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ADVICE

"...how to plan simultaneously for efficiency and, say, affection, taxes not merely the practical but also the theoretic imagination."

John R. Seeley, What is Planning?¹

"It would not be more difficult and not even more expensive to collect happiness ratings than to collect data on income, savings, and prices."

Paul Lazarsfeld, What is Sociology?²

If we want to take Seeley and Lazarsfeld seriously in the sense of systematic policy, then I believe that we will have to alter current attitudes toward the nature and structure of knowledge useful for policymaking. In this essay I want to explore some of the epistemic and ontologic orientations that may be most useful for doing so. We shall be concerned with the social situations involved in the process of transmitting what is known and recommending what to do by means of giving advice.

The problem that we shall be lead to understand is how can our selves be better integrated with the actions we choose? I take self to mean the "integrated unity of subjective experience specifically including those characteristics and attributes of the experiencing organism of which it is reflexively aware."³ My fundamental postulate is that a more explicit and authorized use of the self will make it possible for us to act better.

¹Seeley, 1960.

²Quoted in Swados, 1959.

³Gove, 1966, p. 2059.

This discussion is written at a College of Environmental Design, and is about a problem of design, and not a problem in the development or verification of new knowledge. As such, we shall be concerned with the most central difficulty of design -- solving of poorly posed problems which have ambiguous criteria for the goodness of solutions.

This orientation to design problems will lead us to be concerned about responsible (authorized) knowledge; in other words, designers tend to have clients. This affects the nature of their knowledge, both in its purposes and content. Some people who "know" have a commitment to increasing the base of consensually known things; others are committed to fulfilling ends (which process may be aided by systematic knowledge) specified, perhaps imprecisely, by clients. One is searching for the "truth," while the other is trying to make things "work." Social responsibility (in a pragmatic society?) is more apparent in the second role.

Also, we will want the "acceptance of tacit knowledge and experiences as important sources of knowledge, in addition to more conventional methods of research and study. [We want to make] efforts to distill the tacit knowledge of policy practitioners..." (Dror, 1970, p. 138).

Rather than be knowers who are led around by what we know, we shall want to be purposeful and be led around by what we want (which is, albeit, a function of what we know).

The Problem of Advice

I will take advice-giving as a model of the knowledge utilization process in private and public life. Advice-giving will be taken to be a

transactive process involving two actors, some action that concerns them, and a world. That action, the substance of which is advice, is "an opinion recommended, or offered, as worthy to be followed,"⁴ or a "recommendation regarding a decision or course of conduct."⁵

People who know something are constantly engaged in the activity of giving advice. Since most people know a great deal, advice-giving concerns most of us. One gives advice when one answers questions such as, what should I do?, what should I believe?, what should I feel? Advice-giving often takes the form of helping, information transmission, hand holding, as well as the more conventional forms of telling people that you think so-and-so.

Advice is given at varying levels of public-ness. It can be one part of yourself telling another part what it should do. More publicly, it involves one person giving advice to another in a conversation. We also have cases of advice-giving where one person advises many, many advise one person, or many people advise each other.

Advice is tailored by the adviser to suit the needs of the advisee. If the advisee is one person, the advice can be specific to him. In a large fraction of cases, however, little is known about the actors in the advice-giving process. Either the adviser and/or the advisee is anonymous. Public policy advice often has this character.

Advice-giving is an activity which combines processes of understanding situations better and acting in them. Thus, it bridges the often made dichotomy between thinking and acting, between planning and implementation, between the mind and the environment.

⁴Barnhart, 1960, p. 19.

⁵Gove, 1966, p. 32.

How do I give advice? I try to present a picture of my advice which appeals to the person to whom I am giving advice, to his metaphoric worlds, and not only to his intellectual or cognitive faculties. One can "paint" advice. Advice given in such a fashion is not easily received. It is not linear, nor is it necessarily responsive to the cognitive style of the person to whom you are giving advice. He may accuse you of "painting" rather than being explicitly clear. Someone has said to me, "How can you talk to someone who is painting?" This is the problem that I will explore here. How is it possible for us to increase the number of levels on which accepted discourse takes place so that those who are used to arguing in explicit, overt, ways may be able to learn to paint; and those who are painting may learn to write well enough so that the recipients of their advice will understand them.

If you are giving advice as a painter, then you may be unduly manipulating someone's psyche without his being able to fight back. More broadly we may ask, whom are you affecting when you give advice? My guess is that the adviser and the advisee are about equally involved. Insofar as the adviser is deeply involved, then the question of his manipulating the advisee can be turned around with equal force. For if the adviser is to make a commitment to those whom he gives advice, then he may be involving them in risk, but he is also involving himself at a similar level of risk.

On a societal level, we encounter similar problems in advice-giving.

(1) Advisers frequently rely on their experience and their judgment, supplemented by explicit techniques of analysis, in giving

advice. Those whom they advise may rely on the advice-giver's own experience or they may be entranced by the more systematic ways of thinking. How are they to combine the judgment of their advisers with their own?

(2) How are we to convert our own knowledge into something which is useful to the rest of society? How can we convince other people that what we know is the case, and how can they use what we know for social betterment? This problem appears in many forms. For example, organizational analysts describe how information flows within organizations and how the kinds of information involved in the organization determines organizational structure. Much of their concern has been with the reduction of intelligence failures -- cases in which knowledge somehow does not get to the person who needs it to act better. This has been formulated in terms of what kinds of organizations can we develop that will make it possible for us to use the knowledge we have, to take the advice we wish to give, yet insulate the society and the advice-giver from the cases when he is very wrong. We want to pool our individual knowledge in such a way that the uncertainties and dangers in using it become social risk.

(3) How can we make what some people know be responsive to the doubts of others who may not have the same experience or similar intellectual apparatus. Science has provided one model for making knowledge public and available to doubt. But scientific practitioners require the doubters go through a substantial training period before they are listened to. Can we do better than this in our advice-giving procedures?

We can rephrase this question in the form, "How can we make more democratic use of what is knowable?" Before we can talk about a

scheme for doing so, we need to develop some ideas about knowing.

About Knowing Things

I suspect that there is an experiential, wisdom-like, expert knowledge which is differentiable from other kinds of senses about the world.⁶ This kind of knowledge is more than the sum of a person's experiences and study that make it up. Observably, what is distinctive about our expert knowledge is that we are willing to apply this knowledge to situations which are new and to which we have not applied it before.

Expert knowledge is a knowledge we claim to have when we are capable of judging situations. It is the knowledge that resides in a self rather than in a thing. That a person believes he is capable of using what he knows in a new situation, and not so much whether he is always successful, characterizes an expert knower. The legitimacy of holding this belief will be determined in a social way. Others believe that he can successfully use what he knows in new situations.

A similar question concerning knowledge comes up in linguistics. Chomsky asks how is it possible for a person to create and understand sentences he has never heard before. He defines the competent speaker-hearer to be one who can do this. (We might define a competent adviser analogously.) He then goes on to argue that within our minds there exists a grammar which interprets each sentence based on fairly general rules plus some of the more particular rules that we learn in everyday life. It is suggested, in its most radical form, that we do not learn

⁶Expert knowledge is related to Polanyi's personal knowledge. The differences lie in: (1) I reject Polanyi's psychological reductionism -- tacit knowing and focal and subsidiary awareness are interesting but seem unnecessary and doubtful additions to his theory. (2) I am not concerned about the status of scientific knowledge useful in understanding a well defined phenomenon. I am concerned with advice-giving knowledge, which has both public accountability and verifiability.

a language in the sense of accumulating bits and pieces of it, but rather that in some physiological way the equivalent of a grammar is actually stored in our brains. In the process of language acquisition, we stimulate this grammar to come forth.

For the moment, we do not need to accept this set of ideas about language. What is important is that the questions that are stimulated by this approach are central to understanding of how knowledge and experience can be used in the public realm. The analogy may be not exact, but it is suggestive when we say that we want to know why some people are better advice-givers than others, and what is the nature or logic of advice-giving. It is attractive to think that judgmental processes have a logic that is internalized in the physiology of our brain and that similar processes work for all experts. But, to repeat, we do not need to admit these hypotheses. We just want to keep in mind the question, how is it possible for some people to give advice about situations they have not seen before?

The Level of Social and Political Analysis

Advice is given in a social and political context. Our knowledge is of that context and it develops within it. Need we restrict the analysis to the socio-political? I think not.

There is a choice between situating the discussion in the context of self and family or in a global context of society, polity, or culture. Since the larger context influences the self, it may seem most natural to center one's discussion on that larger context. The difficulty with such a perspective is that the modes of conceptualization useful for discussing larger contexts may be unduly restrictive when we come to the self. Historical orientations are particularly

pernicious in this regard. Therefore, I will first deal with the self and then explore how this self plays out in a larger society.

Not many, whatever their political style, are willing to face their selves, if their style is political at all. Herbert Marcuse is most inventive so far in this effort, but even he has stepped back from his originally deep commitment to the sexual and personal, to a sense of futility and a rejection of sexuality.⁷ Another part of the utopian left, which sees salvation in decentralization or greater complexity, abandons big politics altogether. The politics that is left is that of the small community and might be called human relations. Neither view seems helpful.

There are, however, other perspectives. They do not concentrate their attention on whether we need a communitarian or individualist society.⁸ Taking someone like Marcuse seriously, the question is what is the nature of community that makes it possible for self and sexuality to be. This often leads to deeply personal sorts of analysis in order to get at political realities. (Aronson, 1971)

⁷Marcuse's sexual nirvana is very different from Norman O. Brown's. Brown never gets to deal with societal action or social history. He does escape some of the problems of historicism, but unfortunately does not deal with political problems. Also, he is stuck with a psychological determinism.

⁸What is the schizophrenia in our selves that makes a self-society polarity seem meaningful? Lichtman (p. 81), for example, insists on the dialectic aspects of self and society. Power, it seems to me, is insufficient to justify this.

The Knowing Advice-Giver

If knowledge is to be useful to a society, and is used in an advice-giving context, the personal source of this knowledge is both crucial and problematic. It is crucial since many public policy problems are not well formulated and require that people make informed guesses. It is problematic since we exist in a putative democracy, and we would hope that others should be able to criticize and argue with the expert's knowledge. Yet it resides in the expert's self.

A resolution of this problem comes when we consider our selves, all of our selves, as sources of knowledge. Then we may inquire of each other's selves. The expert, rather than being shielded by his credentials, is provided with communication links with others through his self. This is a substantially different approach to public knowledge from that offered by conventional science. What is the guarantee that it will work? What are the mechanisms that we may use to realize its potential? Planning may provide an appropriate vehicle.

Planning: A Mode of Action for the Knowing Advice-Giver

Planning interposes action and thought. When we plan, we are modifying our actions by what we know of the world. Planning is an activity itself. When we decide to plan, then we may alter the kinds of action that planning involves.

Planning is more conventionally defined in terms of knowing (especially in a future oriented sense) about the world in which you are acting. It has a normative element, a prescription of what should be, as well as a strategic element, systematic programs of going from here to there.

Planning is not viewed favorably by most people and they are upset by the prospect of planning. Why is this so?

They are upset because they equate planning with the oppression of the individual by society.^{8a} They are also upset by the seemingly cold (highly distanced from man) techniques that are called systematic planning methods. We need not junk planning, but should modify or discard some of these methods and inform planning practice by the self.

Planning can be a process by which we make room for the self to operate, rather than a way of holding back our selves. It will not permit unrestrained action, but presumably that is not the desired end of most social activities. True, planning for non-planning (or planning for freedom) may not work. If we say that there are some times when everybody can "run free," then their self-consciousness at these times may leave them more inhibited than free. Still, if we do not try to plan for ourselves, even at the most rudimentary level, our uncoordinated actions may hurt us even more.⁹

^{8a}See Mannheim's work on planning for a discussion of planning as "salvation."

⁹Alternatives to planning are less desirable than not planning. If we allow only some people to plan, and especially those who have substantial coercive power, then what about those who do not have such power? We might allow tradition to operate, and just continue acting in the way that we did in the past. Presumably, planning would not be necessary in that case. We can no longer afford such a luxury, since tradition does not operate very well in our society. No longer do we learn from our elders, but we learn from our children. Lastly, we might just act on impulse. In a rich society we might be able to afford to do exactly that. Unfortunately, most rich societies have developed techniques by which impulsive action can result in the total destruction of that society. More importantly, my guess is that the expressive self, the highly articulated individuality that we possess, is not brought out best when we act only on impulse, but is often better articulated when we combine our impulses with experience in a systematic way.

Public Advice

We return to our original question, "How can we make more democratic use of what is knowable for public policy purposes?" Circularly (but not viciously), as we learn to use our selves more in the public arena we shall come closer to understanding and acting out the answer to such a question. Some central questions concerning expertise in society could be understood differently: credentialism could be reformed, our senses of others and our selves would replace more "objective" criteria for the success of social programs, our studies of society would represent themselves more fairly and more usefully to the public, and expertise would come to mean something that is more honest to the public.

Credentials, often in the form of university degrees and professional certifications, are not suitable ways of choosing one adviser from among the advice-giving population. The post-industrial model of society, which insists on the significance of theoretical knowledge for understanding the world, overestimates our understanding of the social realm in a theoretical, well-verified, way. Those who understand the "scene" may be people who are well credentialed, but there is no guarantee that credentials provide understanding. The opposite may be true. Today, this point is partly conceded when we talk about understanding the ghetto. (Ellis and Orleans, 1971) But I wonder if this is not also true in many other situations. The intuitive grasp of many social collectivities possessed by the members of those collectivities is rarely tapped when public policy for these groups is made.

Most of the credentialed argue that those who are involved in the situation will only view things in terms of their self-interest

and therefore they are not reliable observers of their own worlds. But the credentialed are no more reliable than locals. For credentialed observers, as a social group, have their own interests which frequently are incongruent with the interests of those whom they are "helping." The credentialed come to power largely on the basis of presumed technical capability; not because their political values are considered desirable. We must be careful not to let their presumed technical capability hide the fact that we may disagree with them in terms of aims and values.

I am not against systematic understanding of our problems and concerns. I am for a strategic sense about what is knowable and an economic sense about how this information ought to be gathered. In terms of the logic of most credentialed observers objections to using the intuition and self-knowledge of people about their own situations is not only natural but necessary. For systematic analysts, specification of a system's outputs forces a separation of system and evaluation. They have called for statements of objectives of programs and policies so that we may better evaluate those programs and policies and change them accordingly. Yet they have chosen as a source of such criteria a rather limited set of standards. They never deal with selves. But this separation is not a necessary consequence of a concern with outputs. It is important that the criteria for performance of programs and policies be phrased, in part, in terms of how people feel about the consequences of such policies, and how their internal metaphoric worlds are influenced by such actions. It is probably just as important to plan for meaning and self, as it is to plan for more solid nutrients.

This attitude is likely to lead to a substantial change in the general tone of most studies of society that are meant to guide us toward better public action. If these studies were to emphasize the personal interest of the studiers and admit their purposeful orientation (they are trying to make a point), such studies would be more usable and more acceptable than conventional ones.

The people who shall be writing these reports may be very different than those who are being trained today. They will have to realize that their expertise derives from their technical knowledge and from their selves. They will no longer view themselves as repositories of knowledge, as walking computers or libraries, but men who are constantly exercising their judgment. They are political and personal.

I am talking about a science, a systematic understanding of the world, that is beyond conventional science, and consequently I am talking about a society that is beyond the post-industrial one. In a beyond post-industrial society, knowledge of self will be as significant as theoretical knowledge of the outside world. As a result people will want to learn as much about themselves as they do about their environments. This attitude is likely to lead to another kind of change which may be the most profound of all. The kinds of questions we choose to ask at any time are intimately related to questions we must have internally about ourselves. It will be very interesting to see what kinds of questions people will want to ask when they are centrally concerned with their selves.¹⁰

¹⁰See Cooper, 1971.

WHAT IS

We perambulate from knowledge to being. I want to explore some important characteristics of man's existence in his environment and their implications for how he may act in giving advice. First, let me sketch a picture of our world.

Man exists in his environment and interacts with it. It is difficult to draw good boundaries between man and the environment, especially if we are concerned about the nature of that interaction. Though a person acts in terms of sets of typical behaviors, this does not mean that he is predictable or mechanical. Persons are responsible for their actions and responsive to the world around them. What is most remarkable is that it is likely that the world also interacts with its environment, the people in it, is alive and not too mechanical, and is actually responsible and responsive. The world is the other people with whom a person interacts, plus their images of what is not human.

Given this picture, we ask: How should a man act socially to improve the sense (knowledge) which is used to build and control his actions, and how should society, a very organized part of the environment, act toward such men?

This picture is not universally accepted, by far. Most of our images of responsible public action, informed by some sense about the world, try to minimize the interaction of a man with his world

while maintaining his control over it. The practice of the professions involved in knowing and policymaking illustrate this and point up the difficulties with it.

Science, as conventionally and not-so-conventionally pictured, minimizes interaction best of all ways of knowing. Our sensuous involvement with subjective facts and an evaluative attitude towards those facts is highly controlled and is eventually to be expunged when we do science. Our selves become alienated from praxis either by excision of self or by over-specification of the kind of involvement. Most importantly, the concept of good action is not considered.

I am not saying that science and its practitioners ought, necessarily, to be involved with questions that it chooses not to approach, but I am saying that science may have to claim for itself a rather narrow area of concern, and leave other questions to other approaches.

A similar alienation of self from praxis is found in the social role that is prescribed for professional knowers. Theirs is a problem of facade. Their status comes from a seeming omniscience and self-control; they may seem knowing and competent about the general area of which they have some specialized technical knowledge. For example, physicians who know something about disease are said to be specialists in health, and lawyers who know something about manipulating a legal apparatus are specialists in justice. This disparity leads to a number of difficulties. A commitment to professional ideals, which includes the maintenance of a role model, makes it very difficult for personal inventions to become part of professional practices. If the commitment is to the maintenance of societal expectations of a professional, this should not bother the professional. But if he is also committed to societal improvement, then he must step out of his professionally

prescribed role in order to effect change even within his field of professional expertise.¹¹ As for the relationship with his client, his maintenance of an air of all-knowing and large scale competence contrasts starkly with the client's position of total ignorance. The falsity of both images forces unnatural behavior and an unresponsiveness to one's own person by both client and professional.

A similar unresponsiveness is found in most social policymaking. Social policymaking involves collective statements about action and statements about social or collective action. In order to make social policy we have to have some sense about the society of individuals. What is the nature of their collectivity? Social studies over the years have provided some conceptions of these. Most of them seem too unrealistic, in one way or another, to be useful for understanding social action by complex individuals.

Conventional images are of men who are highly mechanistic. These images are derived from a scientific sociology and a deep concern with the regularities of society. This is associated with a larger conception of a complex post-industrial, knowledge-based social system. We may hold an alternative view in which we have a "sexualized" man, with complex sets of action bases and innovative behavior. This man exists in a rather different kind of world which can be described as a new tribal environment.

¹¹This is a problem for all theories that try to understand change and disruption as contrasted to stasis and order. A theory that can explain order will not necessarily explain, by negation or residual categories, situations of disorder. Such powerful, complete theories are rare in the social studies. They fail a test of "negation" and it seems to me that to hope for the ideal may be unrealistic considering the complexity of social situations.

It may be comfortable to have these neat views of man matched with their corresponding societies, but I do not think this approach works. Technē is with us and so is sex. We have a post-industrial and tribal society, with scientific and sexualized actors in it. Little is known about what good public action means in this situation. Good action is not scientific action, for science has little to do with much of people's lives, and good action is not pure expression, since so much of the world is too coordinate to work that way.

The problem is that our selves are alienated from praxis, our ostensible perfection does not allow us to be fallible, and our private knowledge does not easily inform social learning. Given this problem, we would expect a number of answers to be offered which minimally disturb the social system. I want to look at some of these.

Some Answers which Don't Work

Each of the popular prescriptions for resolving the dilemmas presented in the last section seems to have a substantial flaw.

Tribalism, and the formation of groups which can achieve the intents of individuals, is one way to avoid and ameliorate the alienation of self from praxis. A tribe forms a sufficiently powerful collectivity to do things that individuals cannot do themselves, but is it adequate? Tribes are not primitive, but they are certainly not complex. It is true that the relationships among the members of a tribe can be complicated, but their complexity is not of the character of current technical activities.¹²

Another alternative is government, in which a society simulates individual behavior and has a will and a self-consciousness of its own.

¹² Making the distinctions between the various kinds of complexity is a research problem itself. See, for example, the collection edited by Todd LaPorte, to be published.

One describes government as being involved in societal guidance and self-examination. This analog may be useful for synoptic description, but it rarely prescribes how man exists within a government. That a society "responds" is a reification of a set of individual actions and little is said about the transformation of individuals or how these transformed individuals make for social response.

An alternative view of government in terms of competing interest groups and power conflicts is really no more adequate than the above cybernetic model. It may provide a stage on which the new man can perform, but there is not reason to believe that the setting is especially appropriate for him.

A more sophisticated version of government is synoptic planning.¹³ Planning usually requires specific models for freedom and choice. This conception, though quite conventional, is difficult to apply. For example, there is no accepted model for how individual choice is to be weighed systematically against social choice.

Rather than reorganize the structure of the larger social process, we might try to reorganize the process itself.

We can all become policy-makers and somehow use ourselves in figuring out how the society should act. Everybody wants to use his own feelings and ideas in reforming the world. There is no systematic technique here. There is no reason to believe that anyone but a genius is going to be able to be effective in this activity.

A final answer that is sometimes offered is some form of existential public action. A public interest exists and can be formulated to incorporate all of our wishes and solve all of our problems. The difficulty in defining such a public interest is a paramount problem.

¹³ Models of planning concerned with reform or incremental change are excluded since they, respectively, do not prescribe for individual action specifically or are subsumed under the model of government just proposed.

All of these ideas, which are represented in much of the current writing about failures in American society, seem in error on several grounds. They imply that changed individuals will result in a changed larger society, yet no mechanism for making this connection is described. At the same time, their images of men are not very rich and they leave out their selves and their bodies. A richer social conception is not provided either. By treating men in fairly narrow ways, as all "science" or all "art," the variety and ambiguity of man never makes it through to the picture of society. To make a different approach to this problem, we return to our original question about how man exists in the world around him.

Four Characteristics That Matter

The way we describe our existence in the world determines how we come to social conceptions about it.

The advice-giver exists in the world and is a part of it. His own realization of his role depends on that existence. Though he is an expert, he is still a quite ordinary person. Like everyone else, his interactions with others determine his own nature, and his body and physical self determine how he learns and knows things.

The advice-giver is a feeling, sensuous, and susceptible creature. His world is peopled by similar persons, and his historical conception is in part determined by his view of what men are like. Thus, politics and history become informed by feeling and sensuousness. He realizes that the sensuous world is coexistent with the world of facts and that the data we choose to call factual are a convention of the moment. Finally, he knows that if he is to convince others he must use a logic which assumes that they are like him. They have a nature which includes

his characteristics, and he will not be able to argue independently of their persons. His arguments must be in terms of their beliefs, which are determined by their selves.

The advice-giver is subject to his own knowledge. He defines what he believes, and he knows that. He has commitments and realizes that in changing them it is likely that his logical beliefs will alter also.

Lastly, the advice-giver is a man who faces new problems all the time. Invention and the use of the past, to decide on present action, are the central questions that concern him. It is only in himself can he find out how to act and what to know, for no technique given by others will tell him enough.

The Possibilities for Radical Changes

The analysis I present here suggests a radical reorientation for social inquiry that will be used for responsible public action. If we have (1) a sensuous involvement with "objective facts," (2) a relief of the alienation of praxis and self, and (3) an ambiguity of the objective-subject dichotomy, then all of what is called conventional social studies will not provide comparably adequate clues about good action. Given a narrow problem for which consensual agreement exists, it is possible that current social research will work. But if social researchers are to transcend the limitations they have placed on themselves and become intrinsically responsible, then there is not much hope for what they do nowadays.

The radical change in current social studies will involve a reexamination of the sources of what we know and a sense of the importance of perceived action, in contrast to sensed behavior, for social knowing.

Radical change would come from a consequent alteration of our actions and our perceptions of them.

The primitive that informs all of these conceptions of radical change is the importance of sensibility. Sensibility is the manner in which we view the world, our affective stance toward it, and the components of the world that we select out for significance and relevance. Radical change, if sensibility is the central organizing idea of life, comes from altering sensibility.

But this need not be the case. One may argue that the institutions of economic power are the central ones; what needs to be effected is a transformation of these. More recently, in response to perceived changes in industrial society, the service sector is seen as another handle for radical change; which sector is also to be transformed and seized.

The choice between sensibility and materiality is profound for persons schooled in current politics and ideologies. I suspect that the choice between the two is a matter of taste. Radical change (and improvement) itself come from a commitment to it as such.

The Future of Science

This essay is, in part, an attack on conventional science when it deals with public action. If we are concerned with inquiry that is related to problems that are publicly defined or publicly relevant, and if we are sensitive to the interest of those who know about these problems, then the conventional science model is not very useful.

Still, I believe science is quite important. Scientific procedures are helpful for delineating what is known and for sweeping

up and tending to a body of knowledge. Science is also quite useful for shaking up conceptions, for being avant garde. Science fails in the middle ground, in the ground where the problems are not well-defined because they are either too new or too old.

Science will always be concerned about the problems that most people do not care about. If people care enough, then it will be very difficult for science, in a form even close to what is currently called science, to survive. A possibility for science as we know it lies in working on well-defined, consensually agreed upon problems for which technical solutions are deemed appropriate.

Science will never be adequate for politics or for the general assessment of the consequences of social action. Even if science changes, so that the separation between science and scientists who act in public (with their respective ethos) is reduced, it is not clear that societal policy would be better.

A FURTHER EXPLORATION OF THE PROPERTIES OF THE WORLD

As yet no explicit mechanism that relates self to better action is developed in the analysis. I cannot offer one now. For the moment, I want to explore the four properties of the actor who tries to give advice.

As It Is

If science, with its disjunction of man and his world, does not provide a useful perspective for understanding how we should act, then phenomenology, with its conjunction of man and his world, may offer one.

Men are ordinary. Their common sense everyday lives are intrinsic to the ways in which they describe experience. Who they are and those with whom they interact determines how they typify in their descriptive processes. Since people interact with others, these descriptive categories are mutual and depend on shared experiences. Since they are also actors and take (and interpret) experience as being relevant to their own action, their environments in others (how others see that they see others) always have meaning for them, and they do not exist apart from that meaning. Again, because the person does the experiencing, experiences have a sense of time with a past and a future, and actions are within this sense of time. The meanings that are given to the world depend on one's intention toward the world -- are you acting in order to achieve a certain end or because something

else has happened? In either case, choices have to be made concerning action; the manner in which these choices are made depends on the person who is doing the choosing.

What is most surprising about the preceding observations is that we rarely note them in everyday life. But it is not so surprising if we realize that the nature of everyday life is to ignore that we have these choices. This is its significance. Our ordinary knowing perspective rarely deals with questions related to our being as a person, and almost always deal with our being as a measuring instrument -- as if in analogy with rulers and scales. It is usually assumed that these measuring instruments are quite inanimate or can be made so.¹⁴ But this is a dangerous deception in the context of social problem-solving where the person of the knower is not going to disappear.

¹⁴ Standard models assume that a mechanical observer ideally affects the situation in very precise and small ways. We know, however, that social observers have effects on the situations they are observing which are not small. Unlike most physical or biological problems, there often is no way of parametrizing this intervention of the observer with respect to his environment. For example, there are no natural distances, as there are for physical problems, so that there is no societal equivalent of the "indivisible" electron used to study properties of nuclei. This lack may represent a temporary situation, only waiting for better social theory to put the observer in his place. But, except for special situations (as in laboratories -- and when can we say then that laboratory experiments apply to larger contexts?), the observer is involved organically with the situation he is in. Simple parametrizations of degrees of uninvolvedness are not an appropriate model for understanding the effects of his presence.

What we know depends on our own mood as well as the persons we deal with. Our cognitive capabilities depend on our psychological moods. To believe that we can somehow understand the effects of these moods is perhaps reasonable. But they are always with us. At one extreme, our moods are culturally determined and we know it is quite difficult to escape our culture when we are trying to know things. At the other, our moods are determined by our closest acquaintances. The process of "purifying" those moods may destroy our capabilities for fruitful relationships.

This perspective emphasizes the experience of the knower in his coming to believe certain statements. We do not abstract away from the involvement of the person with what he knows. This is appropriate when we deal with public action, since the process of knowing is an action which is explicitly dealt with and at the same time is contiguous with larger actions affecting the environment. Conventional perspectives treat knowing as part of an action, but the actions they identify as intrinsic to knowing are alien to public life.

The social determinism that is the basis for the perspective can be oppressive. It might be argued that we can be partly independent of others in our vision of the world; their images of us need not be taken as the only images we have of ourselves. They may not be the only ones, but they may be the most important, if we are concerned about effective social action. We must have some way of knowing how our actions affect others; their perceptions of us are one of the most important of these.

At the least, we are all embodied. If man is the knower through his experience, the physical object that experiences is his body. By exploring the world and using his body as a manipulator, sensor, and inventor of new explorations, man's experience is a very powerful way of knowing. Because there are random and sometimes unplanned actions in his bodily realm, he can discover new things, he escapes. Sexuality is the epitome of these articulated involvements and offers the most intimate way of exploring the environment through others.

Sex

Sexuality, as an orientation, provides a way of investigating the problems of public advice and action. In that sexuality centers on a highly uncontrollable and extraordinary transforming experience, it provides a radical break from conventional analyses.

We all know that men are sexual and that sexual intimacies of various kinds and degree are part of existence and events. It would seem that the strength of such experience should make sexuality pervasive in analyses of public action, yet it is not. The analysis proceeds from sex on the individual level to larger social entities. We will go from sex as such, to intense sexuality and revolution, to revolution and sexual actors, and finally to a sexual political vision. Then, I will turn to sexuality as a model for a knowing experience.

(1) Sex is important. This kind of statement does not get us very far, no matter how important sex really is in public action. We can say that sex is related to history. We could detail the love lives of kings and prime ministers. We might see in history a development characteristic of the sexual changes in sexual life. But we do not get much further even with that. The reason for this difficulty is that we have no normative ideas of what a sexual life should be.

(2) An alternative is to say that sex is important and is everything. A good life requires full and complete orgasm with complete emotional release. One then can base a political and social revolution on spreading this good around and making it possible throughout the society. This would be a radical transformation of what is usually considered "revolution." We would not be concerned

with questions of justice and injustice and the social correction of problems; we would be concerned about health and sickness and private self-transformations involved in maintaining this sexual state. This second view seems fairly useful. Sexuality is central and social change has something to do with personal fulfillment. But in a critical way, it does not deal with politics and power. Institutional change, especially of the most powerful institutions, will not be critically affected by calling for a full orgasm for everybody.

(3) So we need a way of talking about social change, civilization, and sexuality which also involves some aspects of power and action. An immediate difficulty is that the present civilization may limit our metaphoric conceptions of a possibly different future, so a utopian stance is only partially successful.

Sexuality is certainly a powerful tool for political action and characterization. For example, repression of sexual performance and desire may be used to channel energy to other goals such as material productivity. Therefore, there needs to be a minimal and acceptable level of repression in a society. Or we can say that in all but a few social situations almost all freedom is channelled or can be channelled to repressive ends. The first type of repressive situation makes the sexual deviant a hero, since he is escaping from excess repression; while in the second, he is a repressed neurotic, who in being repressed at least does not have any false sense of freedom, and is heroic. Both of these views offer a way of looking at sexuality in a political context. How do we choose between them?

I suspect that men are protean. No matter how much freedom they have, there will always exist larger freedoms that will be desired. The freedoms they do have can serve to harm them as much as to help. A (sexual) freedom that does not hold men back will require a transformation of sexuality away from a commitment to orgiastic "excesses," but at the same time away from neurotic abstention. In order to transcend the dichotomy between the extremes of sexuality, our attitudes towards sex will change. A sensibility would be developed whereby sexuality would lead to erotic freedom and a sense of love (a transcending synthesis of the neurotic and the deviant) as contrasted to power and control.

This mode of analysis treats sex separately from individual action. It becomes social action. Yet it then returns to transform individual life as a social context. The power nexus, by being informed by sexuality, has meaning for persons apart from the political ideas which are expressed and the material interests which are traded. The persons of political actors become significant both personally and archetypally.

(4) Sexuality can inform politics and change its categories. It is also possible for sexuality to completely rise over politics. We might end up rejecting all political involvements and making of our own bodies and self-involvement our whole lives. More likely, a small group of individuals (perhaps larger than a family) could make their own world. In these cases, political values are denied completely. Sexual visions and fulfillment transcend public action. We have come full circle, from private to public sex and back again.

Sexual Action as a Model for Knowing

Sexual activity obviously has something to do with a spasmodic release of energy in human beings which often involves two persons in close contact, and the preliminaries to such action. This description does not seem to me to get at the essence of what goes on. Physiology is not destiny.

A more useful analysis may be made in terms of the interactions of individuals who are involved in the process of relating sexually. Certainly, sexuality involves a mutual perception of the other's interest in you as a sexual being. It also involves a perception of your own state of sexual interest. These perceptions are of physical and behavioral manifestations, as well as of internal introspective analysis of one's mental state. One appreciates the fact that another person is somehow making a (friendly) assault on one's person. Sexuality is distinguished from other forms of intercourse by its involuntary and controlled aspects. One can choose to be involved with a sexual relationship and at the same time, having become involved, there are aspects of sexuality which are much less controlled than that original choice. What makes sexual relationships distinctive are the depth, strength, and mutuality of the involvements as well as the bodily physical articulations of sexual interest. The interpersonal context of love is sometimes a significant concomitant.

We may define sexual perversion in terms of the degree of completeness of the sexual relationship, including the degrees of arousal and mutual awareness. For example, a human adult's sexual intercourse with animals or small children usually involves a lack of awareness on the part of the other of his own sexuality and interest.

This description may be carried wholesale into an analysis of knowing for public action. Knowing about social situation involves an interaction of the knower with those of whom he knows, and their mutual awareness of these knowing operations. True, there are no specific bodily manifestations of knowledge, since there is no simple specific and general response to knowledge. Still, there are situations in which our knowledge of others does result in physical manifestations. One of these is an internal sense of completeness about that understanding. Knowing also has its uncontrollable aspects; curiosity and sub-conscious working-out have made people know more than they intended. Knowledge perversion is more analogously understood in terms of an involvement with facts, or machines, or reified history in politics. All of these perversions have no chance of responding to the knower and represent incomplete knowledge.

We always have incomplete knowledge. This specific variety of incomplete knowledge is special in that if we are involved in social action, knowledge of the other would seem to be essential. Social action involves taking another into one's sphere of action and taking the other with you through a process of change. If the other is treated as inanimate, either by your attitude toward him or the kinds of things you know of him, he is victimized. His complete self is not included within your ken.

Sexuality is a central part of our selves and history. At the same time, it can be a primary description of how we know.

Innovative Action

It may be true that there exists a perfect sexual action set which results in the optimal state of being for those involved in

sexual relations. I have my doubts about this since surprise and invention are important in life, and probably make a difference in sexual relations as well. Also, we know that the sexual states of individuals depend on their outside involvements; it may be impossible to have that perfect sexual action set occur, since the environment may alter the state of the actors in an unpredictable way. The same observations apply to public action and public advice. People must act and they must give advice. Situations are rarely static, and a single explicit rule seems not to exist. Advice-givers, like good sex actors, must be inventive.

They may have a whole stock of inventions available to them. An all-purpose law which does not work very well but does work sometimes might be used. This will not result in optimal action but could result in sufficiently acceptable action. Another possibility is that advice-givers have a set of stock responses for typical situations and choose the response that is most suitable for the situation at hand. A third possibility is that they invent entirely new actions each time. This option is hard to believe, but might be so.

What is important to note is that the knowers must apply their selves, at each point in time, to understanding how to act. Their bodies and their psychic selves are within the world of action and in articulating, growing, and being, they invent of necessity. They exercise their selves in making judgments of relevance and in evaluating their own actions.

Personalness

If one's own being determines the way one sees the world, the way one acts within it, and the objective solutions that are offered,

it seems only natural that the knowledge that is socially known of the world is determined in large part by the persons who are the knowers. Their faith and commitment to certain ideas determine which issues are interesting and important to them, and which events are relevant and of consequence. The content of their knowledge, and the boundaries of the systems which they choose to comprehend, depends intimately on their selves.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTES*

(1) Marcuse, and Robinson (as a secondary source), provide a discussion of both politics and sex that I find usable and important. Whether Marcuse is "right" is not so significant as the questions he forces one to think about. Sennett and Goodman offer some visions of a new society.

Judgmental operations have received substantial thought in recent years. Vickers has written of judgment in organizations, Wilensky on intelligence in organizations, and Goffman, in his unique way, has explored the process by which personal judgment becomes socialized risk. Sharon Kaufman and John Friedmann gave me the idea of calling what I am writing about "advice-giving." Wilensky's work on organizational intelligence has influenced much of my analysis.

As to the personal status of the knower, Polanyi and Maslow have thought most deeply of these questions in recent years. Chomsky has inventively converted a linguistic theory to a model for knowing and provides another useful set of questions to think about.

Jack Seeley has thought most perceptively about the people problems of planning. John Friedmann has concerned himself about planning in strange places. And Margaret Mead worries us all about whether we learn from the past or the future.

Daniel Cahn started me thinking about painting.

*References are to be found in WP-144B and WP-144D.

(2) Wilbert Moore provides a recent review and discussion of the sociology of the professions. The literature on post-industrialism is also helpful.

For conventional solutions to our dilemmas see: Sartre on tribes, Etzioni on societal guidance, Duhl on planning, and Sennett on planners and policy-makers.

Natanson's discussion of Schutz's work is the basis (in detail) for my discussion of social man. Warnock on Heidegger is useful. Discussions of symbolic interactionism are found in Blumer and Denzin. My discussions of these points with Patricia Bourne were quite helpful in formulating what I wanted to say. Merleau-Ponty on the body is especially good. Dreyfus' discussion of him in the context of artificial intelligence is illuminating for me.

Robinson did a good job in getting me into Marcuse and Reich. Brown speaks for himself. And Freud is part of general culture. Nagel's discussion of sexual perversion is a nice combination of phenomenology and sex. Rieff's discussion of the therapeutic has also been helpful to me.

Chomsky gives a good introduction to his ideas in Language and Mind. Useful criticisms are to be found in the book edited by Hook.

Polanyi is one of the least mined authors, and has been useful to me.

Some of Marcuse's followers (in the book edited by Breines) provide the inspiration for my discussion of radical change.