of “linguistically and racially foreign” (*Sprach- und Rassenfremde*) populations that threatened the homogeneity of the German people. Hasse also contextualized his claims by comparisons with Germany’s international competitors and warned that the German nation was already “much less homogeneously formed” (*sehr wenig homogen gestaltet*) in comparison to “other *Kulturvölker*,” even without the influx of more “foreigners.” Hasse was referring here not only to the existence of linguistic and ethnic minorities in Imperial Germany (including Danes, French, Polish, Kashubians, Sorbians and so on), but also to the political and cultural diversity among German speakers, whose sense of belonging to localities, regions, federal states, and different confessions seemed to him as a threat to the political cohesion of the nation. His co-signatory on the motion, another Pan-German who represented the main government-supporting party, the Conservative Party, made it clear in his speech that the motivation was to exclude Jews and Slavs. The motion was supported

by the National Liberal faction in the parliament, and despite its defeat, had set the terms of debate for the next twenty years.⁸⁷

Between the 1890s and the passing of the new citizenship law in 1913, parliamentary and public debates on the topic were strongly shaped by the question of national and racial belonging in two border regions of the Prussian-German empire, Polish Prussia and Germany's colonies. In Germany's colonies, and especially in Southwest Africa, Germany's only colony of settlement, Africans' access to German citizenship through marriage and parentage seemed to many German nationalists as a threat to the power of white settlers and colonial administrators as well as to the racial purity of the German nation at home. The racial hierarchies made up by colonial administrators, who answered to the German Emperor through the Colonial Office and operated outside the purview of judicial and parliamentary oversight, did not have any legal validity in the metropole.⁸⁸ German nationalists lumped together what they perceived as potential hygienic, racial, and political dangers posed by the three million Prussian Poles and the hundreds of thousands of labor and transit migrants from the Russian and Austrian empires. Throughout the

⁸⁷ Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen*, pp. 265–280, and for Hasse's motion and parliamentary speech, including the quoted passages, see pp. 276–280.

⁸⁸ On the role of the colonies in the debates leading up to the 1913 law see Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen*, pp. 303–309. In the colonies, citizenship was based on interrelated hierarchies of gender and race and on the constitutional and legal difference between colony and metropole. Administrative bans on racially mixed marriages in German Southwest Africa (1905), German Southeast Africa (1906), and German Samoa (1912) sought to prevent access to German citizenship by non-White colonial subjects/ The bans deprived children of German men and indigenous women of German citizenship. These bans were based on race as a legal category of citizenship that differentiated German colonists from colonial subjects and were also retrospective in application and reclassified decedents of male German Citizens as colonial subjects. These bans were administrative and enacted by decrees of colonial governors and the colonial secretary in Berlin. Mixed-race marriage bans (re)constituted a colonial citizenship law which contradicted Imperial Germany's citizenship rules. This contradiction created a situation in which individuals who lost their German citizenship in the colonies could regain it by moving to the imperial metropole. Laura Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, German Women for Empire, 1884–1945* (Durham: Duke University Press 2001), pp. 79–130; Krista O'Donnell, "Home, Nation, Empire: Domestic Germanness and Colonial Citizenship," *The Heimat Abroad*, pp. 40–57.

debates, nationalist pressure groups such as the Colonial League and the Pan-German League had strong influence on the government's approach to the wording of various drafts of the law.⁸⁹

When the law finally passed in 1913, it instituted immigration and emigration rules that were strongly influenced by an ethnic definition of German nationhood, representing a break with previous legislation on multiple accounts. The law had replaced the territorial principal of citizenship with the principle of origins (*Abstammung*), cancelled the stipulation about German citizens' losing their citizenship after ten years of non-residency, and granted citizenship to decedents of male German citizens, while excluding immigrants from it. Nevertheless, as the law did not recognize race as a category, it implicitly upheld the right for citizenship of children of marriages between Africans and Germans. But to have this right recognized, German fathers had to turn to courts in the metropole, which rejected the kind of racial exclusion practiced by colonial administrators. The law, then, also represented a compromise between concerns about racial and national homogeneity as demanded by the Pan-Germans and the Prussian state on the one hand, and the idea that citizenship should uphold and be mediated through patriarchal family norms. In 1913, the government did not have the *Reichstag* votes for a more radical law that would infringe on the patriarchal family in the name of national homogeneity and racial purity.⁹⁰

The Prussian state went beyond changing the legal definition of citizenship and instituted complex hierarchies of access to claim-making in its attempt to redefine political loyalties and the terms of political participation in its Polish provinces. While non-Prussian workers from Russian and Austrian Poland were denied any social and political rights, Prussian Poles were treated as second-class citizens, with limited participation in electoral politics and ability to make

⁸⁹ Gosewinckel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen*, 277ff.

⁹⁰ Gosewinckel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen*, pp. 310–327;

political claims on the state. At the same time, the state sought to import different populations into Polish Prussia who would have privileged access to the state and its resources and would be expected to act as extension of the state's power and to promote its Germanizing agenda.

In Prussia's Polish provinces, the state increasingly marginalized Prussian Poles as politically disloyal and culturally inferior and treated them as second-class citizens. At the same time, it instituted harsh control mechanisms to prevent the large numbers of mostly Polish migrant farmworkers from staying in its eastern provinces, where they were economically indispensable.⁹¹ Labor migration into Germany had massively increased in the 1890s, as the country became a leading global importer of labor. In addition to the influx to industrial centers in western Germany of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers, mainly Italians, Russians, and Dutch (about 700,000 up to 1914), the 1890s saw an ever increasing number of seasonal farmworkers coming from Eastern Europe into the predominantly agricultural areas in eastern Germany, where large scale cultivation of root crops significantly increased labor needs. By 1914, an estimated 500,000 migrant farmworkers entered Germany, mostly from the Polish regions of the Russian and Habsburg empires. The need for agricultural labor was aggravated first by the mass Atlantic migration wave between 1880–1893, in which the largest contingent out of the 1.8 million German emigrants came from rural northeastern Germany, and then by the upswing in the internal east-west migration, both seasonal and longer-term. By 1910, about 250,000 people from the provinces of Poznan and West Prussia alone migrated to industrial centers in the Prussian province of Westphalia.⁹²

⁹¹ Cf. Lerp, *Imperiale Grenzräume*; Conrad, *Globalization and the Nation*, ch. 2.

⁹² Klaus J. Bade, "Massenwanderung und Arbeitsmarkt im deutschen Nordosten von 1880 bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg," *Archive für Sozialgeschichte* 20 (1980) pp. 265–323, pp. 270–286; Conrad and Ther, *On the Move*, pp. 573–591.

In order to control the mounting numbers of people on the move and particularly concerned about the ethnic composition of Polish Prussia, the state had put in place a strict migration control regime based on a racial hierarchy. At the bottom of this hierarchy were Polish and Jewish migrants, who faced highly restrictive conditions that were meant to minimize their length of stay and range of movement in Prussia. The Prussian government decided to implement a *Karenzzeit* or waiting period in the winter months, when labor needs in agricultural were lower, in which these migrant workers were forbidden to stay in Prussia and had to go back across the border. During the rest of the year, they were housed in dreadful conditions in wooden outbuildings on their employer's estate and were completely dependent on their work contract, which was buttressed by state policing. They were also forbidden to change employers or to engage in another kind of work. Workers accused of breaking their contract faced deportation.⁹³

While migrant farmworkers were barely tolerated foreigners controlled through the denial of citizenship and residency, many Prussian farmworkers were controlled through the Prussian Domestic Workers Regulation (*Gesindeordnung*), which bore many similarities with the legal status of migrant farmworkers. The Domestic Workers Regulation treated Prussian workers in agriculture as domestic servants and gave employers wide-ranging powers of punishment and control over workers. Both migrant workers and those under the Domestic Workers Regulation needed to produce proof of good conduct to be legally employed and faced similar limitations on changing employers. For example, leaving one's employer without their approval was punishable by the authorities with a prison sentence.⁹⁴

⁹³ Lerp, *Imperiale Grenzräume*, pp. 64–67.

⁹⁴ Ibid.; Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation*, ch. 2. On the *Gesindeordnung* in the countryside see Klaus Tenfelde, "Ländliches Gesinde in Preußen, Gesinderecht und Gesindestatistik 1810 bis 1861," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 19 (1979), pp. 189–229. In 1861, about 1,200,000 workers in agriculture were counted as domestic workers under this regulation. A detailed legal-historical study of domestic workers regulations in nineteenth-century Germany is Thomas Vormbaum, *Politik und Gesinderecht im 19. Jahrhundert, vornehmlich in Preussen*,

Alongside the control regimes instituted for migrant and resident agricultural workers, who were mostly Polish-speakers, Polish citizens of Prussia in general were reduced to second-class status by a range of legal, juridical, and administrative measures which limited their political participation. The use of the Polish language, for example, was gradually banned from schools and religion instruction after 1871 and its use in associational and public life was limited and controlled by police. The 1908 Imperial Law of Association, for example, contained a “language paragraph” that prescribed the use of the German language for public meetings in order to curb Polish political organizing.⁹⁵ Critics of the government’s marginalizing policies accused it of creating legal and administrative exceptions to the Prussian constitution, in contravention of its letter and spirit. Nevertheless, the courts normally upheld the government’s discriminatory and suppressive policies.⁹⁶

The Prussian government also utilized the state bureaucracy in Polish Prussia for its Germanizing agenda and significantly increased the number of state-employed Germans stationed in the border region. It limited the employment of Prussian Poles in the state administration and used both ministerial directives and monetary incentives to ensure that officials promoted its Germanization agenda in their everyday behavior. A 1898 ministerial

1810–1918 (Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 1980). On the social history of women farmworkers and servants (Mägde) during the *Kaiserreich* see Elizabeth B. Jones, *Gender and Rural Modernity: Farm Women and the Politics of Labor in Germany, 1871–1933* (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009), chs. 1–2.

⁹⁵ “Vereinsgesetz. Vom 19. April 1908,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1908:18, pp. 151–157, paragraph 12. I discuss the limitations on using and teaching Polish in schools and religious instruction in detail in chapter four.

⁹⁶ Wehler, *Polenpolitik*, pp. 118ff; Balzer, *Haltung*, pp. 156ff.; Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen*, pp. 211–218. A detailed account of these public debates and criticism is given in Robert Spät, *Die “polnische Frage” in der öffentlichen Diskussion im Deutschen Reich, 1894–1918* (Marburg: Herder Institute, 2004), pp. 90–169. On the Prussian Administrative Court in this context, see Kenneth F. Ledford, “Formalizing the Rule of Law in Prussia: The Supreme Administrative Law Court, 1876–1914,” *Central European History* 37:2 (2004), pp. 203–224, pp. 218–220. Ledford mentions an early 1876 case in which the Supreme Administrative Law Court rejected the argument, put forward by the ministry of the interior, that the constitutional right of assembly applied only to Germans.

decree instructed all state employees to demonstrate their loyalty to the state and the German nation in their private lives, creating an immediate surge in officials' participation in nationalist associations in the region.⁹⁷ The government spent large amounts of money on establishing new, officially German, cultural, academic, and medical institutions and invested in infrastructure, thereby drawing German state employees of every rank to Polish Prussia. The moniker chosen for this policy, *Hebungspolitik* or *Hebung des Deutschtums*, could be translated as a policy of improvement as well as of uplifting, and pointed to a civilizing mission that was meant to create and ensure the economic and cultural dominance of adherents and beneficiaries of state-centered Germanization. Already-present Germans were to be tied to the state, while more dependable Germans, e.g. state employees, would come from outside.⁹⁸

In addition to the establishment of a German middle-class cultural infrastructure and the stationing of troops in the region, there was an increasingly substantial presence of mostly lower

⁹⁷ Elizabeth Drummond, "Protecting Poznan: Germans, Poles, and the Conflict over National Identity, 1886–1914." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Georgetown University, 2004), pp. 106–112. Drummond's analysis shows that among the general membership of the East Marches Society, sixty-one percent were public officials, teachers, or professionals who cultivated close relationship with the state bureaucracy. She notes that "public officials constituted a greater proportion of the Eastern Marches Society's membership than of the Pan-German League, who was primarily active in other areas of Germany. These numbers, Drummond argues, "reflected the significance of the German officialdom in the eastern provinces," (p. 108) as well as the instructions they had to follow.

⁹⁸ This policy of bringing in a new "German" middle class and lower middle class began in 1897/8 and was focused on the main cities and towns of Polish Prussia, where an increasingly assertive and nationally committed Polish middle class caused alarm among the higher echelons of the Prussian state and in German nationalist circles. In this context, more than 25 million Marks were invested by 1914 in German-language libraries, theaters, academic and medical institutions, and most importantly, in an "East Marches Bonus" (*Ostmarkenzulage*) added to the paycheck of state employees. Most cultural institutions were established in Poznań/Posen, which was planned to become an imperial, German city, despite its majority Polish-speaking population. During the first decade of the twentieth century, the city underwent wide-ranging gentrification that resulted in increasing social segregation. State-supported urban development replaced mostly Polish-speaking working-class neighborhoods with middle-class dwellings for mostly German state employees and new professional class. Lerp, *imperiale Grenzräume*, pp. 201–217; Elizabeth A. Drummond, "In and Out of the Ostmark Migration, Settlement, and Demographics in Poznan, 1871–1918," *Itinerario* 37 (2013), pp. 73–86; Christoph Schutte, *Die Königliche Akademie in Posen (1903–1919) und andere kulturelle Einrichtungen im Rahmen der Politik zur "Hebung des Deutschtums,"* (Marburg: Herder Institut, 2008). On the establishment of a hygiene institute in Poznań/Posen, see the recently published Justyna Aniceta Turkowska, *Der kranke Rand des Reiches: Sozialhygiene und nationale Räume in der Provinz Posen um 1900* (Marburg: Herder Institute, 2020).

middle-class state employees in the province of Poznania. Indeed, they were so numerous that their presence in the province was registered in the numerical relationship between German and Polish speakers in the official census. The rise in the recorded number of German speakers in Poznania after 1900, explained the president of the provincial administration in 1909, was mainly due to the increasing numbers of the lower ranks of state employees, mostly postal services and the railroad administration workers, alongside “the exclusion of the Polish element from the high and middle bureaucracy.”⁹⁹ Railroad and postal workers and their families probably made up about 120,000 people or 15% of what registered as Poznania’s German population in 1909. Although this migration of state employees was often more of a sojourn than a long-lasting relocation, it brought in people from outside who were expected by the state to take part in its Germanizing agenda, were paid for it, and could be sanctioned if needed.¹⁰⁰

Between 1871–1914, the Prussian state and its Colonization Commission were constructing an imperial frontier of settlement in the Polish border provinces by redefining the space of negotiations over the access to resources according to a cultural-racial hierarchy. The state utilized citizenship in the formal sense to excluded non-citizen farmworkers from any rights and significantly limited the rights of Polish citizens. At the same time, it imported German-speaking populations from outside whose political reliability and adherence to the Germanizing agenda of the state could be more easily ensured. The Colonization Commission was central to this process of constructing an imperial frontier. It offered settlers advantageous access to land

⁹⁹ Quoted from a 1.5.1909 report to the government by the provincial president of Poznania in Broszat, *Polenpolitik*, p. 170.

¹⁰⁰ Broszat, *Polenpolitik*, pp. 169–170. By 1911, notes Hanna Grzeszczuk-Brendel, the percentage of state employees in the population of the city of Poznań/Posen was one of the highest in Imperial Germany, comparable only to the affluent municipality of Charlottenburg, adjacent to the capital Berlin. Hanna Grzeszczuk-Brendel, “Das Villen-Miethaus in Posen: Eine neue Vorstellung von Wohnung und Stadt” in Alena Janatková and Hanna Kozińska-Witt, *Wohnen in der Großstadt 1900–1939: Wohnsituation und Modernisierung im europäischen Vergleich* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2006), pp. 379–390, p. 381n13.

and yet kept control of future transfer of ownership, thereby effectively nationalizing the land that it had bought.¹⁰¹ But many settlers were not Prussian citizens: About one eighth of the 22,700 families who settled in Polish Prussia by 1914 came from other federal states in Germany, and a further quarter came from outside the borders of Imperial Germany – mainly from the Russian Empire.¹⁰² Such settlers were expected by the commission to take up Prussian citizenship as soon as possible so they could fulfil their duties as German settlers, including voting in elections and participating in communal administration. Although the Prussian state was using formal citizenship to set a range of expectations about settlers’ duties and political participation, non-Prussian applicants who did not harbor any particular loyalty to the Prussian state did not necessarily accept their role as extensions of Prussian power. As indicated by the case of the Württemberg settlers sought out by the commission in 1888–1889, prospective settlers must have known that they were entering a complex relationship of dependency, supervision, and patronage with the commission and they could contest the expectations and political duties that came with Prussian citizenship in the imperial frontier.

The Recruitment of Swabian Settlers by the Prussian Colonization Commission

As soon as the Prussian parliament approved the Settlement Law in April 1886 and before the commission had even decided on its own administrative procedures or on the wording of its settlement contract, a flood of inquiries and applications reached the commission’s head

¹⁰¹ On the implications of the state’s land policies on the land market, see Daniel Benedikt Stienen, “Landownership between Nationalization and De-Liberalization: Changes in Prussian Property Regimes, 1886–1914,” *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung/Journal of East Central European Studies* 69:3 (2020), pp. 355–377. Stienen calculates that as much as 32% of the land in Polish Prussia was removed from the land market by 1914, mostly due to state ownership (p. 371). Among the different forms of state ownership, Commission-bought land was second only to state forests in size. It should be noted that Stienen includes entailed estates in the calculation since they were removed from the market, even though they were not state property and were not necessarily owned by Germans.

¹⁰² Stienen, *Anwerbung*, pp. 71–73.

office. These unsolicited applications strengthened the impression of the first president of the commission, the career civil servant and estate owner, Count Robert von Zedlitz, that too much publicity would be counterproductive. Lamenting the low quality of applicants in a December 1886 report to the Prussian cabinet, he noted that most of the inquiries came from people who had hoped to easily procure a large landed properties of 100 hectares or more (365 out of 705 inquiries, or about 53%), precisely the opposite of the commission's aim of creating small and medium-sized farms. Furthermore, these unsolicited applicants tended to have significantly less capital than what the commission thought was required for settlement, and many, he suspected, were after quick profits rather than long-term settlement. Zedlitz was also unhappy about the professional experience and personal traits of these early applicants, since many were inexperienced in small-scale agrarian production, even if they had experience in the administration of large estates for the state or for private owners. Yet another kind of applicants he dismissed as "Ganz-und Halbbildungsproletariate" or financially "shipwrecked" small farmers. They had applied with "nothing to lose" and were "obviously ruled out."¹⁰³

In light of this unpromising start, Zedlitz worried that "beating the drum" of colonization would only result in high numbers of unsuitable applicants, create more difficulties in discreet land purchases from Polish owners, and propagate unrealistic expectations from the commission. Instead, he hoped that careful bureaucratic practice could achieve the required balance between the strategic goal of purchasing land and reducing the number of Polish-owned large estates – which he thought required backroom dealings rather than a public information campaign – with the need to recruit suitable settlers. In late December 1886, the commission officially decided to limit its recruitment attempts to articles in specific regional newspapers and to rely on settlers'

¹⁰³ Zedlitz to the Prussian cabinet [copy], 5.12.1886, I. HA Rep. 90 A Nr. 4179, pp. 4–6.

favorable reporting back home to attract new settlers. At this point, the commission's priority was to buy land and to experiment with different techniques of settlement in order to come up with a well-defined administrative procedure.¹⁰⁴ Zedlitz also favored the idea of targeting groups of families from the same region instead of waiting for individual applicants, so as to create more homogenous villages quickly. For that purpose, he was willing to undertake publicity efforts, albeit regionally focused.

One regional focus of the commission was South Germany, where farmers were reputed to be frugal, skilled in intensive agriculture, and able to amass the necessary capital for establishing a farm. When the commission sought to recruit farmers from Württemberg in 1888, it used local notables to reach would-be settlers. These notables took on a somewhat ambivalent role as self-appointed patrons for a group of Swabian farmers who were interested in settlement. This patronage allowed these farmers to negotiate over the terms of settlement in advance, thereby making recruitment concomitant with claim-making. By requesting swiping changes to the settlement contract, the Swabian farmers made alternative claims about the terms of settlement. The ensuing negotiations show how non-Prussian farmers could, under certain conditions, attain a bargaining position and contest their utilization as tools of the Prussian state.

The commission's attempts to recruit settlers from Württemberg need to be seen in the context of the last mass migration out of Germany in the years 1880–1893. During the 1880s, emigration from Württemberg was on the rise, after reaching a high point in the middle of the nineteenth century and waning thereafter. During the 1880s and early 1890s, Württemberg citizens were generally more likely to emigrate than the average citizen of Imperial Germany,

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

but unlike previous migrations in the earlier part of the century, the large majority of Atlantic emigrants originated in Imperial Germany's northeast region.¹⁰⁵

Earlier migrations, however, had often set a pattern for subsequent migrants from the same region, shaping their available options based on information sharing and the presence of people who were also connected to the same home region. A history of migration from a certain area also provided precedence for recruiting states.¹⁰⁶ Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Southwest Germany was a significant location of outward migration to Eastern and Southeastern Europe and to the United States. Continental migration, especially to Russia, the Habsburg Empire, and Prussian Poland, was based on states inviting settlers and offering them different privileges to come and settle, often in remote or recently acquired border regions (e.g. Russian Volhynia, which was part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth before the partitions of Poland, and the Habsburg Banat that was conquered from the Ottoman Empire). States would normally undertake aggressive campaigning, publish and circulate privilege charters and advertisements, and make widespread use of migration agents and recruitment stations.¹⁰⁷ These methods were adopted by the Prussian state as it began its large-scale settlement initiatives under

¹⁰⁵ In 1888, when the Colonization Commission attempted to recruit Swabian farmers, 6445 emigrants left Württemberg, mostly for the United States. According to the Württemberg official statistics, the average annual emigration from Württemberg and from Imperial Germany until 1890 was as follows. The average yearly emigration numbers out of Württemberg is given, followed by the average percentage of emigrants out of the population in Württemberg and in Imperial Germany, both in parenthesis. For 1871–1875: 3,361 (0.192%; 0.183%); For 1876–1880: 2,782 (0.144% ; 0.097%); For 1881–1885: 8,818 (0.441% ; 0.357%); For 1886–1890: 5,559 (0.275% ; 0.191%). See: *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Königreich Württemberg* (Stuttgart, 1890/1891), p. 18; *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Königreich Württemberg* (Stuttgart, 1892), p. 32

¹⁰⁶ Blackbourn, *Conquest of Nature*, pp. 50–62.

¹⁰⁷ William O'Reilly, "Agenten, Werbung und Reisemodalitäten. Die Auswanderung ins Temscher Banat im 18. Jahrhundert," in Matthias Beer and Dittmar Dahmann (eds.) *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 1999), pp. 109–120.

Friedrich II (1740–1786).¹⁰⁸ Significant migration out of Southwest Germany to Prussia’s newly-annexed Polish provinces began in 1781 and over the next five years about 900 families, mostly from Württemberg, settled in the lower Vistula basin south of Danzig/Gdańsk and in the Netze area (Netzedistrikt/Obwód Nadnotecki), areas which would later be included in the Prussian provinces of West Prussia and Poznania. In the early 1800s, another wave of migrants from Württemberg settled partly in the same areas and partly further east, in the areas that Prussia annexed in the last partition of Poland. Disappointed by the conditions they found, many of these migrants returned to Württemberg within a couple of years or continued to move further and re-settled in the Black Sea region of the Russian Empire.¹⁰⁹ The Russian Empire, which offered colonists communal, linguistic, and confessional autonomy as well as exemption from military service, became the main destination for continental migration out of Württemberg after 1815, attracting many dissenting Pietists who were reluctant to accede to the authority of the official Württemberg church.¹¹⁰ All in all, Prussia, which normally required migrants to own a certain amount of capital to be eligible for settlement, proved a much less popular destination for Württemberg migrants than Habsburg Hungary or the Odessa and Volhynia provinces of the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, in the years around 1800, whenever Prussian authorities initiated

¹⁰⁸ Among the benefits and privileges that Prussia offered incoming migrants were reimbursement of travel costs after arrival, freedom from customs on their possessions, freedom from military service, and free allocation of wood, farm equipment, livestock, and tools for craftspeople. Blackbourn, *Conquest of Nature*, pp. 50–62.

¹⁰⁹ Arnold Scheuerbrandt, “Die Auswanderung aus dem heutigen Baden-Württemberg nach Preußen, in den habsburgischen Südosten, nach Rußland und Nordamerika zwischen 1683 und 1811” in *Historischer Atlas von Baden-Württemberg* (Stuttgart, 1972–1988), Section 12/5.

¹¹⁰ Ralph Tuchtenhagen, “Religiöser Dissens, Staat und Auswanderung nach Osteuropa im 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert” in Beer and Dahmann (eds.), *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa*, pp. 263–290.

a recruitment campaign for agrarian settlement, the response from Württemberg overwhelmed the capacities of the Prussian state to provide land and housing.¹¹¹

When the president of the Prussian Colonization Commission decided to focus his recruitment efforts in 1888 on the Württemberg district of Ludwigsburg, he was probably unaware of any specific history of emigration from the area to Prussia.¹¹² Instead, his choice was significantly shaped by his personal connections in Berlin's high society salons and in the high nobility of the empire. Baroness Hildegard Spitzemberg, the daughter of the veteran Württemberg politician Baron Carl von Varnbüler, was one of the most prominent high society *salonnières* of the imperial capital and counted Zedlitz among her frequent visitors. In a journal entry from April 1886, as the Prussian *Landtag* debated the Settlement Law, Spitzemberg recorded her "unwarranted" reminder to Chancellor Bismarck over dinner that "our Swabians" were, in fact, especially suitable to serve as colonists in Poznan. He agreed. Two years later, Swabian peasants were again a matter of discussion. In summer 1888, during a trip to Württemberg to study the possibility of recruiting groups of farmers, Zedlitz was invited for dinner to the Varnbüler residence, Castle Hemmingen. Zedlitz used the occasion to promote the recruitment of Swabian peasants for the Prussian settlement project. Spitzemberg's father's copious notes, kept in the family papers, indicate that Zedlitz presented at length the settlement procedures that the commission had put in place. Varnbüler's personal papers also hint that he may have been personally encouraged to work with the commission by the German emperor and

¹¹¹ Wolfgang von Hippel, *Auswanderung aus Süddeutschland: Studien zur württemburgerischen Auswanderung und Auswanderungspolitik im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1984), pp. 79–85.

¹¹² Ludwigsburg was not a traditional emigration hotspot in Württemberg, but there was a history of migration to Prussian Poland from the area, in addition to the more significant migration to the Russian Empire. Hippel, *Auswanderung*, pp. 202–203.

king of Prussia, Wilhelm I.¹¹³ Another result of the visit was an article in the supplement to the semi-official *Württembergische Landeszeitung* that detailed the conditions of settlement offered by the commission and directed interested persons to the commission's central office.¹¹⁴

Throughout the fall and winter of 1888 and into early 1889, Varnbüler and Zedlitz corresponded both privately and officially about the conditions and procedures under which migration and settlement of Württemberg farmers would take place. But Varnbüler was not about to do the footwork of recruiting settlers. From a certain point in fall 1888, Varnbüler was assisted by Ernst Essich, a younger landowner with political ambitions from neighboring Bietingheim. Varnbüler probably became interested in Essich's help due to the latter's experience in another effort of self-styled Germanization in the Alsace-Lorraine, the region annexed by Germany from France following the Franco-Prussian War. During the summer and fall of 1888, Essich was involved in a profit-oriented scheme lightly colored in nationalist, anti-French fervor that was based on purchasing an estate on the cheap, dividing it, and settling it with Württemberg farmers. In summer 1888, Essich joined the Prussian estate owner Anton Ludwig Sombart in a fact-finding tour to the new *Reichsland* Alsace-Lorraine to evaluate the state of agriculture and the possibilities for intensification of production and the settlement of German farmers in the formerly French region. Sombart, a National-Liberal politician and a leading advocate of

¹¹³ The Spitzemberg journal was edited and published as Rudolf Vierhaus (ed.), *Das Tagebuch der Baronin Spitzemberg, geb. Freiin v. Varnbüler. Aufzeichnungen aus der Hofgesellschaft des Hohenzollernreiches* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960), her remark to Bismarck is mentioned on p. 222, Zedlitz's 7.8.1888 visit to Castle Hemmingen on p. 253. For other mentions of Zedlitz as a guest and a friend, see pp. 294, 298–300. Regarding Varnbüler's position in Württemberg politics and the family's connections with the Prussian political elite after 1871 despite their previous anti-Prussian stance, see Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), ch. 3. Varnbüler's notes mention that he was encouraged to help the commission by the "highest places," a moniker that in this context probably referred to the German *Kaiser*. The notes are in the Varnbüler family papers in HStA Stuttgart, BW P 10 Bue 591 (unpaginated), fol. 192–198.

¹¹⁴ The article also mentioned Zedlitz's visit to Württemberg in connection with the recruitment of settlers: "Die Colonien in preußisch Polen," *Beilage zur Württembergischen Landeszeitung*, 14.10.1888. In: HStA Stuttgart, BW P 10 Bue 591, (unpaginated) fol. 313.

practical internal colonization, had experimented with dividing part of one of his estates to settle German farmers. A close associate of Gustav Schmoller, Sombart was one of the chief speakers in the September 1886 *Verein für Sozialpolitik* meeting that discussed and sought to frame the goals and of “internal colonization” at the moment of formation of the Prussian Colonization Commission. In that meeting, which I discuss in the chapter 2, Sombart held a talk about the practical side of colonization, presenting his experience of private settlement on his estate and outlined practical lessons for large-scale state-led colonization.¹¹⁵

Two years later, Sombart had completed his self-described “colonization works” (*Colonisationsarbeiten*) in his estate in Prussian Saxony and sought out new projects of private colonization. Writing in the *Magdeburger Zeitung*, Sombart recounted at length his recent tour in Lorraine, where he discovered a similar structure of landownership and political belonging to the one that characterized Prussia’s Polish provinces. In his description of the province, Sombart noted the preponderance of large estates, the widespread use of old-fashioned three-field crop rotation, and the lack of both new agricultural machines and a secured labor supply. For Sombart, Lorraine, like Polish Prussia, called for economic and national intervention in the form of settling German smallholders who would be both profit-oriented producers and politically reliable Germans. At the same time, Sombart pointed out the investment opportunities in the underdeveloped provinces, either land purchase for cultivation or buying and dividing estates. It is noteworthy how well-established was the linkage of internal colonization and

¹¹⁵ Verein für Socialpolitik, *Zur Inneren Kolonisation in Deutschland. Erfahrungen und Vorschläge* [=Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik 32], (Leipzig 1886); idem, *Verhandlungen der am 24. und 25. September 1886 in Frankfurt a.M. abgehaltenen Generalversammlung des Vereins für Socialpolitik* (Leipzig, 1887). On Sombart, who was also the father of economist Werner Sombart, see Eberhard Mertens, “Sombart, Anton Ludwig,” In: *Neue Deutsche Biographie* (NDB), vol. 24 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010), p. 561f. According to Werner Sombart’s obituary on his father, the older Sombart’s main contribution to politics and public life was his ardent promotion of internal colonization. Werner Sombart, “Sombart, Anton Ludwig,” in Anton Bettelheim (ed.), *Biographisches Jahrbuch und Deutscher Nekrolog*, vol. 3 (Berlin: Riemer, 1900), pp. 253–256.

“Germanization” in Sombart’s projection of political and economic relationship on the Alsace-Lorraine landscape. He saw the landscape as calling for intervention that would supplant the economically inefficient large estates owned by a class of foreign, here French, absentee landlords with German farmers. Varnbüler, to judge by his marginalia, had read Sombart’s report with interest. Presumably, Essich’s involvement in Sombart’s tour and the idea of recruiting Swabians for settlement in Lorraine recommended him to Varnbüler.¹¹⁶

In fall 1888, Essich traveled to Poznania together with four farmers who were interested in settling in Ustaszewo and an official from Varnbüler’s Hemmingen estate. The impression was favorable enough for Essich to plan a meeting with prospective settlers in December 1888. Upon returning from another Lorraine trip in November, Essich requested the Colonization Commission to send more material about conditions of settlement, since the meeting with prospective settlers was coming up and details about the prices and layout of the plots were necessary. Essich complained that he had to face accusations from angry would-be settlers, many of whom allegedly sold their land in preparation for migration and now faced both financial losses and complaints from their wives, while others were already looking, he wrote, for other possibilities.¹¹⁷ His complaints moved the commission into action. The next day, it sent more exemplars of the documents detailing the conditions of purchase and layout of the plots. These were part of a dossier that also included maps of the provinces of Poznania and West-Prussia, a colored plan of the estate/village divided into numbered settlement plots, tabular summary of

¹¹⁶ Sombart-Emsleben “Die Germanisierung Lothringens durch deutsche Landwirthe und Capitalisten” *Magdeburger Zeitung* 23.9.1888 (first part) and 25.9.1888 (second part), located in: BW P 10 Bue 591 (unpaginated), fol. 314–315. Varnbüler’s detailed marginalia included the conversion of the Prussian land measurements that Sombart provided to Württemberg units.

¹¹⁷ Essich to von Zedlitz, 1.12.1888, APP-Gneizno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, , Reg VI Nr. 2892 (“Korntal: Austuung vol. 1”), pp. 17ff, and the internal notes and letter drafting for the correspondence between Zedlitz and other officials in pp. 18ff.

each plot's characteristics, details on the upfront payment and rent payments, questionnaires to be filled by each applicant, blank settlement contracts, a railroad brochure with estimated transportation costs, general information about the procedures of settlement, and an invitation to visit the estate that included details about its location, means of transportation, distance to towns and markets, and land quality. A similar dossier was made for each estate and was available for perusal by prospective settlers in the commission's head office, through the commission's representatives across Germany, and on the spot in each estate.¹¹⁸

The sources that I consulted do not give much detail on how precisely Essich reached out to prospective settlers or publicized the December meeting. According to Essich's own reporting, however, his attempts to facilitate settlement included responding to over a hundred letters and spending hours explaining the conditions on offer to prospective settlers. He also made at least two trips to Poznan. During the second one in March 1889, Essich, accompanied by nineteen would-be settlers, met Zedlitz and his senior staff and were shown around the estate.¹¹⁹ This highlights the personal attention invested both by Essich and by Zedlitz, who was also the president of the Poznan province, in the recruitment of the Swabian group.

Essich's subsequent career may also reveal some clues about the social skills that he deployed in reaching out to prospective settlers. A former cavalry officer, he entered electoral politics shortly after his involvement in the recruitment of settlers for the Prussian Colonization Commission. He stood as an independent candidate in the Württemberg *Landtag* elections of August 1890 and won the Besigheim seat, where he allegedly used wine as a means of

¹¹⁸ For the complete dossier see BW P 10 Bue 591 (unpaginated), fol. 29ff., 55–75.

¹¹⁹ Essich to Zedlitz, 18.12.1889, BW P 10 Bue 591 (unpaginated), fol. 10ff. Regarding his trips to Poznan, one is mentioned in the correspondence with Zedlitz, the other in: Ustaszewo Estate Manager to the Colonization Commission, 15.4.1890, APP-Gneizno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Reg. VI Nr. 2892 ("Korntal: Austuung vol. 1"), pp. 148–150.

purchasing votes in the highly contested race. As several Besigheim voters recounted, he approached them in the street, escorted them to a local tavern, bought them a bottle of wine, provided them with a voting paper with his name and finally accompanied them in person to the ballot station with the promise of a few further glasses of wine later in the day. According to other witnesses, Essich had agents throughout the election district, usually innkeepers with easy access to alcohol, who would operate in similar ways. All the witnesses also admitted to consuming the provided alcohol. Despite the apparently overwhelming evidence, the parliamentary inquiry commission refused to take steps against Essich on procedural grounds and he retained his seat. The skills and connections that Essich utilized for his apparent election fraud in multiple localities in the Besigheim constituency in August 1889 might have been necessary in the previous year to effectively reach out to villagers in the same area and discuss with them the possibility of settlement in Poznania.¹²⁰

We do not know how the assembly in Bietingheim on 17 December 1888 actually unfolded and must rely on Essich's account. In detailed letters that he sent the next day to Varnbüler, who missed the meeting due to ill health, and Zedlitz, Essich described his own actions and the demands that the settlers made. The relationship between his described actions and the demands that he ascribed to the "men" (*Leute*) or "peasants" are opaque in his rendering. Thirty-five prospective settlers were present, he reported, and the meeting began with Essich going over the settlement contract and prescribed conditions of settlement "line by line" with the

¹²⁰ On Essich's election corruption case see: "Bericht der Legitimationskommission der Kammer der Abgeordneten über die Anfechtung der Abgeordnetenwahl im Oberamtsbezirke Besigheim (Berichterstatter: Freiherr von Seckendorf)" in *Verhandlungen in der Kammer der Abgeordneten des Königreichs Württemberg*, Beilage 8, 18.1.1893, pp. 39–79. More on the highly contested elections can be found in the Bissinger Heimatbuch (Bietigheim: Gläser und Kümmerle, 1955), and in Michael Schirpf, "Die Familie(n) Grimm in Bietigheim," *Blätter zur Stadtgeschichte* 14, pp. 180–188. Also see Frank Raberg, *Biographisches Handbuch der württembergischen Landtagsabgeordneten (1815–1933)* [Sonderveröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Württemberg] (Stuttgart, 2002). Since the 1930s, Essich's name has honored a main street in Bietingheim: <http://www.pascua.de/thesaurus/straßenn> [Accessed Online 1 October 2019].

participants. His sense of duty, explained Essich, led him to point out to those present some especially problematic paragraphs. Thanks to his efforts, he stressed, all the participants in the meeting declared that they were committed to settle in Ustaszewo, if only “a few points” that “required adjustments” could be changed.¹²¹ These adjustments, in fact, contested the terms of the settlement contract across the board, and the ensuing negotiations amounted to a challenge to the terms of settlement proposed by the Prussian state.¹²² Most of the farmers involved decided to come to Poznania even though their main requests were denied, but their ability to claim participation in determining their terms of settlement is significant. It suggests that the ways in which the recruitment of settlers by the Prussian Colonization Commission unfolded could significantly shape the capacity of prospective settlers to negotiate the terms of settlement.

By early 1889, after participating in long discussions with the commission and with Varnbüler, Essich seems to have more or less accepted the conditions set out by the commission and his limited ability to mediate between the commission and the prospective settlers. Settlers in Ustaszewo contacted the commission directly and made demands and requests, including in the name of friends and family back home, for whom they hoped to secure a good plot in the new village.¹²³ By that point, Essich was considered useful and trustworthy enough by the commission to be appointed its representative in Württemberg, and prospective migrants from Württemberg were directed by the commission to Essich. Essich thus became one of the

¹²¹ Essich to Zedlitz, 18.12.1889, BW P 10 Bue 591 (unpaginated), pp. 10ff.

¹²² These demands are discussed in greater detail in the following section.

¹²³ See for example the correspondence between the settlers Honegger (also appears as Honecker), Müller, and Diefenbach the estate manager, and the commission in APP-Gneizno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Reg VI Nr. 2892. This correspondence also includes Wilhelm Rommel’s attempt to increase his brother-in-law’s chances of getting a good plot in Ustaszewo, which in part relied on tarnishing the aforementioned trio as malcontents.

commission's recruiting agents, illustrating how the commission asserted its power to utilize mediators of its own choosing in its relationship with settlers.¹²⁴

Family and Movement in the Process of Settlement

The social and political networks that connected ranking members of the commission like Zedlitz to local notables such as Essich provided an infrastructure for the recruitment of settlers outside Prussia. But settlers had their own networks that connected Württemberg and Prussian Poland, and these were equally significant for the process of settlement. When we read the village files in the commission's archives in Gneizno together with sources from Möglingen, one of the Württemberg villages from whence settlers came to Ustaszewo, it is clear that settlement was a complex social process that did not end with settlers' arrival at a new village. It involved frequent movement of family members between settlers' home community and the settlement village, relying on kin and allies to execute essential functions back home, and constant negotiations between settlers and the commission. This suggests that settlement in Poznanian was just one possibility for these settlers and they seem to have kept open the option of going back to Württemberg or leaving for another destination that would bring them into different political relationships. Moreover, as we saw in the case of Johann Müller's complaint about the lack of pastoral care in Ustaszewo, settlers could use these alternatives as a *resource*, a leverage in negotiating the terms of settlement, even after they settled in Polish Prussia.

¹²⁴ The *Posener Tageblatt*, which often ran articles that promoted the commission's work, included in its 18.1.1889 morning edition an anonymous article about the settlement of Württemberg farmers in Poznanian, essentially a redacted version of the letter exchange between Essich and Zedlitz that functioned as a kind of questions-and-answers about the what to expect and not to expect from the commission. The article concluded with the invitation of persons interested in migration to contact Essich: "Zur Ansiedlung württembergischer Landwirthe in der Provinz Posen," *Posener Tageblatt*, 18.1.1889, in APP-Gneizno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Reg VI Nr. 2892, pp. 96–97. This piece was probably meant to be reproduced in other news outlets as well.

Despite the distance and travel costs, there was constant movement back and forth between Württemberg and Poznań. Passenger train travel from Stuttgart to Poznań and back cost around sixty Marks, a considerable sum that amounted to more than half of a village teacher's monthly pay and was only partially reimbursed by the commission.¹²⁵ The correspondence of the estate manager in Ustaszewo and the Colonization Commission suggests that male settlers first came alone for one or two days during the fall or winter, probably to undertake preparations and examine the state of existing buildings and ongoing construction work. They then came back again with their families in the early spring. Wilhelm Rommel, a cooper from Möglingen, was probably the first to come to Ustaszewo after signing the contract with the Colonization Commission. In February 1889, he came alone for a day and stayed the night on the estate. In May 1889, Rommel returned with nine other people, a group that probably included three children from his first marriage to Marie Karoline Oberacker (d. 1882), his second wife Friederike Wagner, who was then also pregnant and their three previous children. Perhaps the remaining two persons were friends or relatives who came to help establish the family in the village. They might have also wanted to see the place for themselves before they too decided on migration. A similar migration pattern can be detected in other cases as well.¹²⁶

As indicated by continuing movement between the settlers' home village and the new village, the makeup of settler households often changed. Relatives joined and left their already-established families in Ustaszewo for a variety of reasons. In 1896, Barbara Raiser, the 78-year-old mother of Marie Karoline Oberacker and a widow of twenty years, joined her son-in-law

¹²⁵ See the calculation in BW P 10 Bue 591 (unpaginated), fol. 127–128.

¹²⁶ See the list of stays at the Ustaszewo estate, for which the estate manager requested reimbursement from the Colonization Commission. The list also details a similar pattern of settlement to Rommel's in the case of the non-Möglingen settlers Adolph Honegger, Friedrich Müller, and Ludwig Diefenbach. One visit by an unnamed Württemberg village mayor (*Schultheis*) with his wife is also noted. See: APP-Gneizno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, , Reg VI Nr. 2892, p. 150. For the Rommel and Oberacker family information, see the Möglingen Familienregister.

Rommel and her son Ernst Oberacker in Ustaszewo, which by that point became a village community and renamed as Kornthal. Upon her death there two years later, Barbara Raiser left behind only a few personal items, which amounted to a bed, some linen, and clothes, mainly warm clothing, all valued at about thirty Marks. She probably hoped to be cared for by her family in Kornthal when she decided to go there and relied on their care until her death. Her son Ernst also took care of the funeral arrangements in Kornthal. Following her death, the two brothers-in-law, Ernst Oberacker and Wilhelm Rommel, agreed that the formal division of the estate would be done back in Möglingen. They did not travel from Poznanía back to Möglingen for the occasion in July 1898, however. Instead, they gave powers of attorney to relatives and allies present in the village.¹²⁷

In 1900, the widower Gottlob Pflugfelder (b. 1838) likewise migrated from Möglingen to Poznanía following his daughter Pauline Friederike, who married and left for Poznanía that same year. Upon her death in 1914, Gottlob Pflugfelder returned to Möglingen, where his only surviving child was living. His late daughter's husband remained in Poznanía, and married Wilhelm Rommel's daughter. In other cases, the settlement of Ustaszewo around 1890 was a springboard for further settlement by Württemberg farmers nearby. Families such as Raiser and Reichert sent members to Ustaszewo in 1889 and 1890, to be followed around 1900 by their siblings or cousins who settled in nearby Dornbrunn/Dąbrowa.¹²⁸

As the previous examples indicate, the return to Württemberg was a real option for some settlers and was related, among other things, to life cycle, inheritance, and provision of care. In

¹²⁷ Möglingen *Familienregister*; Möglingen *Inventuren und Teilungen* A1859 (Oberacker, Johannes und Anne Barbara geb. Raiser [1898]). On the inheritance of marital estates in Württemberg, see David Warren Sabean, *Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen, 1700–1870* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 8, esp. pp. 210–214.

¹²⁸ Möglingen *Familienregister*.

Essich's correspondence with the colonization commission following the December 1888 meeting, he sought to make it easier for settlers to cancel their contract and to limit the punitive payments that were demanded in such cases. He specifically asked that a special stipulation be added to the contract that would allow wives, on the death of their husbands, to cancel the contract and pay minimal compensation to the commission. Presumably, this request was made by Württemberg villagers to allow widowed women who did not have adult children or a wider family network available in the new settlement area to return to Württemberg with at least some financial means. Essich also requested that settlers would be allowed to cancel the contract after three years with reduced compensation that would take into account the improvements that they made on the farm, thus minimizing the costs of contract annulment. However, the commission insisted on seeing settlement as permanent and sought to limit settlers' alternatives and ability to leave. Zedlitz flatly denied Essich's requests that would have made the settlement contract more flexible. The Swabians, it seems, had to accept these terms.¹²⁹

Prospective settlers were thinking hard about the implications of migration and used their own experiences and common sense to try and secure not just favorable conditions, but also a real possibility to go back to Württemberg. The ultimately unsuccessful attempts by Württemberg notables and prospective settlers to secure for settlers the right to keep their Württemberg citizenship probably had a similar motive. The next section turns to consider confession and migration and tries to imagine how some Württemberg settlers understood their migration by looking at their families and their histories of migration in the context of Pietist

¹²⁹ For Zedlitz's flat refusal to amend the contract, see his 26.12.1888 letter to Varbüler, and for Essich's and the settlers' requests, see a copy of his 18.12.1888 letter to Zedlitz, both in HStA Stuttgart, BW P 10 Bue 591 (unpaginated), fol. 2, 9–15. I did not see clear evidence that the settlers actually took up Prussia citizenship, but since the issue was not discussed again, it seems that Zedlitz's Swabian interlocutors had no choice but to accept his conditions.

ferment. Such histories, I discovered, were a source for disagreement over the renaming of Ustaszewo, the first wholly Swabian settler-village that was established by the Prussian Colonization Commission.

Kinship and Pietism in the Renaming of Ustaszewo/Kornthal

The former estate of Ustaszewo, located 60 kilometers north of Poznań, was settled by the Colonization Commission between 1888–1893. The transformation of the estate (*Gutsbezirk*) into a rural community (*Landgemeinde*) with administrative autonomy also included renaming the place with a German-sounding name. For the Colonization Commission, naming was an important aspect in promoting what it termed “Germanization,” which entailed enforcing a hegemonic version of Germanness that was tied with loyalty to the Prussian state and, at least in the majority-Catholic and Polish-speaking border region, also with adherence to the state’s Protestant confession. Often, the commission used the German orthography of existing names for the new settlements, but there was a larger ideological project at hand that required new German names, disconnected from any local naming practices.¹³⁰

In the second half of the nineteenth century, German nationalist intellectuals, archivists, teachers, and pastors were hard at work creating histories of German presence and historical legitimizations for Prussian rule in the Polish border provinces. They uncovered old toponyms and invented new ones, provided etiologies for colloquial terms and naming practices, and dived into archival documents to unearth histories that could tie the region to Prussian-German history.

¹³⁰ For example, in the case of the first village established by the Commission in Dollnik-Paruszke (County Flatow/Złotow), Germanization amounted to a slight change of the orthography (Dolnik-Paruschke). Only much later did Dollnik become Wittenberg, possibly in honor of the second president of the Prussian Colonization Commission. Nearby Augustowo was settled a few years after Dollnik and when it became a village in 1903 it was renamed Augustendorf. Other settler-villages bore more overt nationalist tones, such as Bismarcksfelde (Świniary) near Gneizno.

Although similar activities were common ways for enthusiasts of local histories and folklore to rediscover local and national landscapes and histories across Central Europe, in Prussia's contested border region such activities had a particular political edge.¹³¹ As Thomas Serrier has shown in his work on the cultural construction of Poznań as a border region, such writers often selectively recorded rather than actively erased what they considered as the region's Polish history, which was enthusiastically researched and appropriated for the Polish nation by the Poznań Society of the Friends of the Sciences (*Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk*) since its establishment in 1857. The establishment of Imperial Germany in 1871 increased the political urgency of crafting a self-contained and entirely German history for Poznań. According to Serrier, German nationalists researched and wrote local histories that erected a "historical *tabula rasa*," and marginalized or ignored the Polish speaking population. The Historical Society for the Province Posen (*Historische Gesellschaft für die Provinz Posen*), established in 1885, was at the forefront of this kind of activity, and its historical-scientific studies of the region's German past significantly shaped German perceptions of the region well into the twentieth century.¹³²

In that context, the Prussian state, nationalist pressure groups, and their affiliated intellectuals had embarked in the last decade of the nineteenth century on a wide-ranging "symbolic appropriation" of the cultural geography of the region.¹³³ While the Historical Society for the Province Posen, for example, arranged excursions to destinations that symbolized the German history of the province, the Eastern Marches Society undertook large-scale advocacy to promote the Germanization of Polish toponyms in order to "give to our German Eastern Marches

¹³¹ For comparable activities in the Bavarian Palatinate, another border region that changed hands in the nineteenth century, see Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

¹³² Serrier, *Eine Grenzregion*, pp. 140ff., 267–268.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

also outwardly a more German character.”¹³⁴ The Eastern Marches Society even provided a list of naming suggestions, such as *Deutschanger*, *Deutschgard*, *Deutschthal*, and *Reichshofen*, but also warned against thoughtless renaming that rang hollow.¹³⁵ Local elites sitting in town councils also sought to rename their localities, often with encouragement from the Eastern Marches Society and against the wishes of local residents. The most egregious case was the 1905 renaming of Inowrazlaw (today’s Inowrocław), a city of 25,000 inhabitants of whom two thirds were Polish-speaking Catholics, as *Hohensalza*. Such local initiatives, together with decisions by the state administration and especially the hundreds of new settlements established by the Colonization Commission, prompted officials to compose concordances of old and new place names for Poznan and West Prussia in the decade before World War I.¹³⁶

Naming and renaming of the landscape had acquired an important symbolic value that the Colonization Commission could scarcely afford to ignore. But the issue at hand was also the kind of political project that such names evoked. Especially after 1900, the commission promoted names that conjured romanticized rurality and bore no resemblance to the Polish name. The importance of the power to name was also apparent in the internal bureaucratic strife between the commission and the regional governments about the authority to Germanize names, in which the commission demanded, and was denied, absolute naming power. The commission was also very

¹³⁴“...unseren deutschen Ostmarken auch äusserlich ein mehr deutsches Gepräge zu geben.” See “Deutsche Ortsnamen für die Ostmark,” *Die Ostmark* (1901), p. 82, quoted in: Grabowski, *Deutscher und polnischer Nationalismus*, p. 296; Serrier, *Eine Grenzregion*, pp. 247–256, 268.

¹³⁵ Grabowski, *Deutscher und polnischer Nationalismus*, p. 296. The warning appeared in a later issue of the East Marches Society’s bulletin: “Die Umänderung polnischer Ortsnamen,” *Die Ostmark* (1903), p. 34.

¹³⁶ Serrier, *Eine Grenzregion*, p. 268; Grabowski, *Deutscher und polnischer Nationalismus*, p. 296. For further discussions of the issue of place names in this context see the contributions by Stefan Dyroff and Christian Pletzing in: Peter Oliver Loew, Christian Pletzing, and Thomas Serrier (eds.), *Zwischen Enteignung und Aneignung: Geschichte und Geschichten in den ‘Zwischenräumen Mitteleuropas’* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006).

conscious about the utilization of names in the representation of settlements in maps, reports, photographs, propaganda brochures, and in organized tours to the settlement areas.¹³⁷

The documentation of such changes was public and symbolically gestured to the power of the state to shape cultural landscapes and social realities according to a hegemonic notion of Germanization that revolved around the Prussian state, its history, and its state confession. Nevertheless, according to Prussian law, authorities had to consult the inhabitants of new communities about their naming preferences. While the state had the final say, disagreements over naming can also reveal otherwise hidden meanings that settlers attached to their presence in Polish Prussia.

As a practice of ownership and, literally, of entitlement, changing Polish names to German-sounding ones was an important part of the hegemonic, Prussian-centered definition of “Germanization” of the imperial border region. But settlers could also feel strongly about the (re)naming of their new community and come up with naming suggestions of their own. In some cases, settlers’ choice of name seems to point towards a close relationship to the local society, which was majority Polish-speaking. Mielżyn, an estate in county Witkowo that was bought by the commission in 1906, is a case in point. Mielżyn was adjacent to a large and majority-Polish village of the same name and communal boundaries as well as land ownership intersected across the two administrative entities and the nearby hamlet of Mielżynek. Unlike the Swabians in Ustaszewo, the settlers in Mielżyn were a diverse group. The majority came either from Austrian and Russian Poland or from the provinces of West Prussia and Poznań, including several who came from county Witkowo or the adjacent county Gniezno. These settlers must have previously

¹³⁷ Regarding naming practices and the administrative struggle over naming power, see Jacobczyk, *Pruska Komisja Osadnicza*, pp. 80–89. One senior activist in the Eastern Marches Society, Emil Stumpf, had suggested in 1902 that the commission give new settlements names drawing on farming communities in western Germany, to increase their appeal to settlers from these areas. Cf. Serrier, *Eine Grenzregion*, p. 269.

lived in a culturally and linguistically diverse rural society and came in with a very different set of skills and experiences than settlers from western Germany. We know that the Mielżyn settlers had close connections with the Polish inhabitants of Mielżyn, including a common saving bank, and that they insisted on maintaining these connections despite pressure from the Colonization Commission. When the settlement was transformed into a village, the county commissioner and the Colonization Commission, after a long toponymic discussion, agreed on *Miltau* as the new name of the village. The settlers rejected that name and selected instead the name *Neu-Mieltschin*, using the common German orthography. The commission eventually decided to reject both options in favor of *Kleinfleiss*, a name that “does not even remotely ring like the current name” and overrode any local roots (“die jetzige Bezeichnung nicht den geringsten Anklang hat, um den alten Namen... vergessen zu machen”). In this case, the commission sought to erase any connection to the original place name as it was already mired in scandal due to publicized mistreatment of children in a reformatory education institution there, which I discuss in chapter four.¹³⁸ Although the commission and state officials held the power of naming and renaming, settlers who were already established in the existing social landscape could use naming to symbolize belonging that did not also denote the supplanting of existing social relationships. By declining the names that were suggested to them and choosing a name that did

¹³⁸ The discussions about a new name for the settlement in Mielżyn started in December 1908 and their resolution took almost a year. APP-Gniezno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Reg. III Nr. 1851, pp. 28ff. Originally, the commission suggested the name *Milzingen*, which the county commissioner rejected because its ending was “specifically South German.” He explained that the German population in the province lacked a distinct character because of the influx of migrants from across Germany. Instead of using a “mixture” (*Gemisch*) of names from every corner of Imperial Germany, it was preferable to use names whose endings were characteristic of Poznań and thereby strengthen settlers’ connection (*Anhänglichkeit*) to the region. He therefore suggested *Miltau*, which the commission adopted. Witkowo County Commissioner to Colonization Commission, 8.1.1909, *ibid*, p. 34. The settlers’ choice of *Neu-Mieltschin* over *Miltau* is reported in: Witkowo County Commissioner to Colonization Commission, 31.7.1909, *ibid*, p. 55. The choice of *Kleinfleiss* and its motivations are discussed in *ibid*, pp. 59–60ff. For the connections between the settlers and the long-established commune in Mielżyn, see APP, Niemiecka Kasa Stanu Średniego w Poznaniu 732/830 and APP-Gniezno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Reg. III Nr. 1850.

resonate in the local landscape, settlers in Mielżyn showed stubborn indifference to their assigned role in the commission's Germanizing agenda.

The Swabian settlers of Ustaszewo, who disagreed among themselves about the naming the new settler-village, indicate another kind of rift between settlers' and the commission's approach to the symbolism of naming. When they got together to discuss their preferences for a new name in December 1890, there were fifteen households present in the village, all arriving in the first wave of migration from Württemberg in 1889–1890. The settlers could not reach an agreement among themselves and were evenly split between the names *Schwabenfeld* and *Kornthal*. All the settlers from Möglingen voted for the latter. The assembled settlers therefore asked the regional administration to make the decision, explaining that despite their differences, they were united in wanting a “fully German name” instead of a mere orthographic change (“Vollständig deutschen Namen zu wählen und nicht eine Umwandlung... vorzunehmen”). The president of the Colonization Commission, Zedlitz, sided with the settlers who supported *Kornthal* since it evoked memories of the *Heimat* (“heimatlichen Erinnerungen”) in his opinion. He also opined that the name *Kornthal* “expressed confidence that the new settlement would flourish and prosper like the Württemberg *Colonie* of the same name” that was established just south of Möglingen in 1819.¹³⁹

What brought settlers and officials to agree on this name? In the official report from the village on the issue of naming, settlers did not explain their naming preferences. As settlers from Möglingen insisted on a very particular name, we may assume that there was a logic behind their

¹³⁹ The name, wrote Zedlitz to the regional government in Bromberg/Bydgoszcz on 15.1.1891, “der Zuversicht Ausdruck gibt, dass die neue Ansiedlung gleich der im Anfange dieses Jahrhunderts begründenden württembergischen Colonie desselben Namens sich gedeihlich und blühend entfalten werde.” GStA PK XVI HA. Rep. 30 Nr. 1463, pp. 53ff. The quotes from the settlers' proposals are on p. 56, the position of the president of the Colonization Commission is on p. 57.

preference. The president of the commission did provide some explanation for his decision, as we saw, but what stood behind the presumably divergent symbolic meanings that Möglingen settlers and colonization officials had attached to the name Kornthal?

The establishment of the Brethren Community of Korntal in 1819 was an important milestone in the history of nineteenth-century Württemberg Pietism. Gottlieb Wilhelm Hoffmann (1771–1846), notary and the mayor of the county town Leonberg, sought to establish a Pietist community that would be independent of the Lutheran state church and its newly-introduced liturgy (1809), which was a symbol of “rationalist” approaches to theology and religious practice that Pietists detested.¹⁴⁰ Hoffmann did not want to directly challenge the official church, instead promoting a separate and autonomous existence that would allow community members to practice their beliefs without interference. In response to a February 1817 royal directive to regional governments to come up with ways to reduce rampant emigration, Hofmann cleverly suggested to the king that the establishment of separate Pietist communities would help prevent emigration of propertied, loyal, and industrious Pietists from the kingdom without constituting a threat to the state. These supposedly good Pietists were motivated only by the suppression of their religious practice by the new liturgy introduced in 1809, he argued, and, unlike those suffering from hunger and poverty in those years of famine and bad crops, they could actually contribute to the state. The increasing migration from Württemberg to the Russian Empire at the time was based on the promise that migrants could live in separate village-communities where they would enjoy religious freedom and other privileges granted by the state. Implicitly using

¹⁴⁰ On the introduction of the new hymnbook in 1791 and the new liturgy in 1809, their political and theological implications, and the way the two events were constructed in pietist history-writing, see Hartmut Lehmann, “Die politische Widerstand gegen die Einführung des neuen Gesangbuches von 1791 in Württemberg: Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Kirchen und Sozialgeschichte,” in idem, *Protestantische Weltansichten: Transformationen seit dem 17. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), pp. 49–68.

this model but proposing a kind of internal migration, Hofmann was able to convince the king. Although Hofmann foresaw the establishment of multiple communities, this was not allowed by a suspicious state, and only Korntal and one other community were established according to his suggestions. Nevertheless, the fraternal community in Korntal became an important Pietist center, which also produced a global diaspora of missionaries and settlers. It was a model for others to emulate, not least for villagers just down the road in Möglingen.¹⁴¹

Royal support allowed Hofmann and his adherents to establish a land-purchase company that bought the Korntal estate in January 1819, which was quickly divided among the members. Royal privilege was granted in August, clearing the way for the creation of a community. This haste was linked to eschatological beliefs common to Württemberg Pietism. It was necessary for Hofmann and his supporters to establish a true community of Christ's followers well before Christ was to return to his flock, an event that was scheduled, they believed, for 1836. The payment installments for the estate were to be completed by that same year.¹⁴² The 1819 dedication of the Korntal chapel (*Bethsaal*), reported the Möglingen pastor, drew multitudes from across the district and the kingdom. On Sundays and Holidays, he continued, crowds from different sects and confessions, as well as the curious, regularly flocked to Korntal. The pastor noted, with an eye towards optimism, that some had been so exhausted by the long walk that they slept during the sermons.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Samuel Koehne, "Pietism as Societal Solution: The Foundation of the Korntal Brethren (*Korntaler Brüdergemeinde*)" in Jonathan Strom (ed.), *Pietism and Community in Europe and North America, 1650–1850* (Leiden and Boston: Brill Academic, 2010), pp. 329–50. For the story of Kornthal as sympathetically and authoritatively narrated in the 1880s, see the article "Kornthal" in the *Real-Encyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, vol. 8 (Leipzig 1881), pp. 236ff. More broadly on Pietism in Württemberg, see Hartmut Lehmann, *Pietismus und weltliche Ordnung in Württemberg vom 17. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969).

¹⁴² Koehne, *Pietism as Societal Solution*.

¹⁴³ Eighteenth-century Württemberg Pietist and biblical scholar, Johann Albrecht Bengel, had suggested the year 1836 as the beginning of Christ's second coming. For the first report by Pastor Breuning in Möglingen regarding the

The year 1836 ended up an eschatological disappointment. In its aftermath, there was a reorientation of the political orientation of many Pietists, who were more willing to accept the state church, as well as to embrace a sense of Württemberg patriotism combined with Protestant German nationalism. At the same time, missionary zeal among Pietists was increasingly expressed through visions of empire and projects of global evangelism.¹⁴⁴

It is not clear how the approaching eschatological deadline influenced religious practices and convictions in Möglingen. Coincidentally, we do know that the two bible circle speakers in the village had died that very year. In 1830, Pastor Breuning in Möglingen reported to his superiors in the *Landeskirche* that the moral and religious situation in the village tended to be good, with adherence and respect to the official church and good attendance in service and communion. “Only a few,” he remarked, go to neighboring Korntal “in good weather” to join in devotional practices (*Andachtsübungen*), which was a key part of Pietist religiosity and probably a meeting point for Pietists from across the Leonberg and Ludwigsburg districts and beyond. There were also two Pietist meetings in Möglingen during that year (for comparison, Breuning mentioned four assemblies in 1822, held in different houses), each with about 30 participants (out of 1180 Möglingen inhabitants at the time).¹⁴⁵ Looking into more pastoral reports would allow for a better assessment of the religious situation in the village up to and in the 1880s (bearing in mind pastors’ biases, interests, and partial knowledge) but for the moment it suffices to point to one

establishment of the community of brothers in Korntal, just to south of Möglingen, in 1819, see Michael Kannenberg, *Verschleierte Uhrtafeln: Endzeiterwartungen im württembergischen Pietismus zwischen 1818 und 1848* [=Arbeiten zur Geschichte des Pietismus 52] (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2007), pp. 62–63.

¹⁴⁴ See generally: Karl Rennstich, “Geschichte der protestantischen Mission in Deutschland” in Ulrich Gäbler (ed.), *Der Pietismus im neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhundert* [=Geschichte des Pietismus, vol. 3] (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), pp. 308–320.

¹⁴⁵ For the pastor’s report, see the collection of the *Heimatverein* Möglingen. For devotional practices, see “Andachtsübungen” in: *Real-Encyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, vol. 1 (Hamburg 1854), p. 310.

thread across the century, namely the possibility that Pietist socialization through the family and in the locality shaped the ideas and motives of the first Möglingen settlers and contributed to their determination to name their village after the neighboring Pietist brethren community.

In the village of Neckarhausen, about 40 kilometers to the south on the foothills of the Swabian Jura, David Sabean has identified a Pietist group that was active during the early nineteenth century. The Neckarhausen group was of similar size to the one reported by the Möglingen pastor in the 1820s and met three days a week, late at night, in private houses in mixed gender gatherings. Pastoral reports about the Neckarhausen group suggest that it existed at least until the 1850s, with its size fluctuating between 25 to 60 participants. Beyond that, the comprehensive source-material for Neckarhausen does not include any reference to this or any other Pietist activity. In Möglingen, located in the heartland of Württemberg Pietism between Ludwigsburg and Leonberg, Pietist activity left more traces. If Möglingen Pietists operated in a similar fashion to their Neckarhausen colleagues, then their meetings were not only mixed gender but also attended by multiple members of the household. After all, since the duty of married partners was to care for each other's soul, the household became a fundamental site of Pietist religiosity, disciplining, and socialization.¹⁴⁶

The two Möglingen Pietist groups, according to the 1830 pastor report, held their meetings in private houses, and each group had a speaker who would explicate Sundays' pastoral lessons on the epistles in the New Testament using "old sermon books," probably ones preceding the liturgical changes around 1800. The speakers in these meeting were named by the pastor as

¹⁴⁶ Sabean, *Property, Production, and Family*, pp. 182, 427–428. For marriage, household construction, and class-building in Pietism, see Ulrike Gleixner, "Zwischen göttlicher und weltlicher Ordnung: Die Ehe im lutherischen Pietismus," *Pietismus und Neuzeit. Ein Jahrbuch zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantismus* 28 (2002) pp. 147–184, 150–152.

Jakob Bäuerle (probably d. 1836), a tailor, and Johann Georg Rossnagel (1772–1836).¹⁴⁷ Tracing the family alliances throughout four generations based on the Möglingen *Familienregister* we learn that Rossnagel, the Pietist ringleader, had kinship connections with several of the settlers who left Möglingen for Poznania, both to Kornthal/Ustaszewo and to the neighboring Dornbrunn/Dąbrowa (figure 1.1).

Johann Georg Rossnagel's son Friedrich Jacob (1804–1890) was a longtime member of the village church council (*Pfarrgemeinderat / Kirchenrat*) and so was his first cousin, the son of Johann Georg's sister Barbara (1784–1854), Johannes Oberacker (1811–1876). By the early nineteenth century, the monopolization of political power by closely allied families through the repeated marriages between cousins across several generations was an entrenched pattern, as David Sabeau shows for Neckarhausen. In Möglingen, the alliance of Oberackers and Rossnagels in this generation allowed them to participate in the regulation of morality and even to challenge the pastor as inadequate for the religious needs of the community, jointly demanding his replacement by the church authorities in the early 1860s. In the fourth generation, the Rommel and Oberacker families who left Möglingen in 1889 were closely allied. Johannes Oberacker's son (and Barbara's grandson) Ernst Hermann Oberacker (1854–1924) was noted as a wainwright like his father. He settled in 1889 in Ustaszewo. His sister, Marie Karoline Oberacker (d. 1882), was married to Wilhelm Friedrich Rommel, a cooper (1853–1930), making the two men in-laws. Anna Barbara Raiser was married to Barbara Rossnagel's son while her brother Christoph Friedrich Raiser (1837–1921) married Johann Georg Rossnagel's *granddaughter* Marie Rosine Rossnagel (1837–1916). The two siblings with whom we started, born in the 1770s and 1780s, thus reconnected in the second and third generations. The son of

¹⁴⁷ Breuning's report is located in the collection of Möglingen *Heimatverein*.

Marie Rosine Rossnagel and Christoph Friedrich Raiser also left Möglingen for Poznan in 1900, settling in Dornbrunn/Dąbrowa.¹⁴⁸ The Oberackers and Rossnagels seem to have had a particular structural position in the village that combined repeated intermarriage, political office, and a radical Pietist orientation that also pitted them against the pastor and the state church.

Pietist socialization may have partially shaped the sense of purpose and belonging of the first Möglingen families who settled in Ustaszewo, although the meaning of being a Pietist in Möglingen at this time seems elusive. Disagreements with the Möglingen pastor and the church authorities may have been partly institutionalized after 1836, but we know that tensions did remain and were related in part to nearby Korntal. In 1861, over forty Möglingen villagers left the Lutheran state church and joined the Association of the Friends of Jerusalem, also known as the Temple Society, which had strong roots in Korntal. Over the next two decades, these Möglingen Templars gradually migrated to Palestine, where the Temple Society established

¹⁴⁸ There is a strong intergenerational presence of artisans among the settlers from Möglingen. Such occupations were also related to lifecycle and did not mean that artisans would not own land or cultivate it. Cf. Sabean, *Property, Production, and Family*, pp. 316–320.




Figure 1.1: Partial kinship diagram of the Rossnagels in Möglingen down four generations. In red are those who left for Poznania. (Based on the Möglingen *Familienregister* and supplemented by other village sources made available through the painstaking genealogical work of Walter Reichert from the Möglingen *Heimatverein*).

Legend: Δ Male; O Female; = Marriage; — Siblings; ← Moving into Möglingen (Place of Origin); → Moving out of Möglingen (Destination); Red underline designates destinations in Poznania.

several colonies in preparation for the second coming of Christ. Perhaps in light of these developments, the state church sent a young vicar to assist the village pastor in his work. The vicar, who spent several years in the Swabian settlement area around the colony Hofnungstal near Odessa (established during the migration period of 1819) and was probably associated with the Templars himself, proved a successful preacher, and there was strong opposition in the village to his subsequent removal. In this context, 112 villagers led by the first cousins who sat on the village church council, Johannes Oberacker and Friedrich Jacob Rossnagel (see figure 1.1), demanded the retention of the vicar, complained about the “dry and boring” sermons of the pastor, and warned that otherwise more villagers would leave the state church in favor of the

Templars. Between 1861 and his departure to Palestine in 1873, the shoemaker Jacob Friedrich Knoll (1805–1878), brother-in-law of Friedrich Jacob Rossnagel and a Templar elder, undertook several baptisms and seems to have been leading a small community within the village. We do know that another of Rossnagel’s daughters left Möglingen to settle with her husband in the Templer colony Sarona, established in Palestine in 1871, while one of Knoll’s daughters, who stayed behind in Möglingen as her parents and most of her siblings left for Palestine in 1873, moved to Poznania with her husband and children in 1900.¹⁴⁹

The 1879 marriage between Wilhelm Friedrich Rommel and Marie Karoline Oberacker, Johannes’ daughter, was not entered as a regularly numbered entry in the marriage register despite the fact that both were residing in Möglingen at that time. This may suggest that their marriage was not conducted by the village pastor and may have been done outside the village, perhaps within a separate Pietist group or even in neighboring Korntal. After Marie Karoline Oberacker’s death in 1882, the two brothers-in-law, Rommel and Oberacker, continued to be connected through the dead Marie Karoline while being married to women from outside the village. Indeed, both Rommel, a cooper, and his second wife were outsiders, born in other villages in the Ludwigsburg district. Likewise, Christine Hönes, the wife of Ernst Hermann Oberacker, was born to a family from Münchingen, a large village bordering Möglingen in

¹⁴⁹ See the Möglingen *Familienregister*. Sectarian baptisms and marriages were recorded in the parish records but marked in various ways to note that the pastor did not carry them out. Regarding the preacher and the village petition see the short article by pastor Rentschler based on the village archive in the *Möglinger Heimatglocken*, 1933. Among Pietists, marriage did not require official pastoral intervention, see Gleixner, “Die Ehe,” pp. 156–157.

which many Möglingen villagers had property.¹⁵⁰ When they left Möglingen in 1889, the Rommels took with them the surviving children from both marriages.¹⁵¹

Despite the significant differences between the two villages of Kornthal and Korntal, established 70 years apart, both were founded on the promise and premise of internal migration and settlement. The creation of Korntal out of an estate resembled the commission's own project and seemed to Zedlitz as elucidating a real affinity of colony-building and migration, alongside the usefulness of the name as a propaganda tool to appeal to Swabian Pietists. Radical Pietism combined here symbolically with the confessional nationalizing policies of the Prussian state and church. For the settlers from Möglingen, Kornthal allowed them to put forward a name that resonated with their sense of *Heimat*. Schwabenfeld would have meant much less to them.

The Möglingen settlers had a different sense of *Heimat* than the regionalist generalizations to which Zedlitz hinted at when he mentioned the “memories of the homeland.” Theirs was a strongly Pietist *Heimat* whose landscape and devotional practices intertwined. By going down the road to Korntal for bible circles, Möglingen Pietists actively shaped their *Heimat* as well. It was these memories and meanings that they carried with them to Poznania. The migration and naming practices of Möglingen settlers also shows how practicing their piety was embedded in a long history of migration and tensions with the Württemberg state and its church. For them, migration to Poznania was part of this history and needs to be understood within a field of possibilities and accumulated social experience that was intensely local and familial.

¹⁵⁰ Sabean shows that there was a pattern of artisanal marrying outside the village and developing regional networks that corresponded to their movement in search of work: *Property, Production, and Family*, pp. 316–320, *Kinship in Neckarhausen, 1700–1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), ch. 19. For the connection between Möglingen and Münchingen see Königlichen statistisch-topographischen Bureau, *Beschreibung des Oberamts Ludwigsberg* (Stuttgart: Karl Aue, 1859), pp. 275–181

¹⁵¹ Further marriage and ritual kinship connections existed but are not explicated here. The *Familienregister* was focused on marriage and patrilineal descent and did not indicate god-parentage.

Such experiences of family members and neighbors, which included migration and settlement in the Russian Empire and in Palestine, is likely to have produced knowledge that was also a set of resources with which people could imagine and relate social action. Württemberg settlers were also looking into other migration options and had their own ideas about making a new, and not necessarily permanent, *Heimat*.

The language of forgetting and remembering the *Heimat* denoted political claims rather than any mental activity.¹⁵² By putting forward the name Kornthal, Möglingen settlers were not only highlighting a particular symbolic connection with their homeland, but more importantly, they were making *new claims* on old connections and new social landscapes. And by trying to name their village Neu-Mieltschin, settlers in Mielzyn probably sought to make a different set of claims that emphasized their embeddedness in the local social context, even while using a well-worn model of naming for colonial settlement. The Colonization Commission, for its part, utilized naming to make claims about the state's power to reshape social landscapes and human relationships. This required, paradoxically, leaving traces, especially as these claims were not very persuasive in light of the increasing strength of the Polish national movement and its own land purchase and settlement activities. In promoting the toponymic symbolism of a romanticized rurality, the commission made claims on settlers' behavior, posited settlement as

¹⁵² This paragraph is indebted to Gadi Algazi's discussion of the pitfalls of the terminology of memory in historical analysis. While "true forgetting" is an intensely social process that involves the destruction of webs of social relations and cultural meaning, the language of memory is not about knowledge but about recognition. Although the language of memory seems to presuppose a pre-existing object that is remembered or forgotten, it actually assumes a pre-existing interpretative framework. But by asking about the social logic of the language of memory we often discover that precisely such a framework is under construction and contestation, whereby the language of memory is used as a political strategy. By considering remembering as recognition, we can reinterpret languages of memory as claim making and ask about their social logic. Gadi Algazi, "Forget Memory: Some Critical Remarks on Memory, Forgetting and History" in Sebastian Scholz, Gerald Schwedler, and Kai-Michael Sprenger (eds.), *Damnatio in Memoria: Deformation und Gegenkonstruktionen von Geschichte*, (Vienna/Cologne/Weimer: Böhlau, 2014), pp. 25–34.

permanent, and underscored settlers' limited options as Germans and as colonizers in the imperial border region. Naming, then, was a site of contestation between settlers and the commission, where different claims about the social implications of settlement were negotiated. Even when the commission and settlers agreed on a name, they did so based on widely differing sets of expectations about settlement. Naming was a site of contestation around settlers' frontier citizenship, the permanency it assumed, and the alternatives it afforded.

Negotiating Frontier Citizenship around the Ballot

Swabian settlers had a range of resources that gave them a viable exit option and a relatively strong bargaining position when negotiating with the commission. And yet, taking up Prussian citizenship as the commission demanded would have weakened their leverage, as they were likely to end up losing their Württemberg citizenship. Settlers and prospective settlers faced a powerful state agency that determined the framework within which the particular aspects of settlers' frontier citizenship were negotiated. Two central expectations were that settlers would vote for parliamentary candidates favored by the Prussian government and participate in communal self-administration, both predicated on formally holding Prussian citizenship. This section focuses on election participation as a central tenant of the hegemonic notion of Prussian frontier citizenship. The articulation of this notion – probably for the first time in this regard – took place in the context of the 1888–1889 negotiations between the commission and the farmers from Württemberg. By 1898, Settlers' voting became a high-stakes arena in which the hegemonic notion of Prussian frontier citizenship was tenaciously obstructed by many settlers, and the publication of election statistics threatened to make this fact widely known. As the commission utilized new administrative tools to enumerate settlers' voting behavior, it became apparent that many settlers chose not to go to the ballot at all. In order to enforce voting for

government-supported German candidates, the commission developed administrative strategies that combined enumeration with individual supervision and paternalist domination.

In the meeting that Essich organized in December 1888 with would-be settlers from Württemberg, those present expressed the wish to retain their Württemberg citizenship after settling in Polish Prussia. Essich reiterated the point in his letter to the Colonization Commission's president, Zedlitz, and sought assurance that this would not create problems. Varnbüler likewise stressed the issue in his communication with Zedlitz.¹⁵³ While local patriotism and sense of paternalist duty may have played an important role in the support shown by Varnbüler and Essich to their fellow Swabians, prospective settlers were more likely worried about their ability to return to Württemberg. This option was severely limited by two recent Württemberg laws, the 1885 Law on Communal Belonging, which updated existing legislation from the 1820s and 1830s, and the 1881 ministerial decree on re-naturalization. In this case, the requirement that settlers hold Prussian citizenship considerably limited settlers' alternatives once they moved to Polish Prussia.

In Württemberg, citizenship continued to rely on actual residence in a community long after Prussia had disassociated state citizenship from communal residency in the middle of the century. While Prussian law allowed settlers to keep the citizenship of other German states while residing in Prussia, settlers from Württemberg could expect to lose their communal residency (*Bürgerrecht*) within a year of their departure. According to the 1885 Württemberg Law on Communal Belonging, communal residency was lost upon the revocation or renunciation of Württemberg citizenship (Articles 36.1 and 36.2), and acquiring communal residency in the

¹⁵³ Essich to Zedlitz, 18.12.1888, HStA Stuttgart, BW P 10 Bue 591 (unpaginated), fol. 9–15.

kingdom required Württemberg citizenship (Article 6) in addition to a certain minimal period of tax payment in the community (Articles 6 and 7). The application further required the payment of administrative fees, normally between ten and fifty Marks (Article 9). Retaining citizenship without residency required payment of a fee which was determined according to the taxes that residents would normally pay (Article 34). After three months of non-payment of this fee, communal residency was to be revoked (Article 38). The path to re-naturalization was also rugged. Former citizens who did not reside in Württemberg were required to renounce their previous citizenship and then apply for re-naturalization. The state would then make a case-by-case decision.¹⁵⁴ All in all, Swabian settlers faced a loss of citizenship and a costly re-naturalization process if they took up Prussian citizenship, and a reapplication for residency in Möglingen and for Württemberg citizenship required a substantial investment of time and money and was by no means guaranteed to succeed.

It seems that the Prussian Colonization Commission did not immediately realize that settlers' citizenship would play such a significant role in its work. During summer and fall 1888, Zedlitz did not regard the issue of Prussian citizenship as particularly important and did not see any significant problem with Württemberg settlers keeping their Württemberg citizenship. The possibility of requiring settlers to take up Prussian citizenship, he wrote to Varnbüler in early

¹⁵⁴ See "Gesetz vom 16. Juni 1885 betreffend die Gemeindeangehörigkeit," reproduced in: *Verwaltungsedikt für die Gemeinden, Oberämter und Stiftungen vom 1. März 1822 nebst das dasselbe abändernden und ergänzenden Gesetzen, im Auftrag des Königl. Ministerium des Innern, überarbeitet von Oberregierungsrat Fleischhauer* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1891), pp. 112–137. For the Württemberg ministerial decree that regulated re-naturalization at the time, see: *Erläss des Ministeriums des Innern an die K. Kreisregierungen, die Stadtdirektion Stuttgart und die K. Oberämter, betreffend die Naturalisation von Ausländer, vom 31. Januar 1881*, reproduced as appendix 65 in: Wilhelm Cahn, *Das Reichsgesetz über die Erwerbung und den Verlust der Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeit vom 1. Juni 1870*, 2nd edition (Berlin, 1896), pp. 477ff.

November 1888, was not even discussed by the commission up to that point.¹⁵⁵ This was perhaps due to the fact that regarding the ownership and utilization of property, non-Prussian German citizens had equal rights to Prussians. Unlike the privileges granted to colonists in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Zedlitz explained, the specific economic relationship between settlers and the Prussian state were now defined through private contract law, not through royal privilege. Unlike privileges which could be negotiated on individual or family basis, the Prussian Colonization Commission in its dealings with settlers was committed to the framework of public administrative law and had drafted largely uniform contracts for settlers to sign. Citizenship was not mentioned in the standard contracts between the commission and settlers, and settlers could not, therefore, be legally forced to take up one citizenship or give up another. As we know from instructions sent by the commission to its estate managers, it was the latter's power over settlers that was usually used to ensure compliance with the commission's regulations and instructions.¹⁵⁶

The commission had earmarked several estates for settlement by Württemberg farmers and the expressed wish of the Württemberg settlers to keep their Württemberg citizenship brought to the fore an issue that was potentially relevant to multiple villages. In December 1888, Zedlitz admitted to Varnbüler that he had initially failed to grasp the far-reaching implications of the matter and explained why the commission now regarded it as essential that settlers would

¹⁵⁵ Zedlitz to Varnbüler, 1.11.1888 and Zedlitz to Varnbüler, 26.12.1888, HStA Stuttgart, BW P 10 Bue 591 (unpaginated), fol. 75, 3–5, 8. Also compare various stages of the preparation of the document in the head office of the commission, in APP-Gneizno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, , Reg VI Nr. 2892, pp. 41–49, 54ff.

¹⁵⁶ Zedlitz to Varnbüler, 26.12.1888, HStA Stuttgart, BW P 10 Bue 591 (unpaginated), fol. 2. Cf. the commission's *Geschäfts-Anweisungen* of 1898 and 1910. On property rights and citizenship, see the brief discussion in Dieter Gosewinckel "Eigentum vor nationalen Grenzen: Zur Entwicklung von Eigentumsrecht und Staatsangehörigkeit in Deutschland während des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts" in Hannes Siegrist and David Sugarman (eds.) *Eigentum im internationalen Vergleich: 18.–20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), pp. 87–108.

take up Prussian citizenship.¹⁵⁷ Zedlitz's reasoning focused on communal self-administration and participation in electoral politics, both of which he saw as key aspects of the commission's colonization activity. "Only strong German communities, which would be a match for their Polish environment in their unity and national distinctiveness," he explained to Varnbüler, would not only have a lasting capacity to resist the Polish environment, but also "have a colonizing and Germanizing influence [on their environment] through a healthy economically and communally [*communalen*] development."¹⁵⁸ The establishment of communal self-administration was thus "absolutely necessary" (*unumgänglich Nothwendig*), without which a "fundamental political goal of the entire policy [of settlement] will not be fulfilled." The creation of whole villages comprised of Württemberg citizens without Prussian citizenship would have created a political vacuum, as such villages would not be able to exercise the political, administrative, and disciplinary functions of the communal administration.¹⁵⁹ Zedlitz's explanation was clearly not meant for the settlers' ears, as they did not see themselves as extensions of Prussian power. But by sharing Prussian state thinking with the former Württemberg premier, Zedlitz probably hoped that Varnbüller would be convinced that rather than an affront to Württemberg, Prussian

¹⁵⁷ Zedlitz to Varnbüler, 26.12.1888, HStA Stuttgart, BW P 10 Bue 591 (unpaginated), fol. 3–5, 8. Also compare various stages of the preparation of the document in the head office of the commission, in APP-Gneizno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, , Reg VI Nr. 2892, pp. 41–49, 54ff. Zedlitz also hinted in the letter that Varnbüler may exercise his political influence in Württemberg to allow for a formal expression of the settlers' connection with their "old *Heimat*," probably a reference to the differences in citizenship laws between the two German states. Varnbüler had written a series of articles in the *Schwäbische Merkur* in the early 1860s in which he called for a "German *Heimatrecht*" that would allow equal political rights for citizens of every German state in any other German state. Zedlitz was perhaps gently referring to this article series and the fact the Württemberg was still to follow Varnbüller's own suggestions from twenty years earlier. See "Friedrich Karl Freiherr von Varnbüller: Über die Frage eines deutschen Heimatrechtes" in Jürgen Müller (ed.), *Vom Frankfurter Fürstentag bis zur Auflösung des Deutschen Bundes 1863–1866* (Göttingen: De Gruyter, 2017), Source 30, pp. 159ff.

¹⁵⁸ "Nur kräftige deutsche Gemeinden, die in ihrer Geschlossenheit und Eigenart den polnischen Umgebungen gewachsen sind, werden nicht nur widerstandsfähig bleiben, sondern auch [durch] einer gesunden wirtschaftlichen und kommunalen Entwicklung selbst wieder colonisierend und germanisierend wirken." Zedlitz to Varnbüler, 26.12.1888, HStA Stuttgart, BW P 10 Bue 591 (unpaginated), fol. 5–6.

¹⁵⁹ Zedlitz to Varnbüler, 26.12.1888, HStA Stuttgart, BW P 10 Bue 591 (unpaginated), fol. 3–5.

citizenship was a necessity for imperial Germanization, and would help to persuade the farmers that it was in their interest to take up Prussian citizenship.

Participation in electoral politics, and especially the elections for the Prussian parliament, the *Landtag*, was the other formal political aspect of settlers' duties to the Prussian state that presupposed Prussian citizenship. According to Zedlitz's explication of state thinking to Varnbüler, the exclusion of Polish representatives from the political arena was a crucial part of what was meant by Germanization, particularly regarding elections to the Prussian parliament. Experience taught, Zedlitz explained, that "the first step in the complete conquest of an area for Germandom" was to defeat "Polishdom" on the "battlefield of political elections." In every constituency in which Polish candidates lost their majority, Polish "social-economic and linguistic resistance" soon dwindled. It was therefore "strongly desired," Zedlitz concluded, that "German settlers would also be German voters."¹⁶⁰ Prussian frontier citizenship required, then, that settlers participate in elections and vote for candidates acceptable to the government.

The Prussian government and the commission continued to regard election participation and settlers' voting behavior as central aspects of the settlement project. The government expected the commission to buy land and establish settlements in areas where a relatively small Polish majority afforded the opportunity to prevent the election of Polish candidates.¹⁶¹ Thus, the commission put special emphasis on settlement in counties where elections results could be

¹⁶⁰ "Auch vom rein staatlichen Standpunkte aus ist dies dringend erwünscht, da in den Landtagswahlen es natürlich von großer Bedeutung ist, daß deutschen Ansiedler auch deutsche Wähler sind [...] Die Erfahrung hat hier gelehrt, daß der erste Schritt zur völligen Eroberung eines Landstrichs für das Deutschtum stets in den Niederwerfung des Polenthums auf dem Kampfplatz der politischen Wahl getan wird und daß in allen Wahlkreisen, in welchen die Polen nicht mehr die Majorität bei den Landtagswahlen erreichen können, ihre Widerstandskraft auch auf wirtschaftlichen-socialen und sprachlichen Gebiete rapid sinkt." Zedlitz to Varnbüler, 26.12.1888, HStA Stuttgart, BW P 10 Bue 591 (unpaginated), fol. 6–8.

¹⁶¹ Jacòbczyk, *Pruska komisja osadnicza*, p. 48.

influenced, including Wongrowitz/Wągrowiec, Gnesen/Gniezno, Witkowo, and Znin/Żnin (where Ustaszewo was located). Around 3,000 settler families lived there by 1911.¹⁶² Starting from the 1898 elections, German representatives of the Conservative, National-Liberal, and Left-Liberal parties won *Landtag* seats in these areas which were formerly held by Polish deputies.¹⁶³ All that was dependent on settlers' holding Prussian citizenship, as Zedlitz had come to understand in the context of the negotiations with Swabian villagers in 1888.

Having Prussian citizenship, however, was not sufficient for settlers to fulfill the expectations of the commission. Even after taking up Prussian citizenship (if they did not hold one already), and despite what we may assume were recurrent reminders from the commission's agents on the ground, many settlers did not regard voting as a duty they needed to preform and did not vote at all in parliamentary elections. Unlike elections-related disagreements between the commission and settlers, we know little about conflicts related to participation in communal administration. It seems that conflicts were more about which settlers were to lead communal administration and about the relationship between settler communities and their surrounding villages than about the extent of participation in local administration.¹⁶⁴ But even regarding elections, despite the public character of the Prussian ballot, information is limited. Up to 1898, the commission was also apparently in the dark regarding settlers' voting and did not try to keep track of individuals or communities' electoral behavior. But in 1898 we note a shift in the

¹⁶² Ibid., pp. 103, 134, 195.

¹⁶³ The results of the 1898 elections for the Prussian parliament and the Reichstag seem to confirm the success of this strategy, as less Polish representatives were elected than in 1893. See further the details of the map "Parteistellung der Abgeordneten in den einzelnen Landtagswahlbezirken Preußens bei den Abgeordnetenwahlen der Jahre 1876, 1893, 1903, 1913" in *XXXIII Ergänzungsheft zur Zeitschrift des Königl. Preuß. Statist. Landesamts* (Berlin, 1913), reproduced in Thomas Kühne, *Dreiklassenwahlrecht und Wahlkultur in Preussen 1867–1914: Landtagswahlen zwischen korporativer Tradition und politischem Massenmarkt* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag 1994).

¹⁶⁴ This issue is seriously unresearched in the scholarship. See generally Jacobczyk, *Pruska komisja osadnicza*, ch. 4, who also looks in some detail into the establishment of a model village in Gołeczewo/Golenhofen.

commission's approach to settlers' voting and election participation, which became categories for gathering information. The resulting statistics became a way of measuring settlers' compliance with the commission's normative definition of their frontier citizenship, as well as an administrative tool to enforce this definition.

The commission's new approach to elections was possibly connected to the coming parliamentary elections in October 1898, but also to changes in government policies. The previous elections to the Prussian *Landtag* and the Imperial *Reichstag*, held in 1893, resulted in gains for Polish representatives (In the Prussian Parliament, for instance, they won 17 mandates – their best result since 1879 – in comparison to 15 mandates in the previous 1888 elections and 13 in the subsequent 1898 elections).¹⁶⁵ Between 1890 and 1894, Leo von Caprivi's government relied on the support of the Catholic Center Party and the Polish faction in the *Reichstag* to pass key legislation and did not prioritize further radicalization of the colonization in Polish Prussia. Under the new chancellor von Hohenlohe, the Prussian government was again escalating its Germanization measures. In early 1898 the Prussian parliament granted the Colonization Commission another 100 million Marks. Later that year, the link between elections and settlement policy was formalized and the government ordered the commission to make electoral considerations a high priority in its decisions about land purchase and settlement.¹⁶⁶

Until 1898 there was no collection of information on settlers' voting practices despite the existence of official statistics on elections and the importance attributed to voting by the commission since its establishment. Although the commission developed an array of social

¹⁶⁵ It was also significant that the 1893 election was the only instance in which the Polish faction won a seat thanks to support from the Left-Liberals. See Kühne, *Dreiklassenwahlrecht und Wahlkultur*, pp. 262–263.

¹⁶⁶ Jacòbczyk, *Pruska komisja osadnicza*, ch. 3, esp. pp. 60–65.

categories in the process of articulating the terms of settlement, these were not transformed into statistical categories. At the same time, other categories and methods that were widely used in state statistics at the time were apparently not deemed relevant or useful for the commission's work. That the commission did not seek to compose statistics about settlers' voting behavior until 1898 is particularly striking when we consider Prussian state statisticians' aspirations and zeal at this time. Christine von Oertzen shows, for example, the incredibly effective technologies and "machineries of data power" that were used by the Prussian Statistical Bureau as early as the 1860s, which were based on the innovative use of the new "paper tool" of moveable and standardized counting cards that allow an unprecedentedly detailed census. Statistics were also widely used as a nationalizing tool, as Morgane Labbé shows regarding language statistics.¹⁶⁷

Scholars have demonstrated the strong relationship between electoral politics and national statistics in Imperial Germany.¹⁶⁸ Election statistics in Prussia existed in one form or the other since 1849, but comprehensive "statistics of the political characteristics of the population" were first suggested by Ernst Engel, the head of the Prussian Statistical Office, in 1865. Engel's plan was politically ambitious, as it was meant to include the ballot results of the parties in the first round of elections (*Urwahl*) in which the electors for every constituency were elected, who

¹⁶⁷ Christine von Oertzen, "Machineries of Data Power: Manual versus Mechanical Census Compilation in Nineteenth-Century Europe," *Osiris* 32 (2017), pp. 129–150; "Die Historizität der Verdatung: Konzepte, Werkzeuge und Praktiken im 19. Jahrhundert" *N.T.M.* 25 (2017), pp. 407–434; Labbé, "Institutionalizing the Statistics of Nationality." For nationality in the institutional history of the Prussian Statistical Office, see Michael C. Schneider, *Wissensproduktion im Staat: Das königlich preußische statistische Bureau 1860–1914* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 2013), ch. 4.

¹⁶⁸ Labbé, "Institutionalizing the Statistics of Nationality," emphasizes the divergence between the statistics and categories produced by local administration on the one hand and centralizing state-statisticians on the other hand. For the importance of statistically measuring bodies in the context of national conscription, see Heinrich Hartmann, *The Body Populace: Military Statistics and Demography in Europe before the First World War*, Translated by Ellen Yutzy Glebe (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2019). On statistics as the "science of nationality" see Jason D. Hansen, *Mapping the Germans: Statistical Science, Cartography, and the Visualization of the German Nation, 1848–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

then proceeded to elect the candidate for the Prussian *Landtag*. This first round of elections was conducted according to a “three class” system that granted different weight to votes according to voters’ fiscal contribution to the state.¹⁶⁹ Although elections were severely skewed in favor of property, the results of the first voting round were still the closest one could get to what statisticians imagined as the “political characteristics” of the population. The political risks involved, namely exposing how different the results were between the first and the second round, must have prompted the government to block Engel’s statistical empire-making in this case. Between 1867–1888 there were hardly any official election statistics in Prussia, but from the 1893 *Landtag* election, official statistics were regularly published and included the absolute number of votes and vote share of candidates in each constituency. Starting in 1898, the votes for each party in the first round were also given, and in 1903 published official statistics included the voting of the electors in the second round of election. In 1898 the statistics also included for the first time a division of results in localities according to the size of their populations.¹⁷⁰ The availability of such local-level information probably contributed to the commission’s decision to collect information about settlers’ voting that year.

¹⁶⁹ Elections for the Prussian parliament took place in two different days, normally with a week or two in between, in uniform dates across the kingdom. In the first round of the vote (*Urwahl*), the weight of the votes was uneven and depended on direct tax payments. Voters were divided into three classes (*Abteilungen*) according to the direct taxes they paid. Each class represented one third of the total direct tax revenue in the election district or community. Classes were filled with voters ranked according to their tax payments, starting from the highest, adding taxpayers until one third of the total tax base was reached. In the first round, each class elected its representatives separately and in consecutive order, and once one class completed the vote, its voters had to leave the ballot area. The ballot was open and public, and the order of ballot casting meant that the first two classes were watchfully present when the third class (of the lowest tax contribution) voted but not the other way around. Once electors (*Wahlmänner*) were elected for each class in every community or election district, they got together in the next voting day to vote for the representative for the *Landtag*, who needed an absolute majority to get elected. In the second round, every elector had one vote. Electors voted as they pleased rather than in line with their voters. Electors did not have to be members of the class they represented. For more details on the complex election procedures and their further manipulation, see Thomas Kühne, *Dreiklassenwahlrecht und Wahlkultur in Preussen*, pp. 127–141.

¹⁷⁰ Dieter Roth, *Empirische Wahlforschung: Ursprung, Theorien, Instrumente und Methoden* (Berlin: Springer, 1998), pp. 8–9; On Engel’s statistical-political ambitions, which often run afoul of the Prussian government’s political goals, see Michael C. Schneider, *Wissensproduktion im Staat: Das königlich preußische statistische Bureau 1860–1914* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 2013), esp. ch 2.

Friedrich Seibert, an intrepid clerk at the commission's head office in Posen/Poznań, was troubled by this lack of systematic information about settlers' voting behavior. He therefore decided at a certain point during 1898 to put together a notebook that carefully followed and enumerated how settlers fulfilled their electoral obligations. In the notebook's preface, conceivably written just before it was first shown to Seibert's superiors, Seibert explained that ever since he started working for the commission and understood its objectives, he had been "gripped by burning patriotism" and spent years working day and night in his free time, collecting data and composing minute statistics from the files and government publications available to him with the goal of providing the president of the commission with an "ever more accurate picture" about the "sites [*Stellen*] in which Germandom needs strengthening." He presented the notebook as a practical tool to highlight the areas or issues that the commission should prioritize. It was also, I suggest, a "little tool of knowledge" that for the first time took settlers' voting as an object of enumeration, making it possible to talk about settlers' voting patterns. Settlers' behavior, rather than their status as rent-owing signatories to a contract, was now enumerated and tabulated by an official of the Colonization Commission.¹⁷¹

Seibert's efforts resulted in a pocket-sized, handwritten compendium entitled "statistical overviews about the activity of the Colonization Commission and about the national movement in the Ostmark" (*statistische Übersichten über die Tätigkeit der Ansiedlungskommission und über die Nationale Bewegung in den Ostmarken*). The usage of the term "movement" in different

¹⁷¹ In the preface to his work, Siebert described the undertaking as follows: "Als ich zur königlichen Ansiedlungskommission kam und deren Aufgabe erkannte, fesselte mich ein glühender Patriotismus Jahre lang in meiner dienstfreier Zeit fast täglich bis tief nach Mitternacht an der Herstellung statistischer Unterlagen, aus denen der Präsident der königlichen Ansiedlungskommission ersehen kann, an welchen Stellen das Deutschtum der Stärkung bedarf." GStA PK I. HA Rep 212 Nr. 5225. For "little tools" of bureaucratic knowledge see Peter Becker and William Clark (eds.), *Little Tools of Knowledge: Historical Essays on Academic and Bureaucratic Practices* (Ann Arbor: Michigan University press 2001).

places in the notebook indicates that it meant, broadly, the German national movement, whose progress Seibert sought to measure through the electoral behavior of settlers and workers who lived in the commission's estates and villages. This was, Seibert emphasized, a very practical endeavor, as the commission could put pressure on settlers and workers to change their voting behavior. The notebook consisted of some 267 pages and included voting statistics regarding several *Landtag* and *Reichstag* elections. Although numbers were given regarding previous elections, the election of 1898 were the first regarding which settlers' voting decisions were enumerated. I therefore assume that the notebook was started either just before or shortly after the 1898 election cycle for the Imperial and the Prussian parliaments. The notebook was constructed in a way that would allow regular updates, and space was left in each section for future additions. Comparisons and changes in numbers and percentage of votes were marked using colored ink: green, blue, and red. Seibert regularly updated and corrected the notebook from that time onwards until the outbreak of World War I. Its concluding note carried the volume into the 1920s and lamented the fate of the commission in the aftermath of the war.¹⁷² Seibert himself must have been proud of the notebook and the significance it had attained and perhaps saw it as a material symbol of his dedication and loyalty to the state. He took the notebook with him when he left the commission sometime in the early 1920s and held on to it into his retirement. He eventually sold the notebook to the Prussian State Archive in 1928 for a handsome 300 Reichsmark.¹⁷³

¹⁷² Seibert explained in the preface that he intended the notebook to be used for many years to come: "Bei Anfertigung dieses Buches nahm ich darauf Rücksicht, daß dasselbe auf viele Jahren hinaus ergänzt werden kann, um dadurch ein immer deutlicher werdendes Bild von der Tätigkeit der Ansiedlungskommission und von den nationalen Bewegungen den Ostmark der Monarchie zu erhalten." GStA PK I. HA Rep 212 Nr. 5225.

¹⁷³ The retired *Geheimsekretär* Friedrich Seibert, resident of Berlin-Friedenau, sold the notebook to the Prussian State archives for 300 Reichsmark on 2.11.1928. See the entry in the archival acquisitions book of the Prussian State Archives: GStA PK I. HA Rep. 178 Nr. 2383: Tagebuch der Archivalien 1927–1935, Geschäfts-Journal des Staatsarchiv Nr. 35072, Acc. 278/28. This sum must have been significant for Seibert. As a *Kanzleisekretär* His annual income in prewar terms would be just before retirement 4,000 Marks coupled with 800 Marks annual

Seibert's notebook and its uses are interesting because they reveal that settlers' voting often did not conform to the commission's normative definition of Prussian frontier citizenship and because of what they can tell us about changes in the administrative practice of enforcing that definition. Seibert's inquiry into the 1898 elections was limited to 33 settler-villages in the administrative district (*Regierungsbezirk*) Posen in the province of the same name due to unspecified difficulties in retrieving the information. He expressed his surprise and disappointment upon discovering that just over half (51%) of the eligible German voters residing in settlements and commission-owned estates did *not* vote in the Prussian parliamentary elections of that year and that in at least three settlements, abstention rates among eligible voters reached 100%. He concluded, rather dramatically, that "in the settlements — in some completely — the national spirit sleeps" and expressed his "humble opinion" that "if this situation were to endure, the great expenditure of money and the entire national work would be in vain." Settlers, Seibert proposed, needed to "be instructed" on their duties. After all, "the settlers enjoy state beneficence, for which they must be grateful to the state government and fulfill their national duty!"¹⁷⁴ For the Colonization Commission, Seibert's findings pointed out a potential political debacle. By making it easier for Polish candidates to get elected, most settlers actually hindered the political goals of the commission. The fact that the same people that the commission brought

housing allowance. Since he received *Reichsmark* – the currency introduced following the postwar inflation in 1924 and stabilized on the pre-war exchange rate with the British Pound Sterling and the American Dollar – the sums are roughly comparable. For state officials' income tables, see Gerd Hohorst, Jürgen Kocka and Gerhard A. Ritter, *Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch: Materialien und Statistik des Kaiserreichs 1870–1914* (München: C.H. Beck, 1975), p. 109.

¹⁷⁴ "Die vorstehende Statistik zeigt nun, daß in den Ansiedlungen — in einzelnen gänzlich — Der nationale Geist schläft. Die große Geldaufwendung und ganze nationale Arbeit wäre meines unmaßgeblichen Erachtens umsonst, würde dieser Zustand fortbestehen. Die Ansiedler sind dann über den Zweck ihre Anpflanzung in der Ostmarken der Monarchie belehrt worden. Die Wahlbeteiligung war dann auch eine andere... der Ansiedler genießt Staatliche Wohltaten, dafür muß er der Staatsregierung auch dankbar sein und seine nationale Pflicht erfüllen!", GStA PK I. HA Rep 212 Nr. 5225, Quote from p. 154, the tables detailing the results are on pp. 147–168.

in to Germanize the border provinces did not bother to vote for German candidates could become an embarrassment as detailed election statistics were increasingly made more available to the public. The scale of the failure here is significant. Twelve years after its establishment and after exhausting its initial 100 million Marks budget the Prussian Colonization Commission still failed to get the majority of settlers to fulfil a crucial aspect of what it saw as their duties. Settlers clearly did not see themselves as extensions of state power or agents of Germanization when it came to the ballot. Seibert's indignation may seem hyperbolic, but there was much at stake.

Seibert's discovery, in conjuncture with the Prussian government's instructions to the commission regarding the importance of electoral politics, had an immediate impact on the commission's administrative practices. The first instruction manual for the commission's estate managers, also issued that year, included an expressed formulation of the normative relationship between frontier citizenship and settlers' voting behavior. Seibert's words on non-voting settlers and the need to "instruct" them about their duties were echoed in the manual. Estate managers, who were in charge of the transformation of estates into settler-villages and held local administrative and disciplinary powers, were to make sure that settlers vote and vote correctly. Under the section dealing with Prussian citizenship, the manual stressed that estate managers needed to make sure that settlers vote and "make full use of the opportunity to demonstrate the German sentiment [*Gesinnung*] that is expected from them."¹⁷⁵ Estate managers were also repeatedly reminded that settlers needed to take up Prussian citizenship as soon as possible after settling on the land and the commission's manuals (the second version was circulated in 1910)

¹⁷⁵ "Es muß das größte Gewicht daraufgelegt werden, daß die Ansiedler, wenn es sich um die Ausübung dieses Rechtes [i.e. the right to vote] handelt, nicht fehlen, sondern vollzählig die Gelegenheit benützen, um die deutsche Gesinnung zu beweisen, die man von ihnen erwartet." *Geschäfts-Anweisung für die Ansiedlungsvermittler der Königlichen Ansiedlungskommission* (Posen 1898), p. 39. Archiwum Państwowe w Koszalinie 26/172/194, Landratsamt Flatow: Durchführung des Ansiedlungsgesetzes in Kreis Flatow, pp. 64ff.

laid out in detail the procedure to follow. As citizenship was not automatically awarded by the fact of residency in Prussia, citizens of other German states needed to request Prussian citizenship. Since the commission could not legally force settlers to follow this process, estate managers were to assure non-Prussian settlers that they would not be disadvantaged by applying for Prussian citizenship. In the case of Württemberg, such assurances, as we saw, were only partial truths.¹⁷⁶

Seibert's pocket-size notebook, which he continued to update, was soon accompanied by a much bulkier folio-sized handbook that he prepared, now in an official capacity. This handbook included elaborate noting of voting behavior for elections, as well as textual, tabular, and graphic overviews of the commission's work. Conceivably, the president of the commission would have the handbook at hand when meeting senior officials and parliamentarians or when he needed to publicly discuss and defend the commission's activities.¹⁷⁷

By the 1908 *Landtag* elections, the commission was well-versed in the compilation and utilization of voting data regarding settler villages and keen to demonstrate its favorable influence on the electoral results in the Polish provinces of Prussia. Seibert's notebook now dealt with the entire population of both the settler villages and the estates bought by the commission and documented only one vote for Polish candidates in the 1908 *Landtag* elections, as well as an average election participation rate among settlers of about 90%, which was lauded by Seibert as

¹⁷⁶ *Geschäfts-Anweisung für die Ansiedlungsvermittler der Königlichen Ansiedlungskommission* (Posen 1910). GStA PK I. HA Rep 212 Nr. 5224, pp. 23–24, and the previous manual from 1899 with similar instructions in Archiwum Państwowe w Koszalinie 26/172/194, Landratsamt Flatow: Durchführung des Ansiedlungsgesetzes in Kreis Flatow, pp. 64–114. In the period between the two manuals, the commission sent two further circulars detailing administrative changes in the procedure for receiving Prussian citizenship and providing revised forms: GStA PK I. HA Rep. 212 Nr. 5142, pp. 29–31, 42–47.

¹⁷⁷ The 1903 presidential handbook is located in APP-Gniezno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Generalia 12.

a success.¹⁷⁸ Hidden behind the seeming success of the commission's political supervision there was a large variance in the abstention rates across counties, which were the smallest administrative unit provided in Seibert's notebook for the 1908 elections. For example, in the administrative district (*Regierungsbezirk*) Marienwerder in the province of West Prussia, abstention rates among settlers ranged between 4% in County Schwetz and 6.5% in County Konitz to 23.1% in Flatow, 29% in Rosenberg, and reaching as high as 62.6% in the sparsely populated County Tuchel.¹⁷⁹

These numbers should be seen in a larger context. High *Landtag* election abstention rates were the rule across Prussia, and usually were significantly higher than the rates that Seibert had discovered among settlers. The scholarship on the Prussian election system has shown that voting abstention was a widespread practice in the first round of elections, especially in rural areas and among members of the third class of voters in the three-class system. Such abstentionism made sense to people who knew how local elections worked and recognized the limited weight of their vote in it. Local residents often made deals regarding who will go to vote for whom or did not vote based on tacit understanding of local social dynamics, especially in rural areas where voting often meant a long ride to the ballot box and much loss of time. Such practices of (non) voting were integral to the differentiated character of political rights and to the local practices of political representation and patronage relationships.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ GStA PK I. HA Rep 212 Nr. 5225, pp. 155–174. For the 1907 presidential handbook see GStA I. HA Rep. 212 Nr. 6115 and for the 1903 presidential handbook see APP-Gneizno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Generalia 12. The high participation rate in 1908 may also be the reason for the lack of an explanation of the crucial political importance of settlers' voting in the 1910 version of the manual for estate managers. See *Geschäfts-Anweisungen 1910*.

¹⁷⁹ GStA PK I. HA Rep 212 Nr. 5225, pp. 155–174.

¹⁸⁰ Kühne, *Dreiklassenwahlrecht und Wahlkultur in Preussen*, pp. 165–206.

If we consider the official numbers on election *participation* (rather than abstention) in the rural areas of the provinces of Poznania (49,3% in 1893, 48,4% in 1898, and 66,2% in 1908) and West Prussia (39,4% in 1893, 42,7% in 1898, 55,8% in 1908), it seems that settlers in fact participated in *Landtag* elections more than the rural population as a whole. Moreover, participation rates in the Polish provinces were particularly high in comparison with rural areas across Prussia (18,2% in 1893, 17% in 1898, 27,5% in 1908), and arguably reflect the highly contested nature of elections in the region.¹⁸¹ By 1908, settlers in Polish Prussia were apparently much more likely to participate in elections than other inhabitants of rural election districts. The commission's efforts to make settlers vote were successful, then, but unevenly so.

The large variance between settler abstention rates in different counties in Seibert's notebook also suggests that new settlers were *more* likely to vote than long-established ones who were enmeshed in and better understood local power relations.¹⁸² Multiple local factors must have played into settlers' (non) voting decisions, and in some cases, being integrated in the locality actually meant less, rather than more, adherence to the commission's definition of frontier citizenship. As villages became established and the commission's tutelage more distant, settlers perhaps felt less inclined to be "instructed," and more importantly, had also developed different kinds of social networks and loyalties. The difference in participation rates for Mielżyn and Kornthal/Ustasewo, for instance, seem to underscore the importance of local conditions. In recently settled Mielżyn, out of six settlers who were eligible to vote in the 1908 Prussian

¹⁸¹ Kühne, *Dreiklassenwahlrecht und Wahlkultur in Preussen*, pp. 167–168.

¹⁸² The only significant influx of settlers shortly before the 1908 elections in the Marienwerder administration district (*Regierungsbezirk*) was in the county that displayed the lowest rate of abstention (Schwetz). In county Flatow (23.1% abstention rate), however, most settler-villages had been in existence for years and many settlers came from the nearby area. They probably knew how local politics worked. GStA PK I. HA Rep 212 Nr. 5225, pp. 155–174.

elections, two did not go to the ballot. In Kornthal/Ustaszewo, settled in the early 1890s, out of the 24 settlers eligible to vote in 1908 only one abstained.¹⁸³ Nevertheless, in the very fact of their existence and large variance, Seibert's statistics points to the limits of enforcing frontier citizenship. While the commission was only partially able to induce settlers to vote in elections even in 1908, settlers' leeway in terms of undercutting the commission's Germanizing agenda was still very much set by the hegemonic notion of Germanization and the possible ramifications of traversing outside the fold of the state-centered German national belonging. Almost no one in the settlements voted for Polish candidates in 1908.

The high abstention rate among settlers in the 1908 Prussian parliamentary election did not go unnoticed by the Prussian Colonization Commission. The president of the commission at the time, the jurist and career bureaucrat Friedrich Karl Gramsch, emphasized to his subordinates that it was "imperative" to "educate" (*erziehen*) and "instruct" (*anhalten*) the settlers to vote, especially in view of the next *Reichstag* elections.¹⁸⁴ Clearly expecting full compliance, Gramsch decided to keep a record of settlers' voting in every settlement and to compile a list of the names of those settlers who abstained in the 1908 election, putting Seibert in charge of keeping track of names and voting decisions.¹⁸⁵ In practice, Gramsch's instructions to estate managers and other

¹⁸³ For 1908 *Landtag* voting by settlers in Mielżyn, see APP-Gniezno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Reg. II Nr. 1851, fol. 1. For voting in Kornthal/Ustaszewo, see APP-Gniezno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Reg. VI Nr. 2894, fol. 1.

¹⁸⁴ In Gramsch's words, "schon aus erziehlichen Gründen mit Rücksicht auf die Reichstagswahlen, wo eine schwache Beteiligung der Ansiedler ungleich bedeutsamer ist, halten ich es für Geboten, die Ansiedler zur Ausübung ihres Wahlrechts anzuhalten." For Gramsch's instructions and the corresponding document in the *Gemeindevorhältnis* file for Ustaszewo/Kornthal, see: Instructions from the President of the Colonization Commission (copy), 28.8.1909, APP-Gniezno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Reg. VI Nr. 2894, fol. 1.

¹⁸⁵ Numerical information about the 1908 Prussian *Landtag* elections, in line with Gramsch's instructions, can be found for each village in the first page of the village file entitled "Gemeindevorhältnis" in APP-Gniezno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Collection. For Mielżyn and Kornthal/Ustaszewo, see footnote 119 above. The names of abstentionist settlers were probably recorded in a separate registry that is no longer available.

commission officials most likely resulted in a combination of pressure, inducements, threats, and punishments.

What does Seibert's discovery and its administrative consequences tell us about the ways in which Prussian frontier citizenship was understood, practiced, and enforced? Electoral politics supplied a stage on which settlers were expected to exhibit – quite literally considering the Prussian open ballot voting system – their particular loyalty to the state as frontier citizens and to do their duty by the commission. This duty was articulated in paternalist terms and officials expected that settlers would recognize and act upon their debt of gratitude for the commission's beneficence. Settlers, especially those who came from the colonized provinces or were already well-established there, did not necessarily agree that voting was their duty. In fact, throughout the period, abstention among settlers was very widespread, similarly to other rural areas in Prussia. By not voting, settlers potentially hindered the election of government-supported German parliamentarians and undercut a central aspect of how the commission understood its Germanizing mission. The commission repeatedly tried to “instruct” and “educate” settlers about their national duty, with limited success. Settlers' behavior, it seems, was more influenced by local social relationships and local forms of domination and patronage than by prescriptions of Germanness.

The discovery of settlers' widespread non-voting pushed the commission to compose more systematic enumeration of voting behavior on the local level and to keep lists of abstentionists. These numbers, meticulously collected in tabular form, were used for an overview of where direct exercise of power was needed and where individuals had to be leaned on to perform their duties. Paternalism and supervision as practices of domination could be bureaucratized by the commission and enumerated by enthusiastic, career-driven junior officials,

but at the other end of the commission's chain of command, threats, promises, and punishments looked very much the same.

The Contested Making of a Prussian Frontier

The chapter explored how the Prussian Colonization Commission sought to create a frontier of settlement in Polish Prussia as a strategy of consolidating the nationalizing state's control over the imperial border region. It focused on the commission's attempts to recruit groups of settlers and to impose on them to play their part, and on the contending ways in which settlers understood their migration and the claims they made regarding their move to and presence in Polish Prussia. The state's intransigent definition of what Germanization in Polish Prussia was in juxtaposition with settlers' expectations, as the state strategically sought to limit their options and make permanent their settlement, while settlers considered settlement in Polish Prussia as only one option within a range of alternatives that they hoped to keep open. Moreover, Settlers did not see themselves as extensions of the Prussian state and its Germanizing agenda, as the persistent nonparticipation in Prussian parliamentary elections indicate.

Between 1886 and the eve of World War I, the Prussian Colonization Commission had articulated and sought to enforce a hegemonic and normative definition of how settlers in Polish Prussia needed to behave, seeing them as extensions of the Prussian state and tools of its Germanizing agenda. Two parameters of this official understanding of Germanization, which remained central to the commission's activities throughout the period, were settlers' participation in communal administration and their voting for government candidates in parliamentary elections. Both parameters required settlers to hold Prussian citizenship in the legal sense. The commission had thereby defined a Prussian frontier citizenship for the imperial border region, in which central political *rights* of Prussian citizens became fundamental *duties* of German settlers.

These expectations were grounded in a relationship of patronage between the commission and settlers, mediated through a settlement contract and local power relations in the settlements, and anchored in complex property arrangements. In the commission's formulation of this relationship, gratitude and duty, more than any intrinsic sense of national belonging that settlers had brought with them, were to motivate settlers to follow the commission's prescriptions. Settlers and would-be settlers often contested this ideological framework as well as the specific contractual conditions offered to them, making particular claims and requests and even challenging the conditions of participation set out by the commission.

This chapter focused on the case of a group of prospective settlers from Württemberg who sought to collectively negotiate both particular stipulations in the settlement contract and the basic terms of participation in the commission's colonization project. The main questions I asked in this regard were about the resources that settlers had for contesting the terms of settlement, about the expectations they had and the social logic of the claims they made. I also looked into the ways in which the commission sought to enforce its hegemonic definition of settlers' duties. While connections between imperial and local elites made it possible for the commission to reach out and try to recruit Swabian villagers, having ad-hoc local patrons and negotiating collectively allowed the villagers to put forward a range of claims in advance of their agreement to settle in Polish Prussia. As I followed the name *Kornthal* from Poznania to Württemberg and then back again and traced the family histories of settlers from Möglingen, it was possible to partially reconstruct kinship practices in Möglingen and connect them both with political power in the village and with Pietist religiosity. Following this route led to a radical Pietist sect that flourished in Möglingen and whose members migrated and settled in Palestine during the 1860s and 1870s. The close family alliances between the Möglingen Templers and villagers who left

for Poznania allowed me to suggest that Möglingen settlers had alternative trajectories for migration. And the protracted nature of settlers' migration to Poznania, coupled with the continued connections that families had across geographical distance, suggested that settlers continuously cultivated social ties between with their home village, and thereby actively kept open the option of leaving Polish Prussia. Möglingen settlers' alternative options for migration and their possibility to return home were grounded in kinship and Pietist religiosity and embedded in specifically local social structures, village politics, and histories of migrations and religious dissent.

This singular case cannot be regarded as representative of the ways in which settlers ended up in Polish Prussia, but it does allow us to explore a range of historical possibilities regarding how settlers were recruited, what was their role in the settlement project, and what their migration meant to them. This case is definitely an outlier in relation to most people who came to settle in Polish Prussia through the commission. By 1914, only about 12.5% of the about 21,700 settler families came from Imperial Germany outside of Prussia, in comparison with over a third who came from Prussia outside of the colonized provinces. This particular case personally involved the commission's president, as he traveled to Württemberg to set in motion recruitment efforts, and prospective settlers who were particularly desired by the commission. Settlers from other areas of Germany, especially if they did not act collectively or did not have powerful representatives, were generally unable to significantly negotiate the terms of settlement. Settlers from the Russian or Habsburg empire (about a quarter of all settlers by 1914) or from within the colonized provinces (roughly another 25% of the settlers by 1914) were explicitly seen by the commission as less desirable and were even less likely to be in a position of negotiations with the

commission.¹⁸⁶ While we cannot regard the case of the Württemberg settlers as typical, it opens up a new understanding of the dynamics of settlement as a messy social process, where the official understanding of settlement comes up against the expectations, beliefs, experiences, and attachments that people weigh as they make significant life decisions.

¹⁸⁶ I discuss these hierarchies of Germanness in greater detail in chapter three of the dissertation. For settlers' place of origin, see Stienen, "Die Anwerbung," pp. 72–73.

Chapter 2

Workers Housing, Internal Colonization, and Social Reform

This chapter explicates how German settlement in Polish Prussia partially grew out of broader concerns about workers' housing and social reform in industrial cities, and also significantly shaped the history of workers' housing reform in Germany between the 1880s and the 1920s. The argument pivots around the interplay between forms of land tenure, housing design, and the fundamentally different political economies involved in the settlement of workers and farmers. In the late 1890s, the Prussian Colonization Commission increasingly sought to reduce the employment of Polish labor in its estates and in settlers' farms and to promote German-only villages that would uniformly vote for government-supported candidates in parliamentary elections. In order to recruit German-speaking workers under conditions of labor scarcity and mass emigration out of rural Eastern Germany, the commission tried with partial success to import workers both from other parts of Germany and from German-speaking communities in the Russian and Austrian empires. The new land tenure form that was introduced with the establishment of the Colonization Commission in 1886 (the *Rentegut*) offered settlers land ownership that was combined with a long-term, unamortizable lease. Although it required no upfront payment, prospective settlers needed to demonstrate that they had the capital required to set up a farm and pay a fixed annuity. Workers could not afford to establish a house or a farm and hence the commission had to build housing for them and use other forms of land tenure than the *Rentegut* of settler-farmers. By 1910, the commission used most of its building budget for workers' housing and invested increasing resources in collaborating with private associations to establish worker colonies in Polish Prussia, usually in collaboration with large employers. The transition from farmers' settlement to workers' settlement demonstrates some of the

discrepancies between the ideological underpinnings of the commission's activities and its economic imperatives, but also points to broader historical developments that brought cities and their less densely populated hinterland into a closer relationship.

The settlement of workers was a major shift in the commission's policy, but it needs to be understood within a broader context of developments in housing reform during the same period. Already during the first half of the century, rising land and rent prices in developing industrial centers and swelling population gave rise to housing shortages and deteriorating housing conditions, most prominently in Berlin. The situation became more acute after mid-century, as expanding industries and reduced transportation costs increasingly contributed to the expansion cities' working-class population. The densely inhabited workers' neighborhoods of Berlin demonstrated a potential for political radicalism during the events of 1848, encouraging middle-class reformers to give more thought to urban low-income housing. Still, only small-scale initiatives, usually drawn from British examples, sought to improve housing conditions. After the establishment of Imperial Germany, cities continued to grow and a range of newer concerns about sanitation and health became prominent in social reform discussion, alongside anxieties about the moral degradation and political dangers of the working classes. In the 1870s and 1880s, the urban housing crisis became the linchpin of social reform advocacy.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁷ In Prussia, 5,2% of the population lived in communities with more than 100,000 residents in 1871. By 1890 the figure was 13,3%, and in 1910 it reached 22,4%. If we add the numbers for communities of over 20,000 residents, the 36,2% of Prussia's population lived in cities in 1890, and in 1910, 59,5% of the population. Between 1871 and 1910, Prussia's population increased from 24 million to 40 million. The development of Berlin was outsized and earlier in relation to other urban centers: in 1875 it had about 960,000 inhabitants, with the neighboring Charlottenburg adding another 25,000 to the number. By 1910, Berlin had well over 2 million residents, with Charlottenburg adding 300,000 more. The Greater Berlin metropolis would be created only after World War I. All these numbers are taken from official statistics, but the nature of migration and the mobility within cities and between cities and the countryside meant that the real population numbers were much higher. See Hohorst, Kocka, and Ritter, *Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch*, pp. 42–43. On migration and urbanization see Steve Hochstadt, *Mobility and Modernity: Migration in Germany 1820–1989* (Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 1999). On the increasing importance of public health and sanitation after 1870 in housing reform see Clemens Zimmermann, *Von der*

By the last two decades of the nineteenth century, many cities had taken down their fortifications and began to develop newly available land and expand into the surrounding rural areas. Large-scale annexations of agricultural land took place by cities like Cologne, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt am Main, and Berlin. Once the economic dominance of cities over their immediate rural hinterland was joined by their administrative control, as historian Brian Ladd characterizes this expansion, opportunities for development, which threatened existing environments and ways of life, were opened up.¹⁸⁸ While the natural and built environment in the countryside was urbanized, the inner cities were also transformed in many cases. City expansion, rising rents and land prices, and even new regulations that sought to improve the quality of housing, often entailed dislocation for workers, away from the inner cities. In the 1870s, as a response to the housing crisis in Berlin, working-class families established shantytowns on communal land that was newly freed by the removal of the city walls. Other working-class communities were pushed out of the inner cities through municipal land grants on city outskirts, which were meant for improved low-cost housing. Protests in Berlin and in Hamburg in the later decades of the nineteenth century, for example, attest to the active resistance of working-class communities and Socialist Democratic Party (SPD) activists to measures that threatened to displace workers from places of employment and from their communities. Social reform measures were often a result of the political challenge from workers and the SPD. These processes made planning, housing reform, and preservation of natural and built environments in the rapidly changing landscapes around cities timely issues of great concern for middle-class reformers. In many Prussia cities,

Wohnungsfrage zur Wohnungspolitik. Die Reformbewegung in Deutschland 1845–1914 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), pp. 79–121.

¹⁸⁸ Brian Ladd, *Urban Planning and Civic Order in Germany, 1860–1914* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 210–235.

municipal autonomy allowed middle-class liberal reformers to enact reforms that would otherwise be blocked by the state bureaucracy.¹⁸⁹ German and Prussian cities were, then, the home for most middle-class reformers, the location of production of new categories of social expertise, the place where reforms were demanded, and where they were politically possible.

Rather than an urban phenomenon of industrial modernity, the history of housing reform may be more accurately described as a history of the expansion of cities into the countryside and of the movement and circulation of people across rural and urban spaces. Paradoxically, histories of migration and histories of urbanization are often written separately.¹⁹⁰ This separation is reinforced in the literature by the caesura of World War I. Whereas the scholarship on pre-1914 housing reform and workers' housing focuses on cities as if they were disconnected from the countryside and from the large population of mobile rural workers, histories of the postwar period highlight large scale housing projects in modern style that were often built on formerly agricultural land. When scholars discuss countryside building projects, these are usually villas and *Landhäuser* built for the bourgeoisie and the educated upper middle classes. Rural low-

¹⁸⁹ For cities as a “liberal reserve” see Lutz Niethammer, “Ein Langer March durch die Institutionen: Zur Vorgeschichte des preußischen Wohnungsgesetzes von 1918,” in: Idem (ed.) *Wohnen in Wandel*, pp. 363–384, pp. 365–367. George Steinmetz makes a similar argument and emphasizes the willingness for social experimentation in Prussian municipalities unlike the Prussian bureaucracy: George Steinmetz, *Regulating the Social: The Welfare State and Local Politics in Imperial Germany* (Princeton UP, 1993); Philipp Reick, “Desire or Displacement? Working-Class Notions of Urban Belonging in Late- Nineteenth-Century Germany,” *Journal of Urban History* 45:6 (2019), pp. 1193–1211. On the Workers *quartier* and its social and political significance, see Adelheid von Saldern, *Häuserleben. Zur Geschichte städtischen Arbeiterwohnens vom Kaiserreich bis heute* (Bonn: Dietz, 1995). On the taking down of Berlin's city walls in the 1860s and the short-lived shantytowns that were built by those fleeing the brutality of the city's housing market, see Kristin Poling, “Shantytowns and Pioneers beyond the City Wall: Berlin's Urban Frontier in the Nineteenth Century,” *Central European History* 47:2 (June 2014), pp. 245–274.

¹⁹⁰ For the crucial importance of different structures of migration and circulation (seasonal, life cycle, permanent), their connections with changing labor markets, and their interdependence on forms of industrial and agrarian production, see for example James E. Jackson, Jr., *Migration and Urbanization in the Ruhr Valley, 1821–1914* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1997); Steve Hochstadt, *Mobility and Modernity: Migration in Germany 1820–1989* (Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 1999).

income housing is primarily discussed by scholars focusing on small scale experimentations connected with garden city ideas or on company housing projects.¹⁹¹

The scholarly focus on the large-scale housing projects, innovative floorplans, mass-produced housing and high modernist aspirations of social engineering of the post 1918 period is rooted in a prevalent narrative about modern architecture that posits it as a radical break from previous styles and architectural traditions. When historians of architecture seek to question this narrative by bridging the caesura of 1914–1918, they usually focus on personal and institutional continuities that involve the iconic figures of the postwar period. In the case of architecture and the formation of mass market and industrialized production, scholars usually foreground the *Deutscher Werkbund* with its collection of illustrious male artists, architects, and designers.¹⁹²

This chapter links rural and urban workers housing and shows that solutions for the urban housing crisis were often indistinguishable from “internal colonization.” It thereby complicates the historical narrative of housing reform, which usually emphasizes the achievements of

¹⁹¹ In their classic survey of the prewar housing reform movement, Bullock and Read mention the issue of rural housing in Germany only twice, generally noting that a contributing factor in the political failure of the campaign for national housing legislation was Prussian conservatives’ and the government’s apprehension that such legislation will eventually push through improvements in the living conditions of agricultural laborers, thereby harming the large latifundia estates in the areas east of the Elbe river. Bullock and Read, *The Housing Reform Movement*, pp. 259, 265. On the German Garden City Movement see the dissertation by Teresa Marie Harris, “The German Garden City Movement: Architecture, Politics and Urban Transformation, 1902–1931.” *Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation* (New York: Columbia University, 2012). On company housing, see: Monhart, Michael, “Company Housing As Urban Planning in Germany, 1870–1940,” *Central European History* 23:1 (1990), pp. 3–21; Cedric Bolz, “Constructing Heimat in the Ruhr Valley: Krupp Housing and the Search for the Ideal German Home 1914–1931,” *German Studies Review* 34:1 (2011), pp.17–43; Stephan Strauß, “Margarethenhöhe und Mathildenhöhe: Beiträge und Wechselwirkungen zur Reform des Kleinwohnhauses und des städtischen Wohnens,” *International Committee on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) — Hefte des Deutschen Nationalkomitees* 64 (2018), pp. 111–122.

¹⁹² Two English-language studies stand out in their careful attention to culture and politics and in their nuanced argumentation in relation to the *Werkbund*, its place in the history of modern architecture, and the importance of the political economy of consumption and imperial expansion: Fredric J. Schwartz, *The Werkbund: Design Theory and Mass Culture before the First World War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); John V. Maciuika, *Before the Bauhaus: Architecture, Politics and the German State, 1890–1920* (Cambridge UP 2005). Compare the internalist approach taken by William J. R. Curtis, *Modern Architecture since 1900* (Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1982), who discusses the “formative strands” of modern architecture in the nineteenth century teleologically before focusing on the “crystallization” of modern architecture in the interwar period.

communal leaders and middle-class reformers in urban centers. Seen from the multi-ethnic imperial periphery, housing reform was intertwined with colonization and Germanization.

The chapter brings out the tension between the broad Germanizing and social reformist agendas in the making of Prussia's colonization program on the one hand, and the particular political economy of settlement that underpinned the planning and construction activity of the Prussian Colonization Commission, on the other hand. It focuses on the formulation of housing reform programs, forms of land tenure, legal and statutory developments, the development of new institutional frameworks for small-scale settlement, and the changing planning and building procedures of the commission. The chapter also traces how the commission's building activities became a resource for career-making for its long-time chief architect, Paul Fischer, who became the Prussian government's leading expert on rural low-income housing and played a part in shaping the development of building regulations and housing laws well into the 1920s. As these six aspects were historically intertwined, the chapter's six sections bring out detailed facets of a complicated historical process.

The argument unfolds along three avenues. First, the chapter locates the establishment of the Prussian Colonization Commission within the context of housing reform discussions beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century. Housing reformers tended to concentrate on the miserable conditions of working-class tenements in developing urban and industrial centers. But since any meaningful housing reform needed to grapple with issues of access to land and land prices, broader issues of land reform were increasingly connected with housing reform discussions. Between the 1870s and 1890s, the influential advocacy and research activity of the Association for Social Policy (*Verein für Socialpolitik* or Vfs) gradually brought together the question of housing reform with issues relating to land reform and small-hold agrarian settlement

in the countryside of the eastern provinces of Prussia. In the 1880s, as the agricultural crisis deepened and the “flight from the land,” primarily from rural eastern Germany, to the United State and to urban centers peaked, VfS economists sought to better elucidate the connections between changes in land tenure, economy, and mobility in the countryside on the one hand, and the housing crisis in urban centers on the other hand. Many in the VfS began to see settlement of both workers and farmers on the land as part and parcel of social and land reforms in both urban centers and in rural areas dominated by large landholdings. From the 1890s, housing reform legislation and the settlement activities of the commission intersected at many junctures, as settlement in Polish Prussia both relied on and influenced the trajectory of new legislation.

The second line of argumentation underscores the growing importance of workers’ housing in the planning and construction activities of the Prussian Colonization Commission. Despite its ideological commitment to settle independent farmers that were supposed to make up German village communities, the commission invested increasing amounts of money in bringing in and settling laborers on its estates and in its villages after 1900. There was a range of strategic reasons for this shift in focus, among them the attempt to replace Polish workers in the commission’s estates and villages with German ones. In the late 1890s, the Prussian Colonization Commission decided to address the disparity between its stated goal of creating German settler-villages and the fact that settlers and the commission’s estates tended to employ Polish workers. By the late 1900s, the commission was investing a large share of its budget in building cottages and semi-detached housing for workers.

The third avenue focuses on the mushrooming of housing cooperative associations around 1910, following new legislation and the allocation of state credit. The commission spearheaded the development of such cooperative associations in Polish Prussia and supported

them financially. The commission also sought to steer the development of this new half-privatized sector of workers' settlement. Its chief architect, Paul Fischer, not only designed many of the workers' cottages and workers' colonies, but also sought to develop architectural exemplars and building principles that such associations would follow. Paul Fischer's career further demonstrates that the commission's involvement in the early history of state-sponsored workers' housing partially shaped the history of low-income housing well into the twentieth century. The chapter traces Fischer's transformation from a government architect of agrarian settlement to a recognized expert on small settlement during World War I, when he took up senior positions in the Prussian government. First, he managed the reconstruction of East Prussia following the short Russian occupation in the early part of the war, a government initiative that was unprecedented in the power it afforded private architects to shape the built environment in the province. Fischer continued to draw on his expertise in workers' settlements after 1918, when he also participated in preparing the first statewide housing legislation in Prussia since 1875.

Housing Reform and “Internal Colonization” in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

The 1886 Settlement Law required compromise between the contradictory positions of National Liberals under Johannes Miquel and the Conservative parties, as the support of both parties was needed for passing the government's bill through the Prussian *Landtag*. The law offered National Liberals an opportunity to promote their land reform ideas, which centered on reducing the number of large estates, primarily in eastern Prussia, and creating smaller farms owned by German independent cultivators in their place. Bismarck wanted the state to buy land from Polish nobles and thereby weaken their political power in rural areas, which, he thought, was the mainstay of Polish nationalism. Conservatives, predominantly represented by estate owners, hoped that the legislation would funnel state monies to buy out indebted estates in the

most crisis-stricken areas of the agrarian economy of eastern Prussia. They hoped these estates might later be leased or resold intact. The political compromise that was struck in the *Landtag*, aided by nationalist rhetoric about the dangers of Polish nationalism, resulted in a very broad legislation that did not rule out any of these quite varied policy directions.¹⁹³

Political negotiations over the use of the 100 million Marks allocated by the 1886 Settlement Law continued in the Prussian cabinet and in the state bureaucracy, especially within the newly established Prussian Colonization Commission. Seeking to shape the policies and incipient institutional structure of the commission, liberal-leaning academics, senior officials and politicians involved in the influential Association of Social Policy hurried to come up with a persuasive policy program, which Gustav Schmoller, the VfS chairman, dubbed “internal colonization.” This term had been circulating among Protestant social reformers since mid-century and referred to a variety of proposals for low-density workers’ housing projects. The term was now re-coined, as Schmoller used it to articulate a large-scale project of agrarian settlement. At the same annual meeting of the VfS in which Schmoller presented his conception of “internal colonization,” the VfS also discussed the “housing crisis” and the need to improve the quality of workers’ housing in large urban centers. This section and the next look at how policies and legislative measures meant to promote settlement in Polish Prussia were enabled by housing reform measures first in the 1840s and then in the 1880s, when “internal colonization” came to denote a wide-ranging program of land reform, settlement, and nationalization in the majority Polish border region of Imperial Germany.

¹⁹³ The National Liberals decided on a rapprochement with Bismarck’s politics in the early 1880s. In the Heidelberg Declaration of 1884, National Liberals under Johannes Miquel’s leadership expressed support for the first time for trade tariffs and for state-led social reform. James J. Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), ch. 13.

Workers' housing conditions in industrial centers such as Berlin became a pressing issue for educated middle-class social reformers in Prussia in the 1840s, as the social effects of industrialization and the radical potential of workers' political involvement became increasingly evident. In the Prussian capital, like other urban centers, industrialization and seasonal as well as long-term migration massively increased the city's population, resulting in rising rent prices and rapidly expanding, densely populated, and poverty-stricken workers' neighborhoods.¹⁹⁴ It was in the context of rapid urban restructuring of the 1840s that the term "internal colonization" first appeared in German-language publications. It broadly denoted preplanned small house settlements for workers, linking it directly to social issues caused by industrialization. The term was infrequently used in German publications until around 1883, but in almost every instance, it was closely connected to social reform, often in connection with the Protestant Inner Mission.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ The developments in German cities varied greatly. In Bremen, for example, there were no tenement blocks until the turn of the twentieth century, while in Berlin they were particularly notorious already in the middle of the nineteenth century. Until the last decade of the century, much of the immigration to cities from rural areas was seasonal. Nevertheless, many workers did establish households and families in cities, as marriage statistics indicate. Many also migrated between cities according to work opportunities. These characteristics of migration to cities also explain the ubiquitous presence in reformers' writing and in workers' household of lodgers, often multiple lodgers at one time, who would receive a bed or a room in an attic, basement, or in the apartment, often shared with several people who used the same bed, sometime in shifts. Many middle-class reformers were troubled by the implications of these practices, ranging from overcrowding and public health risks to the threatened propriety and morality of workers' families. See the survey of these issues in Zimmermann, *Von der Wohnungsfrage zur Wohnungspolitik*, ch. 1, and more broadly and comparatively in Friedrich Lenger, *European Cities in the Modern Era, 1850–1914* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012), ch. 4. For historical monographs that document the complexities of these processes see e.g. James H. Jackson Jr., *Migration and Urbanization in the Ruhr Valley, 1821–1914* (N.J.: Humanities Press 1997); Steve Hochstadt, *Mobility and Modernity: Migration in Germany, 1820–1989* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999). For an in-depth overview of the social history of workers' housing see the groundbreaking work by Lutz Niethammer and Franz Brüggemeier, "Wie wohnten Arbeiter im Kaiserreich?" *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 16 (1976), pp. 61–134.

¹⁹⁵ The frequency and chronology of use of the term are based on several searches that I ran on Google Ngrams. The results can only be seen as indicative, due to the partial coverage of German-language publications, and the problems of Google's text recognition software, which does not always recognize writings in the *Fraktur* font commonly used by German printers at the time. In the 1820s and 1830s we see only a handful of occurrences of the term in German-language publications regarding English workers. The search was last accessed on 30.7. 2020. [https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=%22innere+kolonisation%22&year_start=1800&year_end=2019&corpus=31&smoothing=1&case_insensitive=true].

Historians usually see the period between the 1840s and the 1870s or 1880s as the “early phase” of housing reform, during which reformers set the terms of future debates and policy measures and undertook limited private welfare initiatives, but very little changed in the housing conditions of workers.¹⁹⁶ During this period, both socially-conservative and liberal reformers sought new ways to deal with the general problem of what they termed “pauperism,” while also discussing specific solutions for improving the housing conditions of the poor. The mostly middle-class city-dwelling university professors, physicians, members of the clergy, and municipal officials interested in social reform during this period experienced firsthand the deleterious effects on morality and public health caused by urban housing problems. Reformers usually agreed that the plight of the urban poor was caused by historically specific structural phenomena associated with industrial change. Nevertheless, most reformers ruled out state involvement in the housing market and advocated philanthropic or “self-help” initiatives.¹⁹⁷

One important exception was the Pietist reformer and Berlin philology professor, Viktor Aimé Huber (1800–1869), who, in the 1840s, suggested that workers’ cooperative associations should be established that could receive credit from the state to build quality housing. Like other reformers, Huber sought to grapple with the new scale of social, moral, and political challenges that he could see at home by looking to England. His conclusions were informed by personal

¹⁹⁶ The terminology appears in Zimmermann, *Wohnungsfrage*; Similar position is repeated in Bullock and Read, *The Housing Reform Movement*.

¹⁹⁷ Zimmermann, *Wohnungsfrage*, ch. 1. It was also generally accepted among reformers that the ideal workers’ dwelling is a cottage rather than a tenement block, but high land prices made cottages impractical in larger cities. An influential attempt to build workers’ cottages was the four-family dwelling of the “Mulhouse Blueprint” designed for a company settlement of textile workers in the French industrial city in 1851. It influenced many future projects that sought to balance the costly ideal of workers’ cottages with the reality of limited budgets without reproducing the cheap construction and the horrors of the tenement. Renate Kastort-Viehmann, “Kleinhaus und Mietskaserne,” in Lutz Niethammer (ed.) *Wohnen im Wandel: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Alltags in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Wuppertal: Peter Hammer, 1979), pp. 271–291, pp. 282–284; Bullock and Read, *The Housing Reform Movement*, pp. 110–111.

observations made on visits to England's industrial heartland.¹⁹⁸ Huber, a social conservative and one-time royal protégé, is interesting not only because he demanded state involvement in housing, but also due to his advocacy of workers' settlements based on cooperative principles. First writing in the 1840s, Huber contended that small-scale, paternalist, patriarchal, or charitable welfarism of well-meaning employers, missionaries, and philanthropists was not enough to counter the housing problem and did not facilitate workers' helping themselves. If workers self-organized and pooled their meager resources for such a purpose, however, they would still lack the necessary capital to finance building projects. Therefore, Huber expected the authorities, as well as private philanthropists, to support the self-organization, or collective self-help, of workers by providing long-term loans to workers' cooperative associations. Once fully paid by the association, the land and dwellings would be registered as the private property of the members. In this way, workers' associations would be able to fund the construction of cottage settlements near their places of employment. Collective self-help, he hoped, would create a community and prevent loneliness and poverty, which he saw as primary causes of the political radicalization and moral decline of industrial workers. Only such programmatic actions would improve workers' living conditions and "create and secure the Christian family life of the proletariat," integrating it into the existing social order.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁸ For Huber's travels to England as well as for his contact and disagreements with the founder of the Protestant Inner Mission, Johannes Wichern, who favored Christian philanthropy over state welfare, see Michael A. Kanther and Dietmar Petzina, *Victor Aimé Huber (1800–1869): Sozialreformer und Wegbreiter der sozialen Wohnungswirtschaft* [=Schriften zur Genossenschaftswesen und zur Öffentlichen Wirtschaft 36] (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 2000), here pp. 70–71. For Wichern's travels to England and how his interpretation of the Protestant charity work in the poverty-stricken working-class quarters of English cities shaped his conception of *innere Mission*, see Alexandra Przyrembel, "Der Missionar Johann Hinrich Wichern, die Sünde und das unabänderliche Elend der städtischen Unterschichten um 1850," *Werkstatt Geschichte* 57 (2011), pp. 53–67, pp. 62ff.

¹⁹⁹ V. A. Huber, "Über innere Colonisation," *Janus: Jahrbücher deutscher Gesinnung, Bildung und That* 1:7-8 (1846), pp. 193–222, 225–255, quote from p. 204; Kanther and Petzina, *Victor Aimé Huber*, pp. 128–142.

Huber first used the term “internal colonization” to describe his ideas in an 1846 article titled “On Internal Colonization” (*Über innere Colonisation*). Huber described internal colonization as creating a new social, institutional, and spatial framework that would be based on cooperatives, or what he referred to as economic associations. Shortly afterwards the term was picked up in publications dealing with social reform, often in conjunction with the Protestant Inner Mission, who seem to have borrowed this usage from Huber. In 1848, Huber anonymously published “Economic Associations and Internal Settlement” (*Wirtschaftsvereine und innere Ansiedlung*) where he made the rationale behind this terminology and the connection between settlement and social organization even more explicit.

Indeed, the establishment of new living places, in part in new locations, is a very important part of the whole plan, and we know no other and better name for this aspect of the matter than internal settlement or colonization [*innern Ansiedlung oder Kolonisation*], in contrast to external colonization through emigration to foreign countries or parts of the world.²⁰⁰

Unlike external colonization, Huber emphasized, his term did not denote the migration of workers to lightly settled or unsettled areas far away from the localities in which they had been living and where they had found or had been looking for work. Instead, he was interested in creating better living conditions for workers “of both sexes” in the same areas in which they already had employment opportunities. He foresaw no large-scale or long-distance relocation of workers and stressed that although cottages in the immediate outskirts of cities are preferable, “in many cases, the same localities and city districts in which the worker currently lives could be used.” For Huber, then, internal colonization was not about displacement or about the large-scale socio-geographic reorganization of populations. His proposals were much more in line with

²⁰⁰ The pamphlet is reproduced in K. Munding (ed.), *V. A. Hubers Ausgewählte Schriften über Socialreform und Genossenschaftswesen* (Berlin: Pionier Verlag, 1894), pp. 837–869, and attributed to Huber. The editor noted that it was also published as “Selbsthilfe der arbeitenden Klassen durch Wirtschaftsvereine und innere Ansiedlung” (p.837n7). On this point cf. Bullock and Read, *The Housing Reform Movement*, p. 27.

small-scale social experiments that Marx dismissed as utopian socialism. Although influenced by the ideas of Charles Fourier and Robert Owen, Huber distanced himself from their “reveries,” as he termed it, by invoking a class-specific notion of the Christian family. His cooperative settlement plans were predicated on the Christian family as the fundamental social unit according to which cooperatives, settlements, and buildings would be modeled. Any activity that threatened to undermine the unity of the family hearth, such as shared kitchens or communal dining, would not be permissible, regardless of economic advantage.²⁰¹

In the late 1840s and the 1850s, workers’ housing projects were taken up by the *Berliner gemeinnützigen Baugesellschaft*, where Huber was a leading figure, and other building associations followed. However, these associations operated only for a limited time or undertook only a small number of building projects. Although Huber, like most reformers, thought that workers’ cottages were the ideal housing solution, high land prices in cities meant that building associations that followed Huber’s ideas could only build cottages on the outskirts of cities or through land grants. Consequently, they often ended up building tenement houses instead.²⁰²

Housing reform took central place in the first meeting of what would become the VfS in Eisenach in 1872.²⁰³ Ernst Engel (1821–1896), the head of the Prussian Statistical Bureau and a statistician of international renown, delivered one of the main papers, alongside the university

²⁰¹ Huber, *Wirtschaftsvereine und innere Ansiedlung*, pp. 840–841. also see the discussion of Huber in Bullock and Read, *The Housing Reform Movement*, pp. 26–28 and in Zimmermann, *Wohnungsfrage*, ch.1. By stressing the family, Huber also critiqued the shared living in company settlements of his time. On company settlements in the 1840s see Adelheid von Saldern, *Häuserleben. Zur Geschichte städtischen Arbeiterwohnens vom Kaiserreich bis Heute* (Berlin: Dietz 1997 [1995]), p. 53.

²⁰² Bullock and Read, *The Housing Reform Movement*, pp. 26–28 and Zimmermann, *Wohnungsfrage*, pp. 64–68.

²⁰³ The location was not accidental. It symbolically posited an expertise-based and state-led social reform as the alternative to Marxist social democracy. Eisenach was also where the Social Democratic Workers’ Party, led by August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, was established three years earlier. In 1875, against the backdrop of increasing state repression, it joined the Lassallian General German Workers’ Association to form the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Cf: Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa*, ch. 2.

professors Gustav Schmoller and Lujo Brentano. Engel's paper dealt with the "modern housing crisis," its reasons, and its possible solutions, mostly based on data and reports from Berlin. Engel declared that Huber, who had died three years earlier, should be seen as the "founder" of housing reform literature in Germany for bringing the emerging crisis to public attention in the 1840s.²⁰⁴ Engel outlined three aspects of the crisis. First, the almost constant lack of a sufficient quantity of housing. Secondly, the bad quality of existing and newly built housing, which often did not meet the most basic construction and public health standards. And thirdly, the dependency relationship between renters and house owners, who could arbitrarily increase rents or turn their tenants out and thus endanger their livelihood. Using the analogy of the relationship between serfs and manorial lords, Engel termed the relationship between "house lords" (*Hausherren*) and tenants as "housing feudalism" (*Wohnungsfeudalismus*).²⁰⁵

The effects of the owner-tenant relationship worsened the impact of increasing rent prices. They forced families to change housing often and to take lodgers, thereby precluding families from living in a long-term and appropriate dwelling (he thought that such a dwelling required a kitchen, one heated room, and a third room). Engel highlighted the psychological aspects of the "rent tyranny" (*Mietstyrannie*), which amounted to "literal servitude" (*buchstäbliche Knechtung*) and noted in particular the competition over the favor of the "house lord" and the general precarity of housing that harmed the integrity of the family, the feeling of friendship to fellow humans, and workers' ability to live moral and free lives. The housing crisis

²⁰⁴ Ernst Engel, "Über die moderne Wohnungsnoth," in: Verhandlungen der Eisenacher Versammlung zur Besprechung der socialen Frage am 6. und 7. Oktober 1872 (Leipzig, 1873), pp.164–177, p. 165.

²⁰⁵ Engel, *Wohnungsnot*, p. 187.

and the increasing rent prices, Engel warned, did not just effect workers but increasingly impacted society as a whole.²⁰⁶

The general solution that Engel suggested was a radical one: the state and communal authorities should move to abolish the “monopoly” of house owners and create a situation in which broader swathes of society owned their own dwelling. The only practical suggestion that he gave, however, was a reformulation of Huber’s cooperative model that combined membership of the cooperative association and ownership, so members would continue to be part of the cooperative even after they received ownership of a house. Most of Engel’s efforts seem to have gone into developing a financial model for the cooperative associations that would rely on the market for financing. Like Huber, Engel predicated that membership in the association would only be affordable for skilled workers and the lower middle-classes.²⁰⁷ In his call to the state to abolish the “monopoly” of “house lords” over land ownership, Engel underscored a homology between the urban housing market and the feudal relationship between peasants and lords that had been legally abolished during Prussia’s agrarian reforms. Liberal reformers and politicians, he hinted, could scarcely ignore the housing crisis on their doorstep.

Housing reform continued to be a topic of debate throughout the 1870s, especially after the financial collapse of 1873. However, it was not until the second half of the 1880s that discussion of “internal colonization” began to center on agricultural land reform in Eastern Prussia. The VfS and the Evangelical-Social Congress, which connected proliferating networks

²⁰⁶ Engel, *Wohnungsnot*, p. 224; Hans-Jürgen Teuteberg, “Die Debatte der deutschen Nationalökonomie im Verein für Sozialpolitik über die Ursachen der ‘Wohnungsfrage’ und die Steuerungsmittel einer Wohnungsreform im späten 19. Jahrhundert,” in: idem (ed.) *Stadtwachstum, Industrialisierung, sozialer Wandel* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot 1986), pp. 13–60, pp. 21–26. Engel was also a National-Liberal member of the Prussian Parliament between 1867–1870. Ernst Meier, “Engel, Ernst,” in: *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, Vol. 4 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1959), pp. 500–501.

²⁰⁷ Engel, *Wohnungsnot*. He suggested, in fact, a joint-stock company model that would both be appealing to investors and would make stocks, or bonds, tied to ownership.

of Protestant and Pietist associations and institutions, were largely responsible for bringing the questions of housing reform and land reform together. During the 1880s, the two intertwined associations reached a brittle consensus about the need for intervention by the state and communal authorities in the workings of the market if the pressing social problems of agricultural labor, depopulation of the countryside, and the insalubrious and dense living conditions in cities were to be solved.²⁰⁸

Housing reform and land reform were explicitly brought together under the concept of “internal colonization” during the two-day annual meeting of the VfS in September 1886. Convened in Frankfurt, a bastion of National-Liberal communal politics, and chaired by the city’s mayor, leading member of the National-Liberal Party, and soon-to-be Prussian minister of finance, Johannes Miquel, the meeting’s first day discussed rural settlement and reforms to land ownership with particular focus on Prussia’s eastern provinces. The second day was dedicated to the housing crisis in German cities. As preparation for the discussion, the VfS published two volumes of studies on the housing crisis in different cities and one volume exploring different aspects of what a state-sponsored “internal colonization” might look like.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁸ Alfred Weber, on the more politically conservative side of the VfS, and Max Weber, both held programmatic contributions to the proceedings of the Evangelical-Social Congress, the latter producing studies on the *Landarbeiter* question for both organizations. Conversely, Pastor von Bodelschwingh, the most prominent Protestant social reformer and paternalist philanthropist of the age, contributed a paper to the VfS discussion on the housing crisis. For the VfS, see Manfred Jatzlauk, “Diskussionen und Untersuchungen über die Agrarverhältnisse im Verein für Sozialpolitik in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in: Hainz Raif (ed.), *Ostelbische Agrargesellschaft im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik: Agrarkrise - junkerliche Interessenpolitik - Modernisierungsstrategien* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), pp. 51–72; Teuteberg, *die Debatte*. For the *Evangelisch-Sozialer Kongress* see Harry Liebersohn, *Religion and industrial society. The Protestant social congress in Wilhelmine Germany* [=Transactions of the American Philosophical Association vol. 76, part 6] (Philadelphia, 1986). About the political economy of work and race among social scientists of the time and the complex relationship between the US ‘new South,’ the forced transformation of rural economies under German colonialism in Africa, and the Prussian ‘east,’ see Andrew Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

²⁰⁹ See Teuteberg, *Die Debatte der deutschen Nationalökonomie*, pp. 26ff.; *Verhandlungen der am 24. und 25. September 1886 in Frankfurt a. M. abgehaltenen Generalversammlung des Vereins für Socialpolitik über die Wohnungsverhältnisse der ärmeren Klassen in deutschen Großstädten und über Innere Kolonisation mit Rücksicht*

The resurgence of interest in the concept of “internal colonization” was brought about in part by the promulgation of the Settlement Law of April 1886. Even before the September meeting, the VfS published an essay collection under the title “Internal Colonization in Germany: experiences and recommendations.” In this publication Gustav Schmoller, the “father” of the so-called “younger historical school” of economists and one of the founders of the VfS, together with his close associate and agricultural ministry mandarin Hugo Thiel, attempted to establish a historical and expertise-oriented narrative about what a forthcoming colonization project should look like.²¹⁰ More importantly, they tailored it for the practical use of the Colonization Commission’s officials. Schmoller produced a historical narrative that suggest a continuity between medieval German colonization in Slavic-populated areas east of the Elbe, the settlement policies of the Hohenzollerns in the eighteenth century, and the “new Prussian colonization” of 1886. He then used the colonization policies of Friedrich II as a benchmark from which to calculate what the Prussian state of the day could do. In his opening essay on internal colonization, Schmoller sought to combine Prussian *Staatsraison* with liberal reforms that aimed at reducing the concentration of landownership and increasing the number of farmers and workers. He started by placing the new settlement project within a global context of European and North American imperialism and settlement. Schmoller then proceeded to insert the new policy within a longer trajectory of Prussian state-making and Germanic eastward colonization. Schmoller discussed at length previous Hohenzollern settlement efforts, focusing

auf die Erhaltung und Vermehrung des mittleren und kleineren ländlichen Grundbesitzes (= Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik; 32), Leipzig 1886.

²¹⁰ On Schmoller and Thiel’s close friendship and on their failed project of persuading the Prussian government to break up some of the extensive state holdings of leased estates (*Domäne*) into small-farm settlements, see Florian Tennstedt, “Hugo Thiel und der Verein für Sozialpolitik,” *Zeitschrift für Sozialreform* 34:9 (1988), pp. 524–537, and p. 536n75 for the failed attempts to break up the *Domäne*, based on Thiel’s memoirs. He blamed this failure on the opposition of the finance ministry, which objected to the plan on fiscal grounds.

on Friedrich II, and offered some guidelines for policies in the present. Stressing the need for a far-seeing state and its disciplining hand, along with the obedience of the colonists, Schmoller argued that a modern colonization project would require not only large investment of public funds but also a significant planning and administration apparatus. “Every colonization is a wide-ranging social process” (*sozialer Massenprozess*), Schmoller wrote, “a war that cannot be led by the individual as a squatter; those peoples with the stronger social discipline, with the best state infrastructure, and with the healthiest communal lives are the colonizing peoples.”²¹¹

In the VfS meeting in Frankfurt, Schmoller was the only participant to serve as a main speaker on both days of the gathering. His words framed the issues at hand as a question of social policy, moral duty, and the management of social difference, and he foregrounded the issue of workers’ housing on both days of the proceedings. Regarding ‘internal colonization,’ Schmoller remarked to his audience that although the present political constellation dictated that the only way to achieve reform was through a nationalist, namely anti-Polish, legislation, and despite the limited geographic scale of the 1886 Settlement Law, the VfS still needed to welcome the settlement law as an important experiment that could open the way to more ambitious land and social reforms. These, he added, would also be aimed at constructing workers’ cottages. Clearly, Schmoller was already deeply involved in both legitimizing the 1886 law in nationalist and imperialist terms and in shaping the institution that would carry it out.²¹²

²¹¹ Andrew Zimmerman pointed out the key role in German social science of the dialectics of freedom and coercion in the context of the management of labor. He also noted the centrality of state coercion in the ‘education to work’ and the colonial civilizing mission in sociological thinking at the time. See Andrew Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa*. For a shorter, more recent version of the argument, including a discussion of Schmoller’s 1886 text, see Zimmerman’s “German Sociology and Empire: From Internal Colonization to Overseas Colonization and Back Again,” in: George Steinmetz (ed.), *Sociology and Empire: Colonial Studies and the Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), pp. 166–187; Gustav Schmoller, “Die preußische Kolonisation des 17. Und 18. Jahrhunderts,” in: *Innere Kolonisation in Deutschland: Erfahrungen und Vorschläge* [=Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, 32], pp. 1–43.

²¹² Schmoller’s papers on internal colonization and on the housing question are in *Verhandlungen der am 24. und 25. September 1886 in Frankfurt a. M. abgehaltenen Generalversammlung des Vereins für Socialpolitik*. For

The discussion on housing reform on the second day of the 1886 VfS meeting is seen in the scholarship as a pivotal moment in the long road of housing reform but is never considered together with the proceedings of the previous day. The association's endorsement of the call for state legislation put forward by the influential Frankfurt mayor Miquel represented "a clear break" with prevalent attitudes to the issue. Instead of accepting existing building regulations and inspection and planning powers as fairly adequate and faulting individual greed and the market, demands for state intervention received wide legitimacy.²¹³ The VfS now lent its considerable political clout to a general demand for a housing regulation and inspection regime that would go far beyond the existing Prussian legislation. Schmoller's own position on the solutions for the housing crisis was notably more cautious than the final resolution, as he objected to state-supported or state-built social housing. While a new Prussian-wide housing law would wait until 1918 and most communal level reforms were blocked by property owners' associations, the political constellation that made the 1886 Settlement Law possible offered more immediate reform achievements for the VfS and liberal reformers. The Prussian Colonization Commission promised a significant land reform program, even if pertaining to only two provinces, that if successful would constitute a significant precedent for transferring ownership of land from large estate owners to independent farmers. Perhaps for this reason, Schmoller struck a much more activist tone in the "internal colonization" debate during the September 25th meeting, advocating a large-scale, bureaucrat-led enterprise of rural settlement.²¹⁴

Schmoller's later colonial and jingoist agitation, see Eric Solem-Grimm, "The Professors' Africa: Economists, the Elections of 1907, and the Legitimation of German Imperialism," *German History* 25:3 (2007), pp. 313–347.

²¹³ Bullock and Read, *The Housing Reform Movement*, p. 249.

²¹⁴ *Verhandlungen der am 24. und 25. September 1886 in Frankfurt a.M. abgehaltenen Generalversammlung des Vereins für Socialpolitik*, Schmollers' contribution on pp. 90–101, and Miquel's on pp. 5–17. For a detailed discussion of the debate on the housing crisis in the VfS see Hans Jürgen Teuteberg, "Die Debatte der deutschen Nationalökonomie im Verein für Socialpolitik über die Ursachen der 'Wohnungsfrage' und die Steuerungsmittel einer Wohnungsreform im späten 19. Jahrhundert," in: Idem (ed.), *Stadtwachstum, Industrialisierung, Sozialer*

Rudolf von Wittenberg, appointed as the deputy president of the new Prussian Colonization Commission, was present at the 1886 VfS meeting (by 1893 he was both the president of the commission and a registered VfS member), and made extensive use of the proceedings to put together his recommendations for the procedures of the settlement. His recommendations, submitted to the commission's board on its second meeting in October 1886, referenced the VfS 1886 publication on internal colonization, as well as the proceedings of the Frankfurt meeting. He presented the same argument about the skewed division of land in the Prussian East in favor of large landownership and repeated the basic proposition of liberal land reform, namely that small agrarian producers are more useful fiscally and more viable economically, as they pay on average more taxes per hectare and have less debt than large-scale producers. These were the main premises on which “the new agrarian policy of internal colonization” was founded, Wittenberg wrote in his pre-circulated memorandum, and noted that the ultimate goal was to create in the eastern provinces of Prussia a similar structure of landownership to west Germany, with its preponderance of small agrarian producers.²¹⁵

Drawing on the North American example as well as on previous Prussian settlements, Wittenberg defined “colonizing” as an “artificial population increase” achieved by the “placing” (*Ansetzung*) of small agricultural producers on “arable land not occupied by buildings”

Wandel, Beiträge zur Erforschung der Urbanisierung im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin 1986), pp. 13–59. On the VfS during that period see Erik Grimmer-Solem, *The Rise of Historical Economics and Social Reform in Germany 1864–1894* (Oxford University Press, 2003), ch. 6. The Prussian law, *Gesetz, betreffend die Anlegung und Veränderung von Straßen und Plätzen in Städten und ländlichen Ortschaften vom 2. Juli 1875*, would be significantly amended only in 1918, with the involvement of the former head architect of the Colonization Commission, Paul Fischer.

²¹⁵ Rudolf von Wittenberg, “Bericht des unterzeichneten zu Punkt 6 der Tagesordnung, vom 11. October 1886” (printed copy). BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, N2308, Nr. 65, pp. 156–164, p. 157–158. On the early days of the commission see Jacobczyk, *Pruska komisja osadnicza*, pp. 20–28. On Wittenberg's membership of the VfS see *Verhandlungen der am 20. und 21. März 1893 in Berlin abgehaltenen Generalversammlung des Vereins für Socialpolitik über die ländliche Arbeiterfrage und über die Bodenbesitzverteilung und die Sicherung des Kleingrundbesitzes* (Leipzig 1893), p. 162.

(*Ackerfläche, die nicht mit Gebäuden bebaut wird*). Letting settlers build their own farms was the surest way, he noted, to tie people to the land. At this point, he made no mention of farmworkers or workers' settlements to complement the larger farms. Wittenberg also expected settlers to prove that they had available capital amounting to a third of the value of the land, to ensure that they could build and operate a fully functioning farm. Settlement that would serve the "great political goal of strengthening Germandom," Wittenberg emphasized, was not meant for "economically weak characters."²¹⁶

Schmoller and his VfS colleagues, then, were actively reconfiguring a set of historical and economic arguments that informed officials' ideas about the tasks of "internal colonization." Wittenberg, the commission's main administrator and a member of the VfS, took up many of these ideas and modes of argumentation as he formulated concrete policies of colonization. As policies were devised, the concept of "internal colonization" grew further apart from Huber's conception of "internal colonization" as a solution for workers' housing in cities. Colonization was about bureaucratic agrarian settlement grounded in a cultural hierarchy between what Schmoller termed "the colonizing people" and the colonized. Nevertheless, as the commission became more interested in settling workers as well as farmers around 1900, housing reform measures and settlement policies again came together. By the 1910s, state credit for founding *Rentengüter* – the form of land tenure first introduced by the 1886 Settlement Law – became central to the establishment of workers' housing in towns and cities as well as in the countryside.

The term "internal colonization" came to denote a distinctive field of activity in connection with rural and suburban small-scale settlement by the eve of World War I that was seemingly more similar to Huber's usage of the term than to the nationalist rancor that

²¹⁶ Wittenberg, *Bericht*, p. 157–158.

accompanied the work of the Colonization Commission in Polish Prussia. In fact, however, these histories were by that time intertwined. The fourth edition of Rudolf Eberstadt's authoritative *Handbook of Housing* referred to "internal colonization" as a simple synonym of suburban low-income housing, the "inland establishment of settlement plots according to a plan" (*die planmäßige Begründung neuer Siedlerstellen im Inlande*). Central to Eberstadt's definition was the form of proprietorship involved, namely the *Rentegut*. By planning whole villages for settlement and using the *Rentegut* form of land tenure, Eberstadt wrote, the Colonization Commission had set an example (*Vorbild*) for the increasing number of initiatives to plan whole settlements or neighborhoods (*Siedlungen*) of cottages and semidetached workers' houses.²¹⁷

Housing Reform and the *Rentegut* Land Tenure Regime

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, many middle-class social reformers adhering to different denominations and political ideologies began to consider inequality under capitalism as rooted in unequal access to land and in its monopolization and commodification by large landowners in cities and rural areas alike, who made it a commodity for speculation. Others thought that the utilization of land as a resource for social policy required the appropriation of landed property by states and municipalities through purchase or expropriation. Many of the housing laws and regulations for which reformers advocated or against which they clamored in the last decades of the nineteenth century and in the years before World War I had a lot to do with the activities of the Colonization Commission. And many of the legal instruments that were introduced with the avowed aim of enabling colonization were in fact relevant for, and later extended in scope to include, some of the key issues of housing and land reform demands. This

²¹⁷ Rudolf Eberstadt, *Handbuch des Wohnungswesens und der Wohnungsfrage*, 4th ed. (Jena: Fischer, 1920 [1909]), pp. 463–467.

section focuses on two new legal instruments that were designed to bypass the constitutional absolute right of property to allow both land expropriation, with compensation, and limited ownership of property based on a long-term annuity payment.

Central to these legal instruments was the *Rentegut* form of land tenure, which was based on the legal institution of hereditary leasehold (*Erbpacht*). Because it tied people to the land across generations, hereditary leasehold was outlawed in 1849 and 1850 as Prussia moved to monetize feudal relationship and to abolish the indissoluble and heritable duties of peasants to lords. During the economic downturn of the 1870s and 1880s, many landowners and social reformers sought to reintroduce an updated form of hereditary leasehold that would allow workers access to proprietorship while securing labor for estate owners by tying rural workers to the land. The April 1886 Settlement Law ushered in the *Rentegut*, a new form of land tenure that combined ownership with hereditary rent and obligations and proved pivotal in the development of low-income housing and rural settlement across Germany. *Rentengüter* started off as a tool to create small and medium farms by the Colonization Commission and were geographically limited to the colonized provinces of Poznania and West Prussia. As the minimal size of *Rentegut* plots was gradually reduced, this form of land tenure was increasingly used in low-income housing projects. Ernest Engel, as we saw, compared the housing plight of the urban working class to “literal servitude” to feudal lords in the 1870s. This section outlines the legal changes that made the *Rentegut*, whose roots went back to the abolition of feudal relationship in the early part of the century, into a central tool for housing reforms and for nationalizing settlement by the Prussian Colonization Commission.

The *Rentegut* as set out in 1886 was a form of limited ownership based on long-term, fixed, unamortizable rent payments between a *Rentegut* holder and the commission. The

landowner retained a veto over the transfer of property rights from the holder to a third person, and the *Rentegut* contract could stipulate rent payments long into the future. The rent included a part which was amortizable only with the consent of the commission. A contractual repurchase (*Widerkaufsrecht*) clause was also added to allow the commission to buy back the land at will. These conditions, which created in practice an unamortizable monetary payment, ensured that the commission continued to have control over ownership and use of the land. Thus, the April 1886 law reintroduced into Prussian law the possibility of contractually binding future generations to the land by means of an unamortizable rent payment. As the *Rentegut* did not require upfront payment (the land was to be fully paid for in interest-bearing rent installments), it potentially widened the sections of society that could own land. Nevertheless, the unamortizable lease and contractual stipulations, which could include particular utilization of land and punitive terms of repurchase, meant that the *Rentegüter* created a long-term relationship of dependency.

The *Rentegut* as form of land tenure was rooted in the agrarian reforms and the dissolution of feudal relationship that occupied the attention of the Prussian state throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. Reform legislation in the early part of the century sought to monetize former feudal relationship to allow their dissolution, or conversion to contractual relationship, over the long term. The culmination of the reforms came about in conjunction with the new Prussian constitution and in the wake of the political upheavals of 1848/9. Article 42, section 5 of the Prussian constitution of January 1850 determined that property devolution through inheritance would be allowed only for full ownership, with the exception of a fixed, dissoluble, monetary payment tied with land. This exception primarily alluded to the payments that peasants had to pay their former lords as compensation for the abolishment of feudal dues. Building on previous reform measures, the last law that is traditionally associated with the

reforms was promulgated in March 1850 and concretized the stipulations of the constitution. The *Gesetz über die Ablösung der Reallasten und die Regulierung der gutsherrlichen und bäuerlichen Verhältnisse vom 2. März 1850* was meant to prevent the reproduction of semi-feudal relations by limiting the kind of contractual relationship possible under heritable tenure. From that point on, according to section 91 of the law, only fixed, dissoluble monetary payments were allowed to burden heritable landed property, with a maximal duration of 25 to 30 years during which such monetary burdens were irredeemable. The law also limited the monetary cost of paying off the whole amount that burdened the inherited land to 25 times the annual payment and declared void any contracts that contravened its stipulations. In conjunction with this law, the *Rentenbanken* were established to provide state credit to peasants to pay the monetary payments for the final dissolution of such monetized burdens on the land. The *Rentenbanken* would pay the landowner for the dissolution of these dues with interest-bearing bonds and the peasant would pay the *Rentenbanken* an annual amount, a *Rente*, secured through the land that they now owned. This was the first time that the Prussian state offered credit to small agricultural producers, who were often unable to get private credit on sustainable terms. The 1850 legislation signified an attempt by the state to bring to an end not only the registration and regulation of property rights and land tenure, but also the actual relationship of long-term dependence between landowning farmers and their former lords. By disburdening the land and ensuring full property rights while offering estate owners a secure, interest-bearing remuneration, the state hoped to empower independent farmers, increase agricultural productivity, and enliven the land market.²¹⁸

²¹⁸ For the legislation mentioned here see *Verfassungsurkunde vom 31. Januar 1850* (Preußische Gesetz-Sammlung 1850, pp. 17 ff.); *Gesetz über die Ablösung der Reallasten und die Regulierung der gutsherrlichen und bäuerlichen Verhältnisse vom 2. März 1850 nebst dem Gesetz über die Errichtung von Rentenbanken* (Eisleben, 1850). See further the Munich dissertation written under Lujo Brentano: Arthur Aal, *Das preussische Rentengut, seine Vorgeschichte und seine Gestaltung in Gesetzgebung und Praxis* (Stuttgart, 1901), pp. 10–15, 43–55. On the Prussian agrarian reforms there is a huge literature. For the central historiographical issues, see Josef Mooser, “Preußische Agrarreformen, Bauern und Kapitalismus. Bemerkungen zu Hartmut Harnischs Buch ‘Kapitalistische

The financial crash of 1873 led to a resurgence of ideas championing the reforming potential of long-term, heritable leaseholds that had only recently been eradicated by law. One important intervention was by the economist and Berlin professor Alfred Wagner, a co-founder of the VfS, who argued for communal and state ownership of land mitigated by a legal instrument that was akin to a long-term lease, or a new form of heritable leasehold. His suggestions were influential in shaping public discussions, including the demands of the land reform movement, as well as subsequent legislation. This new direction for agrarian reform resulted in the *Rentegut* as defined by the Settlement Law of April 1886. For many liberals, private property and full ownership rights were a necessary aspect of individual freedom, economic entrepreneurship, and responsible citizenship. The *Rentegut* represented in their eyes an undoing of the achievements of the agrarian reforms and the abolishment of heritable semi-feudal relationships. For the socially conservative liberals in the National-Liberal Party, the 1886 law was social reformist and an opportunity to promote long-held liberal demands to reform land ownership structures. For leading National-Liberal politicians like Johannes Miquel, as well as for VfS members such as Schmoller and the legal scholar Otto Gierke, the *Rentegut* allowed the use of the productivity of the land to provide credit for proprietorship (by means of a fixed long-term rent), instead of financing land acquisition through mortgages, which were based on treating land as a commodity. In this vein, Gierke argued that the *Rentegut* represented a partial reintroduction of the old Germanic element of communal ownership of land into a legal system

Agrarreform und industrielle Revolution,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 18 (1992), pp. 533–554; Hartmut Harnisch, *Kapitalistische Agrarreform und industrielle Revolution* (Weimar: Böhlau, 1984), is fundamental for the more recent literature, and so is Heinrich Kaak’s detailed study of the history and historiography of agrarian relations in East Elbia: Heinrich Kaak, *Die Gutsherrschaft: Theoriegeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Agrarwesen im ostelbischen Raum* (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter 1991). For a vivid description and analysis of the complexities of agrarian reforms on the ground in one Brandenburg estate, see William Hagen, *Ordinary Prussians: Brandenburg Junkers and their Villagers, 1500–1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), ch. 10.

that constructed land as an object of “speculation.” By making land into state property (*Verstaatlichung*) and introducing the “social-legal” *Rentegut* land tenure, Gierke told the 1893 VfS annual meeting, it was possible to create villages similar to the “old German rural community” that was “organically” divided into independent peasant-farmers, small farmers (*Kossäten*) and cottager-farmworkers (*Büdner*). This “organic” community offered a way to reduce social conflict exacerbated by land commodification under liberal capitalism. Miquel, Schmoller, Gierke, and others were very much aware of the feudal appearance of the *Rentegut*. Nevertheless, they saw it as a necessary social-reformist land policy measure to increase the numbers of independent farmers and settled farmworkers, since the *Rentegut* granted land ownership, albeit in truncated form.²¹⁹

Despite the objections of those who saw the *Rentegut* as a backward move, this form of tenure, first introduced for the provinces of Poznan and West-Prussia in 1886, became increasingly widespread due to state support. Beginning in 1890, the Prussian government extended the applicability of the *Rentegut* beyond Polish Prussia to the whole kingdom and offered increasing legal, administrative, and financial support for the creation of *Rentegüter* by private-public partnerships, state agencies, and cooperative associations. In 1890 and 1891, two laws significantly expanded the applicability of the *Rentegut* as stipulated in sections 3–7 of the

²¹⁹ Hannelore Bruchhold-Whal, *Die Krise des Großgrundbesitzes und die Güterankaufe der Ansiedlungskommission in der Provinz Posen in den Jahren 1886–1898* [Münster University Ph.D. Dissertation] (Münster 1980), pp. 82–99; Aal, *Das preussische Rentengut*, pp. 10–15, 43–55. For Gierke, a renowned scholar of German law, see his speech at the 1893 VfS annual meeting: *Verhandlungen der am 20. und 21. März 1893 in Berlin abgehaltenen Generalversammlung des Vereins für Socialpolitik über die ländliche Arbeiterfrage und über die Bodenbesitzverteilung und die Sicherung des Kleingrundbesitzes* (Leipzig 1893), pp. 163–178. On the land reform movement see Kevin Repp, *Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity: Anti-politics and the Search for Alternatives, 1890–1914* (Cambridge: Harvard UP 2000), pp. 69–91; Bullock and Read, *The Movement for Housing Reform*, 159–163, 178–179. An important law that preceded the 1886 settlement law and regulated the division of landed property and the construction of settlements in Prussia that preceded the Settlement Law was *Das Gesetz betreffend die Verteilung der öffentlichen Lasten bei Grundstücksteilungen und die Gründung neuer Ansiedlungen vom 25.8.1876*.

1886 Settlement Law to the whole of Prussia and expanded their usage also to smaller agricultural plots that necessitated some wage labor. The laws empowered the *Generalkommissionen* – government agencies originally established to regulate the new property relations brought about by the agrarian reforms – to assist in the establishment of *Rentegüter*, first by private individuals and later by private-public not-for-profit associations, and provincial and local authorities. The laws also tasked government land banks (the *Rentenbanken* that were established in 1850) with facilitating credit for the establishment of *Rentegüter*. Credit to allow for the establishment of the plots was granted to the owners of the land, while the holders of the *Rentegut* were to pay annuities to the *Rentenbanken*. The legislation did not stipulate specific sizes for the *Rentegut* plots facilitated through the *Generalkommissionen* but they were primarily supposed to allow for the establishment of independent farmers, normally in the range of 7.5–15 hectares. The *Generalkommissionen* did create smaller plots, however, when employment in the locality was available, for example in connection with the establishment of larger farms. In 1899, the government further reduced the minimal size of *Rentengüter* but still stipulated that such plots were to allow families to be mainly engaged in agriculture.²²⁰ By 1904, around 90% of the *Rentengüter* established by the *Generalkommissionen* were in the agrarian provinces of Prussia east of the Elbe, where large estates predominated, and were planned for independent farmers.²²¹

²²⁰ *Das Gesetz über Rentengüter vom 27.6.1890; Das Gesetz betreffend die Beförderung der Errichtung von Rentengütern vom 7.7.1891; Ausführungsanweisung vom 16. November 1891; Das Gesetz betreffend des Anerbenrecht bei Renten- und Ansiedlungsgütern vom 8.6.1896; BGB Ausführungsgesetz vom 20.8.1899.* See also Paul Fischer, “Die bisherige Entwicklung des Kleinsiedlungswesens in Preußen,” in idem, *Zur Förderung des Kleinsiedlungswesens*, pp. 40ff. See the explanation of the procedures and work of the *Generalkommission* in Frankfurt on the Oder by its president, Hermann Metz, in the 1893 annual meeting of the VfS: *Verhandlungen der am 20. und 21. März 1893 in Berlin abgehaltenen Generalversammlung des Vereins für Socialpolitik über die ländliche Arbeiterfrage und über die Bodenbesitzverteilung und die Sicherung des Kleingrundbesitzes* (Leipzig: Duncker und Humboldt, 1893), pp. 150–162, p. 155.

²²¹ Between 1891 and 1904, 10,299 *Rentengüter* were established by *Generalkommissionen* across Prussia with an average size of 11.4 hectares. About 55% of these *Rentegüter* were larger than 7.5 hectare, while only 7.8% were smaller than 2.5 hectare. “Rentengüter,” in *Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon* (Leipzig 1908), vol. 16, pp. 807–808.

During the first two decades of its existence, then, the *Rentegut* form of land tenure was primary utilized to establish independent farms in rural areas and seemed to fulfill liberal hopes for a gradual transformation of ownership structures in the agrarian economy which would entail the creation of a class of independent farmers instead of large landholdings.

The *Rentegut* was also becoming a solution to wider housing problems facing industrial workers. Two Prussian ministerial decrees from 1907 and 1909 reduced the minimal size of *Rentegüter* plots and made it possible to expand their use to also supply housing for industrial and other non-agricultural workers. The minimal plot size for these smaller *Rentengüter* was set at 0.125–0.5 Prussian Morgen (1 Hectare equaled about 4 Prussian Morgen, so the minimal plot size was between 319 to 1,276 square meters) and they were defined as pertaining only to plots with one single family house no more than two stories high. Between 85% to 90% of the plot's area was to remain free of buildings and dedicated to cultivating a garden (These plots were often referred to as *Gartenrentengüter*). Nevertheless, the government allowed for multi-family houses under circumstances of acute housing shortage, and thereby made it possible for cities to undertake large projects with state credit based on the *Rentegut* form and the facilitation of the *Generalkommissionen*. Only public agencies, such as municipalities, or private-public housing associations in which provincial or local authorities had a capital stake, were allowed to establish the *Rentengüter*, while private landowners who sought to do the same had to prove that they did not seek quick profits. In “nationally threatened regions,” the law stipulated, *Rentengüter* could only be given to Germans. Municipalities and government agencies, as well as not-for-profit housing associations, began to establish these small garden-plot *Rentengüter* from that point on. By the end of 1915, 22,190 *Rentengüter* of all sizes were established in Prussia. Almost 40% of them were smaller than 5 hectares. 10.8% of them, or 2,403, were

garden-plot *Rentengüter* for industry workers. 4,214 further garden-plot *Rentengüter* were in preparation at that time. In comparison, between 1891–1904 10,299 *Rentengüter* were established, 7.8% of which were smaller than 2 hectares. Between 1904 and 1915, then, the number of small plots out of all the *Rentengüter* rose by about 2%, while their average size decreased significantly.²²² *Rentengüter* were becoming a way of providing housing to low-income municipal and government employees as well as skilled workers with secure employment.

Many social reformers saw the *Rentegut* as part of a more wide-ranging transformation in the relationship between land use and public welfare that would take land outside the realm of capitalist relationship and ensure its utilization for the public good, if needed through expropriation. At the same time, the articulation of the public good by middle-class reformers was intertwined with what they saw as the long-term interests of the state and the nation. The interlocking of housing reform, land reform, and a radical nationalist agenda was especially apparent when the expropriation of private landed property was concerned. Around 1900, there were two attempts to pass legislation in Prussia that allowed the state to expropriate land from private proprietors despite the constitutional safeguards on private property, using the constitutional clause that allowed confiscation of land for full compensation if deemed necessary to the public weal. The first initiative was related to the housing crisis in large cities, while the second was connected with the work of the Colonization Commission in Polish Prussia.

²²² Eberstadt, *Handbuch des Wohnungswesens*, pp. 463–479. See the Prussia-wide numbers reported by the president of the *Generalkommission* in Frankfurt on the Oder. [Hermann] Metz, “Funf und Zwanzig Jahre Siedlungsarbeit der Generalkommissionen,” *AfIK* IX:5/6 (February/March 1917), pp. 113–160, pp. 152–156. Paul Fischer, “Die bisherige Entwicklung des Kleinsiedlungswesens in Preußen,” in idem, *Zur Förderung des Kleinsiedlungswesens*, pp. 40ff.

State expropriation of private land for the public weal was previously used in cases of railroad construction and military need, but in the 1890s, some municipalities sought similar powers to increase housing supply and improve infrastructure. Franz Adickes (1846–1915), Johannes Miquel’s successor as the mayor of Frankfurt and an important figure in the housing reform movement, embarked on an activist city expansion and land purchase policy, which he sought to bolster with land expropriation as well. Municipalities’ land policies tended during that time to be motivated by fiscal rather than social concerns, but Adickes, whose land policy resulted in the municipality owning a half of the land within the expanding borders of the city, sought to use the land for housing projects. He promoted housing construction for low-income municipal employees as well as for workers by collaborating with charities, private-public associations, and private investors. Adickes had been advocating an expropriation law since 1893 in the hope that it would allow municipalities to take control of land to facilitate urban development, zoning, street construction, and public health improvements. This was primarily meant for areas newly incorporated into municipal borders, where he wanted to take the land into municipal ownership, build a transportation infrastructure, re-parcel it to allow for largescale housing construction, and then return it to the previous owners. In 1902, after other German states had already passed similar laws, Adickes finally succeeded in lobbying for a limited version of this legislation despite widespread resistance from landowners’ organizations. The many restrictions that were inserted into the law in the process of legislation rendered it unsuitable for large-scale use. Even with subsequent amendments, which also extended the applicability of the law to other urban centers, it was rarely used by municipalities.²²³

²²³ For the history and importance of Adickes’ initiative and the bill, nicknamed “lex Adickes,” see Jan Palmowski, *Urban Liberalism in Imperial Germany: Frankfurt Am Main, 1866–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 5 and Ladd, *Urban Planning and Civic Order*, pp. 199–201. After a protracted controversy, the bill that eventually passed in the Prussian Landtag limited new expropriation powers only to Frankfurt a. M. and for land

The idea that the continued “Germanization” of Polish Prussia required more radical settlement policies as well as the expropriation, rather than purchase, of Polish-owned estates became a rallying call of German nationalist groups around 1900.²²⁴ Demands for expropriation of Polish-owned land by the state increased as the Colonization Commission discovered that it was unable to rely on land purchase from Polish landowners to continue its settlement policies. By the mid-1890s, an expanding Polish network of land banks, settlement associations, and credit cooperatives, successfully closed-off the Polish land market to the commission and was able to buy land from Germans as well. In the years 1898–1903, the number of estates purchased by the commission more than quadrupled in comparison with the previous five years. Of the estates bought in this period, only 16% were bought from Polish owners.²²⁵ In 1899, an anonymous manifest-like article in the Pan-German bulletin outlined a program of “Germanization” that called for radical measures against Prussia’s Polish citizens. It demanded that the state revoke most of the citizenship rights and constitutional protections accorded to its Polish citizens and legislate an “unconditional right of expropriation against the Polish landed property in its entirety.”²²⁶ Written by Alfred Hugenberg, a co-founder of the Pan-German League and since 1895 one of the most influential officials in the Colonization Commission,

bordering on streets. It also stipulated generous compensation for landowners. See *Gesetzes betreffend die Umlegung von Grundstücken in Frankfurt am Main vom 28. Juli 1902* (Preus. G. S. Nr. 37).

²²⁴ This was not a wholly new idea, however. According to Lerp, even before the establishment of the Prussian Colonization Commission, the Prussian government briefly considered the possibility that the state could expropriate or confiscate large estates in Polish Prussia to reduce the political power of Polish nobles and to make land available for settlement. Such an idea was even considered by Bismarck during the drafting of the 1886 Settlement Law, despite the anticipated opposition of large estate owners and many National Liberals. Lerp, *imperiale Grenzräume*, pp. 177–179.

²²⁵ Bruchhold-Wahl, *Die Krise des Großgrundbesitzes*, pp. 144–152, 256–283. Also see the June 1898 memorandum from the president of the commission to the Prussian cabinet, reproduced in idem, pp. 450–456. On Polish land purchase see Jacobczyk, *Pruska komisja osadnicza*, pp. 129ff.

²²⁶ Peter Walkenhorst, *Nation – Volk – Rasse: Radikaler Nationalismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1890–1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), pp. 263–265, quote on p. 264.

sketched out a new course for Prussia's "Germanization" policies which put the emphasis on aggressive land policies, settlement, and economic development of a separate and economically superior German society in Poznan and West Prussia. In a 1902 memorandum to the leadership of the Pan-German league, Hugenberg criticizing the inefficiencies of the government's settlement policies, and demanded the appropriation by the state of every landholding larger than 100 hectares in Poznan and parts of West Prussia, with compensation determined in a "simplified procedure" outside the purview of the courts. Otherwise, he warned, every estate threatened to become a "Polish village."²²⁷ The rest of the Pan-German leadership agreed and the demand for expropriation was included in the league's 1902 program. The Eastern Marches Society had been likewise advocating expropriation of Polish-owned land since around 1900. In 1902, it called upon the government to adopt a more restricted expropriation law than Hugenberg proposed and used its influence in the press and in government circles to strongly promote such a move.²²⁸

The final version of the expropriation law was approved in 1908 as an amendment to the 1886 Settlement Law. It relied on a revised definition of "the public weal" to justify the abrogation of the constitutional right of property. The definition of the public weal was now expanded to include "the ideal of national homogeneity" (*Ideal der nationalen Homogenität*) in

²²⁷ Lerp, *imperiale Grenzräume*, pp. 177–179, quote on p. 178. Hugenberg was appointed in 1899 as the director of the new provincial association of cooperatives in Poznan, a position which he combined with directing the new provincial cooperative bank in the province. The financial and political power that he wielded in these roles made it possible for him to promote the closely-knit cooperative network that, he hoped, would suppress the flourishing Polish economic associational network that had developed in the province.

²²⁸ Witold Jacóbczyk, "Der Deutsche Ostmarkenverein von 1900 bis 1914," in: Adam Galos, Felix-Heinrich Gentzen and Witold Jacóbczyk, *Die Hakenisten: Der Deutsche Ostmarkenverein, 1894–1934: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Ostpolitik des deutschen Imperialismus* (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1966), pp. 135–265, pp. 210–220.

the sense of the “Germanization” of the multi-ethnic provinces of Prussia.²²⁹ Despite widespread objections to the law, the government had a clear majority for it in the lower house after the Eastern Marches Society undertook extensive lobbying and won the support of the powerful Agrarian League. In the unelected upper house of the *Landtag*, where numerous landowning members of the high nobility sat, the fate of the bill was less certain. For many of them, state expropriation of large estates seemed a dangerous precedent, and so the upper house watered down the bill to exclude church property and properties, which did not change ownership for 10 years. The Frankfurt mayor Adickes, who was also Hugenberg’s father-in-law, was an ex officio member of the Prussian upper house alongside the mayors of many large or historically independent cities. He played a central role in the proceedings concerning the expropriation law and refused to accept the watered-down bill. Instead, Adickes successfully moved to return to the harsher version approved by the lower house and that version of the bill finally passed with the votes of the politically Liberal members of the house, mainly mayors and university professors.²³⁰ The expropriation law was used for only four estates by 1914 and had more symbolic than practical value in terms of promoting German settlement.

The 1886 Settlement Law stipulated for the first time a new land tenure structure that afforded limited ownership of property for private individuals, secured state control on land usage, and created the framework for a financing structure that was supposed to make the land accessible and appealing for prospective settlers. Other legal measures allowed housing cooperatives and building associations to be established as limited liability organizations, thus

²²⁹ *Novelle des Gesetzes über Maßnahmen zur Stärkung des Deutschtums in den Provinzen Westpreußen und Posen vom 20. März 1908*, Preus. G.S 7 (1908) pp. 29–34.

²³⁰ On the legislation process and Adickes’ role see Robert Spät, *Die “polnische Frage” in der öffentlichen Diskussion im Deutschen Reich, 1894–1918* (Marburg: Herder Institut, 2014), pp. 116–117 and more broadly pp. 110–138. On the controversies around the law and its implementation see also Jacóczyk, *Pruska Komisja Osadnicza*, pp. 148–173.

increasing their access to private and public capital. Through these legal and administrative developments, low-income housing and garden plots were established in both urban and rural contexts. By 1910, growing numbers of not-for-profit, public-private associations engaged in the rural and semi-urban settlement of workers were being established across Prussia. In the colonized provinces, the Prussian Colonization Commission's administrative apparatus, financial means, and land purchase activities made it a central player in this emerging small settlement and workers' housing market. Before we turn to explore the implication of this process in the building activities of the commission, we need to better understand how the commission set out to divide its estates into smaller plots and how administrative fiscal considerations significantly shaped the course of settlement.

Settlement Plans, Balanced Books, and the Management of Estates

The primary purpose of the Prussian Colonization Commission was the purchase of large estates in Polish Prussia and their division into village communities peopled by German settlers. The administrative instrument through which the commission undertook this work was the settlement or division plan (*Teilungsplan*). The plan was put into effect by an appointed estate manager, who facilitated the protracted process of surveying, measuring, and dividing the land into individual plots. It laid out the structure of the future village, specified the kind of buildings and infrastructure work that was required, and contained calculations about the costs of settlement and the rent that settlers would need to pay. The commission's settlement plans needed to demonstrate that it was not overspending and that the estate's account books would be balanced by a combination of the settlers' rent payments and the economic management of the estate in the period before it was transformed into a communal entity. The plans were also grounded in the political imperative of spatially separating settlers from the local Polish

population, and this imperative, together with cost-cutting, were crucial for both shaping the layout of villages and for assigning them separate church and school districts. This section looks at the settlement plans and the interim management of estates to prepare the ground for discussing the building activity of the commission in the 1890s.

The commission approached the building of settlements through the social template of close-knit village communities (*Dorfgemeinden*) that were between fifteen and thirty farms, possessed a village school, church, and inn, village cooperatives, a few workers' cottages, and land plots that would allow for self-supporting farmer-villagers. As chapter three explores in greater detail, the commission's planning principles were informed by the idea that a German village should look like South German, Saxon, or Thuringian villages, with houses concentrated around the church and the fields spread out around the village core. In practice, settler villages looked very differently, but the commission aimed to situate farmhouses in near proximity to each other as far as it was possible without increasing expenses. The commission publicized its conception of a "compact rural community" (*geschlossene Landgemeinde*) with its school and church as the "fundamentals of modern colonization," which defined "the Prussian state as a modern colonizer" (*der Preußische Staat als moderner Kolonisor*) and stood apart from both the US model of scattered single farms and the older settlement projects of eighteenth-century Prussia. The commission explained that although the US model was more efficient in terms of agricultural production, the possibility of Polish-German mingling and familial relations (*nationale unerwünschte Verbindungen*) that would cause a gradual weakening (*Abschwächung*) in the national commitment of scattered German farming families required a closely-knit village layout instead.²³¹

²³¹ *Zwanzig Jahre*, pp. 46–49. This document, the commission's annual report for 1906 as well as a celebration of its twenty years of "cultural work", contains the most concentrated and elaborated ideological statement for the

Although the commission sought to avoid scattered farms and preferred close-knit villages that separated settlers from the local Polish population, in practice, a range of constraints led the commission to choose village layouts that placed farmhouses alongside existing roads (see figure 1). The basic principles of the division plan were determined by administrative borders, topography, roads, existing buildings and infrastructure, soils and land types, and financial considerations. Villages also had to abide by local duties and obligations to which the estate was committed before its purchase, e.g. a *Patronatrecht* over local shrines of Catholic saints. Plots normally included arable land, pastureland, meadowland, and often a small patch of woodland, and were frequently not contiguous but rather scattered across the estate. This spatial division of each plot was not necessarily congruent with existing roads and infrastructure. The commission's choice of village layout, "linear settlement with a village core" (*Reihedorf mit Dorfkern*), was a compromise between scattered homesteads and closely-knit villages and sought to take advantage of existing roads to reduce costs. Farmhouses would be situated next to roads in a linear fashion. A village core, made of communal buildings, a village inn, and craftspeople and workers' dwellings, was planned in the location of the former manor house with its adjacent

settlement project. It was at the same time an annual activity report, a summary of the commission's activities in its first twenty years, and a programmatic ideological statement about colonization. The report spoke, therefore, less to what was true in the 1880s or 1890s than to what was useful for the public image of the commission in the later part of the 1900s, as it was seeking to replenish its exhausted budget. The report posited an experimental phase in the commission's first decade of activity (1886–1893/6) and a subsequent period of purportedly proper and well-planned settlement. For more on this report, see Witold Jacóbczyk, *Pruska Komisja Osadnicza 1886–1919* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1976), pp.103ff.




Figure 2.1: The settlement plan of the estates Ruchocin and Lipe in County Witkowo, ca. 1890. The future village would be named Neuzedlitz. Planned farmhouses are located along the main roads and marked as red rectangles. Plots are numbered. The main part of the plot, where the farm is located, is marked only with Arabic numerals. Additional parts of the plot are marked with numbers and small Latin letters. In this case, the village was not planned with a central core. Farmhouses were spread out along three main roads leading from the Ruchocin manor westwards. A school was planned on the main east-west road near the Lipe manor house. A large tract of land around and to the south of the Ruchocin manor and park was reserved and not divided up to plots (it is marked Restgut in the map). By 1897, the land was sold to a Protestant charity that established an orphanage in the former manor. Chapters four and five discuss this institution. Source: GStA PK, XVI. HA Rep. 30 Nr. 1513.

farm buildings. Church and school buildings were usually constructed in this location as well and utilized existing buildings to reduce costs. Other massive stone and brick buildings were converted to farmhouses, usually for the larger plots. When such buildings were scattered, the commission would place at least two farms next to one another, to avoid isolated farmsteads.²³²

The division plans (*Teilungspläne*) drafted by the commission and ratified in the quarterly meetings of the commission's board were important documents of social engineering and spatial planning. The division plan ordered and regulated communal property relations by means of plotting the landscape. Plots were assigned to different purposes with a view to shaping a future village society and allowing a stable financial basis for the operation of communal institutions. For example, plots were set aside to support the livelihood of teachers and other communal officeholders and activities and to accommodate future changes. A village school would be typically assigned a larger plot than was necessary to sustain it and the teacher, so as to allow the construction of a larger school later, with a larger garden plot for the second teacher that would be required. Small plots were also kept aside so they could be used to settle workers and craftspeople once the village developed a demand for their services. The number of plots varied according to the layout of the land and the quality of the soil, but usually villages had between twenty and thirty plots. Between 1886 and 1900, most farms were fairly large and ranged between 20 and 50 Hectares. After 1900, average farm size decreased significantly, also

²³² *Zwanzig Jahre deutsche Kulturarbeit*, pp. 46–49. The discussion of village plans in this paragraph and the next one is based on a number of villages: Dollnik and Augustowo in county Flatow/Złotow in the province of West Prussia, Kornthal/Ustaszewo in county Znin in Poznanian, and several close-by settlements in the county of Witkowo, likewise in Poznanian (Neu-Tecklenberg/Sobiesiernie, Neuzedlitz/Ruchicin, and Kleinfleis/Mielżyn). For the format of “Reihedörfer mit Dorfkern” in the commission's planing see H. Schülze, “Die Posener Landschaft nach ihrer Bodenbewachung, Form und Besiedelung,” *Geographische Zeitschrift*, 22:4 (1916), pp. 182–199, p. 197. The distinction from the US model was most likely both a response and a reference to Max Sering's influential study on the agrarian relations in North America and to his later critique of the commission's work. See Robert L. Nelson, “From Manitoba to the Memel: Max Sering, inner colonization and the German East,” *Social History* 35:4 (November 2010), pp. 439–457. For Sering's critique of the commission, see the next section.

since more plots for workers and craftspeople were laid out. Between 1900 and 1914, average plot sizes ranged between 10-20 Hectares, with a consistent downward trend. Once the transformation to a village was complete and the village was recognized as a communal administrative unit, the estate division plan was normally incorporated into the communal statute of the new village, including stipulations regarding communal dues and future utilization of land. Thus, the drafters of these plans had in their hands the power to shape the lives of people and the fortunes of communities well into the future.²³³

The commission's settlement plans were shaped by its social and nationalist goals, but also constrained by administrative and fiscal controls on expenditure built into the settlement law. Settlement and division plans were both a blueprint for rural transformation and an accounting exercise, as they included a calculation of the costs of purchasing and transforming the estate, according to which the price of the plots, the annual rent, and the settlers' capital requirements were calculated. The commission was required to manage, lease, and sell land in accordance with the provision of *Schadloshaltung des Staates* (A 'balanced books' clause), which was incorporated into the 1886 Settlement Law. This was the main legal assurance that the 100 million Marks initially earmarked for colonization in 1886 would not be used to pay off estates' debts, before reselling the debt-free estate for market prices. This safeguard went all the way back to the 1794 Prussian *Allgemeines Landrecht*, which allowed the state to sell crown estates (*Domänen*) only if the price compensated the state for its investment in the estate. Since crown estates and crown forests financed the interest payments on state debt, the state sought to

²³³ These policies were laid out in the commission's 1892 annual report, pp. 1896ff, and see also *Zwanzig Jahre deutsche Kulturarbeit* (1907), pp. 56–57. On plot sizes and village layout see Jacobczyk, *Pruska Komisja Osadnicza*, pp. 56, 77.

ensure their fiscal integrity.²³⁴ The commission's finances were also subject to the scrutiny of the Prussian state comptroller (*Ober-Rechnungskammer*), a quasi-independent administrative body which was responsible for auditing imperial and Prussian state finance. The Prussian state comptroller could exercise stringent oversight, and there were protracted disputes about the financial responsibility of estate managers.²³⁵

Bounded by administrative, fiscal, and legal obligations, the commission decided to determine the selling price of land to settlers not according to the approximate value of the land (either before or after the division of the estate), but according to the costs of transforming the estate into a village. Thus, infrastructure, land amelioration, and building costs largely determined the price of plots. Each estate and each plot became units of account: the settlement plan set the upfront capital requirements, the rent, and the interest rates, and the expected payment of rent and other obligations were projected several decades into the future.²³⁶

During the process of settlement, the commission's estates fell under the interim management of estate managers appointed by the commission, who reproduced in many ways

²³⁴ On the 'balanced books clause' to which the commission was committed see: *Zwanzig Jahre deutsche Kulturarbeit* (1907), pp. 59ff; On the *Schadloshaltung des Staates* in the Prussian *Allgemeines Landrecht* see ALR I:14, sections 16–19. On the management of crown domains by the state, see Wilhelm Treue, "Preußens Wirtschaft vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis zum Nationalsozialismus," in Otto Büsch (ed.) *Handbuch der preussischen Geschichte*, vol.2 (Berlin: De Gruyter 1992), pp. 558–560; and Rimpler's 1888 book, written specifically in the context of the *VfS* debates about the land question and the liberal initiatives to break up some of the crown estates, following up on the author's contribution to the 1886 *innere Colonisation* volume: H. Rimpler, *Domänenpolitik und Grundeigentumsvertheilung vornehmlich in Preußen* (Berlin 1888), pp. 28ff.

²³⁵ For instance, in the case of the first settler-village established by the commission, Dolnik, the *Ober-Rechnungskammer* undertook a long inquiry into the financial management of the estate after the accounts were only partially given over to its audit. The commission's estate manager, Georg Hahlweg, refused to give over the estate account books and claimed that they were either lost or must not be removed from the estate due to their fragile condition. The missing files, including most of the monthly accounts of the estate in the years 1886–1887, were eventually handed over after much inner-bureaucratic strife and procrastination in 1896. See the accounts and correspondence between the estate manager, the commission, the regional government, and the Prussian state comptroller in GStA PK I HA. Rep. 212 Nr. 1219.

²³⁶ For a detailed description of the administrative procedure according to which plot prices were set in the later years of the commission's work see *Zwanzig Jahre*, p. 86.

the position of domination enjoyed by the estate's previous owner. From the purchasing of the estate to the settlement of colonists, a process that could take a couple of years, estate managers were tasked with maximizing the estates' revenues, preparing the estate for settlement, and eventually with overseeing the actual settlement itself. They not only administered the economic running of the estate but also wielded the statutory powers of the lord of the manor (*Gutsbesitzer*), which combined both the communal administration of the *Gutsbezirk* and the local policing powers (*Ortspolizei*) under Prussian law. The increasing bureaucratization of the commission's work and the estates' labor needs meant that estate managers often headed a small bureaucracy of their own, including junior officials, bookkeepers, and work supervisors as well as permanent and temporary farmworkers, who would often live on its grounds and dwell in existing buildings. Estate managers were also the main interlocutors with prospective and incoming settlers. They handled the vetting of applicants and managed the relationship between the commission and settlers in the process of settlement. By 1906, the interim management of the commission's estates required a large bureaucracy that included 240 estate managers, 261 assistants and bookkeepers, and ten senior administrators (*Oberverwalter*), each tasked with overseeing the management of the commission's estates in a designated area.²³⁷

A sure sign of increasing bureaucratization was paperwork. In 1899, estate managers received a newly printed fifty-page manual together with a hefty bundle of 75 enclosed items. These included detailed instructions about administrative communication channels within the commission's centralized structure, blank forms and letter formats for different purposes, explications of specific laws and procedures, and exemplars of contracts with service providers,

²³⁷ The paragraph is based on my reading of several village files from the two provinces, with particular attention paid to the village files of Dolnik, the commission's first settlement, and Augustowo, both in county Flatow/Złotow. GStA PK I. HA Rep. 212, Nrs. 1160–1218 (Augustowo) and Nrs. 1219–1290 (Dolnik). Also see well as on *Zwanzig Jahre deutsche Kulturarbiet* (1907), esp. pp. 43–46.

settlers, workers, and leaseholders. Although we still know very little on the social background and characteristics of the commission's estate managers, it seems likely that they were related in terms of skills, knowledge, social background, and family, to leaseholders of Prussian crown estates (*Domänenpächter*), who became a distinct social group of officials-entrepreneurs by the nineteenth century. It is safe to assume that estate managers were accustomed to at least moderate amount of paperwork, had probably studied agriculture academically, and could draw on some experience in managing large-scale agricultural production.²³⁸ Clearly, the commission assumed that they did, as the manual and its attachments are largely silent on that point. Reporting on estates' economic activity, however, was required often and in minute detail. Precise instructions for bookkeeping and tabular formats for monthly reporting of estates' economic situation were also enclosed in the manual. The level of detail can be gauged from the ever-increasing size of the appendices devoted to the financial results of estates in the commission's annual reports.²³⁹

The Commission's Farm-Building Activity in the 1890s

The issue of farm construction was a central problem during the 1890s that highlighted a central tension between the commission's economic and nationalist goals. Prospective settlers

²³⁸ About the *Domänenpächter* as a social group see Hans-Heinrich Müller, "Domänen und Domänenpächter in Brandenburg-Preußen im 18. Jahrhundert," *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1965), pp. 152–192; "Domänenpächter im 19. Jahrhundert" *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1989), pp. 123–137; "Pächter und Güterdirektoren: Zur Rolle agrarwissenschaftlicher Intelligenzgruppen in der ostelbischen Landwirtschaft im Kaiserreich" in Heinz Reif (ed.) *Ostelbische Agrargesellschaft im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), pp. 267–286

²³⁹ *Geschäftsanweisung für die Ansiedlungsvermittler der Königlichen Ansiedlungs-Kommission 1899*, Archiwum Państwowe w Koszalinie, Landratsamt Flatow: Durchführung des Ansiedlungsgesetzes 1886–1913, Nr. 194, pp. 65–114. For Sohnrey's fifty-page propaganda piece, see Heinrich Sohnrey, *Bauernland. Ein Gespräch mit Vater Brinkhöfer über das Ansiedlungswesen in den Provinzen Posen und Westpreußen* (Berlin, 1897). For the map see Paul Langhans, *Karte der Thätigkeit der Ansiedlungs-kommission für die Provinzen Westpreußen und Posen 1886–1896: auf Grund amtlicher Angaben entworfen* (Gotha: Justus Perthes 1896). Langhans used the same color codes for his *Kolonial-Atlas* which mapped a *Völkish* and expansionist understanding of the nation on a global scale. On Langhans and his map see Lerp, *Imperiale Grenzräume*, pp. 143–147; Kopp, *Germany's Wild East*, pp. 1–8.

often did not want to build a farm from scratch, but they were also reluctant to take up structures built by the commission because of they were built on the cheap. When settlers built their own farms, however, they ran the risk of overspending and getting into long-term debt that put the economic viability of settlement at risk. To manage this conundrum, the commission built up a vast technical bureaucracy that included increasing numbers of surveyors, draughtsmen, agricultural experts, civil engineers, and government architects. Although the commission built communal buildings such as schools and churches extensively, this section traces how it dealt with the construction of workers' dwellings and farmhouses. For the present discussion, however, I focus only on the latter activity, which I refer to as building for private use.

In the early years of the commission's activities, construction of new buildings and repurposing of old ones, including farmhouses, was done locally and managed by estate managers according to plans adapted from the Prussian ministry of public works or the administration of state domains.²⁴⁰ In the mid-1890s, the low appeal of these houses in the eyes of prospective settlers was singled out by the commission as a reason for the rising numbers of applicants who changed their minds after signing a settlement contract. But leaving the construction of new farms entirely in the hands of settlers was seen by the commission as risky. Building costs of new farms were normally the single largest expense for the settlers. The commission was worried that settlers would spend beyond their means, based on their previous experience and their old farms, and would end up constructing a larger or more costly farmhouse than they could sustain. The commission oscillated between different policies regarding the construction of settler farms throughout the 1890s in an attempt to strike a balance between cost-cutting, closely monitoring settlers' own building activities, and the need to attract settlers.

²⁴⁰ See the building of a village school in the Dollnik-Paruszke estate in county Flatow/Złotow: "Ausschreibung: Die Ausführung der Arbeiten und Lieferung zum Bau eines einklassigen Schulhaus mit Nebengebäude," appeared in the regional German-Language daily, *Schneidemühler Zeitung*, on 3.2.1889, and officially in the *Flatower Kreisblatt*, 2.2.1889, p. 74ff. The tender process is documented in APP-Gniezno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, C. III. Nr. 1878.

The annual reports of the commission in the 1890s bemoaned the recurring difficulties in attracting prospective settlers, in finalizing contracts with them, and in fulfilling the agreed upon terms. The state's accountancy rules limited the commission's leeway in setting the financial terms of the *Rentegut* agreement, and also stipulated that the costs of construction and building upkeep, as well as insurance, were to be paid by settlers. This represented a significant financial burden at an early stage and could force settlers to take on more debt. The construction of farm buildings for settlers upfront was one of the major areas that the commission could experiment with to entice more settlers, as the costs could be included in the long-term annual rent payment and fixed from the start.

During the first years of settlement, while the estate was being prepared according to the commission's plans, the commission used the existing infrastructure to support the first incoming settlers. The first years of settlement were rent-free (normally for three years, but this depended on the specific conditions of the plot and the contract) and during this time settlers were allotted a share of the estate's harvest relative to the land they acquired. To improve the financial results of estates and to lower construction costs for settlers, agricultural buildings and dwellings on estates bought by the commission were renovated and repurposed to provide temporary and permanent housing for in-coming settlers and to accommodate the needs of the interim economic management of the estate before settlement.²⁴¹ Although documentation is hard to come by, in many cases settlers were temporarily housed in buildings whose previous occupants were the workers employed on the estate. The interim management of estates also provided transportation of building materials with wagons from nearby train stations or production sites. Moreover, building materials were supplied at

²⁴¹ As the commission explained, existing buildings were also part of the purchase price and not utilizing them would constitute a "destruction of value" in the account books. See the 1894 annual report, p. 1168.

cost, sometimes based on the estates' brickmaking and woodcutting infrastructure. Later, a central brick and roof-tile manufacturing complex was constructed.²⁴²

The most important measure implemented by the commission to help settlers to set up a farm was a special "supplementary loan" (*Ergänzungsdarlehn*), separate from the *Rentegut* payments, that the commission offered to cover the *Baugeld* and other costs of starting up a farm. The settlement contract stipulated that supplementary loans were conditional on the estate manager's approval of settlers' building plans, which needed to be suitable for the plot size and local conditions and not done at excessive cost. More flexible than *Rentegut*, the commission nevertheless feared that supplementary loans could burden nascent villages. As we shall see, these supplementary loans were perhaps the most direct tool to supervise and control settlers' spending and building activities.²⁴³

By 1893, the negative effects that high construction and building upkeep costs could have on the success of the colonization project had become a key point for critics of the commission. In 1893, the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* devoted its annual meeting to the "rural labor question," the structure of land ownership, and the "safeguarding of small land holding," namely all the issues that the VfS had brought together under the rubric of "internal colonization" in 1886. Back then, the Colonization Commission, still in the early stages of formation, was greeted with fanfare by the VfS. Now the commission found itself on the defensive when compared to the *Generalkommission*, a state agency that facilitated private *Rentengüter* settlements, which was less bureaucratic and centralized and was not committed to an anti-Polish settlement policy.²⁴⁴

²⁴² See the 1892 and 1907 annual reports.

²⁴³ See the 1892 and 1907 annual reports.

²⁴⁴ Another speaker at the meeting was the president of the *Generalkommission*. It was tasked with the facilitation of *Rentengüter* without buying or managing land itself and without the legal obligation to discriminate against Polish citizens of Prussia. It was therefore seen by many as a competitor of the Prussian Colonization Commission in so far as it supported the *Rentengüter* settlement regardless of language or nationality, including in the provinces of Poznan and West-Prussia. For the likes of Alfred Hugenberg, this state of affairs merited accusing the Prussian government of "Polonization." The VfS meeting did not include speakers from the Colonization Commission. Max

In preparation for the meeting, Max Sering (1859–1939), a leading expert in agrarian economy and a professor in Berlin, undertook a survey of settlement activities in the eastern provinces of Prussia that came to cement his reputation as Germany’s foremost agrarian settlement expert. The survey was completed in January 1893 and published shortly afterwards in the publication series of the VfS. It included a detailed engagement with the work of the Prussian Colonization Commission, based not only on the commission’s reports for the years 1886–1892 and presumably on unpublished information as well, but also on Sering’s travels to several of the commission’s settlements and on his conversations with settlers and officials. Travel as a mode of knowledge-making was not new to Sering. A “star student” of Schmoller and agrarian historical economist G. F. Knapp in Strasbourg in the early 1880s, Sering was sent by the Prussian ministry of agriculture on a fact-finding mission to the heartland of agricultural production in North America. In 1889, two years after his full report on the causes of the success of North American agriculture was published, Sering left his professorship in Bonn for a position in Berlin, closer to the political action and to his patron, Schmoller. In 1891, he was appointed to the Prussian Land Economy Collegium, the most important official advisory body on statewide agricultural policy. Financially supported by the Prussian minister of agriculture, Sering’s 1893 publication was entitled *Die innere Kolonisation im östlichen Deutschland*. Although he was careful to praise this first large-scale government initiative of agrarian settlement on large estates, a project that he had advocated ever since he returned from North America, Sering had severe criticism for some of the basic assumptions of the commission’s activities.²⁴⁵

Weber presented the results from his farmworkers study in this meeting. *Verhandlungen der am 20. und 21. März 1893 in Berlin abgehaltenen Generalversammlung des Vereins für Socialpolitik über die ländliche Arbeiterfrage und über die Bodenbesitzverteilung und die Sicherung des Kleingrundbesitzes* (Leipzig 1893).

²⁴⁵ Sering, *Die innere Kolonisation im östlichen Deutschland* [=Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik 36] (Leipzig 1893), pp. 200-242. Sering began the book by thanking the Prussian minister of agriculture for his support of Sering’s research and publication. On Sering and his career see: Robert L. Nelson, “From Manitoba to the Memel:

Sering focused his critique on the issue of farm building costs, arguing that they were too high and prevented the commission from fulfilling its goal of creating a new, independent German peasantry. He approved of the manifold ways in which the commission sought to reduce costs and supervise the planning and construction of farms, but noted that the result was a hasty construction of expensive, massively built (namely, with brick foundations and brick or stone walls) farmhouses that were often beyond the means of settlers, especially in the case of less affluent ones. Those with smaller plots simply could not afford such expensive buildings. “Those who visit the settlements nowadays would be no doubt moved by the picture of comfortable prosperity,” wrote Sering, “but it is undeniable that this delightful picture is brought about in part through the complete exhaustion of settlers’ financial means.” Sering made calculations of the relationship between land value, the costs of the agricultural inventory (e.g. cattle) and building costs in different settler-villages. He showed how as a rule building costs amounted to over 50% of the land value, despite the supply of building material and the commission’s supervision of building plans. The commission, however, only required settlers to provide proof of available capital for building and equipping a farm that amounted to one third of the land value. In addition, the commission offered supplementary loans, whose interest rate was gradually changed by the commission to bring it more in line with the market (e.g. four percent instead of three percent interest). This, in turn, significantly increased the burden of debt, especially for settlers who took up smaller plots and had less starting capital.²⁴⁶

Sering argued that there were, in fact, fundamental problems in the commission’s settlement activity, rather than individual cases in which settlers were building beyond their

Max Sering, “Inner Colonization and the German East,” *Social History* 35:4 (Nov. 2010): 439–57; idem, “A German on the Prairies: Max Sering and Settler Colonialism in Canada,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 5, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 1–19. Also see Erik Grimmer-Solem, *Learning Empire: Globalization and the German Quest for World Status, 1875–1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 43–59 and passim. Sering is one of the main characters in Grimmer-Solem’s magisterial survey of social science and empire and appears throughout the book.

²⁴⁶ Sering, *Die innere Kolonisation*, pp. 223–228, p. 226.

means, as the commission was wont to portray it. Both the commission and the settlers were building in a very condensed timeframe infrastructure that would otherwise be the cumulative result of the capital and labor investment across several generations. And this was done precisely at the time when the future of the farm depended on investing sparingly in fixed capital in order to get the farm up and running. For settlers with experience in intensive agriculture and appropriate starting capital, Sering concluded that the commission offered excellent conditions that allowed them to prosper and were even better than the North American Mid-West. Like the commission itself, he thought that this kind of settler was coming from western and southwestern Germany. However, another type of settler, those from eastern Germany, lacked the capital and knowhow to undertake intensive agriculture and tended to invest too much money in land, machinery, and buildings. Settlers from the east were successful, Sering argued, only when they were in fact locals who came from the immediate area in which the new settler-village was located. This proximity allowed them to take advantage of local knowledge, family, and neighborly connections to reduce their initial investment needs (i.e. building costs, livestock, and equipment).²⁴⁷

Sering's critical insight was that the commission was undertaking two different projects. The first one was the settlement of relatively well-off and capable farmers, who were able to withstand the large investment in the early years, to practice intensive agriculture, and to prosper, in part thanks to the commission's significant subsidies. The second project was the settlement of much poorer eastern German farmers and workers, which Sering believed was destined either to fail economically or to be able only to reproduce the same level of culture and cultivation that already existed in the Polish provinces. Their settlement did not promote the economic and cultural civilizing mission of the commission and so did not justify the huge

²⁴⁷ Sering, *Die innere Kolonisation*, pp. 228–242

expenses involved. Sering reasoned that the two projects could not be successfully undertaken according to the same contractual conditions and settlement procedures. The commission had to stop bringing in incapable or poorer settlers just because they were German, start accepting suitable Polish farmers (even if Sering did not believe many capable ones could be found), and focus on the settlement of better-off, competent, and more culturally advanced farmers from western and southern Germany.²⁴⁸ Sering, then, used farm construction costs to mount a critique of the commission's work across the board and posited economic development as the main guiding principles for settlement and a German civilizing mission in Polish Prussia.²⁴⁹

The commission's developing building apparatus in the early 1890s was in part a response to Sering's critique. Against the backdrop of Sering's critique and the difficulties in recruiting settlers, the commission first decided to build more appealing farms and then quickly abandoned that course of action. A fall in the number of finalized settlement contracts in comparison with signed contracts was registered for the first time in 1892 and repeated in the next few years. In 1892 and 1893, the commission announced the adoption of various unclarified forms of centralized farm construction with the aim of luring in relatively more well off settlers, who were thought to be reluctant to start building a farm from scratch. However, in 1894, after building fifteen farms in the previous year, the commission decided to halt the

²⁴⁸ Ibid. The developmentalist element in Sering's understanding of race and culture is noteworthy. He believed that a cultural civilizing mission was first of all economic. While clearly a German nationalist that supported racialist assimilationism, assimilation itself for Sering was about rational, modern, economic production, behavior and mentality. In his eyes, as long as Poles were good Prussians and were improving themselves with the help of the state, they did not pose a problem. Conversely, bringing in Germans with a supposed low economic/cultural level was never the solution for him. On this point see also Grimmer-Solem, *Learning Empire*, p. 57; Nelson, "A German on the Prairies" and "From Manitoba to Memel."

²⁴⁹ In 1897, for example, the president of the commission, Rudolf von Wittenberg explained to the Prussian cabinet that the capacity to build cheaply was among the ideal set of skills that the commission sought in prospective settlers, which he associated with acquired local knowledge. See Anlage A [Copy of a decision communicated by the Prussian Colonization Commission to the Mayor of Frankfurt am Main, 22.11.1897, pp. 3–23. GStA PK I. HA Rep. 87B Nr. 9568.

building of farms for settlers, since settlers continued to take issue with the buildings and as the “practice of settlers building [their farms] themselves had established itself so much.”²⁵⁰ In addition, the numbers of prospective settlers who changed their minds continued to be considerable. In the following year, 59 out of 255 signed contracts were revoked or cancelled, eight were pending fulfillment, and only 186 had been fulfilled in the sense that the signatories settled in their plots. This last figure compared poorly with previous years (222 in 1894, 241 in 1893).²⁵¹

The commission explained the continued decline in the numbers of finalized contracts in relation to the signed contracts by unexpected changes in personal circumstances. For those from western Germany, the commission’s most coveted settler population, the report gave more details, apparently drawing on prospective settlers’ self-reporting. The report mentioned life events such as marriage or inheritance, difficulties in selling their land for a high enough price, and wives’ “reluctance” (*Widerwille*) to deal with the “difficulties and inconveniences” (*Schwierigkeiten und Unbequemlichkeiten*) of setting up a new farm. Perhaps the makeshift character of habitation in the first years (often in repurposed workers’ barracks, barns, and cheap temporary buildings) was considered to weigh especially heavy on married women in the household. Many of the “considerable hardships” (*erhebliche Mühsale*) that women could expect remained unspecified in the report, which nevertheless acknowledged them as a fact of the process of settlement rather than a matter of misfortune.²⁵²

The commission had to acknowledge settlers’ wives as active participants in the colonization project since that they were often joint owners of family property. Joint spousal

²⁵⁰ See e.g. 1892 Annual Report, *Anlagen zu den Stenographischen Berichten... 5. Session der 17. Legislatur-Periode 1892/3*, vol. 4 (Berlin 1893), p. 1898; 1894 Annual Report, p. 1170.

²⁵¹ 1895 Annual Report, pp. 1323–1324.

²⁵² “Widerwille der Frauen gegen das Ansiedeln wegen der Schwierigkeiten und Unbequemlichkeiten, die der eigene Aufbau und die Ausführung des Hofes mit sich bringt...” 1895 Annual Report, pp. 1323–1324.

ownership of property (*Ehegemeinschaft*) was legislated in many parts of Germany at the time (including the Prussian provinces of Poznan, West-Prussia, and Westphalia), and was soon to be enshrined in the German civil code.²⁵³ Women had the right to refuse sale of joint property and their “reluctance” was in fact an exercise of their legal rights, which officials must have felt obliged to take into account in order to “enliven the settlement activity.” The commission normally treated “settlers” as male heads of households in its official publications, with women and families assumed as their mere extensions. However, the commission was forced to admit that women were justified in their reluctance to join the settlement project in the face of the expected hardship. To address the concerns levied by the wives of prospective settlers the commission decided to experiment with the building and conversion of existing farm buildings for use in settler farms’ in a way that would include more “comforts” without unnecessarily raising costs.²⁵⁴

In 1896, the Colonization Commission declared a new era in the field of state-led construction work in settler villages aimed to halt the drop in new settlers, especially from western Germany. By that point, the commission had constructed over 210 farms. The continued stagnation in the numbers of new settlers that year was explained by high construction costs and by settlers’ reluctance to take up farms that were built by the interim management of estates, mainly due to the small size of the rooms and stalls. As reduction in the requirement of starting capital or changes to the relation between upfront payment and

²⁵³ For the different legal categories and arrangements in relation to joint spousal ownership of landed and moveable property, see the definition of *Gütergemeinschaft* and subsequent legal variations in Otto Gierke’s contemporary overview: “Grundzüge des deutschen Privatrechts,” in: *Encyklopädie der Rechtswissenschaft*, 6th edition, vol 1 (Berlin and Leipzig, 1904), pp. 431–559, here 537–539ff. In the sources it appears with the general term *Ehegemeinschaft*. See further: *Frauen in der Geschichte der Rechts* volume; Klaus Schmid, *Die Entstehung der güterrechtlichen Vorschriften im Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der sozialen Stellung der Frau* (1990); Jens Lehmann, *Die Ehefrau und ihr Vermögen: Reformforderungen der bürgerlichen Frauenbewegung zum Ehegüterrecht um 1900* (2006).

²⁵⁴ 1895 Annual Report, pp. 1323–1324.

yearly rent were not on the agenda, the main way that the commission saw to increase the appeal of settlement was to change its building policies. The construction of farms by the commission was limited in the previous years, the 1896 report explained, due to personnel shortage and the focus on communal and public buildings. Those farm-buildings that were built or renovated by the commission were often repurposed for the interim management of the estate and were only later transferred or sold to settlers. They were, then, constructed according to uniform state blueprints that resulted in not only greater expense but also in “unavoidable repetition of the same templates” (*Schablonisierung*), disdained by settlers and estate managers alike.²⁵⁵ The commission now decided to begin constructing on a large-scale individual settler farms that would have greater appeal to prospective settlers. During 1895 and 1896, the commission undertook its first large-scale construction effort earmarked for settlers’ private use. Table 1 (in the next section) indicates that building costs for private use more than doubled between 1896 and 1897 to about 466,000 Mark, went down, and went back up to 465,000 Mark between 1898 and 1899. From that point on, there began a clear upward trend in the first years of the twentieth century.²⁵⁶

As the commission’s instructions to estate managers during that time indicate, an accompanying move was to increase the level of supervision over settlers who chose to build their own farms. Between 1896 and 1899, the commission put in place new supervisory procedures regarding settlers’ building plans. Estate managers were to send every proposed

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ 1896 Annual Report, pp. 1705–1706; 1895 Annual Report, pp. 1323–1324. The commission’s report for 1896 detailed the locations of construction projects, the projected buildings, the size of settlement plots, and the costs of construction in a text-heavy tabular form. The relationship between the number of buildings per settlement plot, the plot’s size, the value of the plot according to the village’s settlement plan, the size of the built area, and the total building cost were central to the representation of this expensive construction spree. See: “Appendix XI-B: Nachweisungen der nur im Jahre 1896 ausgeführten Bauten, welche nicht öffentlichen Zwecken dienen,” in: *Stenographischen Berichten über die Verhandlungen des Preuß. Hauses der Abgeordneten*, 18. Leg. Periode, IV. Session, vol. 3 (Berlin 1897), pp. 1765ff.

building plan to the commission's head office for evaluation by its own experts. The commission's technical department either approved the building plans or revised and changed them. The estate manager was supposed to make sure that the changes in the plan were followed. A booklet with exemplary blueprints and recommended building costs was provided to estate managers to supply them, as well as settlers, with criteria to judge the building plans. Estate managers were supposed to use the criteria to indicate necessary changes in the plans before the final version was sent for expert review.²⁵⁷ At the same time, the commission massively expanded its technical staff. In 1891, the technical department was established with three specialty areas: land amelioration, building, and surveying. By 1907, the commission's sizeable technical bureaucracy comprised of 16 senior and 285 junior officials, the latter including 71 cadastral and land surveyors, 153 temporary and permanent draftsmen, and 51 civil engineers.²⁵⁸

The commission clearly expected some pushback on the supervision of settlers' building plans. The 1899 manual for estate managers included instructions on how to "force" (*erzwingen*) settlers to comply with the building "advice" (*Ratschläge*) they received and how to punish those who persistently (*eigensinnig*) refused to do so. Such punitive measures included refusing to grant supplemental building loans, limiting or withholding assistance in building materials and transportation, and refusing any future requests from *eigensinnig* settlers.²⁵⁹ By 1910, the supervisory procedure changed somewhat. Estate managers were to send plans for review by the head office only if they thought that the plans deviated from the detailed building instructions and exemplary designs of the commission, namely those which were "unsuitable,"

²⁵⁷ I could not find a copy of the booklet itself and rely on its description in the estate managers' manual. *Geschäftsweisungen für die Ansiedlungsvermittler der Königlichen Ansiedlungs-Kommission 1899*, in Archiwum Państwowe w Koszalinie, Landratsamt Flatow: Durchführung des Ansiedlungsgesetzes 1886–1913, Nr. 194, here pp. 100–101

²⁵⁸ *Zwanzig Jahre*, pp. 18–19.

²⁵⁹ *Geschäftsweisungen 1899*, pp. 35–36, in Archiwum Państwowe w Koszalinie, Landratsamt Flatow: Durchführung des Ansiedlungsgesetzes 1886–1913, Nr. 194, pp.100–101.

“unattractive” (*unschön*), too expensive, or at variance with the division plan of the estate. The delay that this procedure would cause, the 1910 manual stated, was the direct result of settlers’ divergent ambitions (*Sonderbestrebungen*).²⁶⁰ Settlers were expected, then, to follow the commission’s building recommendations to the letter.

While the commission continued to build farmhouses, most settlers were building their own farms by the early 1900s under tightening direction by estate managers. By combining architectural exemplars, such as the blueprint booklet and a subsequent 1904 sketchbook, with administrative powers of coercion, the commission sought to ensure broadly consistent supervision criteria rather than to centralize planning or supervision in its head office. Exemplars were not to be imitated as if they were a mold. Instead, they set the range of possibilities available for settlers and estate managers. An altogether different kind of building effort, however, can be seen in the increasing scale of construction of workers’ cottages, which were built according to an even more stringent cost-cutting calculus.²⁶¹

Polish Workers and the Commission’s Shift to Building Workers’ Housing

During the first fifteen years of its existence, the commission attempted to balance a number of conflicting pressures through its approach to the construction of new farms and villages. After 1900, the commission invested increasing efforts and money in settling workers, even though the settlement of independent farmers and the design of farms continued to be central to its activities and modes of legitimation. This change was related to the commission’s

²⁶⁰ *Geschäftsanweisungen 1910*, pp. 27–28, GStA PK I HA. Rep. 212 Nr. 5224.

²⁶¹ Fischer, *Ansiedlungsbauten* (1904); *Geschäftsanweisungen 1910*, pp. 27–28. One successful example for the education of the educated middle-class eye and taste by exemplars was Paul Schultze-Naumburg’s *Kulturarbeiten*, a ten-volume work that appeared between 1901–1917 and used photographs of “good” and “bad” examples of architectural design. On Schultze Naumburg see Hans-Rudolf Meier and Daniela Spiegel (eds.), *Kulturreformer. Rassenideologe. Hochschuldirektor: Der lange Schatten des Paul Schultze-Naumburg* (Heidelberg: arthistoricum.net 2018) [Online Access: <https://doi.org/10.11588/arthistoricum.352.486>].

goal of reducing the number of Polish workers employed in its estates and settler-village by replacing them with Germans. The employment of Polish farmworkers by the commission and by settlers was widespread. But during the 1890s, the renewed seasonal migration of Polish farmworkers to the landed estates of East Elbia was seen as a racial and national threat by many German nationalists. For the commission, it was politically embarrassing to employ significant numbers of Polish workers, especially as official statistics exposed that fact in public.

The commission's attempts to replace Polish with German workers need to be seen in the context of the increasing dependence of the large-scale agrarian economy of the eastern provinces of Prussia on seasonal labor migration from Russian and Austrian Poland. As the Prussian government opened up its eastern border to seasonal labor migration in 1890 and instituted a new migration control regime (see chapter 1), tens and then hundreds of thousands of mostly Polish migrant farmworkers entered the country every spring to work and left it again in late fall. Some numbers about Polish Prussians who resided and worked in the estates and villages of the commission were publicly available (through the census categories of language and confession). In the changing political climate of the 1890s and given the significance of the nationalist backing of the commission, employing Polish workers on its settlements was potentially embarrassing for the commission and the government. In the late 1890s, the commission sought to actively secure more German labor, which led it to take an increasingly

Table 2.1: The Building Activity of the Colonization Commission, 1895–1905 (Cost and Extent, Private Use)

Year	Number of Buildings	Number of Settlements in which building took place	Cost (Mk)	Number of Incoming Settler-Families	Indicative: Expenditure per incoming settler-family*
1895	70	14	208,870	178	1,173
1896	77	18	214,975	191	1,126
1897	117	36	466,960	365	1,279
1898	66	27	288,300	605	477
1899	116	41	465,800	669	696
1900	175	58	814,570	661	1,232
1901	182	44	881,800	418	2,110
1902	253	72	1,245,500	1,211	1,028
1903	497	70	1,801,300	1,476	1,220
1904	1292	123	4,519,000	1,480	3,053
1905	1241	158	4,426,820	1,527	2,899

* The building costs include workers' *Mietsstellen* or rental houses as well as buildings constructed for fixed term lease. Workers who rented houses or leaseholders did not sign a *Rentegut* contract and are thus not included, as far as I can say, in the incoming settler-family statistics.

Sources: Annual reports 1895–1905 and Martin Belgrade, *Parzellierung und innere Kolonisation*, p. 318 (also based on the commission's reports 1895–1905).

active role in the construction of workers' housing. By the mid-1900s, the commission was constructing workers' colonies and investing millions every year in construction work, much of it on workers' cottages.

The first significant quantitative shift in the commission's building activities took place around 1900, when the number of construction projects massively increased and costs doubled from the previous year, beginning a strong upward trend (see tables 2.1 and 2.2). The average yearly expenditure on construction for private use rather than communal purposes between 1895 and 1899 was around 320,000 Marks. In 1900, this spending more than doubled to over 800,000 Marks, and continued to rise. Costs stabilized within the range of four to four and a half million in the later part of the decade. Although the commission was clearly building more farms and

Table 2.2: Costs and Breakdown of the Commission's Building Activity (Private use, selected years): Small Plots in Grey*

Category/Year	1902	1908	1909	1910	1911
Peasant farms	180**	314	226	168	151
Craftspeople plots	8**	21	26	40	31
Workers' farmhouses (No. of family dwellings)	102 (97)	270 (321)	283 (326)	268 (281)	178 (190)
separate dwelling houses		4	6	6	4
Agricultural buildings	132	71	117	99	120
Restoration/repair	?	52	95	54	72
Approx. total cost (in million Marks)	<i>1.2</i>	<i>4.6</i>	<i>4.3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>3.5</i>

* The construction of Inns is excluded.

** Built by settlers according to plans approved by the commission, which later reimbursed the construction costs against receipts.

Source: Colonization Commission Annual Reports for 1902 (Verhandlungen des Abgeordnetenhauses 1903, Drucksache 55, Appendix X, parts B, C); 1908 (Verhandlungen des Abgeordnetenhauses 1909, Drucksache 210, Appendix X) 1909 (Verhandlungen des Abgeordnetenhauses 1910, Drucksache 160A-160B, Appendix X); 1910 (Verhandlungen des Abgeordnetenhauses 1911, Drucksache 195A-195B, Appendix X); 1911 (Verhandlungen des Abgeordnetenhauses 1912/1913, Drucksache 165A-165B, Appendix X).

agricultural buildings, the rise in the extent and cost of construction can be traced, as table 2 indicates, directly to its new emphasis on workers' housing.

Previously, very small plots were laid out for craftspeople (between 2 and 5 Hectare, or 8 and 20 Prussian Morgen) and workers (up to 2 Hectare), with the intent that they would combine wage work outside the farm with working their own land. These smaller plots were either given as *Rentegüter*, leased, or rented out (*Mietstellen*). The houses and farm buildings were constructed by the commission. These could include a single cottage with separate farm buildings or two-family cottages with separate farmyards, dwellings, a "little garden," and between 1.5 and 4 Morgen (up to 1 Hectare) of agricultural land per family. The buildings were normally built with a small basement-level stall, allowing the family to raise pigs and even a goat, but not a cow, which was considered as the sign that a family is still reliant on agriculture. By 1906, 458 worker families lived in workers' cottages built by the commission, of which 78

came from west Germany, 186 were Germans from Russia, and 194 had previously resided in the colonized area.²⁶² After heavy investment in workers' housing before 1910, between 1910 and 1912 about 1,500 new settled plots were added, bringing the reported total of workers' plots to 1,966. The significant increase in workers' settlements is underscored by a comparison to the total number of new settlers each year. In 1910 and 1911, the number of newly settled workers made up a third of the total settlers and in 1912 workers probably accounted for over a half of the number of settlers.²⁶³

The significant rise in the importance of the settlement of workers both in terms of numbers and in terms of building expenses was directly linked to the high-stake question of Polish labor. Already in 1887, during one of its first plenary meetings, the Prussian Colonization Commission decided that when hiring workers on the commission's estates, Germans would be hired "as far as possible."²⁶⁴ However, according the commission's internal discussions and in light of the commission's circulars to estate managers, the commission's estate managers as well as settlers regularly employed Polish labor who were already working on the estate or were living nearby. Around 1897 the commission first began to explore ways to actively seek out and settle workers on its estates and villages, either permanently or temporarily. One way, which I discuss in chapters four and five, involved an unofficial collaboration between the commission

²⁶² *Zwanzig Jahre*, pp. 51–53.

²⁶³ These numbers for 1910–1912 are based on Witold Jacóbczyk, *Pruska Komisja Osadnicza*, p. 124. The comparison with the total number of settlers relies on Daniel Benedikt Stienen, "Deutsche, Kauft deutsches Bauernland": Über die Anwerbung von Kolonisten und die damit verbundenen administrativen Hemmnisse in der preußischen Siedlungspolitik (1886–1914)," *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte* 26:1 New Series (2017), pp. 63–90, p. 70. I am grateful to the author for his generosity in sharing the article and his knowledge of the archives with me. It is possible that the figures are not fully comparable, as Jacóbczyk may have included workers who were settled through private settlement associations but paid for by the commission and brought in with its acquiescence, or they may have rented a cottage from the commission without signing a settlement contract. The figures are still indicative, I think, of the general trend.

²⁶⁴ This decision was at the request of the representative of the ministry for education and religious affairs. See meeting protocol from 28.2–1.3.1887, GStA PK I. HA. Rep. 90A Nr 4190. pp. 16–17.

and the Pan-German League in bringing working-class German children from urban centers in western Germany to work for settlers in Polish Prussia. Initiated by Alfred Hugenberg, this scheme demonstrates the variety of measures that seemed reasonable to solve what was in fact a social problem constructed by nationalist concerns.²⁶⁵

The importance of agrarian labor for the economy of eastern Prussia and nationalist apprehension about the influx of Polish immigrant workers after the reopening of the borders in 1890 made the question of rural labor to a central political and academic battleground. In the 1893 annual meeting of the VfS in Berlin – for which Sering penned his criticism of the building practices of the commission – the thirty-one years old Max Weber undertook his massive study on rural labor in eastern Prussia in preparation for this meeting, where he also presented his main conclusions. When discussing the countryside, the VfS had concentrated in the 1870s and 1880s on land ownership reform and on the creation of smallholding, based on the idea the social order would be best preserved by opening up small proprietorship to rural workers and to the children of small farmers who would otherwise migrate to the cities and swell the ranks of the politically dangerous working class. Property, facilitated by the state, would grant workers a stake in the existing order, reduce the ever-increasing social differentiation and tone down the intensity of social conflict. Weber's involvement in the VfS introduced a new constellation of concerns regarding rural labor and smallholding. His concerns were national and racial, as much as economic and social. Weber showed how the changing structures of agrarian production, most significantly the increasing competition on the global markets and the increasing importance of seasonal root crops cultivation for large-scale agrarian producers, intersected with cultural-racial attributes. Polish farmworkers and their ability to work for lower wages were the primary threat

²⁶⁵ Jacóbczyk, *Pruska Komisja Osadnicza*, pp. 117–125.

for the German culture, race, and nation. Since no one at the VfS doubted that the large-scale beet-crop cultivation would only increase in scale and that the large landowners would not go away, German rural workers would either continue to emigrate from the eastern provinces of Prussia westwards or have to adapt themselves culturally in order to compete economically on the labor market. This “danger of assimilation” and adoption of lower cultural standards seemed to Weber an acute problem that arose from letting “two nations with different bodily constitutions” and “stomachs” to compete as free workers in the same area.²⁶⁶ “In the long run,” Weber foresaw “the Polonization of the east” (*Polonisierung des Ostens*), and claimed that the “nationality of the countryside” (*die Nationalität des platten Landes*) depended on the national affiliation not of the landowners but of the rural laborers (*Landproletariat*). “We will be denationalized in the east, and it is in no way a mere nationality problem. It means that our cultural level, the nutrition standards of the rural population and its needs, would sink to the level of a lower, more eastern civilization.”²⁶⁷ Although his understanding of race was cultural rather than biological, the difference that he noted was no less intractable, and the threat that he identified from Polish workers to the racial superiority of Germans in Polish Prussia was no less profound.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁶ Max Weber, “Die ländliche Arbeitsverfassung” (Referat auf der Tagung des Vereins für Sozialpolitik im Jahre 1893), in: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1924), pp 444–469, here pp. 456–457

²⁶⁷ “Auf die Dauer ist die Polonisierung des Ostens, wenn es so weitergeht, absolut nicht auszuschließen, wir mögen noch so viel Grundbesitz in deutsche Hände überführen. Die Entscheidung der Frage der Nationalität des platten Landes hängt auf die Dauer nicht von der Abkunft der besitzenden Schichten, sondern von der Frage ab, welcher Nationalität das Landproletariat angehört. Wir werden im Osten denationalisiert, und das ist keineswegs eine bloße Nationalitätensorge, sondern das bedeutet: es wird unser Kultur-niveau, der Nahrungsstand der Landbevölkerung und ihre Bedürfnisse herabgedrückt auf das Niveau einer tieferen, östlicheren Kulturstufe.” Weber, *Die ländliche Arbeitsverfassung*, p. 451.

²⁶⁸ Weber was an early “theorist” of “a racism that denies the importance of biological race while working out a system of cultural differences that functions as effectively as race as a means of underwriting political and economic inequality,” argues Andrew Zimmerman. On Weber’s conceptions of race and their roots in Polish Prussia and the United States, see Andrew Zimmerman, “Decolonizing Weber,” *Postcolonial Studies* 9:1 (2006), pp. 53–79, quote on p. 53. Zimmerman draws here on Etienne Balibar’s conceptualization of culture as race. Etienne Balibar, “Is

The question of rural labor in the Prussian east, Weber concluded in his 1892 study of rural labor, “flows into the question of internal colonization.”²⁶⁹ Weber’s solution was to close off the border for Polish labor migration and to settle German workers on the land in such a way that would lock them for a limited number of years into a form of land tenure that included labor commitments.²⁷⁰ By connecting the two measures, Weber expertly reframed the discussions in the VfS over the previous decade and a half about “internal colonization” as a question of national and racial defense that needed to be undertaken for “reasons of state” (*Staatsräson*). “If an enemy appeared now on the eastern border and threatened us with armed force, there is no doubt that the nation will rally around the flag to defend the border,” Weber declared to the assembled members of the VfS in Berlin. “But when we want to undertake a peaceful defense of the eastern border of Germandom, we ran against conflicting interests.” Weber singled out two main opponents, the same ones that the VfS had parried with since its establishment: the “interests” of the large landowners of the Prussian east – he portrayed them as the greatest contributors to “Polonization” (*Polonisierung*) because of their reliance on Polish workers and demands for migrant labor – and the “instincts” of the “Manchesterian” free-trade liberals, whom Schmoller and the VfS had constituted as their main enemy since the early 1870s.²⁷¹ While for

There a ‘Neo-Racism’?” in: idem and Immanuel Wallerstein, translated by Chris Turner, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London: Verso, 1999), pp 17–28.

²⁶⁹ Max Weber, *Die Lage Der Landarbeiter Im Ostelbischen Deutschland (1892)* [=Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe, edited by Martin Riesebrodt, vols. I/3,1-2 (Tübingen 1984), pp. 916–929, p. 926. (in the original publication in the *Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik*, vol. 55, the page range is 795–803).

²⁷⁰ Interestingly, while Weber portrayed his radical nationalism and racial politics as the analysis of a new generation ready for new national tasks following the achievement of political unification by the previous generation, he ended up espousing a practical solution that was not dissimilar to what Bismarck hoped to achieve in the previous decade, when he repeatedly pushed the nascent Colonization Commission to focus on giving out 7–12 year leaseholds instead of *Rentegüter*. The difference was that Weber wanted workers tied up in this way to the land, while Bismarck was thinking on medium and large farms.

²⁷¹ “Wenn jetzt ein Feind an der Ostgrenze erschiene und uns mit Kriegsmacht bedrohte, so bestände kein Zweifel, daß die Nation sich hinter den Fahnen sammeln würde, um die Landesgrenzen zu verteidigen. Wenn wir aber die friedliche Verteidigung der östlichen Grenze des Deutschtums unternehmen wollen, stoßen wir auf verschiedene sich widerstreitende Interessen. Schauen wir uns um nach Bundesgenossen, so muß, zum Teil wenigstens, diese

most members of the VfS, an interventionist social policy by the state was necessary to counter working-class radicalism, Weber argued for such intervention for social as well as cultural-racial reasons.

Weber sought to promote his views publicly, including, significantly, by joining the Pan-German League upon its establishment in 1894. He also undertook public lectures to disseminate them, often under the league's auspices. His most famous public engagement in those years, however, was his professorial inaugural address in Freiburg in 1895, where he fused propaganda and academia in an extremely effective way and portrayed the Polish threat in strong alarmist terms to underline the importance of facilitating workers' settlement and closing the border to stem the racial danger posed by Polish workers. According to Marianne Weber, her husband Max Weber left the Pan-German League in 1899 since the Pan-Germans preferred not to come out officially for the closing of the border for Polish workers, which would have harmed their relationship with the political representatives of the East-Elbian landowners.²⁷² In other words, the Pan-German League did not take the question of Russian-Polish labor migration seriously enough for Weber.

Official statistics gave a numerical face to the commission's growing concern about Polish workers in its estates and settlements. The Prussian census of 1890 was the first time that language was noted and could be used as a proxy for nationality. Since this census took place a

Verteidigung unternommen werden gegen das Interesse des Großgrundbesitzes, sie muß unternommen werden gegen die Instinkte weiter manchesterlich-freihändlerisch gesinnter Teile der Bevölkerung, welche Ausnahmemassregeln darin finden und fürchten, daß diese sich auch auf andere Gebiete erstrecken könnten..." Weber, *Die ländliche Arbeitsverfassung*, pp. 467–568. On the large landowners as "the greatest enemy to our nationality" and chief promoters of "Polonization" see idem, p. 452.

²⁷² For Weber and his public engagements for the Pan-German League, see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, translated by Michael S. Steinberg, *Max Weber and German Politics, 1890–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984 [1974, 1959]), pp. 54–56; Marianne Weber, *Max Weber, Ein Lebensbild* (Tübingen, 1926), p. 237ff; Zimmerman, *Decolonizing Weber*, pp. 63–64. For the Freiburg address, see Max Weber, translated by Ben Fowkes, "The national state and economic policy (Freiburg address)," *Economy and Society* 9:4 (1980), pp. 428–449.

mere four years after the commission was established, it could not reveal much on the demographic efficacy of the settlement project work. The census of 1895, however, revealed the widespread use of Polish labor in the settlements. According to Jacóbczyk, the commission's officials gleaned from the new statistics, published and unpublished, that thirty percent of the permanent residents on the commission's estates and settlements were Polish. An internal survey to assess the extent of the problem was conducted in 1901. It found that at the end of 1900 the commission's estates were inhabited by 1,947 settlers' families and 548 worker families. In Poznań, out of the 451 worker families, 341 were reported as Polish, while in the province of West Prussia, the numbers were 58 out of 97 workers families.²⁷³ The commission, therefore, was not exempt from the general structure of the labor market. Its estate managers either could not or did not try too hard to find German farmworkers when mostly Polish workers were already working on the purchased estates or available in the nearby villages.

If it was to succeed in building German villages in Polish Prussia, the commission came to see that it needed to devote special efforts to recruit German laborers by increasing the number of small workers' plots and by building worker's cottages to reduce the upfront cost of taking up a plot, which was otherwise prohibitive for wage laborers. In November 1901, the commission started an experiment with building workers' cottages and semi-detached houses with small

²⁷³ Jacóbczyk, *Pruska Komisja*, pp. 117–125; In addition to the census, the Prussian Statistical Bureau regularly published a Directory of Communities (*Gemeindelexikon*) that included basic details on every administrative community in the kingdom, based on the latest census data. The directory of 1897–1898, based on the 1895 census, still included only religion as a category of difference, but the unpublished version perhaps also included language as a criterion. See *Gemeindelexikon für das königreich Preussen auf grund der materialien der Volkszählung vom 2. Dezember 1895 und anderer amtlicher Quellen* (Berlin 1897/1898). For the usage of language to define nationality, first attempted in the 1890 Prussian census, and for the pitfalls of defining language, see Labbé, “Institutionalizing the Statistics of Nationality,” pp. 297–302. On statistics and “bilingualism” as well as on census counters, usually teachers, contributing to the supposed self-reporting procedure of the census, see Mark Tilse, *Transnationalism in the Prussian East: From National Conflict to Synthesis, 1871–1914* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), ch. 3, esp. pp. 69–76. For a related development regarding election statistics, see the discussion in chapter 1 of the dissertation.

gardens. Two months later, it granted specific subventions to attract workers, offering a 500 Marks payoff for workers on top of the reimbursement of transportation costs both for an initial visit and for the transportation of belongings and family members to the settlement. In this way, the commission recruited 271 German workers from the Russian and Austrian Empires and 27 workers from the Germany in 1901–1902. The numbers recorded by the commission for 1903–1904 suggest that at the end of 1904, about a half of the 766 families and 151 unmarried persons employed by the commission in its estates were Germans. Settlers, on their part, employed twice as many Polish workers as German ones during that time, according to the numbers that Jacóbczyk takes out of the commission’s “fragmentary calculations” for that year. While there was a near parity in the numbers of unmarried workers employed by settlers, there were more than twice as many Polish worker families as German ones. The numbers, probably based on the language category in the Prussian census, also showed a significant population of Polish residents in the commission’s settlements, who may have lodged in settlers’ farms and worked in their households and elsewhere. These numbers ranged from as much as a half of the population in the oldest settlements to about a sixth in settlements established between 1900 and 1905.²⁷⁴

Despite all its efforts, the commission was still a long way from resolving its dependence on Polish labor by the outbreak of World War I, it continued to issue decisively worded circulars about the employment of Polish workers, and estate managers continued to employ them. By 1910, however, the instructions from the head office seem to have lost their sense of urgency. A

²⁷⁴ According to Jacóbczyk, calculations for 255 of the commission’s settlements revealed that there were 311 German and 686 Polish families living and working in the settlements, as well as 1,144 German and 1026 Polish unmarried persons of both genders. He attributes the decrease to the measures to promote the settlement of German workers taken since 1900, as well as to the relatively higher number of larger plots established in the earlier period, which required more hired labor. In addition, the commission counted 49 Polish craftsmen in its settlements that year. Either Jacóbczyk or the commission omitted to mention more details about gender and family structure. See Jacóbczyk, *Pruska Komisja*, pp. 122–124.

directive from 1910 reminded estate managers that the commission “had the duty” to employ Germans and instructed them to replace Polish with German workers “gradually” and “wherever possible” and to include the nationality of employed workers in the monthly report from every estate.²⁷⁵ By that point, the settlement of workers by the commission looked very different, as the commission was deeply involved in establishing workers’ colonies and supporting private housing associations. The commission’s public claim to create solidly German peasant communities in the colonized provinces was an exaggeration. The only German settlements created by the commission according to its own criteria were actually workers’ colonies. The next section discusses the settlement of German workers in designated colonies, which became also a matter for private cooperative associations in the years before the war.

Workers’ Colonies and Small Settlement Associations Before 1914

Up to around 1900, workers’ cottages were constructed by the commission to provide labor for farmers and craftspeople as part of the establishment of settler-villages. After 1900, the commission began to lay out workers’ colonies in an attempt to increase the numbers of settled German workers in Polish Prussia. These colonies were separate settlements of varying sizes that were not designed as villages with different plots sizes and new communal buildings. Instead, they were uniformly made up of prebuilt cottages on very small plots, which necessitated residents to undertake hired work as their main source of livelihood. In 1910, the Prussian

²⁷⁵ In one detailed circular from 27.9.1907 the president of the commission forbade estate managers “once and for all” to hire workers whose good conduct, either under the *Gesindeordnung* for Prussian workers or under the migration regulations for migrant workers, had not been ascertained beyond doubt. GStA PK I. HA. Rep. 212 Nr. 5152, p. 46. In 1910 the commission used a more resigned tone: “Die Ansiedlungskommission hat die Pflicht, in ihren großwirtschaftlichen Betrieben deutsche Leute zu beschäftigen. Ich weise die Herren Betriebsleiter an, die polnischen Leute nach und nach soweit es angeht durch deutsche möglichst zu ersetzen, und jedenfalls dies schon beim nächsten Kündigungstermin zu beachten...” President of the Colonization Commission to estate managers, “Beschäftigung von deutschen Gutsarbeitern,” 13.12.1910, GStA PK I. HA. Rep. 212 Nr. 5152, p. 87.

government took further steps to support the establishment of workers' settlements by facilitating cooperative associations subsidized by grants for individual plots. By 1914, the settlement of Germans in Polish Prussia came to rely to a significant extent on workers' settlements and on cooperative housing associations. This marked a significant change in the activities of the commission, as settling workers was quite different than settling farmers. Moreover, the emerging new market in small-scale settlement was more connected with large-scale and highly capitalized agrarian industry and urban labor markets than with small and medium agrarian producers. This section examines the attempts by the commission to soften the differences between the two models of settlement through Paul Fischer's use of the *Heimat* architectural style as displayed at the large trades and agriculture exhibition that took place in Poznań/Posen in 1911.

The workers' colonies built by the commission were located in proximity to specific sources of employment and provided labor for particular purposes that the commission held dear. The commission began to establish workers' colonies in 1903, mostly around cities or to supply workers for important industries. By 1907 seven colonies were established, including one that supplied workers to the large sugar refinery in Culmsee/Chełmża (18 workers' cottages), and four colonies which were established around Posen/Poznań, with 86 single-family cottages for industrial workers, farmworkers, and skilled construction workers.²⁷⁶ The workers' colonies planned by Paul Fischer, the commission's chief architect, in Starołęka (Luisenhain) and later in Dębiec (Dembsen), both industrial suburbs on the outskirts of Poznań with railroad and river access, were products of this new policy. The workers' colony Luisenhain in Starołęka was established, the commission reported, "to secure a permanent supply of German workers" (*einen*

²⁷⁶ *Zwanzig Jahre*, p. 206. On the refinery see *Verzeichnis der Zuckerfabriken und Raffinerien Deutschlands und des Auslandes* (Magdeburg, 1900), p. 141. Around 1900 it was the largest refinery in Germany.

Stamm von deutschen Arbeitern zu sichern) for a newly built, massive granary of 60,000 Zentnern (3,000 ton) storage capacity. This granary, one of the largest in Germany, was established by the *Deutsches Lagerhaus Posen*, a limited liability association partially owned by the Colonization Commission.²⁷⁷ The *Deutsches Lagerhaus Posen*, established in 1901 and managed until late 1903 by Alfred Hugenberg, received a near monopoly on the storage and marketing of the cereals grown on the commission's Poznanian estates as well as privileged access to the produce of settlers, who were pressed by the commission to form village producers' cooperatives that would work only with the *Lagerhaus*.²⁷⁸

After 1910, the commission received new powers to provide subventions for the settlement of workers by cooperative settlement associations and significantly encouraged the establishment of such small-scale settlement associations (*Kleinsiedlungsgenossenschaften*) in Poznanian and West Prussia. A 1910 ministerial decree allowed the commission to grant subventions for the settlement of workers and craftspeople on small plots, built with single-family cottages. The cottages' size and layout were also defined: they had to include a kitchen and at most two good rooms with heating (*Stube*). The settlement was supposed to be undertaken only by registered not-for-profit associations that could demonstrate sufficient capital and whose activity would be geographically limited to a community, municipality or county. The commission's grant amounted to one thousand Mark per settled plot. The grant was given to the cooperative association to be used for public purposes, such as roadbuilding, and deposited in a special reserve account. In 1911, there were thirty-one small settlement associations in the

²⁷⁷ *Zwanzig Jahre*, pp. 52, 80, 98–99.

²⁷⁸ For the establishment of *Deutsches Lagerhaus Posen* see the limited liability companies' registry in E. Stopier, *Die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung* (Berlin: Richard Gahl, 1901), p. 21. On the granary, see Rudolf Leonhard, *Kornhäuser und Getreidehandel: ein Beitrag zur deutschen Agrarpolitik* (Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1906), pp. 99–100.

colonized provinces. Half of them emphasized “Germanness” in their official name. In the rest of Prussia, there were eight such associations. The commission’s cash infusion of a thousand Marks per plot amounted to an important contribution to these associations, whose registered capital was mostly invested in land and buildings.²⁷⁹ Members of cooperative housing associations who received such a plot signed a *Rentegut* contract with the Prussian Colonization Commission.

The return of long-term tenure introduced by *Rentegüter* also opened up the use of state credit and other financing possibilities for low-income housing. In 1889-1890, an important piece of imperial legislation permitted the operation of limited liability economic associations. Together with the new availability of funds from provincial insurance boards (established in the wake of Bismarck’s social welfare legislation), this law allowed for an expansion of not-for-profit housing associations and also made workers’ housing a more lucrative professionalization route for architects. From the 1890s, the state also provided increased indirect funding to building associations and thus gradually created new institutional spheres within which workers could be leaseholders on small cottage plots. These measures encouraged the parceling out of landed property in small plots for workers and craftspeople. It also increased the financial and legal leeway for the activities of such bodies. Since the financial risks involved in purchasing land and building housing projects were particularly high, increasing available credit and allowing the creation of limited liability associations were essential for the development of housing associations. By 1902, there were 466 building associations (*Baugenossenschaften*) across Germany, compared to 35 in 1887. A new market was gradually created. It opened up

²⁷⁹ APP Niemiecka Kasa Stanu Średniego w Poznaniu 732 Nr. 892 (unpaginated). Riechert, “Die Tätigkeit der deutschen Kleinsiedlungsgenossenschaften in den Provinzen Posen und Westpreussen im Jahre 1911,” *AfTK* 40, pp. 534–549, and idem, “Die Tätigkeit der Kleinsiedlungsgenossenschaften ausserhalb der beiden Ansiedlungsprovinzen im Jahre 1911.” *AfTK* 40, pp. 550–555.

opportunities for different professionals, particularly architects, as well as for profit-seeking entrepreneurs, and private and public-private charitable and cooperative associations.²⁸⁰

Some small settlement associations operated in rural areas, were often responsible for a whole county, and chaired by the county commissioner. However, the majority of small settlement associations were established to provide workers for a specific industrial complex. This was the case with the “Non-for-Profit Building Association Luisenhain, Association with Limited Liability” (*Gemeinnütziger Bauverein Luisenhain, G. m. b. H.*) based in Poznań/Posen. This association took over the workers’ colony Luisenhain in Starołęka south of Posen/Poznań, which was originally established by the commission to provide labor for its affiliated granary and storehouse complex. It also took part in the general building boom in the city at the time.

Another case was the “German Workers’ Housing Association” (*Deutscher Arbeiter-Wohnungs-Verein e. G. m. b. H.*) in Bydgoszcz/Bromberg, the second most important economic center in Poznanian after the provincial capital. This association was established to settle workers for the large railroad-riverboat transshipment complex operated by the Bromberg Towboat Company (*Bromberger Schlepsschiffahrts-Aktien-Gesellschaft*). The company’s director, the engineer Ernst Müller, sat on the executive board of the German Workers’ Housing Association. The association also acquired land for settlement from other employers in the river transportation business and built cottages for their employees.²⁸¹

²⁸⁰ See “Genossenschaften,” in *Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon* (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut 1907), vol. 7, pp. 570–577. The 1908 amendment to the 1886 Settlement Law and its implementation instructions in a subsequent ministerial decree (September 10, 1910) laid out for the first time the basic principles of workers’ settlement by the Colonization Commission, including the provision of bonuses for workers to encourage their settlement in cottages on larger settler farms or small estates. On these subventions see Reichert, “Die Tätigkeit der deutschen Kleinsiedlungsgenossenschaften in den Provinzen Posen und Westpreußen im Jahre 1911,” *AfIK* 4:12 (1911/1912), pp. 533–549.

²⁸¹ On Starołęka see Waldemar Karolczak, “Z dziejów Małej Starołęki na początku XX wieku,” *Kronika Miasta Poznanian* 4 (2009), pp. 190–201. On the Bromberg Towboat Company’s transshipment complex in Bromberg/Bydgoszcz see the publication by the Prussian ministry of public works: Sympher, *Die Wasserwirthschaftliche Vorlage* (Berlin 1901), p. 84. For the annual reports see APP Niemiecka Kasa Stanu

The growth of workers' building and housing associations in the colonized provinces after 1910 had been enabled, and partially transformed, by the commission's activities. By partially outsourcing workers' settlement to associations, the Prussian Colonization Commission externalized supervision, administration and construction costs, while offering substantial subventions and maintaining a strong informal influence on the activities of the cooperative associations. The design and layout of settlements was a central aspect of the commission's ideology of "Germanization." The partial privatization of settlement presented new challenges to the commission in this regard, as private associations were not beholden to the same principles that guided the commission's own settlement. The commission reacted to these difficulties by focusing on the design of these worker settlements.

At the East German Exhibition that took place in Posen/Poznań in 1911 Paul Fischer, the commission's chief architect, designed a model settlement village that symbolically collapsed the two modes of settlement. Giving the buildings a rural, quaint appearance that became popular around 1900 and was predicated on combining modern techniques and materials with a selective appropriation of regional building traditions in style and form, Fischer created a model village that was meant for workers rather than farmers.²⁸² The ways in which the commission and Fischer used the architectural *Heimat* style as an administrative tool are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Here, the focus is on how Fischer built on his work for the commission to

Średniego w Poznaniu 732 Nr. 891–893. In addition, one association, the "German Civil Servants' Housing Association in Posen" offered housing for junior officials (*Deutscher Beamten-Wohnungs-Bau Verein e.G.m. b. H. zu Posen*), see APP Niemiecka Kasa Stanu Średniego w Poznaniu 732 Nr. 892 (unpaginated). For the housing market in Poznań/Posen at the time, see Anna Bitner-Nowak, "Wohnungspolitik und Wohnungsverhältnisse in Posen in den Jahren 1900–1939," in: Alena Janatková and Hanna Kozińska-Witt (eds.), *Wohnen in der Grossstadt, 1900–1939: Wohnsituation und Modernisierung im europäischen Vergleich* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 2006), pp. 151–178; Lerp, *imperial Grenzräume*, pp. 184ff.

²⁸² On reform architecture, the development of the *Heimat* movement, and their politics, see William Rollins, *A Greener Vision of Home: Cultural Politics and Environmental Reform in the German Heimatschutz Movement* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), and Lekan, *Imagining the Nation in Nature*.

style himself as an expert on both farmers' and workers' settlements. On that basis, Fischer was appointed to senior positions in the state bureaucracy after leaving the commission in 1915 and thereby participated in shaping the postwar Prussian housing legislation that reformers were advocating, in one form or another, since the VfS meeting in Frankfurt in September 1886.

The East-German Exhibition of Industry, Trades, and Agriculture (*Ostdeutsche Ausstellung für Industrie, Gewerbe und Landwirtschaft*) took place in Posen/Poznań between May and October 1911. At the time, the city was the cultural and economic center for the Polish majority in the province and home to around 150,000 people of which two-thirds were Catholics, largely Poles, and one-third Protestants, mostly Germans. The exhibition was explicitly conceived as 'German,' and thus only the German language was used, only German speakers were addressed as potential visitors, and only German firms appeared and sponsored the event, with the exception of one important Polish steel magnate based in the city. Most visitors came from outside of the city, and it is unlikely that it drew large Polish crowds. Although no official boycott was declared, the Polish-language press took pains to dissuade its readers from visiting the exhibition because of its German-nationalist framing.²⁸³

The small model village was located in the middle of the exhibit area that symbolized German modernity, near the pavilions of industry and trades and across from the beer garden. Some of the new cooperative building associations participated in the small settlement village exhibit to showcase their activities and increase their membership. **[**Image**]**They presented

²⁸³ Andreas Hofmann, "Utopien der Nation: Landes- und Nationalausstellungen in Ostmitteleuropa vor und nach dem Erster Weltkrieg," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 58:1-2 (2009) pp. 6–32, p. 18. Also see Hanna Grzeszczuk-Brendel, "Die Architektur der Posener Ausstellungen 1911 und 1929," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 58 (2009), pp. 78–110; Beate Störckuhl, "Architektura wystawowa jako metoda narodowej prezentacji. Wystawa Wschodniemiecka (1911) i Powszechna Wystawa Krajowa (1929) w Poznaniu," in: Jacek Purchla and Wolf Tegerhoff, *Naród. Styl. Modernizm* (Krakow and Munich, 2006), pp. 226–237 and Dyroff, *Die Bauliche Tätigkeit*.

house models as well as maps of settlements and publicized their terms of credit and membership.²⁸⁴ The architect of the village was Paul Fischer, who also sat on the advisory committee of the exhibition. He claimed that the initiative for and financing of the model village came not from the state but solely from the new cooperative housing associations and from unnamed local firms, and that he took on merely the “artistic direction” of the model-village.²⁸⁵ The financial reports of the cooperative building associations for these years suggest that the large expense that the model-village must have required was partly covered by the commission indirectly through its affiliated associations, such as the *Deutsches Lagerhaus*.²⁸⁶

Fischer’s design adopted the modernist *Heimat* style for the public buildings and the eight cottages and semi-detached houses that made up the village. As a postcard from the exhibit shows (figure 1), at least on some occasions the village was provided with a resident sheep flock and possibly also two model housewives. Echoing the importance that Fischer attributed to a central village square (*Dorfanger*), the village was planned in what the brochure described as a “traditional but increasingly rare” way around a communal well, flanked in asymmetrical, non-straight angles by a wooden church and a stone-built inn. Indeed, Fischer’s main achievement, as he stated to the readers of the *Jugendstil* magazine *Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration*, was the non-symmetrical layout of the village and the impression it made of a “natural” and “free” creation

²⁸⁴ *Ostdeutsche Ausstellung für Industrie, Gewerbe und Landwirtschaft, Posen 1911: offizieller Katalog* (Verlag der Ausstellung, Druck der Ostdeutschen Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt, Posen 1911), pp. 58ff. For the presentation of these cooperative housing associations, see e.g. the German Workers Housing Association, which presented two model workers’ houses as well as ground plans according to its 1911 financial report: “Geschäftsbericht des Deutschen Arbeiter-Wohnungs-Verein e.G.m.b.H. in Bromberg für das Jahr 1911,” APP *Niemecka Kasa Stanu Średniego w Poznaniu* 732/891, p. 9.

²⁸⁵ Paul Fischer, “Kleinsiedlungsdorf,” *Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration* 1911/1912, pp. 259–262, p. 262.

²⁸⁶ For financial reports of some of these associations see the *Niemecka Kasa Stanu Średniego w Poznaniu* files in APP 732/891–892. If we use Fischer’s own building costs calculus and account for the fact that most buildings were temporary, it seems likely that at least 50,000 Mark were spent on the model village.

rather than a forced or preplanned design.²⁸⁷ The eight different model houses were meant, according to the official brochure, to represent different housing possibilities for workers' families, artisans, junior clerks, and officials, as well as other members of the new *Mittelstand* of service employees. The official catalogue articulated the hope that visitors would be persuaded by their stroll among the houses and inside them to join a housing association and acquire a house with some likeness to the models in the exhibition. In that, the model village was a material contribution to a kind of frontier boosterism, utilizing a rural image to promote small settlements that would rely on employment in towns.²⁸⁸



Figure 2.2: The 'Small Settlement Village' in the 1911 East-German Exhibition in Poznań. Note the resident flock, possibly two model housewives, and some middle-class observers. The house behind the two women was designed as a two-family house for workers.

Source: www.fotopolska.eu under Creative Commons for non-commercial use.

²⁸⁷ Paul Fischer, "Kleinsiedlungsdorf," *Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration* 1911/1912, pp. 259–262, p. 262.

²⁸⁸ *Ostdeutsche Ausstellung für Industrie, Gewerbe und Landwirtschaft, Posen 1911: offizieller Katalog* (Verlag der Ausstellung, Druck der Ostdeutschen Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt, Posen 1911), pp. 58ff.

The design of the model village design was removed from any actual rural environment around Poznań. An old-new German *Heimat* with its own defined vernacular, as Fischer admitted, had no existence in the reality of the Poznanian countryside. In his mind, a German local vernacular was still lacking, a yet-to-come long-term development. Once the exhibition was over, the wooden church in the model village was relocated to a nearby settler-village established by the Prussian Colonization Commission. The contested imperial border region was here imagined, or fantasized, as a clean slate ready for German settlement.²⁸⁹

The German small settlement village was expressly not meant for independent settler farmers. There was a clear discrepancy between the carefully constructed pastoral rurality of the model village and the fact that its houses were designed for small-scale settlement that increasingly took place in the outskirts of cities and supplied housing for workers, artisans, and junior officials who relied on the city for employment. The implanting of rural romanticism on workers settlements was not unique to Fischer and can be seen in many company settlements established around and after 1900, for example in the Altenhof and Margarethenhöhe settlements established by the Krupp concern in the Ruhr. With these projects, the Krupp concern moved away from grid-like layout of tenement housing projects in favor of rustic cottages and semi-detached houses. The design was intended to support labor discipline by strengthening the role of family and community in the life of workers and distancing them from radical politics.²⁹⁰ But in

²⁸⁹ Paul Fischer, "Ansiedlung und Landschaftsbild," in: *25 Jahre Ansiedlung 1886–1911* (Sonderabdrucke von: Aus dem Posener Lande - Monatsblätter für Heimatkunde) (Lissa i.P.: Oskar Euliß Verlag, 1911). For the lack of correspondence between the supposedly vernacular ideal of Heimat architects, to which Fischer tried to appeal here, and the building traditions of Wielkopolska, see Cupers, *Forthcoming*.

²⁹⁰ Krupp's two model villages were inspired by English designs and were utilized extensively by the company for propaganda purposes. They were also criticized by *Heimat* architecture enthusiasts as not fitting the vernacular of the Ruhr area. See Cedric Bolz, "Constructing 'Heimat' in the Ruhr Valley: Krupp Housing and the Search for the Ideal German Home 1914–1931," *German Studies Review* 34:1 (February 2011), pp. 17–43; Stephan Strauß, "Margarethenhöhe und Mathildenhöhe: Beiträge und Wechselwirkungen zur Reform des Kleinwohnhauses und des städtischen Wohnens," *International Committee on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) — Hefte des Deutschen Nationalkomitees* 64 (2018), pp. 111–122. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11588/ih.2018.0.46886>. For the place of the

the multi-ethnic borderlands of the empire, the stakes were different. The symbolism of a rural *Heimat* represented a new German-national presence in the Polish-majority border provinces of the German empire, and thus emphasized that small settlement colonies were part of the colonization project with which the commission was entrusted.

When we look carefully at the imagery that accompanied the exhibition and consider the decision to include interior design in the model houses, we can discern a gendered social logic that underpinned the promotion of small-scale settlements as part of an internal colonization project. As a 1911 article in the new, specialized publication for settlement, the *Archiv für innere Kolonisation*, explained, through housework that included raising animals and through the establishment of women's organizations supporting such activities, women would have an important role in the economy of the household that complemented their husbands' wages from working outside the home. The article, titled "the economic tasks of women in internal colonization", was published with a half-apology by the editors, who felt a need to justify discussing the issue at all. Its conclusion was that women were an important albeit neglected part of "internal colonization," and that they should receive more attention in future from colonization experts.²⁹¹ Similarly, the image shows women enacting part of rural life by raising a few animals (several pigs, chickens, and geese. A goat was considered as a good replacement for a cow under space limitations) and tending the garden, which would normally have some land

cottage in conservative social reform see e.g. Renate Kastort-Viehmann, "Kleinhaus und Mietskaserne," in Lutz Niethammer (ed.) *Wohnen im Wandel*, pp. 282–284. For reform architecture as a national style see Sigrid Hofer, *Reformarchitektur 1900–1918: Deutsche Baukünstler auf der Suche nach dem nationalen Stil* (Stuttgart, 2005).

²⁹¹ L. Maass, "Wirtschaftliche Frauenaufgaben in der inneren Kolonisation," *AfiK* 4:8 (1911/1912) pp. 410–416. On women's role as guardians of whiteness and morality in the German empire, see Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire*; Elizabeth A. Drummond, "'Durch Liebe stark, deutsch bis ins Mark: Weiblicher Kulturimperialismus und der Deutsche Frauenverein für die Ostmarken,'" in Ute Fervert (ed.), *Nation, Politik, und Geschichte: Frauenbewegung und Nationalismus in der Modern* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2000), pp. 147–164; Birthe Kundrus, "Weiblicher Kulturimperialismus. Die imperialistischen Frauenverbände des Kaiserreichs," in Conrad and Osterhammel, *Das Kaiserraich transnational*, pp. 213–235.

for cultivating potatoes and could include a small patch of grass for grazing. Women were supposed to undertake not only the management of the small-settlement household but also most of the work involved, so as to retain the link between working-class families and agriculture.

The emphasis on the gendered division of labor was supported by the entrance to the stall, which was often accessed through a scullery that was also utilized for preparing fodder. If we look at residents' lists of the German Workers' Housing Association in Bydgoszcz/Bromberg, which participated in the 1911 exhibition, we see a rather different picture. There was a large number of young, unmarried women living in its workers' settlements and employed as washers or seamstresses. But in the normative social order produced for the 1911 exhibition and for the consumption of middle-class visitors, it seem that women's place was in the household, where they had a crucial role to play in keeping this new half-privatized form of internal colonization culturally German, symbolically rural, and politically loyal.²⁹²

The model village in the 1911 exhibition was a professional success for Fischer. Based on his experience in designing workers' housing projects for the commission and for building association that worked with it, Fischer was tasked with leading the reconstruction effort of East-Prussia during WWI, and was later a senior official in the Prussian public works and welfare ministries until his retirement sometime in the middle of the 1920s. In the context of the acute housing shortage of the war and post-war period, Fischer had a key role to play in housing legislation and policy, and he authored one of the most important architectural manuals of the

²⁹² Compare Fischer's laying out of the principles of building small settlements, albeit for larger plots beginning from eight hectare: Paul Fischer, "Fragen über das Bauwesen," *AfK* IV (1912), pp. 556–558, as well as Fischer's 1920 prizewinning design for workers' houses on very small plots of $\frac{3}{4}$ Morgen for the Rastenberg Millworks in East Prussia: "Wettbewerb: Siedlung der Rastenburger Mühlewerke: Entwurf 'Erika' 1. Preis (Variante) Architekt Paul Fischer-Naumbourg," *Süd-und Mitteldeutsche Bauzeitung* XVII:45–47 (Nov. 1920), pp. 101–102. For residents lists of the German Workers' Housing Association in Bydgoszcz/Bromberg, see APP 732/893 (unpaginated).

day.²⁹³ Drawing on his previous experiences in “internal colonization”, Fischer reached the peak of his career during and in the immediate aftermath of the war. His wartime reform of building regulations in East Prussia and his detailed examination of building regulations in every Prussian province allowed him to put forward a blueprint for fundamental reform of building regulations that was meant to ease and simplify them to support construction of small settlements across Prussia. These suggestions, published in 1916 in the *Archiv für innere Kolonisation*, became a benchmark for architect-reformers and significantly shaped Prussian regulatory and legal changes during 1917–1918, culminating in the new building law of 1918. Fischer himself was appointed to key positions in connection with housing policy and welfare in the rapidly changing Prussian administration, ending his career as a ministerial councilor (*Ministerialrat*) in the Prussian welfare ministry in the mid-1920s.

The 1911 Posen/Poznań exhibition finally brings us full circle to the early part of this chapter and to the solutions proposed by early reformers to the emerging housing crisis of industrial and urban centers in Germany. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, German social reformers had sought ways to improve the terrible housing conditions of the growing population of industrial workers. Their ideal solution was to provide workers with cottages or semi-detached houses. In practice, though, better tenement houses were the only realistic goal due to high land prices in cities. Cooperative housing associations and charitable initiatives that were established after mid-century were unable to change the structure of the housing market, and some reformers arrived at the conclusion that the state and municipalities needed to both change building regulations and provide credit for housing projects. One spatial solution that was suggested in this earlier period was to relocate workers’ housing to city outskirts where the land

²⁹³ *Ländliches Bauwesen* (1919, 1921) together with Gerhard Jobst.

was cheaper. In the 1840s, Victor Aimé Huber called this, probably for the first time in German, “internal colonization.” His ideas combined associational cooperation between workers with state credit and advocated a social and architectural organization that would strengthen the Christian family, a central tenant in Protestant social reform. When the Prussian Colonization Commission was established in 1886, internal colonization was adopted by Gustav Schmoller and his VfS associates – many of them connected with the National Liberal Party – to denote a project that combined land reform and agrarian settlement, which they hoped would take place across Prussia. The creation of the commission, National Liberals hoped, would usher in a new era of land reform across Prussia and counteract the dangers of Polish nationalism.

Central to these hopes was the introduction in the 1886 Settlement Law of a limited, heritable form of landownership, the *Rentegut*, which was based on amortizable but irredeemable long-term rent payments. This kind of arrangement had been banned in the course of Prussia’s agrarian reforms of the nineteenth century, as it could give rise to long-term, indissoluble dependency relationship similar to serfdom. Four years after the introduction of the *Rentegut* in Poznan and West Prussia, the Prussian state started to broaden the applicability of this old-new form of land tenure, extending it to the whole of Prussia in 1890 and making it available for small plots for craftspeople and workers and allowing private landowners to use it, facilitate by the state.

Increasing state support for cooperative housing associations, which often utilized the *Rentegut* form, directly influenced the housing market. As cooperatives were gradually granted state credit and the ability to form as limited liability associations, the years before WWI saw the development of a new economic sector of cooperative associations of small settlement. In Polish Prussia, the Prussian Colonization Commission sought to shape this market according to its own

goals, and to use cooperative housing associations to settle German workers who would be employed in the commission's settlements and estates as replacements for Polish workers. In many cases, however, the German workers who were settled through cooperative associations were employed by large industrial and infrastructure operations, such as sugar-beet refineries, river and rail transportation, and a large granary, in some cases in urban spaces. The commission's involvement in this latter kind of workers' settlements, either directly or through subsidies, formed a precedence in terms of state-constructed low-income dwellings.

The commission's building activities and its farm construction constitute a significant, and little studied, undertaking which touched on fundamental issues of the process of settlement. Settlers needed not only to pay for the construction of their farms but also for their upkeep and insurance over the long term. The commission was concerned that the cost and upkeep of buildings would encumber settlers and force them to become burdened with debts they could not afford. But even when construction was undertaken by the commission to control costs, prospective settlers voted with their feet and changed their mind about migration to Polish Prussia. The commission concluded that the problem was the austere, small, cheap, and unattractive farm building that it constructed for settlers. Settlers also proved reluctant to move into plots bereft of existing buildings, however. The commission oscillated, then, between different approaches to solve this conundrum in the 1890s, in the face of dwindling numbers of new settlers and a growing critique of the commission's building activity. During 1896–1899, the commission decided to both build farms itself and allow settlers to build their own farms, while exercising strict control over costs and building plans.

In the 1890s, the migration of Polish farmworkers to Prussia's eastern provinces became a hotly debated political issue, as the government reopened the eastern border for seasonal

workers. Radical nationalist pressure groups, as well as ambitious social scientists, alleged that migrant and local Polish farmworkers constituted a national and racial threat. Such arguments made the commission's tendency to employ Polish workers to fulfil its own labor needs too embarrassing to sustain. As the commission moved around 1898–1900 to actively settle German workers, it needed to construct housing and small farm plots for them. At this point, the commission increased its construction budget significantly and diverted resources to the construction of workers' housing. The commission's growing investment in the settlement of workers coincided, and in part propelled, the opening up of a state-backed market of cooperative associations and public-private partnerships that built workers' housing. In the colonized provinces, the commission worked closely with such German associations and granted them subventions for every worker settled.

By the 1910s, the focus of much of the commission's building work shifted to workers' cottages. Workers' cottages were the preferred form of worker housing for housing reform advocates of the time for a host of hygienic, social, and political reasons, although the focus of the housing reform movement was on improving conditions in tenement blocks in cities, where most workers lived. The most widespread form of suburban workers' housing was the company villages built by Germany's largest industrial conglomerates in industrial heartlands and mining districts. These, scholars have noted, were often built and run as cultural projects of work optimization and moral education. In the rural, latifundia-dominated Prussian Eastern provinces, where emigration to industrial centers, hardening movement restrictions for migrant workers, and changing modes of cultivation resulted in endemic labor shortage in large-scale agricultural production, large agrarian producers usually did not have the available capital to build farmworkers' colonies, and migrant labor seemed more useful for the seasonal character of

production. In this context, workers' cottages were increasingly built by housing associations with the commission's support after 1900. The Prussian Colonization Commission in many ways spearheaded these developments with its own construction projects and through the new legislation that supported its activities.

The Prussian Colonization Commission had set an important precedent for the interwar surge in public housing projects and in regional and city planning. The next chapter returns to 1890s to trace how the commission tried to solve the acute problems of high construction costs and low appeal of the farms it designed and constructed. Fischer, as we shall see, developed his ideas for building regulations reform out of the practical need to plan and legitimate cheap housing for German workers in the context of the colonization project in Polish Prussia. Ideas about *Heimat* became significant tools for administrative, architectural, and social interventions, but also as highly effective strategies for administrative career making.

Chapter 3

Heimat-Building German Farmhouses and Social Hierarchies

In 1911, the Prussian Colonization Commission celebrated 25 years of what it called *Kulturarbeit* and colonization in Polish Prussia. A festive publication was prepared for the occasion and printed in a special bounded edition of 45 copies, probably meant for long serving or senior officials, and also reproduced in the German nationalist magazine *Aus dem Posener Lande*. The volume included an article by Paul Fischer, the commission's chief architect, on the topic of "landscape and settlement" (*Landschaftsbild und Ansiedlung*). *Landschaftsbild* translates both as landscape painting and as a scenery or image of the landscape, and the article's call for "artistic" village planning pertained to both meanings. The article called for a "decisive artistic involvement" not only in farm and house design, but also in the entire settlement plan of new colonies. This call was directed to architects, developers, and building associations, who were engaged in planning new rural settlements. Aided by state credit and a favorable regulatory framework, this was a new line of economic activity that took off in Germany in the years before World War I. Fischer suggested that village planning by the Prussian Colonization Commission, and himself, should serve as an example for the manner in which new settlements should be created and the central role that should be played by professional architects attuned to the artistic task of creating a holistic and pleasing rural appearance.²⁹⁴

Fischer's article acknowledged that the commission's settler-villages were a disappointment when measured against the yardstick of the old, closely-knit German villages of

²⁹⁴ Paul Fischer, "Landschaftsbild und Ansiedlung," in Georg Minde-Pouet (ed.), *25 Jahre Ansiedlung: Zum 25. Jahrestage der Königlichen Ansiedlungs-Kommission für Westpreußen und Posen in Posen, 1886–1911* [Reprint: *Aus dem Posener Lande*, 1911] (Lissa: Oskar Eulitz 1911), pp. 22–34, 23–27.

Thuringia – Fischer’s own home region – or Swabia. This was due in part to a lack of expert knowledge in the early period of the commission’s work about how to build villages aesthetically suited to the landscape. Another reason, Fischer explained, was that settlers lacked “a sense of *Heimat*” in their new surroundings. In their first few years, settlers were too busy setting up farms to develop “the necessary unity” with their surrounding nature to cultivate a sense of *Heimat* or belonging in their environment. Fischer argued that settlers’ emotional integration into their new environment was initially lacking, and they therefore insisted on placing individual farms in the most convenient place to access fields or roads without regard to the visual impression made by the village as a whole. By the time settlers developed a sense of belonging and *Heimat*, Fischer concluded, the physical structures of the village were already in place. Therefore, “artistic” involvement by architects was needed to compensate for settlers’ lack of *Heimat* sensibility. Architectural involvement from the beginning would not only prevent the construction of unattractive (*Unschön*) buildings but also prevent a village layout that was either too geometric or too dispersed. Small houses for workers, together with trees and shrubberies, should be used to fill the gaps between settlers’ farms, he suggested. Buildings should stand in asymmetrical and tilted fashion in relation to each other and placed in varying distances from the road. The structure of the village should give the impression of an unplanned, gradual development, even though it was meticulously planned. Buildings might be improved or replaced, he wrote, but bad village planning, once put in place, is seldom remade.²⁹⁵

Fischer relied in this text and in his practice more generally on the concept of *Heimat*, or local homeland, that evoked powerful notions of belonging for contemporaries, which ranged across regional, confessional, and political divides. It could denote identification with one’s

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

hometown, district, province, state or nation or refer to childhood memories embedded in particular locations. The flexibility and ambiguity of the concept allowed for layered identifications that mediated between the regional, local, personal, and familiar on the one hand, and the more abstract belonging to the nation and to the state of new Imperial Germany that was created in 1871.²⁹⁶

This chapter introduces the notion of “*Heimat-building*” to discuss the ways in which new architectural ideas about *Heimat* – popularized during the 1890s and the early 1900s – were utilized by the Prussian Colonization Commission as a strategy to define and naturalize difference among the populations in its settlements. At the same time, *Heimat-building* was also about architectural practice. Based on a regional and cultural typology that justified different construction principles for settlers’ farmhouses and workers’ dwellings, the commission’s language of *Heimat-building* both justified and materially shaped social hierarchies and the reproduction of racialized cultural difference among the supposed “German” settler population.

The chapter opens with a consideration of the language of *Heimat* and how it mediated and shaped nationalizing elites’ imagining of the Polish provinces of Prussia. Anxieties about these multiethnic provinces as an unruly frontier within the Prussian-German empire were projected to the environment and the landscape. From the 1890s on, the colonization project was increasingly portrayed as a *Heimat-building* project, as the colonization commission employed both the idea of *Heimat* and the language of architectural expertise to legitimate its activities.

While the commission’s main goal was the transformation of the Poznanian and West-Prussian

²⁹⁶ On *Heimat* in Polish Prussia see Jeffrey K. Wilson, “Imagining a Homeland: Constructing *Heimat* in the German East, 1871–1914,” *National Identities* 9:4 (2007), pp. 331–349. On the *Heimatschutz* and politics, and the complexity of views and political affiliations among local associations and in the movement in general, see William Rollins, *A Greener Vision of Home: Cultural Politics and Environmental Reform in the German Heimatschutz Movement* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Thomas M. Lekan, *Imagining the Nation in Nature: Landscape Preservation and German Identity, 1885–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

social landscape through agrarian settlement of German peasants, the repertoire it increasingly employed from the late 1890s was shaped by the claims of the commission to undertake a German *Kulturarbeit* and a *Heimat* construction project on a large scale, in which architectural intervention played an increasingly important role. The commission sought to shape social relations and political loyalties in settlements through village planning and farm design, in other words, through *Heimat-building*. This goal was grounded in an organicist view of the relationship between society, environment, material culture, and nature that originated from local and regional characteristics, evoking in the idioms of *Heimat*, and community.

Heimat-building coincided with efforts of architects to claim a special expertise that combined the prestige and individual genius of the artist with the technical mastery of the engineer. As architects claimed an increasing political and social role for their practice through the idiom of *Heimat*, the design of farmhouses was increasingly imbued with political and social meanings as well. At stake were notions of progress, colonial domination, and the meaning of national belonging. In the literal sense, if the success of Germanization and *Heimat-building* was to transform Polish Prussia into Swabia or Saxony, then the commission's project was impossible. But as this chapter explicates, we may treat the frequent measuring of Polish Prussia against an ideal image of German rurality as a strategy. Colonization was supposed to bring Germans and German modernity to a backward and unruly Polish Prussia, but in fact the commission realized that this modern German-ness was not brought ready-made from the banks of the Rhine or the Mosel. Instead, it was created through the process of settlement and embedded in the conditions of life in settler-villages and their surroundings. For this reason, the commission sought to shape the process of settlement in a way that would form the right kind of Germans. Settlers' sense of *Heimat* served as an important category to measure their long-term

usefulness. At this point, new forms of architectural expertise and claims for social relevance became useful for both planning villages and administering settlers.

When Paul Fischer began his career with the commission in 1896, the main problem that the settlement project faced was the dwindling numbers of new settlers. The commission therefore sought to find inexpensive farm designs that appealed to would-be settlers from western Germany. Fischer decided to undertake a survey of settlers' farms in 1896, from which he hoped to draw practical lessons to improve the building practices of the commission. Anchored in regionalist typology, the survey utilized the designs that settlers from different parts of Germany used to construct their farmhouses to come up with better farm designs attractive to settlers. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the German farmhouse was formalized as an object of architectural interest. Fischer drew on this language as it was institutionalized around 1900 and strategically adopted the language of *Heimat* to give a wider ideological horizon to the settlement project, using printed and built exemplars. But the majority of buildings constructed in the context of settlement were not picturesque or romanticized versions of German peasant-houses built around a village square. The practical considerations of the commission, the limitations set on settlers' own construction, and the economizing imperatives of the project meant that farms would normally be simple and unadorned, practical and cubical, especially if the commission itself had them built. Workers' houses were developed by Fischer as a different kind of "building object" that could be designed according to traditional building styles without paying attention to regional vernacular architecture. He rationalized this contradiction by arguing that workers' undeveloped sense of *Heimat* and basic material requirements did not require such elaborate and costly attention to regional variations.

Fischer's regionalist typology raises the notion of *Heimat-building* as an administrative project but also as a technique of population management through the production of difference among settlers. I discuss this issue mainly concerning the so-called "German Returnees" who migrated to Germany from Russia and Austrian Poland and were widely considered as somehow less German or less cultured. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the constitution of internal hierarchies among settlers and prospective settlers, and the ways in which the architectural language of *Heimat* facilitated the manufacture of such tools of population management. This usage aimed to shape the terms and the criteria for the activities of the commission and was employed strategically by the commission to promote, give shape, and fabricate a horizon for a project that was always riddled with political, ideological, and economic contradictions. Architectural ideas about *Heimat* that were popularized in the 1890s and 1900s were strategically used by the Prussian Colonization Commission and its chief architect not only to legitimize its actions but also to manufacture, reproduce, and naturalize social hierarchies and cultural differences.

Architecture and the Precariousness of *Heimat* on the Imperial Frontier

The commission and its supporters operated under the nationalist assumption that their task centered on creating a German *Heimat* in an area in which a distinctive German *Heimat* – as well as a German majority population – was lacking. The notion of *Heimat* emphasized the supposed organic unity of environment and people, leading to continuous concern about the Germanness of the Polish Prussian landscape. The natural and built environment was, in this view, both shaped by Germans and actively formed their distinctive national character. Thus, when German nationalists expressed anxieties about how German the landscape of Polish Prussia really was, they were talking about imperial sovereignty, which was increasingly reframed in

nationalist terms. Such anxieties, and how they inhered in visions of imperial expansion, played out in the landscape not only on the metaphorical level, but informed and were utilized by the Colonization Commission's practices of settlement. *Heimat*-building was central to the Germanization of the multiethnic border region through settlement.²⁹⁷

The work of Celia Applegate and Alon Confino from the 1990s is considered foundational to the study of *Heimat* and German national identity. Applegate and Confino both defined *Heimat* through regional studies. Applegate focused on the Palatinate, which moved from Bavarian control to become a part of Imperial Germany, while Confino dealt with Württemberg. Both scholars saw the regional discussion of the concept of *Heimat* as being about national integration. Liberal and liberal-conservative circles among the middle-classes and local elites used *Heimat* to redirect regional emotional belonging and loyalty towards the German nation after 1871. The notion of *Heimat* made it possible to regard regional particularities and characteristics as variations of an overarching national whole, potentially weakening conflicts of loyalty, especially between the dominant power of Prussia and other states. Local and national belonging could be brought together through various fields of knowledge and cultural symbols.²⁹⁸

Heimat was about more than national integration. It was also a central mechanism through which the educated middle-classes attempted to understand and steer the social, political, and physical changes wrought by rapid industrialization of the second half of the nineteenth century. The drastic remaking and damage to the rural countryside was contested by activists as a

²⁹⁷ Kenny Cupers, "Bodenständigkeit: The Environmental Epistemology of Modernism," *The Journal of Architecture* 21:8 (2016), pp. 1226–1252; Wilson, "Imagining a Homeland."

²⁹⁸ For the literature about *Heimat*, provincial and local identities, and nationalism see; Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Lekan, *Imagining the Nation in Nature*.

national issue that threatened German national character. Preservationists imagined the rural landscape as dotted with “natural monuments” of scenic landmarks, vistas, and flora and fauna, all of which had national significance. The landscape as a central category for nature preservationists and *Heimat* activists was rooted in folklorist and ethnographic traditions that reached back to the middle of the nineteenth century and saw the German landscape as a historical development formed by many “tribes” (Stämme) with distinctive regional characteristics that united landscape and people. Rootedness in a local landscape as an antidote to modern social ills was celebrated as an organic connection between people, landscape, and nature that created particular regional or local characteristics.²⁹⁹

The symbolism of *Heimat*, so central to the development of German nationalism, was drawn from local nature and from town and village communities with their old houses, farms, and settlement structures. Regional, state-level, and imperial *Heimat* organizations celebrated the local but did so within the context of nationalist and even racialist ideas. Empire-wide umbrella organizations such as the *Dürerbund* (established in 1902) and the *Bund Deutscher Heimatschutz* (established in 1904) unified the concern for the local and vernacular. They brought together and amplified the voices of architects and artists, who started calling locally or regionally rooted crafts, building styles, and materials as distinctly German. For them, *Heimat* was also a political reform program that relied on emotional attachment and unfolded in the built and natural environment across the nationalizing empire.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁹ Lekan, *Imagining the Nation in Nature*; Willi Oberkrome, *Deutsche Heimat. Nationale Konzeption und regionale Praxis von Naturschutz, Landschaftsgestaltung und Kulturpolitik in Westfalen-Lippe und Thüringen 1900–1960* (Paderborn 2004, pp. 41–5, 513–516).

³⁰⁰ Rollins, *A Greener Vision of Home*.

Building on ideas that can be traced to W. H. Riehl, as well as to the English Arts and Crafts movement, a developing stylized *Heimat* architecture sought to incorporate what was considered local, regional, or traditional materials and forms with the contemporary practice of architecture. Around the 1890s, the local countryside was increasingly thought of as monuments to be protected and also as inspiration for a more grounded and nationalist form of architecture. *Heimat* architecture could serve as a building block of a new, more authentic, and more commercially successful, national style.³⁰¹

Heimat-building could be at once a regionally grounded project and serve as articulation of imperial expansion. Looking at the circulation of images of Germany's African Colonies, Jens Jäger has argued that the notion of *Heimat* was a way of articulating the imperial and the local through the national. *Heimat* denoted not only a local rootedness but an "awareness of common points of reference even within a large imperial unit."³⁰² Moreover, *Heimat* could even be lost.

³⁰¹ On the commercial and symbolic imbrication of imperial, national, and local see Maiken Umbach, "The Vernacular International: *Heimat*, Modernism and the Global Market in Early Twentieth-Century Germany," *National Identities* 4:1 (2002), pp. 45–68; Maciuika, *Before the Bauhaus*, ch. 7.

³⁰² Jens Jaeger, "Colony as *Heimat*? The Formation of Colonial Identity in Germany around 1900," *German History* 27:4 (2009), pp. 467–489, p. 470. On imagery and the colonial appropriation of the landscape in Germany's African colonies, see also: Iris Schröder, "Der deutsche Berg in Afrika. Zur Geographie und Politik des Kilimandscharo im deutschen Kaiserreich," *Historische Anthropologie* 13 (2005), pp. 19–44. On citizenship and *Heimat* in the colonies see Krista O'Donnell, "Home, Nation, Empire: Domestic Germanness and Colonial Citizenship" in idem et al. *The Heimat Abroad*, and on *Heimat* among German migrant communities see Thomas Lekan, "German Landscape: Local Promotion of the *Heimat* Abroad," in the same edited volume, pp. 141–166. On environmental preservation as *Heimat*-claiming, see William H. Rollins, "Imperial Shades of Green: Conservation and Environmental Chauvinism in the German Colonial Project," *German Studies Review* 22:2 (1999), pp. 187–213, and more recently Daniel Rouven Steinbach, "Carved out of Nature: Identity and Environment in German Colonial Africa," in Christina Folke Ax, Niels Brimnes, Niklas Thode Jensen, Karen Oslund (eds.), *Cultivating the Colonies: Colonial States and their Environmental Legacies* (Athens, OH.: Ohio University Press, 2011), pp. 47–77. Of course, such notions of *Heimat* in the context of Germany's colonies did not mean that humans, animals, plants, and landscape were not plundered or considered as objects of economic extraction, as the work of scholars such as Bernhard Gißibl and Thaddeus Sunseri, demonstrates. See Bernhard Gißibl, *The Nature of German Imperialism. Conservation and the Politics of Wildlife in colonial East Africa* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2016); Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax: State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820–2000* (Athens, OH.: Ohio University Press, 2009). Exploitative and wanton destruction was not, of course, limited to the oversea colonies, as demonstrated by the exploitation of the Białowieża forest, romanticized as Europe's last *Urwald* or primeval forest, under wartime conditions and in lieu of access to Germany's Cameroon colony. See Thaddeus Sunseri, "Exploiting the *Urwald*: German Post-Colonial Forestry in Poland and Central Africa, 1900–1960," *Past & Present* 214:1 (2012), pp. 305–342.

Anxieties about imperial sovereignty in the Polish-German borderlands were increasingly articulated through the notion of *Heimat*. To make Polish Prussia truly German required the foundation and strengthening of a distinctly German *Heimat* in the region. However, anxieties about Polish Prussia's place in the imperial polity intensified with the negative migration of mainly rural populations from Poznan and West-Prussia to central and western Germany and with the increasing dependence on Polish migrant workers in the large-scale agriculture of the Prussia east. The mass migration of rural populations to industrial centers, commonly referred to as the "flight from the land," could also be explained in *Heimat* terms. The Danzig/Gdańsk-born botanist Hugo Conwentz, who served as the first head of the Provincial Museum of West Prussia (established in 1880 by his hometown's local elite) and then went on to become Prussia's first commissioner of natural monuments in 1906, made it his mission to promote among the German inhabitants of the province, and particularly school children, a sensibility for the local *Heimat*. Schoolbooks that dwell too much on landscapes and locations in western Germany, he warned, could encourage the "flight from the homeland." Conwentz persuaded the head of the provincial government to make homeland studies part of the school curriculum, to prescribe nature hikes and classes on local flora and fauna, and to train teachers accordingly.³⁰³

The possibility that German farmers in the majority-Polish areas of Prussia would lose their Germanness was a recurring trope of nationalist literature on the Polish-German borderlands. This issue was raised already in the 1860s by Max Beheim-Schwarzbach, who did much to popularize a historical narrative of Prussian colonization from the middle ages to Friedrich II. In the early 1880s, the widely quoted *Bamberger* study by the archivist Max Bär gave a new social-scientific impetus to these anxieties. The study purported to demonstrate that

³⁰³ Wilson, "Imagining a Homeland," p. 340.

Catholic colonists from Bavarian Bamberg, who settled in weaving villages around Poznań in the eighteenth century had become completely “Polonized” in a few generations. In Polish Prussia, it implied, Germans had to be Protestants to stay German.³⁰⁴ The influential economist, Gustav Schmoller, used both authors to formulate his own narrative of a distinctively Prussian ‘internal colonization’ as social reform in the 1880s, and they continued to provide a foundation for the legitimation of more radical nationalizing policies to the turn of the century. The sense of uncertain control over the rural and urban lived landscape of Polish Prussia, over a perceived lack of *Heimat*, was of critical concern to German nationalists even as it cohered with a clearly aggressive, racially inflected, nationalizing politics that sought to restructure society and the terms of political belonging in the imperial border region.

These anxieties made the physical mastery of the landscape necessary to secure political control, economic development, and the expansion of German civilization in the imperial periphery. As Jeffery Wilson explains, this was the logic that underlay the state’s initiative to purchase and reforest land on the Tuchel Heath in the province of West-Prussia. For state foresters in this hinterland west of Danzig/Gdańsk, whose numbers swelled from 1893 on, controlling the forested landscape was key to subduing and civilizing both an unruly landscape and an unruly population, who persisted in resisting the state’s hardening grip on forest use. Wilson also highlights how reforestation was itself a culturally coded practice and was carried out differently in the west and in the east of the kingdom. On the Lüneburg Heath, local peasants

³⁰⁴ Thomas Serrier, *Posen-Ostmark-Wielkopolska: Eine Grenzregion zwischen Deutschen und Polen 1848–1914* (Marburg 2005), pp. 165–7. Max Bär published his study under “Die ‘Bamberger’ bei Posen,” *Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Landeskunde der Provinz Posen* 1 (1882), pp. 294ff; *Die ‘Bamberger’ bei Posen, zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Polonisierungsbestrebungen in der Provinz Posen* (Poznań/Posen, 1882). Beheim-Schwarzbach also published a well-timed article on the actuality of Friedrich’s colonization drive in the highly regarded *Preussische Jahrbücher*. See Max Beheim-Schwarzbach, “Die Ansiedler Friedrichs des Großen – ein Wink für die Gegenwart,” *Preussische Jahrbücher* 57 (1886), pp. 574–583.

could be relied upon to plant trees of their choice with state encouragement. On the Tüchel Heath, officials called for state-led rather than private reforestation, as local peasants were seen as unwilling to improve the landscape. Through state efforts, the German forest would be instrumental in creating a German *Heimat* in the imperial border region.³⁰⁵

Around 1900, a new environmentally oriented way of thinking developed among architects, social reformers, and state administrators, who were worried about the relationship between industrial capitalism, urban expansion, and social conflict. According to Kenny Cupers, this new epistemology combined an older fascination with the picturesque landscape and a set of new biological and racial concerns. Prominent scholars such as Friedrich Ratzel and widely read architects such as Willi Lange and Paul Schulze-Naumburg produced highly effective arguments about the innate, organic connection between humans and the landscape, soils, and climate in which they lived. Such arguments were not backward looking, but rather sought to produce new prescriptive syntheses about the relationship of humans, nations, and races with their built and natural environment. Cupers argues that this new environmental epistemology was centered around the notion of *Bodenständigkeit*. Defined as “the quality of something rooted in, or uniquely appropriate to, the soil on which it stands,” *Bodenständigkeit* or rootedness had wide ranging material, psychological, and cultural ramifications. This notion came to be central not only in debates about landscape conservation, building materials, or the design of new buildings and settlements, argues Cupers, but also in choosing “the methods of domestic and overseas

³⁰⁵ On *Heimat* and the environment in the context of the Polish provinces of Prussia, see Jeffery K. Wilson, “Imagining a Homeland,” and idem, “Environmental Chauvinism in the Prussian East: Forestry as a Civilizing Mission on the Ethnic Frontier, 1871–1914,” *Central European History* 41 (2008), pp. 27–70. On the anxieties about Germanness in Polish Prussia, see also Mark Tilse, *Transnationalism in the Prussian East from National Conflict to Synthesis, 1871–1914* (Palgrave Macmillan 2011), ch. 2. On the German Forest as a cultural trope, see Michael Imort, “A Sylvan People: Wilhelmine Forestry and the Forest as a Symbol of Germandom,” in Thomas Lekan and Thomas Zeller (eds.), *Germany’s Nature: Cultural Landscapes and Environmental History* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2005), pp. 55–80.

colonization.” Rootedness, then, became a central parameter of the making and reproducing of *Heimat*, but its deployment in the service of imperial expansion also exposed its contradictory nature. While architects insisted that the connection between colonists and the colonized environment was, or could be, innate, anxieties about imperial authority and the challenges of colonial settlement demonstrated over and over again how essential were state power, racialization, and brutal oppression for maintaining imperial rule.³⁰⁶

The notion of rootedness or *Bodenständigkeit* was also employed by architects around 1900 as they increasingly considered both cities and rural areas as objects of intervention and social transformation through planning. The expansion of cities into the countryside, the lower cost of land in the outskirts of cities, and the increasing willingness of municipal authorities to promote workers’ housing projects afforded architects new professional opportunities. By the early 1890s, reform-minded architects recognized that tenement houses in cities were the main form of housing that could accommodate large numbers of workers dependent on employment in urban centers. Nevertheless, they still regarded workers’ cottages in city outskirts as the ideal form of low-income housing, seeing them as healthier for body and mind and more favorable for family life. Company settlements were the main type of low-density workers’ housing possible at the time, since it was usually large employers who could put together the necessary resources. As Adelheid von Saldern suggests regarding the establishment of *Werkssiedlungen* or company settlements, we may understand the critique levied by architects against different kinds of housing projects as a part of a strategy to increase their authority and gain access to employment possibilities. According to von Saldern, architects rushed to stake their claims in the new market

³⁰⁶ Kenny Cupers, “Bodenständigkeit,” quotes on pp. 1226, 1229. Also see Kenny Cupers, “The Invention of Indigenous Architecture,” in Irene Cheng, Charles L. Davis II, and Mabel O. Wilson (eds.), *Race and Modern Architecture* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2020), pp. 187–199.

of *Werkssiedlungen* and used a growing repertoire of professional strategies to that end. It is instructive, then, to consider the calls for a vernacular style that only non-vernacular architects could build both in the context of new building regulations and methods, and in connection with the increasing prospects for large-scale rural settlements of workers.³⁰⁷

The use of art-historical and aesthetic arguments as a way of asserting architects' authority and seeking employment opportunities was not new in the political history of architecture. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, architects and artists as well as political figures and educated middle-class activists promoted the rediscovery of medieval Gothic architecture as a national style. This cultural project involved a concentrated effort to document exemplary architectural monuments as well as various reconstruction and restoration projects, most famously the resumption of work on the unfinished Cologne Cathedral in 1842. Historians of art produced necessary scaffoldings for such cultural projects, publishing the first German-language works dedicated to Gothic architecture in the earlier part of the nineteenth century. This effort went hand-in-hand with the proliferation of visual representations meant both to appeal to wider educated audiences and to school the taste of those audiences. Once collected, this knowledge could be employed in architectural practice as a way of claiming a national mantle for themselves and their profession. In the closing years of the century, as Frederic J. Schwartz demonstrates, Austrian art historian Alois Riegl provided a common frame of reference for attempts by various *Werkbund* members (Peter Behrens' composition of a "style" for the industry giant AEG, for example) to think about and design a style that would be German and


³⁰⁷ Adelheid von Saldern, *Häuserleben. Zur Geschichte städtischen Arbeiterwohnens vom Kaiserreich bis Heute* (Berlin: Dietz 1997 [1995]), pp. 52–53; Lutz Raphael, "Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als methodische und konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22 (1996), pp. 165–193.

Modern, artistic and mass-produced, meant for large-scale consumption and yet sharing formalist characteristics and collapsing the separation between applied and pure art.³⁰⁸

Heimat architecture advocates around 1900 sought to employ this common style by combining a carefully studied assemblage of a local vernacular with modern building methods, which in practice often amounted to symbolic ‘quotations’ of traditional styles, ornamentations, and materials. For the architect Paul Schultze-Naumburg, a leading figure of the *Heimatschutz* movement, the folklorist, vernacular ‘peasant house’ was not only an inspiration for bourgeois *Landvillen* or a source of ‘quotations’ for *Mietskasernen* in cities, it was also a model for agricultural workers’ housing. The career of such a paragon of modern architecture as Walter Gropius, for example, was launched with construction projects on landed estates in rural Pomerania, in which he showed himself willing to dabble both in *Heimatstil* and in more functional, namely inexpensive, designs. Gropius’ first designs were of low-cost houses for agricultural laborers on the landed estate of his uncle Erich in Pomerania. These were two-storied, unadorned, cubic, semi-detached houses separated by small gardens, with slightly perched, almost flat, roofs and a small one-story, flat-roofed extension (Figure 3.2). They were laid out along one road in a domino-resembling sequence, with consecutive houses adjacent to the road or removed from it by means of the garden. Gropius’ second project, another commission from his uncle, was the design of several agricultural buildings, which also served a representational function in the symbolic economy of the estate. These, unlike the first, were designed in clear *Heimat* style that employed vernacular forms and materials. The only significant deviation from this style, notes Małgorzata Omilanowska, was the addition of a

³⁰⁸ Annah Krieg, “The Walls of the Confessions: Neo-Romanesque Architecture, Nationalism, and Religious Identity in the *Kaiserreich*” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2010). Regarding Riegel and his influence on members of the *Werkbund*, see Schwartz, *Design Theory*, ch. 2.

clocktower on the granary, so the uncle, a keen follower of the newest work organization methods of the time, could better regulate worktime, and workers' lives, on the estate (Figure 3.1). The functional building style of the workers' houses may have foreshadowed later 'modern'



Figures 3.1 and 3.2: Walter Gropius, granary (up) and workers' dwelling (down) on Erich Gropius' Jankowo estate, Pomerania (1904–1906/1909–1910).

Source: Małgorzata Omilanowska, "Das Frühwerk von Walter Gropius in Hinterpommern," pp. 151, 155.

design forms as some scholars have claimed. The uncanny, almost ghostly appearance of these houses, however, might have had more to do with the imperatives of Erich Gropius' economizing management.³⁰⁹

Gropius' stark utilitarian design for farmworkers' houses represented exactly the type of architecture that leading *Heimatschutz* advocates such as Paul Schultze-Naumburg rejected. Schultze-Naumburg argued that such building styles lacked a sense of place by ignoring vernacular building traditions and therefore did not serve to increase social cohesion and reduce class conflict. Instead, he advocated the "German peasant house" as a model that could "connect the traditionless *Stand* of the future with the past" (*den Traditionslosen Stand der Zukunft mit der Vergangenheit zu verknüpfen*). He believed that the construction of more traditional forms of housing could shape the "nature" (*Artung*) of the new proletariat that migrated into industrial centers in a socially conservative fashion, even if the design would merely give the appearance of a historically unbroken building tradition.³¹⁰

Discussion of *Heimat* and questions over the relationship between architecture and rootedness were particularly heightened in border regions such as Polish Prussia. Nationalists' anxieties about securing a German *Heimat* in Polish Prussia were also present in the architectural press of the time. The Prussian architectural journal of record, *Das Centralblatt der*

³⁰⁹ Until 1908 Gropius was an intern in the Solf and Richards architects' chambers in Berlin, where clear adherence to *Heimatstil* ruled. His designs for his uncle were private and not done through the chambers. Małgorzata Omilanowska, "Das Frühwerk von Walter Gropius in Hinterpommern," in Birte Pusback (ed.), *Landgüter in den Regionen des gemeinsamen Kulturerbes von Deutschen und Polen* (Warsaw: Instytut Sztuki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2007), pp. 133–149. Omilanowska sees in the later workers' housing a later design than the granary and ascribes it to a neoclassical influence and to Gropius' internship in Behrens' architects' chambers. See also Clemens Zimmermann, "Wohnen als sozialpolitische Herausforderung," in Jürgen Reulecke (ed.), *Geschichte des Wohnens, 1800-1918*, (Ludwigsburg and Stuttgart: Wüstenrot Stiftung and Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1997), pp. 503–636, pp. 566–567, who mentions Gropius' farmworkers housing project as a 1904 design and also includes a sketch of the domino-like layout of the buildings.

³¹⁰ Zimmermann, "Wohnen als sozialpolitische Herausforderung." The quote from Paul Schultze-Naumburg's third volume of his *Kulturarbeiten* series: Paul Schultze-Naumburg, *Dörfer und Kolonien* (Munich: Callwey, 1904), pp. 140–143.

Bauverwaltung, bemoaned in 1893 that the only provinces in Prussia which were yet to compile a registry of their architectural monuments were Poznan and the little dynastic territory of Hohenzollern in south-west Germany.³¹¹ However, the first two studies of the cultural monuments of the province in a German-nationalist key did appear only a couple of years later, notably the four-volume work by the state architect Julius Krahte, who was the conservator of monuments in Poznan in the 1890s.³¹²

After 1900, the city of Poznan itself became an object of architectural intervention on a large scale. The old city fortifications were taken down and the architect and urban planner Josef Stübgen, an expert in social segregation through zoning, took charge of redeveloping the new urban space. The first decade of the century was a period of rapid growth in which Poznań was remade into a German imperial city. While most official buildings were built in an imposing Neo-Renaissance style, the bourgeois apartment blocks that replaced Polish working-class dwellings and military fortifications tended to correspond to the fashionable *Heimat* style. These townhouses were meant for the new German bureaucratic and professional class that flocked to the city as the Prussian state increased its presence and investment in the multiethnic border region and provided officials stationed in Poznan and West-Prussia significant pay bonuses.³¹³

As we shall see with the work of the settlement commission, the new language of the modern vernacular and *Bodenständigkeit* were also new ways to argue old arguments (in

³¹¹ *Das Centralblatt der Bauverwaltung* 13:19, 13.05.1893. The reference is given in Serrier, *Posen-Ostmark-Wielkopolska*, p. 165.

³¹² Julius Krahte, *Verzeichnis der Kunstdenkmäler der Provinz Posen*, 4 vols. (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1896–1898).

³¹³ Lerp, *Imperial Grenzräume*, pp. 208–217; Hanna Grzeszczuk-Brendel, “Das Villen-Mietshaus in Posen: Eine Neue Vorstellung von Wohnung und Stadt,” in Alena Janatková and Hanna Kozińska-Witt (eds.), *Wohnen in der Großstadt 1900–1939: Wohnsituation und Modernisierung im europäischen Vergleich* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2006), pp. 379–390, on bureaucrats see p. 381. Grzeszczuk-Brendel notes that only Charlottenburg was comparable to Poznań in terms of the number state employees relative to the city population.

materials, decorations, or words) or as idiom of talking about and legitimatizing specific planning and architectural choices.³¹⁴ Seen as practices, these claims for local knowledge and rootedness were articulated within political projects that normally ignored, targeted, or radically reconfigured existing local knowledges and ways of life.

The problem for the commission, as nationalist intellectuals perceived it, was that a sense of *Heimat* in Poznan and West-Prussia was either weak or totally lacking. Some believed that a German culture could be traced back to the construction works of colonists who arrived from different German lands during the eighteenth century or to the structures linked to the Teutonic Order. However, the commission's architect, Paul Fischer, dismissed local 'German' traditions on the grounds that they largely contravened modern building regulations, especially fire protection regulations.³¹⁵ The commission did not try to find a local vernacular to inspire its architectural work, even though it did begin employing the architectural language of *Heimats* to legitimate its choices in terms of the technical inapplicability or lack of local traditions. In the building of a *Heimat* in the imperial borderlands, architectural inspiration and stylistic justification needed to be found not from local architecture but from building forms of regions where the nation and the *Heimat* were supposedly secured. However, it would also need to meet the budgetary limitations of the Colonization Commission.

³¹⁴ The same conclusion is brought for other case studies. See Susan R. Henderson, "Ernst May and the Campaign to Resettle the Countryside: Rural Housing in Silesia, 1919–1925," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 61:2 (2002), pp. 188–211.

³¹⁵ Cf. Kenny Cupers, *Bodenständigkeit*. For contemporary works, see Hans Lutsch's early study, influenced very much by Meitzen's work: Hans Lutsch, "Wanderunegn durch Ostdeutschland: Zur Erforschung volksthümlicher Bauweise," *Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung* 1888, pp. 63ff., 76ff., 368ff., 378ff.

Peasant Farmhouses and Heimat Architecture

The 'German Peasant-house' attained a central place for architects and their professionalization in Imperial Germany by the 1890s. Ethnographers and folklorists had been interested in peasant houses and in the inscribed proverbs on their doorways for about a century, but their endeavor was about collecting, documenting, preserving, and displaying. This kind of engagement with real and imagined peasant houses gained popularity in the 1870s, notably in the Habsburg Empire, and was picked up by folklorists and architects in the German empire in the 1880s and 1890s. This section looks at two prominent typological undertakings in Germany during the last decades of the nineteenth century that sought to collect and order house types. The first was August Meitzen's decades-long collection of examples of peasant houses and formulation of regional typologies, a geographical, historical, and folklorist endeavor. The second was initiated by the Berlin-based Association of German Architects to document the German *Bauernhaus* in its regional variety and under national unity. They sought to set an example of, and a model for, architectural engagement, which functioned both as an archive of examples and as an authoritative compendium for years to come. These studies of rural dwellings became foundational to attempts made by architects at the turn of the century to establish themselves as experts on social questions.

Both endeavors were undertaken with a clear sense of temporal urgency. The introduction of new building and fire regulations in the 1870s made many aspects of traditional peasant houses difficult and expensive to build, renovate, and insure, and creating a sense of imminent loss about the possible disappearance of such historic dwellings. The thatched roof was the most salient part of traditional farmhouses that was now at risk. Although it was (erroneously) considered as particularly prone to catch fire, *Heimat* style enthusiasts attached to it a central role in the appearance of a seamless combination of houses and rural landscape,

especially in northern Germany. In the Worpswede artists' colony near Bremen, an important center of avant-garde *Heimatkunst* and *Jugendstil* design, one of the colony's founders undertook experimentation to come up with a way of saving the traditional form for modern architecture by building a firesafe "impregnated thatched roof."³¹⁶

It is useful to look at the typological interest in peasant houses against the background of the supra-national imperial claims of the Habsburgs and their representation in the Vienna World Fair of 1873. This lavish undertaking, carefully planned to outdo the 1867 *Exposition Universelle* in Paris, was meant to showcase the Habsburg Empire's claim to imperial modernity and multiethnic harmony. Two exhibits in Vienna are particularly interesting for the present discussion. The first exhibit, entitled "The Middle-Class Dwelling with its Internal Furnishing and Decoration" (*Das Bürgerliche Wohnhaus mit seiner inneren Einrichtung und Ausschmückung*), explicitly rejected ethnographic display as a mode of exhibition and instead provided examples for modern domesticity and demonstrated practical solutions to urban housing problems. The second exhibit, a centerpiece of the World Fair, was the peasant farmhouse exhibit (*Das Bauernhaus mit seiner Einrichtung und seinen Geräthen*), which was precisely about the ethnographic description of peasant life. Offering what Matthew Rampley terms a "museum of rural life," the farmhouse exhibit emphasized architecture and included

³¹⁶ For the problems with using thatched roofs in the settler farms buildings, see Fischer, *Landschaftsbild und Ansiedlung*, p. 27, and Verena Jacobi, "Heimatschutz und Bauerndorf: Zum planmäßigen Dorfbau im Deutschen Reich zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts," 2 vols. (Dr.-Ing diss., Berlin Technical University, 2003), vol. 1: pp. 241, 247 and vol. 2: p. 13. Schultze-Naumburg even warned that one ill-fitting roof can destroy the pastoral character of a whole village (Quoted in Jacobi, "Heimatschutz und Bauerndorf," vol. 1: p. 221). On the ideological significance of roofs see also Richard Pommer, "The Flat Roof: A Modernist Controversy in Germany," *Art Journal* 43:2 (1983), pp. 158–169. For the experimentation in Worpswede, see Hans Am Ende, *Das feuersichere Strohdach: Protokoll der Brandprobe in Worpswede und Beschreibung der Herstellung des Daches* (Hamburg: Drexel & Adler, 1908). There were in fact several attempts to find firesafe thatched roofs, often supported by different states agencies, which centered around the idea of an "impregnated thatched roof." See Michael Schimek, *Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit. Staatliche Einflussnahmen auf das ländliche Bauen: Das Land Oldenburg zwischen 1880–1930*, pp. 233–235.

photographs, sketches, plans, and models of farmhouses as well as a life-size “peasant village” with model farmhouses designed after typical rural architecture in different regions of the Habsburg Empire. According to the pictures from the exhibit, the model village was also populated with real-life examples of rural inhabitants donning traditional costumes and demonstrating their craftwork. There is no question that the main goal of the model villages was to educate visitors about the geographic, cultural, and national diversity of the Habsburg Empire. The difference between one modern middle-class dwelling and traditional peasant houses of different regions highlights how architecture provided tools to model both regional and national diversity – based on traditionalist rurality – and to construct the modern.³¹⁷

August Meitzen’s (1822–1910) study of traditional house forms followed on the interest in rural dwellings exemplified by the Vienna farmhouse exhibit. Meitzen, a well-known agrarian economist, historian, and statistician, began his scholarly engagement only after completing his legal training and joining the Prussian state bureaucracy. His most important state-statistical work was sponsored by the Prussian agricultural ministry and sought to encompass the whole of Prussian agriculture, ranging from geology and climate to settlement forms, agricultural practices, laws, administrative regulations, and forms of labor relations.³¹⁸ Meitzen combined working for the Prussian Statistical Bureau with teaching economics, agrarian history, and statistics at the Berlin university, where he taught from 1875 until his death. Meitzen’s administrative career was closely entangled with the process of agrarian reforms in Prussia. He

³¹⁷ Mathew Rampley, “Peasants in Vienna: Ethnographic Display and the 1873 World’s Fair,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 42 (2011), pp. 110–132. More broadly see the edited volume dedicated to critical approaches to the history of the peasant house in architecture, which includes several contributions on the Habsburg Empire: Anita Aigner (ed.), *Vernakulare Moderne: Grenzüberschreitungen in der Architektur um 1900. Das Bauernhaus und seine Aneignung* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010).

³¹⁸ August Meitzen, *Der Boden und die landwirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse des preußischen Staats*, 4 vols. (Berlin: Wiegandt & Hempel, 1868–1873).

spent five years in the Prussian *General-Kommission* in Breslau (Wrocław), where he dealt with the process of dissolving feudal rights, dues, and obligations and transforming land into absolute private property. Meitzen then took up a different but related task, facilitating the introduction of the new Prussian land tax law and the new procedure of land assessment that came with it. Both roles, suggests Hartmut Harnisch, were significant for Meitzen's innovations in using historical village and field maps for historical settlement research.³¹⁹

Meitzen was interested in folklore, philology, and archeology as they pertained to the agrarian history of settlement and dwelling. He was particularly interested in dwellings, building formations, and plans. He published several articles on these topics based on a combination of archival research and ethnographic observations, with a particular focus on the rural "German" house. Meitzen's research culminated with the 1895 three-volume publication, *Wanderungen, Anbau und Agrarrecht der Völker Europas nördlich der Alpen*, which grew out of his university lectures. This work on the settlement and agriculture of West-Germanic, East-Germanic, Celts, Romans, Finns, and Slavs included a detailed description of ethnic-geographic regions, their villages and arable lands, and their farm and dwelling houses. Regarding the latter, Meitzen sought to identify regional types through a close study of variations, based on his travels, on other publications, and on reports he solicited and collected. Meitzen's was considered a masterwork at the time, breaking new ground in using historical maps of field systems (*Fluren*),

³¹⁹ Hartmut Harnisch, "August Meitzen und seine Bedeutung für die Agrar- und Siedlungsgeschichte," *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 63:1 (1975), pp. 97–119. Also see Rita Aldenhoff, "Meitzen, August," in *Neue Deutsche Biographie* vol. 16 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1990), pp. 734–735. For Meitzen's lecture topics at the university, see the historical list of professors of economics at the university, accessed May 17, 2020, http://hicks.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/history/start.php?type=person&name=Meitzen_August.

field names, and village layouts to combine architectural, spatial, and land-use analysis. Future works used his regional typology as a starting point.³²⁰

In 1881 Meitzen gave a lecture at the annual German Geographers' Conference with an eye to facilitating the gathering of information that would come to make up *Wanderungen, Anbau und Agrarrecht*. In this talk, later published as *Das deutsche Haus in seinen volksthümlichen Formen* (1882), Meitzen offered a formalist, ethnic, and geographical typology of houses and requested the aid of his audience in making further inquiries in accordance with it. He declared himself especially interested in ground plans, in details of the building and the art of construction, in variations in house forms and their reason (due to a local tradition, through usage, or due to new building regulations), in use-pattern of the house, in the ordering of objects in the house, and in naming practices of building parts, rooms, and household equipment. As he was nearing the end of his lecture, Meitzen encouraged all “friends of the cultural history of the fatherland” (*Freunden vaterländische Kulturgeschichte*) to aid him in improving the lamentable state of knowledge about the history of rural house types and duly supplied a detailed list of questions to be used in conversations with “locally-informed witnesses” (*ortskundigen Zeugen*). Meitzen provided his postal address to facilitate further communication, presumably formatted in accordance with his questionnaire. As a guide for categorization, Meitzen attached to the printed version of his paper sketches of different house types. His six questions illustrate well his particular concerns (emphasis in original):

1. In which **areas** are you familiar with traditional houses, and to which of the [attached] sketches of house types do they belong?
2. What **deviations** by custom or necessity were you able to note?

³²⁰ Jeannette Redensek, “Zur Rezeption des Bauernhauses durch die Architekten der Moderne in Deutschland um 1900,” *Zeitschrift für Kulturwissenschaften* 11:1 (2017), pp. 49–72. Cf. Reports in the bulletin of the Berlin Association of Architects discussing the issue of the “peasant house” and adopting Meitzen’s typology. For example, the Dresden Architects’ Association report in *Deutsche Bauzeitung*, 20.12.1893, pp. 622–623.

3. Can one find in the **cities** in the area traces of the rural type, or are there other distinctive [architectural] features in these cities that deviate from the usual modern way of building? Can you identify building or fire regulations that have influenced these features?
4. Are specific limits for the spread of individual types noticeable, do written records or [building] features exist that indicate that a change took place and when?
5. Are there published **descriptions or sketches** of the relevant house types? It is requested that you provide as precise information as possible regarding such literature and the addresses of such persons who are interested in these questions and might have relevant information.
6. Which internal furnishing and tools does one normally observe in the houses? Any sketch and blueprint, even if partial and done in haste in comparison with the figures that follow here [in the appendix of the booklet], are very helpful. Indication of the main dimensions is requested.³²¹

At this stage, then, Meitzen was collecting bibliographies, as well as local informants, and trying to fine-tune regional typologies about houses and to ascertain their relationship with supposed ethnic divisions of populations (*Volksstämme*).³²²

When architects in Imperial Germany became professionally interested in peasant houses in the 1890s, they looked for forms, materials, and ornamentations that provided formalistic inspiration and specific objects of material culture for ‘quotation’ with which the traditional and

³²¹ August Meitzen, *Das deutsche Haus in seinen volksthümlichen formen: Behufs Ermittlungen über die geographische und geschichtliche Verbreitung. Besprochen auf dem Geographentage zu Berlin am 7.–9. Juni 1881* [=Separat-Abdruck aus den Verhandlungen des deutschen Geographen-Tages] (Berlin: Reimer, 1882). Meitzen listed his questions on pp. 31–32 (emphasis in original):

1. In welchen **Gegenden** sind Ihnen die volksthümlichen Häuser bekannt, und welchen der in den Tafeln verzeichneten Haustypen gehören dieselben an?
2. Welche auf Sitte oder Bedürfniss beruhende **Abweichungen** haben Sie zu bemerken Gelegenheit gehabt?
3. Finden sich in den **Städten** dieser Gegenden Erinnerungen an den ländlichen Typus, oder sind in denselben andere vom gewöhnlichen modernen Bau abweichende Besonderheiten bemerkbar? Können Sie Bau- oder Brandversicherungs-Vorschriften bezeichnen, welche darauf Einfluss geübt haben?
4. Lassen sich bestimmte **Grenzen für die Verbreitung** einzelner Typen angeben, und bestehen Anzeichen oder Ueberlieferungen, dass und wann darin ein Wechsel stattgefunden?
5. Sind bereits **Beschreibungen oder Zeichnungen** der betreffenden Haustypen veröffentlicht? Es wird um möglichst genaue Angabe dieser Literatur, und um die Adresse solcher Persönlichkeiten gebeten, welche sich für diese Fragen interessiren, und darüber Auskunft zu geben vermögen.
6. Welche innere Einrichtung und welcher Hausrath ist in den beobachteten Häusern üblich? Jede Zeichnung und jeder Grundriss, auch noch flüchtiger und unvollkommener als in den bei folgenden Tafeln, ist sehr dankenswerth. Dabei wird die Angabe der Hauptmaasse erbeten.

³²² The more expansive work of Rudolf Henning, published later in the same year, should also be mentioned in this context. Henning offered a more detailed and complete typology and also challenged Meitzen on several of his typological and historical arguments. Rudolf Henning, *Das Deutsche Haus in Seiner Historischen Entwicklung* (Strasburg: Trübner, 1882). He engages Meitzen critically in the appendix.

vernacular could be appropriated for new buildings. This would allow architects to claim the coherence of what they termed “a style” rather than what they saw as changing fads and disharmonious conglomeration of historicist references.³²³ Architects’ interest in a systemized typology of German peasant houses needs to be understood in conjuncture with their attempts to create a recognized profession outside of the state’s bureaucracy of master-builders and civil engineers. A systemized typology of peasant houses, it was thought, would be of value for architects’ professional practice and for their claim for broader social and national importance. At the same time, drawing on national-folklorist legitimation, private architects sought to formulate an argument for their artistic superiority and greater national sensitivity in comparison with the overly technical state-employed building masters.

August Meitzen’s work, long considered a standard on the subject, was used by architects even as they sought to partially supplant it.³²⁴ In 1892, the German Federation of Architects’ and Civil Engineers’ Associations adopted a resolution that called for an empire-wide professional survey of peasant farmhouses. Notably, the resolution was adopted at the instigation of the Berlin Association of Architects (*Vereinigung Berliner Architekten*), which was in midst of reinventing itself as a professional body.³²⁵ The survey was to be conducted by local and regional

³²³ See above. For Alois Riegel’s influential conception of style and its subsequent importance for architectural discourse, see Schwartz, *Design Theory and Mass Culture*, ch. 2.

³²⁴ This is stated rather clearly in the introduction to the 1906 *Bauernhaus* volume: “In die Untersuchung dieses Stoffes, der in neuester Zeit vorzugsweise von Anthropologen behandelt worden sei, mit einzutreten, erscheine als eine dankbare Aufgabe der Architekten, denn die Erforschung einer Frage der Baukunst könne ohne Teilnahme der Baukundigen schwerlich einer endgültigen Lösung entgegengehen.” (*Das Bauernhaus*, p. III). On the professionalization of architecture as a competition about cultural expertise, in the German context especially with ethnographers, and the changing role of travel in and outside of Europe and the career-making of individual architects, see: Itohan Osayimwese, “Prolegomenon to an alternative genealogy of German modernism: German architects’ encounters with world cultures c. 1900,” *The Journal of Architecture* 18:6 (2013), pp. 835–874, here pp. 856–862; For the professionalization of German architects in general, see Vincent Clark, “A Struggle for Existence: The Professionalization of German Architects,” in Geoffrey Cocks and Konrad H. Jarausch (eds.), *German Professions, 1800–1950* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 143–162.

³²⁵ The new association statute from 1890 of the *Vereinigung Berliner Architekten*, for example, stipulated the establishment of new permanent committees for evaluation and certification of building procedures, methods, and

associations according to a unified set of instructions, sent as a questionnaire. The instructions for the survey made clear that philological and ethnographic inquiries, such as Riehl's and Meitzen's, were still very much present in the conceptualization of the work. Nevertheless, in contrast to Meitzen's work, the regional division of this survey was shaped more by the existence and division of labor between different local associations than by historical-ethnological and speculative typologies. The architects wanted to create a documentation of farmhouses and reflect on the "historical development of typical forms." Both exercises contributed to the practical goal of supplying models and exemplars so that new buildings could be built "im Geiste heimatlicher Überlieferung," according to the introduction to the published work.³²⁶

The introduction to the architects' *Bauernhaus* volume set out the criteria and instructions that had been sent to regional and local associations, according to which only buildings dated before 1800 were considered. Strong preference was given to buildings that were unusual in their old age or their complete preservation, had special aesthetic qualities, exhibited unusual forms and building methods, or displayed an especially clear exemplar of a house or building type. Such buildings were to be expertly documented in architectural drawings: location maps, site and floor plans, a cross-section and elevation (façade) drawings and other projections of the building or parts of it, which allowed for detailed inspection. For less important buildings, a floor plan

materials, and for taking a stand in questions of building regulations and their enforcement. The new statute also included the organization of examination and study tours to workshops, building sites, and architectural monuments (*Baudenkmälern*), and an arbitration tribunal (*Schiedsgericht*) for internal regulation of professional disputes. See the celebratory volume issued on the 25th anniversary of the association: *Vereinigung Berliner Architekten, MDCCCLXXIX-MDCCCIV* (Berlin, 1904), pp. 15–18 [Accessed online: <https://archive.org/details/vereinigungberli00vere/page/n5>]

³²⁶ Verband Deutscher Architekten- und Ingenieurvereine (ed.) *Das Bauernhaus im Deutschen Reiche und in seinen Grenzgebieten* (2 vols.) (Dresden: Gerhard Kühtmann, 1906), quote on p. VIII. The Atlas holds high-quality figures that include sketches of building fronts, ground plans, minutely rendered close-up sketches of specific decorations and building ways, and photographs of buildings, often with people who are presumably their inhabitants in what may be customary dress posing outside of the house [Accessed online: <http://dk.bu.uni.wroc.pl/cymelia/displayDocumentFotos.htm?docId=8200036645>].

sketch on a smaller scale was deemed sufficient. In general, these drawings were to display the current condition of the building, but they also needed to clearly demarcate later additions and changes. Further, inscriptions on the walls, particularly any inscribed dates or years, as well as unusual naming practices for buildings, parts of buildings, rooms, and household equipment were to be “documented with great care” and with attention to local dialects.³²⁷

By taking up such a project, architects sought to claim a special kind of expertise in knowledge-making in relation to German folk forms of dwelling. They did so in implicit competition with other professionalizing communities of expertise such as folklorists, linguists, ethnologists, geographers, and state-statisticians turned historical economists. The sense of anticipation that was reserved for the *Bauernhaus* compendium during the long years of its production (1892–1906) runs through the pages of the *Deutsche Bauzeitung*, the bulletin of the Berlin Architects’ Association. When this anticipation is considered together with the high costs of the undertaking, it seems clear that *Das Bauernhaus* was regarded as a centerpiece of architects’ professional claim-making long before the final product was published in 1906.³²⁸

While architects were mostly working in the urban environment, rural areas were seen as good objects of study for their designs. Hermann Muthesius (1861–1927), a leading advocate of Arts and Crafts ideas in Germany, an official in the Prussian trade ministry, and a member of both the *Heimatschutz* movement and the German *Werkbund*, was influential in this reconfiguration of the architectural ideas towards highlighting rural features. He saw the design and layout of “the peasant house” as quintessentially functional and devoid of superfluous

³²⁷ See the instructions in *Das Bauernhaus im Deutschen Reiche und in seinen Grenzgebieten*, p. III.

³²⁸ Regarding the costs, see *Das Bauernhaus im Deutschen Reiche*, pp. VI–VII. On top of 21,000 Mark contributed by different states and provinces for the execution of the work, 30,000 Mark for publications costs were allocated by chancellor von Bülow from the imperial coffers. On joining the *Bund Heimatschutz* see *Vereinigung Berliner Architekten*, MDCCCLXXIX–MDCCCCIV (Berlin, 1904), p. 49.

decorations. Its inherent functionality and familiarity, according to Muthesius, made the peasant dwelling an idealized model for workers' housing in the cities, not least because many workers originated from rural areas and might feel more at home in the city living in an apartment building inspired by rural models.³²⁹

By quoting traditional rural architecture in urban settings, architects hoped to evoke in memories of the rural homeland of urban workers, imagining this physical environment as free from the deep social conflict that accompanied the emergence of an industrial working class. As we have already seen, Schulze-Naumburg, a leading figure in the propagation and articulation of an architectural ideology of *Heimat*, also thought that using traditional building methods and forms would have a socially normative effect, instilling a sense of historical rootedness in the new working classes. Assumptions about innate memories of *Heimat*, itself mediated through a generalized and nationalized rural ideal, were thus a cornerstone of the model of conservative social reform that middle-class architects promoted.

During the 1890s and the 1900s, the residential house became a central unit of reform architecture, and many architects hoped to find in traditional farmhouses inspiration for modern dwellings. The peasant farmhouse was regarded as the lived-in result of hundreds of years of adaptation to changing human needs, productive activities, climates, and environments. As such, it was an authentic cultural artifact, a pure expression of German simplicity and practical innovation. At the same time, it was the place of actual living, which unified family and architecture, as Riehl already claimed in the 1860s, and where architects' work might have a social impact through design.³³⁰ It was also the place where the traditional ways of building of

³²⁹ Redensek, *Zur Rezeption des Bauernhauses*, pp. 61, 64–65.

³³⁰ For Riehl's discussion of the house, its architecture, and the family, see Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, *Die Familie* [= *Die Naturgeschichte des Volkes als Grundlage einer deutschen Social-Politik*, vol. 3] (Stuttgart: Cotta 1861), II:3, pp. 203–246. On Riehl's role in the formulation of a specific concept of *Heimat* regarding the Bavarian Platinat, see

the locality, which architects termed *vernacular*, were to be found as an object of study and appropriation. The separation between modern housing solutions and traditional peasant farmhouses on display in the 1873 Vienna Exhibition had been reworked by 1900 as the traditional became a source of design motifs and architectural forms for modern housing. Between 1900–1906, Muthesius, Schultze-Naumburg, and the Berlin Architects' Association all published standard-setting works and joined others in formulating an influential new vocabulary of terms, forms, and material. The professionalization of architecture went hand-in-hand with new claims about the links between traditional peasant houses and a German national, modern architecture.

Paul Fischer's Farmhouse Survey: Collection and Utilization

The growing architectural interest in rural dwellings in the 1890s occurred just as the Prussian Colonization Commission faced dwindling numbers of prospective settlers. The commission interpreted the decline in interest as partially a result of the low appeal of the commission-built farms. At the same time, the commission was dealing with the criticism of Max Sering and others over the long-term financial ramifications of overspending on the initial construction of settlers' farms. It was within this context that Paul Fischer turned his focus to the study of settlers' farmhouse designs. In state-sponsored projects state architects and civil engineers usually adhered to templates that were approved by different state agencies and were reproduced in official manuals (for example, the *Domäneverwaltung* in relation to agricultural buildings). Fischer decided to take a different course by studying how settlers were actually building their farms and using this for his own plans. He hoped to collect good examples for

see Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: the German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 34–41.

what architects call “solutions” that settlers came up with in their new farms and to use these designs to estimate the building costs of well-designed settler farms.

Fischer’s survey and the subsequent report have not been discussed by scholars. It is not completely clear how he in fact used the survey that he requested teachers in settler villages to conduct during 1896. The report that he composed based on this survey, however, was deemed worthwhile enough to justify the allocation of funds to compensate teachers and to fund a separate publication. It was also deemed suitable to be appended to the 1896 annual report of the commission. The survey proved to be a steppingstone in Fischer’s career. By the 1910s he became an authority on planning villages that paired modern *Heimat* style architecture with the economizing imperatives of low-income housing.

We do not know what brought the 37-year-old Paul Fischer to the Prussian Colonization Commission in 1896, and we know previous little about his life, education, and career up to that time. Fischer was born in 1860 in the small spa town Langensalza, about 35 kilometers northwest of Erfurt, which became part of Prussian Saxony in 1815. We do not know anything about his background, but in light of his studies, it may be that he came from a master bricklayer’s family. Before joining state service, he attended Langensalza’s building trade school (*Baugewerkschule*), where he specialized in brickmaking, and spent two years (1881–1883) as a visiting student at the much more prestigious Technical College in Hannover, where he expanded on his previous training and also studied with the star architect Conrad Wilhelm Hase (1818–1902). Inspired by North German Gothic architecture that employed exposed bricks, Hase, a Hanoverian loyalist and keen builder of churches, developed a particular way of using exposed red bricks as architectural elements to emphasize buildings’ contours while giving a sense of

timelessness and local rootedness in the construction.³³¹ During his time in Hannover, Fischer probably encountered the Hannover-born Alfred Hugenberg, who stayed in his family home while writing his dissertation. The two struck a long-term relationship of patronage.

A postcard that Fischer sent to his friend and patron Hugenberg in October 1896 is his first private correspondence that we have (see figure 3.3). Fischer's postcard was probably sent during a vacation in the artists' colony in Worpswede on the Teufelmoor northeast of Bremen, and combined friendliness and flattery with a pencil-drawn sketch of a farmhouse. This was a *Fachhallenbau* farmhouse with dwelling and stall that was considered typical of the moorlands of northwest Germany. Inspired by French impressionist landscape painting and *Art Nouveau* designs, the Worpswede artists sought to practice an avantgarde *Heimatkunst* that paid attention to the specificities of local landscapes and local craft traditions. The artists engaged in many art forms, but it was landscape paintings of the moorlands that took up much of their time. Fischer chose a farmhouse sketch as a symbol of the colonization of the high moors that served as the topic of Hugenberg's dissertation and began the postcard with a greeting "from the fen colonies to their author." A recurring theme of their correspondence between 1896–1917 was Fischer's requests for career advancement opportunities. Possibly, it was Hugenberg, the righthand man of the commission's president von Wittenberg, who brought Fischer to the commission.³³²

³³¹ Fischer's studies in Hannover are documented in Archiv der TIB/Universitätsarchiv Hannover, Best. 9, Nr. 89, Bl. 10 und 49, and in Herbert Mundhenke, *Die Matrikel der Höheren Gewerbeschule, der Polytechnischen Schule und der Technischen Hochschule zu Hannover*, vol. 3. (Hildesheim 1988–1992), entry 7706. On Hase, see Markus Jäger, *Conrad Wilhelm Hase (1818–1902): Architekt, Hochschullehrer, Konsistorialbaumeister, Denkmalpfleger* (Hannover: Imhof Verlag, 2019).

³³² The Fischer-Hugenberg correspondence is located in BA-Koblenz, N1231/13, pp. 117ff. On Hugenberg's role in the colonization commission, see Lerp, *Imperiale Grensräume*, pp. 178ff. Hugenberg's dissertation, written under the agrarian economist Georg Friedrich Knapp in Strasbourg, was published as Alfred Hugenberg, *Innere Colonisation im Nordwesten Deutschlands* (Strasbourg: Trübner, 1891). Elizabeth Jones has published extensively on the fen colonies, also touching on their connections with the colonization of Prussian Poland. See Elizabeth B. Jones, "The Rural 'Social Ladder': Internal Colonization, Germanization and Civilizing Missions in the German Empire," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 40:4 (2014), pp. 457–492. On the Worpswede artists' colony, see Jennifer Jenkins, "Heimat Art, Modernism, Modernity," in David Blackbourn and James Retallack, *Localism, landscape, and*



Figure 3.3: Paul Fischer, Postcard with a Peasant House Sketch. “The fen colonies greet their author...,” Fischer wrote to Alfred Hugenberg, whose dissertation dealt with the colonization of the fenlands in northwest Germany. In the center is a sketch of what resembles a niederdeutscher Fachhallenbau, showing the gabled stall front, possibly the other side is the dwelling part. Worpswede, near Bremen, 3.10.1896.

Paul Fischer’s survey of settlers’ farms was undertaken earlier that same year and appended to the commission’s 1896 annual report under the title “comparative remarks on settlers’ self-constructed buildings, on the basis of 513 sketches, done in the year 1896.”

the Ambiguities of Place: German-Speaking Central Europe, 1860–1930 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2007), pp. 60–75.

(Vergleichende Bemerkungen über 'Eigenaufbauten' von Ansiedlern auf Grund von 513 Skizzen, aufgenommen im Jahre 1896). In internal correspondence, however, the survey on which Fischer based his report had a different title that emphasized Fischer's interest in architectural form (*Behebung über die Grundformen welche sich der selbstständige Gehöftbau der Ansiedler bewegt hat*). The sketches were made by village teachers following instructions that Fischer sent to every settlement established by the commission. The teachers were told to sketch ground plans of "especially characteristic" farm layouts built by settlers according to their own design, rather than farms that used already-existing buildings, those built by the colonization commission, or whose design followed a government blueprint. Teachers were to interview the owners about the buildings and their use and hopefully glean information about building costs directly from settlers. Fischer emphasized in his instructions the importance of details on everyday practices for architectural plans and the need for sketches. The collected material, unsystematic and varied according to Fischer's subsequent report, amounted to 513 sketches of farmhouses. It afforded, wrote Fischer, a unique source that surpassed "technical or historical compendia" because of the intimate local knowledge of teachers and the collection's attention to the particular conditions in the locality. Fischer hoped that by collecting this information, he would be able to design farm buildings more suitable to each locality, more appealing to settlers, and more cost-effective.³³³

The collected sketches and reports of teachers did not survive in a centralized collection, and the process in which teachers' responses were collected, sorted, interpreted, and utilized left us with a fragmentary archival trail. One surviving file in the colonization commission's archival

³³³ See the details in the Colonization Commission's 1896 annual report, in *Stenographischen Berichten über die Verhandlungen des Preuß. Hauses der Abgeordneten, 18. Leg. Periode, IV. Session* (3rd Volume) (Berlin 1897), pp. 1705–1706. Fischer's report is located in appendix XIa to the annual report: "Eigenaufbauten von Ansiedler auf Grund von 513 Skizze, aufgenommen im Jahre 1896," pp. 1770–1789. The internal instructions and framing of the survey are in APP Gneizno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Vol. 4, Registratur C-III, Nr. 1880, pp. 9ff.

collection in Gniezno can shed some light on the administrative process behind the 1896 survey on farmhouses. This file, dealing with the settler-village of Dollnik, was opened in the commission's civil engineering department in 1894, when the process of establishing the village was under intense scrutiny by the Prussian State Comptroller.³³⁴ While also dealing with other issues, the bulk of the slim file concerns Fischer's 1896 survey and subsequent report. It begins with Fischer's circular to teachers in settler-villages, in which he set out the task at hand and promised a compensation of up to 25 Marks depending on the amount and quality of their work. This sum amounted to between a quarter and a half of the monthly pay of a rural *Volksschullehrer*.³³⁵ Witte, the village teacher, informed the commission that he would take the offer and would try to complete the gathering of information as soon as possible. Three weeks later, Witte sent the commission sketches of nineteen farm layouts and asked for a speedy payment of the promised compensation. An expeditious transfer of the money would help him greatly, as on top of his "wretched living conditions" he needed to cope with recent cases of illness in his family. Apparently satisfied with Witte's work, Fischer approved payment of the maximal compensation without delay.³³⁶

³³⁴ While other files regarding building projects in settler-villages may contain similar documents, I could not locate in Gniezno any other file similar to this one about Dollnik.

³³⁵ The average yearly pay for primary and secondary school teachers was the lowest in the eastern provinces of Prussia and especially so in rural areas. It could range between 1000–1200 Marks, often less than a half of the pay in the western provinces. Women teachers received an even lower pay. Otto Rühle, one of the important marxist pedagogical experts, had spent years criticizing not only the notoriously low pay of Prussian teachers, primarily in the countryside, but also challenged the truthfulness of government statistics about teachers's pay. See e.g. Otto Rühle, "Die wirtschaftliche Lage der preussischen Volksschullehrer," *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, 1/1903, Januar 1903, pp. 71–77. More broadly see Marjorie Lamberti, *State, Society, and the Elementary School in Imperial Germany* (Oxford University Press 1989).

³³⁶ See the correspondence between Fischer and Witte and between Fischer and the Bromberg/Bydgoszcz regional government in: "Dolnik: Bauten Generalia," APP-Gneizno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Vol. 4, Registratur C-III, Nr. 1880, pp. 9–14.

Fischer asked teachers to sketch out “very simple” ground plans of settlers’ farms based on on-site measuring and to include on the reversal side of each sketch a short description of the individual buildings. These included a description of the set-up of the farm, which he divided into dwellings and farm buildings. Regarding the former, Fischer wanted to know about building costs, heating and cooking installations, set-up of the kitchen, cooking and washing utensils, water pipework (taking water in and out), water pumps, and wells. Fischer divided farm buildings into stall and barn structures and requested a detailed description of each. He wanted to know about the particularities of the set-up of the stall and ways in which stall-feeding was organized. This included the placement and make-up of the fodder crib, the feeding access routes (one central gangway with access to all the stall-animals, or otherwise), the ways in which animals reached the food (stall-feeding for cattle was different from pig-feeding), the approach and connecting passages to the feeding spots (*Futterboden*), the existence and location of steam-machines used in dairy production, the existence of a boiling room, the washing equipment, organization of the cattle in the stall, the groupings of the different kind of cattle, the system put in place for collecting and depositing animal excrements (pipes, receptacles), the structure and location of manure heaps, and the ways of conveyance of liquid (e.g. surface water) to and from the manure deposit. Regarding barns and other storage facilities, Fischer expressed interest in unusual collection and storage methods, use of sloping walls and roof, the location of equipment storage rooms (*Schirrkammer*), basement, wagon shed, and storage rooms for provisions. Fischer emphasized that he was looking for “especially practical and unusual positioning of the farms to each other, size of the farm, ways of fencing and enclosing, garden layout, entry and access roads, and the like,” and in short everything that is “comfortable, practical, and useful for saving labor.” If several settlers built similar houses following the same design, Fischer wrote, “it is

only necessary to give one typical example.” Fischer, then, was interested in a collection of building forms and completed farms that represented the different formalist types utilized by settlers.³³⁷

One aspect that drew Fisher’s attention was the ways in which settlers fashioned the connection between the dwelling house and the animal stall, shaped both by the expectation of a material and functional separation between the two spaces and by the need of frequent and convenient access. Building and fire regulations stipulated that dwellings and farm buildings were to be separate or if under one roof, needed to have a “fire wall,” or a fire-resistant brick wall between them. Costs associated with following such regulations made Fischer particularly interested in the different ways in which feeding, excrement collection, and direct access to the animals were structured. Connecting house and stall was a crucial question for every peasant farm due to the centrality of livestock for small agrarian producers. Fischer emphasized settlers’ solutions that minimized the wall space overlap between stall and dwelling (thereby minimizing the need for a firewall), allowed both separation and direct access through a fodder kitchen, or were otherwise able to provide an inexpensive solution that complied with building regulations.

The most important administrative goal of the 1896 survey was to provide the commission with a benchmark cost calculus to control settlers’ expenditure and its own building budget. Fischer was suspicious of the information that settlers provided in this regard, but he also recognized the significance of the information that they could provide. As he noted in his instructions to teachers, he was interested in estimates of building costs only if they were settlers’ own estimation. But Fischer’s professional expertise gave allowed him to see beyond what he claimed was peasants’ tendency to boast when asked about the construction costs of their own

³³⁷ Fischer to Witte, APP-Gneizno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Vol. 4, Registratur C-III, Nr. 1880, pp. 9–10.

farm. He was confident in his ability to correctly estimate the cost of a building once he learned of its architectural specifications. Nevertheless, he suggested that information collected from settlers substantiated his own calculations. His calculations showed that the smaller the plots increased the average cost per hectare, a hypothesis that came to be treated as axiomatic by the commission. In 1907, roughly the same ratio between building costs and plot size was given as the general rule for farm construction by the commission, showing the use of Fischer's calculations as a standard for measuring the efficiency of farms.³³⁸

Looking through his later publications, it seems that Fischer's study enabled him to borrow specific elements and solutions from settlers' actual designs rather than wholesale blueprints, and to use these elements in his own designs while claiming a certain authenticity for these designs due to their supposed peasant origins. His lavish 1904 publication for the commission that included a hundred architectural sketches for farmhouses, workers' houses, poorhouses, and communal structures, did not include examples of a clear appropriation of whole farm layouts from his survey.³³⁹ This weighty, glossy book in a large 36x52 centimeters format was available to the public for the price of 55 Mark for the whole 100-page bounded portfolio or 12.50 Mark for a bundle of 25 loose sheets. It was officially meant for artisan master

³³⁸ For Fischer's instructions see APP-Gneizno, Komisja Kolonizacyjna, Vol. 4, Registratur C-III, Nr. 1880, pp. 9ff. In 1896 Fischer divided the building costs in three size categories (Under 10 Hectare: 650M/Ha; 10–25 Hectare: 450M/Ha; Over 25 Hectare: 350M/Ha. In 1907 the scale started with 5–10 Hectare plots, through 10–20 Hectare, and ended with plots 20–50 Hectare in size. That meant that in 1907 farm plots earmarked for workers and craftspeople, as well as workers cottages, were left out of the calculation altogether, and so were larger farms. One reason for that was probably that the commission normally built these dwellings. Compare the commission's 1896 annual report with the 1907 annual report, p. 65. For the 1904 publication: Paul Fischer, *Ansiedlungsbauten in den Provinzen Posen und Westpreußen, im Auftrage der Königl. Ansiedlungskommission zu Posen* (Halle a. S., 1904). For the 1899 and 1910 manuals see: *Geschäftsweisungen für die Ansiedlungsvermittler der Königl. Ansiedlungs-Kommission 1899*, in Archiwum Państwowe w Koszalinie, Landratsamt Flatow: Durchführung des Ansiedlungsgesetzes 1886–1913, Nr. 194, pp. 65–114; *Geschäftsweisungen für die Ansiedlungsvermittler der Königl. Ansiedlungs-Kommission 1910*, in GStA PK I. HA. Rep. 212 Nr. 5224.

³³⁹ Paul Fischer, *Ansiedlungsbauten in den Provinzen Posen und Westpreußen, im Auftrage der Königl. Ansiedlungskommission zu Posen* (Halle a. S., 1904).

builders and building firms as a “practical reference work” (*praktisches Vorlagewerk*), and probably also for the wider architectural profession. Fischer could expect a wide circulation of the sketchbook not only because of its lavish design or ambitious scope, but also because its makeup allowed interested readers to order individual pages according to a table of contents provided in the book’s promotional leaflet. Bearing in mind the control that Fischer had on construction and building plans in the commission’s settlements (see chapter 2), it may well be that this “practical reference work” was also meant to direct building firms that worked in the commission’s settlements towards the right kind of cost calculus and designs. It was probably also distributed to estate managers, perhaps in the form of loose sheets of paper, as a practical guide for them to evaluate settlers’ building plans before they were sent for review to the Fischer’s department.³⁴⁰

The framing and arguments chosen by Fischer to assert the professional importance of the publication point to a process of eclectic appropriation and reconfiguration whereby Fischer attempted to claim a kind of peasant authenticity for his designs. The promotional leaflet, which echoed Fischer’s introduction to the book, emphasized the unique character of the publication as an authentic representation of peasants’ dwelling designs expertly adapted for the economizing principles of settlement. Fischer claimed that the book served as a corrective to the usual architectural engagement with rural settlement. Instead of costly plans that offered “charming and picturesque solutions” or “architecturally interesting” designs, “simplicity, practicality, and low cost” were required for farmers’ “struggle for existence.” Fischer promised that the book contained only “actually executed templates” built either by settlers or by the colonization

³⁴⁰ Paul Fischer, *Ansiedlungsbauten in den Provinzen Posen und Westpreußen, im Auftrage der Königliche Ansiedlungskommission zu Posen* (Halle a. S., 1904). The Promotional booklet by the publisher Ludwig Hofstetter in Halle an der Saale for *Ansiedlungsbauten* is located in GStA PK XVI. HA. Rep. 30 Nr. 1292 (unpaginated). For a detailed discussion of the supervision over settlers’ farm construction see chapter 2.

commission, which made use of “peasants’ planning ideas” (*bäuerliche Planideen*). The designs in the book thus claimed to offer access to authentic farm design by “peasants from the most varied parts of the German fatherland [who] had the possibility to build their farms according to their local traditions,” undisturbed by “state impositions” (*nicht durch staatliche Bevormundung hierin gestört*). State intervention, he wrote, was limited to supplying building materials and to “examining” (*Prüfung*) the building plans. This statement, which was repeated often in the commission’s official reports, was palpably false. As the previous chapter demonstrated, the provision of building advice and the examination of building plans were, in fact, accompanied by a range of sanctions that were precisely designed to impose Fischer’s planning ideas and his criteria of “simplicity, practicality, and low cost” on settlers’ farmhouse design.³⁴¹

Fischer’s mention of “peasants’ planning ideas” as lending authenticity to the commission’s designs can help us understand how he engaged with the results of the 1896 survey. Fischer had probably eclectically assembled different elements of settlers’ farm design in his plans regardless of any supposed regional origins and without regard to the individual unity of the plans from which they were appropriated. As the 1904 book advertisement indicated, Fischer attributed a superior claim for authenticity to those elements that he adopted from settlers’ farmhouse designs, which thereby endowed his designs with greater authority. He employed similar methods in the design of the commission’s much publicized model-village in Golenhofen/Goleńczewo (built between 1902–1906). The commission claimed that the village represented the variety of Germany’s regions, but the actual design of the houses showed no sign of such an architectural unity in diversity. Rather, as Verena Jakobi demonstrates, Fischer used

³⁴¹ Promotional booklet by the publisher Ludwig Hofstetter in Halle an der Saale for *Ansiedlungsbauten in den Provinzen Posen und Westpreußen*. GStA PK XVI. HA. Rep. 30 Nr. 1292 (unpaginated). For a detailed discussion of the supervision over settlers’ farm construction see the chapter 2.

elements of farmhouses of different regions, combining them to create picturesque farmhouses in such a way that precluded any pretensions that they represented the building traditions specific to settlers' home region. The village as created by Fischer, then, did not meet the criteria of architectural *Heimat*, which assumed a different and coherent regionalist vernacular that settlers would bring with them. Moreover, the model village in Golenhofen/Goleńczewo was exempt from the usual economizing building policies of the commission as it was meant to showcase the commission's work to prospective settlers, journalists, and politicians. It was widely publicized and also won praise among professional architects, including from important reform architecture journals and from Paul Schultze-Naumburg.³⁴²

Regionalism and Populism in the Commission's *Heimat*-talk

Fischer's 1896 report was organized according to the regional origin of the settlers. Since Fischer instructed teachers to send him sketches of farms, with details about each farm on the backside of the corresponding sketch, he was presumably able to easily sort and sort anew each sketch according to different formalist-architectural, production-related, and regional characteristics. He nevertheless decided on a regional division for the report. This decision was not accidental. It reflected the ways in which class, culture, and race were mapped by the

³⁴² Verena Jakobi, *Heimatschutz und Bauerndorf*, pp. 1–45. On Schultze-Naumburg in this context, see Cupers, *The Earth that Modernism Built*. Favorable contemporary reviews for Fischer's Goleńczewo/Golenhofen design can be found in Kiehl, "Golenhofen bei Posen. Ein Musterdorf," *Die Gartenkunst* IX:4 (1907), pp. 71–73. Also see the extensive preview in "Das Ansiedlungsdorf Golenhofen bei Posen," *Blätter für Architektur und Kunsthandwerk* 20: 9–10 (September 1907), pp. 33–39. The city planner Theodore Goecke also praised Fischer's Goleńczewo/Golenhofen design, together with the planning of the workers' colony in Dembsen south of Poznań in the Garden City publication *Der Städtebau*. See Theodore Goecke, "Der Bebauungsplan in Stadt und Land," *Der Städtebau* 11 (1914), pp. 19–21. The model-village in Goleńczewo/Golenhofen was also used in the *Heimat* propaganda of the time. The nationalist publisher Oskar Eulitz included an aquarelle painting of the village in his print series *Landschafts- und Kulturbilder aus dem deutschen Osten*, which was edited by the pedagogue Hermann Schwochow and offered pedagogical tools and advice books for schoolteachers. Schwochow also published a detailed description of Goleńczewo/Golenhofen with the same publisher. Hermann Schwochow *Die deutschen Ansiedlungen in der Provinz Posen nach ihrer geschichtl. Entwicklung u. ihrem gegenwärt. Stande mit besond. Berücks. d. Ansiedlungsdorfes Golenhofen* (Lissa: Oskar Eulitz, 1908).

commission's officials on an ambiguous political hierarchy that combined administrative regions, epistemological divisions of east and west, and broad ethnic and geographic generalizations, like "Russian Germans," "German Returnees," or Swabians. These divisions and hierarchies were not just an example of armchair political fantasies. They had a concrete social logic and were used as administrative strategies of population management by the colonization commission.

Fischer's published report was broadly organized according to a west-east axis. Westphalia came first with the largest number of sketches, followed by Lippe-Detmold, the Rhine Province, The Prussian province of Saxony, The Kingdom of Württemberg, the provinces of Hessen, Hannover, Schleswig-Holstein, and finally Lower Austria. The second part of the report detailed the regions on the right bank of the Elbe, with Brandenburg followed by Silesia, Pomerania, Mecklenburg, and East Prussia. The final two regions were the colonized provinces of Poznania and West Prussia. There was, then, distinction neither between Prussia and the other states of the empire, nor between the Habsburg crown lands of Lower Austria, and the lands within the borders of the German empire. The nationalist politics behind this division was very much in line with the Pan-German conception of the German nation as transcending the borders of the German state.³⁴³

The colonized provinces of Poznania and West-Prussia were given short shrift in Fischer's published survey. Fischer explained that he ignored in the calculation of building costs the 181 sketches of farms built by settlers from Poznania and West-Prussia because they were built with "local" (*einheimisch*) knowledge. This familiarity with local conditions allowed

³⁴³ 1896 Annual Report. On the relationship between the settlement project in Polish Prussia and pan-German conceptions of the nation, see Lerp, *imperial Grenzräume*, pp. 117–148.

“local” settlers to avoiding many of the difficulties encountered by settlers from outside and to build their farms inexpensively. Although Fischer justified the omission of about a third of his source-material through such technical arguments, it seems likely that the main reason was that settlers from Poznanian and West-Prussia were generally regarded by the commission as less desirable than settlers from western Germany. They did not add new Germans to the population of Polish Prussia, did not bring supposedly superior cultural and economic capacities, and were suspect of mingling with Poles. Fischer focused, then, on the commission’s favored candidates for settlement, namely west-German settlers, who also proved hard to satisfy when the commission built their farms.³⁴⁴

The overlap between cultural hierarchies based on regional origin and social hierarchies can be seen in the writings of Heinrich Sohnrey, the populist, folklorist, and conservative social reformer who cooperated with Hugenberg in the propaganda efforts of the Colonization Commission in the 1890s and 1900s. Sohnrey positioned himself at a distance from the more practical usage of *Heimat* by the commission’s officials. His use of Fischer’s report shows the range of possible directions that *Heimat-building* as a form of legitimation could take. Sohnrey embraced a more populist understanding of *Heimat* that emphasized the emotional and everyday experiences of ordinary, if also stereotypical, inhabitants of the countryside. His 1897 promotional book on his travels in the provinces of Poznanian and West Prussia contrasted with Fischer’s more professionalized, bureaucratic, and expert-oriented approach to farmhouse building and to authoritative knowledge-making. In short, this section aims to chart a range of options for utilizing the conceptions of *Heimat* to naturalize social hierarchies.

³⁴⁴ 1896 Annual Report. For the intricate categorization of “heimisch” settlers, see the commission’s manuals for estate managers: *Geschäftsanweisungen* 1899, pp. 18–20; *Geschäftsanweisungen* 1910, pp. 14–15.

Since the 1890s, the Prussian Colonization Commission utilized rural-folklorist and romanticist *Heimat* motifs in its publications to articulate, legitimize, and publicize its work to different audiences and to appeal to would-be settlers. In 1898, the commission began publishing a monthly bulletin, *Neues Bauernland*, which fulfilled the functions of an official paper, giving notice for trips to settlements, available plots, and the procedures of settlement (see figures 4–5). It also had a “non-official” part, which included advice columns, discussing issues like how to use phosphate as an additive to animal fodder to improve the fertilizing capacity of manure and how to slaughter pigs to maximize meat quality. The publication also included didactic morality tales on topics such as the proper behavior in relation to the commission’s officials, the necessity of sufficient insurance, and the importance of building farmhouses inexpensively. Other items included stories about the idyll of communal life in settler-villages, such as the formation of a singing association. The bulletin was published as a supplement to *die Kleine Dorfzeitung*, one of Sohnrey’s journals, bankrolled by the Prussian ministry of agriculture and reliant on Sohnrey’s rural-romanticist and folklorist storytelling skills. Sohnrey had invented a whole gallery of stereotypical male village characters and used them to deliver a variety of lessons and information to his purportedly rural readership. In addition, there were advice columns written by experts (lawyers, veterinarians), who presumably answered real questions almost as often as they wrote lectures pretending to be answers. *Neues Bauernland* was distributed as a part of *die Kleine Dorfzeitung*, and so Sohnrey’s writings and his village characters often wandered, announced and unannounced, between the pages of the two publications. *Neues Bauernland* regularly included advertisements for the serial publications edited by Sohnrey, *die Kleine*

Dorfzeitung and *das Land*, as well as for his two promotional books about the Prussian settlement project.³⁴⁵



Figures 3.4 and 3.5: The Colonization Commission's official bulletin, *Neues Bauernland*, vol. 11 (1898) and vol. 11 (1904), masthead of title page.

Source: GStA PK XVI HA. Rep. 30, Nr. 1292.

³⁴⁵ The State Library in Berlin (Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin) holds probably the most extensive series of the of *Neues Bauernland*. The discussion here is based on this series combined with some of the earlier issues, retrieved from the Prussian State Archive: GStA PK XVI. HA. Rep. 30 Nr. 1292. On Sohnrey, who was born in the rural countryside around Göttingen in 1859, the illegitimate son of a local noblemen, and on his worldview and work for the Colonization Commission see Georg Stöcker, *Agrarideologie und Sozialreform im Deutschen Kaiserreich: Heinrich Sohnrey und der Deutsche Verein für ländliche Wohlfahrts- und Heimatpflege 1896–1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), pp. 41–67, 145–155.

The change of symbolism in *Neues Bauernland* is noteworthy (figures 4–5). We can see the change of symbolism from the happy village-life of two young farmers, with background drawings depicting different stages in the process of settlement (moving in, building a house) to a much more austere and manly imagery. By 1904 the official representation of the commission was the grim and heroic *Jugendstil* drawing of a lone hard-working male farmer demonstrating ownership and belonging by ploughing the land with a pair of horses.

Sohnrey was a key figure in the production of a *Heimat* ideology for the colonization project. His agrarian-romantic, conservative, and folklorist-populist worldview emphasized the plight of rural laborers and the importance of their emotional rootedness in one place to prevent their migration to cities and their transformation to a politically dangerous and morally corrupted urban proletariat. With his promotional book, *Travels through the German Settlement Area* (1897), Sohnrey provided the commission with an effective propaganda tool. In the book, he adroitly combined his personal voice, recounting his travel experiences and recording observations, with the voice of an official. While in his own voice, Sohnrey struck a populist tone and identified with the “little man” over the “heartless bureaucrat.” His official or administrative voice, often involved the reproduction, almost verbatim at times, of large parts of the commission’s publications.³⁴⁶

Sohnrey purported to summarize Fischer’s report for his readers. In fact, he copied almost verbatim long chunks of text, while making small but significant changes that foregrounded folklorist romanticizing of regional identities. At the same time, he had cut out some of the most important architectural aspects in Fischer’s original version. Sohnrey omitted plot sizes and made some changes in the architectural drawings that Fischer provided, including

³⁴⁶ Heinrich Sohnrey, *Eine Wanderfahrt durch die deutschen Ansiedlungsgebiete* (Berlin: Schoenfeldt, 1897).

in the placement of structures in relation to each other. In Sohnrey's view, the construction of one's house was an almost mystical act. It was a foundational moment in the development of the emotional bond between people and their local environment. He thus sought to use Fischer's report to demonstrate the different German *Volksstämme*, a concept that referred to regional origins and to the diversity attributed to the German nation. He was much less interested in the exactness of architectural blueprints.³⁴⁷

The building of a house as a symbolic act of sinking roots into the landscape enabled Sohnrey to highlight the close relationship between settlers' origins, their capacity for a sense of *Heimat*, and their ability to carry this sensibility with them, as he termed it, into the new settlements in the colonized provinces and to recreate the old *Heimat* in a new place. As an important national and *volkstümlich* moment, settlers' housebuilding was essential for the commission's settlement project, he argued. He criticized the commission for its overly bureaucratic approach in the construction of settler farms and for its failure to recognize the emotional value of farmhouses for settlers. He railed against the uniformity of the red brick buildings and the lack of consideration of settlers' *Volksstamm* and peasant traditions in house design, symbolized for him by the absence of inscribed *Haussprüche* that he detected in the settlements. In Sohnrey's view, settlers could and partially did reproduce their old *Heimat* in building their farms, but a complete reproduction could only be achieved if settlers wrestled control of the building process from the commission's bureaucrats, possibly from Fischer himself. This complete reproduction of the old *Heimat* in the new place was nevertheless

³⁴⁷ To the best of my knowledge, scholars have invariably missed the published version of Fischer's report, and drew on Sohnrey's edited reproduction only. Sohnrey, *Wanderfahrt*, pp. 49–83. For diversity in the understandings of *Heimat*, see Celia Applegate, "Senses of Place," in Helmut Walser Smith (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 50–70.

reserved only to some settlers. Only settlers from western Germany (“especially the Westphalians”) could forge the unique emotional bond with the new *Heimat* by building their own farm. Settlers from eastern Germany were excluded from this moment altogether, as Sohnrey considered them to have a weak sense of folkish regional distinctiveness (*Volkstum*).³⁴⁸

Ambiguously German: “Returnees” as Administrative Category

In his 1896 report, Fischer listed, after East-Prussia and before Poznan, a newly conceived group of people rather than a province or a region. The group was the “returnees from Russia” (*Russische Rückwanderer*), individuals and families who resided in, and were subjects of, the Russian Empire and whose origins went back to various invited migrations from German-speaking central Europe to different parts of the Russian Empire between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries. In the second half of the nineteenth century, German migrant communities beyond the borders and political control of Imperial Germany were seen by German nationalists as part of the national body and as potential tools of national and colonial expansion both in continental Eurasia and overseas. The lack of a German state strong enough to compete on the imperial stage before 1871 led many nationalists to develop a conception of the nation that was geographically expansive and relied on the notion of a “national diaspora” to conceptualize the imagined ties between what was increasingly termed “Germans abroad,” or *Auslanddeutsche*, and the German lands in Central Europe. The etymological transformation of *Auswanderer*

³⁴⁸ “Zu diesen Vorteilen kommt noch ein wesentliches Moment, das meiner Meinung nach gerade für den nationalen Zweck des Ansiedelungsgesetzes durchaus in Anschlag gebracht werden muß: der Ansiedler kann sich das Haus nach seiner heimatlichen Sitte und Gewohnheit einrichten. Wie die Erfahrung genugsam gezeigt hat, ist dies volkstümliche Moment für die aus dem Westen kommenden Ansiedler, besonders für die Westfalen, von einer keineswegs geringen Bedeutung, wohingegen es allerdings für die östlichen Ansiedler, die kein so scharf ausgeprägtes charakteristische Volkstum haben, so gut wie gar nicht in Betracht kommt.” Sohnrey, *Wanderfahrt*, pp. 48–53. On p.86n1 he stated that “So habe ich nicht ein einziges Haus gefunden, über dessen Hausthür ein guter, sinniger deutscher Hausspruch begrüßt hätte.”

(emigrant) to *Auslanddeutsche* that gained traction from the middle of the century stood for broader changes in the meaning of Germanness, which combined language and culture with an increasingly widespread assumption about innate national commonalities. Although the emigration of Germans from German states had been a theme of nationalist debates and anxieties about the ‘national body’ since mid-century, it was not until the establishment of Imperial Germany that government policies and new legal categories were developed to steer emigration and to encourage the “return” of those who “remained German in language and customs” (“nach Sprache und Sitte deutsch geblieben”), as a Prussian government decree on their access to citizenship rights put it in 1899. Previously, every citizen who left Prussia, and other German states, for ten years would have lost their citizenship.³⁴⁹

The Colonization Commission, the Prussian government, and associations such as the Pan-German League and the Eastern Marches Association cast “returnee” Germans, especially those coming from the Russian and Habsburg empires as a permanent “German” solution to the shortage in German agricultural workers (rather than Polish or seasonal migrant workers) in the eastern provinces of Prussia. In view of the large number of Polish workers in its settlements and

³⁴⁹ Dieter Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen: die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), pp. 259ff; Bradley Naranch, “Inventing the Auslandsdeutsche. Emigration, Colonial Fantasy, and German National Identity, 1848–1871,” in Eric Ames, Marcia Klotz, and Lora Wildenthal (eds.), *Germany's Colonial Pasts* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), pp. 21–40; Stefan Manz, *Constructing a German Diaspora: The "Greater German Empire", 1871–1918* (Oxford: Routledge, 2013). For a broader synthesis see David Blackbourn, “Germans Abroad and ‘Auslandsdeutsche’: Places, Networks and Experiences from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 41:2 (2015), pp. 321–346, and the edited volume by Jason Coy, Jared Poley, and Alexander Schunka, *Migrations in the German Lands, 1500–2000* (New York: Berghahn 2016). On German nationalists and their unfulfilled imperial ambitions at mid-century, see Brian Vick, “Imperialism, Race, and Genocide at the Paulskirche: Origins, Meanings, Trajectories,” in Michael Perraudin and Jürgen Zimmerer (eds.), *German Colonialism and National Identity* (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 9–20. As Peter Judson notes, however, multiple understandings of German affinity and belonging existed, which often had very little in common with the Prussian-German state and its project of monopolization of national representation. Peter Judson, “When Is a Diaspora Not a Diaspora? Rethinking Nation-Centered Narratives About Germans in Habsburg East Central Europe,” in Christa O’Donnell, Renate Bridenthal, and Nancy Reagan (eds.), *The Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness* (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2005), pp. 219–247.

estates and the problems this entailed for its nationalizing mission (see chapter 2), the commission became interested in actively recruiting such “returnee” workers to settle in its villages or work in its estates.³⁵⁰

In 1890, having closed the eastern border to labor migration following the 1885 expulsions of Poles and Jews, and under the pressure of employers in agriculture, the Prussian government reopened the border for Polish seasonal labor migration under a new and restrictive migration regime. It also decided to explore the possibility of recruiting workers among specific groups beyond Germany’s borders that would not increase the Polish presence in the Prussian eastern provinces. One option was to recruit agricultural workers whose ethnicity or religion was imagined as distinct from and even antithetical to Prussia’s Polish population. Although Chinese and African workers were mentioned in discussions about the possibilities for importing labor, the most readily available workers were in the Russian and Austrian Empires.

To recruit workers from the two neighboring empires, the Central Agency for the Procurement of German Settlers and Farmworkers (*Centralstelle zur Beschaffung deutscher Ansiedler und Feldarbeiter*) was established in 1902/3. This was a clandestine operation led by the Prussian government, the Colonization Commission, the Agrarian League (*Bund der Landwirt*) as the representative of large landowners, and the two nationalist pressure groups, the Eastern Marches Society and the Pan-German League. On the one hand, the *Centralstelle* targeted a variety of purportedly ethnic Germans outside the German empire in order to support and supplement the Prussian Colonization Commission in its efforts to settle Germans

³⁵⁰ On conceptions of the “Germans Abroad” and the “Russian Germans” as an ethnically safe labor reservoir, See Conrad, *Globalization and the Nation*, esp. ch. 3. Regarding the commission in this context, see Jacóbczyk, pp. 117–125. On the “Returnee” Germans more generally see Jochen Oltmer, “The unspoilt nature of German ethnicity: Immigration and integration of ‘ethnic Germans’ in the German Empire and the Weimar Republic,” *Nationalities Papers* 34:4 (2006), pp. 429–446.

in Prussian Poland. On the other hand, it aimed to “import” Ruthenians (Ukrainians) from Austrian Poland and Hungarians “as a counterweight to Polish summer workers.”³⁵¹ The establishment of the agency was followed by a short-lived cooperation with the Ruthenian National Committee, which was busy at the time with its own anti-Polish agitation efforts in the Habsburg Empire and was supposed to help Prussian officials to differentiate Ruthenians from Poles and to develop an anti-Polish Ruthenian identity among the incoming migrant workers. The state also tried to persuade employers to prefer Ruthenians workers by easing some restrictions, most importantly the “waiting period” for leaving Germany in the winter.³⁵²

In 1907 the *Centralstelle* was officially taken over by the Prussian state and became a state agency, *die Deutsche Feldarbeiter-Centrale*, with a monopoly on issuing identification for workers and on carrying through their mandatory registration. It instituted an identification system that included color codes that combined nationality and ethnicity, with each color marking a particular set of regulations and limitations on workers. The *Feldarbeiter-Centrale* also combined the coordination of foreign recruitment of workers with what Klaus Bade calls “domestic brokerage,” or the management of supplying labor to employers. As Dörte Lerp points out, through this agency, the Prussian government participated and intervened in trans-imperial networks in order to both secure labor for Prussian agriculture and to alter the ethnic composition of the large population of farm workers it imported every year to provide cheap labor for its large landowners.³⁵³

³⁵¹ The quotes from a 1904 meeting protocol of the executive body of the agency (*Protokoll der Sitzung des Kuratoriums der Centralstelle zur Beschaffung deutscher Ansiedler und Feldarbeiter*) are in Lerp, *Imperiale Grenzräume*, p. 106.

³⁵² Lerp, *Imperiale Grenzräume*, pp. 103–108; Klaus J. Bade, *Migration in European History*, translated by Allison Brown (Blackwell 2003) pp. 157–164; Conrad, *Globalization and the Nation*, pp. 189–202. Nichtweiß, *Saisonarbeiter*, pp. 85–93, writes that in the years after 1904, about 100,000 Ruthenians were employed in Prussian agriculture.

³⁵³ Lerp, *Imperiale Grenzräume*, pp. 103–108; Bade, *Migration in European History*, pp. 157–164; Conrad, *Globalization and the Nation*, pp. 189–202.

Even before 1907, the labor demands of Prussian estate-owners and other interests moved the Centralstelle to undertake the importation of Polish workers as its main activity, leading the Colonization Commission to find other ways to recruit Germans from East and South East Europe. Moreover, in terms of the importation of Germans from the Russian and Austrian empires, the results were meager in relation to the expectations and financial investment of the commission. The commission then started working with the *Evangelischen Hauptverein für deutsche Ansiedler und Auswanderer*, whose main office was in Witzenhausen, the site of a settlement school for women colonists heading to Germany's African colonies. In 1909 it was renamed as the Welfare Association for German Returnees (*Fürsorgeverein für deutsche Rückwanderer*). It was unofficially sponsored by the state and received the backing of the Eastern Marches Association, the Hamburg-America Line, nine provincial Chambers of Agriculture, and 20 rural counties by 1914. The *Fürsorgeverein* attempted to take up the same kind of monopoly of documentation, registration, recruitment, and brokerage regarding Germans returnees that the *Feldarbeiter-Centrale* held regarding non-German workers. The commission collaborated with this attempt, and instructed estate managers to communicate to the *Centralstelle*, and later to the *Fürsorgeverein*, any changes in the status of the "returnee" workers. In 1912 the commission instructed its estate managers that their labor needs would be "mainly covered" by the *Fürsorgeverein*. Under its agreement with the commission, the *Fürsorgeverein* committed to paying compensation if "returnee" workers were dismissed due to their conduct (*Kontraktbruch*, in the language of the *Gesindeordnung*).³⁵⁴

Workers were, then, objects of labor brokerage, and different institutions competed over positions in the chain of brokerage, allocation, distribution, and placement of different

³⁵⁴ See the circulars to estate managers regarding the registration of unemployed workers from Russia (16.12.1908), and of workers' families (28.3.1909) in GStA PK I. HA Rep. 212 Nr. 5143, pp. 101–103. On the labor brokerage agreement see GStA PK I. HA Rep. 212 Nr. 5152, p. 94.

kinds of workers. While the commission focused on importing German workers, other organizations undertook labor arbitrage as well, participating in the parallel recruitment and distribution of different kinds of workers. Coming in as Germans, “returnee” workers were more privileged in relation to Polish seasonal workers. The former could and did receive Prussian citizenship, were employed for higher wages, received better employment conditions, and could come in as whole families. Polish migrant workers experienced strict gender separation, were not allowed to bring their children, and Polish women workers were expelled if they became pregnant.³⁵⁵

The commission’s cooperation with the *Centralstelle* and the *Fürsorgeverein* increased the numbers of incoming Germans from the Russian and Habsburg Empires. By spring 1904 over 3,500 workers had arrived in Polish Prussia and were distributed among the commission’s estates and private *latifundias*.³⁵⁶ By the end of 1909, 30.4% of the 900 workers’ plots given as *Rentegüter* were settled by Germans from the Russian and Habsburg Empires. In 1914, the commission reported a total of 5,480 settler families from the Russian Empire (4,900), Austrian Poland (500) and Hungary (80), amounting to a quarter of the total number of families settled by the commission since 1886. Out of the families who came from the Russian Empire, a vast majority (3,540) came from Russian or Congress Poland. It is hard to determine how many workers who did not receive a *Rentegut* from the commission were living in its settlements and estates at any given time, but some indicative numbers exist. In 1909, German returnees numbered 1,052 of the 1,769 German workers’ families and 149 out of 331 German unmarried

³⁵⁵ Jochen Oltmer, *Migration und Politik in der Weimarer Republik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), pp. 140–150; See the Breslau Political Science dissertation by Hans Siegfried Weber, *Rücksiedlung Auslandsdeutscher nach dem deutschen Reich* (Jena: Fischer 1915), here pp. 51ff. Also see Andrzej Bożek, *Niemcy zagraniczni w polityce kolonizacji pruskich prowincji wschodnich 1886–1918* (Poznań 1989). On the Witzenhausen colonial school see Dörte Lerp, “Die Kolonialfrauenschulen in Witzenhausen und Bad Weilbach.” (MA Thesis, Free University of Berlin, 2006).

³⁵⁶ Jácóbczyk, *Pruska Komisja Osdanicza*, pp. 117–125.

workers. In 1910, the same numbers were 908 out of 1,494 and 169 out of 334. These numbers indicate that “returnees” amounted to between half and two-thirds of German workers in the commission’s settlements and estates and became essential for the commission’s attempt to replace Polish workers with German ones.³⁵⁷

Sebastian Conrad has pointed out the ways that notions of race that combined culture and ethnicity were utilized as strategies of difference in attempts by the Prussian government to import and control different kinds of migrant labor. He also noted the precarity of the often-meticulous distinctions in ethnicity conjured by officials and translated into different employment conditions and migration regulations. Officials in Berlin, for example, complained about the “great difficulty” in distinguishing between Polish and Ruthenian workers, which had important consequences as the Prussian government allowed the latter to stay in Prussia over the winter.³⁵⁸

Officials in Berlin may have tired of minute distinctions between incoming laborers, but the commission saw such distinctions, alongside the creation of a regionalist hierarchy between Germans from eastern Europe, Germans from Polish Prussia, and Germans from South and West Germany, as central to its mission. Estate managers were encouraged to employ Germans from the Habsburg and Russian empires but within the framework of a civilizing mission. The 1910 instruction manual assured estate managers that “returnees” were a particularly docile, if less civilized workforce, inexperienced in modern agriculture, but quick

³⁵⁷ For the *Rentegüter* numbers see Annual Report 1914; for the workers’ *Rentegüter* see Regierungsrat Gaede, “Die persönlichen und wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse bei 900 Arbeiterrentenstellen der Königl. Ansiedlungs-Kommission,” *Archiv für innere Kolonisation* 4:9 (1911/1912), pp. 427–444. A summary of the numbers is in Weber, *Rücksiedlung Auslandsdeutscher*, p. 22. Weber also sets the numbers of German returnees working for settlers in the commission’s settler-villages as 635 for 1914/1915. Also see Stienen, “Über die Anwerbung,” pp. 72–73.

³⁵⁸ Conrad, *Globalization and the Nation*, pp. 192–201, quote on p. 196.

to learn.³⁵⁹ They were supposed to mainly settle in already established settler-villages and to receive a small plot in the middle of the village, so they would be within equal distance from the different settler-farms where they would be working as agricultural laborers. They were assumed to lack the cultural strengths of other Germans, and so they needed to improve themselves by imitating the more culturally advanced western settlers or the somewhat less advanced 'local' settlers.³⁶⁰ Having a small number of individuals or families of "returnees" in each estate or village was important for their civilizing process. Estate managers were thus warned against letting "returnees" bring in more relatives or settle in large kin-groups on one estate. Some of the political risks of having too many "returnees" in one village were demonstrated in the commission's model-village Golenhofen/Golęczewo, which had a large number of settlers from the Habsburg and Russian empires, both farmers and workers. According to Witold Jacóbczyk, in the first communal elections one of the returnees won the majority of votes to become the head of the community. The commission hurried to intervene and had the election results overturned.³⁶¹

The increasing numbers of "returnees" among the German population in the commission's estates and settlements and their ambiguous position as new arrivals from Eastern Europe contributed to an increasing volume of administrative correspondence and

³⁵⁹ *Geschäfts-Anweisung für die Ansiedlungsvermittler* (1910).

³⁶⁰ Steffan Dyroff, "Die bauliche Tätigkeit der Königlich-Preußischen Ansiedlungskommission für Posen und Westpreußen. Versuch einer Einführung am Beispiel des Gutsbezirks Rojewo," in Birte Pusback and Jan Skuratowicz (eds.), *Landgüter in den Regionen des gemeinsamen Kulturerbes von Deutschen und Polen. Entstehung, Verfall und Bewahrung. Beiträge der 12. Tagung des Arbeitskreises deutscher und polnischer Kunsthistoriker und Denkmalpfleger in Będlewo, 30. September–4. Oktober 2005* (Warsaw 2007), pp. 193–206.

³⁶¹ "Die Rückwanderer haben die Neigung, sich in großen Trupps meist unter einander verwendeter Families auf einen und demselben Gute niederzulassen und weitere verwendete nach sich zu ziehen. Es ist aber unter alle Umstände zu vermeiden, ein Gut lediglich mit Rückwanderer zu besetzen." *Geschäfts-Anweisung für die Gutsverwalter* (1910), p. 13. On the model village see Jacóbczyk, *Pruska Komisja Osdanicza*, pp. 89–102. Moreover, the Prussian government was also suspicious about granting citizenship to "returnees" too easily. Usually, they could only receive Prussian citizenship after a probation period. Gosewinckel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen*, pp. 259–260.

instructions regarding how to best utilize, control, and civilize them. The “returnees” presented the problem to the commission of being both German and non-German. The commission had to figure out where they should be treated similar to other German emigrants versus where such liberality might contradict the nationalizing goals of the commission. Their employment as workers on estates owned by the commission was encouraged with the intention that they would later settle in the village, and estate managers were instructed to grant such workers a range of subventions to help them to set up a household.³⁶² At the same time, such “returnees” from Eastern Europe were earmarked for special inspections regarding contagious diseases as Prussian authorities moved to counter all manners of perceived dangers to public health that were thought to come from Eastern European migrants and established an increasingly tight regime of border controls and disinfection stations.³⁶³

The ambivalent position of “returnees” also prompted the commission to define more clearly the position of “returnee” workers within the hierarchical structures of labor discipline in its estates. In February 1905, the commission instructed estate managers to refrain from having German workers supervised by Polish overseers and to replace the latter with Germans. The president of the commission demanded full compliance by the first day of April. The main reason given was that the “arbitrariness” of the Polish overseers may deter German workers from settling in the colonized provinces, especially those Germans who were “more difficult to handle” and could therefore expect harsher treatment from their “national opponents.” In

³⁶² Instructions to cover different transportation and moving costs: “Reisekosten-beihilfe für Rückwanderer, die auf Gütern als Arbeiter beschäftigt werden und eventuell später eine Stelle erwerben wollen,” in a 1902 presidential circular to estate managers, and another circular from 23.5.1906, GStA PK I. HA Rep. 212 Nr. 5143, pp. 18, 58–9. Estate managers were also instructed to support “returnees” in establishing a household, including the provision of “Leihkühe” or cows on loan. See circulars from 15.11.1906, 4.10.1907, and 21.2.1910. GStA PK I. HA. Rep. 212 Nr. 5143, pp. 68, 82–87, 130.

³⁶³ The Instructions about medical examination to identify Cholera among “returnees” are from 21.8.1907. GStA PK I. HA. Rep. 212 Nr. 5143, p. 80. For Cholera, migration controls, and the racialization of public health see Paul Weindling, *Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe, 1890–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 3; Conrad, *Globalization and the Nation*, pp. 184–189.

parenthesis, the president of the commission explained that the “difficult” German workers were those who migrated from the Russian Empire at the commission’s encouragement, perhaps because they were less responsive to the commission’s Germanizing agenda. Their ambiguous place in the racialized hierarchy of work in the commission’s estates and the possibility that returnees would warn family and friends away from the commission must have contributed to anxieties among officials and complaints and contestation in estates.³⁶⁴

The fact that in Fischer’s farmhouses report “German Returnees” were categorized as if they were a region of the German *Heimat* is noteworthy. Their *Heimatlos* status, indicated here, was also literal in the sense that in most cases, the commission constructed dwellings for “returnees,” as they could not afford to build a house themselves. In the context of the internal colonization of Polish Prussia such differentiations had, perhaps for the first time, practical meaning. They could receive inferior land, be prevented from living together with other “returnees” in the same villages and subjected to particularly close supervision. The commission, however, was rarely in a position to follow its own instructions and minute categorizations to the letter. Workers and settlers were normally in short supply and there were always complex political and practical considerations, which influenced the actual intake of settlers. It seems likely that the intricate instructions about how different settlers were defined and what subsidies they were allowed mainly reflected officials’ growing realization of the complexity of managing the diverse populations that participated in the Germanization of the imperial border region.

The commission developed a cultural hierarchy between different kinds of Germans based on regionalist assumptions about their character and economic and agricultural skill. These

³⁶⁴ Estate managers were also required to send the commission a list of the Polish overseers in their estates, the date in which they could be given notice, and the day in which their employment could be terminated according to their work contract. President of the Prussian Colonization Commission to estate managers, 18.2.1905. GStA PK I. HA Rep. 212 Nr. 5143, pp. 38–39.

assumptions were mapped on a more general west-to-east axis of diminished modernity and civilization and served to naturalize class differences. It institutionalized this hierarchy in policies and in instruction manuals. This hierarchy of culture among Germans, as it was set up by the commission's officials and adherents of a so-called "German cultural mission" (*Kulturarbeit*) in Polish Prussia, was articulated by differences in the sense of *Heimat* that they had brought with them upon joining the settlement project and by their cultural capacity to create a new *Heimat* in the colonized provinces. The material basis of this cultural hierarchy is underlined by the fact that many returnees, as well as workers more generally, did not have the means to acquire large enough farms to become independent peasants and were expected to become workers. *Heimat-building* both elided and reaffirmed social hierarchies.

Heimat-Building and Architecture on the Internal Frontier

Fresh on the job in 1896, Paul Fischer undertook his survey of settler farms to better understand the types of buildings and cost structures that settlers found most appealing. Fischer and the leaders of the commission hoped that the survey could better enable the commission to attract settlers. At the same time, many settlers insisted on building their own houses and farms, a practice with symbolic and ideological value that resonated with contemporary conceptions of *Heimat* and settlement. This practice, however, raised the specter of settlers' overspending on farm-building, leading to indebtedness and eventually financial ruin. The hybrid procedure that the commission developed combined both forms with tight supervision.

Architectural exemplars played an important role in the new supervisory procedures. Fischer designed model blueprints and provided architectural handbooks to direct building practices. Around 1900, Fischer strategically adopted the architectural notions of *Heimat* and sought to combine practicality and inexpensiveness with the new ideas about rootedness or

Bodenständigkeit and vernacular designs and materials. The commission, however, made no attempt to build in a Poznan vernacular. By allowing farmer-settlers to build their own farms only under strict limitations, the actual use of the ways of building that they brought with them from their *Heimat* was severely restricted. Nevertheless, the supposed possibility to build new farms according to regional traditions from western Germany lent credence to a project that attempted to create a new German *Heimat* in the multiethnic borderlands of the empire.

A rather different approach was taken regarding workers' cottages, which took up a growing share of the commission's building activity after 1900. Fischer suggested that there was no particular sense of *Heimat* among workers that could guide the design of buildings. Workers could not afford to pay for architectural interventions based on *Heimatstil* ideas about the grounded-ness in the local landscape. It was accordingly justified to standardize building processes and designs for workers' housing to a much greater extent than other kinds of buildings. Fischer followed this reasoning in the various worker cottages and workers colonies that he designed for the commission.

I suggested the term "Heimat-building" to conceptualize the commission's particular combination of *Heimat* and *Heimat* architecture in its administrative discussions and practices. *Heimat-building* used an idealized picture of the past to paint the future in the colors of a normative vision of the present. As an administrative tool, *Heimat-building* served to articulate, naturalize, and reproduce differences among settlers in villages set up by the commission. Officials and experts worked together to construct an intricate cultural hierarchy among settlers as a mode of inventing, governing, and discerning difference for the purposes of the colonization project. The cultural and moral inferiority attributed to "returnees" from Eastern Europe and to "local" Germans living in the provinces of Poznan and West Prussia, was mapped on the east-

west axis of cultural modernity. The regional hierarchy was articulated not only through categories of moral and economic normativity, but also through a folklorist and architectural notions of *Heimat* that naturalized social hierarchies and cultural difference.

Fischer's survey used what he claimed to be local knowledge of typical houses of the different regions in Germany to legitimate his policy of building cheaply. He did so by investigating how settlers planned and used their "typical" farmhouses. He then proceeded to use elements of these plans in his own designs, thereby institutionalizing a supposed local knowledge that future settlers were advised to emulate. They were to do so, however, under strict conditions. On top of Fischer's building costs calculus, meant to ensure practical and inexpensive construction, there was a litany of building and fire regulations, as well as insurance requirements. All this meant that settlers' building options were, in fact, quite limited.

Fischer's survey aligned with developments in the architectural profession in the 1890s even if Fischer's activities at the time evince little engagement with new developments in architecture.³⁶⁵ He must have been aware of Meitzen's work on peasant houses, and his questionnaire for teachers is similar in its more "ethnographic" part to Meitzen's. The architects' *Bauernhaus* survey, however, was probably of more importance for Fischer's insistence on carrying out his own survey. While only in its early stages in 1896, the survey undertaken by the Federation of German Architects' Associations in 1892 was consciously constructed and marketed as a significant professionalization step and also pointed the way for architects of the time. The young state-architect Fischer, then, may have decided to undertake a survey in a similar direction but with a more administrative-practical and less stylistic emphasis.

³⁶⁵ Jakobi, *Heimatschutz und Bauerndorf*, pp. 121–122.

Despite the clear significance of Fischer's survey to his and the commission's understanding of the *Heimat-building* in the settlements, by 1900 the survey was no longer mentioned in the commission publications or in the publications of its supporters, nor could I find references to it in professional literature of the time. Fischer himself did not reference it in his subsequent publications, although some traces remain in the 1904 sketchbook, where he mentioned "peasant design ideas" as a source. Fischer's building cost calculations continued to be used as a rough guide for farm and cottage designs created by Fischer and the commission. However, the professional standard for *Heimat* architecture was much higher by the early 1900s: Schultze-Naumburg's *Kulturarbeiten* volumes were already shaping the ideas and tastes of the educated middle-classes regarding architecture, using a litany of juxtaposed photographs of "good" and "bad" examples. His work was amplified and given concrete and purportedly authentic vernacular examples for practical design by the *Bauernhaus* publication. Fischer, who called this publication "epoch making" in 1911, had just completed the design of the commission's model village in Golenhofen/Goleńczewo (1902–1904). Fischer's designs and vocabulary clearly drew on the ideas and terminology of *Heimatschutz* architecture. In 1911, Fischer declared his 1890s work for the commission as relatively naive and unsystematic. It was undertaken, he explained, before key ideas and concepts of *Heimatschutz* such as *Bodenständigkeit* were brought into circulation. By 1914, Fischer explicitly characterized himself as a proponent of the new *Heimat* architecture, lauding its main personae and their important contribution to national architecture.³⁶⁶

³⁶⁶ Fischer, *Landschaftsbild und Ansiedlung* (1911); idem, *Ländliches Bauwesen* (Stuttgart: Karl Schuler, 1914), pp. 4–7.

When it came to Fischer's principles of building of farm buildings, farmhouses, and cottages for workers in the period after the completion of the survey, cost-cutting was still the main design imperative. But Fischer now tried, in addition to finding inexpensive ways to create some sense of an organic development of the new villages (e.g., shrubbery and tree planting), to justify his architectural priorities within the same language of *Heimat* that helped to articulate the commission's settlement project. The study of supposedly local or more authentic building forms as a strategy for legitimation of architectural expertise was itself an important part of the new epistemologies of architectural practice embedded in interventionist assumptions about the role of architecture in society. A similar strategy is evident in the early work of Ernst May, one of the main figures of 'modern' architecture in the interwar period, who was tasked with designing and managing the construction of workers' housing in Silesia in the early 1920s. As Susan Henderson shows, his designs were similarly grounded in claims about the vernacular that May made based on his study of Silesian forms of building before 1800, which he then formalized, disassembled, and reconfigured into what Henderson calls "rationalized vernacular."³⁶⁷

The model village that Fischer designed for the colonization commission in the early 1900s in Golęczewo/Golenhofen was another example of the contradictions that inhered in architects use of *Heimat*. A picturesque achievement of *Heimat* architecture and a propaganda tool, the village's "engineered regional diversity" of farmhouses from different German regions relied on the latest technology and industrial production from across the empire.³⁶⁸ Although it purported to represent the unity in diversity of the nation's regions, Jakobi notes that no single

³⁶⁷ Henderson, "Ernst May and the Campaign to Resettle the Countryside," pp. 192–198; On these "concealed continuities" and on the connection between May and Fischer, see Cupers, "Bodenständigkeit," pp. 1245–1248.

³⁶⁸ According to Cupers, the village communal bath was fitted with newly invented asbestos panels produced in Berlin, the wind turbine for the water pump was produced in Dresden, and heating systems were manufactured in Hannover. See Cupers, *The Earth that Modernism Built*.

farm corresponded to any single, established, regional type. Instead, Fischer's designs mixed different forms from various regions in each farmhouse. Fischer also made decisions which directly contradicted cherished principles of *Heimat* architecture, for example, by choosing a relatively flat *Pappedach* for stalls and barns, while keeping the 45–50 degree angled pitched roof favored by adherents of *Heimat* architecture for the dwelling houses.³⁶⁹

Fischer's survey, I argue, was an administrative tool that connected farm design with social hierarchies and their naturalization in the project of settlement, an instance of what I termed *Heimat-building*. We saw how social hierarchies were articulated through the idiom of *Heimat* and materialized through architecture. The idea of regional distinctiveness was strategically utilized as administrative practice. Fischer's 1896 survey with its interest in a mixture of issues relating to ethnology, architecture, and productive efficiency was both a product and an intervention in the utilization of *Heimat* by architects and bureaucrats, embedded in normative notions about the house as a physical and symbolic space of social interaction, class reproduction, and economic activity.³⁷⁰

The house was a central arena of *Heimat* activity and sensibility, with the language of house and home interlacing in important ways. The house as a centerpiece of national identity, was understood in the context of the settlement project as central to the *Heimat-building* capacity of settlers. The act of building a house meant taking up space and claiming a relationship of authentic grounded-ness in the land. On this level, especially once architectural *Heimat* ideas

³⁶⁹ Jakobi, *Heimatschutz und Bauerndorf*, pp. 243ff.

³⁷⁰ The centrality of the imaginary of the house in the colonial fantasies about the Prussian 'east' can be seen in Gustav Freytag's best-seller novel *Soll und Haben*. See Marcus Twellmann, "Das deutsche Bürgerhaus: Zum oikonomisch Imaginären in Gustav Freytags *Soll und Haben*," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 87 (2013), pp. 356–385.

became widespread around 1900, the idea that settlers should be allowed to build for themselves had a strong ideological appeal

Notwithstanding the evocation of ideal village communities, the regional-essentialist rhetoric in the commission's publications, and despite the romanticization of regional identity that was skillfully employed by the commission, there is little evidence to suggest a simple reproduction of traditional farmhouses by settlers in Poznan and West Prussia. There were many direct and indirect limitations on settlers' building activity after 1896-1897. Closely guarded fire regulations, fire insurance conditions, and the close supervision exercised by estate managers and Fischer's office meant that there was little leeway to maintain regional specificities beyond the layout of the farm, the relative location of buildings, and to a limited extent their internal organization. Perhaps for this reason, Fischer's survey was mainly about agricultural practices, farm layout, building floorplans, and formalist "solutions" that settlers employed.

Epilogue: Heimat-Building as Career Making

Paul Fischer spent most of his professional career working for the Colonization Commission. During his nineteen years there, from 1896 to 1915, he moved up the Prussian bureaucratic ladder and created the networks of friendship and patronage, as well as the professional reputation, that would allow him to take advantage of a unique opportunity of war-time reconstruction. Fischer's standing in the profession as an expert on small settlement and workers housing was also secure by 1914. In a programmatic reform architecture book, which sought to recast state architects as powerful "building consultants" (*Bauberater*) who would mediate between government, local authorities, investors, and housing associations, Fischer took up the position of the expert on housing for agricultural workers. His work and building principles were extensively referred to in authoritative texts such as Rudolf Eberstadt's *Handbuch des*

Wohnungswesens. Fischer later composed the new building regulations for East Prussia during his stint as the director of the reconstruction of the province during the war (1914–1915) and also contributed to regulatory changes in the aftermath of the war.³⁷¹

In early September 1914, shortly after the Russian advance into East Prussia was halted by the German Army, Fischer was already thinking about a possible career move to one of the theaters of war as an expert of “reconstruction” and “the technical matters of internal colonization.” He requested the assistance of Alfred Hugenberg, who by that time had been managing the financial affairs of Germany’s largest armaments producer, the Krupp concern, for six years. Hugenberg responded that he was actively promoting projects of “internal colonization” on both warfronts and had already discussed with senior officials the establishment of expertise-driven “advisory offices” (*Beratungsstellen*) for that purpose. He assured Fischer that a place for him would be found.³⁷² Hugenberg, in fact, was referring here to plans of wide-ranging annexation, ethnic cleansing, and resettlement which he was promoting together with allies in the Pan-German League, the army, the business world, and the bureaucracy.³⁷³

³⁷¹ Paul Fischer, “Das Haus des Landarbeiters,” in Johannes Altenrath (ed.), *Neuzeitliche Baupflege: ein Handbuch für die Bauberatung und die öffentliche Förderung der Bauweise; im Auftrage des Hauptausschusses für Bauberatung* (Berlin: Heymann, 1914), pp. 107–132. Rudolf Eberstadt, *Handbuch des Wohnungswesens und der Wohnungsfrage*, 4th Edition (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1920) adopted Fischer’s argument for standardization of regulations and forms of small settlement houses (p. 352) and mentioned with approval Fischer’s 1915 regulations in East Prussia, which prescribed two-story houses for small settlements in cities (p. 354). On pp. 503–504 appears a sketch of farmworkers’ houses from Fischer’s *Ländliche Bauwesen* (Stuttgart: Karl Schuler, 1914), pp. 22–23. See further references in Eberstadt, *Handbuch* that make clear Fischer’s professional standing regarding planning of small settlements, or at least his influential position in the state bureaucracy in this context: pp. 121, 267, 329, 343, 459, 469, 479, 493, 496, 499, 693. Hermann Muthesius used Fischer’s work in his *Kleinhaus und Kleinsiedlung* (Munich: Bruckmann 1918), including the reproduction of one of Fischer’s floor plans for worker’s houses on p. 112.

³⁷² Fischer to Hugenberg, 10.9.1914, and Hugenberg to Fischer 7.10.1914, BA-Koblenz N1231 Nr. 13, pp. 117–118.

³⁷³ On the empire-making and settlement plans in east and west in the early months of the war, see Ron Hellfritzsch’s forthcoming dissertation on war-time resettlement in eastern Europe, as well as Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Robert L. Nelson “The Archive for Inner Colonization, the German East, and World War I,” in idem (ed.) *Germans, Poland, and Colonial Expansion to the East — 1850 Through the Present* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 65–94; Imanuel Geiss, *Der polnische Grenzstreifen, 1914–1918. Ein Beitrag zur*

Fischer's next career moves brought him to the epicenter of planning and architectural policymaking. In 1915 he left Poznań for the post of the director of reconstruction in war-ravaged East-Prussia, where he oversaw a cohort of mostly younger architects, already or soon to be more famous than he, who were employed in local and regional "advisory offices" to plan everything from city halls to urban and rural workers' housing projects, to stalls, barns, and barracks for seasonal agricultural laborers. His experiences working for the Colonization Commission were important in making Fischer's reputation as an expert of workers' settlements, agricultural buildings, and housing issues, and he referred to it as a model as he embarked on his work in East Prussia.³⁷⁴ This war-time state project was conceived according to the architectural tenants of the *Heimatschutz* movement and was in many ways foundational to later developments in housing and planning. In particular, it saw an unprecedented, close collaboration between government and private architects, who were recognized as experts and accorded wide-ranging powers across the province. Under the exigencies of war, professional architects were finally fulfilling their long-held aspirations of the 1890s to establish the legitimacy and usefulness of their expertise in the eyes of the state.³⁷⁵ In 1917 Fischer transferred to the office of the state commissioner for housing in Berlin (*Staatskommissar für das Wohnungswesen*), where he also participated in the framing of the new general housing law for Prussia (enacted on 28 March 1918). From 1922 until his retirement, he was a senior official in

deutschen Kriegszielpolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Lübeck: Matthiesen, 1960); Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967).

³⁷⁴ Paul Fischer, "Die Maßnahmen der Staatsregierung für den Wiederaufbau Ostpreußens", *Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung* 46 (9.6.1915), pp. 297–299.

³⁷⁵ Hartmut Frank, "Heimatschutz und typologisches Entwerfen. Modernisierung und Tradition beim Wiederaufbau von Ostpreußen 1915–1927," in Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani and Romana Schneider (eds.), *Moderne Architektur in Deutschland 1900 bis 1950: Reform und Tradition* (Stuttgart: Verlag Gerd Hatje 1992), pp. 105–132. Among the architects involved in the reconstruction project were the young Hans Scharoun (b. 1893), fresh from designing internment camps for the German army in the eastern front, Bruno Taut, a native of the provincial capital Königsberg (b. 1880), and Heinrich Tessenow (b. 1876).

the new welfare ministry (*Ministerium für Volkswohlfahrt*) with responsibility for formulating unified building regulations across Prussia as well as for organizing a supervisory apparatus.³⁷⁶

In 1916, still based in Königsberg, Fischer published two programmatic essays on the historical development of workers' settlements and ways to simplify and reduce costs of low-income housing projects. Written at the instigation of the Prussian minister of agriculture as a kind of policy paper and probably foreshadowing a subsequent ministerial decree in 1917, the two essays were published in the *Schriften zur Förderung der inneren Kolonisation*, the publication series of the Society for the Advancement of Internal Colonization (*Gesellschaft zur Förderung der inneren Kolonisation*, hereafter GFK). This society claimed specific expertise on the topic and included leading officials, social reformers, and agrarian experts, including Max Sering, the foremost academic expert on agrarian settlement of the time, as well as Alfred Hugenberg, Heinrich Sohnrey, and senior officials such as the Provincial President of Brandenburg, Friedrich von Schwerin. As Robert Nelson notes, during the war the GFK openly promoted an imperialist and racial-expansionist line that saw opportunities for German settlement and the accompanied displacement of local populations across Eastern Europe. In light of Fischer's future role in housing legislation and in regulatory standardization, the two essays were perhaps a kind of job application for high office as well. In that case, it is significant that he published the essays in the GFK's house publication and not in professional, social-scientific, architectural, or city planning journals. Fischer, perhaps, was making a claim here for expertise and experience in workers' housing as internal colonization in the wider sense of planning and social engineering.³⁷⁷

³⁷⁶ See his obituary, a crucial source of biographical information which nevertheless omits any mention of social background, training, and education: "Paul Fischer," *Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung* 55 (1935), pp. 482–483.

³⁷⁷ See Fischer's articles in the *Archiv für innere Kolonisation (Afik)*, including one outlining the basic principles for building settlements as they were developed in the colonization commission in the 1890s. For Fischer's articles, see:

One of these essays is helpful in highlighting the connections between Fischer's work for the Prussian Colonization Commission and the subsequent housing reforms in post-war Prussia. Under the title "The simplification and cost reduction of small settlement buildings," Fischer called for a Prussian-wide standardization of building regulations and provided an overview of all the building regulations in Prussia pertaining to workers' settlements (namely regulations of building in rural areas and in small towns). He briefly evaluated the suitability of regulations in each province for the promotion of small settlement and concluded with a list of provinces and government districts (*Regierungsbezirke*), noting where and what kind of changes were required to achieve more lenient and simplified building regulations that would be suitable for the construction of small settlements. Such a broadly unified regulatory framework for the purposes of small settlement projects, he maintained, does not ignore local distinctiveness and building traditions, as workers cottages are the most easily standardized "building object" (*Bauobjekt*). Because of the little difference in the living conditions and needs of workers in the eastern and the western parts of Prussia, such buildings, Fischer argued, could be designed "independently from local and personal habits" and in accordance with a small number of general types with two variants for each: a dwelling of three rooms (the number included a kitchen but not an attic) or a dwelling of two rooms; a stall built as an extension of the house or built separately; with or without a space designated for a lodger; a detached house or a pair of semi-detached ones. Since workers' settlements must be built with "great thriftiness and simplicity," layout types and standardized building regulations for design and construction could be applicable to every region

"Die Wasserversorgungsanlage der Ansiedlung in Golenhofen," *AfiK* I, pp. 145–147; "Fragen über das Bauwesen," *AfiK* IV 556–558; "Landschaftsbild und Ansiedlung," *AfiK* V pp. 26–36; "Die Förderung des Kleinsiedlungswesen in Preussen," *AfiK* IV pp. 1–56. On the Society for the Advancement of Internal Colonization see Nelson, "The Archive for Inner Colonization."

and environment, with the only caveat being adaptation to the specific conditions of the building site and to its location in relation to sunlight, in line with the current best practices in the field.³⁷⁸

In the next section of the publication, Fischer listed more specific “technical” ways in which construction regulations for workers’ settlements could be eased (*technisch-konstruktive Erleichterungen*) and the buildings made cheaper. These, he noted, were based on his experiences in designing over 120 workers’ dwellings for the Colonization Commission in the years 1909–1912, as well as on the practices of several building associations. His recommendations dealt with most aspects of the building process and included laying out more shallow foundations (50–60 centimeters deep instead of 80 centimeters), allowing thinner perimeter and internal walls, placing doors and windows only according to need (rather than “mere symmetry”), making windows smaller (as light and air are readily available in the countryside and workers could easily stand at the door to breath fresh air, as he claimed), and using shutters instead of double-glazed windows and smaller window-frames. Bay windows, loggias, gables, and even corridors, he suggested, were usually unnecessary, as workers would be interested not in embellishments but in the size of the rooms, and the space would be better used for designing larger rooms as well as for service areas. He also suggested replacing a space for the entrance hallway with a space for summer-time cooking, fodder preparation, washing, and other tasks. By separating this make-shift scullery from the rest of the kitchen space, Fischer

³⁷⁸ “Das Wohnhaus der Kleinsiedlung, das freistehende Einfamilien-Arbeiterhaus, ist ein Bauobjekt, das mehr wie andere Gebäudearten unabhängig sein kann von örtlichen und persönlichen Gewohnheiten. Die Lebensbedingungen des Arbeiters und Kleinsiedlers sind im Osten nicht wesentlich verschieden von denen im Westen. Wenigstens die allgemeinen Programmforderungen können mit gewisser, überall gültiger Abwechslung annähernd dieselben sich und bewegen sich in wenigen Typen: Wohnung von drei Räumen (einschließlich Küche, ohne die Dachkammer) oder von zwei Räumen, Stall angebaut oder besonders, mit und ohne Mietwohnung, Einzelhaus und Doppelhaus. Da Aufbau und Konstruktion nur den Gesetzen größter Einfachheit und Sparsamkeit zu folgen haben, können die hierfür gültigen Regeln an der Küste so wie im Gebirge zur Anwendung gebracht und allgemein aufgestellt werden. Nur die Anpassung an die Baustelle und die Lage [der] Sonne bedürfen der Beachtung.” Paul Fischer, *Zur Förderung der Kleinsiedlungswesens: A. Die Verbilligung und Vereinfachung der Kleinsiedlungsbauten* [= Schriften zur Förderung der inneren Kolonisation 24/25] (Deutsche Landbuchhaltung, 1918[1916]), p. 14.

followed best practices in the field of housing hygiene while economizing on space by uniting fodder preparation and scullery.³⁷⁹

Fischer, then, put forward large-scale standardization and reform of building regulations that partially shaped and certainly seem to foreshadow many developments in low-income housing projects in the interwar period. His claims for authority, as well as the content of his suggestions were grounded in his experiences as the chief architect of the colonization commission. By generalizing from these experiences, he suggested regulatory reform and standardization as well as specific building principles that would be applicable to small settlements and workers cottages across Prussia.

The changing focus of the commission's building activity, the connection between the language of *Heimat* and social reform, the new professionalization and social involvement of architects, the growing significance of workers' housing for social reform, all contributed to Fischer's professional career. Based on his experience in designing workers' housing projects for the commission and for building association that worked with it, Fischer was tasked with leading the reconstruction effort of East-Prussia during World War I and was later a senior official in the Prussian public works and welfare ministries until his retirement in the middle of the 1920s. In the context of the acute housing shortage of the war and post-war period, Fischer contributed to governmental housing policies and authored one of the important architectural manuals of the day, steeped in designs made during his time at the commission.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁹ Paul Fischer, *Zur Förderung der Kleinsiedlungswesens: A. Die Verbilligung und Vereinfachung der Kleinsiedlungsbauten* (1918 [1916]), pp. 15–18.

³⁸⁰ Paul Fischer and Gerhard Jobst, *Ländliches Bauwesen* (Berlin: Wilhelm Ernst 1921[1919]).

Chapter 4

“Give Us a Child for Christmas” Nationalizing Children and the Politics of Child Displacement

A mysterious headline in the 1897 Christmas edition of the bulletin of the Pan-German League (*Alldeutscher Verband*, or ADV), Imperial Germany’s influential radical nationalist and imperialist association established in 1891, called upon its readership to “Give us a child for Christmas.” The few lines underneath explained that “the cause of Germandom in the East” could be promoted by the “transfer of Protestant children” to a new children’s institution in Poznan, the Neuzedlitz Orphanage, which the ADV claimed as its own. “We reach out to our readers in this Christmas time with the request: Give us children and think of our children,” the article continued, soliciting readers to donate a hundred Marks to support one child’s yearly upkeep and promising to report to donors about the situation and progress of the children.³⁸¹

Historians agree that the ADV was an important factor in producing ever-more radical policies and ideological platforms that combined nationalism and biological racism and promoted both continental expansion and global empire making. It is also seen as an institutional and ideological bridge that connected the radical imperialist right of the *Kaiserreich* with the fascist right of the Weimar Republic. Broadly, the historiography has identified six main fields of ADV activity: grassroots organization building, propaganda efforts, the organization of a propaganda apparatus, alliances and feuds with other pressure groups on the right, the formation of a political platform and an ideological position, and finally, exerting direct pressure on the Prussian and German governments.³⁸² Although the pages of the ADV bulletin have been

³⁸¹ “Gebt uns ein Kind zu Weihnachten,” *Alldeutsche Blätter* 7:52, 26.12.1897, p. 275.

³⁸² For a review of the literature on the Pan-German League up to the 1980s, see Roger Chickering’s path breaking study of the league, which remains the most conceptually sophisticated work on the topic. Roger Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League 1886-1914* (London: George Allen &

meticulously studied by many historians, this particular headline from December 1897 does not seem to have caught scholars' attention. By following the fragmented information on the bulletin's front page, however, a whole range of activities centered on children and undertaken in cooperation with the Prussian government and the Prussian Colonization Commission comes to light.

Child welfare has had an important role in the development of Central European nationalism around 1900, as national movements in Central Europe increasingly sought to instill national self-identification among "nationally indifferent" populations through education, care, and resettlement of children.³⁸³ Historian Tara Zahra shows how the displacement and relocation of children, in particular orphans, were central to the competition between national movements and middle-class nationalist activists in the supranational Habsburg Empire. Nationalist activists went about "colonizing the Czech-German language frontier," with orphans, who were "among the first participants in early nationalist attempts to alter the national demography of East Central Europe through resettlement." The increasing importance of national geopolitics across East and Central Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was reflected, Zahra shows, in nationalists' growing ambitions to win territories for the nation by "moving and improving

Unwin, 1984), ch. 1. Particularly on Pan-German visions of empire and settlement, see Dennis Sweeney, "Pan-German Conceptions of the Colonial Empire," in Eley and Naranch (eds.), *German Colonialism in a Global Age*, pp. 265-282. On the continuity thesis, see also Shelley Baranowski, *Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch. 1. Illuminating recent works on the ADV are Rainer Hering, *Konstruierte Nation: Der Alldeutsche Verband, 1890 bis 1939* (Hamburg: Christians, 2003), which focuses on the ADV's local operations, in this case in Hamburg, and Björn Hofmeister, "Between Monarchy and Dictatorship. Radical Nationalism and Social Mobilization of the Pan-German League, 1914–1939," Unpublished PhD Dissertation (University of Georgetown, 2012), which presents a fascinating reinterpretation of the ADV's transition from pre-World War I leader of the "mass market" of nationalist politics to an antiquated and yet influential relic of Wilhelmine notable politics in the fragmented political field of the Weimar Republic.

³⁸³ For "national indifference" see Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

human material.”³⁸⁴ Nationalist activists in Imperial Germany, however, were usually reliant on the state, which increasingly claimed to represent the German nation, for the implementation of practical schemes. Instead, nationalists concentrated on lobby, agitation, and propaganda work to influence government policies. Drawing on the legal and institutional changes of the period relating to the policing, education, welfare, and training of children and youth in Imperial Germany, this chapter examines how the Prussian state and the ADV sought to use children as tools of colonization and imperial Germanization in Polish Prussia. The chapter also complicates our understanding of the relationship between the Prussian state and nationalist pressure groups by telling a story of close institutional collaboration, in which a range of state agencies, municipal authorities, and radical nationalist groups constructed an elaborate infrastructure of colonization that spanned Imperial Germany. By putting together a pan-imperial infrastructure of child displacement, the state and the ADV sought to shape the terms of (re)production of a German settler society in the German-Polish borderlands and to increase everyday separation between Germans and the local Polish population.

In 1897, the Prussian Colonization Commission and the ADV embarked on a scheme to displace poor children, administratively designated as orphans, from cities in western Germany to Prussia’s Polish provinces. In the context of labor shortage in the majority Polish region, settlers tended to employ locally available Polish farmworkers. As part of a larger administrative project of separating Germans from Poles, the commission anticipated that the children would replace Polish workers in settler households. Moreover, the Prussian authorities hoped that the relocated children would strike roots in local communities and remain in Polish Prussia after reaching adulthood. Once the children arrived in Poznan, they came under the care of a

³⁸⁴ Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, pp. 72–3.

charitable children's institution that enjoyed significant state support. The children received some training in farm and household work, skills they probably lacked coming from an urban lower working-class background. After a stay in the institution, children were transferred to settler families to perform house and farm work. Much of the legitimation of the scheme depended on the promise that children who showed themselves worthy of social advancement would be supported in acquiring small plots of land. This paternalist promise of social advancement, however, was a thinly disguised ploy to encourage municipalities in western Germany to cooperate with the scheme and to send children to Poznan. Despite the limited number of children transported and the fact that most children insisted on returning to their hometowns after leaving the institution, the scheme opened up new ways to concretize "Germanization" and opened up spheres for administrative action in a context of increasing state interest in controlling young people's morals and politics. Children became an integral part of the imperial nationalizing settlement project undertaken by the Prussian state in its eastern borderlands.

This hitherto unexplored scheme should be seen in the context of Eastern and Central European nationalisms around 1900. The study of nationalism in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe has adopted a new analytical framework in the last two decades and begun to emphasize the complex and mutually constitutive relationship between empires and national movements. Late nineteenth and early twentieth-century empires were traditionally seen by scholars of nationalism as outdated political formations destined to be replaced by supposedly modern nation-states. Instead, scholars now recognize empires as central to the study of nationalism. By looking at the ways in which "imperial nations" and "nationalizing empires" were political projects "conceived and implemented in the imperial core," as Alexi Miller and Stefan Berger

phrase it, scholars are exploring how the “nationalization” of imperial politics was rooted in the new realms of public activity that developed through various state institutions, the most salient of which was the growing field of welfare activism.³⁸⁵

Looking at developing welfare regimes through the lens of institutional boundary work can help us understand the ways in which nationalization projects worked in social practice. Tara Zahra captures part of that dimension in her work on the German-Czech “language frontier” in the Bohemian lands of the Habsburg Empire. She argues that German and Czech nationalist welfare activists and social workers actively sought to establish a social welfare system divided along national lines in the Habsburg Empire. The competition between middle-class nationalist activists, who tended to act in similar ways, created a particularly consolidated and interventionist institutional network of child welfare and social work. Understanding social welfare as a key site in the development of nationalization strategies also warrants, Zahra suggests, a reflection on the meaning of family and children in a contested process of creating separate “national” societies. Welfare in the Habsburg Bohemian lands “was shaped by a competing understanding of the family, in which children were not seen as the private property or sole responsibility of their parents” but rather as objects for, and agents of, “national” and class-specific cultural transformation within families.³⁸⁶

Zahra’s analytical framework and her foregrounding of children and the politics of childhood in the history of nationalizing activism in Central Europe is yet to take hold among scholars studying the nationalization of Prussia’s Polish provinces. In this chapter I explore the

³⁸⁵ A. I. Miller and Stefan Berger, “Introduction: Building Nations In and With Empires – A Reassessment,” in idem and Berger, (eds.), *Nationalizing Empires* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2014), pp. 1–30, quote on pp. 4–5.

³⁸⁶ Tara Zahra, “Each nation only cares for its own”: Empire, Nation, and Child Welfare Activism in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–1918,” *American Historical Review* 111 (2006), pp. 1378-1402, p. 1402.

different roles ascribed to children in the settlement and “Germanization” of the provinces of Poznanian and West Prussia, where a large Polish population, constituting two thirds of the population in Poznanian and over a half in West Prussia, was viewed by the state as a strategic threat. I focus on the Prussian state’s semi-official attempt to bring poor German children, most of whom were administratively designated as orphans, from cities in western Germany to the two provinces in the context of the significant extension and growing institutionalization of children’s welfare institutions in Germany around the turn of the twentieth century. The orphans were conceived of as both labor power and pawns in the socio-demographic reshaping of the two provinces. They were to be supplied to German craftsmen and farmers who had settled in the area through the state’s colonization agency to take the place of Polish laborers and to secure the reproduction of the next “German” generation. Initiators of the scheme also maintained that the deserving orphans would be given a chance for social advancement by joining the ranks of a future rural and town-based German property-owning craftsmen and farmers. Both career trajectories were based on explicitly segregationist and class-specific vision of the national community.

In 1897, Prussian officials and activists from the Pan-German League started a small-scale and hitherto unexplored experiment in using children for settlement purposes by establishing the Neuzedlitz orphans’ institution (*Waisenanstalt* or *Waisenhaus zu Neuzedlitz*) in the Prussian province of Poznanian. The orphanage enjoyed significant support in local and central government circles, received financial and administrative assistance from the state, and had close links with the Protestant Inner Mission and with nationalist associations. In 1909, the range of activities of the Neuzedlitz institution was expanded, when in tandem with changing children’s welfare legislation, a subsidiary reformatory education institution for “wayward”

youth was established in the vicinity of Neuzedlitz. The tendency of children and families to subvert the permanent “transplanting” of the children transferred to the Prussian “east”, the autonomy of municipal governance (the source for the required supply of children), municipal electoral politics, and finally the financial difficulties, legal disputes, and pedagogical scandals that beset the scheme, all contributed to the decline in the institution’s activities in the years directly preceding the outbreak of war in 1914.

The immediate context of the Neuzedlitz scheme was the nationalizing policies in Prussia’s Polish provinces that pertained both to the politics of childhood and to the confessional identification of the Prussian state with the Protestant state church. As the state intervened in Catholic religious education in schools and marginalized the Polish language, Polish children and their parents actively opposed the state’s forced assimilation policies. At the same time that the state sought to “Germanize” Catholic Polish schoolchildren against their will, it was also attempting to bring in Protestant German children to Polish Prussia. The Neuzedlitz institution was established to manage the dislocation and relocation of these children, ostensibly as a private welfare initiative. In fact, it was strongly supported by the Prussian Colonization Commission and the Prussian state. Partly as a result of this initiative, children were established as important tools of imperial nationalization by 1914.

Language, Education, and Social Control in Polish Prussia

After the creation of the German empire in 1871, increasing nationalization of the politics and policies of the Prussian state made the eastern borderlands a central arena of imperial experimentation and nationalist agitation. At the same time, a global price slump in agriculture highlighted the increasing dependence of the agrarian economy east of the Elbe, mainly comprised of large estates, on cheap seasonal and largely Polish immigrant labor. By the 1880s,

imperial strategies of rule in Polish Prussia already included policies that put increasing limitations on the use of Polish in schools and public life and on the involvement of the Catholic priesthood in education, thought to be a main subversive element against the Prussian state and its Protestant state confession. During the 1890s and 1900s, the increasing forcefulness of assimilation policies was met with growing opposition in Prussian Poland. The state responded by using new child welfare legislation that allowed authorities to take children from their families to protect them from physical neglect and moral degradation. Through the emerging welfare legislation and institutional infrastructure, children and families across the empire became directly involved in the state's "Germanization" policies in Polish Prussia.³⁸⁷

After the creation of Imperial Germany under Prussian domination, nationalizing the Polish-German borderlands became an important component of state ideology and its attempts to consolidate its power over the multiethnic region. Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* against institutional Catholicism following the establishment of the empire took a clear anti-Polish direction in Prussia's eastern provinces, where religion, language, national belonging, and political allegiances tended to coalesce in the eyes of officials. Officials and politicians in Berlin tended to view Protestantism, strongly identified with the state and with speakers of the German language in Poznań, as pitted against a majority Catholic and Polish speaking population. *Kulturkampf* era legislation that was particularly important in the Polish-German borderlands included the March 1872 Prussian law that made all school inspectors officials of the state and the May Laws

³⁸⁷ See more details and references in the introduction to the dissertation. On the centrality of the Polish provinces for the history of Germany, and the need to see Prussia and later Prussian-dominated Germany analytically as an empire and especially after 1871 as a nationalizing state, see Philipp Ther, "Beyond the Nation: The Relational Basis of a Comparative History of Germany and Europe." *Central European History* 36:1 (2003), pp. 45–73; idem, "Deutsche Geschichte als imperiale Geschichte. Polen, slawophone Minderheiten und das Kaiserreich als kontinentales Empire," in Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871–1914* (Göttingen: V&R, 2004), pp. 129-148; "Imperial Nationalism as Challenge for the Study of Nationalism," in A. I. Miller and Stefan Berger (eds.), *Nationalizing Empires* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2014), pp. 573-593.

of 1873 that abolished the separate Catholic Department of the Prussian Ministry of Education and Religion and extended state control over religious education.³⁸⁸

The politics of language in Polish Prussia changed significantly after 1871, as the state moved to marginalize the Polish language in education, administration, and public life. In 1872–1873, German became the sole language of school instruction first in Silesia, where the overlap between religion and language was the least clear-cut, and later in the provinces of East and West Prussia and finally in Poznań. German was also made the official language of administration and the judiciary in 1876, and Polish was abolished as a separate subject of instruction in 1887. By 1894, instruction in the Polish language officially persisted only in schools that held religion classes in Polish. Religion instruction, considered essential to the moral and political development of children into useful and obedient subjects, could still be taught in Polish under Church auspices in the lower grades, on the assumption that younger Polish children may not have sufficient command of German to understand their lessons.³⁸⁹

When government ministers decided in early 1900 that religious instruction would be in German as well and county school inspectors began implementing ministerial directives to this effect, popular resistance by children and parents developed into a mass civil disobedience that the state saw as a direct challenge to its authority. Open non-violent resistance to these policies first took place in 1901 in the town of Wreschen/Września, just south of the Neuzedlitz institution. It spread across the countryside, culminating in a so-called “general school strike” of

³⁸⁸ John J. Kulczycki, *School Strikes in Prussian Poland 1901–1907: The Struggle over Bilingual Education* (Boulder Colo. : New York: East European Monographs, 1981), ch. 1. Lech Trzeciakowski, “The Prussian State and the Catholic Church in Prussian Poland 1871–1914,” *Slavic Review* 26 (1967), pp. 618-637; Idem, *The Kulturkampf in Prussian Poland* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs/New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Helmut Walser Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870-1914* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

³⁸⁹ Kulczycki, *School Strikes*, ch. 1; Elizabeth A. Drummond, “Protecting Poznań: Germans, Poles, and the Conflict over National Identity, 1886-1914,” *Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation* (Georgetown University, 2004).

1906-1907. At its height the civil disobedience campaign included more than 90,000 schoolchildren in 1,600 schools who refused to be taught religious lessons and prayers, and in some cases other subjects, in German.³⁹⁰

The strikes brought into focus children's actual — rather than rhetorical or symbolic — political role. Concentrated in rural areas, these protests challenged the social order on many levels: their popular character and lack of apparent organization posed a grassroots challenge to Polish middle-class nationalists, as well as to the Catholic Church, to the established political parties that sought to represent the Polish-Catholic population, and of course to the Prussian state and its anti-Polish policies. The strikes pitted the state against children and children and parents against teachers, who as state employees had to tow the government's harsh line. Strikers, as John J. Kulczycki argues in his classic study on the topic, were most often schoolgirls and their mothers, thus possibly posing a challenge to patriarchal as well as state authority.

The motivations of striking children and parents were a far cry from the nationalist fervor that nationalist activists and historians attributed to them, and in fact challenged the very basis of nationalists' claim to speak for the nation. Popular religiosity, with language as an important medium, had a central role in inspiring the strikes, according to Kulczycki, and it also moved many of the lower clergy to support strikers locally and at times to make broader declarations of support as well. In that, they stood in contrast to the ambivalent, if not downright hostile, position of high officials of the Catholic Church towards the strikes, a position shared by the German-dominated Catholic Center party despite its own heated struggle with Polish nationalists over votes and influence in Polish-Catholic areas. Polish nationalists of the middle classes, both in striking localities and in the urban centers of the national movement, were quick to exploit the

³⁹⁰ Kulczycki, *School Strikes*, ch. 1; Broszat, *Polenpolitik*, p. 161.

wide-spread civil disobedience for their own ends, but also viewed the often heated and violent character of the conflicts between teachers, children, and parents in villages and towns with apprehension as a possible threat to the social order and their own positions of authority.

Kulczycki argues that local elites, including nationalist activists, played an important role not in the beginning of a strike in a certain location but in its chances of persistence, as the channeling of monetary and moral support was essential in the face of government oppression and the normally meager means at the disposal of much poorer striking children and families. Prussian authorities responded with harsh counter-measures, which included heavy fines for parents and harsh reprimands for children, including corporal punishments and expulsion or early termination of schooling. Polish middle-class nationalists, for their part, were equivocal about the strikes. On the one hand, they had to publicly support the strikes and tried to use them to garner support for the national cause. On the other hand, they were neither able to control nor direct them. Local nationalist activists, who often belonged to the small educated middle class in rural towns and in the countryside, also tended to be uncomfortable with the strikers' challenge to established authorities. The punitive reaction of the Prussian state and the ambivalence of Polish nationalists contributed to the ebbing of the strikes after 1906/7.³⁹¹

The civil disobedience campaign against the use of German as an instructional language should be seen within the broader context of a greater interest of the German and Prussian governments in controlling lower-class children and young adults, in particular in view of the

³⁹¹ Kulczycki, *School Strikes in Prussian Poland*. On Polish nationalists and the question of social discipline, see Brian Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Nationalists in Silesia mapped husband and wife on the supposedly corresponding opposition between the Church (Catholic) and the Employer (Protestant German). See for example the local struggles over church building unpacked by Jim Bjork in his "Church Fights: Nationality, Class, and the Politics of Church-Building in a German–Polish Borderland, 1890–1914," in: Paul Readman, et al. (eds.), *Borderlands in World History, 1700-1914* (Chicago: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 192–213, p. 200.

apparent success of SPD youth organizing. The gap years between the end of obligatory schooling at the age of fourteen and what middle-class reformers saw as the next stage in life (army service for men, marriage for women) were identified by educators, reformers, and politicians as the key battleground. This “gap” was basically a legal and institutional category created by the lack of state and pedagogical supervision after the age of 14. It was nevertheless seen as an educational and moral problem and addressed through various local, municipal, and state programs for continuing education and vocational training. It was also the object of increasingly concentrated efforts by the Prussian government at political and social control of the working youth. The 1911 Prussian ministerial decree on “youth cultivation” (*Jugendpflege*), for example, was issued within this logic. It foresaw for the first time the granting of central government funds (rather than communal or provincial funds) to a unified network of voluntary, German-speaking youth organizations for males that would not only educate youth for political subordination but would also, explicitly, prepare them for the military.³⁹²

The removal of children from their familial and social relations by municipalities and courts on the basis of perceived parental deficiencies or criminal proclivities was an accepted form of social control at the time. However, the myriad institutional and legal techniques designed to deal with neglected youth were facing growing numbers of children and youth in need of “saving” or putting away. In the 1890s, the soaring numbers of Prussian criminal youth delinquency led to a common middle-class perception of a crisis of authority. The imperial civil code (BGB), voted on in 1896 and in force since 1900, was a crucial piece of legislation in relation to children and youth that sought to respond to this sense of crisis. For the first time

³⁹² On continuing education and the ‘Youth Cultivation’ decree see Edward Ross Dickinson, “Citizenship, Vocational Training, and Reaction: Continuation Schooling and the Prussian ‘Youth Cultivation’ Decree of 1911,” *European History Quarterly* 29:1 (1999), pp. 109–147; Derek S. Linton, *‘Who Has the Youth, Has the Future’: The Campaign to Save Young Workers in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

issues like parental authority, the legal position of the mother, the rights of “illegitimate” children, guardianship, adoption, and the responsibilities of the Guardianship Courts were all included in a unified legal framework that held for the empire as a whole. The considerable freedom given within its remit for state-specific legislation allowed Prussia to enact the *Gesetz für die Fürsorgeerziehung Minderjähriger* that decriminalized most underage offenders and replaced prison sentences with compulsory “reformatory education,” either in institutions or in foster families. In many cases the actual change for young people entrapped in this system was minimal, unlike the apparent transformation in the eyes of consumers of official statistics. More significant were both the extended reach of the state into the lives of children and families and the new sphere for social entrepreneurship opened up by the state’s commitment to grant funds and power to semi-official associations and to municipal administrators. In Prussia, the legal authority to make decisions on custody and placement of children according to this new set of laws was invested in a new version of the Guardianship Courts. These Youth Courts could remove children from the legal and actual custody of their parents and send them to publicly funded correctional education institutions in order to protect them from what section 1666 of the BGB termed “complete moral ruin.”³⁹³

³⁹³ For the changes in legislation around 1900 see: Christoph Sachße and Florian Tennstedt, *Geschichte der Armenfürsorge in Deutschland: Fürsorge und Wohlfahrtspflege 1871–1929* [=Armenfürsorge in Deutschland, vol. 2] (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1988), pp. 33ff. ; Idem, “Armenfürsorge, Soziale Fürsorge, Sozialarbeit,” in Christa Berg (ed.) *Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte, Vol. 4: 1870-1914* (Munich: C. Beck, 1991), pp. 411–440, p. 424. For the Prussian law and the ministerial instruction for its implementation, see *Das Gesetz über die Fürsorgeerziehung Minderjähriger vom 2. Juli 1900 nebst den Ausführungsbestimmungen*, von Dr. P. F. Aschrott, Landesgerichtsrat in Berlin (Berlin: Guttentag Verlag-Buchhandlung, 1901). Also see Edward Ross Dickinson, “‘Until the Stubborn Will is Broken’: Crisis and Reform in Prussian Reformatory Education, 1900–34,” *European History Quarterly* 32:2 (2002), pp. 161–206. Two standard works on juvenile criminality and reformatory education are Detlev Peukert, *Grenzen der Sozialdisziplinierung: Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Jugendfürsorge von 1878 bis 1932* (Köln: Bund-Verlag, 1986) and most recently Dietrich Oberwittler’s important study, which includes a critical analysis of state youth statistics: *Von der Strafe zur Erziehung? Jugendkriminalpolitik in England und Deutschland, 1850-1920* (Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus, 2000).

Section 1666 of the BGB had an interesting role to play in the suppression of the school strikes in 1906. The strikes were centered in Poznania but caught on to a limited extent in Silesia, which was strongly Catholic and industrial, and whose large industrial working class resisted a stable division into national communities. Silesian officials' fear of losing working-class children to Polish nationalism prompted an especially intensive effort by the regional government to create German-language preschool, continuing education, out-of-school activities, and vocational training frameworks for boys and for girls. However effective the political education that children received was, these well-funded educational frameworks were well-attended, and the Silesia provincial government was proud of its record of nationalization through education.

When a few school disobedience cases occurred in Silesia during the height of the school strikes in 1906, the authorities took the unprecedented move of using the new section 1666 of the BGB against several parents who were seen as particularly recalcitrant or active in promoting the strikes locally and sanctioned the removal of their children to state custody. At the request of the Silesian public prosecutors, the district court in Zabrze decided to see the encouragement of and participation in civil disobedience around schools and the enjoining disregard for teachers' authority as detrimental to children's moral development and as an "attack on the psychic nature of the child" because of the conflict between parents' and teachers' authority. Therefore, the court ordered the removal of children from two families. With this judicial approbation, the local district commissioner could even see the potential for removing one to two hundred children from their families in order to protect the interests of the state. Another court in Pomerania followed suit within two weeks and in late November 1906 removed two children from the custody of their nationalist activist father. The Silesian parents appealed to the Prussian Supreme Administrative Court (*Oberverwaltungsgericht*) against the decision, but the court found that

state action was justified, accepting the argument that by allowing and even encouraging them to strike, parents were inflicting psychological harm on their children.

Although the Prussian cabinet shied away from a wide-scale use of section 1666 of the BGB as a tool of political oppression, it seems clear that local officials, court judges, and senior government ministers were all willing to use a set of laws that purported to protect children in order to remove children from their families for openly political reasons. Seeking to buttress state authority and to politically discipline both parents and children, such actions undermined paternal authority, a fundamental legal principle in Imperial Germany, and disrupted Polish families in the name of the German nation. This was unusual to the extent that section 1666 of the BGB and similar laws were usually utilized as a tool of social discipline against workers' families and particularly against single mothers. As we shall see, both aims were combined when the state decided on experimenting with child displacement as a strategy of colonization in the Polish-German border region.³⁹⁴

The Politics of Experimental Child Displacement

As the previous chapters have shown, the 1890s saw important changes in the personnel and policies of the Colonization Commission. The appointment of Rudolf von Wittenberg as the second president of the commission and the arrival of a new group of mostly middle-ranking younger officials and experts on their way up transformed the administrative practice of settlement. This group, in which Alfred Hugenberg (1865-1951), a co-founder of the ADV, was

³⁹⁴ For nationalization in Silesia see James Bjork, *Neither German Nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland* (University of Michigan Press, 2008), here pp. 92–98. For the application of Section 1666 of the BGB in Silesia in the context of the school strikes, see Kulczycki, *School Strikes in Prussian Poland*, pp. 152-153, 189. On the position the Prussian courts towards Polish appellants see Kenneth F. Ledford, "Formalizing the Rule of Law in Prussia: The Supreme Administrative Law Court, 1876-1914," *Central European History* 37:2, pp. 203–224.

a central figure, pushed for more radical methods of land acquisition (expropriation rather than purchase), credit allocation (special land banks and settlement cooperatives, partially based on the Polish model that successfully prevented the Colonization Commission from buying land from Poles), and wider recruitment of potential settlers. Heinrich Sohnrey (1859-1948), the influential publisher, publicist, and conservative agrarian social reformer, also joined the propaganda effort. Sohnrey, who worked closely with the Prussian Ministry of Agriculture, was preoccupied with the material and moral conditions in rural areas and with the ideological and vocational training of agricultural workers.³⁹⁵

The large numbers of Polish workers employed both by settlers and on the commission's estates was a problem that the commission was increasingly desperate to solve in the late 1890s.³⁹⁶ In this context it is important to recall that the commission's labor problem was part of the larger political economy of Prussia's eastern provinces, where mass emigration and increasing demand for workers by labor-intensive, large-scale agriculture resulted in heightened labor scarcity. Large agrarian producers and their political lobby pushed to reopen the eastern border for labor migration and supported the importation of more vulnerable non-German workers, recruited and controlled through a harsh regulatory regime that was put in place in that

³⁹⁵ Dörte Lerp, *Imperiale Grenzräume*, ch. 4, and for Hugenberg's involvement in the settlement project, pp. 178-183, 243-259; Dankwart Guratzsch, *Macht durch Organisation: die Grundlegung Hugenberg'schen Presseimperiums* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1974), ch. 1; Heidrun Holzbach, *Das "System Hugenberg": die Organisation bürgerlicher Sammlungspolitik vor dem Aufstieg der NSDAP* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981), pp. 21-64. On Sohnrey's involvement with the Colonization Commission see Georg Stöcker, *Agrarideologie und Sozialreform im Deutschen Kaiserreich: Heinrich Sohnrey und der Deutsche Verein für ländliche Wohlfahrts- und Heimatpflege 1896-1914* (Göttingen: V&R, 2010) pp. 145-155. For Sohnrey's most important publications in the context of the commission's propaganda campaign, see Heinrich Sohnrey, *Bauernland: Ein Gespräch mit Vater Brinkhöfer über das Ansiedlungswesen in den Provinzen Posen und Westpreußen* (Berlin: Trowitzsch, 1897); idem, *Eine Wanderfahrt durch die deutschen Ansiedlungsgebiete in Posen und Westpreußen* (Berlin: Thomas Schoenfeldt, 1897); and a now forgotten piece (missing also in Stöcker's detailed work): Heinrich Sohnrey, *Der Kleine Heinrich: Ein Waisenknabe aus dem Westen und eine Ansiedlergestalt aus der Deutschen Ostmark. Zur Erläuterung einer sozial-pädagogischen und nationalen Aufgabe des deutschen Volkes* [= Grüne Blätter für Kunst und Volkstum, Heft 4] (Leipzig/Berlin: G.H. Meyer Heimat Verlag, 1901). The latter publication is discussed in the next chapter.

³⁹⁶ See chapter 2.

decade (see chapter 3).³⁹⁷ But the large majority of these farmworkers were Slavophone Catholics from the formerly Polish lands of the Russian and Austrian empires. The Colonization Commission, however, was committed to changing the ethnic composition of Polish Prussia and ensuring that government candidates were elected over Polish candidates in Prussian and imperial elections. As both commitments became available for inspection in official statistics during the 1890s, the commission made the replacement of Polish workers with Germans a priority. Even as the commission increased its investment in constructing workers' housing and recruiting ethnically German workers from the Russian and Habsburg empires, officials continued to seek other avenues to tackle the economic dependency on Polish labor.

One solution to the labor problem was to import and permanently settle workers from the Austrian and mainly the Russian Empires who were considered ethnically Germans. Another solution was to bring in from the two empires non-Catholic Slavophone workers, who the Prussian state did not regard as Polish. Both were attempted on a large scale, with the Colonization Commission playing a central, and at times secretive role. A third way was to import German workers who would be unable to leave for a certain period of time. As the settlement of workers advanced slowly, and they rarely had the necessary capital to take up a *Rentegut* with the concomitant long-term commitment to pay rent, other administrative tools were required. In 1897, at Hugenberg's initiative, the commission started considering the "experimental" use of guardianship laws to bring in children as workers in settler households.

The idea to utilize working-class children as workers was apparently rooted in internal discussions in the ADV and in the personal relationship between Hugenberg and the ADV's first chairman, the Leipzig statistics professor Ernst Hasse (1846-1908). In 1895, less than a year after

³⁹⁷ See chapter 3.

he tabled the *Reichstag* motion calling for citizenship laws that would uphold national and racial homogeneity while promoting imperial expansion, Hasse proposed to “settle the East,” or Prussia’s Polish border region, by “relieving the big cities” (*Entlastung*) of poor children.³⁹⁸ Laying out his plan in the ADV bulletin, Hasse suggested a centralized system of private charity institutions for children. Orphans’ institutions would be erected in key transportation hubs to facilitate the transportation of children from cities to foster families in the settlements.³⁹⁹ Hugenberg, at the time both an official of the Prussian Colonization Commission in Posen/Poznań and a central figure in the Pan-German League, followed this idea in close cooperation with other Colonization Commission officials. Together with several colleagues, Hugenberg established a private association organized according to the models of Protestant philanthropy. The Protestant Association for the Care of Orphans in the Province of Posen (*Evangelischer Verein für Waisenzpflege in der Provinz Posen*, renamed in 1904 to *Evangelischer Verein für Waisenzpflege in der Ostmark*; hereafter EWO) was established and officially recognized as a legal entity in 1897. The association shared its leading members with the Colonization Commission and the Pan-German League and was able to draw upon the political clout, personal networks, and fundraising abilities of the Pan-Germans and on significant state support. Even before its official registration, an agreement was reached with the Colonization Commission, giving the association ownership of the manor house and surrounding park and fields in Ruchocin (renamed Neuzedlitz, probably after the first president of the commission), a recently settled estate. The aim of the association, as explained by the commission to the

³⁹⁸ Ernst Hasse, “Die Besiedlung des Ostens durch Entlassung der großen Städte” *Alldeutsche Blätter*, 29.9.1895. I discuss the Reichstag citizenship debate and Hasse’s role in it in detail in chapter 1.

³⁹⁹ Hasse, *Die Besiedlung des Ostens*. Regarding the “circle of friends” around Hugenberg see Lerp, *Imperiale Grenzräume*, pp. 178-183, 243–259; Guratzsch, *Macht durch Organisation*, ch. 1. On Hasse’s biography, see Gerald Kolditz, “Hasse, Ernst Traugott Friedrich,” in: Institut für Sächsische Geschichte und Volkskunde e.V (ed.), *Sächsische Biografie* [Online Access: <http://www.isgv.de/saebi/> (13.6.2020).

Prussian government, was “transplanting” (*Verpflanzung*) children from the large cities of western Germany to the eastern provinces of Prussia, “filling the holes” in the German population.⁴⁰⁰

The basic proposition of the EWO was to use the lower living costs in the rural periphery of the eastern provinces of Prussia to foster children for as low as half of the costs in cities (the cost was calculated as 100 Mark a year). Municipalities, however, were not supposed to save money by the scheme, but rather to transfer to the EWO the same amount that they would otherwise pay for children’s upkeep. The difference between the cost of yearly upkeep by the EWO and the monies paid by municipalities were to be kept in trust in a savings account and released to the children upon coming of age, with some strings attached (for men “not sooner than their release from military service,” and for women upon marriage). If children ended up leaving the eastern provinces before that time, the association was to be “compensated” with a quarter of the accumulated fund, with the rest going to the city that sent the child. If the children remained, the accumulated monies in the fund would be used to allow children to receive small plots through the Colonization Commission, enabling them to become settlers in their own right. After some hesitation, hoping that cities would pick up the bill for the settlement of children, the Colonization Commission declared itself ready to support such children, in “suitable cases,” with credit, loans, and an interest-free payment period, meaning that the children would later tie themselves through debt and a settlement contract to the land. Judging by discussions in the Frankfurt Poor Administration and municipal council and correspondence with Berlin and Hannover, it was the EWO’s offer of this possibility of social advancement, backed by an

⁴⁰⁰ See the programmatic Colonization Commission report on the EWO to the Prussian Cabinet from 9.7.1898. GStA PK I. HA 87B Nr. 9568, pp. 3–33, here p. 6.

official note from the commission that allowed communal authorities to justify participation in the entire project. Nevertheless, from the start only “suitable” married men were intended to ascend into the ranks of fully-fledged (and indebted) propertied settler-farmers. As the Colonization Commission president readily admitted, it could be expected only from a handful.⁴⁰¹

Between 1897 and 1914, the EWO received 1,434 children in its main institution in Neuzedlitz and its affiliated institutions in the provinces of Poznanian and West-Prussia. Neuzedlitz/Ruchocin was located 30 kilometers from the Russian border in the county of Witkowo, not far from the city of Gnesen/Gneizno. The Polish-owned estate was bought by the Colonization Commission and turned into a settler-village, with the manor house and a considerable area around it given over to the EWO for a discounted price. The single most important supplier of children to the EWO was the municipality of Berlin, together with its surrounding municipalities (mainly Schöneberg and Charlottenburg). Berlin was also well located in terms of transportation. It only took one day to travel to the institution by train (through Posen/Poznań to Gnesen/Gniezno and then the regional train to Witkowo) and horse-drawn wagon. In comparison, Frankfurt children and the official escorting them needed at least two days for the journey. Leipzig, Hannover, Elberfeld, and towns within the colonized provinces also sent children in smaller numbers. In the aftermath of the First World War the EWO still had 700 children under its supervision. Most of them probably returned to their hometowns soon after the culmination of the war.⁴⁰²

⁴⁰¹ President of the Colonization Commission president to the Prussian Cabinet, 9.7.1898. GStA PK I. HA 87B Nr. 9568, pp. 3–32. For inner colonization as social reform, see chapter 2 of the dissertation.

⁴⁰² According to a 1918 circular letter to members of the EWO, until that year 2050 children passed through the association, but the changes in the working of the EWO during the war mean that the number cannot be compared with prewar figures. Regarding the EWO and its activities during the war and in its aftermath, see the EWO call

The EWO utilized a network of Protestant children institutions across Polish Prussia to increase its capacity to receive children. The EWO sister association in West-Prussia, based in another estate purchased by the commission, Gross Tillitz, gave the EWO the authority to enter and conclude negotiations in its name with communal authorities in order to bring children to the colonized provinces (1897). At least ten other Protestant institutions were established along similar lines to Gross Tillitz. Some of these institutions also dealt with cities directly, however, and the EWO was forced at times to transfer children to other institutions, which may have negotiated better terms with municipalities or were better located for supervision.⁴⁰³

Even before the war, children usually did not stay as intended in the colonized provinces and tended to go back to their hometowns when they could legally leave the institution at the age of 14 or 16. By 1912 there were only three cases of marriage between EWO children, and even in these cases we do not know if they brought together their funds to take on a settlement contract with the commission. As no success story is mentioned in the annual reports, it seems safe to assume that they did not. In 1909, a short-lived experiment to open in the vicinity a separate institution for young people in reformatory education (*Fürsorgeerziehung*) on the basis of an agreement with the Berlin municipality was beset with scandals and abandoned, though not before it significantly harmed the reputation and financial situation of the EWO. By 1912 the EWO leadership actively sought to sell or lease out the institute's buildings and land in Neuzedlitz, and upon completion of the sale the staff and children moved to the former reformatory institution in Mielżyn, renamed *Kleinfleiss* to avoid association with the brutalities

from March 1918. EWO to the Protestant Consistory in Posen, 18.9.1919. APP Konsystorz Ewangelicki w Poznaniu Nr. 893/8528 (unpaginated).

⁴⁰³ Based on the EWO annual reports between 1897 to 1912. The annual reports used here are all located in ISG-Frankfurt am Main, Magistrat V829 (unpaginated). Copies of these reports are also found in other archival files used in this chapter.

that came to light in the reformatory education institute.⁴⁰⁴ The EWO retained the Neuzedlitz name while operating from Kleinfleiss/Mielżyn. In 1918, the EWO moved to Berlin. By 1926 it probably ceased its operations, though it was not fully dissolved until the Nazis took power.⁴⁰⁵

Alfred Hugenberg was the leading figure in the establishment and running of the EWO up to 1914. Hugenberg took a leading role in the establishment of the ADV in 1893 and then sought and received a position at the Colonization Commission in Posen in 1894, where he quickly became the right-hand man of the commission's president, Rudolf von Wittenberg. He rapidly ascended the ranks of the Prussian civil service until 1907, when he left state service to become a powerful business executive. After less than a year in the *Berg-und Metallbank* in Frankfurt, he was appointed chairman of the financial operations board of Krupp AG in Essen in 1909. Coming from a well-connected Hannover family prominent in National-Liberal politics (his father was a National-Liberal politician and the mayor of Hannover), Hugenberg took an early interest in applied social sciences and in conservative social reform. After studying law and national economy in Berlin and passing his bureaucracy entrance exams, he undertook doctoral studies under the agrarian economist G.-F. Knapp in Strasburg, writing his dissertation in 1887-1888 on the construction of "colonies" in the fen and moorlands of the German north-west. As Hugenberg explained it in the introduction, his interest in the so-called *Moorkolonisation* lay not

⁴⁰⁴ The EWO wanted that the new name of the settler community in Mielyżn "will not even remotely ring like the current name" ("an die jetzige Bezeichnung nicht den geringsten Anklang hat, um den alten Namen... vergessen zu machen"). The name that the district commissioner originally favored for the settler-village, Miltau, had therefore to be rejected together with Neu-Mieltschin, the name that the settlers themselves requested and that the district commissioner, after a short etymological and folklorist reflection, rejected as not German enough. Miltau, he mused in writing, was both German and had the local ring to its ending. For the discussions about the name see district commissioner (*Landrat*) in Witkowo to Colonization Commission (copy), 25.8.1909. APP-Gniezno, Komisja Kolonizacja, Reg. III Nr. 1851, pp. 59ff, 136-137.

⁴⁰⁵ EWO reports for 1911, 1914; Central-Ausschuss für die Innere Mission, *Handbuch der Inneren Mission: Die Organisation der Inneren Mission der deutschen evangelischen Kirche* [=Handbuch der Inneren Mission, vol. 1] (Berlin-Spandau: Wichern, 1929), pp. 216-217; EWO file in Landesarchiv Berlin, A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-04 Polizeipräsidium Berlin, Vereine, I. Nr. 3140.

in the technical aspects specific to the reclamation and agrarian settlement of the moorlands. Rather, he was interested in the broader economic processes that come with a “comprehensive new settlement in midst of an old *Kulturland*.”⁴⁰⁶ Throughout his meteoric rise to the summit of German capitalism, Hugenberg remained actively involved in the affairs of the EWO, was in frequent correspondences with its director and leading members in Poznan, and up to the outbreak of war in 1914 decided or was consulted on every important institutional decision. Hugenberg’s personal papers in the Federal Archives in Koblenz contain frequent, at times daily, EWO-related correspondence with his close confidant Leo Wegener, who took the chairmanship of the EWO after Hugenberg left Poznan in 1903.⁴⁰⁷

The EWO had a semi-independent status in relation to the ADV and came to be associated more directly with Hugenberg himself, whose marshaling of ADV connections and influence in the business world and the state bureaucracy played a key role in enabling the EWO’s activities. In order for the EWO to receive more state funding and children, it had to pretend to be a national, Protestant, and yet nonpolitical charity. In the early years of the EWO’s

⁴⁰⁶ "In der Hauptsache beschäftigt sich die vorliegende Arbeit mit der Besiedelung der nordwestdeutschen Moore. Wenn ich ihr trotzdem den allgemeineren Titel „Innere Kolonisation im Nordwesten Deutschlands“ gegeben habe, so geschah dies, um damit anzudeuten, dass das Hauptgewicht nicht auf die technischen Besonderheiten der Moorkolonisation gelegt werden sollte, sondern auf die Klarstellung des wirtschaftlichen Vorganges einer umfassenden Neu-ansiedlung inmitten eines alten Kulturlandes." Alfred Hugenberg, *Innere Colonisation im Nordwesten Deutschlands* [=Abhandlungen zu dem staatswissenschaftlichen Seminar zu Strassburg i. E., Heft VIII] (Strassburg: Trübner, 1891), p. viii (emphasis in original). It is of note that Hugenberg received financial support for his research from the government’s Central Moorlands Commission, arranged through Agricultural Ministry mandarin and early proponent of ‘internal colonization,’ Hugo Thiel. Hugenberg thanked first Knapp and then Thiel in the preface to the dissertation. On the fen colonies as part of ‘internal colonization’ and social reform, see the work of Elizabeth B. Jones: *The Rural ‘Social Ladder’*; idem, “Keeping Up with the Dutch: Internal Colonization and Rural Reform in Germany, 1800–1914,” *International Journal for History, Culture, and Modernity* 3:2 (2015), pp. 173–194.

⁴⁰⁷ For Hugenberg’s continuous involvement with the EWO, see his personal papers in BA N2308 Nr. 30, 67. For his pre-1914 career see Guratzsch, *Macht durch Organisation*, ch. 1 and in greater detail, Holzbach, *Das System Hugenberg*, pp. 21–64. Holzbach also mentions the EWO (pp. 32–33) as an innovative “charitable” activity that promoted Germanization in Polish Prussia in new ways. She then hastens to differentiate the scheme from later Nazi use of children, arguing that Hugenberg stood here for a combination of “social-protectionist bourgeois welfare” with nationalist education, and not for biological conception of race. In light of the actual purpose and activity of the EWO, the assertion seems untenable.

existence, the ADV maintained that the Neuzedlitz institution was “theirs” and the original association statute initially stipulated that publication of reports and activities of the association would appear in the bulletin of the Pan-German League. But by 1900, this changed, and the two organizations were disengaged in public to allow the EWO to more easily collaborate with the government and municipalities. The ADV’s continued, however, to provide the EWO with financial support. As Ernst Hasse made clear in a 1900 meeting of the ADV executive committee, the Pan-German League was not to interfere with the EWO, as it was Hugenberg’s personal project. Hugenberg, Hasse stated, was its “father.”⁴⁰⁸

Despite its structure as a private charitable organization, the role of the state in the EWO scheme was cardinal both in vision and in practice. In the first place, support from the Colonization Commission was crucial for the rapid establishment and operationalization of the Neuzedlitz institution. During 1898, the scheme and the first negotiations with the cities of Frankfurt and Hannover were in full swing and even briefly mentioned in the Prussian cabinet in the context of a discussion about the lack of agricultural workers in the eastern provinces. In July 1898, in a policy paper presented to the Prussian Cabinet dealing with recommendations for the government’s anti-Polish policy, the Prussian minister of education took up the idea of the Neuzedlitz scheme and reformulated it into a general recommendation that would make it the official task of provincial governments to organize and finance the transfer of orphaned children to the eastern provinces through provincial institutions.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁸ “Gebt uns ein Kind zu Weihnachten,” *Alldeutsche Blätter* 7:52, 26.12.1897, p. 275; GStA PK I. HA 77B Nr. 756, “Den Evg. Verein für Waisenfürsorge in der Provinz Posen,” statute amendment from 24.5.1899. For Hasse’s declaration of Hugenberg’s parentage, see the meeting protocol of the ADV executive committee: “Protokoll über die Sitzung des geschäftsführenden Ausschuss in Düsseldorf “Hotel Royal” am 9.12.1900,” BArch-Lichterfelde, R 8048/23, p. 3.

⁴⁰⁹ For the 16.4.1898 *Staatsministerium* meeting summary (without mention of the EWO) see *Acta Borussica Neue Folge: Die Protokolle des Preußischen Staatsministerium* vol. 8/I (2003), pp. 308-309. The Education Ministry called for “Errichtung von Waisenhäusern, in denen Pfleglinge aus deutschen Provinzen für den bürgerlichen Beruf im Osten erzogen werden und Förderung der Waisenfürsorge durch Unterstützung der Provinzial Erziehungsvereine.”

Although the Prussian cabinet was already informed of the EWO scheme, the first detailed, programmatic Colonization Commission report on it was sent to the cabinet office (*Staatsministerium*) in the middle of July 1898. The report, clearly echoing ADV formulations, was composed by Hugenberg (who was alternatively using both his Colonization Commission official and EWO initiator hats) and fully endorsed by Colonization Commission president von Wittenberg.⁴¹⁰ The Wittenberg-Hugenberg document promoted what they describe as an “experiment” and a “new thinking” for Germany. The main reasons for using an association and not an official agency were only hinted at in the document, but the advantages seem to have been twofold. First, Hugenberg noted the ability to act outside the purview of administrative law and the Supreme Administrative Court so as to minimize legal challenges to the scheme. Secondly, a private association would not be inspected by the Prussian State Comptroller (*Oberrechnungskammer*).

Hugenberg also concentrated this first report on the efforts to make the necessary agreements with cities. Important municipalities would be first won over through a combination of government pressure and personal connections (Hugenberg mentioned his personal and ADV connections in Schöneberg and Frankfurt) as well as monetary incentives (Hannover was offered a significant discount, and was asked to pay 60 Mark per child, significantly less than the 100 marks that the EWO estimated to be the real cost). By securing agreements with Schöneberg and Frankfurt, both strongly Liberal-leaning cities at the forefront of communal welfare reforms, Hugenberg hoped to clear the way for other municipalities to join in. In Hugenberg’s eyes,

Education minister to the Prussian Cabinet “Grundsätze für das Verhalten der Staatsregierung gegenüber den Staatsangehörigen polnischer Muttersprache,” 4.7.1898 (copy). GStA PK I. HA Rep 77 Tit. 871 Nr. 60, p. 290. I am grateful to Professor Witold Matwiejczyk for the reference.

⁴¹⁰ Colonization Commission report on the EWO to the Prussian Cabinet (with attachments), 19.7.1898. GStA PK I. HA 87B Nr. 9568, pp. 3–33.

continued government support and exertion of political pressure was essential, and he seemed to place much hope on the network of ADV members among the urban educated middle classes.⁴¹¹

As it turned out, neither government support, nor Hugenberg's social network proved capable of turning the EWO scheme into an overnight success. By 1902, the EWO and the Neuzedlitz institution faced the first in a series of crises. In addition to the heavy debts incurred during the establishment of the institution, there was a permanent running deficit in operational costs that was evident in the everyday functioning of the institution. One devastating inspection report ordered by the Frankfurt municipality even recommended ceasing any further transfer of children to Neuzedlitz in light of the scanty clothing, meagre bedding, furnishing, and washing utensils, lack of in-house toilets, lack of attention to the children, and the generally bad conditions in the place. The institution, meant to be a children's clearing house, became a bottleneck: contracts with municipalities were slow to materialize, the transfer of more children was hindered by the institution's limited capacity, and foster families, who were supposed to receive most of the children, were also in short supply. The resulting overcrowding in the

⁴¹¹ Colonization Commission report on the EWO to the Prussian Cabinet (with attachments), 19.7.1898. GStA PK I. HA 87B Nr. 9568, pp. 3–33. In "Neuzedlitz," (*Alldeutsche Blätter* 7:6, 7.2.1897) a more detailed description of ADV thinking was given, including the argument that German farmers and craftspeople found themselves forced to employ Polish labor and thus threatened the character of "reindeutsche Gemeinden." A simple solution was presented: "Siebt man den deutsche Bauern des polnischsprachigen Ostens westliche Waisen als Pflegekinder, so wird dies aufhören da er dann kein Gesinde mehr braucht." For Hugenberg's anonymous critique of the government in the ADV bulletin, which set the course for the ADV's positions in the 1890s, see: "Der preußische Staat als Polonisor," *Alldeutsche Blätter* 16, 15.4.1894, pp. 65–66. Later articles, probably also written with Hugenberg's approval if not by his own hand, were: "Nochmals der preußische Staat als Polonisor," *Alldeutsche Blätter* 34, 19.8.1894, pp. 137–138, and seven other pieces bearing the same title during early 1896: 26.1.1896, pp. 19–20; 2.2.1896, p. 25; 16.2.1896, p. 35; 23.2.1896, pp. 38–39; 1.3.1896, pp. 42–43; 8.3.1896, pp. 46–47; 15.3.1896, p. 54. For the references see Grabowski, *Deutscher und Polnischer Nationalismus*, pp. 55–57; also see Drummond, *Protecting Poznan*, p. 76ff.

On the Prussian administrative court and on its stance regarding the citizen's liberties of Poles, see Kenneth F. Ledford, "Formalizing the Rule of Law in Prussia: The Supreme Administrative Law Court, 1876–1914," *Central European History* 37:2 (2004), pp. 203–224.

institution appears to have been endemic and was a recurring issue in the inspection reports, which were composed by representatives for the Frankfurt Poor Administration.⁴¹²

In urgent pleas for government assistance launched in late 1902 and early 1903, Hugenberg admitted that long-term debt not only prevented the institute from seeking loans to cover the deficit in running costs and allow expansion but also threatened the very existence of the association, as the bank that underwrote the debt was itself approaching bankruptcy. These urgent requests that Hugenberg sent to three ministries and one provincial president seem to have been a calculated move to get the state squarely behind the EWO. At a time in which the ADV was plunged into financial and operational difficulties that plagued the organization for most of the decade, Hugenberg, still in official service, reminded ministers and the provincial president of Poznan, in the name of the EWO, of the political significance of their “experiment” (*Versuch*) and on this basis requested urgent assistance. Pointing to a much more ambitious scope for child displacement and settlement, Hugenberg wrote that the scheme would remain an experimental one until significant numbers of orphans were “fully settled” (*wirklich heimisch werden*) in Polish Prussia, using a turn of phrase that could also be translated as becoming native to the land.⁴¹³

⁴¹² Sekretär Falkenhagen’s report on his 29.11.1902 inspection is in ISG-Frankfurt am Main Magistrat V960, pp. 163–175. The report was heavily attacked by Hugenberg shortly afterwards in a letter that he sent directly to his father-in-law, Mayor Adicks. He refrained from challenging the inspection’s main findings, however. See *ibid*, pp. 176-178 (n.d.). A further inspection from September 1904 did not come up with significantly different findings, but was much more favorable in tone, positing itself against Falkenhagen and recommending further cooperation with the Neuzedlitz institution. See “Bericht betr. Besuch das Waisenhauses Neu-Zedlitz am 15. und 16. September 1904,” *ibid*, pp. 185ff.

⁴¹³ For the crisis of the ADV, see Chickering, *We Man Who Feel Most German*, pp. 223–227. For Hugenberg’s letters, officially sent by the EWO, see his personal papers in the German Federal Archives: BArch Koblenz N1231/12, pp. 359ff. As Hugenberg explained in his letters to the ministers, the immediate cause for the crisis in the EWO was the financial collapse of the *Scherrebeker Kreditbank*, which underwrote the mortgaging of the Neuzedlitz land, undertaken to pay for the Neuzedlitz institution’s land purchase and building costs. As a later debate in the Prussian parliament revealed, the *Scherrebeker Kreditbank* had already run into difficulties in the late 1890s, at which point the ADV decided to support the bank financially. From this point on, leading ADV members sat on supervisory board. The ADV was presumably interested in using the bank as a financing institution for its activities. It seems that some form of state help was granted to the ailing *Kreditbank* shortly afterwards. On this

The EWO broadly succeeded in getting direct government monies. On the basis of Hugenberg's pleas, a flood of grants from government ministries, provincial governments, and even a one-time 20,000 marks grant from the emperor to facilitate the bringing of "suitable young forces for the German peasant and craftsmen class (*Stand*)" were awarded the EWO in the years 1902-1906. It is difficult to follow all the ways in which state support allowed the EWO to continue its activities. In terms of direct cash grants, it seems that state support amounted to at least 20% of the EWO's annual budget, but this number probably does not fully reflect the EWO's dependency on the state.⁴¹⁴ In contrast, cities and provinces in western Germany often proved resistant to government pressure to work with the EWO.⁴¹⁵

issue see the debate in the Prussian Landtag from 14.3.1904: *Stenographische berichte über die verhandlungen des Preußischen Hauses der Abgeordneten*, 20. Leg. Periode, I. Session. 41. Sitzung (Berlin: Moeser, 1904), pp. 2855-2861.

Hugenberg stated in his appeal that "Wir glauben auch, dass der von uns unternommene Versuch - ein solcher bleibt er ja, solange nicht erhebliche Zahlen von Waisenkindern in den Ansiedlungsprovinzen wirklich heimisch geworden sind - immerhin Wichtig genug ist, um der dabei entfalteten privaten Initiative auch einmal mit Staatsmitteln beizuspringen und den Druck [=financial pressure, R. B.] von ihr zu nehmen, den die stets Finanznot der Anstalt naturnotwendig ausübt." See Hugenberg/EWO to Education Minister Studt, 10.12.1903, BArch N 1231/12, pp. 359ff.

⁴¹⁴ For a partial list of grants see the relevant years in I. HA Rep 76 VII neu Sekt. 7A IV Nr. 7 (unpaginated). Especially the three ministers' requests to the emperor (6.11.1903), joined by the Finance Ministry (26.6.1905) before imperial consent was finally granted (4.7.1905). In the ministerial recommendation letter to the emperor, the EWO is presented much as it presented itself, but with a clearer emphasis on the national and economic interests of the state in importing German labor, stating that the monies will support the EWO in "... diese Waisenkinder in der Ostmark heimisch zu machen und dadurch für den deutschen Bauern- und Handwerkerstand... geeignete junge Kräfte heranzuziehen." It should be noted that the original request was for a three-year support, reduced by the Finance Ministry to a one-time grant-in-aid, with the additional condition that the Interior Ministry would approve a donation-gathering campaign, which was anyhow another item in Hugenberg's list of requests from government. An one-time wide-ranging collection of donations in Protestant churches (*Landeskollekte*) was subsequently approved by ministers, see Interior Minister Bethmann-Hollweg to Education Ministry, 16.6.1905; Also see the repeated ministerial approvals to the provincial governments in Bromberg/Bydgoszcz and Poznań to support the EWO from their funds (e.g. 2,000 Mark on 31.3.1904, 1,000 Mark on 24.4.1906); and direct regular transfers of smaller amounts (e.g. 500 Mark from the Education Ministry, probably as contribution to the salary of the institution's teacher, who taught the settler-village children as well). In defiance of his colleagues, the Minister of Public Works continuously refused requests to support the EWO by allowing cheaper rail travel for the children and their escort. See: *ibid*, correspondences from 11.7.1904, 30.1.1905).

⁴¹⁵ For the normally lukewarm responses from Prussia's western provinces to pressure from the government to assist the EWO: Interior Minister to provincial governments (following a request from the AK), 10.8.1898, and the reports back from the provinces in GStA PK I HA. Rep 87B Nr. 9568, pp. 24-25ff.

The potential of using children to further the nationalization of the German-Polish borderlands and the financial enthusiasm with which the EWO was greeted in government circles was not lost upon other influential political entrepreneurs. As early as December 1900, members of the Poznań/Posen political elite, including the mayor Witting and high-ranking local officials of the church and education bureaucracies in the province, met secretly with senior members of the influential Eastern Marches Society (*Deutscher Ostmarkenverein* or OMV) members, among them its co-founder Major von Tiedemann-Seeheim, to discuss the feasibility of bringing German children to the eastern provinces of Prussia. The protocol of this meeting, declared secret by its participants, has survived in the municipal archives in Poznań and offers an interesting comparison with the EWO.⁴¹⁶

Taking place shortly after the inauguration ceremony of the Neuzedlitz institution, the meeting concerned what Tiedemann-Seeheim referred to as the “exciting plan” to use children to replace the workers lost through emigration from the eastern provinces, “especially to supply apprentices for craftsmen in small towns and laborers for agriculture.” The thorny question of oversight and selection of foster families was left to unspecified teachers and churchmen, the ever-present possibility that children would not stay in the eastern provinces was mentioned and then side-stepped. The question of funding was also left open, although the head of the OMV Berlin office argued that the plan would require significant and costly organization that would have to be supported by the state. The assumption that the state would take up any significant financial burden related to the plan was apparently shared by the participants. Those present

⁴¹⁶ The secret protocol is located in the Poznań municipal archives: APP, Acta Miasta Poznania, Nr. 3832, pp. 19-22.

were also clear about the EWO being their model, and it must have formed their expectation from the state as much as it shaped the framing of their scheme's goals.⁴¹⁷

The details, however, contained marked differences. The children, according to Tiedemann, were to be both “orphans” and children who were taken into compulsory public care for other reasons. Although Tiedemann differentiated between these two groups according to age, the substantive difference was legal: so-called orphans were to be between the ages of fourteen and sixteen, namely after their obligatory schooling, and youth older than sixteen were to be taken according to the new Prussian reformatory education legislation which allowed compulsory placement in institutions. Tiedemann-Seeheim was quite blunt about his choices. Instead of bringing in young school-aged children, older children were desired because they were ready to be directly sent to work. The children were thus to be brought specifically to take on immediate employment as apprentices and young workers with German farmers and craftsmen without the mediation of any centralized institution and without any educational or social-reformist presumptions. Such an arrangement seems to have been based on the Prussian legislation about household work and apprenticeship (*Gesindeordnung*) that tied servants and apprentices to the patriarchal authority and location of the head of the household. It would also be easier to convince municipalities to send children to foster families in the countryside than to closed institutions, Tiedemann-Seeheim reasoned, as well as cheaper.⁴¹⁸

Despite the reported enthusiasm of the Berlin mayor to supply the OMV with children, municipalities in fact declined to collaborate and the scheme never materialized. As the refusal of the Frankfurt municipality to cooperate with the OMV suggests, municipalities were probably

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

reluctant to send children away without even minimal safeguards in place, as the OMV never proposed a solution to a myriad of key problems: the supervision of children and families, the selection of children and foster families, and the provision of the legally mandated education for the children. Additionally, the OMV did not provide any way to limit children's ability to return westwards beyond the harsh application of the stipulations of the *Gesindeordnung*. As we shall see in greater detail in the next chapter, these issues were at the heart of the much more successful children displacement undertaken by the EWO.⁴¹⁹

The OMV had tried and failed to build up a child-transfer operation of its own in the early years of the twentieth century, modelled after the EWO but much more blatant in its dehumanizing and careless treatment of working-class children. While the OMV foresaw only rudimentary provisions for bringing in, distributing, and providing for children, the Neuzedlitz operation was much better thought-out. With its ADV and Protestant church connections and charitable trappings, the EWO seems to have successfully monopolized the experimental transfer of children to German settlements. Having failed to garner any municipal support for its scheme, the OMV would later be satisfied with supporting the EWO, but the abortive competition attempt speaks to the widening ambitions of social transformation opened up by the colonization of Polish Prussia.

By 1907, the strategic use of children – including non-Protestant one – as a tool of nationalization in the provinces of Poznan and West Prussia was accepted by the state. The Prussian government and the Colonization Commission long debated the advantages and disadvantages of settling German Catholics in the eastern provinces, fearing their “Polonization”

⁴¹⁹ Eight months later the scheme matured to a formal request for cooperation from several municipalities along the lines Tiedemann had presented in the Posen meeting. See: Deutsche Ostmarkenverein in Berlin to the municipality of Frankfurt am Main, 7.8.1901, ISG Frankfurt am Main, Magistrat V960, pp. 155-156, and the rejection letter from the municipality on pp. 157-158. I develop the issues of age and work in the next chapter.

through everyday contact with their Polish coreligionists and with Polish priests. After finally allowing settlement of German Catholics in specific areas and limiting their contact with the local Polish population, including by establishing separate church service and schools, the Colonization Commission sought and gained ministerial approval to import Catholic children from western Germany along similar lines as the EWO, to be employed as domestic servants and farm workers in German Catholic families. Such children offered the only way, the president of the commission wrote, to “secure the national loyalties of the Catholic settlers” (“nationale Sicherung der katholischen Ansiedler”) by replacing Polish labor. This initiative came to nothing, however, as the provincial governments in western Prussian provinces declined to cooperate, citing the general shortage in labor in their respective regions.⁴²⁰ Using children under public charge as labor was definitely not limited to the EWO in Poznania.

In 1913, a fully-fledged “Kinderstatistik” was ordered as a basis for further policy decisions by the Prussian Interior Ministry. The aim was to find out what the children of settlers, and those of the EWO, were doing after leaving school, where they ended up, and how they earned a living. Shortly afterwards, the OMV compiled a comprehensive policy paper for officials’ eyes, suggesting a broad array of measures to promote the Germanization of towns and cities in the provinces of Poznania and West Prussia. Much in line with the 1913 reasoning for the “Kinderstatistik” and with internal government discussions, to which the OMV was often privy, the policy paper included several pages dealing with children, including recommendation

⁴²⁰ See the report and conclusions of the Colonization Commission on the issue: Colonization Commission President to the Ministry of Agriculture, forwarded with the latter’s support to the Interior Ministry, “Denkschrift betreffend die Überweisung katholischer Fürsorgezöglinge an katholische Ansiedler” from 19.3.1907, and the subsequent responses of provincial presidents in: GStA PK, I. HA 77B Nr. 1448 (unpaginated).

that the Prussian government put pressure on municipalities to send children to orphans' institutions in the colonized provinces.⁴²¹

The OMV policy paper also contained, probably for the first time in such a programmatic high-profile document, the contours of a new narrative that postulated a competition over children between the two nationalities, in which the EWO was portrayed in a frontline role. According to the OMV, "the Poles," having realized that Polish reformatory education children are sent to German families and institutions where they were "stripped of their anti-German feelings," had established an association that presented Guardianship Courts with Catholic, Polish-speaking guardians for Catholic, Polish-speaking children in an attempt to ensure that such children were raised as German-hating Catholic Poles. The organization that the OMV referred to, the Welfare Association for Catholic Orphans in Poznań (*Towarzystwo Opieki nad dziećmi katolickimi w Poznaniu*, established in 1905), was thus portrayed as a successful manipulator of Prussian guardianship and reformatory education laws. Highlighting the importance of children in the politics of Germanization, the OMV urged the Prussian government to pay close attention to the work of this new, insidious, Polish organization and to support the activities of the EWO as a counterweight in the struggle over children in the German-

⁴²¹ The "Kinderstatistik" is discussed in: Interior Minister to Agricultural Minister, 17.10.1913 (unpaginated), I. HA 87B Nr. 9567. For the OMV policy paper, see the copy that Hugenberg received: Deutscher Ostmarkenverein, "Denkschrift zur Ostmärkischen Städtepolitik mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Provinz Posen" from May 1914. BArch Koblenz, N1231/68 pp. 10-31, the Neuzedlitz institution is mentioned on p. 30 (p. 34 in the report): "Die Unterstützung der deutschen Waisenhäusern in Posen und Westpreußen, die wie das Waisenhaus Neuzedlitz in Kleinfleiß, Kreis Witkowo, Waisenkinder westdeutscher Großstädte vom zarten Kindesalter an aufziehen. Leider besteht noch immer, namentlich in den Großstädten des Westens, eine strake Abneigung dagegen, die Kinder nach dem Osten abzugeben. Hier könnte mehr geleistet werden, wenn seitens der königlichen Staatsregierung den Kommunen die Abgabe ihrer Waisenkinder nach dem Osten in Anstalts- und Familienpflege nahegelegt werden könnte."

Polish borderlands. According to the OMV, the EWO had a central role in the developing struggle over children's national loyalties in Polish Prussia.⁴²²

The yearly reports of the Welfare Association for Catholic Orphans in Poznań, however, were careful not to use any national rhetoric or to offer any reason for critique by the state. They described their activities in the more traditional language of child welfare and Catholic charity and made sure to express gratitude to the city's Guardianship Court, which entrusted children to the association, and to the legal stipulations that made it possible. "The state law and the paragraph 1666 are a great help for the children," the 1911 report noted, who are not to be faulted for their "moral deprivation" but rather rescued from their corrupting environment and parents. The Welfare Association for Catholic Orphans did not run an institution of its own but rather coordinated and financed the placement of children in families and in institutions. In 1911, it nevertheless started a fundraising campaign to build a permanent institution in Poznań to allow it to house children temporarily until they were placed elsewhere. The reports for 1910 and 1911 indicate that the Catholic association was usually made aware of neglected children through priests and teachers and then turned to the family or to the courts to receive guardianship. Children were then placed in Catholic institutions as well as in private homes across the province. The means of supervision were limited, but it seems that local priests were supposed to undertake visitations to foster families and report back to the association.⁴²³ In 1911, the Welfare Association for Catholic Orphans reported on a total of 549 children passing through its affiliated

⁴²² Deutscher Ostmarkenverein, "Denkschrift zur Ostmärkischen Städtepolitik mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Provinz Posen" from May 1914. BArch Koblenz, N1231/68 pp. 10-31. On the Catholic Welfare Association, based in the city of Poznań, see their annual reports: *Trzecie Sprawozdanie Towarzystwa Opieki Nad Dziećmi w Poznaniu* (1910) and *Czwarte sprawozdanie Towarzystwa Opieki nad dziećmi katolickimi w Poznaniu. Rok 1910-1911* (Poznań, 1912) [Online Access: <http://www.wbc.poznan.pl/dlibra/doccontent?id=24331>; <https://www.wbc.poznan.pl/dlibra/publication/22690/edition/37279/content>]

⁴²³ Ibid.

institution and caretakers between 1905 and 1911. Its annual budget for 1910 was 8,388 Marks. The only hint of religious or national conflict is one mention in the 1910 report of a child who was given to foster care in a Jewish family, and then taken away and placed in a Catholic institution thanks to the association's intervention.⁴²⁴

Further research is needed to shed more light on the Welfare Association for Catholic Orphans and its activities. Its scale of operations and financial means seem meager in comparison to the EWO. Although the annual reports of the EWO did not disclose its real financial situation and sources of funding, the Hugenberg-Wegener correspondence reveals that by 1912, it was secretly running a 30,000 Mark deficit, exacerbated by interest payments on a massive 150,000 Marks debt. In the second half of 1912, the two men discussed giving up the Neuzedlitz initiative and selling the land back to the Prussian Colonization Commission to cover the debt. They also tried to keep the EWO afloat by soliciting more state money (10,000 Marks were promised by the provincial government in September 1912) or by transferring the responsibility to wealthy Protestant charities. As Hugenberg and Wegener were secretly trying to get rid of the indebted operation that they had put together, children were still living in the institution and with foster families, a situation that persisted during the war.⁴²⁵

We cannot know what would have happened to the EWO if war had not broken out in August 1914, but the practices spearheaded by the association clearly became part of the bureaucratic common sense. Two years into the war, in August 1916, the Prussian Colonization

⁴²⁴ *Trzecie Sprawozdanie Towarzystwa Opieki Nad Dziećmi w Poznaniu* (1910) [Online Access <https://www.wbc.poznan.pl/dlibra/publication/22690/edition/37279/content>]; *Czwarte sprawozdanie Towarzystwa Opieki nad dziećmi katolickimi w Poznaniu. Rok 1910-1911* (Poznań, 1912) [Online Access: <http://www.wbc.poznan.pl/dlibra/doccontent?id=24331>].

⁴²⁵ See Protokoll-Abschrift: EWO Vorstands Sitzung, Posen/Poznań 26.9.1912 in BArch Koblenz N1231/30 pp. 43–45; For the Hugenberg-Wegener correspondence from May 1912 see BArch Koblenz, N1231/67, pp. 81ff., and from July to November 1912 see BArch Koblenz, N1231/30, pp. 33ff.

Commission began a new initiative, calling on guardians and “war widows” to send school-age “war orphans” to its care. The children, the commission explained, were to be placed with settler families to support running farms whose male labor force, both family members and domestic servants, were conscripted, and did not have prisoners of war to fill their labor needs. This time, no mediation through an ostensibly private charity was deemed necessary. Those mothers and guardians who wanted to send children to settler families in Polish Prussia were to fill a printed form and write directly to the president of the commission. Another important difference was that this time, Catholic and Protestant children were equally accepted, and the commission committed to placing children in families according to their confession. Notably, the commission used an almost identical document to the one created by the EWO to list the conditions under which children would be provided to settler families. Instead of the private EWO contract, these conditions now appeared as official regulations and attached to the letters that the commission sent to municipal welfare authorities. The commission wrote directly to municipalities to promote this initiative and also advertised it in its official bulletin, *Neues Bauernland*. The response, it seems, was not overwhelming. In Düsseldorf, for example, the offer was dismissed out of hand by municipal authorities. By the end of 1917, the commission received 51 children from southwest and middle Germany under these conditions, apparently based on still-existing connections between settlers and their home regions. Forms of bureaucratic practice and administrative common sense that were first developed with the establishment of the EWO as a private charity around 1900 clearly persisted, as official policy, well into World War I.⁴²⁶

⁴²⁶ See the correspondence between the commission and the city of Düsseldorf from August 1916, under “Unterbringung von Kriegswaisen in der Familien der von der Kgl. Ansiedlungs-kommission in der Provinzen Westpreußen und Posen angesetzten Ansiedler.” Stadtarchiv Düsseldorf, 0-1-3-12621 (unpaginated). The commission’s annual report for 1917 provides the details and rationale of this scheme: *Sammlung der Drucksachen des Preußischen Abgeordnetenhauses*, 22. Legislaturperiode, III Tagung 1916/1918, vol. 9 (Berlin, 1918), pp. 5319–5320.

Nationalizing Children and National Cartography

In 1897, Alfred Hugenberg claimed that his new child displacement scheme was a radically novel idea that might prove too controversial for public opinion in Germany at the time. He therefore suggested that the Prussian government use the trappings of a Protestant charity as a cover for what was, in fact, a plan of resettlement, education for work, and labor provision coproduced by the Prussian government, the Colonization Commission, the Pan-German League, and Hugenberg himself. When the Pan-German bulletin called upon its readership in December 1897 to “give us a child for Christmas,” it was in way conveying a request to donate children to the nation. Although the nationalizing state continued to rely on such gifts from municipal authorities to bring in German children to Polish Prussia, it increased its official involvement in the late 1900s. By 1914, the Prussian government was ready to expand the scheme to Catholic children, and by 1916 to take official responsibility for child resettlement. Child displacement became an integral part of the imperial Germanization of Polish Prussia. But children were not just objects of nationalist politics. They also signified the future of the nation. The concluding section of the chapter explores how the nation and its children were represented in cartography from the point of view of competing nationalist projects. Around 1900, nationalists increasingly used maps to mark the horizons of national consolidation and expansion projects. I turn now to discuss an unusual cartographic representation of the children and national demography in Polish Prussia before reflecting on the broader implications in the conclusion of this chapter.

In 1911 the Polish nationalist cartographer, demographer, and teacher Teofil Szumański (1875-1944) prepared an unusual overlay on a blank map printed by the Viennese court cartographer Gustav Freytag. The Szumański map (see Figure 1) seems to have cross-tabulated Prussian official statistics on school children with the confessional and language division of the population according to the Prussian census and matched both with the commission’s annual

reports on settler communities and with the communal directory (*Gemeindelexikon*) that gave statistics on the population of each community. This particular map dealt with only part of Polish Prussia, fortunately including the main areas of operation of the EWO. The extraordinary map is worthy of lengthy consideration, but here a short description will suffice.⁴²⁷ In Szumański's




Figure 4.6: Szumański's census and schoolchildren map [detail]: The county of Witkowo (bottom center) and the bordering county Gnesen/Gniezno (to its northwest). The six blue markings and single red one, probably marking the county town Witkowo, are where the Neuzedlitz Institution and most of the other settler villages discussed in this and the next chapter were located. On the map only the name Witkówek is seen. It is a small village adjacent to county town Witkowo. Source: Teofil Szumański, *Wyniki spisu szkolnego z r. 1911 i działalności Komisji Kolonizacyjnej 1905-10...* (1911) [National Library of Poland, Cartographic Collections, ZZK 6 376 A. Online Access: <https://academica.edu.pl/reading/readSingle?uid=69167240>]

⁴²⁷ Teofil Szumański, *Wyniki spisu szkolnego z r. 1911 i działalności Komisji Kolonizacyjnej 1905-10 = Ergebnisse der preußischen Schulkinderzählung i. J. 1911 und Tätigkeit der Ansiedlungs-Kommission 1905-1910 = Resultats du recensement des élèves des écoles primaires en 1911 et de l'action de la Commission de colonization*

oversized map (on a scale of 1:750,000) there are no swaths of territory painted according to national demographics, administrative districts are only lightly marked, and ownership of land, state forests, railroads and roads, land use, or topography are nowhere to be found. The legend is in German, Polish, and French, but place names are given mostly in Polish. Settler villages are pinpointed in blue and red, and each color mark has two parts: an empty or full ring, symbolizing towns or villages, and a flag or tail, which stands for numerical relationships of Poles to Germans. The blue color stands for the national demographics according to the general census, and red indicates a correction to the census that indicates more Poles. Moreover, red markings represent only those places in which the number of Poles according to the schoolchildren census was higher than the rate of Poles in the general population.

The map uses the number of schoolchildren to correct the widely criticized official statistics produced by Prussian statisticians, who used reported language as a direct proxy for nationality. Furthermore, the map uses schoolchildren as a rough proxy to forecast the future demographic relations between Germans and Poles in Colonization Commission settlement areas. It is possible that the Szumański map was a preparatory work for one of the national cartographic projects on which Szumański collaborated with Eugeniusz Romer from the 1910s into the 1930s, which were in part meant to assess the demographic impact of the Prussian nationalization policies and to promote the cartographic existence of the nation.⁴²⁸ It may have also been a practical tool for Polish nationalists in their work.⁴²⁹

1905-1910 (Vienna: Freytag-Berndt, 1911). National Library of Poland, Cartographic Collections, ZZK 6 376 A [Online Access: <https://academica.edu.pl/reading/readSingle?uid=69167240>].

⁴²⁸ For this suggestion I am indebted to Zbigniew Kolek from the Cartography Reading Room of the Polish National Library in Warsaw.

⁴²⁹ On statistics as the “science of nationality” see Jason D. Hansen, *Mapping the Germans: Statistical Science, Cartography, and the Visualization of the German Nation, 1848–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), ch. 1. For the institutionalization of language as a mark of nationality and the problems this caused both for Prussian statisticians and for Prussian administrators collecting the information, see also Labbé, “Institutionalizing the

The Szumański map is quite different, for example, from official and half-official Colonization Commission maps (see figure 2 below). These were normally published by the publishing house Justus Perthes in Gotha and often prepared by one of the foremost German cartographers, the *Völkisch* nationalist Paul Langhans. Employing a similar coloring template and techniques to his global *Kolonial-Atlas* (First published in 1893 by Perthes), Langhans




Figure 4.7: Detail from Paul Langhans, *Die Provinzen Posen und Westpreußen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ansiedlungsgüter und Ansiedlungen, Staatsdomänen und Staatsförsten nach dem Stand Januar 1 1907*. The green stands for land bought by the Colonization Commission, the blue stands for state domains, and the brown marks state forests. Red underline notes settlements. The overlay gradation of pink to white represents the demographic relationship between Germans and Poles according to the language statistics of the Prussian Statistical Bureau. White represents less than 25% German-speakers in the communities in the area, while pink represents more than 75% Germans-speakers. Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Map Collection, SBB-IIIIC-Kart-N10025-9.

Statistics of Nationality.” About another nodal point of the production of statistical knowledge in the Prussian capital, namely middle-class women’s household work, see Christine von Oertzen, “Die Historizität der Verdattung: Konzepte, Werkzeuge und Praktiken im 19. Jahrhundert,” *NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin* 25:4 (2017), pp. 407–434. On Szumański’s work within Polish nationalist map-making, see: Andrzej Gawryszewski: *Polskie mapy narodowościowe, wyznaniowe i językowe : bibliografia (lata 1827-1967)* [=Dokumentacja Geograficzna 1969 vol. 4, IG PAN] (Warsaw: Geographic Institute of the Polish Academy of Science, 1969).

portrayed “German land” within the borders of Germany by coloring first Colonization Commission land and later also forest and royal Prussian demesne land, put against a white background that continued to the east, far beyond the red borderline separating the German and the Russian empires. As Kristin Kopp notes regarding Langhans’ *Kolonial-Atlas*, this technique gave the impression of an open, non-German space that contained both opportunities for expansion and unspecified dangers. Miniature versions of this cartographic depiction of the activities of the Colonization Commission were inserted into several editions of the *Kolonial-Atlas* as a part of a “de-historicized” and “mythic” colonization process that included actual and supposed German settlements with migration movements on the same pictorial space, regardless of their historical time, specific history, or present situation.⁴³⁰

According to Dörte Lerp, the Langhans atlas indicates the extent of imperial ambitions that were entertained by the Pan-German League and its sympathizers in the Protestant political elite, even if it cannot tell us much about the extent to which such fantasies were common in other milieus in imperial Germany. Moreover, Langhans’ focus on agrarian settlement by a racially, and vaguely, defined *Volkstum* rather than on state borders “indicates the centrality of settler-colonialism for the imperial ambitions of the German empire” and provides us with a visualization of the ways in which the drive for imperial expansion could unite diverging economic interests, such as export-oriented industry, shipping interests, and large agricultural produces, through a spatial political vision of agrarian settlement.⁴³¹ At the same time, we may also consider such powerful visuals as strategic arguments, namely that they not only represented

⁴³⁰ These included German colonies in Africa, settlements of Afrikaner in South Africa, and Mennonites, Swiss, and Austrians in North America. See for example: Paul Langhans, *Deutscher Kolonial-Atlas* (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1897), Nr. 7-8; idem, *Justus Perthes' Alldeutscher Atlas* (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1900). For maps as cultural artifacts in this context, see Kristin Kopp, *Germany’s Wild East: Constructing Poland as Colonial Space* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012), quote on p. 5.

⁴³¹ Lerp, *imperial Grenzräume*, pp. 143–147, quote on p. 147.

widely shared opinions but also sought to shape public perception of imperial expansion in such a way that settlement would seem a central part of it.

Jason Hansen argued that by the 1890s nationalist cartography in Germany employed an “increasing spatial specificity with which statistics related to language use were reported and the location where such studies were conducted,” which could then be used to “plot out” interventions in specific localities. The Szumański map was most likely a practical tool for Polish nationalist activists in the fight over present and future localized demographic balances or a preparation for a more elaborate demographic work. It is noteworthy, I think, that here children attained statistical significance that could be translated into practical measures of countering Prussian nationalization policies.⁴³²

In this chapter I have sought to highlight the increasing importance of children as objects of administration in the political struggles around imperial nationalization policies. As we shall see in greater detail in the next chapter, the prospect of taking children from their families by court order on welfare grounds, as opened up in Prussia in 1901 by section 1666 of the BGB, was already considered a future tool of nationalization in Polish Prussia by leaders of the Pan-German League in the middle years of the 1890s. The utilization of Protestant German children as labor within the colonization of Polish Prussia was not done on a mass scale, but the effort and resources invested in the scheme demonstrate that it was conceived as a potentially significant strategy. The fact that it relied on the cooperation of multiple state and private institutions, as well as municipalities, courts, and the Protestant Church meant that legal frameworks and welfare policies underscored both the strength and the fragility of this endeavor. Pan-imperial institutional networks and legal frameworks allowed the EWO to successfully pool funds,

⁴³² Hansen, *Mapping the Germans*, chs. 3–4, quote on p. 17.

children, and goodwill from municipalities, charities, and government ministries, reaching all the way to the imperial throne. And yet as the project developed it eventually became more vulnerable to negative publicity and finally to the political considerations of municipalities. When Berlin decided to cancel its contract with the EWO following a much-publicized maltreatment scandal in 1909 exposed by the SPD press, the association's reputation and finances suffered a blow from which they would not recover. Venturing out of the bureaucratic fold and beyond backroom manipulations and imperialist racist propaganda into the realm of municipal politics had its price, especially against the backdrop of new understanding of childhood and new forms of municipal welfare that emerged around 1900.

I have argued that a focus on children and the technologies of their displacement reveal specific junctures in which welfare and child-welfare were utilized to support state nationalization in ways that went beyond the often-discussed school and language politics of the Prussian state. This argument is in line with work by scholars such as Tara Zahra and Peter Judson on the Habsburg Empire. However, while these scholars focus on activists on the "language frontiers" within a state that was in theory super or a-national, the case of the Colonization Commission and the Prussian state is quite different. In Prussia, given the ideological commitments, power, and resources of the state (even if employed in contradictory ways to cater for different interests), nationalists worked with the state to create youth institutions that would raise politically reliable cohorts, while pushing for radicalization of the nationalizing politics, pretending to be external to that politics rather than a part of its formulation and application.⁴³³

⁴³³ Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*; Pieter M. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 100-141; Idem, "When Is a Diaspora Not a Diaspora? Rethinking Nation-Centered Narratives about Germans in Habsburg East Central Europe," in: Krista. O'Donnell, Renate. Bridenthal, and Nancy Reagan (eds.) *The Heimat Abroad* (Michigan University Press, 2005), pp.

The Catholic Association for Orphaned Children, which the OMV tried to portray as a national competition parallel to the struggle between nationalizing Germans and nationalizing Czechs in the Habsburg Empire, was careful to avoid such nationalist rhetoric. Regardless of its real intentions, The Catholic Association for Orphaned Children utilized the same legal frameworks that the EWO used for its work but had to avoid the very rhetoric that the EWO used in order to retain access to the courts and to children.

This conclusion also has a methodological aspect. Focusing on self-declared national associations may obscure from historians' view those social entrepreneurs and organizations who did not overtly engaged in nationalist politics – the EWO was officially a Protestant children's charity – but were nevertheless important players in political nationalization processes. Looking into the confluences of state agencies and different institutions of care, discipline, and training of children can allow historians to understand better the ambivalent relationship between the family and the state in the nationalization of otherwise “nationally indifferent” populations. The intersection between future-oriented population politics, families, and nationalizing projects could be studied by looking at social welfare organizations whose activities were both dependent on and a challenge to the state. This point is exemplified by Zahra's linking of nationalization with the development of welfare regimes in central Europe.

This chapter and the comparison with the Habsburg Empire also highlight the usefulness of regarding nationalist associations such as the ADV and OMV as imperial organizations whose activities were rooted in the fact of empire and in hopes of imperial expansion. The difficulty of

219-245. On the Prussian case and on the usefulness of comparison between the two fundamentally different 'German' contexts see also Andrew Donson, *Youth in the Fatherless Land: War Pedagogy, Nationalism, and Authority in Germany, 1914-1918* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 18. Roger Chickering in his *We Men who Feel Most German* already noted this dynamic between the ADV and the state, but focused on lobby work, propaganda, and personal connections. Like later scholars of the ADV, Chickering did not discuss institution-making activities such as the establishment of the EWO.

marking out the boundaries between the state, the EWO, and the ADV does not necessarily derive from Hugenberg and his colleagues being so clever in infiltrating state institutions. While these competing organizations and activists differed on what imperial nationalization should be like in practice, they shared a broad agreement on the imperial nature of their belonging and activities. If the EWO was a sort of cover for the Colonization Commission that could experiment with controversial schemes in uncharted territories between municipal and state governance and private charity, it was at the same time a pressure group that worked within and with the government. Working on multiple political scales between the Emperor and municipal welfare offices, the EWO linked the colonization of the imperial borderlands to wider social and political development across Imperial Germany.

This discussion of the use of orphans by the Prussian Settlement Commission opens up new ways of contextualizing Prussia's imperial Germanization within the history of Imperial Germany. As the next chapter demonstrates, the social history of the utilization of children by the commission allows us to link the Prussian settlement project with other imperial projects of child settlement. At the same time, it uncovers the unexpected ways in which German children and their families, as well as municipalities across Germany, played an active role in the social process of settlement that often contradicted the aims of the state. By linking the settlement of Polish Prussia with various institutions across Imperial Germany, the EWO also opened up avenues for new actors to become involved, and partially shape, the process of settlement in the Polish-German borderlands.

Chapter 5

Colonizing Families Orphaning, Fostering, and Children's Work

During 1894 and 1895, the Pan-German League (ADV) and its first chairman, the National-Liberal member of the *Reichstag* and the Leipzig-based statistics professor Ernst Hasse, embarked on a long campaign to alter citizenship laws to promote their racialist, imperialist vision of the nation. Presenting to the *Reichstag* a motion in the name of 33 individuals, mostly members of the National Liberal party like himself, Hasse called on the German government to change existing citizenship laws to enable emigrating Germans to keep their citizenship, while forbidding “foreigners” from acquiring citizenship. In presenting the motion, Hasse deployed his statistical expertise. He declared that in Germany 9% of the population was “linguistically and racially foreign” (*Sprach-und Rassenfremd*), of which over a half were “Slavs and Semites.” At the same time, Germans continued to emigrate abroad, while more “foreign” workers immigrated into German lands. Citizenship had to be used to preserve the “homogeneity” of Germany’s population. Citizenship should be denied to “inferior” (*minderwertig*) foreigners but secured for fellow members of the German folk (*Volksgenossen*) living abroad. The differentiating principle, he stated, was ethnic-cultural origins or descent (*Abstammung*) rather than residency or property.

Hasse’s argument, contends Dieter Gosewinkl, was powerful because it effectively linked the consolidation of internal national homogeneity with imperialist expansion, and made the latter subservient to the former. While Hasse used scientific arguments to justify a general need for homogeneity, he did not specify clearly what he meant by race. Speaking after Hasse, fellow Pan-German and the motion’s co-sponsor, the Prussian aristocrat Hermann von Arnim made clear the racial content of this argument by warning of the “Slavic-Jewish danger.” The motion,

although defeated, helped to set the terms of debate around the conditions and forms of citizenship in Imperial Germany for the next twenty years until the passing of the 1913 Imperial Citizenship Law, which partially incorporated Hasse's proposals.⁴³⁴

Closely related to Hasse's larger project of tying both citizenship and imperialism to a racial understanding of the German nation was his 1895 proposal to use Protestant children for the colonization of Polish Prussia. Hasse envisioned a centralized brokerage system in which children would be sent to one central institution and later distributed among foster families. Hasse drew on two institutional networks that specialized in displacing working-class children across distance: British Protestant charities who transported children across the Atlantic, and the development of urban youth welfare institutions in Hasse's hometown of Leipzig. Hasse's ideas were taken up by his protégé, Alfred Hugenberg, who established the Protestant Association for the Care of Orphans in the Province of Posen (*Evangelischer Verein für Waisenflege in der Provinz Posen*, hereafter EWO) in 1897. Having discussed the politics of the scheme in the previous chapter, we now turn to the actual practices of displacement and replacement undertaken by the EWO. To give a sense of how child displacement looked like in practice, this chapter begins by focusing on the cases of two children sent from Frankfurt am Main to the EWO orphanage in Poznan. The two cases also illustrate the multiple ways in which municipal authorities were involved in children's lives after handing them over to the EWO. Municipalities not only selected children and sent them to the EWO but also kept track of their condition, both in the Neuzedlitz orphanage and in foster families. The changing practices of municipal welfare in German cities during the 1890s were central not only to Hasse's original proposition for child displacement, but also to the activities of the EWO.

⁴³⁴ Gosewinkl, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen*, pp. 278-285.

The EWO archive was intentionally destroyed in 1917. To work around this obstacle, this chapter reconstructs how the EWO system of child displacement worked on the basis of municipal, church, and state archives as well as the EWO annual reports. The available sources clearly demonstrate the centrality of labor in children's lives at the institution. Moreover, they allow us to get a better idea of the relationship between fostering practices, children's ages, and their labor. In the final part of the chapter, I explore the connection between different categories of children and their physical placement in institutions and families. This analysis allows us to see the scaffolding of an infrastructure of Protestant institutions, municipal welfare administrations, and children's institutions that collectively enabled the displacement project. When we consider children's placement and displacement as central aspects of social reproduction, the significance of the EWO project is highlighted. Protestant German children were supposed to replace Polish household and farm workers. The fact that most children left Polish Prussia and went back to their hometowns and families points to EWO's failure to turn displaced children into permanent settlers. But the economic and social implications of their presence in villages for a few years were surely significant.⁴³⁵

⁴³⁵ The internal records of the children's institution in Neuzedlitz were willfully destroyed in 1918 by the EWO, probably because they were deemed politically sensitive at the time. This transpired as the Protestant Church sought to receive the land of the former Neuzedlitz institution to establish an institution for German children in connection with Nazi resettlement plans soon after Germany occupied Poland in the early stages of World War II. See the correspondence from January-June 1940 in APP Konsystorz Ewangelicki w Poznaniu Nr. 8527 (unpaginated). During the war many archives that could have been relevant for this study of the EWO were destroyed or lost, including the files of the Witkowo Guardianship Court and municipal and court files in the Berlin *Landesarchiv*. Uncovering the story of the institution and the children required me to collect published reports by the EWO and search for relevant material in the archives of the municipalities with which it cooperated, as well as to consult newspaper articles. Another important source was different government ministries and the files of the Colonization Commission, provincial and regional administration, and the Protestant Church archives. I also used the Hugenberg papers in the Federal Archives in Koblenz and the Pan-German League collection in the Federal Archives in Berlin. The EWO annual reports used here are all located in ISG-Frankfurt am Main, Wohlfahrtsamt 960. Copies of these reports are also found in other archival files used in this chapter.

Who was a child in the *Kaiserreich* around 1900? There was no clear and unified legal definition of “child” in the Imperial Germany. Different legal definitions of childhood were ingrained in the relationship between institutions of (partial) confinement, the family, and work, which largely concerned social control and the regulation of worktime and workplace. A key question is, then, about the interrelation of biological age and the legal possibilities of relative confinement. Sections 55-57The 1871 unified federal penal code (*Reichsstrafgesetzbuch*, RStGB) set the age range of partial or relative criminal responsibility between twelve and eighteen years. Partial responsibility meant that suspects had to be acquitted if they did not possess the required level of understanding to grasp the criminality of their actions. If, however, the court decided that offenders had or should have been aware of the criminality of their actions, they could be sent to several kinds of institutions, including prisons, under the rubric of compulsory education (*Zwangserziehung*). The Prussian Reformatory Education Law of 1900 (*Fürsorgeerziehung*), already discussed in the previous chapter, was meant for minors under the age of full criminal responsibility, namely eighteen years of age, but had a preventative character as well as a punitive one that was coded into the “good of the child” clause. Finally, the age of majority in civil law was set at 21 in the Prussian Guardianship Law of 1875, but the courts were authorized to declare anyone over eighteen as majors in concert with their father or legal guardian.⁴³⁶

⁴³⁶ See sections 1–6 of the Federal Civil Code (BGB) of 18.8.1896, in *Reichsgesetzblatt* 21 (1896), pp. 195ff, and the analysis in Heinrich Dernburg, *Vormundschaftsrecht der preußischen Monarchie nach der Vormundschaftsordnung vom 5. Juli 1875* [3., wesentl. veränd. Aufl., Bearb. von Max Schultzenstein] (Berlin, 1886), pp. 161ff. Regarding reformatory education see: *Gesetz über die Fürsorgeerziehung Minderjähriger vom 2. Juli 1900: nebst den ministeriellen Ausführungsbestimmungen und den für die Provinz Westfalen geltenden besonderen Vorschriften und Grundsätzen* (Münster: Krick, 1901). For sections 55–57 in the RStGB, see “Gesetz, betreffend die Redaktion des Strafgesetzbuches für den Norddeutschen Bund als Strafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 24 (1871), pp. 127-205, 137-138. These sections formed the basis for the 1900 Prussian Reformatory Education Law.

Childhood was, however, often associated with schooling and considered to end with the end of compulsory school attendance, which was set for children between five and fourteen years of age in most German states. Persons between fourteen and sixteen years of age were often called “young people” in official statistics and were not considered to be children in regulations concerning children’s work. In practice, however, both “children” and “young people” worked. The legal frameworks that regulated children’s role in education, criminal justice, and work, and the spaces for institutional practice that they defined dealt with different, partially overlapping age groups and thus reinforced a lack of clarity in the terminologies of childhood. This ambiguity is also strewn throughout the literature of the period. For this reason, I mainly use the broader, albeit legally imprecise, term ‘children’, as well as ‘youth’, when specifically referring to children older than the age of fourteen. In line with Annika Boentert’s work, I see in obligatory schooling the most significant institutional factor shaping of the relationship between childhood and work.⁴³⁷

Sophie and “Little Heinrich”

Shortly before Christmas 1899, Heinrich Sohnrey, the influential publisher, *Heimat* writer and conservative social reformer, published in his biweekly *Das Land* and in his daily *Tägliche Rundschau* the story of his accidental meeting in the eastern part of the Prussian province of Poznania with a charming, intelligent, and forthright boy of four, a namesake of his

⁴³⁷ Annika Boentert, *Kinderarbeit im Kaiserreich 1871–1914* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007), pp. 15-16; Karl Tilman Winkler, “Reformers United: The American and the German Juvenile Court, 1882—1923,” in: Norbert Finzsch and Robert Jütte (eds.), *Institutions of Confinement: Hospitals, Asylums, and Prisons in Western Europe and North America, 1500–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp. 235–74. For terminologies of youth see also Michael Mitterauer, “Gesindedienst und Jugendphase im europäischen Vergleich,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 11:2 (1985) [=Themenheft: Sozialgeschichte der Jugend], pp. 177-204; Ulrich Herrmann, “Der ‘Jüngling’ und der ‘Jugendliche’: Männliche Jugend im Spiegel polarisierender Wahrnehmungsmuster an der Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert in Deutschland,” *ibid.*, pp. 205-216.

and an orphaned child from Frankfurt am Main, who was rescued from a life of poverty and moral degradation and sent to the new children's institution in Neuzedlitz/Ruchocin not far from the German-Russian imperial border. "Little Heinrich," as the published story was titled, was written in an apparently successful mixture of patriotic sentimentalism, a celebration of middle-class ideals of boyhood, and a morality tale of the elevation from a poor outcast to a manly and confident servant of the nation-in-arms, a productive and trusted member of an idealized *Mittelstand*. Sohnrey skillfully portrayed an affable and cheerful young boy-figure (*Knirps* and *Bublein* were often used) with a curious fascination for soldiers and military music, an endearing preoccupation with bricklayers and their work, and a quaint knack for spontaneously alternating between patriotic, religious, and guardedly rowdy songs in a mix of Frankfurt dialect and standard High German.

Telling the story of his visit to the Neuzedlitz institution (he came to participate in the opening ceremony) from a first-person perspective, Sohnrey described how he struck an immediate accord with his young namesake, taking on a temporary father-role for the fatherless child and claiming a unique insight into and understanding of the child's inner world. This inner world was in fact an idealized projection of the future social and gendered roles that Sohnrey intended for vulnerable children in poverty. Through Sohnrey's transposition of present and future, this role seemed to emanate from Heinrich's own potentialities and unspoiled natural inclinations: learn High German and keep the old *Heimat* dialect, adopt the dialect of the new *Heimat* in the east as well, fight for the nation, stand up for yourself, and become a productive and hard-working craftsman who knows his place and establishes a family according to middle class standards of propriety. The full and felicitous realization of the child's supposed natural inclinations was, however, not at all a certainty. The main issue at hand was the institutional,

ideological, and confessional framework that would shape the education of “little Heinrich” and children like him, ensuring that his potential was fulfilled. The touching story of a destitute child from Frankfurt am Main who ended up in the contested German-Polish borderlands was in fact “an explication of a social-pedagogic and national task of the German people.”⁴³⁸

Sohnrey’s “little Heinrich,” was, in fact, based on a real boy sent from Frankfurt to Poznania. Heinrich Georg Schoppach, born on 4 October 1893 in Gießen near Frankfurt, was a difficult boy. According to the records of the Frankfurt municipal archive, he was taken from his mother and violent stepfather in Frankfurt and later sent to the Neuzedlitz institution in Poznania. He does not seem to have met the high expectations that Sohnrey had for him as a “settler-figure” (*Ansiedlergestalt*). By the time of the publication of Sohnrey’s first newspaper articles about him in late 1899, Schoppach was already six years old and had already left the institution in the care of the Neuzedlitz farmer-settler Andreas Lutzer, who already had two other children from the institution in his household. Unlike Katharina Nicolai, another Frankfurt child who was sent by the city to the EWO and stayed in the Lutzer household for several years, Heinrich did not persist for long and was soon sent back to the institution. In 1902, a Frankfurt poor administration official visited the institution and wrote disapprovingly of the conditions there. He also had a grim view of the nine-year-old Schoppach. An “ugly boy with a bloated face,” Schoppach’s development was lacking in every respect: morally, bodily, and mentally. The municipal official also noted clear signs of sexual deviancy (using the formula “geschlechtlichen Unarten” that normally referred to masturbation), a suspicion confirmed by the institution’s personnel. The list of deficiencies also included doubts regarding Schoppach’s mental capacity

⁴³⁸ Heinrich Sohnrey, *Der Kleine Heinrich: Ein Waisenknabe aus dem Westen und eine Ansiedlergestalt aus der Deutschen Ostmark. Zur Erläuterung einer sozial-pädagogischen und nationalen Aufgabe des deutschen Volkes* [= Grüne Blätter für Kunst und Volkstum, Heft 4] (Leipzig/Berlin: G.H. Meyer Heimat Verlag, 1901).

and a negative assessment of his work-readiness. In an attempt to deflect the harsh critique against the EWO in the report, the chairman of the association, Alfred Hugenberg, wrote to his father-in-law, the mayor of Frankfurt, and assured him that Schoppach would not be considered as suitable to be fostered-out again.⁴³⁹

Nevertheless, Schoppach was sent out again, shortly before the next inspection, conducted by another municipal official in 1904. This time, the eleven-year-old boy was sent to a settler family in Skorcken in county Znin/Žnin, some 50 kilometers to the north of Neuzedlitz. Schoppach continued to make a bad impression on the Frankfurt inspectors. He tended to weep without any apparent reason and was lagging behind in his physical and mental development. The reporter saved his optimism for the possible favorable influence of the young pair of “orderly and hardworking” settlers with whom Schoppach was staying. The next inspection, in 1907, did not mention Schoppach. By that time, he was fourteen and had completed his obligatory schooling period under Prussian law. We cannot know to what extent Schoppach’s foster parents had been able to exert a positive influence on him before his schooling was over. I found no record of him remaining in the settlements of eastern Prussia. He probably returned to Frankfurt as soon as he was able to do so once he finished his schooling, as his mother still lived in the city despite his official designation as an orphan. The recurrent displacement that Schoppach experienced, and that may have contributed to inspectors’ bad impression of him, must have left enduring emotional and psychological traces.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁹ Sekretär Falkenhagen’s report on his 29.11.1902 inspection is in ISG-Frankfurt am Main Magistrat V960 pp. 163–175, and on pp. 176-177 is Hugenberg’s subsequent response, addressed to the Mayor, Franz Adickes.

⁴⁴⁰ ISG-Frankfurt am Main, Magistrat V960, inspection reports for 1902, 1904, 1907 see pp. 163ff., and Hugenberg’s rejoinder on pp. 176-177.

Heinrich Schoppach's portrayal by welfare officials was a world away from the exemplary image of the future that Sohnrey made out of him as "little Heinrich." His career in the institution, however, was probably common among the Neuzedlitz children. Far less typical was Sophie Halbig's case. Halbig was born in 1897, also in Gießen near Frankfurt, to her unmarried mother Ida. By 1900, Ida and Sophie Halbig moved to Frankfurt, where Ida found employment as a housemaid in an affluent household in the Frankfurt *Innenstadt*. Ida had to give her three-year old daughter to a part-time caregiver so she could continue working what was probably a sixteen-hour workday. Unable to afford the costs of childcare, Ida was dependent on partial support from the communal poor administration. In July 1900, at the behest of municipal authorities, Ida agreed to send Sophie away to the eastern fringes of Imperial German and to transfer oversight over the child to the Guardianship Court (*Vormundschaftsgericht*) in Witkowo. The court in turn transferred guardianship of the child to Alfred Hugenberg, the 35-year-old chairman of the EWO. Three-year-old Sophie was brought by municipal officials to the Neuzedlitz institution. She was first taken by Frankfurt officials by train to Berlin, where they spent the night. The next day she continued her travel to Gnesen/Gniezno, then by the light train to Witkowo, and from there to Neuzedlitz by a horse-drawn wagon. We can only speculate on the circumstances that led Ida to give up her daughter, or about the psychological, emotional, and material effects of separation and dislocation on both. After spending about a year in the institution, Sophie was sent to foster parents in Gnesen/Gniezno. In the inspection reports conducted by the city of Frankfurt between 1900 and 1907 Sophie's new life with a childless married couple with a modest but stable income (the husband was a middling railroad official) was described in extraordinarily glowing terms. She was most likely adopted by her foster

parents when she turned 14. In 1919, the city administration in Frankfurt considered her whereabouts unknown, and it was noted that she was not expected to return to Frankfurt.⁴⁴¹

Sophie's was a highly unusual case in the history of the attempt to "transplant" children from cities in western Germany to the Prussian provinces of West-Prussia and Poznan. Her story does show, however, the range of possible life trajectories and emotional and familial attachments between children and their foster families. Nevertheless, the procedures that the EWO had put in place meant that "Little Heinrich," his literary renown notwithstanding, was much more typical of the career of the children. Normally, children were not adopted, and they did not end up staying in the colonized provinces but went back to their families as soon as they could.

Children, Poverty, and Administrative Orphaning

Children in poverty were particularly vulnerable to welfare-based municipal interference in their lives, especially to what can be called administrative orphaning: a labeling of children as "orphans" by municipal authorities that was not grounded in any legal or judicial norm but had wide-ranging ramifications for families and children. The children sent to the EWO were likely to have experienced a precarious social existence in the cities they had come from. The Frankfurt poor administration files give a partial picture of the children sent to Poznan. Ranging between the ages of two and nine when they left their native city, the children were mostly born to unmarried mothers and labeled as illegitimate. In some cases, the mother had died, was interned (for mishandling the child or for a criminal act) or was unable to raise the child due to sickness. In two cases mothers were labeled as prostitutes or as under the supervision of the police's vice

⁴⁴¹ Sophie's case is drawn from the files of the Welfare Administration in ISG-Frankfurt am Main, Magistrat V960, pp. 148ff.

squad (*Sitten-Kontrolle*). In cases of “legitimate” children sent to the EWO, the parents were interned as criminals and lost their right to raise the child. In the large industrializing cities of the time there was no shortage of such precariously positioned children.⁴⁴²

The usual grounds for designating children as orphans was that their mother was unmarried. Being an unmarried mother, however, was often a temporary condition that was related to lifecycle and employment opportunities available to working women. In big cities such as Berlin or Frankfurt, unmarried motherhood was statistically closely linked with women in service. Between their late teens to their middle or late twenties, working women could earn the highest wages of their working lives and thus tended to concentrate their effort and time on work, usually in service. Often, they had little choice but to send their children away for care in order to continue working. Care services were beyond the means of most women in service, who tended to be recent migrants from rural areas with a limited support network in the city. Therefore, they often had to turn to communal poor support. Receiving poor support contributed to the relative vulnerability of female servants to communal poor administrations.⁴⁴³

The label “orphan” was an administrative designation based on normative assumptions about motherhood and family, and had little to do with familial or social reality. As an administrative practice, it was about making judgments shaped by patriarchal norms regarding

⁴⁴² See the detailed list and internal Poor Administration notes in ISG-Frankfurt am Main, Magistrat V960 pp. 113, 146-148. About “engendered childhoods” around that time see Beata Althammer, Lutz Rephael, and Tamara Stacic-Wendt, *Rescuing the Vulnerable: Poverty, Welfare, and Social Ties in Modern Europe* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2016), ch. 2–5.

⁴⁴³ Dorothee Wierling, *Mädchen für Alles. Arbeitsalltag und Lebensgeschichte Städtischer Dienstmädchen um die Jahrhundertwende* (Berlin: Dietz, 1987), here esp. pp. 226-228. Regarding ‘illegitimacy’ compare David Sabean’s exploration of the social logic of illegitimacy in rural society in the earlier part of the century from the perspective of the social reproduction of households: David Sabean, “Unehelichkeit: Ein Aspect sozialer Reproduktion kleinbäuerlicher Produzenten. Zu einer Analyse dörflicher Quellen um 1800,” in: Berdahl, Lüdke, et al., *Klassen und Kultur: Sozialanthropologische Perspektiven in der Geschichtsschreibung* (Frankfurt a. M.: Syndikat, 1982), pp. 54-76. For the cultural construction of ‘illegitimacy’ in Imperial Germany, see Sybille Buske, *Fräulein Mutter und ihr Bastard: Eine Geschichte der Unehelichkeit in Deutschland, 1900-1970* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004), ch. 1.

the family, gender, and sexuality that underpinned social welfare. In turn, the designation “orphan” animated a whole range of “common-sense” assumptions about lack of care, innocent suffering, distress, and moral duty that underscored that children were deserving of social assistance. These assumptions were reinforced by an image of the city as an immoral, unhygienic, and politically dangerous space that dissolved families, challenged patriarchal authority, and corrupted women, children, and young people. Such ideas were deeply ingrained in denominational welfare practices.

The deployment of administrative orphaning, which opened up a variety of social relationships to municipal intervention, needs to be seen within a broader context of urban social reform. Urban middle-class reformers around 1900 were engaged in promoting projects of progressive reconstruction of “the fabric of social life” in municipalities large and small, dealing with urban planning, housing, sanitation, canalization, formal and continuing education, childcare, and welfare. This “modernity as praxis,” as Maiken Umbach called it, was both about “the perception of modernity” and “a set of cultural and political strategies to interpret and master” social change and its political and moral implications. Municipalities in Imperial Germany enjoyed significant fiscal and administrative autonomy, which enabled them to take up increasing social responsibilities in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Many cities that cooperated with the EWO, such as Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Charlottenburg, and Schöneberg, were hubs of progressive social reform. Municipalities’ unprecedented attempts to shape and reform the social were directly related to the rise of organized working-class politics and to the electoral successes of the SPD.⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴⁴ Maiken Umbach, *German Cities and Bourgeois Modernism, 1890 - 1924* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), quotes from pp. 1–4. On municipal politics in Frankfurt specifically, see Jan Palmowski, *Urban Liberalism in Imperial Germany. Frankfurt am Main, 1866-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 3, and on welfare and social reform see ch. 5, here esp. pp. 215-230. On urban modernity see also Jenifer Jenkins’s work on Hamburg:

Municipal politics came to be one of the primary spaces for popular participation in representative politics in Imperial Germany even if only a minority of the male population had voting right up to the First World War. Although very much limited by the Prussian tax-based three class election system (see chapter 1 for a more detailed explanation), enfranchisement rates rose in large cities between 1871 and 1914 due to the increasing numbers of tax-paying residents and changes in communal elections laws. In Frankfurt am Main, for example, only 7.3% of city residents could vote in communal elections in 1874. By 1913, the figure more than doubled to 15.5%. At the same time, the population of the city swelled by more than 300% to well over 400,000 people, with the sharpest rise between 1890 and 1910. Despite inequalities in income and rights, both the numbers and the social diversity of voters significantly increased.⁴⁴⁵

This increase in the diversity and numbers of the urban electorate posed a challenge to established politics in many cities. During the 1890s, in the face of the rising support for the SPD and the Catholic Center Party, many affluent local patricians – financiers, merchants, and industrialists – who had previously dominated city councils were pushed out or decided to leave municipal politics. They were replaced by increasingly professionalized, academically trained upper middle-class administrators who claimed social and bureaucratic expertise. Like the patriciate, professional municipal politicians were usually adherents of the liberal parties, usually

Provincial Modernity: Local Culture and Bourgeois Politics in Fin-de-Siècle Hamburg (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). On ideas about the evils of big cities related to social reform, see Andrew Lees, *Cities, Sin, And Social Reform In Imperial Germany* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), who emphasizes the progressive tendencies of municipal elites, and the darker portrayal by Klaus Bergmann, *Agrarromantik und Großstadtfeindschaft* (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1970). An insightful overview of social reform in Imperial Germany is Dennis Sweeney, “Reconsidering the Modernity Paradigm: Reform Movements, the Social and the State in Wilhelmine Germany” *Social History* 31:4 (2006), pp. 405-434.

⁴⁴⁵ The central change to election laws was the Prussian 1900 law on the structure three-class division of voters: *Gesetz vom 30.6.1900, betr. die Bildung der Wählerabteilungen bei den Gemeindewahlen* (Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preußischen Staaten (1900), Nr. 25, pp.185-187). On enfranchisement in Frankfurt, see Steinmetz, *Regulating the Social*, p. 156, and on the city’s population, see Gerd Hohorst, Jürgen Kocka, and Gerhard Ritter (eds.), *Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch: Materialien zur Statistik des Kaiserreichs 1870-1914*, vol. 2. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1975), pp. 45-46.

the National Liberals, who continued to dominate municipal politics. By 1890, the National Liberals supported an interventionist social policy and leading reformers of the era, such as Emil Münsterberg, the head of the welfare administration in Berlin, also represented the party in the *Reichstag* or in the Prussian *Landtag*. Other reformers, such as the left-liberal head of the Frankfurt welfare administration, Karl Felsch, came from long-standing patrician families but engaged in local politics on the basis of their professional experience as lawyers or medical doctors. While municipal politicians generally agreed that reforms were necessary in these rapidly changing cities, conflicts between liberal, conservative, denominational, feminist, radical nationalist, and socialist reformers about the political goals and the methods of reform significantly shaped the institutionalization of relief and welfare initiatives. In the 1880s and 1890s, SPD local activists left behind their party's official reluctance to engage in local social reform and joined municipal politics to promote social policies. In many cities, SPD representatives were present in municipal councils and administration, and in a few cases, they even won control of local councils. For the first time, SPD politicians gained direct influence on executive power.⁴⁴⁶

SPD municipal activists were strictly opposed to any cooperation with the EWO. In the Frankfurt municipal administration, the most stalwart opponent of collaboration with the EWO was the veteran socialist and member of the city council, Ludwig Oficius, who made sure that information about the EWO's offer was made public as the municipality was debating it. The

⁴⁴⁶ Sweeney, *Reconsidering the Modernity Paradigm*; Steinmetz, *Regulating the Social*, chs. 6, 7; Lutz Raphael "Introduction: Poverty and Welfare in Modern German History: Recent Trends and New Perspectives in Current Research," in idem (ed.) *Poverty and Welfare in Modern German History* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2016), pp. 1–21. On Münsterberg and Felsch, who were two of the prominent welfare administrators and reformers around 1900, see their biographies in Eckhard Hansen and Florian Tennstedt (eds.), *Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte der deutschen Sozialpolitik 1871 bis 1945* (Kassel University Press, 2010), vol. 1, pp. 47–48 (Felsch), and pp. 113–114 (Münsterberg).

SPD turned the negotiations into an election issue and began a vociferous public campaign against it. The party's official paper, *Vorwärts*, denounced the EWO's proposals as providing Prussian estate owners with "orphans as an object of exploitation" and a public protest was organized by the SPD in which Oficius was the main speaker.⁴⁴⁷ The municipality was directly challenged about its conduct and decided to proceed more cautiously. Flesch, the head of the municipal welfare administration, explained to the EWO that the municipality was determined to proceed with the cooperation despite the "excessive" protests, but he requested, in light of the objections, careful selection of foster families, in order to make sure that they were suitable and did not already have too many children.⁴⁴⁸ Despite the personal commitment of the Frankfurt Mayor, Adickes, and the interest of the welfare administration, the protests probably prevented closer cooperation with the EWO.

Child Displacement between Imperial Borrowing and Urban Welfare

The idea behind the EWO was embedded in the historical context of municipal politics and middle-class reforms concerning the so-called "social problem." Indeed, the impetus for the child displacement scheme came from Ernst Hasse, the chairman of the Pan-German League (ADV). In an 1895 front-page article in the ADV bulletin, Hasse called for transplanting children to rural Polish Prussia as a remedy against the supposed vulnerability of defenseless, fatherless "orphans" to the corrupting influences of the city.⁴⁴⁹ Hasse combined his interest in social reform with imperial settlement. Brandishing his expertise on colonial matters, as well as in statistics, he linked his familiar critique of city life to the large-scale project undertaken by private Protestant

⁴⁴⁷ "Waisenkinder als Ausbeutungsobjekt," *Vorwärts* 10.10.1898

⁴⁴⁸ Karl Flesch to EWO, 2.12.1898, ISG-Frankfurt.

⁴⁴⁹ Ernst Hasse, "Die Besiedlung des Ostens durch Entlassung der großen Städte" *Alldeutsche Blätter: Mitteilungen des Alldeutschen Verbandes* 5:39, 29.9.1895, pp. 173–174.

charities. The most famous example that Hasse cited was Bernardo's Homes, which transported poor "orphaned" children from Britain to Canada as laborers with the possibility of obtaining land under the Homestead Acts.⁴⁵⁰

Child removal and displacement projects in which race and class interlaced with social engineering, Christian pedagogy, and private welfare entrepreneurship were a commonplace in nineteenth and twentieth-century imperial settlement projects. These included indigenous child removal, displacement of 'mixed-race' children, and exporting white working-class children to settler frontiers. The Anglo-Canadian project taken up as a model by Hasse was the largest in scope and the most well-known among child displacement projects in the British Empire. As Ellen Boucher argues, British child migration and settlement programs, which spanned a century and involved at least 800,000 children, had their ideological underpinning in a vision of "the settler empire as a redemptive space for the British race," a unique place where "resettlement would allow destitute children to attain a higher degree of social mobility" far away from the social problems that plagued the metropole. A vision of social reform through migration and resettlement distinguished this project from metropolitan child welfare. According to Boucher, "this promise of future advancement provided a powerful justification for a program that often severed the children's links to the people and places they had formerly known." Although many struggling parents and relations used institutions as a temporary solution, they still kept contact with and some control over their children. Emigration, British Protestant charities hoped, would sever what they saw as harmful familial relationships.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁵⁰ For Hasse's teaching see the 1895/6 course offering at the university of Leipzig: *Historische Vorlesungsverzeichnisse der Universität Leipzig* (Available online: <http://histvv.uni-leipzig.de/vv/1895w.html>).

⁴⁵¹ For the British project, see Ellen Boucher, *Empire's Children: Child Emigration, Welfare, and the Decline of the British World, 1869-1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), here p. 8; For a social history of the metropolitan context of the activities of children's charities such as Barnardo's Homes and on the social construction of the administrative category of 'orphans,' see Lydia Murdoch, *Imagined Orphans: Poor Families,*

The administrative orphaning of children in poverty was enabled by various doctrines of “neglect” (*Verwahrlosung* in German) that both justified and provided criteria for creating or “acquiring” orphans through child removal. In her work on the activities of the Protestant Inner Mission among Christians in the Middle East, Julia Hauser shows how colonial missionaries in Lebanon needed to “acquire orphans” by first using kin to obtain access to children and then by separating children and families. Hauser discusses how Missionaries sought and partially succeeded in separating children from their families as they “discovered” the latter’s harmful influences on the children, leading them to engage in the ideological and administrative work of legitimizing and effecting separation and removal. In Australia and the United States, categorizing children who lived with their non-parental kin as “orphans” justified indigenous child removal discursively and legally as a part of settler colonial projects. In Australia, children with one parent who was aboriginal or “half caste,” as well as those who were cared for by non-parental family members, were regularly designated as “orphans.” By the 1910s, they were considered as “neglected” and could be taken away from their parents without any proof to that effect. As one nineteenth-century US reformer explained, indigenous children could be “virtually orphaned” by parents’ “inadequacy [and] neglect,” thus necessitating state action.⁴⁵²

Child Welfare, and Contested Citizenship in London (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2006), esp. ch. 4. For displacement of ‘mixed race’ children of tea planters in India to New Zealand, see Jane McCabe, *Race, Tea and Colonial Resettlement: Imperial Families, Interrupted* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017). On the broader context of child removal and indigenous families in Australia see Anna Haebich, *Broken Circles: Fragmenting Indigenous Families, 1800–2000* (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 2000). For a comparative analysis of indigenous child removal in the US and Australia, see Margaret D. Jacobs, *White Mother to a Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, Maternalism, and the Removal of Indigenous Children in the American West and Australia, 1880–1940* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009).

⁴⁵² Although the German term can be translated as ‘wayward,’ I decided in favor of the semantic quality of a passive lack that ‘neglect’ and *Verwahrlosung* share. In other contexts, *Verwahrlos* would be translated in a way that would highlight the actively corrupted nature of such children. On the use of ‘neglect’ in the removal of aboriginal children, see Jacobs, *White Mother to a Dark Race*, ch. 2. Regarding Australia see Haebich, *Broken Circles*, quote on p. 59. For “acquiring Orphans” through child removal in German colonial missions in the 1860s see Julia Hauser, “Waisen gewinnen. Mission zwischen Programmatik und Praxis in der Erziehungsanstalt der Kaiserswerther Diakonissen in Beirut seit 1860,” *WerkstattGeschichte* 57 (2011) pp. 9–30, quote on p. 11. For ‘neglect’ in the context of German welfare reforms see Christoph Sachße and Florian Tennstedt, *Geschichte der Armenfürsorge in*

Administrative orphaning was thus about disrupting families and relatedness based on a normative, class-specific model. In Germany and elsewhere, claims of neglect and illegitimacy were administratively used to produce “social orphans” through separation, dislocation, and transfer to closed institutions or “normative” foster families. Child removal and resettlement promoted forced cultural assimilation, elimination, and colonization, all central to the formation of settler societies. In her work on child removal and fostering practices in Hawaii, Judith Modell has argued that children’s institutions and foster care may be regarded as “especially politicized” sites of social reproduction, because they also involve allocation and not just production, namely the power to “place and replace” children and to “determine the terms of continuity from one generation to the next.” Consequently, the control over allocation and use of children should be seen as a central sphere of administrative intervention on the part of the state and an important site of struggle where competing narratives of expertise are deployed.⁴⁵³

Steeped in evangelical, racist, and imperial rhetoric, the English-Canadian model probably appealed to Hasse for both its religious and settler-colonial aspects. In addition, Hasse, who was also the municipal statistician of his hometown of Leipzig, employed the innovative welfare reforms of his native city as a more practical model for administrative orphaning. In his 1895 article, Hasse drew extensively on Leipzig’s most recent municipal annual report, with which he was well acquainted in his capacity as the municipal statistician. This report, and the parts that Hasse chose to omit in his Pan-German bulletin piece, can help us unpack the set of problems that Hasse faced. The 1893 Leipzig report distinguished between truly orphaned

Deutschland: Fürsorge und Wohlfahrtspflege 1871–1929 [=Armenfürsorge in Deutschland, vol. 2] (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1988), pp. 33ff, and Detlev Peukert, *Grenzen Der Sozialdisziplinierung: Aufstieg und Krise der Deutschen Jugendfürsorge von 1878 Bis 1932* (Köln: Bund-Verlag, 1986), ch. 9.

⁴⁵³ Judith Modell, “Rights to the Children: Foster Care and Social Reproduction in Hawaii” in Sarah Franklin and Helena Ragoné (eds.) *Reproducing Reproduction: Kinship, Power, and Technological Innovation* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), pp. 156-172, p. 157.

children and “half orphaned or not-at-all orphaned” (“*Halb- oder nicht verwaiste Kinder*”), the latter kind being a particular source of tribulation for the municipality. Relatives of children of this latter kind, although not constituting a “family” in the sense meant by the municipality, tended to repeatedly and disruptively intervene in the upbringing of children who were taken under the guardianship of communal authorities and fostered-out. These Children’s families would turn up at foster families’ doors, “stirring up malice and suspicion” (*Verhetzungen und Verdächtigungen*) and thus forcing the welfare authorities to transfer children from one place of care to another in a different location. “Another evil” mentioned was the tendency of the those family members (*Angehörigen*) whose neglect (*Verwahrlosung*) prompted the taking of children in the first place, to reclaim the child (presumably after school age) and put them to work as “an errand-boy or a factory-girl” — typical jobs for unskilled child labor — so that they could immediately contribute to the family’s earnings.⁴⁵⁴ Presumably based on this detailed denunciation of disruptive kin, which he omitted, Hasse emphasized the need to “send illegitimate and orphan children as far as possible from the big city” into agricultural areas away from troublesome relatives.⁴⁵⁵

In the Kingdom of Saxony the power to remove children from families and relations was connected with the legal category of public or general guardianship, which allowed for a public institution, rather than an individual, to be vested with guardianship rights over purportedly “neglected” children. Max Taube, a medical doctor and Hasse’s colleague in the Leipzig city administration, centralized guardianship over “illegitimate” children in his own hands, uniting it

⁴⁵⁴ *Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Leipzig 1893* (Leipzig, 1895), pp. 572–573.

⁴⁵⁵ Hasse, *Besiedlung durch Entlastung*, pp. 173–174. For children’s work at the time see Boentert, *Kinderarbeit*. On Settler Colonialism in the ideology of the Pan-German League see Lerp, *Imperiale Grenzräume*, pp. 126ff. For the Hasse family history and more on his father, see Ernst Hasse *Nachrichten über die Familie Hasse und einige verwandte Familien* [3rd Edition] (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1903).

with the tasks and powers of the city's Poor Administration. Aiming to reduce infant and child mortality, especially in light of the alarming mortality rates among those labelled as illegitimate, Taube employed medical expertise together with the centralization of supervision and legal powers of guardianship. Taube prescribed continuous medical oversight and advice by (female) communal employees coupled with a kind of general guardianship (*General- or Berufsvormundschaft*) that gave a city official (in this case Taube himself) guardianship over all the poor children who were either considered illegitimate or were already nursed and cared for with municipal support. Children and their caregivers were supposed to be closely supervised during for two years before being sent to rural communities through a central clearing house that was misleadingly named an orphanage.⁴⁵⁶

In Prussia, in contrast to Saxony, an “illegitimate” child was legally related to the mother's kin and put automatically under the guardianship of the mother's father (after 1900 women could also be guardians). However, the mother retained the right to care for the child for four years after birth. If parents were recipients of poor support or if children committed underage crimes, a loss of parental authority in favor of a guardian could follow. Guardians were always individuals under Prussian law, and their approval was required for changes in the whereabouts of the child or in their educational and caring environment. As the Frankfurt mayor Franz Adickes noted in response to successive queries from the Prussian Interior Ministry about

⁴⁵⁶ See Taube's own description of “his system” in anticipation of the German civil code, finally passed in 1896: Max Taube, *Der Schutz der unehelichen Kinder in Leipzig: Eine Einrichtung für Fürsorge ohne Findelhäuser* (Leipzig, 1893), quote on p. 49; Steffan Baumgarten, *Die Entstehung des Unehelichenrechts im Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch* (Köln: Böhlau 2007), for Saxony see pp. 50-58. For the Prussian legal situation see Dernburg, *Vormundschaftsrecht der preußischen Monarchie nach der Vormundschaftsordnung vom 5. Juli 1875* [3., wesentl. veränd. Aufl., bearb. von Max Schultzenstein] (Berlin, 1886), pp. 200-212. For a celebratory version of Taube's public or professional biography, see Georg Lilienthal, “Max Taube. Ein Wegbereiter moderner Säuglings- und Jugendfürsorge,” *Sozialpädiatrie in Praxis und Klinik* 8 (1986), pp. 476-80. On child welfare in Saxony see Silke Fehlemann, *Armutrisiko Mutterschaft: Mütter- und Säuglingsfürsorge im Deutschen Reich 1890-1924*. Ph.D. Dissertation (Düsseldorf University, 2004), pp. 190-200.

the delay in reaching an agreement with the EWO, the limited authority of the Poor Administration and its dependence on guardians' consent for sending children away was likely an obstacle for transferring large numbers of children to Poznan.⁴⁵⁷

In his 1895 article, Hasse avoided any mention of the problem of troublesome relatives that was so animatedly discussed in the municipal report. Despite the remote location of the Neuzedlitz institution, the EWO also needed to contend with the problem of interfering families and returning children, as indicated by the "compensation" to which it was entitled if children returned to their hometowns earlier than stipulated by its contracts with municipalities. While distance was clearly meant to hinder or sever relationships between children and their relations, the reported numbers of young people leaving the EWO to go back to their hometowns after finishing their obligatory schooling indicate that this aspect of the plan failed. Institutional and foster care for children, in the EWO's case and elsewhere, was a matter of life cycle and work, and was often used as a temporary solution in specific stages in the life of children and their relations or as a response to specific contingencies such as death, illness, or dire economic circumstances. When the numbers of young people leaving the EWO is considered together with the numbers of new children coming in according to the association's annual reports, it seems that the EWO itself was often on the brink of suffering from negative migration in favor of urban centers in the west. In its 1904 report, the EWO complained that its "Christian as well as national work" to "solve the German question in the eastern marches" was in danger because relatives of the children wanted to use them for work, "fooling themselves" that they at the same time were

⁴⁵⁷ Mayor Adickes to the provincial president in Wiesbaden, 14.9.1898 (copy), included in the latter's report to the Prussian Interior Ministry regarding "Die Versorgung deutscher Waisen in der Provinz Posen," 24.11.1898 (copy), sent to the Education Ministry. GStA PK I. HA Rep 76 VII neu Sekt. 7A IV Nr. 7 (unpaginated). For other instances of government pressure on Adickes to reach an agreement with the EWO see correspondence from summer and fall 1898 in ISG-Frankfurt am Main, Magistrat V829, (unpaginated).

saving the children from the “uncultivated east.” In contrast, the report implied, the EWO knew that Polish Prussia was a land of opportunity, and hence it was only “in the interests of the children” that the EWO was determined to fight with all the means at its disposal against parents’ interference.⁴⁵⁸

Under the “Leipzig system,” a public space of responsibility over large numbers of poor children was combined with a disciplining authority practiced through hygienic supervision and control over poor relief wielded by the municipal poor administration. By combining powers over distribution and placement of children with supervision of their care and early training, the new apparatus headed by Taube could exercise, at least in theory, a powerful influence on the terms of social reproduction. It was precisely this aggrandizing of municipal power at the expense of families that was so often contested by children’s relatives. The EWO can be seen as an extension of the Leipzig system, even as it had to rely on municipalities to conduct the preselection of children and never had resources or concentration of administrative powers similar to the Leipzig municipality.

Institutionalized Children: Age, Work, and Foster Families

Hasse’s plan, as well as the general practice of the Neuzedlitz institution, was grounded in a specifically Protestant and evangelical tradition of child welfare that was much influenced by British imperial Protestantism. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, children’s institutions such as *Rettungshäuser* (salvation or rescue homes) and *Erziehungsvereine* (upbringing associations) were developed by Protestant organizations and later incorporated into the Inner Mission after its establishment in the late 1840s. The first such rescue home, *Das*

⁴⁵⁸ EWO 1904 report, quotes on pp. 6, 11.

Rauhe Haus in Hamburg, was established as an evangelical welfare reform institution by Johann Heinrich Wichern in 1833 and became the intellectual and pedagogical training center for a growing institutional network that included about 500 *Rettunghäuser* by the 1870s.⁴⁵⁹

In these institutions, poor children before their confirmation (around the age of fourteen or fifteen) received education as well as training in basic dexterity and crafting skills that would be required in their formal working lives. The families of these children were judged to be unable to support the child's livelihood and Christian upbringing. After their confirmation, youth in *Rettunghäuser* were to be placed in service or to learn a craft. Girls often stayed on in the institution for another year to do household work and to supposedly perfect their moral education. Protestant *Rettunghäuser*, according to Wichern's original vision, were meant to be voluntary, and their activities assumed the acquiescence of children or families. The institutions, on their part, were able to discharge children who they judged as unsuitable for the institution's goals. Working alongside the *Rettunghäuser*, upbringing associations (*Erziehungsvereine*) supervised and managed the placement of children at risk in foster family care, as a stage before relocation to a *Rettunghaus*. If children supervised by the *Erziehungsvereine* were judged unsuitable for fostering due to moral or criminal offences, they could be relocated to a *Rettunghaus*.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁹ On the English influence and the "narrative onslaught" that produced the conception of the Inner Mission around the 1850s see: Alexandra Przyrembel, "Der Missionar Johann Hinrich Wichern, die Sünde und das unabänderliche Elend der städtischen Unterschichten um 1850," *Werkstatt Geschichte* 57 (2011), pp. 53–67. For Wichern's ideas see Roland Anhorn, *Sozialstruktur und Disziplinarindividuum: zu Johann Hinrich Wicherns Fürsorge- und Erziehungskonzeption des Rauhen Hauses* (Frankfurt am Main, 1992).

⁴⁶⁰ Heike Schmidt, *Gefährliche und gefährdete Mädchen: Weibliche Devianz und die Anfänge der Zwangs- und Fürsorgeerziehung* (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2002), pp. 32ff. For Wichern's ideas see Roland Anhorn, *Sozialstruktur und Disziplinarindividuum: zu Johann Hinrich Wicherns Fürsorge- und Erziehungskonzeption des Rauhen Hauses* (Frankfurt am Main, 1992).

The introduction of state legislation, compulsory institutionalization, reformatory education and public funding for children's institutions changed the institutional landscape of the philanthropic Protestant welfare in the later part of the nineteenth century. These changes went hand-in-hand with a modification in the role of the family in accounting for children's miseries and immoral conduct. Alongside older explanations that linked being orphan with a lack of parental supervision and support, resulting in both poverty and the risk of immoral behavior, the ideological construction of neglected or wayward (*verwahrlost*) children was increasingly used to label existing working-class families as dysfunctional, thus justifying the separation of children and families and expanding the infrastructure to allow fulltime care and supervision of such children. Nevertheless, the goals of moral rescue, education and preparation for a specific career in adult life remained guiding principles of Protestant child welfare institutions into the twentieth century, and work remained central to institutional practices and everyday routines. The training of youth also gave room for the creation of supposedly quantitative developmental metrics by which institutions could judge the moral and social maturation of children. At each age children were to attain certain levels of achievement, and by the time of their confirmation, they were supposed to have proved their moral character and ability to work so as to place them in low-paying jobs.⁴⁶¹ While the official rhetoric of the EWO emphasized the moral development of the urban poor as justification for the institution, work and the formation of productive laborers was central to the social logic of the child displacement scheme.

Children's experiences under the care of the EWO were significantly shaped by their age and gender. Although very young children, two or three years old, were sent to the EWO, most

⁴⁶¹ Schmidt, *Gefährliche und gefährdete Mädchen*; For the importance of work in the Protestant institutions established by Pastor Bodelschwingh, where education for work, colonial mission, and racialization intertwined, see Conrad, *Globalization and the Nation*, ch. 1.

of the children were much older, with a median age of eleven in 1903. Incoming children normally lived in the Neuzedlitz institution or in connected institutions for a while before being sent to foster families. Usually, younger children until the age of eight were kept at the institution, while older children were routinely placed with families. According to the EWO annual report for 1903, only four girls younger than eight were sent to lower middle-class households in the nearby city of Gnesen/Gniezno. This was the case with 56 out of the 115 children between the ages of nine and fourteen in 1903. Finally, youth people between the ages of 15 and 19 were mostly working for/apprenticing with different craftspeople (26 out of 36), with three more employed in gardening in Neuzedlitz itself. The gendered division of work was also quite clear. Boys could be either employed or apprenticed (in formal apprenticeship cases the EWO paid the fees, but the provincial government also stepped in at least on one occasion). Unlike boys, girls were noted as having an employer (*Dienstherr*) in whose household they were supposed to learn the required skills for household work.⁴⁶²

The mostly city born children at Neuzedlitz needed to be trained for living and working in rural households and family farms. The EWO emphasized this practical training and made no secret of its educational approach. County School Inspector Folz, who was a member of the EWO board and participated in the negotiations with the Frankfurt municipality, chose the idiom of “intellectually gifted” to describe the selection criteria in the institution’s two-pronged educational tracking system. Referring to boys only, he explained that after the children reached the age of fourteen, those judged as “gifted” would be sent to learn a craft with a master, while

⁴⁶² Based on the EWO annual reports for 1903 and 1905, ISG-Frankfurt am Main Wohlfahrtsamt V960, p. 182ff. For apprenticeship fees, see the provincial *Oberpräsident* in Posen to the president of the Bromberg regional government, 9.2.1915, listing 12 young men who received each a grant of 100 mark for training in crafts. APP-Gniezno, County Commissioner Office (Landratsamt) in Witkowo, Nr. 8 (unpaginated).

the rest were to work as domestic and agricultural laborers.⁴⁶³ The establishment of fruit cultivation and handiwork instruction at the Neuzedlitz institution was explicitly meant to detect such “gifts.” In addition, the children performed a variety of dexterous “small tasks” (*kleine Arbeiten*), including “potato-peeling, knitting, stitching, sewing and patching,” and “helping out” in garden and household work as well as on the fields belonging to the institution, where potatoes and grains were grown. All these kinds of work were considered training for the work children were expected to do in the households of their future foster families. It is unlikely that any of the children was ever trained to be a settler-farmer and to manage crop rotation. Nevertheless, an agricultural winter school operated in the institution for several years and received sons of settlers from the area.⁴⁶⁴

The stated aim of the Neuzedlitz institution was to be a clearing house for children and the EWO sought to place as many children between the ages of five and fourteen in foster families as possible. This was also cheaper than housing and caring for them at the institute. The EWO, however, was often unsuccessful in finding foster families.⁴⁶⁵ Instead, many children were sent to other institutions with which the EWO had what may be called child-sharing agreements.

⁴⁶³ “Die geistig Begabteren sollen nach dem Verlassen der Schule zu deutschen Handwerker in die Lehre gegeben werden, während die weniger begabten als Landarbeiter auf dem Lande verbleiben.” County School Inspector Folz in Witkowo in the name of the EWO to the Frankfurt Poor Administration, 24.5.1897. ISG-Frankfurt am Main Magistrat V960 p. 8. The terminology of “intellectually gifted” resembles the new discourse of racist managerial capitalism that Dennis Sweeney identified in his study of the Saar Industrialists. See Dennis Sweeney, *Work, Race, and the Emergence of Radical Right Corporatism in Imperial Germany* (Michigan: Michigan University Press, 2009), pp. 154-157.

⁴⁶⁴ See the EWO yearly reports for 1897, 1908, and the “Grundsätzen über die Verpflegung der Pflinglinge,” in GStA PK I. HA Rep. 87B Nr. 9568, pp. 13–14. Regarding the agricultural winter school, see its first annual report (1899/1900) in GStA PK, XVI. HA 30 Nr. 2621 (unpaginated). Regarding the role of work in institutions, compare Falk Bretschneider, “Menschen im Zuchthaus. Institutionelle Stabilisierung von Herrschaft durch soziale Praxis. Das Beispiel Sachsen,” *Historische Anthropologie* 15:2 (2007) [=Themenschwerpunkt “Gehorsam,” eds. Alf Lüdtke and Michael Wildt], pp. 164-194, pp. 189-192. Regarding children’s work in rural areas see: Boentert, *Kinderarbeit*, esp. pp. 390-391.

⁴⁶⁵ The following discussion is based on the EWO yearly reports for 1897, 1899, and 1903–1912, as found in ISG-Frankfurt am Main, Magistrat V829 (unpaginated). For the difficulties encountered by the EWO in finding foster families, see especially the annual reports for 1903 and 1904.

Older children were kept in these institutions to do household chores, garden and help supervise the younger children. Supervision seems to have been an important part of the work of the older youths in Neuzedlitz, and it was combined with their role as instructors in various crafts. In 1903 three older boys worked at Neuzedlitz. By 1911 there were eighteen young people doing stall, garden, kitchen, school, and household work and supervising the work of their juniors. This increase was probably connected to a previous decision to stop leasing out the institution's agricultural land (a considerable 75 hectares) and to begin cultivating it. That children worked is clear, but this did not mean they were good at it by the standards of agricultural labor in the large estates of the area, or that there were people in Neuzedlitz who could instruct them in that line of work. In a gloomy report on the state of Neuzedlitz's agricultural activities, prepared at Hugenberg's request by a local estate-owner, the ability and skill of the older boys to supervise and train their younger peers in agricultural work was ridiculed as mediocre at best.⁴⁶⁶

The contractual framework for the relationship between the EWO and foster families was based on a set of symbolic distinctions about family belonging, work, and power in the household. We know very little about children's life in settler households, but EWO normative documents do spell out many stipulations that give us an idea about children's intended position. Contracts between foster fathers and the EWO determined the payment for the family, restricted foster families to one foster child unless special permission to take on more children was granted and made receiving older children dependent on taking in younger ones as well. In return, parents were required not to demand more work from foster children than they would from their own children, to allow them a private room or space in the house, and to supply them with good

⁴⁶⁶ "Das Arbeitspersonal besteht zum grössten Teil aus Kindern und die Arbeit ist Kinderwerk... Die Aufsicht besteht aus Fürsorgejungens, die ungenügend ist. Eine ernste Arbeit kann dort nicht geleistet werden." Gutsbesitzer Peschken to the EWO/Hugenberg, "Gutschrift über den Landbetrieb in Neuzedlitz..." 5.11.1908, BArch Koblenz, N1231/67, pp. 219-224, quote from p. 223. Also see the 1903 and 1905 EWO annual reports.

clothes. Foster parents were also expressly forbidden from putting children in the same living quarters as servants. Moreover, the EWO had set down rules for children's pay after finishing school at the age of fourteen, in case they stayed with the family. Youths living with families were to be paid three Marks per quarter in the first year (ages 14-15) and five Marks in the second (ages 15-16) for their work in the household or farm, on top of lodging and food.⁴⁶⁷

The contract between the EWO and foster families specified differential clothing, living space, and workload to mark a child's specific position as quasi-family within a household. The symbolic differentiation between foster children, farm and household workers, and family members was meant to clarify children's status in the household and to make clear both to families and to municipal authorities that the children were to be cared for and not treated as a mere labor force. This was very likely calculated to avoid an association with the notoriously restrictive Domestic Workers Regulation (*Gesindeordnung*), which treated workers as servants subordinated to the patriarchal authority of the head of the household.⁴⁶⁸ Avoiding such associations was important precisely because the logic of the whole scheme in the eyes of Hugenberg and his associates hinged on the idea that fostered-out children would replace Polish *Gesinde*. This was made clear in an anonymous article in the ADV bulletin that announced the opening of the Neuzedlitz institution. This article, probably written by Hugenberg, argued that German farmers and craftspeople found themselves forced to employ Polish labor, thereby putting at risk the character of purely German communities (*reindeutsche Gemeinden*). Sending "orphans" from the west "as fosterlings" to German farmers in the "Polish-speaking East," to

⁴⁶⁷ For the contract between families and the EWO, see ISG-Frankfurt am Main, Wohlfahrtsamt, Nr. 960, pp. 48-49.

⁴⁶⁸ Jürgen Kocka, *Arbeitsverhältnisse und Arbeiterexistenzen: Grundlagen der Klassenbildung im 19. Jahrhundert* (Bonn: Dietz, 1990), pp. 125-172.

replace Polish domestic and farm workers (*Gesinde*), claimed the article, was a service both to German farmers and to the German nation.⁴⁶⁹

In fact, any attempt to bring in new workers to the agriculture of Polish Prussia had to be formulated in relation to existing labor regimes, and in particular, the aforementioned *Gesindeordnung* that regulated the work of about a quarter of the agricultural workforce in Prussia, including children.⁴⁷⁰ Under the *Gesindeordnung*, children could potentially enter a legally binding service contract even unintentionally, as no written contract was required and domestic work relationship could be entered upon with the mere acceptance of remuneration. The EWO fostering contract stipulated that after turning fourteen and completing their schooling, children could stay with and work for their foster family. The Domestic Workers Regulation stipulated that children aged 14-21 could become domestic workers if approved by their legal guardian, in this case either the EWO or municipal welfare authorities. If the contract period was longer than a year, an additional authorization of a Guardianship Court was required. The contract could be canceled by giving notice three months in advance. The specification of three months payment for children in the EWO fostering contract indicates, then, that future work relationship between foster families and EWO children were already laid down in advance in the fostering contract. This also explains why older children were considered more valuable. They had less time left in school and could be expected to take up full time domestic work sooner. While there was no certainty that children would enter into such work relationship with foster

⁴⁶⁹ “Siebt man den deutsche Bauern des polnischsprachigen Ostens westliche Waisen als Pflegekinder, so wird dies aufhören da er dann kein Gesinde mehr braucht.” Anonymous, “Neuzedlitz,” *Alldeutsche Blätter* 7:6, 7.2.1897.

⁴⁷⁰ According to the 1882 figures given by Jürgen Kocka, *Gesinde* in household and farm work amounted to an average of 23,8% of the agricultural workforce in Prussia, but the numbers were higher in the eastern provinces of Prussia. In Brandenburg, for instance, the comparable figure was 27.4 % and in East Prussia, 28,1%. The onset of mass farmworker migration after 1890 and changes in agricultural production must have reduced these numbers in subsequent years, especially in the large-scale *latifundia* economy. See Kocka, *Arbeitsverhältnisse und Arbeiterexistenzen*, pp. 149-172, figures on p. 153.

families, the EWO offered families the possibility that children would stay and even regulated their pay during this time.⁴⁷¹ It is conceivable that with EWO support, regulation, and approval, penurious children did stay on after their schooling period, at least to earn their fare back to their hometown. The symbolism employed in the fostering contract made it clear to foster families, without directly mentioning the *Gesindeordnung*, that this form of domestic work relationship was not acceptable before the age of fourteen, when children completed their schooling period. By suggesting that children would become domestic workers later on, the EWO, in fact, both regulated and facilitated the transition from fostering to domestic work.⁴⁷²

Another way to consider this transition is through the proposed pay for children after the age of fourteen and its economic value. Rather than a monetary remuneration for clearly defined work, these monies possibly represented children's increasing value as workers following the completion of their obligatory schooling. It is hard to evaluate these wages in terms of real wage-work and they surely cannot be seen solely in those terms. If we assume that lodgings and food costed about the same as the monetary wages and take into account that working on a family farm could have been more intensive than in the large estates on which the available wage numbers are based, it seems that the wages stipulated by the EWO were lower than the local rate

⁴⁷¹ The regulations of domestic work that I use here are those in place after the Federal Civil Code (BGB), which was approved in 1896 and promulgated in 1900. The BGB introduced wide-ranging changes to the application of the Prussian *Gesindeordnung* of 1810, including on the question of children's work. The new legal situation was surely considered by the legally trained Hugenberg and his EWO colleagues when they drafted the fostering contract in 1897. For the legal status of the Domestic Work Regulation after 1900, see the detailed treatise by Karl Lindenberg, *Das preußische Gesinderecht: Im Geltungsbereiche der Gesindeordnung vom 8. Nov. 1810*. 5th Edition (Berlin: H. W. Müller, 1900), esp. pp. 27-36 on the employment of minors as domestic workers, and p. 64 on contract cancellation conditions. On the pre-BGB *Gesindeordnung* and children, see Klaus Tenfelde, "Ländliches Gesinde in Preußen – Gesinderecht und Gesindestatistik 1810 bis 1861," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 19 (1979), pp. 189–229, pp. 200-201.

⁴⁷² "Grundsätzen über die Verpflegung der Pflinglinge," GStA PK I. HA Rep. 87B Nr. 9568, pp. 13–14. Cf. Michael Mitterauer, "Servants and Youth" *Continuity and Change* 5:1 (1990), pp. 11–38, pp. 21ff.

and did not directly represent the value of their work.⁴⁷³ If that is correct, then the Colonization Commission and the EWO presented foster families with a unique economic opportunity by offering them to take in children from the Neuzedlitz institution.

The main state institution that limited children's worktime in agriculture was the local school with its obligatory attendance in terms of hours, days, seasons of the year and age. Unlike work in factories, for example, work in agriculture was never regulated by the Prussian state and there were no explicit stipulations regarding work age, work hours, or workers' safety. The main legal limitation on such work was parents' duty to send their children to school between the ages of five and fourteen. Teachers were responsible for recording school attendance and were required to compose school absence reports. They also collected notes about their negotiations with parents over children's work hours and school time.⁴⁷⁴ The school records of several

⁴⁷³ Directly comparable wage data is hard to find but it is possible to give roughly indicative examples. In the city of Barman in the Rhein Province in 1898, working children in agriculture, probably external to the household, could expect to receive between fifteen and twenty Marks for the three months of the high season agricultural work on family farms. In Max Weber's work on the agricultural workers of East Elbia, undertaken in 1892 for the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*, we have similar indications for the wages of children in agriculture, based on the answers received from estate managers and owners. Of the two estates that answered Weber's questionnaire in the Witkowo county, where the Neuzedlitz institution was located, one reported that children working in the thinning out of sugar beets would receive 50 Pfennig for a day's work. A similar sum for similar work was reported in the adjacent county of Gnesen/Gneizno. According to a 1904 unpublished government report regarding the employment of children in agriculture, over twenty percent of children working in agriculture in Germany were tasked also with this line of work, a number which was surely higher for sugar-beet producing areas. The given amount is for a day's worth of work as a unit of accounting, and it is impossible to know the relationship between this unit and actual working hours or age, the latter also being directly related to school presence. We can deduce that Weber's estate owners were paying children of an unspecified age, probably still in school but ten years old or older, between 2.5 and 3.5 Marks a week or 30-42 Marks for three months, depending if they worked five or seven days a week. For both Weber's and the Barman numbers, we do not know if they include lodging and food (In the EWO contract, the monetary amount supplemented lodging and food), and they are very likely to refer only to the high season in agriculture, when work was the hardest and wages the highest. Boentert, *Kinderarbeit*, pp. 380ff, 397. For Barman numbers, see p. 304 and for the numbers taken from the 1904 unpublished report, a main source for Boentert's work, see p. 390. The 1904 report was based on information collected from schoolteachers on a massive scale by means of questionnaires. Due to its damning results, including the statistics about the widespread use of children in the *latifundia* economy of the eastern provinces of Prussia, it was long kept under wraps. The Witkowo and Gnesen/Gniezno numbers are from Max Weber, *Die Verhältnisse der Landarbeiter im ostelbischen Deutschland* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1892), p. 412.

⁴⁷⁴ According to the unpublished 1904 government report on children's agricultural work in Prussia, over half of the children who worked in agriculture in Prussia worked six hours a day for a period of more than five weeks a year, and a third of them worked over fourteen weeks. Boentert, *Kinderarbeit*, pp. 380ff, p. 401.

villages around the Neuzedlitz institution clearly show that foster fathers regularly cited labor needs as they negotiated with teachers on exemptions from school attendance of children in their household, including EWO children.⁴⁷⁵

The categories used in the EWO reports cannot help us to get a better idea of what children in fact did in foster families. The EWO used the categories of *Dienstherr* and *Beruf* on the one hand and *Familieflege* (employer and family care) on the other hand are misleading in the sense that they were less a matter of actual work, training, place in the household, or future expectations and more about age. The differentiation between confirmed and not confirmed children was based on a similar logic. In 1905 the EWO reported on a particularly high demand for children from settler-families. The high demand was, in fact, for confirmed children only, namely those who completed their obligatory schooling. As this age group was on short supply at the Neuzedlitz institution, the EWO could only fulfill a small portion of the requests for confirmed girls (10 out of 50) and for confirmed boys (26 of 67 requests). In comparison, younger children were more available (14 of 50 “fostering” requests turned down by the EWO). Only children older than the age of 14 were noted as being under a *Dienstherr* or learning a trade/craft, while only those 14 or younger were noted under the foster care rubric (with an average age for family care of 11 years). The demarcation between fostering and work, once again, were based on the compulsory school age, which made a difference regarding the legal limitations of children’s work. Cases such as Sophie’s, in which adoption followed foster care, were clearly outside the vision that the EWO had for the children.⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷⁵ For requests by parents to allow their children to skip school to work on the farm in the settler-village Neu-Tecklenburg (formerly Sobiesierne) near Neuyedlitz, see the administrative file of the village school: “Die Evangelische Schule in Neutecklenburg/Sobiesernie,” APP-Gneizno 92/332/8. More generally the negotiations about school attendance during the summer high season in the Bromberg/Bydgoszcz regional government files, see “Sommerferien und Schulunterricht auf dem Lande 1888-1915,” GStA PK XVI. HA Rep. 30 Nr. 2611.

⁴⁷⁶ EWO annual report for 1905.

In EWO publications, the work of children was coded in strictly separated terms of gender, kinship (fostering and care), and profession (apprenticeship and service), thereby glossing over the unity of the place in which care and work took place, namely the household. Asking about the household should therefore give us more of an idea about the work that children actually did once they left the institution. One way to get a rough idea is to look at the occupations of foster parents/employers. According to three types of occupations (official service, crafts, agriculture) a rough calculation shows that 22 girls (average age 13) and 32 boys (average age 12) were sent to work with families whose main livelihood came from farming. Officials (teachers, pastors, post and railroad employees) received only girls (12 girls, age average 12). On the other hand, craftspeople received almost only boys (2 girls, age average 8, and 11 boys, age average 16).⁴⁷⁷ There was also some connection between the social position of households and receiving a foster child/worker. Teacher Zempel of Neuzedlitz took the 14-year-old Helene K. to his household (three more teachers received children, all from Witkowo or Znin/Żnin counties). Several members of the Schürmann family in the nearby settler-village of Neu-Tecklenburg received no less than six children, including 14-year-old Max and 17-year-old Minna from Berlin, who joined the household of the Neu-Tecklenburg village head (*Gemeindevorsteher*) Schürmann. According to local school records, Schürmann was already fostering another young girl, Hedwig Neins, who was apparently not connected to the EWO. Moreover, both the baker Friedrich Feldkamp and the farmer Friedrich Harte, two of the wealthiest villagers in Neu-Tecklenburg, likewise received children. Finally, only four children were sent to estate owners or to inspectors and craftsmen working on estates. The figures given

⁴⁷⁷ I left some foster families outside the calculation due to unclear occupation. The reports do not lend themselves easily to such categorization, and I made calculated guesses based on the place of residence of the family and the description of the occupation of the father. I took all *Besitzer* and *Ansiedler* in villages to be farmers in addition to those noted as *Landwirt*. In practice, these different categories could overlap or entail different kinds of work.

here do not allow on their own definitive conclusions about the child distribution policy of the EWO. They do demonstrate, however, that the EWO was supplying labor to farmers, craftsmen, and local representatives of the state, and not to large estates. Nevertheless, the supply of children to pastors and teachers, who needed to wear their dedication to the nationalizing state on their sleeve, serves as a reminder that providing children to settler families and local officials was also an act of beneficence by a paternalist state.⁴⁷⁸

Space, Categorization, and Placement

The categorization of children was one of the main administrative tasks in children's institutions, constituting a core institutional practice that normally left a long paper trail. Despite the lack of such documentation in the case of the EWO, it is clear that classifying children as "gifted" or not, or as simply "good" or "bad," both before and during their stay under the EWO, was important in determining their placement with families or in other institutions. In addition to children's aptitude for a range of menial tasks, the EWO also used other means of categorizing and recategorizing their charges, often with the result that children were relocated within the Neuzedlitz institution or moved between institutions and families. I will not discuss in detail the process of categorization or the pedagogical and medical categories used for children and youth. Instead, I will use the very general categories created by the EWO to explore the organization of space and the placement of children within and outside the institutions involved in this scheme.

The categorization of children who came under the authority of the EWO began even before their arrival, as the EWO sought to bring in children that would make good candidates for fostering out to farmer families and to avoid physically or mentally "unsuitable" or otherwise

⁴⁷⁸ EWO annual report for 1903; Neu Tecklenburg/Sobiesiernie school inspection report for 1903, [Evangelische Schule in] Neu Teklenburg, [Szkoła Ewangelicka w Sobiesierni], APP-Gniezno 92/181/15 (unpaginated).

“neglected” children. Despite that, it does not seem that the EWO was able to be too selective. It particularly sought younger children, as they had little memory or experience of their former lives and relatives and were considered easier to train for their appointed roles. Nevertheless, many of the children were older than hoped for and judged by the institution to be unsuitable for fostering in settler families. In 1907, perhaps on the basis of accumulated experience, the president of the Prussian Colonization Commission warned officials against sending “unsuitable” children to settler families, fearing that such a practice might lead settlers to refuse to receive children altogether.⁴⁷⁹ The EWO was desperate to avoid the impression that it was bringing the wrong kind of children to the colonized provinces. It constantly attempted to reassure municipalities, critics, settler families, and state officials that the children were of good “quality” and that separation between “bad” and “good” children was maintained. Municipalities such as Frankfurt am Main regularly sent inspectors to the Neuzedlitz institution to ensure that the EWO lived up to their promises. In response to significant concerns raised by the first Frankfurt poor administration inspection in the institution, Hugenberg assured his father-in-law, the mayor of Frankfurt, that the EWO maintained a regime of strictly differential treatment and spatial separation between different kinds of children, as the association had no intention to “infect” (*infizieren*) German settler families with a “poor-quality children material” (*schlechtes Kindermaterial*).⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁷⁹ “Kinder, die aus anderen Provinzen kommend, dort schon längere Zeit die Schule besucht haben, sind nicht in Familien unterzubringen, sondern in der Anstalt zu behalten. Ebenso Kinder, die in Familienpflege dauernd nicht gut gethan haben,” according to the “Grundsätze über die Verpflegung der Pflinglinge,” GStA PK I. HA Rep. 87B Nr. 9568, pp. 13–14; Colonization Commission president Blomeyer to Agriculture Ministry, “Überweisung von Fürsorgezöglingen an die in den Kreisen Wreschen, Jarotschin und Pleschen angesetzten Katholischen Ansiedler,” 19.3.1907 (copy). GStA PK I. HA Rep. 87B Nr. 9568, p. 34. For the explicit conditions about children’s qualities in the contracts that the EWO signed with different municipalities, see e.g. the contracts with Schöneberg and Wilmersdorf: *Verwaltungsbericht des Magistrats der Stadt Berlin-Schöneberg* (Berlin, 1899), p. 693; *Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Wilmersdorf 1908/1909* (Berlin, 1910), pp. 126-127.

⁴⁸⁰ Hugenberg to Armenverwaltung Frankfurt, n.d. ca. 1903. ISG-Frankfurt am Main, Magistrat V960 pp. 176-177.

Concerns about the quality of children arriving in Neuzedlitz were used to critique the entire program almost from the outset. As early as October 1895, shortly after Hasse first published his article in the ADV bulletin, the leading Catholic daily, *die Kölnische Volkszeitung*, accused Hasse and the EWO of failing in their own population politics by facilitating the arrival of “bad” children, thereby harming instead of strengthening the German population in the colonized provinces. Hasse found it necessary to issue an immediate response, in which he sought to deflect this criticism with the assurance that the “pedagogical abilities” of German settler families were bound to offset any possible problems with the children. Eight years later,



Figure 5.8: A geometrical sketch of the Neuzedlitz Institution ca. 1903. The fenced-in new school building is front and center next to a large tree, the manor house is discernible on the upper left. Source: EWO annual report for 1908, ISG-Frankfurt am Main, Wohlfahrtsamt 960, p. 229ff.

the EWO was accused by *Goniec Wielkopolski*, a leading Polish daily associated with the Polish landed elite, of intentionally bringing in “afflicted bastards” to Polish areas.⁴⁸¹

The seriousness with which the EWO took the categorization of children under their care is demonstrated by the built environment of Neuzedlitz. Figures 5.1 above and 5.2 below show a fence around a two-story building, positioned in the middle of the frame of the two images. This



Figure 5.9: The Neuzedlitz institution with children and staff, ca. 1903. In this unpublished picture, probably taken around 1903, the children and the staff are posing to the camera in front of the new school and dorms building. The boys probably removed their caps for the picture. Girls’ hair, unlike policies in harsher institutions, was not shaved. Source: Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Hugenberg Papers N1231/67.

⁴⁸¹ Hasse’s rejoinder to the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* was published under the same title as his original article: “Die Besiedlung des Ostens durch Entlastung der großen Städte,” *Alldeutsche Blätter* 5:41, 13.10.1895. For the *Goniec Wielkopolski* 1.9.1903 article, see the translation done by the Prussian police, which closely monitored every Polish newspaper, in GStA PK I. HA Rep 76 VII neu Sekt. 7A IV Nr. 7. On the role of social hygiene in the nationalizing politics in Poznań, see Justyna A. Turkowska, “Im Namen der „großen Kolonisationsaufgaben“: Das Hygiene-Institut in Posen (1899-1920) und die preußische Hegemonialpolitik in der Ostmark,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 61:4 (2003), pp. 552–573.

fence was required by the Prussian Ministry of Education as a tangible means of separating two groups of children, those suitable for fostering and those who were not. According to EWO assurances to the ministry, contact between these two kinds of children was allowed only during school hours (as the school was located in the two-story building). Each group was supposed to enter and leave the school separately. The newly completed school and dorms building, which included teacher's lodgings and dorms for the "bad" children, was required as the number of EWO children in reformatory education rose sharply after the passing of the Reformatory Education Law. As Hugenberg hinted in a letter to the Frankfurt mayor, there were financial motivations behind taking such children in, as municipalities paid a much higher rate for them. Berlin, for example, paid the EWO 800 Marks annually for each child, four times more than the EWO received for other children.⁴⁸²

The categorization, separation, and education of children at Neuzedlitz were meant to ensure successful placement of useful children in settler families. Otherwise, the commission feared, settlers would no longer be interested in the taking in children. Without the internal files of the EWO it is difficult to know much about the placement of children in foster families. The files of the Guardianship Court or *Vormundschaftsgericht* under the local *Amtsgericht* in Witkowo, which supervised guardianship over the children, were probably lost together with most of that court's files and are not to be found in the Polish State Archives in Poznań and Gniezno. Little is therefore known about the kind of institutional networks and personal

⁴⁸² Sekretär Falkenhagen's report on his 29.11.1902 inspection is in ISG-Frankfurt am Main Magistrat V960, pp. 163–175. The report was heavily attacked by Hugenberg shortly afterwards, without challenging the main findings, however. See Hugenberg to Armenverwaltung Frankfurt, n.d. ca. 1903, ISG-Frankfurt am Main Magistrat V960, pp. 176–178 (sent directly to Mayor Adickes). A further inspection from September 1904 did not come up with significantly different findings but was much more favorable in tone, positing itself against Falkenhagen and recommending further cooperation with the Neuzedlitz institution. See "Bericht betr. Besuch das Waisenhaus Neu-Zedlitz am 15. und 16. September 1904," *ibid.*, pp. 185ff.

connections that facilitated the placement of children beyond the general guidelines laid out in 1898. Nor do we know much about the vetting of “suitable” families by the EWO and the specific rationales involved. The rules set down by the EWO itself stipulated that the placement of every child would come before the Association’s board for approval. However, the few board-meeting protocols that we have from the Hugenberg papers in the Federal Archive in Koblenz contain at most a laconic mention that the placement of a certain child was approved.⁴⁸³

Despite the intention to “transplant” German children in Polish Prussia, the children under the EWO were frequently on the move. They could be transferred for organizational, financial, disciplinarian, or health reasons, between institutions, foster families, apprenticeships, and employer-families. In some case, for example, children were retrieved from foster families or from other institutions due to mistreatment. On rare occasions children could also be returned to their hometowns. In 1911–1912, one boy managed to escape Neuzedlitz, cross the Russian border, and return after six months on the road. He was promptly sent back to his hometown.⁴⁸⁴

The distances between foster families and the central institution in Neuzedlitz influenced the ability of municipalities and the EWO, the latter always short on staff, wagons and horses, to supervise foster parents. Transportation beyond the main cities and county towns in the region was often limited to horse-drawn wagons. If a village did not happen to be close to the railroad, traveling between Neuzedlitz and villages 90 kilometers to the north could take a whole day. Even traveling to relatively close-by foster families was time-consuming. To get to a settler-village 60 kilometers from Neuzedlitz, a 1904 Frankfurt inspection report noted, required a whole day of travel because of the need to bypass a large lake. The distances involved in visiting

⁴⁸³ See for example the protocol from the 18.8.1910 EWO board meeting, in BArch Koblenz N1231/68, pp. 285-286.

⁴⁸⁴ There is no detailed account of these issues but the annual EWO reports for 1911 and 1912.




Figure 5.10: Land purchase by the Colonization Commission, 1895–1906. The gradation of green denotes the percentage of the agricultural land of the county owned by the Colonization Commission, the strongest green stands for ownership of over 30%. The red circle marks the radius within which the majority of children were placed with families.

Source: Königliche Ansiedlungskommission, *Zwanzig Jahre deutscher Kulturarbeit* [=Denkschrift, Haus der Abgeordneten, 20. Legislaturperiode III. Session 1907, Drucksache 501] (Posen, 1907), p. 82 [p. 3676].

the children were frequently mentioned in inspection reports, with vividly descriptions of long, windy treks by horse-drawn sledges and carriages in freezing temperatures.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁸⁵ See for example the 1907 inspection report on the children sent to the EWO by the Frankfurt municipality. ISG-Frankfurt am Main Magistrat V960, pp. 183ff.

Distance could also indicate placement practices and distribution strategies. The geopolitical, electoral, administrative, and demographic calculations of the Colonization Commission led it to focus on specific counties in the colonized provinces and to avoid almost completely land purchase or settlement in others. The county of Witkowo, where Neuzedlitz was located, and the two adjacent ones, Wreschen/Września and Genesen/Genizno (where by 1907 the Colonization Commission bought almost 34% of the entire agricultural area of the county), were among the most important areas of activity for the Colonization Commission, a fact that may also account for the decision to place the Neuzedlitz institution there in the first place.⁴⁸⁶ In 1903, out of the 92 children who were sent out to families (another 53 were sent to other institutions), 64 remained in the immediate vicinity of Neuzedlitz, more further afield in county Witkowo, or in one of the two adjacent counties. Another important county for the Colonization Commission was Znin/Żnin, where the Colonization Commission bought 24.5% of the land, though only 10 children were sent there. The average distance to which the 92 children were sent was 30 kilometers, but most (52) were still within a radius of twenty kilometers from the institution and still in the Witkowo (39 children), Gnesen or Wreschen counties. Moreover, 28 of the children were given over to settler families in Neuzedlitz itself or in its immediate vicinity (Neu-Tecklenburg/Sobiesiernie). The map in figure 3 shows that these counties were a focal point of the commission's land purchase and settlement activities. Placing the institution in this particular location and the choice of placement for children, was apparently related to the commission's aim to limit the employment of Polish labor in its settlements.

⁴⁸⁶ Königliche Ansiedlungskommission, *Zwanzig Jahre deutscher Kulturarbeit* [=Denkschrift, Haus der Abgeordneten, 20. Legislaturperiode III. Session 1907, Drucksache 501] (Posen, 1907), p. 82 [p. 3676]; Lerp, *imperiale Grenzräume*, p. 134ff.

Despite its fundamental reliance on the Colonization Commission and other state agencies, it would be hasty to suggest that the priorities and placement decisions of the EWO were identical to or simply dictated by those of its backers in the Colonization Commission. The focus on the rather distant Żnin/Znin county may have been about a congruence of interests and policies on the level of institutional practice. Children needed to be placed; the institution was always short of space, money, and staff. As tight and continuous supervision of fostered children and families did not materialize and as there is no indication that the Colonization Commission actively sought to find families for the Neuzedlitz children, it is likely that placement in more distant places was brokered by local state representatives, particularly teachers and pastors, who could find and vouch for the suitability of families and conduct occasional inspections. This was the case for some villages in county Żnin/Znin, where a local pastor made the connection between families and the EWO.⁴⁸⁷

The EWO used the dense institutional network of the Protestant state church, Protestant charities, and village pastors to raise funds and to operate across distances. Provincial donation gathering for the EWO was organized by the provincial church authorities of several provinces of Prussia. We know, for example, that donations were collected during church services in Hannover (1897), Hessen-Nassau and Schleswig-Holstein (1898), Saxony (1900) and Berlin (1901). Additionally, a one-time church donation campaign was approved by the Prussian government in 1905 for the whole of Prussia with the exception of the provinces of Poznania, and West and East Prussia.⁴⁸⁸ Moreover, pastors were encouraged to cooperate with the EWO and with the Colonization Commission through official Church instructions, but also through the

⁴⁸⁷ Inspection report from 1907, ISG-Frankfurt am Main Magistrat V960, pp. 183ff.

⁴⁸⁸ See EWO to the Prussian interior minister von Hammerstein, 10.12.1903. BArch-Koblenz N1231/12, pp. 359ff; EWO annual report for 1905.

semi-official institutional network of the Protestant Internal Mission, where the EWO had a firm presence. Provincial and regional pastors' conferences are likely to have been another main arena for increasing collaboration between the clergy, the EWO and the commission. In 1910 and 1914 two special provincial conferences of pastors of settler communities took place in Poznan, convened by the provincial consistory and partially financed by the commission, with the presidents of both organizations in attendance. On the agenda of these conferences were issues such as "What churchmen could do to overcome the differences between settlers stemming from different areas [in Germany]?" and "The care of children (*Jugendpflege*) in settler communities."⁴⁸⁹

When the EWO is considered together with other Protestant children's institutions, mostly in West Prussia, with which it had contracts regarding the transfer of children, its regional importance comes to the fore. From early on, the EWO had contracts with a number of other care institutions connected with the Protestant Inner Mission that regulated the transfer and allocation of children between different institutions. As early as 1897, the sister association of the EWO in West-Prussia, based in Gross Tillitz, another estate purchased by the Colonization Commission, gave the EWO the authority to enter and conclude negotiations about the transfer of children in its name with municipal authorities. It was followed by at least ten other Protestant institutions, some of which were also established on land bought by the Colonization Commission. At the most practical level, the institutions with which the EWO cooperated served to warehouse children when the Neuzedlitz institution was overcrowded. The cooperation of the EWO with different Protestant institutions in Poznan and West-Prussia also allowed the EWO to effect

⁴⁸⁹ Joachim Rogall, *Die Geistlichkeit der Evangelisch-Unionierten Kirche in der Provinz Posen 1871–1914 und ihr Verhältnis zur preussischen Polenpolitik* (Marburg/Lahn: Herder Institute 1990), pp. 81–83.

greater separation between different kinds of children, especially in the case of girls-only institutions and reformatory education institutions.⁴⁹⁰

Placing and Displacing Children: An Infrastructure of Colonization

German municipalities around 1900 used new legal powers, growing revenues, and a relative political autonomy from state bureaucracies to massively expand their involvement in social welfare. Some of the wealthiest and most progressive German cities in this regard, such as Berlin and Frankfurt am Main, also utilized new child welfare legislation and their expanding administrative capacities to take poor children from their working-class families and send them to the EWO's institutional network in Poznan. The EWO was thinly veiled joint venture between the Prussian Colonization Commission and the Pan-German League. A private-public experiment in children's settlement, it drew on British examples and used the trappings of Protestant charity to garner wide support. Progressive, liberal-controlled municipalities, as well as welfare officials, pedagogues, the Protestant church, and the Inner Mission were all involved in this social experiment, together with the Prussian state and its settlement agency. The scheme was quickly adopted by government officials and won the support of the Prussian government. The Eastern Marches Association, after failing in its own attempt to establish a competing children-as-labor transfer scheme, became an ardent supporter of the EWO. In addition to state funds budgeted for specific purposes (e.g. paying for a teacher's wages at the institute) and to grants-in-aid received from government ministries, provincial authorities, and the German Emperor, significant support came from the Protestant Church and the extensive institutional

⁴⁹⁰ The agreements with other institutions and the number of children sent there are noted in the annual reports of the EWO. In 1905, for example, the EWO had agreements with seven different Protestant institutions in Polish Prussia, and out of 216 children younger than 14 (there also 64 older children as well) under the official care of the institute, 94 children were in other institutions, 63 were housed in Neuzedlitz/Ruchocin, and 59 were living with foster families. EWO annual report for 1905, p. 11.

network affiliated with it. The EWO placed the children in a converted manor house east of Gniezno/Gnesen, educated and trained them there for household and farm work, and then supplied them to settlers and officials. The EWO and the Colonization Commission hoped to replace Polish workers in specific families or households, usually settlers, pastors, teachers, and junior officials, by providing them with captive German-Protestant children who would not only perform underage work in the household but could also become *Gesinde* and subjected to Prussia's harsh Domestic Workers Legislation when they were older. Although we do not know to what extent the EWO children really replaced Polish workers as intended or how many became *Gesinde*, the sheer number of children in relation to the number of settler families is striking. By 1914, just over 21,700 settler families were living in Polish Prussia. By that time, about 1,500 children passed through the EWO, or one child for every fourteen settler families.⁴⁹¹

Placement, displacement, and replacement were administrative strategies and social processes that went to the heart of the Germanization and colonization of the German-Polish borderlands. Recalling Judith Modell's formulation about the special political significance of fostering as the power to "place and replace" children and to "determine the terms of continuity from one generation to the next," I would like to conclude the chapter by reflecting on two modalities of power involved in deploying child welfare for colonization in Polish Prussia.⁴⁹² The first is the relationships between the state, private charity institutions, and municipal welfare authorities. The second is the relationship between the nationalizing state, welfare institutions, and families.

⁴⁹¹ This is just an illustrative calculation. It should be recalled that children did not always end up in foster families and a minority was placed in non-settler families.

⁴⁹² Modell, *Rights to the Children*, p. 157.

The EWO child displacement scheme highlights the interplay between the nationalization of Polish Prussia and the systems of social welfare and social control that were developing in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century. Municipalities were the primary providers of welfare support and poor relief in Imperial Germany. Often in collaboration with medical experts, businessmen, and private associations, they were also “more willing to experiment than the central state” in welfare innovations during the period and developed strategies that would only be taken up by the state after 1918.⁴⁹³ The case of the EWO shows, however, that social experiments could be undertaken in a complex cooperation between cities, state agencies, private charity, and a highly bureaucratized state colonization agency.

The activities of the EWO reveal how municipalities became active participants in the state project of settlement in Polish Prussia. The people behind the EWO adroitly used both personal connections and diverse ways of talking about child welfare to appeal to a variety of social reform agendas – liberal, Protestant, and radical nationalist – and to forge long-term collaboration with municipal administrators in German cities. By using an ostensibly private charity and bringing in children from cities that were autonomous within the structures of the Prussian state, the Prussian Colonization Commission essentially outsourced the decision about which children would be sent to its settlements. Communal politicians and welfare officials in Frankfurt, Berlin, and elsewhere did not just mediate between the commission and its “human material,” but took up a powerful position of authority, as they asserted their power to decide which children would be sent to the EWO and how to supervise the education, placement, and

⁴⁹³ George Steinmetz, *Regulating the Social: The Welfare State and local Politics in Imperial Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993), pp. 150-152, quote from p. 187, generally ch. 6-7. For the intertwined public-private character of these developments, see Edward Ross Dickinson, *The Politics of German Child Welfare from the Empire to the Federal Republic* (Harvard University Press, 1996), esp. ch. 3; Lutz Raphael, “Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22 (1996), pp. 165-193.

general well-being of individual children. The EWO had to accept these interventions to maintain the flow of children, although it could also misinform municipalities and ignore their requests. The detailed inspection reports in the files of the Frankfurt municipality indicate that even if cities could not maintain constant supervision, they were interested in keeping track of the children, especially when facing opposition from their political opponents in the SPD. Municipal electoral struggles and public opinion also influenced cities' participation in the scheme. As we saw in the case of Frankfurt, the EWO and the Prussian Colonization Commission were much more vulnerable to popular public opinion and to local electoral politics than scholars usually assume concerning the Prussian bureaucracy.

Municipal welfare administration and state legislation regarding wayward or neglected children, whose families or guardians did not provide for them, allowed authorities to intervene in children's and families' lives. Authorities could use poverty, criminality, or moral deviance to separate children from their supposedly dysfunctional families and to place children in different frameworks of care. Although municipalities centralized and professionalized their control of placing and displacing working-class children around 1900, denominational child welfare continued to be important, for example the sprawling network of Protestant institutions connected with the Internal Mission. The terminology of orphans, family, and fostering interlaced with the language of Protestant charity and was strategic in its obfuscation of the household labor that children would be performing, their projected transition to *Gesinde*, and the political goals of the scheme. While this smokescreen enabled the collaboration between progressive municipalities and the EWO, it was nevertheless rather thin, since there was a broad agreement that working-class children would be working, either to survive, to pay their keep, or to acquire useful skills. The SPD, for its part, objected not to their work as such but to their

dislocation, the limiting of their future life opportunities, and their exploitation in the service of Prussia's colonizing agenda.⁴⁹⁴

In the Habsburg language frontiers, middle-class Czech and German nationalist activists likewise utilized social welfare as a tool of nationalization, but preferred institutions over families as promoters of the socialization of children into the nation. As Tara Zahra demonstrates, families were usually seen by Habsburg nationalists as a problem rather than as a solution to the challenges of grassroots nationalization, as they sought to supplant the widespread "national indifference" among rural communities. The long tradition of religious charity caring for poor children by means of institutions offered these nationalists a model for childcare in a relatively controlled environment. Lacking a strong state sponsor that would be willing to use its institutional power to forcefully promote nationalization, Habsburg nationalist activists had to concentrate on more diffused network of private welfare institutions that provided services to clients professing to one, preferably long-lasting, national allegiance. Their relative weakness, and perhaps the swelling number of teachers in their ranks, made Habsburg nationalists opt for easily controllable education institutions.⁴⁹⁵

In Prussia, the nationalizing state had already provided for a strong institutional framework that promoted German nationalism combined with state patriotism, leaving the family as the main institution of social reproduction that was not directly controlled by the state. Zahra argues that the experimental linkage between population resettlement and nationalist politics in

⁴⁹⁴ See the resolution of the December 1898 public meeting called by the SPD to protest against the cooperation between the municipality and the EWO. Reiterating its commitment to "improve the lot of the poorest of the poor through practical work," the Frankfurt SPD argued that the dislocation of the children to an area "inferior" in terms of nutrition, education, and vocational training meant that their life chances would be limited. The SPD also objected to the removal of children from effective supervision by municipal officials, and to their exploitation as workers in the service of the Protestant-German colonization of Polish Prussia. See the text of the resolution that was officially conveyed to the municipality on 8.12.1898 in ISG-Frankfurt am Main, Magistrat V829 (unpaginated).

⁴⁹⁵ Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*.

the Habsburg Empire was focused on the role of orphaned children as “ideal raw material” for “moving and improving” in order to win children for the nation, but also to utilize them to legitimize demands for Czech or German-language education in particular localities. In Polish Prussia, German nationalist activists tended to engage in agitation and intentional escalation of social and political tensions, in particular regarding the Polish minority, in order to encourage the state to take more radical suppression measures. Despite their shared terminology and ideas, German nationalists in Prussia-Germany were in fact engaged in a profoundly different political project than German nationalists in the Habsburg Empire.⁴⁹⁶

The Prussian Colonization Commission and the EWO had set up a system of labor supply and brokerage based on displaced children to increase the effectivity and material advantage of national loyalties among representatives of the state’s “Germanizing” agenda on the ground: mainly settlers, junior officials, teachers, and pastors. The EWO supplied such households with workers that had already acquired some skills at the Neuzedlitz institution. The nationalization of these children through education, which came hand-in-hand with their “education for work,” was supposed to continue in settler families, where they would both gain practical skills and replace in their bodies and labor Polish workers.⁴⁹⁷ The children sent to the EWO experienced repeated and forced dislocation, which was part of an emerging regime of access to resources that was predicated on a pan-imperial infrastructure beyond Poznan and West Prussia. At the same time, the central role of municipalities in facilitating children’s dislocation also meant that the municipal politics could shape the practices of settlement and the placement of children in Polish Prussia. Municipal participation also enabled working-class families and children to resist

⁴⁹⁶ Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, pp. 68, 72–3.

⁴⁹⁷ On the civilizing, imperialist, and racialist meanings of the prevalent notions of work at the time, as well as the construction of “German work” as a nationalist symbol, see Conrad, *Globalization and the Nation*, ch. 2 and 6.

displacement and, alongside the political protests of SPD activists, to significantly limit the scope of the child (dis)placement project and its contribution to the colonization of the imperial border region.

Conclusion

The Prussian-German attempt to construct a frontier of settlement in Prussia's Polish border region came to an abrupt end in the aftermath of World War I, as the Versailles Settlement accorded the newly established Polish Republic most of the former Prussian provinces of Poznań and West Prussia. By end of 1918, the Prussian Colonization Commission had created and settled 21,886 plots, of which over 96% (21,161) ended up in the territory of the new Polish state. Germany's defeat and the Polish uprising in Poznań/Greater Poland in late 1918 and early 1919 came as a surprise to officials at the Colonization Commission. Their correspondence from the period conveys a sense of a hurried transition of power that involved the dispersal, loss, and apparently active destruction of large number of files, as the commission's head office relocated to Berlin. The commission hastily sought to register its land as privately owned to hinder possible confiscation by Polish authorities. It therefore transferred land titles to settlers and to government-backed German banks. By 1924, when the commission was finally dissolved, most of the settler population had already left the now Polish region for Germany as part of a mass movement of over half a million people. In part, this departure was due to the Polish state's policies of pushing settlers out and granting their land to people who could claim loyalty to the new state. These Polish de-Germanization policies often used the same legal mechanisms that the Prussian government had put in place to enable German settlement and to control land ownership.⁴⁹⁸

⁴⁹⁸ On the hurried wrapping up of the commission's work, see for example the correspondence in GStA PK I. HA 87B Nr. 9568 from 1926-1927 between the Prussian Agricultural Ministry, the Prussian *Bau- und Finanzdirektion* in Berlin, which inherited the commission's archive and remaining functions after 1924, and the last president of the commission, who was appointed as the provincial president of Silesia after the war. Almost a decade after the end of the war, the files that the commission's last president took with him from Poznań were still tucked away in boxes, while the majority of files remained in Poznań and was held by the Polish authorities. For the commission's activities after 1914 see Jacobczyk, *Pruska komisja osadnicza*, pp. 189–200. On the various movements across the German-Polish borderlands during and after World War I, see Sammartino, *The Impossible Border*; Jochen Oltmer,

The “Wilsonian moment” in the aftermath of the First World War gave rise to a new and intensely contested global geopolitics of national self-determination and to an increasing delegitimization of colonialism. While the Versailles settlement prescribed self-determination to some European nations and sought to protect the right of national minorities in the new political division of the continent, the self-determination of colonized and indigenous peoples outside Europe was ignored with the partial exception of the League of Nations’ supervisory role over the mandate system.⁴⁹⁹ The selective but unprecedented aversion among officials of the League of Nations to some ongoing settler colonial endeavors – they were particularly critical of South Africa’s methods of ruling Germany’s former settler colony in Namibia as a mandate – was possibly tapped by the Polish delegation to justify their country’s policies against its German minority.⁵⁰⁰ These policies, coupled with Germany’s blatant revisionism, gave rise to a flurry of individual and collective complaints from members of the German minority in western Poland to the League of Nations, which was in charge of overseeing the postwar minority rights regime.

In a major case in 1922, the Polish delegation sought to defend their country’s conduct towards the German minority in western Poland, which still included many former settlers, by stressing the settler-colonial nature of prewar Germanization policies. In its official response to the League’s Secretary General, the Polish delegation pointed to the foreignness of the colonists,

“Zuwanderung von Deutschen aus den abgetretenen Gebieten: Aufnahme und Abwehr von ‘Grenzlandvertriebenen’,” in idem, *Handbuch Staat und Migration*, pp. 463–482. Oltmer notes that official German statistics registered about 850,000 migrants from western Poland by mid 1925, but numbers varied. On this point see also Winson Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland*, esp. pp. 63–69.

⁴⁹⁹ Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

⁵⁰⁰ Susan Pedersen, “Settler Colonialism at the Bar of the League of Nations,” In: Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen (eds.), *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 113–34, quote on pp. 129–130; idem, *The Guardians*, esp. pp. 112–141 on Namibia, which was a German colony of settlement and was given over as a mandate to the Union of South Africa.

their arrival as masters, their treatment of the “native population” as inferior and their clear intention to “replace the native population.” They also emphasized that the Germans petitioners wanted to preserve the system of privilege that they had enjoyed in all areas of life, rather than live with Poles as equals. Accepting the extensive demands of German nationalist organizations for restoration of property rights, the Polish delegation argued, amounted to upholding the prewar colonization policy. Such conferral of privileged rights upon the colonizers and the colonizing country, “would be to offer encouragement and reward for the most flagrant acts of injustice and oppression.” To hammer home the argument about German foreign rule and colonial policies, this document also included a detailed recounting of Prussia’s policies of settlement and discrimination against its Polish minority and a tabular calculation of the Colonization Commission’s expenses throughout its years of operation.⁵⁰¹

In the context of the postwar crisis in colonial legitimacy, the Polish argument that Germany had colonized Polish lands and subjected the Polish population to an essentially colonial rule served the purposes of the Polish delegation well. But taken out of the specific context of the early 1920s and brought backwards, what should historians make of such claims about the colonial nature of Prussia’s strategies of rule in its majority-Polish border region before WWI? What are the broader implications of taking colonization seriously as a social process? How can this perspective enrich our understanding of German and German-Polish history?

This study traced the administrative practices and social dynamics of imperial settlement in the German-Polish borderlands before World War I. By bringing in new populations and

⁵⁰¹ The Polish Delegation to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, 24.1.1922. LON Secretariat files, C.110 (b) M.64 (a) 1922.I (unpaginated), fols. 68ff. For settlers’ complaints to the League of Nations about their treatment under the minority regime, which were often collected and approved by the German foreign office in advance, see the files under LON R1640/41/6180. On interwar German minority politics in Poland see Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland*.

interlocking them in a web of legal and economic dependencies, the Prussian state sought to shift the ethnic composition and reshape the political loyalties in an area that was home for about three-quarters of its three million Catholic Polish-speaking citizens. Starting as a political compromise between the Prussian government and the main political parties in the Prussian parliament in 1886, the policy of settlement became a pivotal strategy for buttressing Prussian-German imperial authority. It also became a central arena in which the definitions and implications of Germanization in the Prussian-German empire were negotiated, as the state undertook a range of interventions in the society, economy, and landscape of the border region.

The wide-ranging social transformation that the Colonization Commission had set in motion involved a large and unexpected variety of historical actors from across Imperial Germany, who sought to use the opportunities offered by settlement for their own purposes. Such actors included municipal welfare authorities, working-class children and their families in western Germany, and Pietist villagers from Württemberg, among others. Their involvement in settlement often deviated from and even undermined official policy. At times, they could even bring about a reorientation of the commission's practices. By foregrounding the extent to which colonization in the imperial border region involved active, empire-wide participation of numerous individuals, families, and institutions, the dissertation contributes to a broader re-centering of the Polish provinces of Prussia in the historiography of Imperial Germany.

Across its five chapters, the dissertation demonstrated how empire-making and nation-making coalesced at the intersection of settlement as a state project and a social process. In order to understand the state's strategic choices and their effects on social reality, the dissertation analyzed the social dynamics of settlement through three main entry points: recruitment and migration, the spatial organization of social life, and the provision of labor. By tracing these

themes and their intersections throughout the dissertation, a range of modalities of power comes into view. These modalities emerged out of the interplay between the local, regional, and imperial and were central sites in which the terms of social production and reproduction of a German settler-society in Polish Prussia were negotiated.

Prussia's strategies for ruling its Polish border region transformed significantly after 1871, as political elites increasingly saw loyalty to the state and to the German nation in the imperial border region as inextricable. In the 1880s and 1890s, the Prussian state and its Colonization Commission set out to construct an imperial frontier of bureaucratic settlement in Polish Prussia by appropriating land, planning villages, bringing in German farmers and workers, and instituting long-term relationships of dependency based on a form of tenure that tied settlers to the land. By studying the interplay between the new imperial strategy of Germanization through colonization and the complex social dynamics of settlement, the dissertation showed how Prussia's settlement policies relied on, and were often hindered by, already-existing political structures in the region and across Germany's continental empire. In order to recruit German-speaking farmers and workers for the emerging imperial frontier, the Colonization Commission turned to state agencies, municipal authorities, nationalist pressure groups, political entrepreneurs, semi-private initiatives, and local elites, and also established new organizations. These connections allowed a range of social actors to participate and partially shape both the conditions of settlement and the policies of the state.

Long-established structures of imperial domination in Prussia's eastern provinces, in particular the administrative and policing powers of estate owners, were fundamental to the activities of the Colonization Commission. The commission delegated these powers to its estate managers, who acted as its political representatives. They were expected to manage the process of

settlement and to promote the commission's Germanizing agenda. Even the centralization of planning and of farm design was, in fact, dependent on the use of the economic and administrative powers of estate managers. These duties were often at odds with the divergent economic and administrative goals of running estates efficiently, preparing them for settlement, and watching over settlers' economic and political decisions. Moreover, over the long run, the commission was undercutting the persistence of estates as state-administrative units in the border region by transforming many of them into village communities. The role of the commission's estate managers remains a gap in the historiography and local studies would be essential to reveal more about it. Although this dissertation has only started to address this issue, it seems clear that in order to carry out the colonization and Germanization of its border region, the commission's activities supplanted some of the political structures of administration on which it relied for transforming estates into villages and exercising its supervision of settlers. This was one aim of the "internal colonization" promoted by social reformers, the National-Liberal party, and public intellectuals such as Gustav Schmoller. But neither Schmoller nor the Colonization Commission wanted to leave the Germanization of the border region to village communities. Other forms of supervision and control, including intervening in the labor market and supplying German workers to settler families, became important as more settler villages were established.

The creation of a bureaucratic frontier for the settlement of farmers from the imperial heartland was part of a broader imperial project of German nation-making, with all its ambivalences and internal contradictions. During the three decades before 1914, an increasingly elaborate and yet persistently nebulous meaning of Germanness was developed to articulate difference and loyalty to the state in the imperial border region. Both the political legitimation for settlement and the relationship between settlers and the state were infused with a national

vocabulary. Nevertheless, the Prussian Colonization Commission utilized elaborate differentiations among those it considered to be Germans as a central strategy of administrative control. Thus, class difference between workers and farmers, cultural and economic differences between Germans from different regions inside and outside of Imperial Germany, and the differences between “good” and “bad” children were all translated to cultural-racial hierarchies. Such hierarchies informed administrative procedures, were materialized in the built environment, and both motivated and justified the differential allocation of land, housing, and other resources to diverse kinds of Germans.

The contradictions between economic and national principles in the commission’s activities became palpable during the 1890s around the issue of labor. While the commission shifted its policies at this time to actively promote the separation of Poles and Germans and the creation of German village communities, most available workers continued to be local Poles, often those who had already worked on the estates that the commission bought. Farmworkers were necessary not only for keeping the commission’s estates up and running and for transforming their infrastructure in line with settlement plans, but also for settlers’ farms, about 40% of which were large enough to required additional labor throughout the year, in addition to seasonal labor needs.⁵⁰² In this context, and against the backdrop of labor scarcity and a seasonal influx of hundreds of thousands of mostly Polish-speaking farmworkers from the Russian and Austrian empires into Prussia, the commission devised a range of methods to bring in new workers and to distribute them in its estates and villages. In tracing some of these often-experimental schemes across the dissertation, I sought to show how *strategic* they actually were,

⁵⁰² Based on the numbers given in the commission’s annual report for 1917, pp. 5324–5.

in the sense that they aimed to structure new social relationships in such a way that would make them institutionalized and reproducible.

By looking both at the local contexts and institutional networks that enabled the movement, supervision, and dislocation of children, the recruitment and migration of settler families, and the supply of workers, this study broadened the framework of analysis and brought together seemingly disparate historical actors and contexts to reveal a pan-imperial infrastructure of colonization. A truly empire-wide endeavor thus came into view, in which local actors and their interests and strategies were at times as important as the Prussian bureaucracy in shaping micro-level social relations and processes. The local village sources in Württemberg revealed how farmers' decision to migrate to Poznania around 1890 was embedded in intensely local histories of transgenerational family alliances, village politics, Pietist ferment, and a particular devotional landscape, and was but one of a number of migration possibilities that were available them. All of these, in turn, became resources for the collective negotiation of the terms of settlement with the Colonization Commission. Later in the decade, the commission increased its strategic use of planning and architectural design to determine more of the terms of settlement in advance. The commission designed farms and workers' dwellings to appeal to different social groups and classes and planned villages with the idea that settlers from different home regions would create a compact and ethnically exclusive communities. Unlike settler-farmers, however, workers' contracts with the commission were rent-based and did not include the transfer of ownership rights. The diverging life trajectories between time-limited housing for workers and a life-long placement for farmers were also materialized in the spatial organization of villages. Planning and architecture were administrative tools to channel different kinds of migrants to their assigned social roles and to cement and naturalize social hierarchies.

The integration of future prospects and life cycles of different social actors into the process of colonization was a matter of heightened contestation, as the different chapters of the dissertation demonstrated. This issue was brought out most forcefully by the provision of children to specific families of settlers and state employees by the Neuzedlitz institution, a scheme in which the prospect of a future transition from fostering to domestic work was pivotal. Families, municipalities, children, settlers, and the commission all had different and often competing expectations about children's life trajectories, employment outlooks, and the ways in which they would relate to the colonization project in the future. The provision of children to settler families by the Neuzedlitz institution was strategic both in the sense of securing a longer-term supply of labor and in the sense that it offered settler-families the option of training children for their full-time employment as domestic workers. As children and their families had different plans about the future, the commission needed the long-term collaboration of municipalities and the courts to ensure that children would stay in Polish Prussia at least until they finished school.

The embeddedness of children in systems of welfare and coercion and their attempts to assert their agency worked differently across distance and gave rise to new relationships of power, as children, families, and municipalities became connected to each other in new ways. While the scheme offered settler families both present and longer-term benefits in terms of the children's labor, it also gave the commission, the Neuzedlitz institution, and distant municipal welfare officials the power to take away children from settler families, displace them, and replace them with others. As children and their families tried to shape their own future and municipalities used their authority to decide which children would be sent to Polish Prussia and to oversee their treatment, a range of actors other than the commission achieved significant influence on the Germanization of Polish Prussia. Ultimately, it was parents' uproar, SPD protests, and the stakes

of municipal politics that threatened to unravel the child displacement project. By highlighting the transregional and pan-imperial character of colonization, this study contributes to a reorientation of accepted notions about core and periphery within Prussia and about the place of the Polish border region in Prussian and German history.

Strategies of Difference: Labor, Race, Family

The nexus of labor, family, and race is pivotal for our understanding of Prussia's Germanizing settlement project. The Colonization Commission sought at first to control families as units of social production and reproduction by excluding poorer applicants, planning villages that included different sizes of family farms, and listing detailed cultivation requirements in settlement contracts. It was not long, however, before the commission sought to shape settlers' households and to prevent the employment of Polish workers on settler farms. Distinguishing between desirable and less desirable people was not just about bringing in Germans or separating between Germans and Poles, however. In fact, Germanization turned out to involve a range of practices that defined and produced difference among Germans. Thus, German speakers from different parts of Imperial Germany or from Eastern Europe, of different confessions, age groups, genders, and classes, could expect different opportunities and spaces of negotiation, depending on their perceived contribution for the imperial settlement project.

Although the settlement of ethnic Germans in Polish Prussia is often portrayed in the scholarship as a policy of forceful homogenization, the Colonization Commission used various techniques to identify, solidify, and administer difference among Germans as well as Poles. One of the central problems that the commission had to solve was that its estates and settlers were not exempt from the general structure and local conditions of the labor market and therefore had to rely on local and migrant Polish workers. The commission utilized a range of legal tools and

institutional experiments to segregate the labor market on the local, village, and household level, ranging from the recruitment of workers across imperial bounds, through the construction of workers' housing on a large scale, to the importation of German-speaking children to work in settler households. Discerning between different kinds of Germans and their perceived usefulness for the colonization project was a central administrative strategy of colonization, and racialization was a key tool for managing difference.

Racialization was first and foremost a strategy that related to the institutionalization of the supply, brokerage, and management of labor. The migration of ethnic Germans from eastern Europe into the German empire was solicited by agencies of the Prussian state as an antidote to the enduring reliance on Polish labor. These "returnees" were imported into Polish Prussia as Germans, but once they arrived, they were usually placed as farmworkers in the commission's estates and villages. These Germans were seen by the commission as less capable and culturally inferior, and in the final analysis, less useful Germanizers. Their subservient position in the commission's hierarchy of Germanness was articulated in the commission's uncompromising instructions about labor management in its estates, which forbade Polish overseers to supervise these German workers to protect their precarious Germanness. Their inferior status in relation to farm-owning settler families was solidified by their marginalization in the commission's cultural and architectural project of *Heimat*-building.

Families proved to be at the heart of the settlement project and were the primary institution of social production and reproduction that the state, despite its attempts, never quite managed to control. The displacement of working-class children from their families in order to send them as labor to Poznan involved German working-class families who did not matter to the state and could therefore be taken apart, as well as other families on the imperial frontier

whose Germanness was a strategic asset that needed to be fortified by replacing Polish workers with German children. The development of architectural criteria for building settler farms and workers' cottages hinged on both real and imagined families, with a clear class hierarchy between them. The needs and wishes of prospective settler families needed to be accommodated to a certain extent – wives, as we saw, were earmarked by the commission as particularly prone to use their property rights to veto their husbands' intentions of settling in the border region. At the same time, designs for workers' dwellings were geared towards the creation of a particular division of labor in rural working families, in which wives were supposed to maintain the connection with the land if husbands had to work in industry. Families emerged in this study in surprising places: migrating families, Pietist families, families which the state sought to remake through architecture, fostering, and the removal of their children, and finally families who refused to accept separation from their children or insisted on negotiating the terms of their settlement with the Prussian state. As families tried in multiple ways to assert their right to shape their own future, they exposed the limits of the transformative capacity of the state.

Long Shadows of Colonization

The ultimate failure of the Colonization Commission and the unraveling of its prewar settlement policies in 1918 were not taken by Germany's political class as a sign of a wholly misguided policy. Quite the opposite, in fact. The aftermath of World War I seemed to justify Prussia's settlement policies and, moreover, to prove that they were not wide-ranging enough. Had there been more Germans in the border region, it was commonly argued, Germany would not have lost most of it to the newly created Poland. In the context of the ascendent nationalities politics and against the backdrop of Germany's political weakness after Versailles, German minorities beyond the borders of the Weimar State became a tool of expansionist politics to a

much greater extent than before 1914. If Weimar Germany was, as Philip Ther argues, the first German nation-state, its political class was to a large extent interested in revisionist empire-making in the name of the nation. For many on the radical right, Imperial Germany had fallen short of what it took to secure the eastern border region because it did not take more radical measures of expropriation and resettlement. The Pan-German League had already advocated such measures after Heinrich Claß took over its leadership in 1908, but they found little resonance before the war. During the war, visions of more radical Germanization that combined settlement of Germans from outside the empire with ethnic cleansing and expulsion of local populations were shaping military practices in *Ober Ost*.⁵⁰³

Finally, when Polish territory again came under German rule after 1939, the leaders of Nazi Germany undertook a large-scale Germanization that was conceived in opposition to the perceived failures of Wilhelmine “economic” policies of continental Germanization and imperial expansion overseas.⁵⁰⁴ And yet, when Nazi administrators set about composing the *Volkslist*, a list of members of the German *Volksgemeinschaft* in the formerly Polish territories annexed to the Third Reich, they used categories that evinced deep continuities with the Colonization Commission’s demands for loyalty from its settlers. Ranking and evaluating individuals’ claims for Germanness in the so-called “new Reich” was not done by the racial experts of the SS. Instead, socio-political categories of belonging that prioritized loyalty to the German

⁵⁰³ Ther, “Imperial Instead of National History”; On Claß and his worldview, see his influential anti-Jewish and anti-Polish pamphlet published under the pseudonym Daniel Frymann, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär'. Politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten* (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1912); On *Ober-Ost* see Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front*.

⁵⁰⁴ Sammartino, *Impossible Border*; Baranowski, *Nazi Empire*.

Volksgemeinschaft and the German state trumped “Arian” appearance or ancestry as a category of belonging. SS racial experts, however, had a free reign further to the east.⁵⁰⁵

The long shadows of colonialism have preoccupied German historians seeking to replace the dated *Sonderweg* thesis with more nuanced interpretations that integrate German history into wider transnational and global contexts. Some scholars have sought to contextualize the Holocaust as “colonial genocide” and argued that we need to look for its roots in Germany’s colonial genocides in its African colonies.⁵⁰⁶ Others argue that long-term interpretations of Nazi brutalities in Eastern Europe should take us through longer histories of German forms of rule of Eastern European peoples and territories, and either deny or assert the importance of colonialism in imagining and enacting domination.⁵⁰⁷

Common to most historians, however, is the focus on the particular angles in which German colonialism and imperialism cast their shadows over German and Slavophone Central and Eastern Europe. This dissertation points towards the outline of a different interpretation, which highlights the long shadows of colonization, not only in state policies and cultural

⁵⁰⁵ Gerhard Wolf, *Ideologie und Herrschaftsrationalität: Nationalsozialistische Germanisierungspolitik in Polen* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, HIS Verlag, 2012).

⁵⁰⁶ On this debate see Jürgen Zimmerer, *Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz. Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust* (Münster, 2011); “Von Windhuk nach Warschau. Die rassistische Privilegiengesellschaft in Deutsch-Südwestafrika – ein Modell mit Zukunft?” In: Frank Becker (ed.), *Rassenmischehen – Mischlinge – Rassentrennung. Zur Politik der Rasse im deutschen Kolonialreich* (Stuttgart 2004), pp. 97–123; the sharp critique by Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, “Der Holocaust als ‘kolonialer Genozid?’ Europäische Kolonialgewalt und nationalsozialistischer Vernichtungskrieg,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 33 (2007), pp. 439–466; and the nuanced discussion in Birthe Kundrus, “Colonialism, Imperialism, National Socialism: How Imperial was the Third Reich?” in Eley and Naranch (eds.), *German Colonialism in a Global Age*, pp. 330–446.

⁵⁰⁷ Winson Chu, Jesse Kauffman, and Michael Meng, “A Sonderweg through Eastern Europe? The Varieties of German Rule in Poland during the Two World Wars,” *German History* 31:3 (2013), pp. 318–344, argue against colonial continuities between forms of rule by Imperial Germany and the Third Reich in Eastern Europe, while Lerp, *Imperial Grenzräume*, Kopp, *Germany’s Wild East*, Nelson, “From Manitoba to Memel,” Baranowski, *Nazi Empire*, Mark Mazower, *Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), and Sammartino, *Impossible Border*, all suggest in different ways that colonialism and colonization was a model of imposing racialized national domination that shaped how the relationship between empire and nation were imagined.

representations of racialized otherness – which have hitherto been the focus of scholarship – but in concrete institutions and practices of settlement. Even though scholars in recent years have brought the colonial question to the forefront of historical debates on Germany’s nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the settlement in Polish Prussia remains a mere example of an already existing and rapidly radicalizing historical trajectory.⁵⁰⁸ When considered instead as a social process, a new understanding of the strategic choices that undergirded colonization emerges, which complicates clear divisions between core and periphery of German and German-Polish history and historiography. Instead of an arena for a struggle of nationalities or one of Imperial Germany’s main national “trouble spots,” the imperial construction of Polish Prussia as a bureaucratic frontier of settlement and its colonization were central to the ways in which Germanness was defined as an imperial project from the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth century.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁸ Cf. the synthesis in Baranowski, *Nazi Empire*.

⁵⁰⁹ Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs, 1871–1918: Studien zur Deutsche Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979[1970]).

Bibliography

Archives:

Baden-Württemberg State Archive, Stuttgart (Hauptstaatsarchiv, HStA Stuttgart):
Varnbüler Papers

Berlin State Archive (Landesarchiv Berlin)
Preussische Bau- und Finanzdirektion (A Pr. Br. Rep. 042)
Polizeipräsidentium Berlin (A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-04)

Düsseldorf Municipal Archive (Stadtarchiv Düsseldorf)
Stadtverwaltung

German Federal Archives, Koblenz (Bundesarchiv, BA-Koblenz):
Hugenberg Papers

German Federal Archives, Berlin-Lichterfelde (Bundesarchiv, BA-Lichterfelde):
Christoph von Tiedemann Papers
Pan-German League Collection

Institute for Municipal History, Frankfurt am Main (Institut für Stadtgeschichte Frankfurt am Main, ISG-Frankfurt am Main):
Magistrat
Wohlfahrtsamt

Möglingen Town Archive:
Familienregister and pastoral reports (Möglingen Heimatverein Collection)
Inventuren und Teilungen

League of Nations Archive, Geneva (LON)
Secretariate
Minorities

Polish State Archives in Poznań (Archiwum Państwowe w Poznaniu, APP):
German Mittelstand Bank (Niemiecka Kasa Stanu Średniego w Poznaniu, Series 732)
Provincial Consistory in Posen/Poznań (Konsystorz Ewangelicki w Poznaniu, Series 893)
Municipal Records (Acta Miasta)

Polish State Archives in Poznań, Gniezno Branch (Archiwum Państwowe w Poznaniu, Oddział w Gnieźnie, APP-Gniezno):
Colonization Commission (Komisja Kolonizacja)
County Commissioner in Witkowo
County School Inspectorate in Witkowo

Polish State Archives in Koszalin (Archiwum Państwowe w Koszalinie):
County Commissioner in Flatow

Prussian State Archives, Berlin-Dahlem (Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, GStA
PK):

Agricultural Ministry (I. HA Rep. 87B)
Colonization Commission (I. HA Rep. 212)
General Directorate of the Archive (I. HA Rep. 178)
Prussian Ministry of State (I. HA Rep. 90A)
Interior Ministry (I. HA Rep. 77)
Education Ministry (I. HA Rep. 76)
Regional Administration in Bromberg/Bydgoszcz (XVI. HA Rep. 30)

University Archive, Hannover
Students Registry

Polish National Library, Warsaw: Cartography Collection

Berlin State Library (Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin): Cartography Collection

Published Sources:

Serial Publication of Laws:

Bundesgesetzblatt des Norddeutschen Bundes
Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt
Königlich-Württembergisches Staats- und Regierungs-Blatt
Preussische Gesetzsammlung

Newspapers and serial publications:

Annual Reports of the Royal Prussian Colonization Commission (Königliche
Ansiedlungskommission, *Denkschriften über die Ausführung des Gesetzes, betreffend die
Beförderung deutscher Ansiedlungen in den Provinzen Westpreußen und Posen*, 1886-
1920)
Alldeutsche Blätter
Archiv für innere Kolonisation (AfIK)
Deutsche Bauzeitung
Das Centralblatt der Bauverwaltung
Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration
Möglingen Heimatglocken (Möglingen Heimatverein Collection)
Posener Tageblatt
Schwäbische Merkur

Aal, Arthur. *Das preussische Rentengut, seine Vorgeschichte und seine Gestaltung in
Gesetzgebung und Praxis* (Stuttgart, 1901).

- Aereboe, Friedrich. *Allgemeine landwirtschaftliche Betriebslehre* (Berlin: Paul Parey, 1920 [1917]).
- Aigner, Anita. “Von ‘architektonischer Moderne’ zu ‘Architektur in der Modern’: kulturelle Grenzüberschreitungen,” in idem (ed.), *Vernakulare Moderne, Grenzüberschreitungen in der Architektur um 1900. Das Bauernhaus und seine Aneignung* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010), pp. 7–36.
- Aldenhoff, Rita. “Meitzen, August,” in *Neue Deutsche Biographie* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1990), vol. 16, pp. 734–735.
- Algazi, Gadi. “Forget Memory: Some Critical Remarks on Memory, Forgetting and History” in Sebastian Scholz, Gerald Schwedler, and Kai-Michael Sprenger (eds.), *Damnatio in Memoria: Deformation und Gegenkonstruktionen von Geschichte*, (Vienna, Cologne and Weimer: Böhlau, 2014), pp. 25–34.
- Althammer, Beata, Lutz Rephael, and Tamara Stacic-Wendt. *Rescuing the Vulnerable: Poverty, Welfare, and Social Ties in Modern Europe* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2016).
- Am Ende, Hans. *Das feuersichere Strohdach: Protokoll der Brandprobe in Worpsswede und Beschreibung der Herstellung des Daches* (Hamburg: Drexel & Adler, 1908).
- Ames, Eric, Marcia Klotz, and Lora Wildenthal (eds.). *Germany's Colonial Pasts* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2005).
- Anhorn, Roland. *Sozialstruktur und Disziplinarindividuum: zu Johann Hinrich Wicherns Fürsorge- und Erziehungskonzeption des Rauhen Hauses* (Frankfurt am Main: Hänssel-Hohenhausen, 1992).
- Applegate, Celia. *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
- . “Senses of Place,” in Helmut Walser Smith (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 50–70.
- Aronova, Elena, Christine von Oertzen, and David Sepkoski (eds.). *Data Histories, Osiris 32* (2017).

Bade, Klaus J. *Land oder Arbeit? Transnationale und interne Migration im deutschen Nordosten vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Osnabrück, 1979).

———. “Massenwanderung und Arbeitsmarkt im deutschen Nordosten von 1880 bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg: überseeische Auswanderung, interne Abwanderung und kontinentale Zuwanderung,” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 20 (1980), pp. 265-32.

———. *Migration in European History*, translated by Allison Brown (Blackwell 2003).

Balibar, Etienne. “Is There a ‘Neo-Racism’?” in idem and Immanuel Wallerstein, translated by Chris Turner, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London: Verso, 1999), pp 17–28.

Balzer, Brigitte. *Die preussische Polenpolitik 1894-1908 und die Haltung der deutschen Konservativen und Liberalen Parteien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Provinz Posen* (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 1990).

Baranowski, Shelley. *Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Baumgarten, Steffan. *Die Entstehung des Unehelichenrechts im Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch* (Köln: Böhlau 2007).

Becker, Peter and William Clark. *Little Tools of Knowledge: Historical Essays on Academic and Bureaucratic Practices* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).

Beheim-Schwarzbach, Max. “Die Ansiedler Friedrichs des Großen – ein Wink für die Gegenwart,” *Preussische Jahrbücher* 57 (1886), pp. 574-583.

Bergmann, Klaus. *Agrarromantik und Großstadtfeindschaft* (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1970).

Bissinger Heimatbuch (Bietigheim: Gläser und Kümmerle, 1955).

Bitner-Nowak, Anna. “Wohnungspolitik und Wohnverhältnisse in Posen in den Jahren 1900–1939,” in: Alena Janatková and Hanna Kozińska-Witt (eds.), *Wohnen in der Großstadt 1900-1939. Wohnsituation und Modernisierung im europäischen Vergleich* (Stuttgart, 2006), pp. 151–177.

Bittel, Carla, Elaine Leong and Christine von Oertzen (eds.). *Working with Paper: Gendered Practices in the History of Knowledge* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press 2019).

Bjork, James. *Neither German Nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008).

———. “Church Fights: Nationality, Class, and the Politics of Church-Building in a German–Polish Borderland, 1890–1914,” in Paul Readman, et al. (eds.), *Borderlands in World History, 1700-1914* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 192–213.

Blackbourn, David. “Germans Abroad and ‘Auslandsdeutsche’: Places, Networks and Experiences from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 41:2 (2015), pp. 321-346.

———. *The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany* (London and New York: Norton, 2006),

Boentert, Annika. *Kinderarbeit im Kaiserreich 1871-1914* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007).

Bolz, Cedric. “Constructing Heimat in the Ruhr Valley: Krupp Housing and the Search for the Ideal German Home 1914-1931,” *German Studies Review* 34:1 (2011), pp.17-43.

Boucher, Ellen. *Empire’s Children: Child Emigration, Welfare, and the Decline of the British World, 1869-1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

Bożek, Andrzej. *Niemcy zagraniczni w polityce kolonizacji pruskich prowincji wschodnich 1886–1918* (Poznań 1989).

Bretschneider, Falk. “Menschen im Zuchthaus. Institutionelle Stabilisierung von Herrschaft durch soziale Praxis. Das Beispiel Sachsen,” *Historische Anthropologie* 15:2 (2007) [=Themenschwerpunkt “Gehorsam,” eds. Alf Lüdtkke and Michael Wildt], pp. 164-194.

Bullock, Nicholas and James Read. *The Housing Reform Movement in Germany and France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

- Burbank, Jane. "An Imperial Rights Regime: Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire," *Kritika* 7.3 (2006), pp. 397-431.
- Buske, Sybille. *Fräulein Mutter und ihr Bastard: Eine Geschichte der Unehrllichkeit in Deutschland, 1900-1970* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004).
- Broszat, Martin. *Zweihundert Jahre deutsche Polenpolitik* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1972 [1963]).
- Bruchhold-Wahl, Hannelore. "Die Krise des Grossgrundbesitzes und die Güterankäufe der Ansiedlungskommission in der Provinz Posen, in den Jahren 1886-1898" (PhD diss., University of Münster, 1980).
- Cahn, Wilhelm. *Das Reichsgesetz über die Erwerbung und den Verlust der Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeit vom 1. Juni 1870*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Guttentag, 1896).
- Canning, Kathleen. "Class vs. Citizenship: Keywords in German Gender History," *Central European History* 37:2 (2004), pp. 225–244.
- . "Reflections on the Vocabulary of Citizenship in Twentieth-Century Germany" in Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski, *Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 214–32.
- Central-Ausschuss für die Innere Mission. *Handbuch der Inneren Mission: Die Organization der Inneren Mission der deutschen evangelischen Kirche* [=Handbuch der Inneren Mission, vol. 1], (Berlin-Spandau: Wichern, 1929).
- Chickering, Roger. *We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League 1886-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984).
- Clark, Vincent. "A Struggle for Existence: The Professionalization of German Architects," in: Konrad Jarausch and Geoffrey Cocks (eds.), *German Professions 1800-1950* (Oxford University Press, 1990) pp. 143-162.
- Confino, Alon. *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

Conrad, Sebastian. Translated by Sorchá O'Hagen. *Globalization and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

——— and Philipp Ther. "On the Move: Mobility, Migration, and Nation, 1880–1948," in Helmut Walser Smith (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 573–591.

———. Translated by Sorchá O'Hagen. *German Colonialism: A Short History* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012 [2008]), pp. 153–168.

Cooper, Frederick. and Jane Burbank, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2010).

Coy, Jason, Jared Poley and Alexander Schunka. *Migrations in the German Lands, 1500–2000* (New York: Berghahn 2016).

Cupers, Kenny. "Bodenständigkeit: the environmental epistemology of modernism," *The Journal of Architecture*, 21:8 (2016), pp. 1226–1252.

———. "The Invention of Indigenous Architecture," in Irene Cheng, Charles L. Davis II, and Mabel O. Wilson (eds.), *Race and Modern Architecture* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2020), pp. 187–199.

Curtis, William J. R. *Modern Architecture since 1900* (Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1982).

Davies, Norman. *God's Playground: A History of Poland* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

Dernburg, Heinrich. *Vormundschaftsrecht der preußischen Monarchie nach der Vormundschaftsordnung vom 5. Juli 1875* [3., wesentl. veränd. Aufl., Bearb. von Max Schultzenstein] (Berlin, 1886).

Dickinson, Edward Ross. *The Politics of German Child Welfare from the Empire to the Federal Republic* (Harvard University Press, 1996).

———. "Citizenship, Vocational Training, and Reaction: Continuation Schooling and the Prussian 'Youth Cultivation' Decree of 1911," *European History Quarterly* 29:1 (1999), pp. 109–147.

- . “‘Until the Stubborn Will is Broken’: Crisis and Reform in Prussian Reformatory Education, 1900–34,” *European History Quarterly* 32:2 (2002), pp. 161–206.
- Donson, Andrew. *Youth in the Fatherless Land: War Pedagogy, Nationalism, and Authority in Germany, 1914–1918* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010).
- Drummond, Elizabeth. “‘Durch Liebe stark, deutsch bis ins Mark:’ Weiblicher Kulturimperialismus und der Deutsche Frauenverein für die Ostmarken,” in Ute Fervert (ed.), *Nation, Politik, und Geschichte: Frauenbewegung und Nationalismus in der Modern* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2000), pp. 147–164.
- . “Protecting Poznan: Germans, Poles, and the Conflict over National Identity, 1886–1914.” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2004).
- . “In and Out of the Ostmark Migration, Settlement, and Demographics in Poznan, 1871–1918,” *Itinerario* 37 (2013), pp. 73–86.
- Dyroff, Stefan. “Die bauliche Tätigkeit der Königlich-Preußischen Ansiedlungskommission für Posen und Westpreußen. Versuch einer Einführung am Beispiel des Gutsbezirks Rojewo,” in: Pusback, Birte and Jan Skuratowicz (eds.), *Landgüter in den Regionen des gemeinsamen Kulturerbes von Deutschen und Polen. Entstehung, Verfall und Bewahrung. Beiträge der 12. Tagung des Arbeitskreises deutscher und polnischer Kunsthistoriker und Denkmalpfleger in Będlewo, 30. September–4. Oktober 2005* (Warsaw, 2007), pp. 193–206.
- Eberstadt, Rudolf. *Handbuch des Wohnungswesens und der Wohnungsfrage*, 4th ed. (Jena: Fischer, 1920 [1909]),
- Eddie, Scott McNeil. “The Prussian Settlement Commission and Its Activities in the Land Market, 1886–1918.” in Robert L. Nelson, *Germans, Poland, and Colonial Expansion to the East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 39–63
- Eley, Geoff. *Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change After Bismarck* (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1980).
- . “Making a Place in the Nation: The Meanings of ‘Citizenship’ in Wilhelmine Germany,” in idem and James Retallack, eds., *Wilhelminism and its Legacies: German Modernities, Imperialism, and the Meaning of Reform, 1890–1930* (New York: Berghahn, 2003), pp. 16–33.

- . “Some General Thoughts on Citizenship in Germany” in Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski, eds., *Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 233–248.
- . “Empire by Land or Sea: Germany's Imperial Imaginary, 1840–1945,” in: Bradley Naranch and Geoff Eley (eds.) *German Colonialism in a Global Age* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), pp. 19-45.
- Engel, Ernst. “Über die moderne Wohnungsnot,” in Verhandlungen der Eisenacher Versammlung zur Besprechung der socialen Frage am 6. und 7. Oktober 1872 (Leipzig, 1873), pp.164–177.
- Fahrmeir, Andreas. “Nineteenth-Century German Citizenships: A Reconsideration,” *The Historical Journal* 40:3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 721-752.
- Fehlemann, Silke. Armutrisiko Mutterschaft: Mütter- und Säuglingsfürsorge im Deutschen Reich 1890-1924 (PhD diss., Düsseldorf University, 2004).
- Fischer, Fritz. *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967).
- Fischer, Paul. *Ansiedlungsbauten in den Provinzen Posen und Westpreußen* (1904).
- . “Landschaftsbild und Ansiedlung,” In: Georg Minde-Pouet (ed.), *Fünfundzwanzig Jahre Ansiedlung. Zum 25. Jahrestage der Königlichen Ansiedlungs-Kommission für Westpreußen und Posen 1886-1911* (Lissa: Oskar Eulitz 1911).
- . “Kleinsiedlungsdorf,” *Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration* 1911/1912, pp. 259–262
- . “Fragen über das Bauwesen,” *Archiv für Innere Kolonisation* IV (1912), pp. 556–558.
- . “Das Haus des Landarbeiters,” in Johannes Altenrath (ed.), *Neuzeitliche Baupflege: ein Handbuch für die Bauberatung und die öffentliche Förderung der Bauweise im Auftrage des Hauptausschusses für Bauberatung* (Berlin: Heymann, 1914), pp. 107–132.
- . “Die Maßnahmen der Staatsregierung für den Wiederaufbau Ostpreußens,” *Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung* 46 (9.6.1915).

- . *Zur Förderung des Kleinsiedlungswesens. Aufgestellt im Auftrage des Herrn Ministers für Landwirtschaft, Domänen und Forsten* [=Schriften zur Förderung der innere Kolonisation 24/25] (1918 [1916])
- . and Gerhard Jobst. *Ländliches Bauwesen* (1921[1919]).
- Flemming, Jens. “Fremdheit und Ausbeutung. Großgrundbesitz, ‘Leutenot’ und Wanderarbeiter im Wilhelminischen Deutschland,” in: Heinz Reif (ed.) *Ostelbische Agrargesellschaft im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1994), pp. 346-360.
- Frank, Hartmut. “Heimatschutz und typologisches Entwerfen. Modernisierung und Tradition beim Wiederaufbau von Ostpreußen 1915-1927,” in: Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani and Romana Schneider (eds.), *Moderne Architektur in Deutschland 1900 bis 1950: Reform und Tradition* (Stuttgart: Verlag Gerd Hatje 1992), pp. 105-132.
- and H.S. Jones. “Space and belonging in modern Europe: citizenship(s) in localities, regions, and states” *European Review of History/Revue européenne d’histoire* 15:3 (2008), pp. 243-253
- Friedrich, Karin. “Introduction: Citizenship and Identity in an Early Modern Commonwealth,” in Karin Friedrich and Barbara M. Pendzich (eds.) *Citizenship and Identity in a Multinational Commonwealth: Poland–Lithuania in Context, 1550–1772* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009), pp. 1-18.
- . *The Other Prussia: Royal Prussia, Poland and Liberty, 1569-1772* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
- Friedrichsmeyer, Sara, Sara Lennox, Susanne Zantop (eds.). *The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999);
- Gammerl, Benno. Translated by Jennifer Walcoff Neuheiser, *Subjects, Citizens, and Others: Administering Ethnic Heterogeneity in the British and Habsburg Empires, 1867-1918* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books 2018 [2010]).
- Gawryszewski, Andrzej. *Polskie mapy narodowościowe, wyznaniowe i językowe : bibliografia (lata 1827-1967)* [=Dokumentacja Geograficzna 1969 vol. 4, IG PAN] (Warsaw: Geographic Institute of the Polish Academy of Science, 1969).

- Geiss, Imanuel. *Der polnische Grenzstreifen, 1914–1918. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Kriegszielpolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Lübeck: Matthiesen, 1960).
- Gesetz über die Fürsorgeerziehung Minderjähriger vom 2. Juli 1900: nebst den ministeriellen Ausführungsbestimmungen und den für die Provinz Westfalen geltenden besonderen Vorschriften und Grundsätzen* (Münster: Krick, 1901).
- Gierke, Otto. “Grundzüge des deutschen Privatrechts,” in *Encyklopädie der Rechtswissenschaft*, 6th edition (Berlin and Leipzig, 1904), vol. 1, pp. 431–559
- Gißibl, Bernhard. *The Nature of German Imperialism. Conservation and the Politics of Wildlife in colonial East Africa* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2016).
- Gleixner, Ulrike. “Zwischen göttlicher und weltlicher Ordnung: Die Ehe im lutherischen Pietismus,” *Pietismus und Neuzeit. Ein Jahrbuch zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantismus* 28 (2002) pp. 147-184.
- Goecke, Theodore. “Der Bebauungsplan in Stadt und Land,” *Der Städtebau* 11 (1914).
- Gorman, Daniel. *Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).
- Gosewinkel, Dieter. “Rückwirkungen des kolonialen Rasserechts? Deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit zwischen Rassestaat und Rechtsstaat,” in Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), *Das Kaiserreich transnational* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), pp. 236-256
- . *Einbürgern und Ausschließen: die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001).
- . “Eigentum vor nationalen Grenzen: Zur Entwicklung von Eigentumsrecht und Staatsangehörigkeit in Deutschland während des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts,” in: Hannes Siegrist and David Sugarman (eds.) *Eigentum im internationalen Vergleich: 18.–20. Jahrhundert* [Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, Band 130] (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1999), pp. 87-108.

- Green, Abigail. *Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- Grenzmer, Stefan. *Die Landgemeindeordnung für die Sieben östlichen Provinzen der Monarchie vom 3. Juli 1891, nebst dem Zweckverbandsgesetze vom 19. Juli 1911*, 5th Edition (Berlin 1914 [1892]).
- Grossmann, Friedrich. *Der Boden und die landwirthschaftlichen Verhältnisse des Preussischen Staates*, vol. 6 (Berlin, 1901).
- Grzeszczuk-Brendel, Hanna. "Anders wohnen - private und nationale Traditionen im Wohnungsbauwesen in Posen (Poznań) im zeitlichen Umfeld des Ersten Weltkriegs," in: Robert Born (ed.), *Visuelle Erinnerungskulturen und Geschichtskonstruktionen in Deutschland und Polen 1800 bis 1939* (Warsaw 2006), pp. 369-379
- . "Die Architektur der Posener Ausstellungen 1911 und 1929," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 58 (2009), pp. 78-110.
- . "Das Villen-Miethaus in Posen: Eine neue Vorstellung von Wohnung und Stadt" in Alena Janatková and Hanna Kozińska-Witt, *Wohnen in der Großstadt 1900–1939: Wohnsituation und Modernisierung im europäischen Vergleich* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2006), pp. 379–390
- Guratzsch, Dankwart. *Macht durch Organisation: die Grundlegung Hugenbergschen Presseimperiums* (Gütersloh : Bertelsmann, 1974).
- Haebich, Anna. *Broken Circles: Fragmenting Indigenous Families, 1800–2000* (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 2000).
- Harris, Teresa Marie. "The German Garden City Movement: Architecture, Politics and Urban Transformation, 1902–1931." (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2012).
- Hagen, William W. "National Solidarity and Organic Work in Prussian Poland, 1815-1914." *The Journal of Modern History* 44: 1 (1972), pp. 38-64.
- . *Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772-1914* (University of Chicago Press, 1980).

- . *Ordinary Prussians: Brandenburg Junkers and Villagers, 1500-1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- Hansen, Eckhard and Tennstedt, Florian (eds.). *Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte der deutschen Sozialpolitik 1871 bis 1945* vol. 1 (Kassel University Press, 2010), pp. 47-48 (Flesch), and pp. 113-114 (Münsterberg).
- Hansen, Jason D. *Mapping the Germans: Statistical Science, Cartography, and the Visualization of the German Nation, 1848–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
- Harnisch, Harmut. “August Meitzen und seine Bedeutung für die Agrar- und Siedlungsgeschichte,” *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 63:1 (1975), pp. 97–119.
- . *Kapitalistische Agrarreform und industrielle Revolution* (Weimar: Böhlau, 1984)
- . “Agrargeschichtsforschung und sozialpolitisches Engagement im deutschen Kaiserreich (Georg Friedrich Knapp),” *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1993), pp. 95-132.
- Hartmann, Heinrich. Translated by Ellen Yutzy Glebe, *The Body Populace: Military Statistics and Demography in Europe before the First World War* (Boston: MIT Press, 2019).
- Harwood, Jonathan. *Europe’s Green Revolution and Others Since: The Rise and Fall of Peasant-Friendly Plant-Breeding* (Basingstock: Routledge, 2002)
- Hasse, Ernst. “Die Besiedlung des Ostens durch Entlassung der großen Städte” *Alldeutsche Blätter*, 29.9.1895.
- . *Nachrichten über die Familie Hasse und einige verwandte Familien* [3rd Edition] (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1903).
- Hauser, Julia. “Waisen gewinnen. Mission zwischen Programmatik und Praxis in der Erziehungsanstalt der Kaiserswerther Diakonissen in Beirut seit 1860,” *Werkstatt Geschichte* 57 (2011) pp. 9-30.

Henderson, Susan R. "Ernst May and the Campaign to Resettle the Countryside: Rural Housing in Silesia, 1919–1925," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 61:2 (2002), pp. 188–211.

Henning, Rudolf. *Das Deutsche Haus in Seiner Historischen Entwicklung* (Strasburg: Trübner, 1882).

Hering, Rainer. *Konstruierte Nation: Der Alldeutsche Verband, 1890 bis 1939* (Hamburg: Christians, 2003).

Herrmann, Ulrich. Der "Jüngling" und der "Jugendliche": Männliche Jugend im Spiegel polarisierender Wahrnehmungsmuster an der Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert in Deutschland." *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 11:2 (1985), pp. 205-216.

Hippel, Wolfgang von. *Auswanderung aus Süddeutschland: Studien zur württemburgerischen Auswanderung und Auswanderungspolitik im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1984).

Hirschman, Albert O. *Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

Historische Vorlesungsverzeichnisse der Universität Leipzig. Online Edition. Last Accessed August 1, 2020. <https://histvv.uni-leipzig.de/vv/>

Hitzer, Bettina. "Freizügigkeit als Reformergebnis und die Entwicklung von Arbeitsmärkten," in: Jochen Oltmer (ed.), *Handbuch Staat und Migration in Deutschland seit dem 17. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: De Gruyter), pp. 245-289.

Hochstadt, Steve. *Mobility and Modernity: Migration in Germany 1820–1989* (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1999).

Hofer, Sigrid. *Reformarchitektur 1900-1918: deutsche Baukünstler auf der Suche nach dem nationalen Stil* (Stuttgart, 2005).

Hofmann, Andreas. "Utopien der Nation: Landes- und Nationalausstellungen in Ostmitteleuropa vor und nach dem Erster Weltkrieg," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 58:1-2 (2009) pp. 6-32.

- Hofmann, Wolfgang. “Das Ansiedlungsgesetz von 1904 und die preußische Polenpolitik,” *Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands* 38 (1989), pp. 251-285.
- Hofmeister, Björn. “Between Monarchy and Dictatorship. Radical Nationalism and Social Mobilization of the Pan-German League, 1914–1939,” (PhD diss., University of Georgetown, 2012).
- Hohorst, Gerd, Jürgen Kocka, and Gerhard A. Ritter. *Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch: Materialien und Statistik des Kaiserreichs 1870–1914* (München: C.H. Beck, 1975).
- Holzbach, Heidrun. *Das “System Hugenberg”: die Organisation bürgerlicher Sammlungspolitik vor dem Aufstieg der NSDAP* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981).
- Huber, V. A. “Über innere Colonisation,” *Janus: Jahrbücher deutscher Gesinnung, Bildung und That* (1846), vol. 1:7-8, pp. 193–222; 225–255.
- Hugenberg, Alfred. *Innere Colonisation im Nordwesten Deutschlands* (Strasburg: Trübner, 1891).
- Hull, Isabel V. *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Cornell University Press, 2004).
- Hussain, Athar and Keith Tribe. *Marxism and the Agrarian Question* (London: Macmillan, 1981).
- Imort, Michael. “A Sylvan People: Wilhelmine Forestry and the Forest as a Symbol of Germandom,” in Thomas Lekan and Thomas Zeller (eds.), *Germany’s Nature: Cultural Landscapes and Environmental History* (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 2005), pp. 55–80.
- Isin, Engin F. and Turner Bryan S. (eds.) *Handbook of Citizenship Studies* (London: Sage, 2002).
- . “Performative Citizenship” In: Ayelet Shachar, Rainer Bauböck, Irene Bloemraad and Maarten Vink (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 500–523.

- Jackson Jr., James E. *Migration and Urbanization in the Ruhr Valley, 1821–1914* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1997).
- Jacóbczyk, Witold. “Der Deutsche Ostmarkenverein von 1900 bis 1914,” in Adam Galos, Felix-Heinrich Gentzen and Witold Jacóbczyk, *Die Hakatisten: Der Deutsche Ostmarkenverein, 1894–1934: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Ostpolitik des deutschen Imperialismus* (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1966), pp. 135–265.
- . *Pruska Komisja Osadnicza 1886-1919* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1976).
- Jacobs, Margaret D. *White Mother to a Dark Race : Settler Colonialism, Maternalism, and the Removal of Indigenous Children in the American West and Australia, 1880-1940* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009).
- Jaeger, Jens. “Colony as Heimat? The Formation of Colonial Identity in Germany around 1900,” *German History* 27:4 (2009), pp. 467–489.
- Jäger, Markus. *Conrad Wilhelm Hase (1818–1902): Architekt, Hochschullehrer, Konsistorialbaumeister, Denkmalpfleger* (Hannover: Imhof Verlag, 2019).
- Jakobi, Verena. “Heimatschutz und Bauerndorf: Zum planmäßigen Dorfbau im Deutschen Reich zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts,” 2 vols. (Dr.-Ing diss., Berlin Technical University, 2003).
- Jatzlauk, Manfred. “Diskussionen und Untersuchungen über die Agrarverhältnisse im Verein für Sozialpolitik in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in: Hainz Raif (ed.), *Ostelbische Agrargesellschaft im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik: Agrarkrise – junkerliche Interessenpolitik - Modernisierungsstrategien* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), pp. 51-72.
- Jenkins, Jennifer. *Provincial Modernity: Local Culture and Bourgeois Politics in Fin-de-Siècle Hamburg* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003)
- . “Heimat Art, Modernism, Modernity,” in David Blackbourn and James Retallack, *Localism, landscape, and the Ambiguities of Place: German-Speaking Central Europe, 1860–1930* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2007), pp. 60–75.

- Jones, Elizabeth B. *Gender and Rural Modernity: Farm Women and the Politics of Labor in Germany, 1871–1933* (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009).
- . “The Rural ‘Social Ladder’: Internal Colonization, Germanization and Civilizing Missions in the German Empire,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 40:4 (2014), pp. 457–492.
- . “Keeping Up with the Dutch: Internal Colonization and Rural Reform in Germany, 1800–1914,” *International Journal for History, Culture, and Modernity* 3:2 (2015), pp. 183–194.
- Judson, Pieter M. “When Is a Diaspora Not a Diaspora? Rethinking Nation-Centered Narratives About Germans in Habsburg East Central Europe,” in Christa O’Donnell, Renate Bridenthal, and Nancy Reagin (eds.), *The Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness* (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2005), pp. 219–247.
- . *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).
- . *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016).
- Kaak, Heinrich. *Die Gutsherrschaft: Theoriegeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Agrarwesen im ostelbischen Raum* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1991).
- Kannenberg, Michael. *Verschleierte Uhrtafeln: Endzeiterwartungen im württembergischen Pietismus zwischen 1818 und 1848* [Arbeiten zur Geschichte des Pietismus, vol. 52] (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007).
- Kanther, Michael A. and Petzina, Dietmar. *Victor Aimé Huber (1800-1869): Sozialreformer und Wegbreiter der sozialen Wohnungswirtschaft* [Schriften zur Genossenschaftswesen und zur Öffentlichen Wirtschaft 36] (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 2000).
- Kastort-Viehmänn, Renate. “Kleinhaus und Mietskaserne,” in Lutz Niethammer (ed.) *Wohnen im Wandel: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Alltags in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Wuppertal: Peter Hammer, 1979), pp. 271–291
- Kersting, Franz-Werner and Clemens Zimmermann. “Stadt-Land-Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert. Geschichts- und kulturwissenschaftliche Perspektiven” in Kersting and Zimmermann (eds.) *Stadt-Land-Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert : Geschichts- und*

- kulturwissenschaftliche Perspektiven* [Forschungen zur Regionalgeschichte, vol. 77] (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005), pp. 9–34.
- Klein, Ursula. *Experiments, Models, Paper Tools: Cultures of Organic Chemistry in the Nineteenth Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
- Kleßmann, Christoph, and Johannes Frackowiak. “Die Polenpolitik des Deutschen Kaiserreichs 1871-1918.” In: Johannes Frackowiak (ed.), *Nationalistische Politik und Ressentiments: Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), pp. 24-38.
- Knapp, Georg Friedrich. *Die Bauernbefreiung und der Ursprung der Landarbeiter in den älteren Theilen Preußens* (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1887).
- Kocka, Jürgen. *Arbeitsverhältnisse und Arbeiterexistenzen: Grundlagen der Klassenbildung im 19. Jahrhundert* (Bonn: Dietz, 1990).
- Koehne, Samuel. “Pietism as Societal Solution: The Foundation of the Korntal Brethren (*Korntaler Brüdergemeinde*).” In: Jonathan Strom (ed.), *Pietism and Community in Europe and North America, 1650-1850* (Leiden and Boston: Brill Academic, 2010), pp. 329–50.
- Kolditz, Gerald. “Hasse, Ernst Traugott Friedrich,” in Institut für Sächsische Geschichte und Volkskunde e.V (ed.), *Sächsische Biografie*. Online-Edition. Last Modified: August 4, 2020. <http://www.isgv.de/saebi/>.
- Kopp, Kristin. *Germany's Wild East: Constructing Poland as Colonial Space* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012).
- Kostyło, Joanna. “Commonwealth of All Faiths: Republican Myth and the Italian Diaspora in Sixteenth-Century Poland–Lithuania,” in Karin Friedrich and Barbara M. Pendzich (eds.) *Citizenship and Identity in a Multinational Commonwealth: Poland–Lithuania in Context, 1550–1772* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009), pp. 171-208.
- Krahte, Julius. *Verzeichnis der Kunstdenkmäler der Provinz Posen*, 4 vols. (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1896–1898).

- Krieg, Annah. "The Walls of the Confessions: Neo-Romanesque Architecture, Nationalism, and Religious Identity in the Kaiserreich" (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2010).
- Kulczycki, John J. *School Strikes in Prussian Poland 1901-1907: The Struggle over Bilingual Education* (Boulder Colo. : New York: East European Monographs, 1981).
- Kundrus, Birthe. "Weiblicher Kulturimperialismus. Die imperialistischen Frauenverbände des Kaiserreichs," in Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), pp. 213–235.
- Kühne, Thomas. *Dreiklassenwahlrecht und Wahlkultur in Preussen 1867-1914: Landtagswahlen zwischen korporativer Tradition und politischem Massenmarkt* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1994).
- Königliche Ansiedlungskommission. *Zwanzig Jahre deutscher Kulturarbeit* [=Denkschrift, Haus der Abgeordneten, 20. Legislaturperiode III. Session 1907, Drucksache 501] (Posen, 1907)
- Königliche statistisch-topographisches Bureau. *Beschreibung des Oberamts Ludwigsburg* (Stuttgart 1859).
- Labbé, Morgane. "Institutionalizing the Statistics of Nationality in Prussia in the 19th Century. From Local Bureaucracy to State-Level Census of Population." *Centaurus* 49:4 (2007): 289–306.
- Ladd, Brian. *Urban Planning and Civic Order in Germany, 1860–1914* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).
- Langewiesche, Dieter. *Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat in Deutschland und Europa* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2000).
- Lamberti, Marjorie. *State, Society, and the Elementary School in Imperial Germany* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)
- Langhans, Paul. *Deutscher Kolonial-Atlas* (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1897).

———. *Justus Perthes' Alldeutscher Atlas* (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1900).

Ledford, Kenneth F. "Formalizing the Rule of Law in Prussia: The Supreme Administrative Law Court, 1876-1914," *Central European History* 37:2 (2004), pp. 203-224.

Lees, Andrew. *Cities, Sin, And Social Reform In Imperial Germany* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002).

Lehmann, Hartmut. *Pietismus und weltliche Ordnung in Württemberg vom 17. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969).

———. "Die politische Widerstand gegen die Einführung des neuen Gesangbuches von 1791 in Württemberg: Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Kirchen und Sozialgeschichte," in idem, *Protestantische Weltsichten: Transformationen seit dem 17. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1998), pp. 49-68.

Lehmann, Jens. *Die Ehefrau und ihr Vermögen: Reformforderungen der bürgerlichen Frauenbewegung zum Ehegüterrecht um 1900* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2006).

Lekan, Thomas M. *Imagining the Nation in Nature: Landscape Preservation and German Identity, 1885-1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

———. "German Landscape: Local Promotion of the *Heimat* Abroad," in: Krista O'Donnell et al. (eds.), *The Heimat Abroad* (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2005).

Lenger, Friedrich. *European Cities in the Modern Era, 1850–1914* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012).

Leonhard, Rudolf. *Kornhäuser und Getreidehandel: ein Beitrag zur deutschen Agrarpolitik* (Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1906).

Lerp, Dörte. "Die Kolonialfrauenschulen in Witzenhausen und Bad Weilbach." (MA Thesis, Free University of Berlin, 2006).

———. *Imperiale Grenzräume. Bevölkerungspolitiken in Deutsch-Südwestafrika und den östlichen Provinzen Preußens 1884–1914* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2016).

- Liebersohn, Harry. *Religion and industrial society. The Protestant social congress in Wilhelmine Germany* [Transactions of the American Philosophical Association vol. 76, part 6] (Philadelphia, 1986).
- Lilienthal, Georg. "Max Taube. Ein Wegbereiter moderner Säuglings- und Jugendfürsorge," *Sozialpädiatrie in Praxis und Klinik* 8 (1986), pp. 476–80.
- Lindenberg, Karl. *Das preußische Gesinderecht im Geltungsbereiche der Gesindeordnung vom 8. Nov. 1810*. 5th Ed. (Berlin: H. W. Müller, 1900).
- Linton, Derek S. *'Who Has the Youth, Has the Future': The Campaign to Save Young Workers in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
- Liulevicius, Vejas G. *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
- Lutz, Raphael. "Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als methodische und konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22 (1996), pp. 165–93.
- . "Introduction: Poverty and Welfare in Modern German History: Recent Trends and New Perspectives in Current Research," in idem (ed.) *Poverty and Welfare in Modern German History* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2016), pp. 1-21.
- Maass, L. "Wirtschaftliche Frauenaufgaben in der inneren Kolonisation," *Archiv für Innere Kolonisation* 4:8 (1911/1912) pp. 410–416.
- Maciuika, John V. *Before the Bauhaus: Architecture, Politics and the German State, 1890-1920* (Cambridge University Press 2005).
- Manz, Stefan. *Constructing a German Diaspora: The "Greater German Empire" 1871-1918* (Oxford: Routledge, 2013).
- Marshall, T. H. *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973).
- McCabe, Jane. *Race, Tea and Colonial Resettlement: Imperial Families, Interrupted* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017).

- Meier, Ernst. "Engel, Ernst," in *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, Vol. 4 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1959).
- Meier, Hans-Rudolf and Spiegel, Daniela (eds.). *Kulturreformer. Rassenideologe. Hochschuldirektor: Der lange Schatten des Paul Schultze-Naumburg* (Heidelberg: arthistoricum.net 2018).
- Meitzen, August. *Der Boden und die landwirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse des preußischen Staats*. 4 vols. (Berlin: Wiegandt & Hempel, 1868–1873).
- Mertens, Eberhard. "Sombart, Anton Ludwig," in *Neue Deutsche Biographie* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010), vol. 24, p. 561.
- Miller, Alexie and Stefan Berger. "Introduction: Building Nations In and With Empires: A Reassessment," in idem (eds.), *Nationalizing Empires* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2014), pp. 1-30.
- Mitterauer, Michael. "Gesindedienst und Jugendphase im europäischen Vergleich," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 11:2 (1985) [Themenheft: Sozialgeschichte der Jugend], pp. 177-204.
- Modell, Judith. "Rights to the Children: Foster Care and Social Reproduction in Hawaii" in Sarah Franklin and Helena Ragoné (eds.) *Reproducing Reproduction: Kinship, Power, and Technological Innovation* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), pp. 156-172.
- Moltmann, Günter, (ed.) *Aufbruch nach Amerika: Friedrich List und die Auswanderung aus Baden und Württemberg 1816/17: Dokumentation einer Sozialen Bewegung* (Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1979).
- Mommsen, Wolfgang J. Translated by Michael S. Steinberg, *Max Weber and German Politics, 1890–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984 [1974, 1959]).
- Monhart, Michael. "Housing As Urban Planning in Germany, 1870-1940," *Central European History* 23:1 (1990), pp. 3-21.

- Mooser, Josef. "Preußische Agrarreformen, Bauern und Kapitalismus. Bemerkungen zu Hartmut Harnischs Buch 'Kapitalistische Agrarreform und industrielle Revolution,'" *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 18 (1992), pp. 533–554.
- Müller, Hans-Heinrich, "Domänen und Domänenpächter in Brandenburg-Preußen im 18. Jahrhundert," *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1965), pp. 152-192,
- . "Domänenpächter im 19. Jahrhundert" *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1989), pp. 123-137.
- . "Pächter und Güterdirektoren: Zur Rolle agrarwissenschaftlicher Intelligenzgruppen in der ostelbischen Landwirtschaft im Kaiserreich" in Heinz Reif (ed.) *Ostelbische Agrargesellschaft im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), pp. 267–286
- Müller, Michael G. *Die Teilungen Polens 1772, 1793, 1795* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1984).
- Müller, Uwe. "Wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen der Polenpolitik in der Zeit des Deutschen Kaiserreichs." In: Johannes Frackowiak (ed.), *Nationalistische Politik und Ressentiments: Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), pp. 39–62.
- Munding, K. (ed.) *V. A. Hubers Ausgewählte Schriften über Socialreform und Genossenschaftswesen* (Berlin: Pionier Verlag, 1894).
- Mundhenke, Herbert. *Die Matrikel der Höheren Gewerbeschule, der Polytechnischen Schule und der Technischen Hochschule zu Hannover* (Hildesheim 1988–1992).
- Murdoch, Lydia. *Imagined Orphans: Poor Families, Child Welfare, and Contested Citizenship in London* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2006)
- Naranch, Bradley. "Inventing the *Auslandsdeutsche*. Emigration, Colonial Fantasy, and German National Identity, 1848-1871, in: Eric Ames, Marcia Klotz, and Lora Wildenthal (eds.), *Germany's Colonial Pasts* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press 2005), pp. 21-40.
- Nathans, Eli. *The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: Ethnicity, Utility, and Nationalism* (Oxford: Berg, 2004).

Nelson, Robert L. *Germans, Poland, and Colonial Expansion to the East: 1850 through the Present* (New York: Palgrave Macmillen, 2009).

———. “From Manitoba to the Memel: Max Sering, inner colonization and the German East,” *Social History* 35:4 (November 2010), pp. 439-457.

———. “A German on the Prairies: Max Sering and Settler Colonialism in Canada,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 5:1 (January 2015), pp. 1–19.

———. “The Baltics as Colonial Playground: Germany in the East, 1914–1918,” *Journal of Baltic Studies* 42:1 (March 2011): pp. 9–19.

Neubach, Helmut. *Die Ausweisungen von Polen und Juden aus Preussen 1885/8. Ein Beitrag zu Bismarcks Polenpolitik und zur Geschichte des deutsch-polnischen Verhältnisses* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 1967).

Nichtweiß, Johannes. *Die ausländischen Saisonarbeiter in der Landwirtschaft der östlichen und mittleren Gebiete des Deutschen Reiches. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der preußisch-deutschen Politik von 1890 bis 1914* (Berlin-Ost, 1959).

Niendorf, Mathias. *Minderheiten an der Grenze: Deutsche und Polen in den Kreisen Flatow (Złotów) und Zempelburg (Sepólno Krajeńskie) 1900-1939* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997).

Niethammer, Lutz and Brüggemeier, Franz. “Wie wohnten Arbeiter im Kaiserreich?” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 16 (1976), pp. 61–134.

Niethammer, Lutz (ed.). *Wohnen im Wandel. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Alltags in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Wuppertal 1979).

———. “Ein Langer March durch die Institutionen: Zur Vorgeschichte des preußischen Wohnungsgesetzes von 1918,” in idem (ed.) *Wohnen in Wandel*, pp. 363–384.

Nipperdey, Thomas. *Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918*. 3 vols. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1994).

- Nolte, Paul. "Repräsentation und Grundbesitz: Die kreisständische Verfassung Preußens im 19. Jahrhundert," in Klaus Tenfelde and Hans-Ulrich Wehler (eds.), *Wege zur Geschichte des Bürgertums* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1994), pp. 78-104.
- Oberkrome, Willi. *Deutsche Heimat. Nationale Konzeption und regionale Praxis von Naturschutz, Landschaftsgestaltung und Kulturpolitik in Westfalen-Lippe und Thüringen 1900–1960* (Paderborn: Schoeningh, 2004).
- Oberwittler, Dietrich. *Von der Strafe zur Erziehung? Jugendkriminalpolitik in England und Deutschland 1850–1920* (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus, 2000).
- O'Donnell, Krista, Renate Bridenthal, and Nancy Ruth Reagin (eds). *The Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness, Social history, popular culture, and politics in Germany* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2005).
- Oertzen, Christine von. "Machineries of Data Power: Manual versus Mechanical Census Compilation in Nineteenth-Century Europe," *Osiris* 32 (2017), pp. 129–150.
- . "Die Historizität der Verdatung: Konzepte, Werkzeuge und Praktiken im 19. Jahrhundert" *N.T.M.* 25 (2017), pp. 407–434.
- Oltmer, Jochen. *Migration und Politik in der Weimarer Republik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005).
- . "The unspoilt nature of German ethnicity: Immigration and integration of 'ethnic Germans' in the German Empire and the Weimar Republic," *Nationalities Papers* 34:4 (2006), pp. 429–446.
- Omilanowska, Małgorzata. "Das Frühwerk von Walter Gropius in Hinterpommern," in Birte Pusback (ed.), *Landgüter in den Regionen des gemeinsamen Kulturerbes von Deutschen und Polen* (Warsaw: Instytut Sztuki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2007), pp. 133–149.
- O'Reilly, William. "Agenten, Werbung und Reisemodalitäten. Die Auswanderung ins Temscher Banat im 18. Jahrhundert," in Matthias Beer and Dittmar Dahmann (eds.) *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 1999), pp. 109–120.
- Osayimwese, Itohan. "Prolegomenon to an alternative genealogy of German modernism: German architects' encounters with world cultures c. 1900," *The Journal of Architecture* 18:6 (2013), pp. 835–874.

- Ostdeutsche Ausstellung für Industrie, Gewerbe und Landwirtschaft, Posen 1911: offizieller Katalog* (Verlag der Ausstellung, Druck der Ostdeutschen Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt: Posen, 1911).
- Osterhammel, Jürgen. *Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2002 [1995]).
- . Translated by Patrick Camiller, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*, (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2014 (2009)).
- Palmowski, Jan. *Urban Liberalism in Imperial Germany: Frankfurt Am Main, 1866–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- Parisius, Ludolf, and Crüger, Hans. *Das Reichsgesetz betreffend die Erwerbs- und Wirthschafts-Genossenschaften, May 1st, 1889: Kommentar zum praktischen Gebrauch für Juristen und Genossenschaften* (Berlin 1890).
- Pateman, Carol. *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
- Peukert, Detlev. *Grenzen der Sozialdisziplinierung: Aufstieg und Krise der Deutschen Jugendfürsorge von 1878 bis 1932* (Cologne: Bund-Verlag, 1986).
- Plotke, Emil. “Die Arbeiterkolonie Luisenhain bei Posen,” *Aus dem Posener Lande* 5:3 (1910), pp. 136-138.
- Poling, Kristin. “Shantytowns and Pioneers beyond the City Wall: Berlin's Urban Frontier in the Nineteenth Century,” *Central European History* 47:2 (June 2014), pp. 245–274.
- Pommer, Richard. “The Flat Roof: A Modernist Controversy in Germany,” *Art Journal* 43:2 (1983), pp. 158–169.
- Porter, Brian. *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
- Porter-Szücs, Brian. *Faith and fatherland: Catholicism, modernity, and Poland* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

- Przyrembel, Alexandra. "Der Missionar Johann Hinrich Wichern, die Sünde und das unabänderliche Elend der städtischen Unterschichten um 1850," *Werkstatt Geschichte* 57 (2011), pp. 53–67.
- Puhle, Hans-Jürgen. *Agrarische Interessenpolitik und Preussischer Konservatismus im Wilhelminischen Reich, 1893-1914. Ein Beitrag zur Analyse des Nationalismus in Deutschland am Beispiel des Bundes der Landwirte und der Deutsch-Konservativen Partei* (Hannover: Verlag für Literatur u. Zeitgeschehen, 1967).
- Raberg Frank. *Biographisches Handbuch der württembergischen Landtagsabgeordneten (1815-1933)* [Sonderveröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Württemberg] (Stuttgart, 2002).
- Rampley, Mathew. "Peasants in Vienna: Ethnographic Display and the 1873 World's Fair," *Austrian History Yearbook* 42 (2011), pp. 110–132.
- Real-Encyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, vol. 1 (Hamburg 1854) and vol. 8 (Leipzig 1881).
- Redensek, Jeannette. "Zur Rezeption des Bauernhauses durch die Architekten der Moderne in Deutschland um 1900," *Zeitschrift für Kulturwissenschaften* 11:1 (2017), pp. 49–72.
- Reick, Philipp. "Desire or Displacement? Working-Class Notions of Urban Belonging in Late-Nineteenth-Century Germany," *Journal of Urban History* 45:6 (2019), pp. 1193-1211.
- Rennstich, Karl. "Geschichte der protenstantischen Mission in Deutschland" in Ulrich Gäbler (ed.), *Der Pietismus im neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhundert [Geschichte des Pietismus, vol. 3]* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), pp. 308–320.
- Repp, Kevin. *Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity: Anti-Politics and the Search for Alternatives* (Cambridge, 2000).
- Riehl, Wilhelm Heinrich. *Die Familie [=Die Naturgeschichte des Volkes als Grundlage einer deutschen Social-Politik, vol. 3]* (Stuttgart, 1861).
- Rimpler, H. *Domänenpolitik und Grundeigentumsvertheilung vornehmlich in Preußen* (Berlin, 1888).

- Ristau, Bernd. "Adlige Interessenpolitik in Konjunktur und Krise: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der landschaftlichen Kreditkasse Ostpreußens 1788 bis 1835," in *Denkhorizonte und Handlungsspielräume: Historische Studien für Rudolf Vierhaus zum 70. Geburtstag* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1992), pp. 197-234.
- Roberts, Lissa. "Practicing oeconomy during the second half of the long eighteenth century: an introduction," *History and Technology* 30:3 (2004), pp. 133-148.
- Rogall, Joachim. *Die Geistlichkeit der Evangelisch-Unierten Kirche in der Provinz Posen 1871-1914 und ihr Verhältnis zur preussischen Polenpolitik* (Marburg/Lahn: Herder-Inst., 1990).
- Rollins, William. *A Greener Vision of Home: Cultural Politics and Environmental Reform in the German Heimatschutz Movement* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).
- Rosaldo, Renato. "Cultural citizenship, inequality, and multiculturalism," in: Rodolfo D. Torres, Louis F. Miron, and Jonathan Xavier Inda (eds.), *Race, Identity and Citizenship: A Reader* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 253–261.
- Roth, Dieter. *Empirische Wahlforschung: Ursprung, Theorien, Instrumente und Methoden* (Berlin: Springer, 1998).
- Rühle, Otto. "Die wirtschaftliche Lage der preussischen Volksschullehrer," *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, 1/1903, Januar 1903, pp. 71–77.
- Saalfeld, Dietrich. "Zur Frage des bäuerlichen Landverlust im Zusammenhang mit den preussischen Agrarreformen," *Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie* 11 (1963), pp. 163-171.
- Sabeau, David Warren. "Unehelichkeit: Ein Aspect sozialer Reproduktion kleinbäuerlicher Produzenten. Zu einer Analyse dörflicher Quellen um 1800," in: Berdahl, Lüdke, et al., *Klassen und Kultur: Sozialanthropologische Perspektiven in der Geschichtsschreibung* (Frankfurt a. M.: Syndikat, 1982), pp. 54-76.
- . *Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen, 1700–1870* (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

- . *Kinship in Neckarhausen, 1700–1870* (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
- Sachße, Christoph and Florian Tennstedt. *Geschichte der Armenfürsorge in Deutschland: Fürsorge und Wohlfahrtspflege 1871-1929* [Armenfürsorge in Deutschland, vol. 2] (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1988).
- . “Armenfürsorge, Soziale Fürsorge, Sozialarbeit,” in Christa Berg (ed.) *Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte, Vol. 4: 1870-1914* (Munich: Beck, 1991), pp. 411-440.
- Saldern, Adelheid von, *Häuserleben. Zur Geschichte städtischen Arbeiterwohnens vom Kaiserreich bis Heute* (Berlin: Dietz, 1997 [1995]).
- Sammartino, Annemarie H. *The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914-1922* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).
- Scheuerbrandt, Arnold. “Die Auswanderung aus dem heutigen Baden-Württemberg nach Preußen, in den habsburgischen Südosten, nach Rußland und Nordamerika zwischen 1683 und 1811” in *Historischer Atlas von Baden-Württemberg* (Stuttgart, 1972–1988), Section 12/5.
- Schimek, Michael. *Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit. Staatliche Einflussnahmen auf das ländliche Bauen: Das Land Oldenburg zwischen 1880–1930* (Waxmann Verlag GmbH, 2004).
- Schirpf, Michael. “Die Familie(n) Grimm in Bietigheim,” *Blätter zur Stadtgeschichte* 14, pp. 180-188.
- Schmid, Klaus. *Die Entstehung der güterrechtlichen Vorschriften im Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der sozialen Stellung der Frau* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1990)
- Schmidt, Heike. *Gefährliche und gefährdete Mädchen: Weibliche Devianz und die Anfänge der Zwangs- und Fürsorgeerziehung* (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2002).
- Schmoller, Gustav. “Die preußische Kolonisation des 17. und 18. Jahrhundert,” in Verein für Socialpolitik, *Zur Inneren Kolonisation in Deutschland: Erfahrungen und Vorschläge* (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1886), pp. 1-43.

———. “Der Kampf um die Freiheit des Bauernstandes,” *Jahrbücher für Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung* 12 (1888), pp. 245-255.

Schneider, Michael C. *Wissensproduktion im Staat: Das königlich preußische statistische Bureau 1860–1914* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 2013).

Schröder, Iris. “Der deutsche Berg in Afrika. Zur Geographie und Politik des Kilimandscharo im deutschen Kaiserreich,” *Historische Anthropologie* 13 (2005), pp. 19–44.

Schultze-Naumburg, Paul. *Dörfer und Kolonien* (Munich: Callwey, 1904).

Schülze, H. “Die Posener Landschaft nach ihrer Bodenbewachsung, Form und Besiedelung,” *Geographische Zeitschrift*, 22:4 (1916), pp. 182-199.

Schunka, Alexander. “No Return? From Temporary Exile to Permanent Immigration in the Early Modern Era,” in: Jason Coy, Jared Poley, and Alexander Schunka (eds.), *Migrations in the German Lands, 1500-2000* (New York: Berghahn, 2006), pp. 77-97.

Schutte, Christoph. *Die Königliche Akademie in Posen (1903–1919) und andere kulturelle Einrichtungen im Rahmen der Politik zur “Hebung des Deutschtums”* (Marburg: Herder Institut, 2008).

Schwartz, Fredric J. *The Werkbund: Design Theory and Mass Culture before the First World War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).

Schwochow, Hermann. *Die deutschen Ansiedlungen in der Provinz Posen nach ihrer geschichtl. Entwicklung u. ihrem gegenwärt. Stande mit besond. Berücks. d. Ansiedlungsdorfes Golenhofen* (Lissa: Oskar Eulitz, 1908).

Sering, Max. *Die innere Kolonisation im östlichen Deutschland* [Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik vol. 36] (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot 1893).

Serrier, Thomas. *Posen-Ostmark-Wielkopolska: Eine Grenzregion zwischen Deutschen und Polen 1848-1914* (Marburg, 2005).

Sheehan, James J. *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

- Smith, Helmut W. *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870-1914* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
- . “An Preußens Rändern oder: Die Welt, die dem Nationalismus verloren ging,” in Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), pp. 149-169.
- Smith, Wilson. “Old London, Old Edinburgh: Constructing Historic Cities” in: Marta Filipová (ed.) *Cultures of International Exhibitions 1840-1940: Great Exhibitions in the Margins* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 203-230.
- Sohnrey, Heinrich. *Eine Wanderfahrt durch die deutschen Ansiedlungsgebiete in Posen u. Westpreussen* (Berlin: Thomas Schoenfeldt, 1897).
- . *Bauernland: Ein Gespräch mit Vater Brinkhöfer über das Ansiedlungswesen in den Provinzen Posen und Westpreußen* (Berlin: Trowitzsch, 1897).
- . *Der Kleine Heinrich: Ein Waisenknabe aus dem Westen und eine Ansiedlergestalt aus der Deutschen Ostmark. Zur Erläuterung einer sozial-pädagogischen und nationalen Aufgabe des deutschen Volkes* [Grüne Blätter für Kunst und Volkstum, Heft 4] (Leipzig/Berlin: G.H. Meyer Heimat Verlag, 1901).
- Solem-Grimm, Eric. *The Rise of Historical Economics and Social Reform in Germany 1864–1894* (Oxford University Press, 2003).
- . “The Professors’ Africa: Economists, the Elections of 1907, and the Legitimation of German Imperialism,” *German History* 25:3 (2007), pp. 313-347.
- . *Learning Empire: Globalization and the German Quest for World Status, 1875-1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
- Sombart, Werner. “Sombart, Anton Ludwig,” in Anton Bettelheim (ed.), *Biographisches Jahrbuch und Deutscher Nekrolog*, vol. 3 (Berlin: Riemer, 1900), pp. 253–256.
- Spät, Robert. *Die “polnische Frage” in der öffentlichen Diskussion im Deutschen Reich, 1894-1918* (Marburg: Herder Institute, 2004), pp. 90–169.
- Steinbach, Daniel R. “Carved out of Nature: Identity and Environment in German Colonial Africa,” in Christina Folke Ax, Niels Brimnes, Niklas Thode Jensen, Karen Oslund (eds.), *Cultivating the Colonies: Colonial States and their Environmental Legacies* (Athens, OH.: Ohio University Press, 2011), pp. 47–77.

- Steinmetz, George. *Regulating the Social: The Welfare State and Local Politics in Imperial Germany* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
- Stienen, Daniel Benedikt. “Deutsche, Kauft deutsches Bauernland”: Über die Anwerbung von Kolonisten und die damit verbundenen administrativen Hemmnisse in der preußischen Siedlungspolitik (1886-1914),” *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte* 26:1 New Series (2017), pp. 63-90.
- . “Landownership between Nationalization and De-Liberalization: Changes in Prussian Property Regimes, 1886–1914,” *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung/Journal of East Central European Studies* 69:3 (2020), pp. 355–377.
- Stöcker, Georg. *Agrarideologie und Sozialreform im Deutschen Kaiserreich: Heinrich Sohnrey und der Deutsche Verein für ländliche Wohlfahrts- und Heimatpflege 1896–1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011).
- Stoehr, Irene. “Von Max Sering zu Konrad Meyer: ein ‘machtergreifender’ Generationswechsel in der Agrar- und Siedlungswissenschaft,” in Suzanne Heim (ed.), *Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), pp. 57–90.
- Stoler, Ann Laura and Carole McGranahan. “Introduction: Refiguring Imperial Terrains,” in Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter Perdue (eds.) *Imperial Formations* (Santa Fe and Oxford, 2007).
- Störtkuhl, Beate. “Architektura wystawowa jako metoda narodowej prezentacji. Wystawa Wschodniomiemiecka (1911) i Powszechna Wystawa Krajowa (1929) w Poznaniu,” in Jacek Purchla and Wolf Tegerhoff, *Naród. Styl. Modernizm* (Kraków and Munich, 2006), pp. 226-237.
- Strauß, Stephan. “Margarethenhöhe und Mathildenhöhe: Beiträge und Wechselwirkungen zur Reform des Kleinwohnhauses und des städtischen Wohnens,” *International Committee on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) — Hefte des Deutschen Nationalkomitees* 64 (2018), pp. 111-122.
- Struck, Bernhard. *Nicht West - Nicht Ost: Frankreich und Polen in der Wahrnehmung deutscher Reisender zwischen 1750 und 1850* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006).

- Sunseri, Thaddeus. *Wielding the Ax: State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820–2000* (Athens, OH.: Ohio University Press, 2009).
- . “Exploiting the Urwald: German Post-Colonial Forestry in Poland and Central Africa, 1900–1960,” *Past & Present* 214:1 (2012), pp. 305–342.
- Sweeney, Dennis. “Reconsidering the Modernity Paradigm: Reform Movements, the Social and the State in Wilhelmine Germany” *Social History* 31:4 (2006), pp. 405-434.
- . *Work, Race, and the Emergence of Radical Right Corporatism in Imperial Germany* (Michigan University Press, 2009).
- . “Pan-German Conceptions of the Colonial Empire,” in Eley and Naranch (eds.), *German Colonialism in a Global Age* (Duke University Press, 2015), pp. 265-282.
- Taube, Max. *Der Schutz der unehelichen Kinder in Leipzig: Eine Einrichtung für Fürsorge ohne Findelhäuser* (Leipzig, 1893).
- Tenfelde, Klaus. “Ländliches Gesinde in Preußen, Gesinderecht und Gesindestatistik 1810 bis 1861,” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 19 (1979), pp. 189–229.
- Tennstedt, Florian. “Hugo Thiel und der Verein für Sozialpolitik,” *Zeitschrift für Sozialreform* 34:9 (1988), pp. 524-537.
- Teuteberg, Hans-Jürgen. “Die Debatte der deutschen Nationalökonomie im Verein für Sozialpolitik über die Ursachen der ‘Wohnungsfrage’ und die Steuerungsmittel einer Wohnungsreform im späten 19. Jahrhundert,” in idem (ed.) *Stadtwachstum, Industrialisierung, sozialer Wandel* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot 1986), pp. 13–60.
- Tilse, Mark. *Transnationalism in the Prussian East From National Conflict to Synthesis, 1871-1914* (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).
- Ther, Philipp. “Beyond the Nation: The Relational Basis of a Comparative History of Germany and Europe,” *Central European History*, 36:1 (2003), pp. 45-73, pp. 48-52.
- . “Deutsche Geschichte als imperiale Geschichte: Polen, slawophone Minderheiten und das Kaiserreich als kontinentales Empire,” in Jürgen Osterhammel and Sebastian Conrad

- (eds.) *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt, 1871-1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2004), pp. 129-148.
- . “Imperial Instead of National History: Positioning Modern German History on the Map of European Empires.” in Alfred J. Rieber and Alexie Miller (eds.) *Imperial rule* (Central European University Press, 2004), pp. 47-66.
- . “Imperial Nationalism as Challenge for the Study of Nationalism,” in A. I. Miller and Stefan Berger (eds.), *Nationalizing Empires* (Budapest: EUI Press, 2014), pp. 573-593.
- Thum, Gregor. “Megalomania and Angst: The Nineteenth Century Mythicization of Germany’s Eastern Borderlands,” in Eric D. Weitz and Omer Bartov, *Shatterzones of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), pp. 42-60.
- Tooze, Adam. *Statistics and the German State 1900-1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- Trzecie Sprawozdanie Towarzystwa Opieki Nad Dziećmi w Poznaniu* (Poznań, 1910).
- Czwarte Sprawozdanie Towarzystwa Opieki nad dziećmi katolickimi w Poznaniu. Rok 1910-1911* (Poznań, 1912).
- Treue, Wilhelm. “Preußens Wirtschaft vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis zum Nationalsozialismus,” in Otto Büsch (ed.) *Handbuch der preussischen Geschichte*, vol. 2 (Berlin: De Gruyter 1992), pp. 558–560.
- Trzeciakowski, Lech. “The Prussian State and the Catholic Church in Prussian Poland 1871-1914,” *Slavic Review* 26 (1967), pp. 618-63.
- . *The Kulturkampf in Prussian Poland* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs/New York: Columbia University Press, 1990 [1970])
- Tuchtenhagen, Ralph. “Religiöser Dissens, Staat und Auswanderung nach Osteuropa im 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert” in Beer and Dahlmann (eds.), *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa*, pp. 263–290.

Turkowska, Justyna A. “Im Namen der „großen Kolonisationsaufgaben“: Das Hygiene-Institut in Posen (1899-1920) und die preußische Hegemonialpolitik in der Ostmark,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* NF 61:4, pp. 552-573.

———. *Der kranke Rand des Reiches: Sozialhygiene und nationale Räume in der Provinz Posen um 1900* (Marburg: Herder Institute, 2020).

Turner, Bryan S. (ed.) *Citizenship and Social Theory* (London: Sage 1993).

Turner, Fredrick J. “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” [1893], in idem, *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Henry Holt, 1921), pp. 1-38.

Twellmann, Marcus. “Das deutsche Bürgerhaus: Zum oikonomisch Imaginären in Gustav Freytags Soll und Haben,” *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 87 (2013), pp. 356–385.

Umbach, Maiken. “The Vernacular International: Heimat, Modernism and the Global Market in Early Twentieth-Century Germany,” *National Identities* 4:1 (2002), pp. 45–68

———. *German Cities and Bourgeois Modernism, 1890-1924* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Varnbüller, Friedrich Karl Freiherr von. “Über die Frage eines deutschen Heimatrechtes,” in Jürgen Müller (ed.), *Vom Frankfurter Fürstentag bis zur Auflösung des Deutschen Bundes 1863–1866* (Göttingen: De Gruyter, 2017).

Verein für Socialpolitik. *Zur Inneren Kolonisation in Deutschland. Erfahrungen und Vorschläge* [Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik 32], (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1886).

———. *Verhandlungen der am 24. und 25. September 1886 in Frankfurt a.M. abgehaltenen Generalversammlung des Vereins für Socialpolitik* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 188).

Verhandlungen in der Kammer der Abgeordneten des Königreichs Württemberg (Stuttgart, 1893).

Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Leipzig für das Jahr 1893 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1895).

Verwaltungsbericht des Magistrats der Stadt Berlin-Schöneberg (Berlin, 1899).

Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Wilmersdorf 1908/1909 (Berlin, 1910).

Verwaltungsdekret für die Gemeinden, Oberämter und Stiftungen vom 1. März 1822 nebst das dasselbe abändernden und ergänzenden Gesetzen, im Auftrag des Königl. Ministerium des Innern, überarbeitet von Oberregierungsrat Fleischhauer (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1891).

Vick, Brian. "Imperialism, Race, and Genocide at the Paulskirche: Origins, Meanings, Trajectories," in Michael Perraudin and Jürgen Zimmerer (eds.), *German Colonialism and National Identity* (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 9–20.

Vierhaus, Rudolf (ed.). *Das Tagebuch der Baronin Spitzemberg, geb. Freiin v. Varnbüler. Aufzeichnungen aus der Hofgesellschaft des Hohenzollernreiches* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960)

Vormbaum, Thomas. *Politik und Gesinderecht im 19. Jahrhundert, vornehmlich in Preussen, 1810–1918* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980).

Wagner, Patrick, *Bauern, Junker und Beamte. Der Wandel lokaler Herrschaft und Partizipation im Ostelbien des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen, 2005).

Wajda, Kazimierz, "Stosunki ludnościowe na ziemiach pomorskich w latach 1850–1914," in Stanisław Salmonowicz (ed.) *Historia Pomorza* (Toruń, 2000), vol. 4:1, pp. 70–132.

Walkenhorst, Peter. *Nation – Volk – Rasse: Radikaler Nationalismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1890–1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008).

Wandycz, Piotr S. *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918* (Seattle and London: Washington University Press, 1974).

Weber, Hans Siegfried. *Rücksiedlung Auslanddeutscher nach dem deutschen Reich* (Jena: Fischer 1915).

Weber, Marianne. *Max Weber, Ein Lebensbild* (Tübingen, 1926).

Weber, Max. *Die Verhältnisse der Landarbeiter im ostelbischen Deutschland* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1892).

- . “Die ländliche Arbeitsverfassung” (Referat auf der Tagung des Vereins für Sozialpolitik im Jahre 1893), in: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1924), pp. 444–469.
- . translated by Ben Fowkes, “The national state and economic policy (Freiburg address),” *Economy and Society* 9:4 (1980), pp. 428–449.
- . “Die Lage Der Landarbeiter Im Ostelbischen Deutschland (1892),” in *Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe*, ed. by Martin Riesebrodt (Tübingen 1984), vols. I/3,1-2, pp. 916–929.
- Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. “Die Polenpolitik im Deutschen Kaiserreich, 1871-1918,” in: Kurt Kluxen and Wolfgang J. Mommsen (eds.), *Politische Ideologien und nationalstaatliche Ordnung. Studien zur Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Festschrift für Theodor Schieder zu seinem 60. Geburtstag* (München: Oldenbourg, 1968), pp. 297-316.
- . *Das Deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871-1918.* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973).
- Weindling, Paul. *Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe 1890–1945* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
- Wienfort, Monika. *Patrimonialgerichte in Preußen: Ländliche Gesellschaft und bürgerliches Recht 1770-1848/49* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001).
- Wierling, Dorothee. *Mädchen für Alles. Arbeitsalltag und Lebensgeschichte Städtischer Dienstmädchen um die Jahrhundertwende* (Berlin: Dietz, 1987).
- Wildenthal, Lora. *German Women for Empire, 1884–1945* (Durham: Duke University Press 2001).
- Winkler, Karl Tilman. “Reformers United: The American and the German Juvenile Court, 1882—1923,” in: Norbert Finzsch and Robert Jütte (eds.), *Institutions of Confinement: Hospitals, Asylums, and Prisons in Western Europe and North America, 1500–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp. 235–74.
- Wilson, Jeffrey K. “Imagining a Homeland: Constructing Heimat in the German East, 1871–1914,” *National Identities* 9:4 (2007), pp. 331–349.

- . “Environmental Chauvinism in the Prussian East: Forestry as a Civilizing Mission on the Ethnic Frontier, 1871–1914,” *Central European History* 41 (2008), pp. 27–70.
- Zahra, Tara. *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
- Zantop, Susanne. *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770-1870* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).
- Zelljadt, Katja. “Presenting and Consuming the Past: Old Berlin at the Industrial Exhibition of 1896.” *Journal of Urban History* 31:3 (March 2005), pp. 306–33.
- Zimmerman, Andrew. “Decolonizing Weber,” *Postcolonial Studies* 9:1 (2006), pp. 53–79.
- . *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
- . “German Sociology and Empire: From Internal Colonization to Overseas Colonization and Back Again,” in George Steinmetz (ed.), *Sociology and Empire: Colonial Studies and the Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), pp. 166-187.
- Zimmermann, Clemens. “Wohnen als sozialpolitische Herausforderung,” in Jürgen Reulecke (ed.), *Geschichte des Wohnens, 1800-1918*, (Ludwigsburg and Stuttgart: Wüstenrot Stiftung and Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1997), pp. 503-636.
- Zimmermann, Clemens. *Von der Wohnungsfrage zur Wohnungspolitik. Die Reformbewegung in Deutschland 1845–1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993),
- Zollmann, Jakob. “German Colonial Law and Comparative Law, 1884–1919,” in Thomas Duve (ed.) *Entanglements in Legal History: Conceptual Approaches* (Frankfurt am Main: Max Planck Institute for European Legal History), pp. 253–294.
- Zückert, Hartmut. *Allmende und Allmendaufhebung: Vergleichende Studien zum Spätmittelalter bis zu den Agrarreformen des 18./19. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2003).