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The Politics of Military Deployments for Public Security

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by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Politics of Military Deployments for Public Security

by

Igor Daniel Palhares Acácio

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Political Science
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Dr. David Pion-Berlin, Chairperson

This dissertation sheds light on the causes of military deployments for public security in Latin American democracies. It argues for a need to understand the political reasoning behind them, emphasizing the role of civilian control and the military's propensity to execute such missions. It employs a multi-method design that draws on original quantitative data, novel uses of existing events data, FOIA-obtained data, and interviews with high-ranking military officers. The first empirical chapter presents the first-ever quantitative analysis of cross-national correlates of deployments. I find that crime rates matter and that civilian control over the military is associated with more deployments. Its interaction with the military propensity to execute such missions also predict deployment levels. The second empirical chapter investigates how the interaction between the civilian and military leadership takes place by explaining large-scale deployments in Brazil, finding those moments of high civilian control are the ones where large-scale deployments take place and that the military's conduct is explained by their mission preferences and considerations regarding risks – individual and collective – in case

collateral damage takes place. The third empirical chapter presents the first-ever quantitative analysis of subnational correlates of deployments. Crime rates are associated with more deployments, but political considerations are at play, and deployments are used as a tool for political support. These findings advance our understanding of the causes of domestic deployment of the military and in particular the role of civilian control over the military and the military's propensity to execute such missions.

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Chapter 1

Explaining military deployments for public security in Latin America: introductory and theoretical notes

Generals gathered in their masses
Just like witches at black masses
Evil minds that plot destruction
Sorcerer of death's construction […]
Politicians hide themselves away
They only started the war
Why should they go out to fight?
They leave that role to the poor, yeah
Time will tell on their power minds
Making war just for fun
Treating people just like pawns in chess
Wait till their judgement day comes, yeah! […]

William Ward, Tony Iommi, Terence Michael Butler, John Osbourne.

1 Setting up the stage, asking my questions

Latin America has long-lasting authoritarian legacies and endemic violence levels. After military coups during the Cold War, extended periods of authoritarianism followed with the government being run either directly by the military - such as in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay - or by leaders that were fully backed by people in military uniform, such as in Mexico. These countries transitioned to democracy but still face the peculiar challenge of delivering good governance: to produce public goods while in a growingly restricted fiscal space (Flores and Nooruddin 2016). After the transitions to democratic rule, people

believed in the newly minted democratic institutions, they showed up to vote and blatantly rejected the possibility of men in uniform taking over the fate of their countries. Though with varied levels of success in deepening reforms in civil-military relations, democratically elected governments substantially reduced military prerogatives, pushing the military away from internal security missions and from political decision-making, which were both typical of the authoritarian period.

Since the period of democratic transitions, Latin American countries have been facing threats other than military intervention in politics. A substantial rise in criminal violence has brought the issue of public security to the center of citizens and politicians' concerns. These rising levels of crime and inadequacy of established policing capacity (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2011; Ungar and Desmond 2009) have led the citizens to feel threatened (Carreras 2013) and to favor the uses of the military – among the trusted institutions in Latin America - for public security purposes (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017). According to the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), an average of 53.73% of citizens of Latin American democracies do not feel safe in their neighborhood. A plurality, 42.18%, would go as far as supporting a military coup in the case of high crime (LAPOP 2022).

Given these rising public security threats and public concerns, it is no wonder that countries in Latin America have been using their militaries as tools of statecraft. Scholars affirm that the involvement of the military with public security is an irreversible fact (A. Passos and Martínez 2019). Others have pointed out that, between 2012 and 2014, a total

of 488,000 public security operations have been carried out by the military in 15 out of 26 Latin American Countries (Donadio and Tibiletti 2014).

Though there is substantial work showing that these trends in military deployments have become irreversible, the scholarly debate has mostly focused on its potential consequences, not its causes. Scholars see these deployments as pathways for human rights violations, deterioration of civilian control, and democratic deconsolidation (Zaverucha 2008; Diamint 2015; Flores-Maciás and Zarkin 2019; Rodrigues, Brancoli, and Kalil 2018).

This dissertation seeks to further the debate on military missions by asking why Latin American democracies task their armed forces with policing missions despite the dangers of increasing the military's power and their massive potential to yield human rights violations. Arguing for an integrated view of the causes of deployment that highlights the role of democratically elected civilian leaders, I investigate the impact of crime rates, which is the untested conventional wisdom, the levels of civilian control over the military and the degree of military propensity to execute such missions on the levels on military deployment for public security missions.

The main research questions for this doctoral dissertation can be stated: what explains the patterns of deployment of the armed forces for public security missions in Latin American democracies?[1] There is variation in levels of civilian control over the

[1] This dissertation considers the deployment of the military for public security purposes as one that involves the deliberate and planned use of the military, directed by democratically elected governments, for policing missions. The target of such operations is drug-traffickers, other transnational criminal organizations, criminal gangs and common criminals.

military and different armies may view these missions with varying levels of favorability. So, if these missions occur, how do they reflect strategic interaction[2] processes between military officers and democratically elected politicians?

I argue that informed by the gravity of threats in public security and how citizens perceive it, the democratically elected civilian governments will leverage their levels of civilian control to compel militaries who are unwilling to execute public security missions to execute them. Democratically elected governments care about signaling deliverance of the public good of security in the context of high crime, garnering political support in the process. Given that civil-military relations is the arena where the strategic interaction between the government (principals) and the military (agent) takes place, I argue that the military has varied beliefs regarding the appropriateness of missions, and cares about its prestige in the society it serves, and the legal risks of operating. Therefore, it has varied levels of propensity to execute public security missions without proper compensation and safeguards.

The study of the sources of military missions, in particular public security, represents a significant research agenda for several reasons, as it establishes a connection with and fills in significant gaps in the scholarly literature. First, it is about the governmental provision of a much needed public good in Latin America: there are varying levels of policing capacity to tackle the rising levels of crime (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2011; Pion-Berlin 2010). The established policing capacity may be inadequate, and police-

[2] I do not use the term "strategic interaction" in a strict game theoretical sense. I use it to characterize the processes by which democratically elected politicians seek to exert their authority while understanding that the military leadership has varied levels of bureaucratic autonomy in Latin America and may have different preferences regarding their deployments.

like institutions, which are expected to deal with issues of criminal violence, may even be part of the problem (Auyero 2007; Cruz 2015; Sabet 2013; Arias 2006).

Second, following this inadequacy of existing police-like institutions, the literature on public perceptions on public security has pointed out time and again that citizens in Latin America feel threatened by the rise in criminal violence (Trelles and Carreras 2012; Carreras 2013; J. J. Bailey, Parás, and Vargas 2013; Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017). Insecurity affects citizens' political attitudes in considerable ways and may lead democratically elected governments to consider favoring the uses of the military for public security purposes (Neuteboom and Soeters 2017; Easton et al. 2010).

Third, it is about dealing with historical legacies of repressive regimes that have happened not so long ago (Aguero and Brückner 2018). These democratic governments were established years ago and had to reform their civil-military relations with varying levels of success (Pion-Berlin 2009a), through developing a baseline level of civilian control (Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000b; Pion-Berlin 2016). This means that militaries, in varying degrees, are by and large not menaces to democratically elected governments, but organizational actors with preferences that may differ from the ones in the central government, leading to interactions between principals; the democratically elected government, and agents, the military itself (Pion-Berlin 2012).

Fourth and more importantly, the dissertation faces head-on a question long ignored by the scholarship of civil-military relations in Latin America. The scholarly debate has mostly focused on the potential consequences of such missions. Some scholars see the deployment of the military for internal security missions as a pathway for human rights

violations, deterioration of civilian control over the military, and ultimately democratic deconsolidation of Latin American democracies (Diamint 2015; Zaverucha 2008; A. Passos and Martínez 2019; D'Araújo 2016; Flores-Maciás and Zarkin 2019; Jenne and Martínez 2022). On the other hand, another strand of work on military missions has shown that under certain circumstances, the military can be deployed for internal security missions and not commit abuses, acting with professionalism, restraint and under the control of the democratic government (Pion-Berlin 2017; 2016).

Regardless of normative preferences – reflecting on whether the troops should be executing these missions - the step I take in this dissertation is to further the scholarly debates beyond the issues raised by the potential consequences of such deployments, to understand under which conditions they happen, while offering as explanatory factors the preferences of governments and military officers, under institutional and popular constraints. By doing so, the contribution of this dissertation is to urge the scholarly community to have an integrated view of the patterns of deployment of the military for public security purposes. I argue, following on the footsteps of David Pion-Berlin (2016), that the literature must look at the phenomena of internal uses of the military for what they are: a dependent variable that needs to be explained (Pion-Berlin 2016).

This dissertation follows a theorized causal path between the rise of public security threats and state inadequacies to address them with police-like institutions to the governmental deployment of the military for public security purposes. In-between the causal path, the dissertation posits that the key to explaining the patterns of such deployments is to account for the preferences of democratically elected governments, and the military.

I employ a multi-method design that involves the following analytical steps. First leveraging a novel measure of deployments from an existing dataset of events, I pursue cross-national statistical analysis of military deployments for public security purposes from 1995 to 2020 for all Latin American democracies with sizeable militaries. I find support for the untested conventional wisdom that in isolation crime rates matter to explain deployments. In addition to this contextual factor, political variables matter: civilian control over the military is an important explanatory factor of deployments. I also find that the interaction between crime rates and civilian control over the military is positively associated with the outcome of interest and so is the interaction between civilian control over the military and military propensity to execute public security missions.

Second, leveraging a set of interviews with high-ranking military officers, archival research and FOIA requests, a second empirical chapter digs deeper into the decision-making process and the interactions between politicians, who seek to deploy the military, and the troops, who would rather not execute such missions but must comply with civilian orders. I find that civilian control over the decisioning process explains large-scale deployments and that the military, in the context of declining civilian control levels will either re-design interventions or avoid them altogether. What motivates the military's propensity to execute public security missions, is both their thinking on how appropriate they are and the risks – reputational and of prosecution – in case misdeeds take place while they execute these missions.

Finally, digging deeper into the political incentives for the Federal Government to leverage its civilian control over the military to deploy them in public security missions,

and drawing on an original dataset, I pursue a subnational statistical analysis for the military deployments for public security in Brazil. I find that crime rates are a predictor of deployments when interacted with a political variable: the character of the alliance between the president and state governors. Due to the character of Brazil's party system, state governors who are allies but not co-partisans with the president are more likely to receive deployments than co-partisan governors or opposition governors. Findings are illustrated by a brief case study of a massive military deployment in 2010, in which President Lula sent in the military at the request of an important non-copartisan ally, governor Sérgio Cabral.

The next section discusses the literature on military missions more extensively, followed by an explanation of the more general theoretical framework of the dissertation. The fourth section discusses the analytical steps taken to address the research questions posed by this project.

2 The armed forces public security deployments: a review of the literature

The literature on civil-military relations had the treatment of internal missions of the military revalidated by the work of Desch (1999). According to the author, the threat environment affects the patterns of civilian control over the military: countries with high levels of domestic security threats and lack of external threats struggle with securing democratic control over the armed forces. Such is the Latin American predicament. In addition, the end of the Cold War and the post 9-11 security landscape provide the context: scholars have described challenges of a new security agenda that would require debates on

redefining the missions of the military with a possible return inward (Santos 2004; Hunter 1994; Andreas and Price 2001; Caforio and Kummel 2005; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000b). Democratic Latin American governments tackled the structural changes of the post-Cold War period by tasking the military with several non-defense roles, such as peacekeeping and civic action missions, and taking part in the efforts of the "war on drugs" (Pion-Berlin, Ugues, Jr., and Esparza 2012:107-110).

The literature on civil-military relations is prolific on discussing issues of civilian control over the military, but the study of non-defense missions, with notable exceptions (Easton et al. 2010; Shemella 2006; Jaskoski 2013; Pion-Berlin 2016; Head and Mann 2009; Amorim Neto 2019) is rather scarce. Therefore, the role of the military in Latin America remains a significant puzzle (Diamint 2015:155).

Among these exceptions, Pion-Berlin (2016: 22-23) points out that this literature had four primary areas of concern when it addresses military deployment within a state's borders. First, internal security operations are thought to be conducive to major human rights violations because of the lethal nature of defense-related military operations, as opposed to what is expected from police-like institutions. We expect police officers to exercise gradation in the use of force and to be well-versed in mediation and de-escalation in the use of violence, while military officers are experts in the decisive use of lethal violence on behalf of a nation state. When there is blurring between these lines, scholars expect disastrous human rights outcomes (Diamint 2015; Zaverucha 2008; A. Passos and Martínez 2019; D'Araújo 2016; Benítez Manaut 2010; Sotomayor 2012; D'Araujo 2013). This is particularly problematic in Latin America, where the national security doctrines

carried out during the long-lasting right-wing military dictatorships made it a priority for the armed forces to fight the "internal enemy," brutally killing and torturing thousands of left-leaning citizens (Aguero and Brückner 2018; Alves 1985; Pion-Berlin 1989).

If civilian control over the military is a necessary condition for democracy, having the military out of public security is an essential condition for civilian control, according to most of the literature. Therefore, the conclusion by these scholars is that democratic regimes that employ armed forces for internal security tasks are inherently "fragile democracies" or semi-democracies (Zaverucha 2000; 2005; 2008). Human rights violations by the military can undermine people's perceptions of the rule of law and democracy, perpetuating the inefficacy of the state institutions its soldiers are momentarily replacing (Jenne and Martínez 2022; Diamint 2015, 159–60).

Second, there are concerns regarding military effectiveness, as militaries drift away from their main expected missions (preparation for war) into carrying out non-war missions (Desch 1999; 1996; R. A. Brooks 2003; R. A. Brooks and Stanley 2007). Over time, accumulating responsibilities other than war-fighting can cause permanent doctrinal change and undermine a country's national security. Countries may lose their war-fighting capabilities because their military has turned inwards. Additionally, once given internal security tasks, corruption within the military can increase if criminals are able to infiltrate the armed forces, a known concern among armed forces of Latin America.

Third, the literature demonstrates concerns with mission creep and negative consequences of "militarization"(Graham 2012; Bachmann, Bell, and Holmqvist 2014; Holmqvist 2014). Aware of the pathologies resulting from the involvement of the U.S.

military in state-building efforts in addition to a war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan, scholars worry about unwarranted shifts of goals during the execution of a mission (Adams and Murray 2014; Cancian 2019; R. Brooks 2016). Soldiers begin a mission performing "x" tasks, and after some time they end up doing "x,y,z" under the same rubric.

Fourth and relatedly, the military can gain leverage by constantly performing internal security missions. This is important because, since the end of the age of military regimes in Latin America, civilians have been implementing strategies to ensure civilian control over the military, with varying levels of success but managing to avoid military coups (Pion-Berlin and Martinez 2017). However, if the government depends on the military to carry out a significant mission, then officers may bargain with the civilians to obtain benefits, perks, and privileges (Pion-Berlin 2012; Mathias, Zague, and Santos 2019; Benítez Manaut 2010; D'Araujo 2013; Harig and Ruffa 2022). This could pose a threat to democratic governance, with unelected agents of the state gaining more and more policymaking capacity (Beliakova 2021a; 2021b; Diamint 2015), and perpetuating democratic deficits (Jenne and Martínez 2022).

On a normative basis, the scholarship that cautions against the use of the military for public security missions makes a convincing argument for not wanting the military to deal with public security. This often assumes that civilian control over the military is one that is achieved by putting the military in the barracks, removing people in uniform from any domestic security activities. The well-argued risks are enormous. No country would need to have its soldiers deployed for missions that the police should be carrying out. When they deploy domestically, it is essential to highlight that the uses of the military in re-

democratized Latin America are fundamentally different from the military interventions of the past both in terms of the aims of those actions and the level of civilian control and military autonomy. A great deal of the literature fails to acknowledge that once civilian control over the military has made substantial progress, with civilian politicians being in a much stronger position than in the past, civilian control may be conducive to more military public security deployments. It is by the hand of democratically elected presidents that the troops take back the streets (Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2020).

In sum, the military has been used for public security tasks throughout Latin America, and one must understand this reality by theorizing about and empirically assessing its causes. What if governments feel pressured to fulfill the gaps in security provision by deploying their military for internal security work? Under certain circumstances, the military are deployed for internal security missions without abuses, acting with professionalism, restraint, and, most importantly, under the control of the democratic government (Pion-Berlin 2016). If so, the military deployment for public security missions must be treated as a dependent variable, which is what this dissertation does, investigating its causes.

3 Theoretical framework

This framework follows up on an agenda set up by Amorim Neto (2019) to assess how increases in civilian influence can be associated with changes in defense policy in Latin American democracies. He concludes his paper with the following, when analyzing the case of Brazil:

> "The problem is more complex because the mass public is internalist and civilian elites are pragmatic about the domestic use of the military. Brazil is thus trapped in a vicious cycle. The military has ample prerogatives in internal security; crime rates keep rising; state police forces are deficient; civilians frequently call the armed forces to perform law-and-order operations; the mass public supports these operations; the military appreciates the short-term budgetary and reputational benefits generated by such operations; and the combination of all these conditions weakens civilian resolve to reduce military prerogatives in internal security. **This cycle is probably not unique to Brazil**." (Amorim Neto 2019, 24–25)

Illustrated by the box around the central government and military leadership in the Figure 1.1, civil-military relations is the arena (Egnell 2013) where the civilian and military preferences may be in agreement or disagreement. If threats arise, namely the rise in criminal violence, how do governments react to popular constraints, decide on tasking the military with new missions, and assure compliance with such missions on the part of the military?

Drawing from the literature on institutional sources of military change (Avant 1994) and the literature on military missions (Pion-Berlin 2016; Jaskoski 2013), it is necessary to account for the mechanism by which civilian politicians can obtain the desired behavior from military: their compliance with new missions (Pion-Berlin 2012). Therefore, overarching framework to explain military deployments must include, at least at the theoretical level, the dynamics between soldiers, civilians and politicians. Though the subsequent chapters specify the reasoning for hypotheses to be tested, there is an overall theoretical framework I will now outline. Figure 1.1 below summarizes it:

Figure 1. 1 – Theoretical Framework



The dependent variable at the end of the causal chain in the Figure 1.1 is the pattern of military deployment for public security. The dissertation focuses on studying a subset of what is defined by Pion-Berlin (2016) as internal security missions of the military. This term is an umbrella of potential uses of the military within a country's borders and is a spectrum including missions against (1) armed insurgents, (2) drug-traffickers, (3) other transnational criminal organizations, (4) criminal gangs, and (5) common criminals. Counterinsurgency missions are excluded from this project and the remaining four dimensions of internal security are included. Why? While

counterinsurgency is a type of mission that challenges the sovereignty of the state which may justify military deployments, the remaining dimensions are ones in which, at least theoretically, governments should have other organizations available to tackle these threats. The missions I consider in this project also include some degree of systematic planning, so episodic intervention for anti-riot activities is also not included.

In order to identify domestic deployment of the military for public security purposes, this project devises a measure of the patterns of military deployment for public security purposes as well as leverages qualitative information on major deployments and subnational level data for Brazil.

3.1 Crime rates

The first step on the causal path illustrated in the Figure 1.1 is the existence of rising crime levels. This contextual variable sets the stage for both the citizens and the government of Latin American countries. Domestic security remains a challenge in Latin America. The decline in policing capacity has been accompanied by a rise in mid-level security threats against which established police forces can do very little (Pion-Berlin 2010; Heyer 2011). As a result, criminal violence is endemic in Latin America's consolidating democracies and has been on an upward trend since re-democratization began (Bailey 2008; Bergman 2018b). Drug Trade Organizations (DTOs) have grown more powerful as consumer markets in the developed and developing world were eager for more product. DTOs have amassed considerable firepower to the point of challenging the power of the state and its agents who should be enforcing the rule of law (Arias 2006; Stepputat 2007).

The division of labor for the provision of security is such that police officers handle crime deterrence and law enforcement issues. The armed forces prepare for war and externally oriented missions such as peacekeeping, with limited roles regarding domestic functions (Brooks 2019). Latin America has little history of interstate conflict: Brazil, for example, fought its last interstate conflict in the region in 1864, and elsewhere in 1945, when it sent troops to fight in Italy during World War II.

On the other hand, the police forces' incapacity to exert the missions they exist for can be attributed to several factors, ranging from lack of investment in policing capabilities, inadequate training, low salaries (Ortega 2018), leading to high levels of corruption and/ or just plain shirking. Analysts have pointed out that policing in Latin America is part of the problem, not the solution to crime (Auyero 2007; Cruz 2015; Sabet 2013; Arias 2006; Fuentes 2005; Lessing 2017; Huguet and Szabó de Carvalho 2008; Arthur Trindade Maranhão Costa 2011). The reforms employed to de-militarize public security, a legacy of the authoritarian period, and to decentralize police forces are the primary focus of the literature regarding state actions to mitigate citizen security in Latin America (Fuentes 2005; Hinton 2005; Ahnen 2007; Ortega 2018; Bergman 2018b; Sain 2008; Huggins 1998). The content of these reforms, as an unexpected consequence of democratic consolidation, contributes to the rise in insecurity in Latin America (Pion-Berlin 2010).

Per the gray arrows in the Figure 1.1, a possible explanation of the primary outcome of interest of this dissertation would assess the impact of the crime rates on the likelihood of countries assigning their military to pursue internal security work. Such theorization would predict that levels of deployment will increase as crime rises. While this is the

conventional wisdom, it remains untested for a broad sample of countries because of measurement problems in the dependent variable and other independent variables of theoretical interest. To be clear, before this dissertation, to the best of my knowledge, no published work has sought to address the impact of crime rates on military deployments for public security in the context of large-n analysis.

3.2 Civilian control over the military under democratic constraints

The democratic constraints play a role, in addition to the weight of the contextual factor of crime rates. Deploying the military in a democracy is, above all, a decision made by the central government with civil-military relations mattering and the governments' political concerns mattering greatly. In a democracy, the electoral cycle plays a part, and civilian politicians may use military deployment as a signaling device, showing to the public and political allies that they genuinely care about the issue of security just as much as the public and political allies do.

Insecurity produces effects on the political attitudes of citizens, and politicians are aware of this. The literature on public perceptions of public security has pointed out that feeling threatened by the rise in criminal violence, has sizeable effects on citizens' political attitudes. It leads them to trust institutions less, it reduces turnout, it affects voting and protesting (Trelles and Carreras 2012; Carreras 2013; Visconti 2019). If the political attitudes of individuals are affected by levels of violence, governments may consider favoring the uses of the military for public security purposes (Neuteboom and Soeters 2017; Easton et al. 2010; J. J. Bailey, Parás, and Vargas 2013; Pion-Berlin and Carreras

2017). Ideally, hybrid forces such as *gendarmeries* would be created to tackle these threats (Lutterbeck 2004); however, the lack of such organizations with enough firepower, adequate capabilities and training necessary to create them may set up the incentives for democratically elected civilian leaders to draft the military, which are overall remarkably trusted institutions by the citizenry, to act in public security missions (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2011:41).

The second step on the causal path illustrated in the Figure 1.1 is citizens' attitudes toward military deployments. The public growingly cares about the issue of security provision and the inadequacy of governmental institutions to do so. Not all relationships between variables are testable, because of data availability and measurement problems. Such is the case with citizens' preferences regarding military deployments: as there is no survey coverage for all countries and time periods regarding how citizens would like their military to be deployed, this dissertation does not directly test the impact of citizens preferences. Nonetheless, it assumes that citizens perceptions are considered by politicians who have the authority to decide on military missions.

Then comes the issue of civilian control over the military, as shown in the Figure 1.1. Politicians face a dilemma when considering the deliverance of the public good of security: they face the urgency of a threat and have short time horizons (Ames 1990; Geddes 1994; Kaufman 1999; Bersch 2016). Since they are democratically elected and often seek reelection or to elect somebody they support, the product of such a predicament is that if they can rely on the military to assist them in signaling that they are delivering on public security, they will do so.

Why? The military possess innate organizational strengths that no other state organization has. The armed forces are a lethal, large contingent of public servants distributed nationally, operating in combat formations, with enormous logistical capacity and under a rigid system of command and compliance (Pion-Berlin 2016:31-33). They have built-in capability, organization and infrastructure that could be called upon at a moment's notice. They have a large number of personnel at their disposal, tremendous logistical capabilities to move personnel and materials and deployment-ready forces of at least two brigades (about 3,000 troops). The level of skills they have to fulfill such missions may vary but if there is an organization that can implement training protocols it is them. The military demonstrates versatility, able to adapt its organizational structure to new, challenging scenarios (Pion-Berlin 2016). The military's first organizational advantage is structural. The military's customary hierarchical structure of decision-making, when operating as it should, can ensure that orders that are emitted are delivered and acted upon with dispatch. The armed forces also have the advantage of having at their immediate disposal, facilities all over the country, as they are national in scope.

The final and perhaps most important advantage has to do with economy of means (Pion-Berlin 2016). The military is an organization that is already paid for, staffed, and by and large, ready to go. It is already part of the national budget, and comes equipped with the personnel, machines and materials. As mentioned before, creating new security capacity would mean incurring huge costs not to mention that such investment would necessitate considerable time to bring such efforts to fruition. The military can be taken off the proverbial shelf and deployed at a moment's notice.

I theorize that politicians hold a pragmatic vision about military deployments. One might argue that military deployments are ineffective for reducing crime, and the evidence regarding this type of policy intervention has shown that it does have pernicious results (Succi Jr. and Saint-Pierre 2020; Zepeda Gil 2018; Calderón et al. 2015; Viana 2021). Nevertheless, short-term horizons of civilians also impact these policy choices. Politicians are signaling to the electorate that they are doing something about security – even if results are mixed. To them, this is better than not doing anything and more effective for short-term gains than creating state capacity which is a long-term project.

This may be true for both right-wing politicians seeking to implement a "*mano dura*" (tough on crime) strategy on fighting crime (Bonner 2019) or left-wing politicians seeking to broaden their base of support by showing that they can also be tough on crime (Battaglino 2019; Cortinhas and Vitelli 2020). Politicians respond to security threats by symbolically delivering to citizens, taking the military off the "proverbial" shelf rather than creating state capacity out of thin air by, for example, recruiting, funding, and training a new security force. Given the need to signal that they are addressing security needs, governments can count on a political instrument with valuable organizational strengths.

Considering the incentives of politicians to deploy the military, one must also consider determinants at the subnational level, and how it relates to civilian control over the military. The way civilian control is leveraged is such that the deliverance of public security by the central government can be used to garner political support from both local officials and voters who hold those local officials accountable. Therefore, it is necessary to dig deeper into the civilian politicians' preferences regarding military deployments by

understanding if and how the impact of the criminal threat is influenced by the relationship between the presidents and governors. In doing so, I seek to incorporate insights from the political economy of redistribution literature into civil-military relations. The problem of military deployment explained at the subnational level, I argue, pertains to the politics of redistribution of resources in the context that federalist arrangements and fragile political coalitions are typical of more recently established party systems.

To deploy the military, as mentioned before, the government must have a modicum of control over the military. For decades, the literature of civil-military relations, with or without focusing on Latin America, has thrived and been at the center of the comparative politics debate. From the founding studies of this academic theme (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Nordlinger 1977; Finer 1976) - to classic works on the Latin American cases (Stepan 1971; Coelho 2000; Rouquié 1987; Fitch 1986), the research agenda of civil-military relations was to pursue the systematic study of how governments overcame - or not - the following predicament: armed forces protect society from external threats and ensure public order, and in doing so, they are powerful enough to undermine the democratic regime erected by the society they serve (Feaver 1996; Bruneau and Matei 2008).

In western developed countries, scholarship focused on the interplay between civil-military relations and the primary function of these militaries (warfighting). Given external threats countries like the United States faced during the Cold War, the recommendation by Huntington (1957) was simple: governments should establish a system of civilian control by granting officers autonomy over their professional sphere of action while ensuring that democratically elected civilians manage the polity. Such division of labor is optimal, in

Huntington's framework, both to maximize military effectiveness in warfighting and also to minimize the potential of military intervention in politics.

In Latin America, this literature has focused on issues of civilian control over the military, under a fear of military intervention in politics. A fear well warranted given the astounding number of military and military-backed regimes in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s (M. R. S. de Lima et al. 2017) . Military professionalism did not mean that the military-backed away from meddling in governmental affairs, as Huntington theorized; it became a feature of their patterns of intervention in politics (Stepan 1986; Fitch 1998). The national security doctrines of the period gave a virtually unlimited scope of action to the military, either when they directly governed countries in Latin America or when they were a crucial part of the ruling authoritarian coalition. The product of the actions of the military was torture, state terrorism, murder of the political opposition, suspension of fundamental liberties, and several operations to fight rural and urban insurgencies (Loveman 1999).

The established democratic regimes reformed their civil-military relations with varying levels of success, establishing a baseline level of civilian control which meant that the military as a political actor was no longer a menace to democracy (Pion-Berlin 2009a; 2016; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000b). Contrary to the past history of military intervention in politics, the military is being asked to deal with non-defense-related issues by the democratically elected leaders who seek to respond to extreme levels of criminal violence and avoid the deterioration of governmental legitimacy.

This is a story of delegation. Provided that governments consider deploying the military, theorizing about the power to compel the military to adopt new missions becomes paramount, hence civilian control over the military is a central issue. The clearest formulation of this type of mechanism is shown in a recent paper by Beliakova (2021a). Deference takes place when "civilian authorities delegate policy tasks typically fulfilled by civilian actors to members of the military profession" (Beliakova 2021a, 60–61). The executive power does so because it is motivated to try to increase popular approval for a given policy using military participation, which is a highly visible tool (Beliakova 2021a, 71). And this is where I part ways with Beliakova (2021a).

If in her framework, delegating tasks to the military is an erosion of civilian control over the military, I argue that this is not necessarily always the case. It is because of civilian control that delegation by deference will happen. Delegating a task to an agent, though it implies the classic problems of agency and monitoring that are typical of the principal-agent framework (Avant 1993; Feaver 2003), it does not necessarily imply an immediate shift in the balance of power between civilians and members of the military profession. There are plenty of examples of successful delegation without loss of civilian control (Pion-Berlin 2019a; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000a; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2010; 2005). Deterioration of civilian control after delegation of tasks is an empirical question scholars should focus on, not an assumption.

Therefore, concerns regarding re-election, political support and deliverance for the electorate are a source of presidents' preferences, they must control the military to order them to the streets. To proceed with these deployments, civilian leaders must have enough

control over the military to rely on the troops as a tool of state coercive capacity without the adamant fear of coups or deviations from governmental plans. In other words – the military must be under civilian control before civilian politicians are willing to authorize public security deployments.

3.3 Military propensity to execute missions of public security

Civil-military relations is an arena where the civilian politicians and the military may have similar preferences, or they may radically differ (Egnell 2013). In normal conditions of civilian supremacy, a civil-military bargain for tasks and missions would not exist, and the militaries of Latin America would accept their missions without blinking. Baseline control has been mostly achieved, but the military remains a powerful organizational actor. Full civilian supremacy over the armed forces in Latin America is an aspiration (Silva 2001:12). Besides, even in western developed countries with advanced mechanisms of civilian control over the military, governments consult with their military for threat assessments (Cleary and Mcconville 2006; Egnell 2013; Bruneau and Croissant 2019), meaning that there is room for military officers to influence the way in which policies are carried out.

There is substantial potential friction between the military's installed capacity, mission beliefs and the nature of missions at hand. For that, it is paramount to understand military doctrine, defined as the military's institutionalized beliefs about how military force is employed (Høiback 2011; Horowitz 2010; Sloan 2012; Høiback 2016; Graham 2012; Gray 2006), and how it is shaped by both institutional and cultural factors. Given the lack

of interstate conflicts in the region, I argue, combining insights from the organizational and cultural frameworks of studying military doctrine is a promising approach to study Latin American cases.

A "cultural" strand postulates that organizational culture of the military is a crucial factor for military doctrine (Uz Zaman 2009; Mansoor and Murray 2019; Legro 1994; Donnithorne 2017; Long 2016; Kier 1995). The distribution of power in the international system and geographic and technological factors are important (Posen 1984), but military culture does not derive from functional demands and structural imperatives. It has an independent explanatory power in matters of military doctrine, as military preferences are endogenous and should be understood in their cultural context. A bureaucratic politics approach is interested in understanding military doctrine as a result of bureaucratic organizations that clash over preferred policy outcomes (Avant 1994; Donnithorne 2017; Esterhuyse 2013; Herspring 2011).

In this sense, three elements are essential to understanding military doctrine when it comes to considering cultural and bureaucratic approaches: 1) the relationship of the military to the State, 2) whether the military feels accepted and valued by the dominant political actors, and 3) what skills the officers regard as important and professionally rewarding (Kier 1995:70). Latin American military modernization by and large has created armed forces that are trained and prepared for conventional combat due to military emulation of the armed forces of western industrialized countries (Nunn 1983; 1995; Resende-Santos 1996; 2007; Silva 2001; Grauer 2015). This long historical process happened despite the lack of major interstate conflicts (Mares 2001; Kacowicz et al. 2021).

When asked to perform non-traditional missions, military doctrine is the "hard drive" that may have to be altered, along with additional protocols and training. During the Cold War, Latin American armies got involved in counterinsurgency warfare, pursuing and killing citizens they were supposed to protect. The attempts to get away from these all-encompassing national security doctrines led Latin American militaries to largely fall on old practices of preparation for an external war that may never come or to retool their mission preferences towards peacekeeping (Velázquez 2010).

Therefore, the fourth step of this theorized causal path is to account for military considerations and the strategic interaction between the civilian principals and the military leaders. Military will defend their corporate interests (Nordlinger 1977), or simply their mission beliefs – what they think should be the most professionally rewarding missions (Fitch 1998).

Many militaries turn toward other missions that could justify budget allotments and where governments need them to fill gaps left by others, or find a new professional identity (Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2022; 2020). I argue that we cannot "essentialize" armies by assuming that they exhibit equal propensity to execute different missions or that they all possess the same capabilities. Not all militaries take to police-like work kindly, nor do they consider it appropriate and compatible with their prior experience, doctrine and training. Missions that are, in the military mind, professionally degrading or otherwise incompatible with the military's *raison d'etre* are ones they prefer not undertaking- even when national laws enable them to do so (Dunlap 1999; Campbell and Campbell 2010; Zimmermann

2005). But there are other militaries that have been long-accustomed to filling those roles, and do so without objection.

Mission preferences, in other words, will often vary from country to country and from time to time (Fitch 1998; Pion-Berlin 1988; Scharpf 2018). Military preferences do impact military behavior when interacting with civilian leadership at the decision, design and execution stages of a military operation. Different training profiles and different levels of propensity to comply may appear. If armies tend to prefer predictable scenarios of deployment, ones close to their essential toolkit (Jaskoski 2013; Pion-Berlin 2016), it is of paramount importance to empirically assess what the toolkit is for each country. Their propensity to comply with missions of public security, I argue, is a function of their prior deployment experience, training and doctrine, but also their mission beliefs and the risks troops face if they execute their mission. Therefore, they may not prefer to act in those missions, at least not without proper compensation, training and legal shielding. Therefore, the more internally oriented the doctrine, the more likely these armies are to be compliant with new missions ordered by the government.

To sum up, this is a story of delegation of security policy execution to an actor who at best considers policing as a secondary task and at worst would rather never execute it. Therefore, this potential of resistance resulting from differences between the deployments and divergence from military preferences requires that civilians have enough power to induce the expected behavior.

4 Research design

A multi-faceted question, particularly with the richness of case-based evidence in the studies of civil-military relations requires a multimethod design. Provided that there is plenty of room for single method research, and there is certainly space for questioning the validity of combining different methods to answer research questions (Ahmed and Sil 2012), the broad nature and scope of the research endeavor proposed in this dissertation led me to consider the application of a multi-method research design. Part of the literature insists on the use of triangulation strategies, answering the same or similar research questions with different methods (Goertz 2017). Alternatively, another branch of the literature acknowledges that different research methods are adequate for different research questions (Seawright 2016) and that the combination of methods has pre-requisites in data availability and in the kinds of research questions, for example, in the availability of an established conventional wisdom (Weller and Barnes 2016).

Combining methods means crafting research designs that tackle different aspects of the theoretical construct proposed in the framework above. The analysis of the cases of military deployment for public security purposes in Brazil provide the critical case-based evidence for which fieldwork, interviews, and archival work have been done in 2020-2021, amidst the global covid-19 pandemic, allowing for obtaining causal process observations (J. Mahoney 2012; Collier 2011). However, given concerns about the generalizability of single case studies, additional steps on the research design must be taken. Therefore, this dissertation draws on quantitative data upon which case selection procedures are justifiable

(Lieberman 2005): it is not just a Brazil story, it is a dissertation on a phenomenon about which Brazil is just one case that warrants further attention.

The dissertation proposes a combination of analytical techniques to account for different stages of the theorized causal path: (1) a cross-national analysis of the patterns of deployment with a novel use of existing events data, (2) case-based evidence leveraging causal process observations to tease out the mechanism of the interactions between the civilian politicians and the military leadership by carefully analyzing Brazil with within-case comparisons of instances in which major military deployments took place and did not, (3) digging deeper into the incentives civilian to deploy the military by pursuing a quantitative subnational-level analysis of the patterns of deployment for Brazil, using an original dataset and illustrating the findings with a brief case study. Below I briefly describe these steps and the findings.

4.1 Cross-national analysis of Military Deployment in Latin America for public security purposes

To analyze the patterns of military deployment for public security purposes in Latin America, the endpoint in the causal chain in the Figure 1.1, the dissertation pursues a cross-national analysis at the national level, where the dependent variable is the levels of deployment. In particular, I assess its statistical association with crime levels, civilian control over the military, and military propensity to execute missions of public security. This component relies on a cross-national dataset that includes 14 Latin American democracies between 1995-2020: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican

Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.

Generating novel measures for key variables, I perform what it is, to the best of my knowledge, the first-ever cross-national statistical analysis of military public security deployments. Adjusting for important potential confounders and using fixed-effects regressions, I find support for the untested conventional wisdom that crime rates are an important predictor of deployments. I find support for my hypothesis that the impact of crime is enhanced by civilian control over the military. I also find that organizational features of the armed forces and levels of civilian control positively interact to explain levels of deployment.

4.2 Qualitative data

In order to investigate the interactions between civilian and military leadership regarding potential deployment in the context of institutional constraints and citizens' pressure, the dissertation will seek to find causal-process observations through case-based research. This chapter, the qualitative component of the dissertation explains large-scale deployments of the military as a function of the interaction between civilian control over the military and military preferences.

The case research is on Brazil, a country formerly ruled by a military dictatorship; a typical case of a high crime nation, with a politically influential military trained and indoctrinated for conventional warfare; and a significant societal preference for military intervention. Following a known Latin American trend after the downfall of military-

backed authoritarian regimes, Brazil established baseline civilian control over its armed forces and has been calling on them to tackle the rise of violent crime in "Guaranteeing Law and Order" operations. Brazil, in the framework of this dissertation, is then considered to be a case that allows me to probe causal mechanisms that may either confirm or disconfirm a given theory (Seawright and Gerring 2008). In this case, I seek to understand the role of civilian control and how it interacts with military propensity to execute missions.

To maximize representative variation while leveraging the advantages of studying a country in-depth, the analytical focus is on intra-case comparisons, selecting major military deployments for public security work, and an instance where it did not. For moments of deployment, archival fieldwork and interviews seeks to investigate the decision to use the military in the *Alemão-Penha* and in the *Maré Favelas* in Rio de Janeiro (2010 and 2014, respectively) and the decision to intervene in the entire public security of Rio de Janeiro in 2018. The negative case analysis focuses on the instance of non-deployment of the military for public security purposes during the Bolsonaro administration (2019-2022). At that point, a far-right former military officer with campaign promises to pursue a tough on crime strategy and increase military deployments to achieve such goal simply did not do so. The focus on intra-case comparisons allows to control for unexpected heterogeneity that is typical from cross-case comparisons involving different countries and provide substantial leverage to explore causal mechanisms (James Mahoney, 2000). The chapter draws on specialized literature, FOIA requests and interviews carried out with high-ranking military officers. The chapter finds that the moments where the degree of civilian control over the military was the highest coincided with the largest public

security deployments of the military. It finds also that military conduct is heavily motivated by its mission preferences and risks – both individual and collective – in case there is collateral damage in public security operations.

A note on the interviews is in order. Though I have conducted interviews on my own, the bulk of the interviews leveraged in this dissertation have been conducted with the Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV), where I was a visiting researcher. The political climate, including the overall hostility of military officers to academics, and the overall problems of carrying out fieldwork during a pandemic, made it so that I sought to work with the FGV-CPDOC, which is an institution that is known for its reputation on conducting oral history interviews with political elites, and its connection with the armed forces in Brazil, as the solution to obtain access to most interviewees who would not have spoken to me otherwise. The interview protocol was reviewed by the University of California, Riverside Institutional Review Board (project#HS 20-238) and by the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation* Ethics committee on research with human subjects. Interviews conducted under the FGV umbrella are listed as "Interview with the Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV)." In this context, I was only not present for the interviews with Generals Braga Netto, Sérgio and Admiral Carlos Chagas, who required to be interviewed in person, in line with the current Brazilian administration's disdain for covid-19 protocols. For those interviews, I produced the questions and biographical research, which were carried out by Celso Castro and Adriana Marques. Once again, I

would like to thank Celso Castro for his generous support and for allowing me the use our interviews, which will be available in a separate edited volume, in my dissertation.

4.3 Subnational level data analysis

Searching to dig deeper into civilian preferences towards deployments, to figure out what motivates presidents to order their military to execute such missions, we must also study deployments at the subnational level, including not only large-scale operations. Not all Brazilian states are equally likely to receive military troops to police their streets. This chapter seeks to understand variation in deployment levels for public security missions in the 27 Brazilian states. In particular, I assess the impact of crime--which represents the conventional wisdom of why the Federal Government would send in the military to carry out such missions—combined with an investigation into the role of membership in governmental coalitions, inspired by the literature on the political economy of redistribution under federalism.

Drawing on an original cross-state dataset including all 27 Brazilian states between 2004-2020, I perform statistical analysis to assess the most important correlates of deployment at the subnational level. Controlled for important potential confounders such as the number of police strikes, number of police officers per capita and the number of operations of an alternative security force, I find that crime rates in isolation are not an essential predictor of deployments. However, I find evidence supporting the existence of interactive effects: violent crime ridden states are more likely to receive deployment if the governor is a member of the president's coalition, particularly if they are not in the same

party as the president (i.e, flimsy allies). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first-ever statistical analysis of military deployment levels at the subnational level for Brazil. In addition, I provide qualitative evidence from the military deployment in Rio de Janeiro in 2010 to illustrate my argument regarding how government coalitions matter to explain the outcome of interest. Presidents resort to the military to execute security policies to support governors who are members of the governing coalition but with which they do not share partisanship ties. In a highly fragmented party system, presidents are pushed to use resources to secure the support of these "flimsy" allies and not transfer resources to co-partisans, whose support they can already rely on.

Chapter 2

Crime, civilian control over the military and military propensity: explaining military deployment for public security missions in Latin American democracies

Abstract

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Latin America has experienced parallel trends of rising violent crime, consolidation of baseline civilian control over the armed forces, and frequent military deployments in public security missions. This chapter seeks to understand the unexplained variation in the levels of deployment for public security missions in Latin America. In particular, I assess the statistical association of crime and civilian control over the military on public security deployments. Drawing on an original cross-national dataset for 14 Latin American democracies between 1995-2020 and generating novel measures for key variables, I perform the first-ever cross-national statistical analysis of military public security deployments. Adjusting for important potential confounders and using fixed-effects regressions, I find support for the untested conventional wisdom that crime rates are an important predictor of deployments and support for my hypothesis that the impact of crime on the propensity to deploy is enhanced by civilian control over the military. I also find that organizational features of the armed forces and levels of civilian control positively interact to explain levels of deployment.

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Latin America has seen parallel trends of rising violent crime, consolidation of civilian control over the armed forces, and a growing frequency of military deployments in public security missions, but with substantial cross-national and unexplained variation. Military coups and regimes are infrequent in the continent, while violent crime has increased due to the presence of drug-trade organizations and militias. Citizens feel threatened and often describe violence as the biggest problem in their countries (Cruz and Kloppe-Santamaría 2019; Muggah 2017).

In the face of a perceived lack of capacity of policing institutions, some governments have resorted to sending in the armed forces in policing missions. Diamint (2015: 160) concludes that "military involvement with public security is already an irreversible fact". Yet, though much of the literature has focused on the consequences of these deployments and its potential for detrimental effects on democratic governance, a systematic analysis of the causes of military public security deployments for a broader sample over a long period of time has not been done.

This chapter does exactly that. It seeks to understand variation in the levels of deployment for public security missions in Latin America. In particular, I assess its association with crime rates, civilian control over the military, military propensity to execute such missions, and their potential interactions. Drawing on a cross-national dataset of Latin American democracies with sizeable armed forces between 1995-2020, I perform statistical analysis using fixed-effects regressions. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first-ever statistical analysis of military deployment levels for such missions.

Controlling for important potential confounders and alternative explanatory variables, I find support for the untested conventional wisdom, which states that there is a positive association between crime levels and deployments. I find robust evidence that civilian control positively moderates the security threats in its association with the outcome variables. I also find evidence for interactive effects between civilian control over the military and the degree of military propensity to adopt public security missions, measured by how inward facing the militaries are from a hardware standpoint.

The chapter also contributes to scholarship by devising new measures to be used in statistical analysis. First, it presents a measure devised to capture the dependent variable - domestic deployment of the military for public security purposes, which can be obtained rather inexpensively. This solves a long-standing problem of lack of comparable measurement of this dependent variable. Second, it presents a novel measure that seeks to capture the level of military propensity to execute public security missions by collecting data on military hardware. The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section develops the theoretical argument sketched out in this introduction, followed by the quantitative analysis of military deployment for public security purposes. The final section concludes the chapter.

2 Theory recap and hypotheses: crime, civilian control over military and military propensity to execute public security missions

Following up on the previous chapter, the theoretical argument I present seeks to assess how one contextual variable, one political variable and one organizational variable

matter to explain the outcome of interest. They are respectively, crime levels, civilian control over the military and military propensity to execute missions. Some of these factors also interact.

Latin America, in parallel with the process of civilianization and democratization of its political regime also saw a rise in "mid-level" security threats (Pion-Berlin 2010). Criminal violence is endemic in Latin America's consolidating democracies (Arias 2006). Drug Trade Organizations grew powerful and amassed considerable firepower to the point of challenging the power of the state and its agents who should be enforcing the rule of law.

If traditional security forces cannot address the issue of criminal violence in Latin America, the population may grow frustrated with the deliverance of services by these consolidating democracies, and growing evidence has been showing the armed forces are trusted institutions (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017; J. J. Bailey, Parás, and Vargas 2013). Therefore, levels of crime must play an important role to shape how governments strategize when considering tasking the military with public security tasks (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2011; Pion-Berlin 2019b).

This is the conventional wisdom on the topic, yet it remains untested because of the lack of measurement alternatives for the dependent variable that would allow scholars to accomplish more than case-based and cross-case analysis qualitative analysis. This discussion yields the first hypothesis of this chapter, which represents the untested conventional wisdom:

H1: The higher the crime rates, the higher the deployment levels will be.

Aside from this contextual variable, I argue that political variables have an impact on deployments. First off, we must consider the role of civilian control over the military, a key contribution of this dissertation. Heads of state are elected and are accountable to voters. Crime is a super salient electoral issue which can secure an election or get someone voted out of office. It can be a risky strategy to be seen as weak on crime or unwilling to support local officials in case of a public security crisis. Furthermore, building security capability is at best costly and at worse riddled with bureaucratic nightmares.

There is a vast literature on how the military was a menace to democratic regimes in the past as well as how regimes in Latin America have made progress (Casper 1995; Aguero and Brückner 2018; Pion-Berlin and Martinez 2017; Bruneau 2021; Pion-Berlin 2001). A great deal of this literature also sponsors a view that in order to achieve civilian control over the military, governments must keep the military away from security missions. I argue, contra what is regarded as the conventional wisdom, that if governments do not regard the military as a menace to democracy, they may leverage the military to execute public security missions, turning them inward.

The advantages of using the military instead of creating state capacity are clear if the short-term benefits do not bring immediate risks to the survival of the government: the military possess innate organizational strengths. They have built in capability, and infrastructure that could be called upon at a moment's notice. They are already paid for and though they can be inefficient, the military demonstrates versatility, and is able to adapt

its organizational structure to challenging scenarios. The military also have a structural advantage of having at their immediate disposal facilities all over the country, as they are national in scope (Pion-Berlin 2016). A military under civilian control will comply with government orders to operate in public security missions, if ordered. Provided that governments consider deploying the military, considerations regarding the power to compel the military to adopt new missions become central, hence civilian control over the military being a central issue. We can then formalize our second hypothesis:

H2: There is a positive association between civilian control over the military and levels of military public security deployments.

An interactive hypothesis must follow from H1 and H2, to combine the severity of the criminal threat and the power of civilian politicians to order the military to address it. We can therefore formalize our third hypothesis:

H3: Civilian control over the military is a positive moderator of the association between the crime rates and the levels of military deployment for public security purposes.

We must also account for military considerations and whether they find themselves suitable to execute public security missions. Even though they are not menaces to democracy as they were in the 1960s, they are organizational actors with different policy preferences. Militaries have mission preferences that define what their priorities should be.

It clarifies to them what soldiering is about, beyond the defense of sovereign territory against foreign attacks that is written into constitutions. Not all armies are adequately equipped for fighting wars, in a region like Latin America where inter-state war has been exceedingly rare (Pion-Berlin 2016; Mares 2001), while other forms of intra-state violence are rampant (Kacowicz et al. 2021).

The military often seek to defend their corporate interests, preserve their image as members of a prestigious government career field. Their propensity to comply with missions of public security, I argue, is a function of doctrine, training and prior deployment experience, but also considerations of risks to their careers if operations produce collateral damage. Therefore, they may not prefer to act in those missions, at least not without proper compensation and training. Then, the military may obtain many perks when doing the government's bidding or resist altogether and shirk their duties, though that is admittedly a rare outcome in contemporary Latin America (Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2020). In the context of variated degrees of civilian control over the military, and different training profiles within these militaries, different levels of propensity to comply may appear. Their degree of propensity to execute these missions informs military behavior when interacting with civilian leadership at the decision, design and execution stage of a military operation. We can therefore state the second interactive hypothesis that seeks to capture this dynamic:

H4: Civilian control and military propensity to execute missions of public security interact to explain levels of military deployment for public security purposes.

3 Empirical Analysis

3.1. Measures for the Dependent Variable: Military Deployment for Public Security Missions

The first step in my empirical analysis is to create a valid cross-national measure for military deployments for public security missions. First, we must recall what we mean by military deployments in public security. This includes four types of internal security missions as defined by Pion- Berlin (2016), meaning the use of the military against (1) drug trafficking organizations (2) other transnational criminal organizations, (3) criminal gangs, and (4) common criminals. At least theoretically, governments should have other organizations available to tackle these threats but may consider using the military. These are political decisions for which governments are responsible.

Measures to adequately capture domestic deployments of the military for public security are lacking and hence as an empirical contribution of my dissertation, I generated a continuous variable to capture the domestic deployment of the military for public security purposes. The measure for the concept of deployment draws on a machine-coded events dataset (ICEWS). They utilized over 320 news sources, including local ones in different languages, to obtain data on political events. The raw data to generate my measures is freely available at the Harvard University Dataverse (Boschee et al., 2015). In addition, the ICEWS project has a temporal coverage from 1995-2020 and is designed to minimize multiple counts for the same event using a sophisticated machine-learning algorithm.

Though there are events datasets with more, they lose in accuracy if compared to ICEWS. Because it was developed for the use of the U.S. Military in a mechanism to predict political instability, it errs on the side of caution because it seeks to avoid double-counting events. Table 2.1 below shows an example of what the dataset looks like. I generated a yearly count of events for each country in the sample, namely all Latin American electoral democracies, with sizeable militaries and which had authoritarian regimes run by the military or backed by them: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay. Temporal coverage is 1995-2020, yielding a maximum sample size of 364, though sample size is reduced to 207 due to missing data for other key variables, particularly in data for homicides and U.S. security assistance.

Table 2. 1 Example of ICEWS dataset

Event ID	Event Date	Source Name	Source Sectors	Source Country	Event Text	CAMEO Code	Target Name	Target Sectors	Target Country	Story ID	Publisher
1	7/28/99	Police (Brazil)	Police, Government	Brazil	Use conventional military force	190	Thief (Brazil)	Criminals / Gangs, Dissident	Brazil	1	O Estado de São Paulo
2	7/30/99	Military (Brazil)	Military, Government	Brazil	Use conventional military force	190	Thief (Brazil)	Criminals / gangs, Dissident	Brazil	2	O Estado de São Paulo

Since the ICEWS dataset uses the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations and Actor dictionary (CAMEO) (Schrodt 2012; 2002) to code actions, we must select the CAMEO codes that best capture the concept of military deployment for public security purposes.

The main results shown in this chapter use the measure that draws on the count of the instances of the use of conventional military force where the source is government or military, and the target are "criminals". The CAMEO code selected is 190, "Use of Conventional Military Force". Figure 2.1 below shows the data collected for this measure, and the measure does have face validity. Mexico, Brazil and El Salvador are known for their domestic deployments, and so is Guatemala, while Uruguay and Chile are not. Argentina does not legally allow its military to execute all out policing tasks (Pion-Berlin 2020) , but since 2004 it has been using its military in policing roles along the border area in joint operations with the *Gendarmeria Nacional* (Frederic 2020; Vitelli 2018).

To account for biases in the coverage and to have comparable data across countries and time periods, the measure is weighted by the total number of domestic events reported by the same database.[3] Therefore, the measure represents the number of events of deployment of the military for public security as a share of the total number of domestic events reported. Finally, to allow for comparability and more precise identification of the association between variables, the measure for the dependent variable was scaled from 0 to 100, per shown in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2. The measure has face validity as it tracks with case-based evidence of countries one would expect high and low levels of deployment (i.e, Mexico and Chile, respectively).

[3] I also ran count models and results for the independent variables of interest are virtually the same.

Figure 2. 2 Deployment of the military for public security



It is important to highlight the limitations of these measures. First, they do not represent a true count of deployment events as the data collection methods may be subject to biases in the coverage process. These are known problems with events datasets based on press data, yet this is a consistent method developed to advise the United States government on decision-making to avoid double-counting events covering hundreds of news sources. Other datasets of the same kind exist and may render more results, but, as previously mentioned, the risks with double-counting harm accuracy (M. Ward and Beger 2013). The ICEWS data has been used in several quantitative social science studies that faced rigorous peer-review (Metternich et al. 2013; M. D. Ward and Beger 2017), which, coupled with the face validity lent by my case knowledge led me to conclude that these are valid

measures of the levels of domestic deployment of the armed forces for public security purposes.

Figure 2. 3 Deployment of the military for public security missions (1995-2020)



3.2 Independent Variables

To test the hypotheses put forward by this chapter, there are three independent variables of interest: crime levels, civilian control over the military and military propensity to execute missions. To measure crime levels, I use homicide rates per 100,000 individuals, because they are a weighted measure. Data regarding crime in Latin America is plagued by inconsistencies and missingness (UNODC 2019; Abramovay 2015). Nonetheless, it is the best measure available because, in terms of reliability, homicides are relatively well coded compared to other types of crimes and have a clear definition across countries. It is regarded as a standard proxy to measure levels of violence (Inter-American Development Bank 1999; Cano and Rojido 2016). The source for homicide data is a compilation from local and international sources done by the Igarapé Institute, which kindly provided the data (Igarapé Institute 2021). What was not available in their dataset, was pulled from the UNODC database (dataUNODC 2022).

Given its importance for my theory, we must seek to measure civilian control over the military accurately and consistently. Civilian-led ministries of defense (MoD) are a crucial instrument for establishing civilian control over the military. They democratize defense policymaking by enabling elected leaders to set the political direction of and monitor the armed forces if led by civilian ministers (Bruneau and Goetze Jr. 2006; Pion-Berlin 2009a; Croissant et al. 2010; Pion-Berlin, Acácio, and Ivey 2019).

This conceptual dimension covers the civilian control the government has at its disposal to compel the military to execute missions. Of course, having a defense minister who is a civilian does not guarantee absolute control over the military, but it is a proxy

tapping into baseline control beyond avowing that coups and coup attempts frequently happening. This is a complex variable to operationalize and measure with comparable indicators valid for large samples, partially explaining why small-n studies dominate the literature on civil-military relations in Latin America. To measure the concept of civilian control over the military, one must balance concept validity with feasibility in data collection to yield the largest sample size possible. The menu of options explored by quantitative studies in civil-military relations is neither very extensive nor widely used (Eschenauer-Engler and Kamerling 2019). Quantitative studies include the annual existence of a civilian-led ministry of defense (Scartascini, Cruz, and Keefer 2018), the annual percentage of military officers in the cabinet (White 2017), and the past occurrence of military coups (Powell and Thyne 2011).

The measure used in this chapter is relatively straightforward: a binary indicator of whether the person responsible for the defense ministry in each country is a civilian, where 1 equals civilian control and 0 equals lack thereof. Data is pulled from The Database of Political Institutions (DPI), which covers the period between 1975-2020. The main source used in the DPI dataset is the *Statesmen Yearbook.* However, though the insight of collecting that data is laudable, it only codes as military officers, individuals who had a military rank in front of their names. Because of this, there is arguably a tendency to code more active-duty military officers, who are more likely to be listed with their ranks. Retired military officers often times are not listed with their ranks. Therefore, one objection regarding this measure is that it is not nuanced or that the difference between having a military officer or a civilian leading the MoD is meaningless.

The civil-military relations literature has long established that this is an issue of divided loyalties and speaks to how different the military profession is from others. The military profession is one where individuals are subject to a *total institution* (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Nordlinger 1977). Total institutions in their original sense are ones in which individuals sleep, work and play in the same space (Goffman 2007; Becker 2003). The impacts of socialization in total institutions are substantial in individuals' minds and bodies (Foucault 2007). Soldiers are cast aside and become professionals in the use of violence and a considerable change in mentality must take place. They go through a substantial process of indoctrination rendering unfeasible any assumption that military officers, when in charge of the defense sector would behave the same way as a civilian. They are thought to have divided loyalties, after serving for decades in the military (Pion-Berlin 2019a). Using this admittedly blunt measure may provide a conservative test of the weight of civilian control, because it may be biased towards undercounting the number of military officers leading defense ministries. Yet, in the absence of a more complete picture, several empirical studies have been successfully leveraging this data (Beliakova 2021b; Amorim Neto and Accorsi 2020).

Finally, I construct a measure capturing a key organizational feature of the armed forces, to account for the military propensity to execute missions of public security. Following an insight by Amorim Neto (2019), I call this measure the *degree of hardware internalism* of the armed forces. Drawing from manually compiled data from the issues of *The Military Balance* (The International Institute of Strategic Studies 2021), I calculated the percentage of light personnel carriers as a share of the total combat vehicles owned by

each military in each year. Displayed in the Figure 2.3 below, this is an indirect proxy of the degree of how internally oriented armed forces are under the plausible assumption that armies that possess mostly main battle tanks cannot feasibly deploy efficiently in policing missions. On the other hand, if an army only possesses light personnel carriers, that renders them perfect capabilities for executing policing tasks, as they can quickly move from point A to point B in the urban terrain, which is usually the *locus* of policing missions. It does hold face validity, as with the dependent variable, as several of the armed forces one expects to be more set up to execute public security missions rank high in our measure. Including this measure as an independent variable also allows us to shed some light on the interactions between civilian and military leadership to explain the outcome of interest, and pair nicely with the qualitative insights shown in the next chapter.

Figure 2. 1 Degree of Hardware Internalism, quantitative proxy for military propensity to execute public security missions



3.3 Control Variables

Included in my statistical models are control variables that could confound the relationship between the independent variables of interest and the dependent variables and some controls that could theoretically explain the outcomes of interest. First, the lagged dependent variable in this chapter is not only a convention of the analysis of cross-sectional time series data but it is of theoretical interest. It taps into prior deployment experience, which can be a strong predictor of current deployments, and any analysis that does not include it would be biased.

We must also include a variable that captures the direct influence of the citizens on military deployment. The only alternative that allows sizeable temporal coverage is the degree of trust in the military, hence my lack of claims to testing the hypotheses regarding citizens' concerns directly, thought they are included in the general theoretical framework shown in the previous chapter.

Trust in the military was measured using a survey item on the *Latinobarómetro* questionnaire (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2021). It can confound the relationship between civilian control and deployments. This is because arguably civilian control over the military can be achieved if there are low levels of trust in the military (for example, in the case of Argentina after the Malvinas war), while also affecting deployments since arguably it is not conceivable that governments would be constantly sending the military to the streets to execute police-like work if citizens do not trust the military. Trust in the military is also an indirect measure of the citizens preferences for military deployment because prior evidence of statistical tests shows that trust in the military and citizens'

preferences for military deployment in counter-crime missions are highly correlated (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017).

One must also control for the level of GDP per capita. This is a known proxy for wealth and a readily available proxy for state capacity (Dincecco and Katz 2016; Hendrix 2010). The source for this data is the V-dem dataset, which sources it from the World Bank. Second, the levels of democracy can also influence both the levels of violence and civilian control over the military and the deployment of the military in anti-crime missions. Its source is the V-dem project "electoral democracy" variable.

The government's ideology can also be an important confounder because it can arguably affect levels of violence and the deployment of the military. After all, different-leaning governments may pursue different policies in terms of public security. Scholars have argued that right-wing administrations are linked to backsliding in democratic civil-military relations (Pion-Berlin and Martinez 2017) and more military deployments in the public security realm (Bonner 2019; Rosen 2021). On the other hand, recent scholarship on Latin American cases has argued that left-wing governments are more likely to deploy the military for public security missions (Vitelli 2018; Cortinhas and Vitelli 2020; Amorim Neto 2019). Either way, the variable must be included as a control in the model and its source is the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al. 2021).[4] A variable capturing the availability of alternative security forces must be included because they affect levels of violence and military deployment. To that intent, using data from *The Military Balance*, I include a

[4] The item in the V-dem project asks coders to what extent government promotes left-wing values to justify legitimacy. It produces a continuous variable that varies from 0 to 1, reflecting the aggregation of responses by coders based on Item Response Theory.

measure that calculates the number of paramilitary security forces divided by the population of each country-year.

It is also important to introduce a control variable for the security assistance provided by the U.S. to Latin American countries. Since at least the declaration of the War on Drugs during the Nixon Administration, the government of the United States has, through its foreign policy, sought to influence the way governments use their militaries in Latin America (Rodrigues 2016; Tomesani 2018; Brancoli and Gomes 2021; Gomes and Acácio 2016). For years, the U.S. state and defense departments have been sending financial aid to have the militaries convert their mission into fighting the illegal drug trade (Herz 2002; Tokatlian 2015; Brienen 2015; Restrepo 2015; Isacson 2015; Milani 2021). The source for this data is the Security Assistance Monitor, which compiles the data obtained through Freedom of Information Requests from the U.S. State and Defense departments and The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Center for International Policy 2021). The variable is the number of United States dollars divided by the total population of each country.

Two other variables are included as controls because they are standard in the literature regarding public expenditures and allocations. In this category, we must control for federalism and military expenditures. I control for the former using a measure by the Vdem project.[5] For the latter, I include a measure of the military expenditures as a share of

[5] The V-dem codebook states that coders are asked if there are elected local and regional governments and — if so — to what extent they can operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level. It produces a continuous variable that varies from 0 to 1 due to the aggregation of responses by coders based on Item Response Theory.

the country's gross domestic product. The source for this data is the SIPRI dataset (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2021).

4 Research design

The choice of statistical models to analyze data depends on the data structure, which can induce biases in the coefficients and error terms. Since this chapter draws a cross-national dataset for 14 Latin American democracies for the period between 1995-2020, choosing an econometric technique entails an assessment if there is a need to account for autocorrelation, if there is a need to include fixed effects for both time and geographical units of analysis and to assess the existence of potential outliers that would affect the results substantively. In terms of theory, the analysis must also control for potential confounders which are variables that could theoretically affect both the independent variables of interest and the dependent variables being analyzed. Table 2.2 below portrays the summary statistics of all variables used in the statistical analysis.

Table 2. 2 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Deployment of the military for public security scaled (0-100	364	3.733	11.156	0	100
Lagged dependent variable	364	3.733	11.156	0	100
Civilian control (t-1)	364	.69	.463	0	1
Homicide rate (t-1)	313	24.722	22.258	2.7	141.7
Degree of hardware internalism (t-1)	378	75.143	20.937	30.303	100
U.S. security assistance per capita (t-1)	285	1.923	3.947	0	32.819
Left wing government (t-1)	364	-.822	.989	-2.32	1.766
Democracy (t-1)	364	.678	.141	.324	.909
Military expenditures as a share of GDP (t-1)	359	.015	.008	.003	.044
GDP per capita (t-1)	336	10114.949	4730.216	3163.83	22104.77
Level of federalism (t-1)	364	.738	.252	.336	.995
Per capita security forces (t-1)	378	.002	.001	0	.005
Trust in the military (t-1)	294	45.21	11.706	11	76

The results of the Hausman model specification test (Hausman 1978) support the hypothesis that there is a need to model heterogeneity using fixed effects.[6] A test for autocorrelation in panel data (Drukker 2003; Wooldridge 2010) supports the hypothesis

[6]Hausman (1978) specification test

	Coef.
Chi-square test value	64.428
P-value	0

that there is no autocorrelation of first order.[7] Yet, there is still a theoretical need to include a lagged dependent variable in the models, as there is substantial reason to believe that military deployments have an inertial component (i.e., deployments of the previous year may affect the deployments of the current year). Furthermore, a standard Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (Breusch and Pagan 1979) was run and indicated its existence on the data.[8]

Therefore, I followed a standard method for analyzing time-series cross-sectional data in political science (Beck and Katz 2006). The models displayed are Prais-Weinstein regressions with panel-corrected standard errors. I include year and country fixed effects to control for unobserved factors at the country and year levels. This is a panel data with Large T (26) and Small N (14). All independent variables are lagged one year because of endogeneity concerns with the dependent variable.

Finally, a note on missing data for Latin America is in order. Though the dependent variable and two independent variables of interest (civilian control and military propensity) in my theory have no missing data, the data on homicides and on the control variables is not available for all countries in the sample equally. Since I did not want to make assumptions regarding the nature of missing data, I have not performed any data imputation

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[7] Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
F(1, 13) = 1.040
Prob > F = 0.3264

[8] Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of deployment100
chi2(1) = 177.91
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

methods at the peril of losing many observations and running into issues of statistical power when calculating coefficients and error terms. If the expected N, given the number of countries and years, is 364, about half of that is lost due to missing data on one or more variables and the total sample size of the main models is 207.[9] Given the amount of variables included in the models, we still have a number above the conventional 10 observations per variable minimum threshold (Knofczynski and Mundfrom 2007; Wilson Van Voorhis and Morgan 2007).

5 Results and Discussion

First, let us discuss the main effects in models, represented in the Figure 2.4 below. All models report coefficients with the dependent scaled from 0-100, and standardized coefficients in the coefficient plots are reported with 90% confidence intervals. To allow for comparability between effect sizes all of the continuous predictors displayed in the coefficient plots are standardized, meaning their effect is to be assessed in terms of standard deviations. Full model tables are reported in the Appendix 2A.

To account for untested conventional wisdom (hypothesis 1), homicide rates is a positive and statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable in the baseline model one (p-value= 0.039). To account for hypothesis 2, taken in isolation, civilian control over the military is a positive and statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable (p-value=0.001). In other words, in support of hypotheses 1 and 2, crime levels

[9] Given missing data on variables may have to deal with degrees of state capacity, our tests represent a conservative estimate of the associations between variables since theoretically countries with less state capacity should be more likely to deploy the military. If there is missing data, they are dropped from the statistical analysis.

and civilian control contribute to explain the variation in deployment of the military for public security missions. Having a civilian defense minister on average reflect a 12-point increase in the scaled measure of the dependent variable. As for homicide rates, one standard-deviation (22.5) increase is associated with a 5-point increase in the scaled measure of the dependent variable. Taken in isolation, military propensity is not a statistically significant predictor of deployment levels, meaning that according to our tests the military is not autonomously driving deployments.

Figure 2. 2 Regression Coefficients Plot – Baseline Model



Note: R^2=0.5183, N of Countries=14, N of Observations = 207. Note: Prais-Winsten regression, panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs). Models included year and fixed effects and were implemented in Stata 16 xtpsce package.

In terms of the control variables: U.S. security assistance, democracy levels, left-wing orientation in the government, federalism and trust in the military are not statistically significant at any acceptable level. Per capita security forces are positively associated with more deployments – not less, contrary to expectations in the literature. Finally, military expenditures and GDP per capita are both negative and statistically significant predictors of deployments. If we accept GDP per capita as a proxy for state capacity, it would make sense that the lower it is, the more deployments would be taking place. As for levels of military expenditures, I did not have any prior theoretical expectations regarding coefficient signs.

5.1 Interactive models

We must understand the interactive models portrayed in the figures below. They test my two interactive hypotheses and are a key part of my theory about both how civilian control moderates the impact of crime rates, and how military propensity to execute missions interacts with levels of civilian control.

Predictors behave as expected and consistent with the baseline model, though some of the controls do not reach statistical significance. Following what is recommended by the standard literature on the topic (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu 2019), how do these hypotheses fare? Figure 2.5 shows the regression coefficients plot displaying the interactive model considering hypothesis #3. The interactive term of civilian control and homicide rates is not statistically significant, but evaluating interactive hypotheses entails not just assessing statistical significance of the

coefficient of the interactive term in the regression. It is necessary to calculate the marginal effects based on different values of the continuous predictors.

Figure 2. 3 Regression Coefficients Plot – Interactive model #1



Note: R^2= 0.5245, N of Countries=14, N of Observations = 207. Prais-Winsten regression, panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs). Models included year and fixed effects and were implemented in Stata 16 xtpsce package.

For certain values of crime rates the impact of civilian control is not statistically significant, for others it is. Figure 2.6 illustrates this point with a marginal effects plot for

both values of civilian control, while varying levels of homicide rates. These plots are useful heuristic devices to access how the impact of one variable on the dependent variable is conditional on values of a third variable (the moderator). In this case, the level of civilian control is a moderator of homicide rates.

Per Figure 2.6, as homicide rates increase, having a civilian defense minister is associated with more deployments and distinguishable from having a military officer as a defense minister. With low crime rates (below 27.7), having the military leading the defense sector has a negative impact and considering the 95% confidence intervals there are no values of homicide rates for which having a military officer as a defense minister produces an impact that is statistically distinguishable from 0.

Figure 2. 4 Marginal Effects of Civilian control based on different levels of crime rates



Throughout the majority of the sample, there is a statistically significant and meaningful difference between the impact of crime rates on deployments which vary by whether civilians run the defense sector. As crime rates increase, having a civilian defense minister is associated with more deployments and statistically distinguishable from zero in the marginal effects plots, in support of my theory. The interpretation of the constitutive terms also deserves some consideration. They must be separately included in the regression equation (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006), but should not be seen as average marginal effects of a variable on the outcome. They are the effect when the other variable they interact with is zero, which may not even exist in the sample. When civilian control is zero, homicide rates are still associated with deployments, which is consistent with hypothesis #1: at some point, crime is so severe who runs the defense sector just does not matter. When homicide rates are assumed to be zero, which does not exist in the sample, the coefficient for civilian control is statistically significant and positive.

How does hypothesis #4, that civilian control and military propensity interact to explain the outcome, fare? Figure 2.7 displays the regression coefficients. The interaction term is positive and statistically significant (p-value=0.018), but as mentioned before, evaluating the statistical significance of the interaction term is only one step in assessing interactive hypotheses. To assess how the impact of one variable on the dependent variable is conditional on values of a third variable, we must plot the marginal effects. Figure 2.8 illustrates this point with a marginal effects plot for two values of civilian control while varying levels of *hardware internalism.*

Figure 2. 5 Regression Coefficients Plot – Interactive model #2



Note: R^2=0.5305, N of Countries=14, N of Observations = 207. Prais-Winsten regression, panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs). Models included year and fixed effects and were implemented in Stata 16 xtpsce package.

Per Figure 2.8, having a military defense minister is positively associated with deployments when the degree of hardware internalism varies. As the degree of *hardware internalism* increases, if a civilian is the defense minister, levels of deployment will

increase. Substantively this means that as military propensity grows, if there is civilian control over the military more deployments are likely. If military propensity grows and the military hold control over the defense sector, deployments are less likely, allowing us to infer that it is the civilians who really have the upper hand in setting up these deployments: per the interpretation of constitutive terms and Figure 2.8 graphically, when civilian control is zero, hardware internalism is not a statistically significant predictor of deployments.

Figure 2. 6 Marginal Effects of Civilian control based on different levels of the degree of hardware internalism



In terms of explaining the variance in the data, all models explain 51% or more of the variation in the dependent variable. In sum, the statistical analysis of military deployments for public security purposes for all Latin American democracies with sizeable militaries allows us to find support for the untested conventional wisdom: crime rates are positively associated with deployments.

In support of my theory, civilian control over the military is associated with more deployments. I find support for interactive effects: that the impact of the crime levels is positively moderated by civilian control over the military. Finally, drawing on my novel measure of military propensity, *the degree of hardware internalism* I find evidence of interactive effects between this and civilian control over the military.

6 Conclusion

This chapter presented the results of the first-ever quantitative analysis of military deployment patterns for public security missions in Latin American democracies. Though it has provided support for the previously untested conventional wisdom of relating crime levels and domestic military deployment, it has shown findings regarding political and organizational variables, testing key hypotheses that derive from the theoretical framework from this dissertation.

In particular, it emphasizes the role of civilian control over the military as a predictor of more deployments, both in isolation and interacting with the size of the criminal threats. In addition, drawing from an original measure of military propensity to execute public security missions, based on military hardware, the chapter unveils an

interactive relationship between levels of military propensity and civilian control over the military to explain the deployment of the military.

The connection between crime, civilian control, military propensity and deployment is a democratic one: democratically elected politicians seek to signal that they are pursuing security policies to address concerns in their allies and in the electorate. To do so they must control the instrument of such policies: the military, which may not be set up to execute such missions. Next chapter digs into those dynamics, providing more fine-grained evidence of civilian control over the military and on the sources of military propensity to execute public security missions and process-tracing how such interactions between the executive and the military leadership takes place in an overall violent country.

Chapter 3

Explaining military deployments for public security purposes: evidence from large deployments in Brazil

Abstract

This chapter, which includes the main qualitative component of the dissertation, explains large-scale deployments of the military as a function of the interaction between civilian control over the military and the military's propensity to execute such missions, in terms of their preferences. The evidence comes from Brazil, which is a case of overall high crime, varying levels of civilian control over the years and variation on levels of deployment of the military for public security missions. The chapter draws on specialized literature, FOIA requests and interviews carried out with high-ranking military officers during fieldwork. *Contra* the conventional wisdom, moments where the degree of civilian control over the military were the highest coincided with the largest public security deployments of the military. When civilian control declined, the military will act on their preferences and will alter the course of deployments or avoid them altogether. Military behavior is shaped by what they believe to be an appropriate mission and by risks – individual and reputational – in case operations produce collateral damage.

1 Introduction

To investigate the interplay between key variables in the framework presented on chapter 1 of this dissertation, in particular how civilian control leads to more deployments of the military for public security purposes, this chapter leverages representative variation in the case of Brazil's large-scale deployments. Brazil is a former military dictatorship, and has historically enjoyed a relative absence of external threats. Instead, elites have perceived threats that do not derive from potential aggression from abroad, leading the armed forces to focus on domestic actions, constantly involved in domestic politics and executing internal security and national development missions (Stepan 1971; Coelho 2000; Desch 1999; Bruneau and Tollefson 2014). Post-democratization, the country is a typical case of high levels of violence due to powerful organized crime. Its military had to adapt to new public security missions. In additional, there is significant societal trust in the military (Ceratti, Moraes, and Filho 2015; Russo 2020), and significant societal preference for military involvement in public security issues (Harig 2021; Amorim Neto 2019).

This chapter draws on specialized literature, FOIA requests and interviews with high-profile military officers allowing us to dive into the decision-making process regarding the public security deployments.

When Brazil transitioned to democracy in 1985, the military's role was once again established as being responsible for national defense and protection of borders against foreign threats. However, the constitution still allowed the use of the armed forces on domestic security through the "*Guaranteeing of Law and Order*" (GLO) mechanism. This allows the Federal Government to order military deployments for a limited period to

perform internal security tasks to "restore" public safety (Zaverucha 2008). From 1992 to 2021, there were over a hundred of such operations, several of them in Rio de Janeiro, a city known for conflicts between police forces, drug trade organizations, and mafia-like organizations (*milícias*). The city of Rio de Janeiro had two massive GLOs, in the *Alemão* and *Penha* communities (2010–2012), and the *Maré* community (2014–2015). In 2018 then President Temer went further, ordering the military to lead a Federal Intervention in the public security sector of Rio de Janeiro, with command of all security forces in the state. Army Generals Walter Braga Netto and Richard Nunez were tasked with leading the effort, which ended in December 2018, when President Temer stepped down.

These instances of massive deployments contrast with the outcome of no-deployment during Temer's successor term. The former Army Captain Jair Bolsonaro's administration, despite a campaign rhetoric that promised more deployments and a tough on crime domestic security strategy, has not pursued major deployment of the military for public security. The only major GLO operation in this period 2019-2022 was carried out in the Amazon to combat fires and deforestation, nothing like what happened in Rio de Janeiro, where troops executed an array of policing tasks. This is rather puzzling. Why would a tough-on-crime militaristic right-wing populist leader in a country with an established past of military deployment for public security not deploy troops in anti-crime missions?

Let us understand how the variables in the framework play out to explain the outcomes, in particular the role of civilian control. I argue that the interaction between civilian control and military preferences accurately explain the variation. The next section

describes the dependent variable. Then the theoretical framework to explain the variation is shown. Then, according to key variables proposed, I proceed with process tracing considering the evidence. Alternative explanations are also considered. The final section concludes the chapter summarizing how variables work in tandem.

2 The Dependent Variable: public security Guaranteeing Law and Order Operations

2.1 The context and the operations pre-2010

In this section I provide the necessary background to understand the GLO operations before zooming in on the events of the decade from 2010 to 2022 that the chapter will focus on. During our research in official documents, in the available bibliography and from the in-depth interviews that we carried out, we were able to identify, after Operação Rio (1994)--which is the foundational experience of using the military to police the streets --three major operations that served as critical moments and milestones in the formation of the conduct of the armed forces in Op GLO. All three of them were carried out in the state of Rio de Janeiro: Operation *Arcanjo* (2010-12), Operation *São Francisco* (2014-15) and the Federal Intervention in the state of Rio de Janeiro (2018).

The GLO Ops, as we know them today, are a product of a series of doctrinal adaptations based on repeated deployments, having as a starting point the constitutional prerogative established by the Guaranteeing Law and Order provision (Art. 142, Federal Constitution of 1988). Table 3A in the Appendix lists all publicly available legislation and manuals consulted for this dissertation.

GLO Ops may involve a very heterogeneous set of armed forces domestic deployment actions such as security during elections, military police strikes, events security, anti-protest deployments, sports events security, and anti-crime operations. My emphasis in this project was on the issue of public security, hence a focus on anti-crime operations. Over the years, the government enacted laws and decrees that complement this constitutional prerogative. This allowed for the creation and development, from the year 2000 and onwards, of a legal and doctrinal framework that consolidated guidelines and the procedures that troops must follow when conducting such operations.

This endogenous process of organizational change began in the early 1990s, with Operation Rio (1994), and accelerated substantially from 2003, during the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. In the years following democratization, the domestic deployment of the military had an *ad hoc*, relatively improvised character, with no pre-existing legal basis other than Article 142 of the Federal Constitution, which defines the role of the Armed forces (Câmara Senna 2020).[10]

This was the case of military operations during the first half of the 1990s, during the Eco-92 conference and Operation Rio in 1994. In the second half of the 1990s, in the face of an escalation of violence in the country, the Brazilian Congress began to approve legislation that makes up a legal framework specifically aimed at regulating domestic deployment by the military. Complementary Law 97, was approved in 1999 – the same year of the creation of the Defense Ministry.

[10] Interview with Military Commander of the first-ever major GLO in Rio de Janeiro (1994), Retired Four-Start Retired General Roberto Jugurtha CAMARA SENNA. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 04/12/2021.

It allowed the entire security apparatus of the Brazilian State to be used in conjunction with the Armed forces, under military operational command (Government of Brazil 1999). The summoning of forces to be used to guarantee law and order must take place "after the instruments intended for the preservation of public order and the safety of people and property" provided for in the Constitution have been exhausted (Government of Brazil 1999).

The decision for such deployment must be determined by the head of any one of the three branches constituted at the federal level, i.e., the Executive, Legislative or Judiciary. Historically, all GLOs were determined by the head of the Federal Executive branch, the president of the republic, and this is consolidated in the operational manuals of the military (Benites 2019; Brasil. Ministério da Defesa. 2014).

The term "guarantee of law and order" (GLO) emerged in 2001, with the enactment of Decree n. 3,897, whose objective was to reinforce the previous law by establishing guidelines in the planning, coordination and execution of the actions in these missions (Government of Brazil 2001; Veronica Fenocchio Azzi 2020).

After 2003, the Brazilian government intensified the process of developing doctrine and legislation for the domestic deployment of the Armed forces. In 2004, Complementary Law 117 established that Op GLO would involve activities such as planning, organization; instruction and training; development of doctrine; and intelligence, all potentially geared towards these operations.

The 2003 law also establishes that both the governor and the president are legitimate authorities to recognize the insufficiency of local law enforcement in managing

security (Government of Brazil 2004). Soon thereafter, we can trace that the instruction of all recruits started to include training to fulfill missions that could arise under the Guaranteeing Law and Order component (Brazilian Army. Comando de Operações Terrestres 2006; 2019; 2009; 2017).[11]

This law also established that the military could act alone or with other state security agencies, to carry out patrols, searches of individuals, vehicles, ships or aircraft, as well as to arrest suspects when they perceive offenses committed in *flagrante delicto* in the border strip (100 km), filling a gap in the existing legislation and creating a type of domestic mission that is enduring, unlike GLOs, which must have an end date. In 2005, the 11th Infantry Brigade, located in the interior of the state of São Paulo, was designated to be the unit where specific training for Op GLO would take place.

[11] Since at least 2006 all recruits of the Brazilian Army have been subjected to GLO training. In more recent years, they even receive the training before war-like operations given the need to be on stand-by for GLO operations. Interview with Head of Army Doctrine Center, Active-Duty Army General Sérgio Luiz TRATZ. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 06/22/2021.

Figure 3. 1 GLO Op number and public safety GLO Op percentage (1994-2021)



Source: (Ministry of Defense of Brazil 2022b). Prepared by the author. Our Public Security GLO Op rating comes from our own analysis of the information collected at the Ministry of Defense. Thus, it can include military police strikes, urban violence and other operations where the objective was to prevent common crimes. A list is shown in the Appendix 3B.

Graphs 1 and 2 in the Figure 3.1 above demonstrate, respectively, the number of Op GLOs between 1994 and 2021 and the percentage of them specifically intended for public safety. The count is carried out by the year in which the operation began. Between

1994 and 2021, there were a total of 145 GLO Ops executed, 59 of them (40.7%) were of public security. Some of the most significant and enduring GLO Ops took place, as we have pointed out, in the state of Rio de Janeiro. High values in the year 2000 are related to operations for police strikes, which were the hallmark of domestic deployment during the first decade of the GLO Ops.

2.2 The Cases 2010-2021

The scope of GLO Ops in public security increased substantially during the decade from 2000 to 2010. The key defense documents, designed with sizeable civilian input (Amorim Neto 2019), such as the 2008 National Defense Strategy and the White Paper on National Defense (LBDN) mention GLO (Brasil. Ministério da Defesa 2008; Government of Brazil 2012). The Ministry of Defense published a GLO Manual in 2013 that established guidelines for military conduct. This was revised in 2014 to resolve doubts as to which individuals the military would view as an opposing force in the event of an operation (Brasil. Ministério da Defesa. 2014).

The sources for the elaboration of the doctrine of military deployment in GLO in the large operations of the 2010s were also international, in this case derived from the presence of Brazil in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN (Harig 2020; Marques 2018; Castro and Marques 2019). During this period, the main operative term was to establish “rules of engagement” involving the “gradual use of force”, a movement that began after 2004, coinciding with the sending of Brazilian troops to the peace mission in Haiti – MINUSTAH. The flow of soldiers serving in the MINUSTAH and then in the GLO

Ops and vice versa, as well as the elaboration of "lessons learned manuals" are some transmission channels to be mentioned (Harig 2019; Comando de Operações Terrestres 2016). In this chapter, I focus on this period. I obtained fine-grained data on the cost associated with these GLO operations of public security as a share of what is spent on all GLOs, shown in the Figure 3.2. The moments where the public security operations were the vast majority of the expenditures in GLO operations were precisely the occupation operations (*Arcanjo*, in the *Alemão* and *Penha* communities, and *São Francisco*, in the *Maré* community) and the Federal Intervention, which are cases we seek to explain as well as the period 2018-21 which reveals interesting data that requires further explanation.

Between 2010 and 2018, large-scale operations reached their peak, with thousands of military personnel occupying vast areas of urban territory, mainly in the state of Rio de Janeiro, and carrying out policing missions. The military were employed in several Op GLO whose objective was to support public security agencies, mainly the military police, in the implementation of the "pacification" program characterized by the installation of Pacifying Police Units (UPP) (Mathias, Campos, and Santos 2016; Riccio et al. 2013; Ungar and Desmond 2009). At the time, it was understood that the state would need a greater recourse to the use of state force to remove actors of organized crime who had taken over spaces where the State had not made itself present over time except for the BOPE incursions.

Graph 3 in the Figure 3.2 indicates that the period in which most resources were spent was in the context of *Operação Arcanjo* (2010-12), which is an important inflection point as it is a long-term military occupation operation in a community. During the period

of *Operação São Francisco* (2014-15) thousands of soldiers were also mobilized to occupy the *Complexo de Favelas da Maré*, which also explains another peak in 2014.

Figure 3. 2 Spending on GLO Ops and Spending on Public Security GLO Ops as a share of total GLO expenditures (2010-2021)



Note: Values corrected for inflation, in relation to 2021, according to the IPCA-FGV. Source: (Ministry of Defense of Brazil 2022a), prepared by the author. My Public Security GLO Op classification comes from our own analysis of the Ministry of Defense narratives. Thus, it can include military police strikes, urban violence and other operations where the objective was to prevent common crimes.

As it is predictable, when such operations take place, the military can potentially kill suspects, be killed by them and the possibility of "collateral damage", where individuals get injured or die without having anything to do with the operation, is real. Table 3.1 below depicts the number of casualties in all GLO operations for the 2010-2021 period, at the hands of the military. An important point to be made about the lethality of military operations is that any judgment must be made in comparison to the lethality of police forces acting in similar environments.

Table 3. 1 Casualties in GLO Operations

Operation	Civilian Casualties	Military Casualties	Branches Involved	N of Troops	Collateral Damage?	Period
***Operação Arcanjo* (*Alemão* and *Penha*)**	1	0	Army and Navy (logistics only)	1,500	Yes	11/2010-06/2012
***Operação São Francisco* (*Maré*)**	12	1	Army and Navy	2,900	Yes	4/2014-6/2015
Other Operations (Police Strikes, Protection of Military Installations, Etc.)	12	0	Army	Varied	Yes	2010-2021 (casualties only took place in 2017)
Federal Intervention	22*	5	Army, Navy and Police	700	No	2/2018-12/2018

Source: Federal Intervention (Federal Government of Brazil 2022b; Sousa 2021); Others: (Viana 2018a).
*The police killed 29 more individuals in joint operations.

Figure 3.3 below depicts the information for both the state and the city of Rio de Janeiro upon which we can infer that Rio de Janeiro's police forces are substantially more lethal that the Brazilian military in comparison.

Figure 3. 3 Number of deaths caused by police



Source: Instituto de Segurança Pública (ISP - Instituto de Segurança Pública 2022)

Below, I describe the cases that are the focus of this chapter, namely the large-scale operations in the period 2010-2021 and the military's operational conduct in them. There are three cases: two occupation operations (2010-2012 and 2014-2015), which are treated together because they are essentially the same type of deployment, the Federal Intervention (2018), and the outcome of no-deployment during the Bolsonaro administration. This illustrates the representative variation in the dependent variable.

2.2.1 Occupation Operations (2010-2015)

Between 2010 and 2015, Rio de Janeiro saw two massive military deployments in policing missions. In 2010, at the end of his second term, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva received a request by then-Governor of Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral, to send in the Army in a public security deployment. An acute public security crisis had taken place, as drug dealers from the *Penha* and *Alemão* communities had ordered the burning of buses and forced curfews in their areas of influence. Rio de Janeiro police has a special operations unit called BOPE (special operations battalion, *Batalhão de Operações Especiais*), but they were no match for hundreds of heavily armed criminals hiding in a part of the city where they would have all the higher ground advantage.

First, the military provided transportation and logistical support to the police special units to allow them to enter the *Alemão* and *Penha* communities safely. In an effort to establish a state presence in the area, a few days later the federal and state governments agreed that 1,500 troops of professional soldiers (i.e., not conscripts) would occupy the

favela (shanty towns) while the state governor mobilized resources and personnel to implement the Pacifying Policing Units, a community policing program. For a period of 28 months, several postponements and 3-month rotations of several brigades, the military executed police patrols, arrests and searches in two of Rio's largest *favelas*.

In March 2014, in the context of the preparations for hosting the World Cup (*of Futebol*), the state governor of Rio de Janeiro once again asked for military troops to be sent to a community: the *Maré favela*. On April 5, 2014, 2,900 troops of the Army and Marines – about double the amount of the *Alemão and Penha* operation – deployed on similar terms of that prior large-scale GLO. The mission of this "Pacification Force", was also to occupy the terrain until the state government could recruit and train new police officers to implement the UPP program. This deployment lasted continuously until June 30, 2015, its end date postponed several times (Ministry of Defense of Brazil 2022b). Just like in the previous large-scale deployment, the Army took control of all police forces designated to patrol the area, and a Brigadier-General was assigned to be the military commander of the entire operation.

The *Alemão* and *Penha* Favelas occupation and the *Maré* occupation represented the highlight of the "occupation" paradigm. Similar to what was happening in Haiti, these operations were included in the governmental agenda, sending in the military and constantly postponing their withdraw. Several high-profile shooting incidents took place, to which there was a strong media and public opinion response (Viana 2021). As depicted in Table 3.1, these operations lead not only to casualties in confrontations, but collateral damage – individuals who had nothing to do with crime were killed. The repercussion of

such events prompted the military to significantly reflect on the existing rules of engagement and how such incidents could affect the image of the military if reported by media channels. These concerns were incorporated into the doctrine extensively.

2.2.2 Federal Intervention (2018)

In 2018, by order of the then President Michel Temer, the military took over the public security sector of the State of Rio de Janeiro. It was a Federal Intervention in which the then Military Eastern Commander, four-star General Walter Braga Netto would be assigned the position of Head of the Intervention and appoint General Richard Fernandez Nunez as state Secretary of Security. Unlike operations in which the military occupied specific areas of Rio de Janeiro's territory, the focus was on the re-equipment of police forces and their reorganization.

As far as military operations *per se* go, the military then did not remain stationary, unlike in the previous large-scale operations. The focus of the security operations was to conduct patrols in areas considered strategic and operations to prevent cargo truck heists, which is considered a "side hustle" by organized criminal groups whose main business is drug trafficking. The troops were used jointly with the police forces in rapid assaults, not occupations of large swaths of the territory.[12] The breakdown of actions was such that 215 operations took place; 139 in street patrols in 120 neighborhoods (not in *favelas*), 35 in

[12] Interview with Former *Maré* Commander and Former state Secretary of Security during the intervention, Active-Duty Four-Star Army General RICHARD Fernandez Nunez. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 05/24/2021.; Interview with Battalion Commander and Operations Officer, Active-Duty Army Colonel João Luiz LAMPERT. 11/27/2020.

siege and investment[13] in *favelas*, 22 supporting police in *favelas* operations and residual categories that include 19 operations of social work and prison searches and others (Federal Government of Brazil 2022b).

In this context, 951 individuals were arrested. Though the Federal Intervention was more lethal, as shown in Table 3.1, the reports are that no collateral damage took place, as emphasized by the military, and in contrast with prior large-scale GLOs, especially Operation (*Maré*).

The Federal Intervention was certainly more expensive. The resources were spent rather differently, with 83.75% of the resources being spent on non-operational issues (Federal Government of Brazil 2019, 87). More suitable vehicles and equipment were also purchased to carry out future operations in this urban scenario. The Eastern Military Command, which is responsible for Rio de Janeiro, acquired armored personnel carriers (Guarani), more efficient to operate in the urban terrain of the GLOs – very different from the heavy and difficult-to-move amphibious vehicles the military used to occupy the *Penha* and *Alemão* communities in 2010. In addition, a considerable sum was invested in equipment for the police forces, such as bullet proof vests, assault rifles and vehicles.

2.2.3 No public security deployments (2019-2022)

These instances of massive deployments contrast with the outcome of no-deployment during Temer's successor, the former Army Captain Jair Bolsonaro's

[13] Military terminology "*Cerco e Investimento*". It means to send in troops to carry out a siege, surrounding a target and conducting an incursion to attain certain targets and then leaving.

administration. Then candidate Bolsonaro had a strong law and order component in his campaign which included leveraging the military's popularity by involving them in all areas of public administration, including security policy. Despite his campaigns promises of more deployments, devising a "tough on crime" domestic security strategy and appointing a retired General to act as a drug czar, the graph 4 in the Figure 3.2 shows the spending profile of GLO operations, and provides evidence of substantial decline. Only a small portion of those resources were used in public security Op GLO. This was the period of the unprecedented environmental GLOs of the Jair Bolsonaro government, such as *Operação Verde Brasil*, carried out in the Amazon to combat fires and deforestation, nothing like what happened in Rio de Janeiro, where troops executed an array of policing tasks. The trend, therefore, points to a decline in GLO Ops for public security from 2019 onwards. Even in the context of the global pandemic, the military was not deployed to enforce stay-at-home orders (Acacio, Passos, and Pion-Berlin 2022).

3 Explanations for Military Deployment in anti-crime operations

3.1 The Civilian side: civilian control over operations

Heads of state are elected and are accountable to voters. Crime is a super salient electoral issue which can secure an election or get someone voted out of office. In the context of coalitional presidentialism, where presidents need political support from governors and their allies in Congress to rule and not be impeached, it can be a risky strategy to be seen as weak on crime or unwilling to support governors in need in case of a public security crisis. Building security capability is at best costly and at worse riddled

with bureaucratic nightmares, particularly in the context of federalism, where presidents and governors share responsibilities. In this context, if governments do not regard the military as a menace to democracy, they may leverage the military to execute public security missions.

As I mentioned before in this dissertation, the military possess innate organizational strengths. They have built in capability, organization and infrastructure that could be called upon at a moment's notice. They have a large number of personnel at their disposal, tremendous logistical capabilities to move personnel and materials and, in the case of Brazil, deployment-ready forces of at least two brigades (about 3,000 troops). The level of skills they have to fulfill such missions may vary but if there is an organization that can implement training protocols it is them. The military demonstrates versatility, able to adapt its organizational structure to new, challenging scenarios (Pion-Berlin 2016). The military's first organizational advantage is structural. The military's customary hierarchical structure of decision-making can ensure that orders that are emitted are delivered and acted upon with dispatch. The armed forces also have the advantage of having at their immediate disposal, facilities all over the country, as they are national in scope.

The final and perhaps most important advantage has to do with economy of means (Pion-Berlin 2016). The military is an organization that is already paid for, staffed, and by and large, ready to go. It is already part of the national budget, and comes equipped with the personnel, machines and materials. As mentioned before, creating new security capacity would mean incurring huge costs not to mention that such investment would

necessitate considerable time to bring these efforts to fruition. On the other hand, the military can be taken off the proverbial shelf and deployed at a moment's notice.

In terms of civilian control over the military regarding specific operations, one must be precise at distinguishing what is being controlled. In the case of internal security operations, or any other real military deployment (i.e., that involved troops out of the barracks and potentially using violence), there is the issue of who decides to send out troops. Civilian control here is achieved when the democratically elected president or their representatives are able to order the military to do something and they do it. Then comes the issue of who designs the operations. Civilian control is achieved here when the government can have substantial input in the design of the operation. Finally, there is the issue of the conduct of operations: here, the military are going to conduct the operations but civilian control involves active monitoring of the troops regarding their compliance, and assessing if they are achieving the goals set up at the decision and design stages.

A military under civilian control will comply with government orders to operate in public security missions. While police are normally the authorities responsible for this, they may find themselves overwhelmed and incapable of containing the rampant crime. Often, drug dealers will order shops to close, will hijack buses and burn them or will simply cause an atmosphere of fear for which the police are unprepared or can cause even more harm on, as statistics on police lethality indicate. Presidents then turn to their armed forces to assist and delegate operational control.

3.2 The Military Side: military propensity to execute missions

Studies on Latin American military doctrine indicate that military modernization in those countries, by a considerable measure, has created armed forces that are trained and prepared for conventional combat, due to military emulation of the armed forces of western industrialized countries (Nunn 1983; Resende-Santos 2007; Grauer 2015). There is always a fear that the military is not suitably trained to exhibit restraint in non-combat situations, to accurately implement protocols of gradual use of force. It is argued that soldiers are usually hard-wired to utilize maximum force to defeat an enemy. In over heated moments, soldiers are bound to overreact, reaching for their firearms. The results are predictable and deadly, resulting in countless human rights violations with soldiers held culpable.

They may also have genuine qualms about assuming police-like functions that they often find professionally demeaning and not in keeping with their core purpose: defense. Soldiers feel hand-tied in following rules of graduated force and proportionality instead of preparing for armed combat. Policing may not be what they signed up for and could be viewed as a costly diversion from normal duties.

Therefore, we must consider what explains the behavior of the military. I argue that two elements work in tandem, and they are of both ideational and material in nature: the risks to individual soldiers and the military institution, as well as their mission preferences.

Risks, Judicial[14] and Reputational: This is a compound issue, as it is both individual and collective. First, the individual issue. Officers contemplate what must be done to advance their military careers avoiding behaviors that could jeopardize their

[14] This section heavily relies on the framework set up by Pion-Berlin and Acácio (2022).

professional futures (Moskos, Williams, and Segal 2000; Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2022). That raises the all-important matter of judicial risk over human rights violations. What degree of legal jeopardy are soldiers exposing themselves to when facing down suspects. Because soldiers are trained to apply maximum force, and often lack police-like training or instincts, they are bound to overreact to dissent, cause civilian casualties, and then be blamed. Where there has been a history of impunity--either because human rights cases got regularly transferred to military tribunals, or because civilian courts were intimidated into acquitting offending soldiers, then the risk of prosecution was lower. If, however, the justice system has shown itself willing and able to prosecute military rights abusers, then soldiers will be at greater legal risk, and more reticent to crack down on protesters (Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2021). Cross-national Large-N and qualitative research on transitional justice points out that prosecutions of perpetrators of human rights abuses have a deterrent effect on the occurrence of human rights violations (Kitagawa and Bell 2022; Kim and Sikkink 2010; Sikkink 2011). The matter of human rights violations during domestic public order missions brings into sharp review the dilemma governments and militaries face when contemplating coercive responses to crime.

In addition to the individual fear of punishment, one must also consider the role of the collective reputational damage public security operations may cause. Essentially, even in a scenario where the justice system does not investigate and punish the accused of human rights violations, troops can hold back because they are afraid that their actions will negatively affect the reputation of the armed forces as an institution. This is particularly

relevant if a military has worked hard on rehabilitating its public image after the authoritarian period, such as Brazil.

Mission Preferences: Militaries have mission preferences that define what should be their priorities. It clarifies to them what soldiering is about, beyond the defense of sovereign territory against foreign attacks that is written into constitutions. Not all armies are adequately equipped for fighting wars, in a region like Latin America where inter-state war has been exceedingly rare (Pion-Berlin 2016; Mares 2001), while other forms of intra-state violence are rampant (Kacowicz et al. 2021).

Many militaries turn toward other missions that could justify budget allotments and where governments need them to fill gaps left by others or find a new professional identity. Not all militaries take to police-like work kindly, nor do they considerate it appropriate and compatible with their prior experience, doctrine and training. Missions that are, in the military mind, professionally degrading or otherwise incompatible with the military's *raison d'etre* are ones they prefer not undertaking- even when national laws enable them to do so (Dunlap 1999; Campbell and Campbell 2010; Zimmermann 2005). But there are other militaries that have been long-accustomed to filling those roles and do so without objections. Mission preferences, in other words, will often vary from country to country and from time to time (Fitch 1998; Pion-Berlin 1988; Scharpf 2018). These mission beliefs inform military behavior when interacting with civilian leadership at the decision, design and execution stage of a military operation.

3.3 The interaction between civilian control and military preferences

How do civilian control and military preferences interact to explain the outcomes of interest in Brazil? Here, we must highlight the recent contribution of the literature on explaining military behavior[15] and show how they are conditional on levels of civilian control (Pion-Berlin 2012).

Civilian control over the armed forces, as mentioned before, is a cherished principle of any democratic state.[16] There is widespread agreement that democracies must assure that their military falls in line with the decisions made by its executive overseers, whether it wants to or not, and whether it agrees with policies or not (Feaver 2003). When, in response to police failure, a government requests the military to move in and it complies that can lead to catastrophic consequences. If, however it chooses not to fulfill those orders to avoid doing harm, it will have shirked its obligations, undermined the president's authority--perhaps gravely --and risked reprisals. In between obedience and defiance there is a third path. Militaries could hedge their bets by neither fully complying with nor fully defying political orders. These alternatives are forms of conditional compliance.

Militaries can adjust their tactics *after* deploying to minimize risks to soldiers and citizens alike. Post deployment adjustments may take the form of shirking when precise orders are ignored, as officers and soldiers seek ways to creatively limit their exposure to potential harm. Militaries are known to drag their heels when carrying out unfavored

[15] The insights here are to describe behaviors of the military in the gray area between fully following and fully defying the orders of democratically elected presidents, where militaries can partially comply avoiding negative repercussions of their actions.

[16] This and the next paragraph draw heavily on Pion-Berlin and Acácio (2022).

missions, often engaging in slow rolling or other delaying tactics (Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2020; Harig and Ruffa 2021). But there are other options.

If a president orders troops to use all means necessary to fight criminals and a commander instead orders troops to hold their fire, allowing police to do the "dirty work" this constitutes a shirking of duties. On the other hand, should the government issue vaguely worded proclamations, then the military can interpret the mission as it sees fit, fulfilling what they believe to be spirit of the command without strictly violating it. It could severely limit its own use of coercion, choosing not to move to the front lines of confrontation by falling back to rearguard positions, forming the perimeter surrounding the *favelas* and allowing the special operations units of the police to go in. Once ordered to deploy in an overall low governmental monitoring environment, they may avoid confrontation, executing siege operations instead or simply redesign operations altogether. David Pion-Berlin and I refer to this as *post-deployment conditional compliance*. The military may seek to exert its preferences before a decision is made by the government, when designing the operation and when conducting them before troops hit the ground. This is pre-*deployment decision lobbying*, and it has two varieties: *decision-making* and *policy design*.

Brazil illustrates variations of *pre-deployment lobbying* and post-*deployment conditional compliance.* This chapter focuses on the former. In Brazil, the conduct and design of operations is heavily influenced by the military and the best civilians can do, when there is a civilian minister of defense, is to have some input. This is because the Ministry of Defense is still highly dominated by the military. Therefore, what we are left

with assessing is the degree to which the civilians had the upper hand in the decision leading to the operations and if they had substantial input on the policy design. How so? The GLO Operations take place when governors declare that the existing means to tackle public security are not enough. After a request is made or the president is considering it, the first person in the chain is the Minister for the Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI), a four-star General. They act as the most proximate military advisor to the president. If a decision is made to move forward, the president issues the order to the GSI to communicate it to the Ministry of Defense. At that stage, the president decides which branch commands it, how many troops and from where. The president also defines a "desired state of affairs" (DSA), meaning what the scenario would be after the operation is concluded.[17]

Then, at the Ministry of Defense, in the Joint Staff, a military organization, the rules of engagement are broadly designed and the communication with the planning branches of the military is pursued. Rules of engagement design at the MoD stage are broad and modifications along the way do take place only to restrict it – never to broaden its scope.[18]

After the operations start, there is very little institutional civilian oversight. Emissaries for the president rarely visit the sites of the operations unless there are events

[17] Interview with former advisor of the GSI and commander of Operation *São Francisco (Maré)*. Retired Two-Star Army General Francisco Mamede BRITO. 12/03/2020. For instance, during the *São Francisco* operation the DSA was installing pacifying policing units, a community policing program run by the state of Rio de Janeiro. These required recruiting and training a new crop of police officers without the known problems of Rio's police force, taking a considerable amount of time and resources. The interviewee also highlighted that the desired state of affairs is often not very clear, implying that the Presidency can force its hand.

[18] Interview with Battalion Commander and Operations Officer in GLOs (2010-2018) and GLO instructor at the Army Command and Staff School. Active-Duty Army Colonel João Luiz LAMPERT. 11/27/2020. It is clear that the design of the rules of engagement at the MoD level is done by a flag officer posted at the MoD, though the civilian input may vary.

with the state governors, and though there is a presence of civilian prosecutors for the military justice system they are not there to monitor if goals of the operation are being achieved, they are there to inquire on the crimes committed by troops and citizens.

Therefore, civilian control of public security operations in Brazil means the ability to decide whether an operation will take place and set the machine in motion and to provide some input in at the policy design stage. Before orders are issued, the brass may lobby against the operation. They are privileged informants of the president as they are their military advisors and can substantially control information and access, as the principal-agent framework explains (Feaver 2003; Avant 1994). This is particularly true in a context by which there is a great degree of informality in civil-military relations (Pion-Berlin 2009).

More commonly, when presidents have enough power to decide on deployment, the military will seek protections from the legal consequences of their actions on the ground. They may also lobby for favorable deployment conditions, to modify missions, and to secure side payments. The factors listed in the previous section shape these choices on the military's side, namely the fear of individual or collective repercussions if human rights violations are committed and what they regard as their professional mission. The likelihood of the military succeeding in these shirking strategies is conditional on the level of leverage civilians have over them. Therefore, we must highlight that the level of civilian control and the military preferences work in tandem, they interact.

If there is a scenario of high civilian control over decision-making and the military views the operation unfavorably, pre-deployment lobbying is less likely to be effective at

convincing presidents not to deploy. The best they can do is obtain favorable rules of engagement and resources when designing the policy and adjust their deployment, in a clear case of post-decision lobbying. On the other hand, if civilian control is low, pre-deployment lobbying may very well succeed at not sending the military out to the streets, explaining no-deployment situations.

4 Assessing the role of civilian control

This section discusses the features of civilian control and how it can be leveraged by governments to compel the military to execute missions.

4.1 Context and quantitative data

The civilian principal in Brazil's civil-military relations is above all the president and the minister of defense (MoD). In a pure presidential regime like Brazil's, the chief executive always plays a key role in civil-military relations. But the minister of defense is also of relevance. Congress has a constitutional role in defense matters, but it plays second fiddle to that of the executive branch. Hence a key feature of civilian control in Brazil is whether the president has the power to, without too much hassle, order the military to operate.

Brazil came late to the game of establishing a civilian-led ministry of defense. The MoD was finally established in 1999, making civilians the principal in their relations with the armed forces until 2018, when the Army Generals began to head the ministry in a context of growing military influence over domestic politics and declining quality of

democracy. The MoD in the 1999-2018 period was part of the deepest reform in national defense ever enacted in Brazil's republican history. The following developments can be listed as the key events in defense management in Brazil associated with the period of high civilian input: the publication of the *National Defense Strategy* in 2008, drafted by both civilians and the military; the passage of the *New Defense Act* in 2010, which empowered civilians, particularly the defense minister, in making decisions on the use of force, budgets and even promotions (A. Passos 2015); and the publication of the first *White Paper on National Defense* in 2012, where 66.7% of the authors were civilians (Amorim Neto 2019).

Figure 3.4 below shows two indicators of civilian control over the military.[19] Since 1999 the executive branch has not had an agency that is exclusively military with cabinet rank and formal control over defense policy. Indeed, after the 1999 reforms the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by military officers dropped steadily (Amorim Neto 2015).

[19] The empirical indicators of civilian control are drawn from my joint work with Octavio Amorim Neto (Amorim Neto and Acácio 2022b).

Figure 3. 4 Civilian control indicators



Source: Share of Officers in the Cabinet: Author's own data; Source: Author's own data based on biographical research name by name after obtaining data from FOIA. (Federal Government of Brazil 2021) and (Ministry of Defense of Brazil 2021b).

This strengthening of civilian control over the military trend has been reversed with the beginning of the Bolsonaro administration, in which 30-40% of cabinet members are active-duty or retired military officers (Amorim Neto and Acácio 2020). The participation

of military officers in the cabinet is a classic indicator of military influence in politics. The dotted line depicts the percentage of military officers in the top echelons of the Ministry of Defense, leaving no doubt about the decline of civilian participation at the MoD level, paralleled by the loss of civilians in the top job since 2018, but also denoting asubstantial rise in military influence prior to 2018. Based on this information, Table 3.2 displays the indicators of civilian control for three dimensions and three periods.

Table 3. 2 Levels of Civilian Control at each case

	ORDERS TO DEPLOY	DESIGN OF THE OPERATIONS	CONDUCT OF THE OPERATIONS
OCCUPATION OPERATIONS (2010-2015)	High	Medium	Low
FEDERAL INTERVENTION (2018)	Medium	Low	Low
NO-DEPLOYMENT (2019-2022)	Low	Low	Low

4.2 Occupation Operations (2010-2015)

The GLO operations after 2010 had a strong hand of civilian politicians in the decision-making process, as shown on Table 2.2. Some of these civilian defense ministers particularly in the 2010s had sizeable influence and ability to convey the civilian leadership's preference to the brass in regard to domestic missions (Cortinhas and Vitelli 2020; Mathias, Campos, and Santos 2016). Nelson Jobim's appointment as defense minister in 2007 marks the onset of growing civilian input on defense policymaking. Jobim – a leader of the all-important *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (PMDB),

former congressman and Supreme Court Justice, received extensive powers (Amorim Neto 2010). His appointment to the MoD cemented a broad coalition agreement between Lula's centre-left Workers' Party (PT) and the PMDB. Nelson Jobim, the defense minister empowered by the 2010 reforms in the MoD, sought on behalf of the Federal Government to have the armed forces execute its security agenda in Rio de Janeiro and other states. This is a clear case of *deference*, when government agents with clear policy preferences delegate the execution of policy to members of the military profession to cash in on their prestige and expertise (Beliakova 2021a).

The operation had two stages. First, a siege where the troops surround the *favelas* so the police can get in safely, and second, an occupation where troops police the area and establish a presence. The first request by the state governor asked for armored marine corps vehicles to take the troops of the BOPE into the *favelas* without harm. The request was rather clear and only asked for logistical support and transportation, emphasizing that no military personnel beyond support was being requested (C. (retired) C. A. de L. Lima 2012, 19; Cabral 2010a).

A day later, a second request mentions contact with the Minister of Defense and asks for 800 professional troops, two helicopters and ten armored vehicles (Cabral 2010b). On November 28, 2010, four days after the governor's requests, the CLANF vehicles (Vietnam-Era style amphibious armored vehicles) that belonged to the Brazilian Marines were making their way into the *Alemão* and *Penha* communities with the BOPE police officers inside, with Army troops surrounding the perimeter. The Eastern Military

Commander, responsible for Rio de Janeiro clarified how the Army received the second request:

> Later, or in those days, they decided that they should invest in *Alemão*. So, I think on the 26th, I was at the CML and I was approached by the Secretary of Public Security, plus the commander of the state Military Police and the director of the Civil Police, to talk about whether the Army could collaborate, if they needed to, to carry out the invasion. They thought the Army could make a siege line, so they could get in, and the Army would keep the siege. I told them that it was an operation that transcended my authority to decide, but what means of doing so we possessed, and they knew it. Then there was a contact between the governor and the Federal Government, with the defense minister, who was Nelson Jobim. On the 27th, I was ordered, at night, to participate in this siege operation, to collaborate with the public security forces of the state of Rio in the invasion operation.[20]

It is important to highlight that the Army's preference was not to pursue such occupation operations. A witness, serving in the operational command in Brasilia illustrates the thinking at the time:

> I had initially participated in the decision-making process in Brasília, because I was at the Ground Force Operational Command as a senior colonel. So, I thought we shouldn't occupy *Alemão* the way they did. [...]. Militarily, it was not good, because of the size. [21]

[20] Interview with Eastern Military Commander (Rio de Janeiro), Retired Four-Star Army General ADRIANO Pereira Junior. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 05/13/2021. In Portuguese: "Mais tarde, ou naqueles dias, eles decidiram que deveriam investir no Alemão. Então, acho que no dia 26, eu estava no CML e fui procurado pelo secretário de Segurança Pública, mais o comandante da Polícia Militar e o diretor da Polícia Civil, para conversar se o Exército poderia colaborar, se eles precisassem, para fazer a invasão do Alemão. Eles pensavam que o Exército poderia fazer uma linha de cerco, para que eles pudessem entrar, e o Exército manteria o cerco. Eu disse a eles que era uma operação que transcendia a minha autoridade decidir, mas que meios para fazer isso nós possuíamos, e eles sabiam disso. Aí houve um contato do governador com o governo federal, com o ministro da Defesa, que era o Nelson Jobim. No dia 27, eu recebi a ordem, à noite, de participar dessa operação de cerco, de colaborar com as forças de segurança pública do estado do Rio na operação de invasão.

[21] Interview with Retired Two-Star Army General SÉRGIO José Pereira, currently Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense, former advisor to the Federal Intervention and Commander of the Army Staff School. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 13/1/2022. In Portuguese: Do processo decisório, eu havia participado, inicialmente, aqui em Brasília, porque eu era do COTER, era coronel antigo. Então, eu achava que a gente

But once a decision is made, in the context of high civilian control, it must be followed. In the following days, the governor requested the creation of a "pacification force" (Cabral 2010d), to sustain the occupation.[22] Troops with blue hats resembling blue helmets of the United Nations peacekeeping operations made up the bulk of the forces in the terrain, under the operational command of the Army. After several waves prolonging that deployment, they stayed in the area for 28 months. As the former Army deputy commandant recalls:

> There in *Alemão*, we were acting on orders. It was no longer for us to know whether it should be or not. We received the mission and executed it – in fact, very well executed. That's when we occupied top to bottom, as it has to be.[23]

All the articulations to have troops in Rio de Janeiro in 2010 went through the then defense minister Nelson Jobim. Interview evidence shows that he was instrumental in implementing directives given by the president to help send in the military (Viana 2021,

não deveria ocupar o Alemão da forma que ocupou. Esse era o meu parecer. Mas acabou indo, pronto. Militarmente, não era bom, pelo tamanho.

[22] Another example: then Institutional Security Cabinet General Elito recalls advising against postponing a withdraw from a GLO operation. He claims the president agreed, them was asked again by the state government and decided to postpone the GLO. Interview with Former Head of the Joint Staff (2008-2010) and Minister of Institutional Security Retired Four-Star Army General José ELITO Carvalho Siqueira. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 08/31/2020.

[23]Interview with Former Head of the Joint Staff (2008-2010) and Minister of Institutional Security Retired Four-Star Army General José ELITO Carvalho Siqueira. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 08/31/2020. In Portuguese: Lá no Alemão, nós éramos um escalão de execução. Não cabia mais a nós saber se devia ser ou não. Nós recebemos a missão e executamos – aliás, muito bem executada. Foi quando nós ocupamos de cima para baixo, como tem que ser.

51). At every step of the way, when the governor put in a new request to update the terms of deployment, there are literal mentions of calls between the minister and the governor, possibly to define what should be requested in writing (Cabral 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d). When it came to drafting the rules of engagement, according to then head of the Joint Chiefs General de Nardi, Jobim was in the room with his military aides providing key input on how the conduct of the troops would be set up (C. (retired) C. A. de L. Lima 2012, 24). [24]

This decree established the "Pacification Force", by which the military would occupy and be in charge of the security of the communities of *Alemão* and *Penha*. Then, in a clear case of post-decision lobbying, the Eastern Military Commander revealed that he drafted the agreement to be analyzed by the MoD, the president and the state governor:

> I didn't write the rules [of engagement]: I wrote the agreement. And the agreement provided that there should be a rule of engagement and that it should be approved by the Ministry of Defense and the state government. Then a group wrote [the rules of engagement]. The agreement, I wrote it up. Of course, with one or another advisor, but the writing was basically mine. What resulted from this agreement, other documents, other rules, then the staff worked on that. But all these documents have the seal of the two levels of government: state and federal. The civilian government: governor and president or defense minister, who was Nelson Jobim. That was fundamental for us."[25]

[24] This is confirmed by a witness who claimed that the military pushed for favorable rules of engagement, but convinced the Defense Minister that that was the way to go if they wanted the army to engage in these operations safely. Interview with Former Head of the Joint Staff (2008-2010) and Minister of Institutional Security Retired Four-Star Army General José ELITO Carvalho Siqueira. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 08/31/2020.

[25] Interview with Eastern Military Commander (Rio de Janeiro), Retired Four-Star Army General ADRIANO Pereira Junior. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 05/13/2021. In Portuguese: Eu não redigi as regras: eu redigi o acordo. E o acordo previa que deveria haver uma regra de engajamento e que ela deveria ser aprovada pelo Ministério da Defesa e pelo governo do estado. Aí um grupo redigiu. O acordo, fui eu que redigi. É lógico, com um ou outro assessor, mas a redação foi basicamente minha. O que decorreu desse acordo, outros

In August 2011 Jobim was replaced by Celso Amorim, Lula's foreign minister in 2003-2010. While Amorim had been affiliated with the Labour Party (PT) since 2009, his credentials derived from his condition as a first-rate professional diplomat and his long tenure as the head of the foreign ministry. In a similar fashion to Jobim, he conveyed to the armed forces that they would be included in the implementation of the security policies of the government. Even if civilians delegated the conduct of the operations, officers have repeatedly mentioned that they executed such missions at the behest of the administration, certainly not at their own volition.[26]

The Ministry of Defense published a joint manual outlining its guidelines for GLOs in 2014, right before the *Maré* GLO, another major operation. In the manual, due to lessons learned during the *Arcanjo Operation*, rules and procedures for troop deployment were specified. It states that only the president can order a GLO after the president or a governor identify, consider, and consequently declare the unavailability, insufficiency, or non-existence of public security capacity and there is a formal request. Despite these rules being in place, sending in the military remained a political decision above all.[27] Celso Amorim, the head of the MoD, was very clear in saying that the armed forces were an instrument of

documentos, outras normas, aí o pessoal trabalhou em cima disso. Mas todos esses documentos têm a chancela dos dois níveis de governo: estadual e federal. Governo civil: governador e presidente ou ministro da Defesa, que era o Nelson Jobim. Isso aí foi fundamental para nós.

[26] Interview with former advisor of the GSI and commander of Operation *São Francisco*. Retired Two-Star Army General Francisco Mamede BRITO. 12/03/2020.

[27] Interview with Former Head of the Joint Staff (2008-2010) and Minister of Institutional Security Retired Four-Star Army General José ELITO Carvalho Siqueira. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 08/31/2020.

government policy (Defesanet 2012), in the context of the sports megaevents (World Cup, Summer Olympics and others) preparation. It is under this context that the operation in the *Maré favela* took place from 2014 to 2015. 2,900 personnel from the Army and Marines occupied this large *favela* near the Rio de Janeiro International Airport. Their orders were virtually the same as the *Alemão* and *Penha* occupation: personal searches and vehicle searches, street patrols and arrests.[28] General Sérgio Westphalen Etchegoyen clarifies how the Army saw these missions at the time:

> There are two very dangerous words to use in a military. One is the word mission.[29] Think carefully about what you [the government] are going to tell the guy to do, because the mission has an aura of sacredness that the soldier will fulfill. Experience has taught me: when you are going to give someone a mission, think carefully about what you are going to say. And if you complement it like this: "and only you can do it", there will be disaster. If you give the Army a mission to enter *Alemão*, it will enter *Alemão.* It will enter *Alemão,* it will enter *Maré*, it will enter wherever you say. Of course, with planning. But going there. It won't leave there demoralized.[30]

[28]Interview with former advisor of the GSI and commander of Operation *São Francisco*. Retired Two-Star Army General Francisco Mamede BRITO. 12/03/2020.

[29] It is important to clarify how the Brazilian officers understand the word "mission". They see it as a task given by a commander, something to carry out, not in the broad sense.

[30]Interview with former Commander of the Staff School, Deputy Army Commandant, and Minister of Institutional Security (2016-2018), Retired Four-Star Army General Sérgio Westphalen ETCHEGOYEN. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 01/10/2022. In Portuguese: Existem duas palavras muito perigosas de se usar numa força armada. Uma é a palavra missão. Pensa bem no que é que vai mandar o cara fazer, porque missão tem uma aura de sacralidade que o cara vai cumprir. A experiência me ensinou: quando tu fores dar uma missão para alguém, pensa bem no que tu vai dizer. E se tu complementares assim: "e só tu pode cumprir", vai ter desastre. É certo. Se derem a missão para o Exército de entrar no Alemão, ele vai entrar no Alemão. Vai entrar no Alemão, vai entrar na Maré, vai entrar onde mandar. Claro, com planejamento. Mas vai lá. Ele não vai sair de lá desmoralizado.

4.3 Federal Intervention (2018)

There is compelling evidence that from 2015 onwards the Ministry of Defense has become more militarized, despite institutional mechanisms set up to empower civilians at the MoD. The Federal Intervention in 2018 had a strong hand of the Federal Government, but in a context where civilian control was already declining (Verônica F. Azzi and Littlefield 2021). This means the government had the power to issue orders, but declining ability to design the policy. General Etchegoyen, then head of the Institutional Security Cabinet, which meant that he was the president's lead military advisor, described the process:

> Then the president sent for the branch commanders, particularly Villas Bôas, and had to convene the Defense Council or Council of the Republic – I don't remember which of the two, I think the Defense Council – at a meeting there at [The palace of] Alvorada. And decreed. So it was a decision-making process without major conflicts, with clear, honest arguments, pros and cons, advantages and disadvantages, natural resistances, but without major conflicts.[31]

Minister of Defense Raul Jungmann, a civilian, pushed for the intervention with the president, and was later transferred to a newly Ministry of Public Security, so a military officer would be overseeing the defense portfolio. His replacement as Minister of Defense, General Silva e Luna – the first officer to occupy the post since the creation of the MoD -

[31] The only vocal objection at that level was the speaker of the house. Interview with former Commander of the Staff School, Deputy Army Commandant, and Minister of Institutional Security (2016-2018), Retired Four-Star Army General Sérgio Westphalen ETCHEGOYEN. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 01/10/2022. In Portuguese: Aí o presidente mandou chamar os comandantes das Forças, particularmente o Villas Bôas, e teve que convocar o Conselho de Defesa ou Conselho da República – eu não me lembro qual dos dois, acho que o Conselho de Defesa – numa reunião lá no Alvorada. E decretou. Então foi um processo decisório sem grandes conflitos, com argumentos claros, honestos, prós e contras, vantagens e desvantagem, resistências naturais, mas sem grandes conflitos.

describes the process of policy design. Once a decision was made, the military-led MoD and the branches started elaborating a plan for the intervention:

> I remember the decision process. The way of doing it, the way of choosing, was not ready at all, there was nothing already planned on paper; this was being built as the decision was made. The president, in a meeting, made the decision: "get together and bring me the initial planning of how to do it". Bringing already who was to be appointed commander, who would be the best officer in charge of the intervention. Then the Ministry of Defense entered this circuit, the Army commander entered this circuit as well. So that was a conversation that was being built little by little.[32]

Finally, going down the chain of command, when asked how it was to receive the mission of the intervention, General Tomás, who served from 2015 to 2018 as the chief of staff to the Army Commandant, General Villas Bôas, described his reaction:

> How was it to receive the news of the intervention? Received as an order. We don't receive it smiling, we received it as an order. It was a political decision. We complied. That's what was done. We adapted and all the energy of the Brazilian Army and the commander – at the time, General Villas Bôas – was channeled to provide [General] Braga Netto with the necessary means for him to fulfill the mission.[33]

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[32]Interview with former Chief of Staff to the Army Commandant (2007-2011), former Deputy former Army Commandant (2011-2014), former Deputy Defense Minister (2015-2018) and former Defense Minister (2018). Retired Four-Star Army General Joaquim da SILVA e LUNA. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 02/11/2022. In Portuguese: Eu me lembro do processo da decisão. A forma de fazer, a forma da escolha, não estava nada pronto, não tinha nada já planejado no papel; isso foi sendo construído à medida que a decisão foi tomada. O presidente, numa reunião, tomou a decisão: "reúnam-se e me tragam o planejamento inicial de como fazer". Trazendo já quem era para nomear comandante, qual seria o melhor interventor. Aí o Ministério da Defesa entrou nesse circuito, o comandante do Exército entrou nesse circuito também. Então isso daí foi uma conversa que foi sendo construída aos poucos.

[33]Interview with former Military Commander in *Alemão* and *Penha*, former Military Academy Commander, former Chief of Staff to the Army Commandant (2015-2018) and current Southeast Army Commander (São Paulo), Active-Duty Army General TOMÁS Miguel Miné Ribeiro Paiva. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 12/13/2021. In Portuguese: "Como foi receber a notícia da intervenção? Recebeu como ordem. Não recebeu sorrindo, recebeu como ordem. Foi uma decisão política. A gente cumpre. Foi o que foi feito. Nós nos adaptamos e toda a energia do Exército Brasileiro e do comandante – na época, o General Villas Bôas – foi canalizada para proporcionar os meios necessários ao Braga Netto para que ele cumprisse a missão.

There was, however, room for shaping the operational design which led to the operational conduct of the military to be different from the large-scale GLO's that had been in the past. Instead of an occupation operation, which the military outright rejected, the idea was that the intervention would be a "management shock" to reorganize the public security capacity of Rio de Janeiro.[34] This is not to say that the military did not execute policing tasks. But when they did, they were not about occupying and taking command of large swaths of land, they were about acting in support of requests from the police forces in "indirect actions". In response to concerns and having been given orders to intervene, the military designed, aside from a "management shock", two sorts of operations: one to curb cargo heists and patrol strategic areas and in support of the police in siege and investment in *favelas*.[35] The state secretary of security appointed by the Federal Intervention clarified the mindset at the time:

> It was not my objective at the moment, as state Secretary of Security, given the previous experience I already had, to put troops into action as the protagonist of the scene. It was not the case. The police, being there, they have to act; It's not the Army." What was GLO's role at that time? To be part of this effort, in which the main action was going to be carried out by the Police. Who has to arrest the cargo thief is the state Military Police and the Civil Police. The Civil Police investigates; the state Military Police arrests them. And what do we do? We gave them the best conditions so that they could act, with the few resources they had, in terms of

[34] Interview with former Commander of the Staff School, Deputy Army Commandant, and Minister of Institutional Security (2016-2018), Retired Four-Star Army General Sérgio Westphalen ETCHEGOYEN. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 01/10/2022 ; Interview with Retired Two-Star Army General SÉRGIO José Pereira, currently Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense, former advisor to the Federal Intervention and Commander of the Army Staff School. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 13/1/2022.

[35] Interview with Battalion Commander and Operations Officer in GLOs (2010-2018) and GLO instructor at the Army Command and Staff School. Active-Duty Army Colonel João Luiz LAMPERT. 11/27/2020.

> personnel and material, until the resources for us to acquire material arrived, and we fixed their recruitment processes.[36]

The numbers comparatively support the fact that there were less, not more, military involvement in operations during the Federal Intervention. The *Penha* and *Alemão* occupation operation involved one brigade's worth (1,500 approximately), the *Maré* occupation involved two brigades worth (2,900 approximately), while the Federal Intervention included only a battalion's worth of troops (700) per phase (Ministry of Defense of Brazil 2022a).

4.4 No-deployment (2019-2022)

After 2019, civilian control over the military has been seriously backsliding. Officers are back to the center of Brazil's political arena (Fausto 2018; Amorim Neto and Acácio 2020). The military actively became part of the Bolsonaro administration, with officers in the cabinet and occupying thousands of governmental posts (Amorim Neto and Acácio 2020; Hunter and Vega 2021). President Bolsonaro appointed three retired Generals as head of the MoD, Fernando Azevedo (January 2019 – March 2021), former

[36] Interview with Former Maré Commander and Former state Secretary of Security during the intervention, Active-Duty Four-Star Army General RICHARD Fernandez Nunez. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 05/24/2021. In Portuguese: Não era o meu objetivo no momento, como secretário de Segurança, até pela experiência anterior que eu já tinha, colocar tropa em ação como protagonista da cena. Não era o caso. A polícia, estando lá, quem tem que atuar é ela; não é o Exército." O que era o papel da GLO nesse momento? Integrar-se a esse esforço, no qual a ação principal ia ser realizada pela Polícia. Quem tem que prender o ladrão de carga é a Polícia Militar e a Polícia Civil. Quem investiga é a Polícia Civil; quem prende é a Polícia Militar. E nós fazemos o quê? Nós dávamos as melhores condições para que eles pudessem atuar, com os parcos recursos que possuíam, em termos de efetivo e material, enquanto não chegavam os meios para nós adquirirmos, nem colocávamos também em ordem os processos de recrutamento.

head of the Federal Intervention, Walter Braga Netto (March 2021 – March 2022), and Paulo Sérgio Nogueira de Oliveira (March 2021 - Present). Conversely, the military has not been deployed in sizeable public security operations. Former defense minister General Fernando has stated the government has in mind not to trivialize GLO operations because the states and cities have to exhaust their means.[37] The military are now heavily influential at "the decision to intervene" stage and when requested by the governors they refuse to send in troops on the grounds that the means for public security have not been exhausted by governors.[38] This is an efficient use, by the military, of pre-deployment lobbying to send in troops. According to Brazilian legislation, as stated before, the Presidency does have the power to independently identify insufficiency of means. Not doing so is a political decision heavily influenced by the military.

5 The military side

This section delves into the military's side of the explanation, focusing both on the military's mission preferences and risks (individual and collective). When the military left power, in 1986, intense efforts were made by the civilians to repeal the ideas of the national security doctrine (E. R. de Oliveira 1994). The military was able to regain its prestige *pari-*

[37] Interview with former Commander of the Parachutist Brigade, former Eastern Military Commander (Rio de Janeiro) and former Minister of Defense (2019-2021), Retired Four-Star Army General FERNANDO Azevedo Silva. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 1/06/2022.

[38] Retired Four-Star Army General Walter BRAGA NETTO. Former Minister of Defense (2021), former Eastern Military Commander and head of the Federal Intervention in 2018. Interview with the Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 13/1/2022.

passu with the consolidation of democratic rule in Brazil. They returned to the barracks, and had several prerogatives curbed (Hunter 1995). Meanwhile they became one of the most trusted institutions in the country (Ceratti, Moraes, and Filho 2015; Russo 2020). At the same time, the military started to be frequently deployed in public security operations. As far as doctrine goes, there is not a flat-out rejection of doing police work, as article 142 of the constitution lists it as a mission, but the military grew averse to long term operations where the military occupies large parts of city territory to conduct patrols. They prefer to be utilized only as a last resort in short-term operations in case of police strikes or breakdown of existing policing capacity.[39] Former Minister of Defense and Army Eastern Commander General Fernando Azevedo e Silva summarizes:

> We see it as a mission. But really GLO, especially in the Brazilian territory, is not our core activity. You are side by side with the Brazilian population, which is yours. Our main mission is to defend the homeland. There are two strategies for this: deterrence and presence in the territory as a whole, whether by sea, air or land. So it is much more pleasant for a lieutenant to be commanding a border platoon, doing border reconnaissance, doing operations in the jungle, or in the south of the country, training, than in GLO in a poor community, which is not our job, This is the job of the police.[40]

[39] This is a concern about not making operations trivial, too commonly ordered. Interview with former Commander of the Parachutist Brigade, former Eastern Military Commander (Rio de Janeiro) and former Minister of Defense (2019-2021), Retired Four-Star Army General FERNANDO Azevedo Silva. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 1/06/2022.

[40]Interview with former Commander of the Parachutist Brigade, former Eastern Military Commander (Rio de Janeiro) and former Minister of Defense (2019-2021), Retired Four-Star Army General FERNANDO Azevedo Silva. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 1/06/2022. In Portuguese: A gente encara como missão. Mas realmente GLO, principalmente no território brasileiro, não é uma atividade fim nossa. Você está ao lado da população brasileira, que é a sua. Nossa missão principal é defender a pátria. Há duas estratégias para isso: a dissuasão e a presença no território como um todo, seja por mar, por ar ou por terra. Então é muito mais aprazível para um tenente estar comandando um pelotão de fronteira, fazendo reconhecimento de fronteira, fazendo operações na selva, ou no sul do país, se adestrando, do que em GLO em comunidade carente, o que não é uma função nossa, é uma função policial.

5.1 Mission preferences

Brazil is a case where repeated domestic deployments has led the military to shape their preference towards avoidance. The sources of doctrine and practices are both domestic, from the repeated public security deployments, and international, from Brazil's deployments in peacekeeping operations. In the mid 2000s, working groups at the Ministry of Defense and the Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) were set up to evaluate the existing legal framework and propose modifications if deemed necessary. In this period, the key operative term was to set up "rules of engagement" involving the "gradual use of force", coinciding with Brazil's deployment to Haiti (Harig 2019; 2020; Kenkel 2021; Marques 2018).[41]

The view of the military on GLO operations can be summarized by the following quote, from former Army Commandant General Eduardo Villas Bôas, who led the army from 2014 to 2018:

> We in the military have always been critical of GLO missions. Our training and equipment are not suited to jobs of this nature. Our action is always collective, differing from the police, used to acting individually. On the other hand, the posture of members of the Armed forces has a destructive character, rather than the protective posture with which the police act. It cost us a lot to adapt our troops to put the safety of the population first, as this attitude puts an extra difficulty in operations and increases the risks in execution (Castro 2021, 211).[42]

[41]Interview with Former Head of the Joint Staff (2008-2010) and Minister of Institutional Security Retired Four-Star Army General José ELITO Carvalho Siqueira. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 08/31/2020.General Elito was also the force commander of the UN Mission to Haiti. In charge of designing the rules of engagement, he claims to have heavily drawn from his experience in Haiti.

[42]In Portuguese: Nós, militares, sempre tivemos uma postura crítica em relação às missões de GLO. Nossa formação e equipamento não são adequados a empregos dessa natureza. Nossa atuação é sempre coletiva, diferindo das polícias, acostumadas a agir individualmente. Por outro lado, a postura dos integrantes das Forças Armadas tem um caráter destrutivo, ao invés da postura protetiva com que os policiais atuam. Muito nos custou adaptar nossa tropa a colocar a segurança da população em primeiro lugar, pois essa atitude coloca uma dificuldade extra nas operações e aumenta os riscos na execução.

The publicly available survey evidence regarding how officers feel about these missions is scarce, but consistent with not preferring to execute policing tasks. In 2010 a survey was conducted by a military officer for his PhD dissertation at the university of São Paulo with cadets, captains and colonels(Medeiros Filho 2010). It asked respondents about their perceptions in regard to the possibility of an increase of the use of the armed forces to fight crime. Second-year cadets and colonels show similar figures, as roughly 90% answered that there is a growing tendency to the use of armed forces in anti-crime operations whereas roughly 76% of the army captains agreeing or partially agreeing with that statement. On the other hand, when the respondents were asked a question more related to doctrine – not just their perception of the reality of the use of the armed forces – the results are rather different. 40% of the cadets favored domestic missions, 34% of the captains and 32 % of the colonels. This signals that the more inserted in military doctrine, the more the respondents replied that the education of future combatants should not prioritize fighting crime. In a large-scale survey conducted with the officer corps in 2013, 51% of respondents are against deployments to combat drug-trafficking (Raposo, de Carvalho, and Schaffel 2019, 81).

Let us see what high-ranking military officers believe to be their mission. Occupation operations had an impact in how the army carries out policing tasks.

After the *Alemão* and *Penha* occupation operation, which marked the starting point for operations of such type, the *Maré* Operation was a turning point to get the military to be averse to such engagements with the population. General Richard, former Commander

in that operation and later state secretary of security appointed by the Federal Intervention is very clear:

> If we had a continuation of that type of action from *Maré*, I believe it would have a much more serious impact, perhaps even compromising an entire generation. Committing, in this sense, to a vision of military activity that, in my view, is not really the most desirable. I do not think that we should pursue that route, we have to avoid this type of operation at all costs. And it is the prevailing view [in the Army].[43]

In support of this view rejecting policing missions, a former commander of the operation in the *Maré* makes it even clearer:

> "I have no reservations about it, that the command of *Maré* was not a command that I assumed according to my way of thinking. It was difficult. I had to fulfil a mission that I would advise against. But after they decided, I went there with the same enthusiasm to fulfill my mission, but I went within that framework. Now why? Because I would rather be, with those resources, with my brigade, which was a brigade specialized in mountain warfare, doing climbing, doing external defense exercises, doing what was most aligned with the main job of the armed forces of any country, external defense, right? Then you ask me, is it possible to do both at the same time? Yes, but that is not what has been happening. What happened in recent years, because when I left the lieutenant, when I left the academy, I still participated in a large-scale external defense exercise, with real gunfire, where we could do the training with soldiers in the handling of equipment, although our equipment was obsolete, even the obsolete ones I have to train with, because if not, I won't even have that, because in addition to being obsolete, I won't know how to use the obsolete material. So we did an exercise with the use of paratroopers, joining within a framework of external defense, very interesting, which is what drives the cadet, or rather the candidate for a military career, to present himself for that profession. I'm not joining the army to play a role of ostensible policing, it's not a demerit to the ostensible policing that is done by the police, it's not a second-

[43]Interview with Former Maré Commander and Former state Secretary of Security during the intervention, Active-Duty Four-Star Army General RICHARD Fernandez Nunez. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 05/24/2021. In Portuguese: Se nós tivéssemos uma continuação daquele tipo de ação lá da Maré, eu acredito que impactaria de maneira muito mais grave, talvez até comprometendo toda uma geração. Comprometendo, nesse sentido de uma visão da atividade militar que, a meu ver, não é realmente a mais desejável. Eu acho que não é por aí, a gente tem que evitar a todo custo esse tipo de operação. E é a visão predominante.

> class role. It is very important for society. Now I didn't choose the profession to play that role, otherwise I would have joined the military police. Now when I fail to do the essentials of my armed force, I mean, that I've stayed in the last few years, what was the last conventional employment exercise that this brigade ever did when I took command? Oh no one even remembers. What was the last shot we fired with artillery?"[44]

During the Federal Intervention, came the change in conduct. The army understood that what had taken place in the *Maré* should not be repeated. This is what General Richard said about that period: "When I arrived at my post as the Secretary of Security, I said: 'Look, if we stay in this litany, in this nonsense of doing operations here and there, this will not work, we will have a dozen *Marés* and will not have reached our objective.'"[45]

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[44]Interview with former advisor of the GSI and commander of Operation *São Francisco*. Retired Two-Star Army General Francisco Mamede BRITO. 12/03/2020. In Portuguese. Eu acho que, eu digo... não tenho nenhuma reserva em relação a isso, que o comando da Maré não foi aquele comando que eu assumi de acordo com a minha maneira de pensar. Foi difícil. Eu tive que cumprir uma missão daquelas que seu eu pudesse assessorar seria pra não empregar. Mas depois que decidiram fui lá com o mesmo entusiasmo cumprir a minha missão, mas fui dentro desse quadro. Agora por que? Porque eu preferiria estar Igor, com aquele recurso ali, que tão sendo empregados ali, com a minha brigada, que era uma brigada especializada em montanha, fazendo escalada, fazendo exercícios de defesa externa, fazendo aquilo que tivesse mais alinhado com a destinação principal das forças armadas de qualquer país, defesa externa, né. Aí me pergunta, será que não dá pra fazer os dois ao mesmo tempo? Dá. Mas não é o que vem acontecendo. O que aconteceu nos últimos anos, eu digo último anos, porque quando eu saí tenente, quando eu fui sair da academia, eu ainda participei de um exercício de defesa externa de grande envergadura, com tiro real de armas, onde a gente podia fazer o treinamento com soldados no manuseio do equipamento, embora nossos equipamentos eram obsoletos, mesmo aquele obsoleto eu tenho que treinar com ele, porque se não nem isso eu vou ter, porque além de obsoleto, eu não vou saber usar o material obsoleto. Então fizemos exercício com emprego de tropa paraquedista, junção dentro de um quadro de defesa externa, muito interessante, que é o que leva o cadete, ou melhor o pretendente a carreira militar, a se apresentar para aquela profissão. Eu não vou ser, procurar o exército, pra fazer papel de policiamento ostensivo, não é nenhum demérito ao policiamento ostensivo que é feito pelos policiais militares, não é um papel de segunda classe. É importantíssimo pra sociedade. Agora eu não escolhi a profissão pra fazer aquele papel, se não teria entrado pra polícia militar. Agora quando eu deixo de fazer o essencial da minha força armada, quer dizer, que eu fiquei nos últimos anos, qual foi o último exercício de emprego convencional que essa brigada já fez quando eu assumi o comando? Ih ninguém nem lembra mais. Qual foi o último tiro que a gente atirou com artilharia? "

[45] Interview with Former Maré Commander and Former state Secretary of Security during the intervention, Active-Duty Four-Star Army General RICHARD Fernandez Nunez. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 05/24/2021. In Portuguese: "Olha só, se a gente ficar nessa ladainha, nessa baboseira de ficar fazendo operação aqui e acolá, isso não vai dar em nada, nós vamos ter uma dezena de Marés que não vão ter atingido seu objetivo.

The evolution of the armed forces' domestic deployment doctrine was such that experiences on the ground shaped its conduct. On the one hand, they began to constantly prepare for these missions, and, on the other hand, they also sought to develop a doctrine of deployment that could be applied to external defense.

With respect to doctrine and training, every recruit, military academy cadets and sergeants receive training in public security operations. However, over the years, there has been a development to include such activities in the context of operations that can be applied in external defense. In 2005, the 11th Infantry Brigade received the designation of "GLO" and a GLO Op Instruction Center (CIOpGLO) was created to prepare career soldiers for such missions and all Brazilian Army recruits and cadets received basic training in Op GLO, then later the Army began building it into a more comprehensive doctrine of urban warfare. The 11th Infantry Brigade lost its GLO designation in 2013 and, in 2021, in a context of decreasing GLO Ops in the country, the Army's decision to transform CIOpGLO into an Urban Operations Instruction Center (CIOU) was announced, simultaneously with the transformation of the 11th Brigade into a unit whose function is to be a reference in urban combat (whether domestic or international) (Army Staff of Brazil 2021; DefesaNet 2022). The commander for this brigade reveals some insights into why such changes took place:

> Although we maintain our expertise in the Brigade, as well as all other Army troops, we have to be prepared for GLO - there is already instruction, adequate training for this -, to think that a troop can only have one vocation in this sense is very limiting. So, we lost that adjective and started to work in a broader way. Because when we talk about GLO, we're talking about non-war operations. And what about war operations? So it started to deteriorate, a loss of capacity. We reversed that as of

> 2013. Now, the Brigade works with both non-war operations and war operations, because that is how it should be.[46]

These concerns seep into battalion commanders. One of my interviewees revealed that the issues now are not about preparation for deployment in public security operations, those have been solved over the years. The army has the doctrine, equipment and training, policing work is written into the constitution, and the military has learned over the years to prepare its troops to act if necessary. It is the professional military course of action to avoid unpleasant surprises, but that does not mean that this is a mission the Brazilian military sees as being particularly gratifying. General Etchegoyen, former army chief of staff and minister of the Institutional Security Cabinet when the Federal Intervention decree came out stated the following, when asked about the decline of the operations in recent years:

> Is very sad, a people that has to use its armed forces to address its problems. Perhaps this is the root of the great reaction,[47] which it has always had and which I imagine it will continue to have. It's too bad, you must deploy your own army, your own armed forces. GLO operations is not in its essence. When you change the structure of the Armed forces, its spirit goes with it, its soul goes with it.[48]

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[46] Interview with Commander of the 11th Brigade, formerly known as the GLO Brigade, Active-Duty Two-Star General Edson Massayuki HIROSHI. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 11/30/2021. In Portuguese: Embora a gente mantenha a nossa expertise e as tropas da Brigada, assim como todas as demais tropas do Exército, têm que estar preparadas para GLO – já existe instrução, adestramento adequado para isso –, achar que uma tropa só tem uma vocação nesse sentido é muito limitante. Então, perdemos esse adjetivo e passamos a trabalhar de uma forma mais ampla. Porque, ao falar em GLO, nós estamos falando de operações de não guerra. E as operações de guerra, como é que ficavam? Então, isso começou a sofrer um deterioramento, uma perda de capacidade. A gente reverteu isso a partir de 2013. Agora, a Brigada trabalha tanto com operações de não guerra como com operações de guerra, porque assim deve ser.

[47] Here, referring to the decline in the number of the operations.

[48] Interview with former Commander of the Staff School, Deputy Army Commandant, and Minister of Institutional Security (2016-2018), Retired Four-Star Army General Sérgio Westphalen ETCHEGOYEN. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 01/10/2022. In Portuguese: é muito triste, um povo que tenha que usar as suas forças armadas para combater os seus problemas. Talvez seja essa a raiz da grande reação, que sempre teve e que eu imagino que continue tendo. É muito ruim, tu ter que empregar o teu próprio exército, as tuas

It is thus no wonder that in October 2019, less than one year after Bolsonaro took office, the Army Staff, responsible for doctrine manuals, revoked the January 2015 "Manual of Pacification Operations", which had been approved while the *Maré* occupation was still taking place (Army Staff of Brazil 2019). This act essentially scrapped occupation operations from the Brazilian army doctrine. This was done autonomously, without civilian input and as an administrative decision of the Brazilian Army to update the operational conduct of the land force, getting rid of something they largely reject as a mission: long term "pacification "operations. Such an action could only take place with low levels of civilian control over the military.

5.1.1 Quantitative Data

In an attempt to get tangible quantitative data on military mission preferences and in the relative absence of regular surveys in the armed forces, to complement interview data, I devised a data collection strategy to obtain materials produced by military personnel when they take the required courses to advance in their career. Using the Brazilian Army's digital library, I created code to obtain the titles of all 2521 monographs presented as a requirement to obtain degrees in the Academy, the Captain's school and in the Command and Staff School, for Majors, Lieutenant-Colonels and Colonels. This plan allows us to examine three different generations of officers, ranging from 2007 to 2021, though with varying availability per school.

próprias forças armadas. Garantia da lei e da ordem não está na essência. Quando tu mexe na estrutura das Forças Armadas, vai junto o espírito dela, vai junto a alma.

After that, I used a statistical method of cosine similarity to compare the degree of similarity of each title to a "typical" monograph title that describes the use of the military for public security purposes since 1988.[49] I implemented it using the statistical package Quanteda (Benoit et al. 2018). The Figure 3.5 below show the average cosine similarity to this typical monograph title. The closer to 1 the more content on public security it has, assuming the titles summarize what is in the monographs. To complement this data

Figure 3. 5 Average GLO-related content in military monographs



Number of documents: 877 (Cadets), 1512 (Captains), 132 (Staff Officers). Cadets can write their monographs in groups up to 4, Captains can write it with a colleague and Staff Officers must write on their own. Source: Own elaboration from data scrapped from the Army's digital library (Brazilian Army 2022)

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[49] The comparison was to the following title: "Operações de garantia da lei e da ordem (GLO) no combate ao crime organizado e segurança pública".

collection effort, I also consulted a random sample of documents that had low, medium and high levels of similarity with the ideal title, which showed that the measure does have validity.

The main takeaway is that throughout the years available, none of the sets of monographs reaches an average above 50% similarity, and in most years they are consistently below 30%. Peaks are correlated with the occurrence of some major GLO ops in Rio de Janeiro and the immediate period after them. It is also noteworthy that captains are the ones who write the most about GLOs, cadets the least, and that senior officers have had a low and stable trend of interest on the matter, per our data. Graph 7 below depicts a weighted average of the scores, corroborating the claim that the officers have not been focusing their thinking about doctrine on GLOs.

Figure 3. 6 weighted average GLO-related content in military monographs, with 95% CIs



Source: Own elaboration from data scrapped from the Army's digital library (Brazilian Army 2022)

In sum, both the quantitative evidence from military monographs and the qualitative evidence from interviews highlight a strong dislike on the part of the military for policing missions, despite its process of adaptation and repeated deployments – or perhaps because of them.

5.2 The risks: judicial and collective

The army grew averse to the "occupation paradigm", shown in the 2010 and 2014 operations and throughout that period. During the Federal Intervention of 2018, the deployment patterns appear to have been strikingly different from both the *Arcanjo* and *São Francisco* Operations. The solution would be their constant asking for legal shielding, more "flexible" rules of engagement (Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2020), and intensive media training (Comando de Operações Terrestres 2016).[50]

Let us look at the evidence of how risks shape the conduct of the military. There is no lack of criticism towards the military justice system. It is seen as a feature of military overreach (Kyle and Reiter 2020), and as evidence of an incomplete democratic transition that boosts military impunity (D'Araújo 2016). In addition, there is justifiable outrage at the fact that civilians can be put on trial in the military courts – though with a civilian judge – in case they commit crimes against the troops (A. B. Souza and Silva 2016). Yet, this

[50] This has also been confirmed to me by former head of the Army Communications center. Interview with Former Maré Commander and Former state Secretary of Security during the intervention, Active-Duty Four-Star Army General RICHARD Fernandez Nunez. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 05/24/2021. He has mentioned that the army has been focusing on teaching media training at all levels of instruction, including the military academy and recruits, as they all may be called upon to execute domestic operations.

military justice system can still damage officers' careers and collective reputations of the troops. As one interviewee highlights, operationally these missions are not difficult, but the context make them very challenging:

> What is not simple is the context. It is one thing to fire a rifle in conventional warfare; another is to shoot a rifle in the middle of a *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro and in our land, where you can hit an innocent person there or, if a criminal is hit, he is a Brazilian, it has a whole impact for us in a different way. Very complicated.[51]

5.2.1 The military justice system until 2010

The character of military justice in Brazil is *sui generis* and must be understood if we are to claim that it can render judicial risks to officers. As far as crimes committed by the military against civilians, we can pinpoint some periods after the 1988 democratic constitution. During the military dictatorship, the military courts were a part of the executive branch and used not only as an instrument of impunity in support of military abuse but used to put civilians on trial for "political crimes." This has changed.

The military justice system in Brazil is different from the one in the United States, where military justice pertains to the branches of the military in the figure of the JAG corps. The 1988 constitution established the military courts within the judicial branch and set the following system. The members of the Brazilian military, when they commit military

[51]Interview with Former Maré Commander and Former state Secretary of Security during the intervention, Active-Duty Four-Star Army General RICHARD Fernandez Nunez. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 05/24/2021. In Portuguese: O que não é simples é o contexto. Uma coisa é disparar um fuzil numa guerra convencional; outra, é disparar um fuzil no meio de uma favela no Rio de Janeiro e na nossa terra, em que se pode atingir ali uma pessoa inocente ou, se for atingido até um criminoso, ele é um brasileiro, tem todo um impacto para nós de maneira muito complicada.

crimes are tried by a court system that is a branch of the judicial system dedicated to dealing with the military. There are two levels of federal courts; one in the states and the Superior Military Court.

In the federal court, decisions regarding military personnel are made in a collegiate manner: four active-duty military officers drawn randomly from the rank-and-file and one federal civilian judge who presides over the case. This collegiate nature of the decisions can mean that the military can influence the outcomes substantially.

The Superior Military Tribunal is composed of 15 justices appointed for a lifetime term, 10 of them 4-star Generals of the three branches. This Superior Military Court is the one having jurisdiction over cases involving Generals and it functions as a court of appeals for other military personnel. In both cases, the staff in these military courts are civilians. These are career civilian judges and prosecutors, paid by the judicial branch.

Not all cases end up in trial (Viana 2018b). Why? If any incident happens, the military conducts the initial inquiry (*Inquérito Policial Militar*). One of the most important problems pointed out by military justice federal prosecutors, is that initial investigations are not done by a civilian bureaucracy tasked with investigating the military; it is done by the military themselves, overseen by the commanding officer of the unit where the suspect serves (Prazeres 2017). Military officers, trained in soldiering – not investigations – are tasked with handling criminal investigations, which often leads to low-quality investigative reports about which the civilian prosecutors have little input or impact.

Federal prosecutors of the military court system may decide to reopen cases, but they are not involved in the initial investigation. A significant change in the law took place

in 1996, when state police officers were removed from the jurisdiction of this system in case of disciplinary matters. Instead, state cops are put on trial by an analogous system in the states making it so that it is staffed by a different set of civilian prosecutors, judges, and military police officers. These reforms also made it possible for both the military and police to be tried by civilian courts for charges of homicide and attempted homicide. The military had to deal within this framework when the first occupation operation of *Alemão* and *Penha* came up.

5.2.2 Occupation Operations (2010-2015)

After 2010, with the increase in military deployments for public security purposes, the military commanders have continuously lobbied against being put on trial in civilian courts for crimes committed by the military against civilians in the context of such deployments. This has led to a change by Law 136, which lists public security as a military mission, allowing for *ad-hoc* jurisdiction of the military courts over these offenses (Government of Brazil 2010). This very much worried the military in the *Maré* deployments because there were several pending cases from the *Alemão* occupation.[52]

[52]Interview with former advisor of the GSI and commander of Operation *São Francisco*. Retired Two-Star Army General Francisco Mamede BRITO. 12/03/2020.; Interview with former Commander of the Parachutist Brigade, former Eastern Military Commander (Rio de Janeiro) and former Minister of Defense (2019-2021), Retired Four-Star Army General FERNANDO Azevedo Silva. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 1/06/2022; Interview with former Marine commander in the Federal Intervention (Operation Arpoador) and other GLOs, Two-Star Admiral Reinaldo Reis de MEDEIROS. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 11/16/2021.

During both operations the military worked hard at developing rules of engagement to reduce the potential of "collateral damage", which led the *Maré* deployment to have very restrictive rules of engagement,[53] certainly more restrictive than how the Brazilian army performed in Haiti.[54] According to the rules of engagement issued in these operations, a soldier must abide by proportionality and necessity. If confronted with an unarmed civilian, they must verbalize the command to cease and desist, use non-lethal weaponry, use lethal weapons but shoot towards the sky and then they may shoot at the civilian. If this is followed, no charges are brought up. The vast majority of the incidents are dismissed at the prosecution stage or the initial investigation stage as either self-defense or "excusable mistake" on the part of the military because the soldiers followed the rules.

In a 2019 interview, former army commandant General Villas Boas summarizes the individual judicial risks and states clearly that the army lobbied against prosecutions of these cases:

> A critical aspect resided in the legal uncertainty to which our members were exposed, which even created an ethical dilemma for the commanders. The Army takes a boy away from the family, due to mandatory military service, subjects him to training, employs him in operations, he acts according to what he was taught and we return him to the family as a criminal. This is a real story, which took place in the actions of GLO, in Morro do Alemão. Two soldiers, in a confrontation, killed a drug dealer. For this reason, they were subject to a legal provision according to which, as it was an intentional crime, they should be submitted to a popular jury.

[53] Interview with former Commander of the Parachutist Brigade, former Eastern Military Commander (Rio de Janeiro) and former Minister of Defense (2019-2021), Retired Four-Star Army General FERNANDO Azevedo Silva. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 1/06/2022.

[54] Interview with former Military Commander in *Alemão* and *Penha*, former Military Academy Commander, former Chief of Staff to the Army Commandant (2015-2018) and current Southeast Army Commander (São Paulo), Active-Duty Army General TOMÁS Miguel Miné Ribeiro Paiva. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 12/13/2021.

> We had to act in all legal instances to prevent them from being convicted.[55] (Castro 2021, 211)

In response to these efforts, in October 2017, crimes against the life of civilians committed by military personnel were permanently put under the purview of the federal military courts (Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2020). Civilians who commit crimes against the military in the context of GLO operations can also be tried in these military courts. Though in that case, the trial will be rendered solely by a federal civilian judge and not a panel that includes military officers (H. Cavalcanti 2019).

5.2.3 Federal Intervention (2018)

The Federal Intervention was the first one carried out under the new rules permanently changing the jurisdiction of military crimes. A senior marine flag officer with substantial operational experience in public security deployments, highlighted another concern beyond a "search for immunity", that is related to career protection. This can explain why military officers see high risks, even after the military were able to get cases permanently sent to the military courts:

> What do we perceive? That, for the military, the lack of legal support is also very bad. If a soldier breaks the rules of engagement or makes any mistake in an operation like this, his career is completely compromised. He can no longer be moved out of the barracks, he is in a condition that we call "under investigation".

[55] In Portuguese: Um aspecto crítico residia na insegurança jurídica a que estavam expostos nossos integrantes, o que gerava até mesmo um dilema ético para os comandantes. O Exército tira um menino da convivência da família, por força do serviço militar obrigatório, submete-o a treinamento, emprega-o em operações, ele age de acordo com o que lhe foi ensinado e nós o devolvemos à família na condição de criminoso. Essa é uma história real, ocorrida nas ações de GLO, no morro do Alemão. Dois soldados, em um enfrentamento, mataram um traficante. Por essa razão, foram enquadrados no dispositivo legal segundo o qual, por tratar-se de crime doloso, deveriam ser submetidos a júri popular. Tivemos de atuar em todas instâncias jurídicas para evitar que fossem condenados

> That is, he is no longer promoted, he cannot go to a commission abroad, he cannot take courses. There are a number of impediments. What is the difference between Military Justice and ordinary Justice? The Military Justice solves his problem faster. In ordinary justice, this drags on for years and the soldier keeps waiting. His career is stalled until that is effectively resolved. Not all problems were solved with this change, but at least it is solved more quickly. There is always a doubt about the supposed corporatism. I think otherwise. In my opinion, for people who are in a [civilian] Jury Court, and who will eventually make the trial of a soldier before a criminal, the emotion favoring a soldier is much greater than that of favoring the criminal, depending on the whole general dissatisfaction with public safety.[56]

According to the Military Courts, after the law changed, three homicide cases were presented to military courts from October 2017 to 2019[57] (Justiça Militar da União 2019). The military courts also state that in the last 32 years, all 12 civilian deaths that were attributed to members of the military that went to military courts ended up in convictions of the defendants. An examination of criminal cases in general – not only homicides - brought against the military in the context of GLO operations shows that there were 29 brought to trial, rendering 13 convictions and 10 *sursis* (conviction, but with suspension of

[56] Interview with former Marine commander in the Federal Intervention (Operation Arpoador) and other GLOs, Two-Star Admiral Reinaldo Reis de MEDEIROS. Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the *Getúlio Vargas Foundation*, Brazil (CPDOC-FGV). 11/16/2021. In Portuguese: O que a gente percebe? Que, para o militar, a falta de respaldo jurídico também é muito ruim. Se um militar descumprir as regras de engajamento ou cometer qualquer deslize em uma operação como essa, a carreira dele fica completamente comprometida. Ele não pode mais ser movimentado para fora de sede, fica em uma condição que chamamos de sub judice. Ou seja, não é mais promovido, não pode ir para uma comissão no exterior, não pode fazer cursos. Há uma série de impedimentos. Qual a diferença da Justiça Militar para a Justiça comum? É que a Justiça Militar resolve o problema dele mais rápido. Na Justiça comum esse troço se arrasta durante anos e o militar fica marcando passo. A carreira dele fica estacionada até que aquilo efetivamente seja resolvido. Não se resolveram todos os problemas com essa mudança, mas, pelo menos, se resolve de uma forma mais célere. Coloca-se sempre uma dúvida sobre o suposto corporativismo. Eu penso o contrário. A meu juízo, para as pessoas que estão num Tribunal do Júri, e que eventualmente irão fazer o julgamento de um militar perante um criminoso, a emoção a favorecer um militar é muito maior do que a de favorecer o bandido, em função de toda a insatisfação da população, de uma maneira geral, acerca da segurança pública.

[57] The previous law was from 1992, but the military penal code dates to 1969, in the height of the military regime.

a sentence because it was the person's first crime and below 4 years of prison time) and 6 still ongoing or acquitted. This renders a conviction rate of 79.3%.

Unlike what one would expect from a system of justice where the military judges their own, the military courts are not necessarily full vehicles of military impunity because they are not fully military, as mentioned before. While we could normatively prefer a civilian court with no military judges rendering swift punishment to those who commit crimes, we must realistically consider that the current system of military justice in Brazil may be more efficient than the feasible alternative, which is a civilian justice system which struggles with investigating, indicting, and convicting offenders (Costa 2015). Data on the issue is scarce but in 2021 reports showed that only 44% of homicides were solved in Brazil. When cases are solved, they reach a prosecutor who must decide whether to take the case to court (Estadão Conteúdo 2021). Then there is the morosity and low conviction levels of the civilian court system: the most recent study regarding convictions in criminal courts in Brazil shows that 52% of the cases presented to the juries do not end up in convictions. On average, 14% of all cases end up dismissed after passing a statute of limitations and the average time for a case to receive any resolution is over 6 years (National Council of Justice of Brazil 2019, 16–20). Therefore, compared to the civilian justice system, which often moves very slowly and where impunity is often the rule, the military justice system, though certainly not ideal, can render substantial risks of prosecution to troops.

Finally, several military commanders in the *Alemão-Penha* and *Maré* operations (2010-2015) were designated to serve in the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro.

Their conduct, based on their previous experience, lead them towards avoiding what they considered to be mistakes when designing the interaction between the military and the public in order to reduce collateral damage, therefore seeking to minimize risks, judicial and reputational.

5.2.4 No-deployment (2019-2022)

After the Federal Intervention, no major GLO operation of public security took place, despite the promises by then candidate Bolsonaro. Risks play a central role as recognized by a highly publicized case that took place after the Federal Intervention ended, and demonstrates how the military justice system actually worked efficiently. In April 2019, a car full of innocent civilians was mistaken for a stolen vehicle at a checkpoint. Evaldo Rosa, a musician, and his family were in a car on the Camboatá road, in Deodoro (a neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro) and soldiers who were patrolling the surroundings of a military unit – as they are legally allowed to under rules that are analogous to the ones for GLO - targeted the vehicle with 257 shots.

Mr. Rosa could not resist the injuries and died on the spot. Days later, recyclables collector Luciano Macedo, who was also shot that day, also died. Nine members of the military, including the officer leading the patrol, were arrested. These soldiers were released to await investigations and worked under modified duty. The collegiate in charge of the case decided to release them on bail with the only vote against it being from the civilian judge (Viana 2019). The Military Superior Court agreed with releasing these members of the military on bail, and in 2022 they were convicted. Seven of the accused

were sentenced to 28 years' imprisonment and Lieutenant Ítalo da Silva Nunes, the most senior soldier in the operation, was sentenced to 31 years and six months' imprisonment. Four soldiers were acquitted for not firing their weapons. This is mentioned by interviewees as evidence for swift punishment to troops who commit misdeeds.

On November 21, 2019, another bill authored by the Ministry of Defense, which at that point was already led by an Army four-star General, was sent to Congress to reshape legislation regarding the punishment of military personnel when acting in internal security missions as well as the gendarmerie-like institution *Força Nacional de Segurança Pública*. The proposal exculpates members of the military or of the national public security force - when acting in GLO operations from criminal prosecutions by presuming self-defense if the civilian victimized practiced or is about to practice the following: acts of terrorism, conduct able to kill or harm, restricting freedom of individuals by violence or coercion and having a firearm. In all of these cases the member of the military or police would walk free or would only be punished when a judge finds excessive use of force. Federal Government would, also according to the proposal, provide a federal lawyer (from the *Advocacia Geral da União*) – whose job usually is to defend the government in lawsuits. This bill signals another military lobbying push to guarantee legal protections in case it is called upon to act in domestic security. Yet, despite these efforts, the bill has not yet been approved. Because it has not been approved, military officers still perceive substantial risks of prosecution.

A former battalion commander I interviewed disagrees with the assessment that the military justice "goes easy" on the military. He mentioned that, after being in charge of several investigative procedures, that the federal military justice prosecutors are severe

with them, and if officers botch investigative procedures, prosecutors frequently return and ask more questions and can cause problems in the career of the military officer in charge of the investigation.[58] Though the criminal investigation process clearly has its problems, with a lack of specialized police investigation, federal civilian prosecutors who work for the military court system can reopen cases and choose to prosecute. This renders a real possibility for members of the military being criminally convicted for human rights abuses, raising, in the military's opinion, the cost of deployment.

Officers constantly mentioned this "legal insecurity" in which the Brazilian military operates in domestic territory, highlighting the risk for troops that may be involved in episodes of excessive use of force. Additionally, there is the reputational risk, which is collective. The risks of damage to the armed forces' reputation are seen as high due to the constant monitoring by the media in domestic security operations. Some interviews highlighted the importance of the relationship with the media, a lesson learned from Op *São Francisco* (*Maré*), where there were episodes of excessive use of force and a strong response from the media and public opinion. This led the military to reflect on existing rules of engagement and on social communication channels. This last element has been largely incorporated into the doctrine, and social communication courses are already offered to cadets at the *Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras*. The fears of judicial persecution remain, as stated by a battalion commander:

> You have to get to the middle ground, that you can't be so afraid to get there. If you are so afraid of the justice system and you don't have freedom of action, you will arrive at an operation and you will not do anything. You will wait for time to pass,

[58]Interview with Battalion Commander and Operations Officer in GLOs (2010-2018) and GLO instructor at the Army Command and Staff School. Active-Duty Army Colonel João Luiz LAMPERT. 11/27/2020.

to finish and not to have a problem [...]. Justice doesn't have to be rigid or lenient, it has to be fair, using obvious language. So it cannot be "no, the judge there condemns everyone", no, he condemns within the law. So that's what I told my people, it is legality, we have to do what is ordered, not with fear of justice, or without fear. If we do it right, it won't be a problem. You cannot have arbitrary justice, nor justice that is too lenient, you cannot have it. You have to trust the institution. You have to trust that they [the justice system] will do the right job, and that our troops will do the right job. Now, if you establish a relationship of fear of consequences, this will reflect on the operation, because the operation will not be successful. The guy won't search anyone, so there's no problem, because the moment I search someone in the favela and the resident pushes me, then soon someone will be filming or editing the footage and will say that I slapped him, go say that I punched him, that I searched a child. Because the moment the guy pushes me, it's contempt, I arrest him right away, for contempt.[59] An investigation will be launched and the guy will probably answer in court, but wait, everyone is filming today, so I have to be careful. So the troops really can't be afraid of justice. Fear in the sense of: I'm not going to do anything because I don't trust the defense, I don't trust that my institution will defend me. It's a complicated thing. I believe we are not at that point. We are not at that point yet where we are not going to do anything because if we do, it will come back against us.[60]

[59] In Brazil, disrespecting a state official is considered a crime of "contempt", in Portuguese is "*Desacato*".

[60]Interview with Battalion Commander and Operations Officer in GLOs (2010-2018) and GLO instructor at the Army Command and Staff School. Active-Duty Army Colonel João Luiz LAMPERT. 11/27/2020. In Portuguese: Você tem que chegar no meio termo, que você não pode ter tanto medo, a ponto de chegar. Se você sentir tanto medo da justiça e não tiver liberdade de ação, você vai chegar numa operação dessa e não vai fazer nada. Vai esperar o tempo passar, para acabar e não ter problema com você [...]. A justiça não tem que ser rígida ou branda, ela tem que ser justa, usando uma linguagem óbvia. Então ela não pode ser "não, o juiz ali condena todo mundo", não, ele condena dentro da lei. Então é o que eu falava para meu pessoal, é legalidade, a gente tem de fazer o que é previsto não é com medo da justiça, ou sem medo. Se a gente fizer correto não vai ter problema. Você não pode ter uma justiça arbitrária, nem uma justiça branda demais, não pode ter. Tem que confiar na instituição. Tem que confiar que eles vão fazer o trabalho correto, e que a nossa tropa vai fazer o trabalho correto. Agora, se você estabelece uma relação de temor, de consequências, isso vai refletir na operação, porque a operação não vai ter êxito. O cara não vai revistar ninguém, pra não ter problema, porque no momento que eu revisto alguém na favela e o morador me empurra, aí dali a pouco vai ter alguém filmando ou editando a filmagem e vai dizer que eu dei um tapa nele, vai dizer que eu dei um soco, que eu revistei criança. Porque no momento que o cara me empurra, é desacato, eu prendo ele na hora, voz de prisão e vai ser desacato. Vai ser instaurado um inquérito e o cara provavelmente vai responder na justiça, mas pera aí, hoje ta todo mundo filmando, então eu tenho que tomar cuidado. Então realmente a tropa não pode ter medo da justiça. Medo no sentido de: não vou fazer nada porque eu não confio na defesa, não confio que a minha instituição vai me defender. É uma coisa complicada. Eu acredito que a gente não tá nesse ponto não. Nós não estamos nesse ponto ainda de não vamos fazer nada porque senão se a gente fizer vai voltar contra a gente.

Hence, with that the potential of convictions, and with the justifiable public outcry every time there is collateral damage, it is reasonable that out of self-protection, military officers do not feel comfortable sending in their troops into the *favelas* and prefer to avoid occupation operations and, if possible, not send them in at all. This also explains the military's emphasis in repeatedly saying that though the Federal Intervention produced casualties, there was no "collateral damage", meaning there was no harm to civilians who were not involved in confrontations with the troops.

5.3 Alternative explanations

It is possible that other plausible factors that could be related to the dynamic described may have been overlooked. No case study can ever completely ruled out all potentially competitive confounding explanations. What follows is the reasoning behind the exclusion of two plausible variables that seem to have face value but could not withstand empirical scrutiny in accounting for the outcomes.

5.3.1 Bargaining for more resources

Military budgets are arguably an important driver of military behavior. Upward trends in expenditures should be associated with more compliance and downward trends should be associated with defiance or conditional compliance. In the context of our analysis, the variation on military budgets can be reasonably rejected as an explanation because they do not co-vary with the outcomes. Figure 3.7 below shows the shares of investment and salaries in the MoD budgets since the year after the MoD was created. The

trends are relatively stable and uncorrelated with the occurrence of guaranteeing law and order operations.

Figure 3. 7 Investment and Personnel Expenditures as a share of the MoD budgets



Source: (Ministry of Defense of Brazil 2022c)

5.3.2 Independent explanatory power of crime rates

Another potential explanation is the independent explanatory power of crime rates in driving security policy. As we discussed in previous chapters, crime rates may be an important driver but more so when in conjunction with political factors. As depicted in the Figure 3.8 below, in both occupation operations – 2010 and 2014 - the Rio de Janeiro homicide rate was declining. Before the Federal Intervention, the homicide rate in the city did grow. What can be said is that there is a role for acute security crises, as they were the ones that triggered both the 2010 occupation and the Federal Intervention. These cannot be accurately captured by a quantitative measure.

Figure 3. 8 Homicide rates per 100,000 people



Source: (ISP - Instituto de Segurança Pública 2022; IPEA 2022)

6 Conclusion

This chapter provided qualitative evidence to process trace the dynamics by which large-scale military policing operations take place in Brazil, combining the role of civilian control over the military and its interaction with the military preferences to execute these missions. It drew on specialized literature, FOIA requests and several semi-structured interviews with high-ranking military officers who were key witnesses to the military planning and operational execution. Here are the findings.

The high levels of deployment between 2010-2015 and specially both *Favela* Occupation operations are cases where *pre-deployment lobbying* on the part of the military failed to prevent operations from happening due to high levels of civilian control over the military. When they could not lobby successfully against the operations, they designed the operations accordingly, but with input from civilians at the Ministry of Defense, in particular empowered defense ministers Nelson Jobim and Celso Amorim.

The Federal Intervention deployment (2018) is one where the president decided to send in troops but delegated complete operational control and design to the military, which meant that the conduct of the military was completely different from the prior large-scale GLO operations. Instead of occupations, they emphasized their role as managers implementing a "management shock" and deployed the military in support of police operations, while avoiding to leave troops stationed in the communities for long periods of time.

The lack of large-scale military deployment for anti-crime missions during the Bolsonaro administration presents itself as a case *of pre-deployment lobbying* in the context

of low levels of civilian control over the military. Throughout the decade, military behavior has been shaped by fear of prosecution and negative repercussions for the military's reputation, and by the military's mission beliefs. Finally, the context of the pandemic provides further evidence of how a powerful military can pick and choose missions it considers professionally rewarding and less risky. As the president was a denialist, someone who did not seek to sponsor serious state action to address the health emergency, the military as an institution with growing autonomy chose to perform certain missions, despite the lack of presidential instruction. They guided their conduct towards not executing any policing work such as enforcing stay-at-home orders instead mobilizing the armed forces to autonomously execute logistical and health-related support tasks (Acacio, Passos, and Pion-Berlin 2022). In other words, when the military could act on their mission beliefs due to openings in the civilian control environment, they did.

All in all, the trajectory of military deployment in public security missions in Brazil has an impact on doctrine and military training. Over the years, the military doctrine and training for GLO operations became mandatory for all recruits and cadets. The 2010 decade is key to understand the process by which constant military deployments shaped the perceptions of the Brazilian military towards the full acceptance of their role in policing missions in case of emergency (i.e., police strikes, complete breakdown of law enforcement capabilities at the state level) and overall resistance to occupation deployments that are planned by the Federal Government as a medium-term security provision mechanism.

The preferences of the army evolved from being ordered by the civilians in 2010 to occupy large *favelas* and developing a doctrine of occupation akin to what was being

performed in Haiti with the MINUSTAH. After the terrible human rights outcomes of the *Maré* operation in 2014-2015, in a context where they could not completely say "no", they then preferred flexible deployments instead of a full-blown occupation (i.e., rapid strikes, perimeter security, supporting the police) in the Federal Intervention of 2018. After 2018, as their political power grew working within the government, they have been avoiding public security deployments altogether: so far, no sizeable military deployment for public security purposes has taken place in the Bolsonaro administration. The military's proximity to Bolsonaro, particularly in a context where their reputation is already at risk for being blamed by failures of the Bolsonaro administration, makes deployments in policing roles unlikely. Officers are in a privileged position to lobby against them, which highlights the causal role of civilian control over the military on the variation in military deployments for public security missions. When the military gained political leverage, they stopped performing policing operations, even in an administration that is militaristic in nature that got elected with a platform to increase military deployments for public security missions. Counter-intuitively, greater military autonomy is followed by a desire to minimize internal security operations.

Chapter 4

Crime or Politics? A subnational analysis of military deployment for public security operations in Brazil

Abstract

Following a Latin American trend after the downfall of military-backed authoritarian regimes, Brazil established baseline civilian control over its armed forces and has been calling on them to tackle the rise of violent crime in "Guaranteeing Law and Order" operations. Nevertheless, not all Brazilian states are equally likely to receive military troops to police their streets. This chapter seeks to understand variation in deployment levels for public security missions in the 27 Brazilian states. In particular, I assess the impact of crime, which represents the conventional wisdom of why the Federal Government would send in the military to carry out such missions, and investigate the role of variables within Brazilian politics, namely membership of governors in Federal Governmental coalitions, inspired by the literature on the political economy of redistribution under federalism. Drawing on an original cross-state dataset including all 27 Brazilian states between 2004-2020, I perform statistical analysis to assess the most important correlates of deployment at the subnational level. Controlled for important potential confounders such as the number of police strikes, number of police officers per capita and the number of operations of an alternative security force, I find partial support for the untested conventional wisdom that crime rates are associated with more deployments. I also find evidence supporting the existence of interactive effects highlighting the importance of political variables: violent states are more likely to receive

deployment if the governor is a member of the president's coalition, but not when they are co-partisans. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first-ever statistical analysis of military deployment levels at the subnational level for Brazil. In addition, I provide qualitative evidence from the military deployment in Rio de Janeiro in 2010 to illustrate my argument regarding the perceived need of civilian politicians to resort to the military to execute security policies to appease their flimsy allies i.e., with which they do not share partisanship ties.

1 Introduction

Brazil is regarded as a typical case of a former military regime that achieved some degree of civilian control over the military and subsequently, having to deal with criminal threats, deployed the military to address public security issues (A. Passos and Martínez 2019). Recent work has shown, however, that not all states are equally likely to receive GLO operations (Rocha 2021). What are the subnational correlates of the deployments of the military for public security in Brazil?

While there has been a renewed interest in this topic in Brazil, due to massive deployments that happened in the past decade and their potential connection with the election of a right wing retired military officer as president, a systematic analysis of the sources of the phenomena has not been performed beyond the comparative case studies or single-n studies. Following up on the analysis shown in the previous chapter, we seek to uncover some of the reasons behind democratically elected presidents leveraging their control over the military to execute security policies. This chapter presents theoretical and empirical contributions digging deep into the subnational level of military deployments. It proceeds with the first-ever quantitative analysis for public security deployments in Brazil. To do so, the inferences are based on models drawing on an original dataset on Brazil's military deployments.

Establishing a theoretical dialogue that seeks to integrate civil-military relations with a broader literature in comparative politics, I argue that military deployments in domestic soil should be treated as a redistribution problem. In doing so, I test two contending hypotheses of potential moderators of the impact of crime levels: core allies

and flimsy allies. Core ally governors are the ones sharing the president's party, flimsy allied governors are members of the governmental coalition but not partisan allies, therefore, with a more fragile alliance.

I find that for most models, crime rates in isolation are not a predictor of deployments. In support for my theory, I find that being a member of the government coalition positively moderates the impact of crime rates, but not all allies are equal. Co-partisanship does not positively moderate the association between crime and deployments while being a flimsy ally of the president, meaning a non-copartisan member of the governing coalition, positively moderates the association between crime and deployments. This happens because in a highly fragmented party system support from governors is an important political goal for presidents, as they are necessary to secure support in Congress to pass legislation, not suffer from congressional inquiries and from the threats of removal through impeachment procedures. Presidents can already rely on their co-partisans, but flimsy allies require extra resources from the Federal Government: hence more deployments of the military when there is high crime.

The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section briefly discusses the literature on the dependent variable, followed by a presentation of my hypotheses for this chapter. Then I proceed to describe the research design and the variables used in the model. Section 5 presents the results of the statistical analysis of deployments. Section 6 describes some stylized facts of the Rio de Janeiro 2010 military large-scale deployment, illustrating the argument. The final section concludes the chapter.

2 A literature review on the Guaranteeing Law and Order Operations in Brazil

Let us first clarify how the public security deployment of the military takes place. Brazil is a former military dictatorship, a typical case of high levels of violence due to powerful organized crime. Its military had to adapt to new public security missions.

Historically, in Brazil, a relative absence of external threats and the perception of internal threats have caused the armed forces to focus on domestic actions, resulting in constant involvement in domestic politics and executing internal security and national development missions (Stepan 1971; Coelho 2000; Desch 1999; Bruneau and Tollefson 2014). When Brazil transitioned to democracy, the military's role was established as being responsible for national defense and protection of borders against foreign threats. They also gradually recovered their public image and established themselves as a highly trusted institution (Ceratti, Moraes, and Filho 2015; Russo 2020).

However, the Brazilian constitution still allowed the use of the armed forces on domestic security through the "*Guaranteeing of Law and Order*" mechanism. This allows the Federal Government to order military deployments for a limited period to perform internal security tasks to "restore" public safety (Zaverucha 2008). Under this rubric, from 1992 to December 2021, there were 145 operations (Brazil 2020), several of them in Rio de Janeiro, a city known for conflicts between police forces, drug trade organizations, and mafia-like organizations (*milícias*).

Moreover, the size and scope of the GLOs grew in the last decade. The city of Rio de Janeiro had two massive GLOs, in the *Alemão* and *Penha* communities (2010–2012), and the *Maré* community (2014–2015). In 2018 then President Temer went further,

ordering the military to lead a Federal Intervention in the public security sector of Rio de Janeiro, with command of all security forces in the state. Army Generals Walter Braga Netto and Richard Fernandez Nunez were tasked with leading the effort, which ended in December 2018, when president Temer stepped down.

The large public security deployments of the military taking place since 2010 have brought about a new wave of scholarship. Much like the rest of Latin America's literature on domestic military deployments, the focus of the scholarly literature is on some key topics: how to theoretically (in terms of political theory) comprehend the phenomena of militarization and how the deployments fit into it, and the consequences of deployments for human rights and democracy. In this section I reflect on state of the art to position the chapter's contribution.

In terms of the theory-focused approaches, the idea here is that scholars should pay more attention to how problematic it is to militarize public security. It is a feature of excessive *securitization* (Sá Costa 2013; Mendonça 2018a; Rodrigues 2016; Suarez, Brancoli, and Acácio 2017), where governments are treating a threat (crime and criminals) that should be dealt with through "normal" institutions, not as an existential threat (Veronica F. Azzi 2017; L. A. F. de Souza and Serra 2020; Succi Junior 2021; Mendonça 2018b; Rodrigues 2016). The second and complementary strand of scholarship utilizes these arguments against "excessive militarization" and points out the potential consequences of military deployments for human rights and democracy (D'Araújo 2016; Zaverucha 2008; Viana 2021; A. A. P. Oliveira and Reis 2020; Mathias, Campos, and

Santos 2016; Veronica Fenocchio Azzi 2020; L. A. F. de Souza et al. 2020; Rodrigues et al. 2017).

There are some notable exceptions to the trends I outlined, and it is where I am joining the debate, when it comes to studying the causes of military deployment for domestic missions in Brazil. Recent work has shown that not all states are equally likely to receive GLO operations (Rocha 2021). In a recent article, Succi and Saint-Pierre map out some potential arguments regarding the potential causes of deployment. They strongly argue against scholarship that analyzes military deployments from a pragmatic standpoint (i.e., deployments exist because governments face security threats and task the military with dealing with them). Instead, they claim that there are political variables at play, such as the ideological preferences of government, but their analysis is mainly a case study to illustrate the argument (Succi Jr. and Saint-Pierre 2020).

A recent doctoral dissertation has proposed that scholars look at Brazil's military deployments as a strategic interaction between politicians and soldiers (A. M. Passos 2018). The descriptive findings, based on rich fieldwork zooming in on a specific deployment (2014 *Maré*), are certainly a departure from the usual scholarship on the topic. A second paper that addresses the causes of *militarization* in the Brazilian case argues that the military's involvement in internal missions guards a causal relationship with citizen support (Harig 2021).

Nonetheless, the gap for a more systematic understanding of the sources of such deployments remains. Coupled with insights from the previous chapter of this dissertation, filling such a gap is exactly what I will pursue in the following pages. If the literature has

ignored causes of deployment cross-nationally, it has also done so at the subnational level for the largest country in Latin America. Though sizeable and visible deployments often take place in Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro is *not* the most violent state in the country. Several places are more violent, yet they do not often receive army troops or do not receive them at all. What explains this puzzle?

3 Explaining the subnational deployment levels

Latin America, *pari-passu* with the process of sending the military back to the barracks and democratization of its political regime also saw a rise in "mid-level" security threats (Pion-Berlin 2010). Criminal violence is endemic in Latin America's consolidating democracies (Arias 2006). Brazil is certainly one of such cases. Drug Trade Organizations amassed considerable firepower to the point of challenging the power of the state and its agents who should be enforcing the rule of law.

If traditional security forces cannot address the issue of criminal violence in Latin America, citizens grow frustrated with the deliverance of security services by these consolidating democracies, such as Brazil, and growing evidence has been showing the armed forces are trusted institutions and that individuals are concerned for their levels of security. Therefore, and following the framework presented on chapters 1 and 2, levels of crime must lead governments to tasking the military with public security missions (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2011; Pion-Berlin 2019b). In more formal terms:

H1: The higher the crime rates, the higher the deployment levels will be.

I argue that the conventional wisdom, regarding the role of crime levels, needs to be tested in the context of political variables. While there is strong reasoning to see military deployments as a response to crimes, it remains a testable proposition to see if such levels of violence affect deployments in all states the same way. Levels of violence should not be assumed to automatically generate military deployments, at least not at the same rate.

This chapter's purpose is to dig deeper into the civilian politicians' preferences regarding military deployments by understanding if and how the impact of the criminal threat is moderated by the relationship between the presidents and governors. I seek to incorporate insights from the political economy of redistribution literature into civil-military relations. Military deployment explained at the subnational level, I argue, is essentially a problem of redistribution in the context of federalism. What then explains government transfers in the context of federalism? In a context of resource scarcity, incumbents at the federal level are seeking to secure re-election or the election of someone they support. To do that, they have a limited number of assets they can distribute, and they do not do so equally or regardless of political considerations. Sending in the military is a resource available at the Presidency's disposal and may be requested by governors. Like any Federal Government resource, it is conceivable that allies are more likely to be favored by presidents.

Brazilian presidents, seek to secure support in Congress to pass a legislative agenda, survive corruption investigations and not to get impeached, since every president since 1986 has had impeachment procedures filed against them and two were ousted. What do governors hold that may interest the president?

There are two strands of literature regarding the relative power of governors in relation to the president in Brazil. On the one hand, scholars argue that governors hold sizeable political influence over the electorate and the congressional delegations (Limongi and Vasselai 2018) and are a constraint on the Federal Government (D. Samuels and Abrucio 2000). In the words of a classic study of Brazilian federalism, they are the "Barons of the Federation", the indisputable center of all state politics (Abrucio 1994).

On the other hand, since 1988, when the Federal Constitution was published, Brazil has had a federalist system that highly empowers the president in terms of resources and decree powers of the Presidency. In other words, the federalist arrangement strengthens the Presidency (Arretche 2013); the executive power is the center of gravity of national politics (Amorim Neto 2004), at the expense of states (Amorim Neto and Santos 2013; Cheibub, Figueiredo, and Limongi 2009). For instance, in 2018, 67.53% of all taxes levied on the Brazilians went to the Federal Government, while 25.9% went to the states and 6.57% to the cities (Federal Government of Brazil 2020, 3). Correcting for these inequities entail voluntary transfers from the Federal Government, and though some money is earmarked, the Federal Government holds considerable discretion (C. Souza 2005).

Security is where both strands meet and set up a structure of incentives. First, because the constitution issues enormous responsibilities to governors when it comes to public security. Investigative police powers are held at the state level. The governor is the commander in chief of a militarized police force tasked with day-to-day policing and appoints the chief of the "civilian police," which deals with criminal investigations. All of these responsibilities must be dealt with by the governor with state funding. However, as

we have established, the president has a powerful "pen" when it comes to resources, not only financial but also in terms of personnel. The Federal Police of Brazil is a well-funded and competent bureaucracy focused on criminal investigation, while the president also has access since 2004 to a "proto-gendarmerie" *Força Nacional de Seguranca Pública*, which can be readily summoned from police officers from all states to intervene in public security crises. The problems with this force are numerous and range from lack of unified doctrine to lack of knowledge of the terrain and overall, not enough capabilities to act. Then there is the capacity and authority to deploy the military: the president is the commander in chief of an army that has been training recruits to execute policing operations at least since 2006.[61]

Governors, in sum, can use their sway over the state caucus in Congress, provide electoral support to candidates supported by the president and help the president with overall *governability*, in a country where impeachment attempts are not uncommon. Presidents have power and the ability to secure such support by deploying the military. We can therefore state the following interactive hypothesis:

[61] This has been established in several interviews with military officers carried out with the Getúlio Vargas Foundation. For example, General Tratz, head of Army doctrine center; General Richard, head of communications center. Verifying documentation of when this was established has been hard to obtain. A freedom of information request stated that archived copies of army instruction manuals would not be given to me because keeping them is not a "legal requirement", so the furthest they were willing to provide is a manual from 2012. After extensive searches, I obtained a 2006 and a 2009 Army Manuals detailing preparation for GLO ops date to 2006.

H2: As crime rises, if a governor is a member of the president's ruling coalition, then the federal military deployments will be greater than if the governor is not a member of the president's ruling coalition.

Not all allies are the same. We must account for the character of the political coalitions that are typical of more recently established party systems. The comparative debate on how federal transfers are carried out to maximize electoral and political returns is helpful in our analysis. One strand of the literature on allocations, led by the classic studies of Cox and McCubbins, demonstrates that the equilibrium for risk-averse incumbents is to distribute goods to their core supporters (Cox and McCubbins 1986).

Sandra Ley and Guillermo Trejo are the first scholars to apply this framework to decisions in security policy (Trejo and Ley 2016; 2020). They do so in the context of Mexico during the Calderón administration and find that deployments are more likely to happen when the heads of subnational governments are co-partisans of the President. This suggests a political logic to domestic military deployments, indicating that presidents seek to appeal to governors who are core supporters. Therefore, and following Trejo and Ley, we can make evident our co-partisanship hypothesis:

H3a: As crime rises, if a governor is a member of the president's ruling coalition and a member of the president's party deployments will be more likely.

Another strand of the comparative literature on allocations in the context of federalism focuses on the weight of swing voters in the decision-making processes (Weibull 1987; Persson and Tabellini 2000; Dixit and Londregan 1995). Seeking to maximize their power, incumbents are likely to offer goods to swing constituencies in the hopes of harvesting their support. These are flimsy, non-copartisan members of a ruling coalition.

Not all consolidating democracies have stable party systems and low levels of fragmentation such as Mexico, the case analyzed by Trejo and Ley's influential study. Figure 4.1 compares Brazil and Mexico's effective number of parliamentary parties, which is a key measure of party system fragmentation. The results of Ley and Trejo, I argue, hold in support of the co-partisan hypothesis because of the nature of the Mexican party system, which is comprised by three or four major political parties. The nature and character of federalism in Brazil and its party system make it so that flimsy allies may be favored over partisan allies.[62]

[62] My argument about the character of the Brazilian party system and how it is heavily fragmented producing disparate consequences heavily relies on my joint work with Octavio Amorim Neto (Amorim Neto and Acácio 2022a).

Figure 4. 1 Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties in Brazil and Mexico (1995-2020)



Source: Election indices dataset (Gallagher 2021)

The opposite of Mexico when it comes to stability of a party system, since 1994, Brazil has voted into office some of the world's most fragmented legislatures since the beginning of the twentieth century (Nicolau 2017; Zucco and Power 2021). For instance, the 2018 election led to a lower house with an effective number of parties equal to 16.4. The combination of a presidential system of government that grants broad powers to the

head of state (Shugart and Carey 1992) with a highly fragmented legislature, leading to Brazil's *coalitional presidentialism*, has disparate consequences (Amorim Neto 2018).

The extremely high degree of legislative fragmentation in Brazil has made forming and maintaining governing coalitions an arduous task while also creating stronger incentives for presidents to act unilaterally. On the one hand, Brazil's institutional arrangement fosters the building of fragmented and heterogenous coalitions, which can be costly from a fiscal perspective and require presidents to resort to unorthodox or nebulous methods in order to remain in office (Mello and Spektor 2018). On the other hand, the high degree of fragmentation also implies that the size of the president's party in the legislature tends to be small, which, in turn, favors the appointment of minority governments (Amorim Neto 2006; Amorim Neto and Samuels 2011; Cheibub 2006). In Latin America, minority governments are associated with presidential falls (Hochstetler 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2014; 2018; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2012; Pérez-Liñán and Polga-Hecimovich 2017).

In Brazil's coalitional presidentialism, gathering political support means to achieve power and govern by passing a legislative agenda and by avoiding both congressional inquiries and impeachment procedures. In other words, the need for garnering support sets up an incentive structure so that presidents favor allies, but not at the same rate. Therefore, we can make evident our flimsy ally hypothesis, in which presidents will favor allies with which they do not share the same party affiliation.

H3b: Within coalitions, partisanship is not a driving factor of deployments. As crime rises, if a governor is a member of the president's ruling coalition but not member of the president's party (i.e., flimsy ally) deployments will be more likely.

4 Data and Research Design

The chapter seeks to expand our understanding of the impact of crime levels on military deployments and investigate an essential source of civilian preferences to exercise security control: the interests of the president. To do so, the chapter executes the first-ever statistical analysis of military deployments for public security in Brazil. Cross-national analyses such as the one shown previously in this dissertation, though useful for the first cut at an essential topic of interest, tend to blur subnational-level determinants because of measurement problems, among other reasons.

Since we have established that crime levels matter at least partially to explain military public security deployments in the previous chapters, not all areas of a country experience the same levels of violence. Certain areas of Brazil are as safe as any Nordic capital, others are more dangerous than areas facing civil wars. Therefore, analyzing the subnational level allows us to go beyond a cross-national analysis to average the impact of a variable with sizeable subnational variance. It also allows us to control for other confounders we could not control for in a cross-national analysis, even when implementing fixed effects modeling. For example, cross-national differences in terms of culture would theoretically be lower when analyzing a country's subnational units (Niedzwiecki 2018; Pepinsky 2019). It is also to our advantage to use granulated data in terms of the presence

of security forces, state capacity and confounders that vary at the subnational level, instead of averaging them in some way when pursuing cross-national analysis.

4.1 Dependent Variable

To capture the dependent variable, which is the domestic military deployment for public security purposes in Brazil, I use a measure that draws on an original dataset I put together. The primary source for deployments is the Brazilian ministry of defense. Deployment data is available since 1992, but information on key independent variables limits the analysis to the period between 2004-2020.

In the dataset, I compiled a simple count of GLO operations for the period between 2004-2020 per state per year. I consider GLO deployments where specific locations are listed in the source material, excluding operations carried out during the World Cup, Olympics and other large sports events, as well as elections security deployments, because they are carried out at the behest of the electoral justice system, not under agreements between presidents and governors that are typical of the GLO framework.

Figure 4.2 below presents the variation in the outcome variable in the y axis and homicide rates per capita on the x axis, averaging them for the period 2004-2020. Unsurprisingly and lending the measure face validity, the state of Rio de Janeiro ranks high in receiving military troops, but so does Pará – a state known for deployments to deal with rural unrest and known states where the police strike often take place (BA, PE, ES). The association between homicide rates and GLO operations seems to exist but is not strong.

Figure 4. 2 Scatterplot of the Variation in Public Security (1992-2020)



For ease of presentation of all "effect sizes", the measure for the per capita dependent variable is scaled from 0-100. Scaling was done based on values of the variable for the period 1992-2020, and statistics for the true values can be seen in Table 4.1. In Table 4A in the Appendix, I report models run with the count dependent variable. Results are robust for the independent variables of interest.

4.2 Independent Variables

This chapter has four independent variables of interest: one contextual, representing crime levels and three political in nature: the contextual variable is homicide rates, the political ones are membership in a presidential coalition, co-partisanship with the president and non-copartisan membership in the coalition (flimsy allies).

The measure representing crime levels utilizes the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants. It is regarded as a standard proxy to measure levels of violence (Inter-American Development Bank 1999; Cano and Rojido 2016). Homicides are relatively well coded compared to other types of crimes and have a clear definition across countries. The source for the data is the *Forum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública*, a Brazilian think-tank that compiles violence data at the subnational level (*Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública* 2021).

I argue that the impact of such contextual variable is conditioned on a political variable. Such political variables inform presidents to use civilian control over the military to send in troops to the states. To obtain these political measures, I put together a dataset with names, entry and exit dates, political parties and biographical data on all presidents and governors of Brazil from 1992 to 2020. These were manually compiled by me from the *Dicionário Histórico Biográfico Brasileiro*, a project run by the *Fundação Getúlio Vargas* which compiles the biographies of Brazilian politicians (Fundação Getúlio Vargas 2021) and complemented with press sources.

While co-partisanship is straightforward to code, 1 if the governor and the president shared the same party and 0 if parties did not coincide, due to the nature of Brazil's party

system it is harder to capture when an allied governor is not a co-partisan. A first step is to code 1 if governors were from a party of a president's ruling coalition, and 0 if otherwise. After doing this with coalitions data from Amorim Neto (2018), an additional step is required. I carried out biographical information that speaks to whether non-partisan allies were actual allies of the president or only their parties, to recode governors whose parties were members of the national ruling coalition but they themselves were not allies of the president. Therefore, another empirical contribution of this chapter is to generate original data on alliances between governors and presidents in Brazil for the period 2004-2020.

With this dataset in hand, we must obtain a measure of membership of governors in a governing coalition and whether in the context of this coalition they share party identity with the president. In the models, this variable is labeled *"Allied governor",* allowing for a test of hypothesis 2. Co-partisanship, which allows us to test hypothesis 3a, follows the straightforward coding where, for each state-year, I coded as 1 as co-partisan and 0 as non-copartisan. In the models this variable is labeled as *Co-partisan governor*.

Accounting for the flimsy alliances, meaning membership in the governing coalition without partisanship is done by introducing a third measure, labeled *Non-Copartisan allied governor*. It codes 1 as non-copartisan allies and 0 for the remaining governors. Taken together, these measures allow us to dig deeper into the coalitional logic of military deployments for public security purposes.

Finally, a dummy variable for national elections is included. In those years, incumbents are disputing elections for the positions of president and governor. This may

create incentives for these politicians to improve security and to use the military, providing additional support for a political logic of military deployments of public security in Brazil.

4.3 Controls included in the model

To start off, all models included a lagged dependent variable because of an inertial component in the dependent variables. Conceivably, an important predictor of current levels of military deployment for public security is the past year's deployment levels.

A first confounder, meaning a variable that could affect both IVs of interest and the dependent variable, that must be controlled for, is the existence of military police (*polícia militar*) strikes. This is a known problem in Brazil. Though the police in Brazil is militarized and its disciplinary rules resemble the disciplinary manuals of the armed forces, from time to time, the lower ranks of the police will stop working due to low salaries, lack of equipment or unwelcoming work schedules. Usually, because it is constitutionally prohibited to strike, their spouses will park their vehicles and stand in front of the barracks, preventing the police officers from starting their patrol routine. The results? Looting, gang violence, and frequent assassinations are carried out by shadow criminal syndicates within the police forces or all-out war between criminal groups(R. P. Cavalcanti and Garmany 2020; The Washington Post 2017). All of these affect criminal violence, often leading governors to request help from the Federal Government, which can come in the form of a deployment of the military. Therefore, I measure the simple count of police strikes per state per year. The source for this data is the union-funded *Sistema de Acompanhamento de Greves*, from the *Departamento Intersindical de Estatística e Estudos Socioeconômicos*

(DIEESE) (DIEESE 2021).[63] As seen in chapter 3, military officers recognize deployments to address civilian police strikes as an acceptable mission. Therefore, we must include a control for it.

A second confounder is the number of deployments of the *Força Nacional de Segurança Pública* (FNSP). In 2004, the same year our analysis begins for data availability reasons, the Lula administration sought to create this alternative security force (ASF) in the hopes for having an alternative to resorting to military deployments to address acute security crises in the states. When one sees a mention to an Alternative Security Force (ASF), one imagines credible security forces such as the *Carabineros* (Chile) or the *Gendarmaria Nacional* (Argentina) (Esparza 2015).

In Brazil, this attempt does not reflect any resemblance with the successful cases of credible ASF building. The FNSP does not have a permanent staff. It is comprised of police officers from the state police forces that are summoned from time to time to operate in a given area of the country. All sorts of problems arise from this type of structure, from inconsistencies in doctrine and training to basic knowledge of the terrain they are tasked with operating at, to clientelist practices in recruitment. Nonetheless, the presence of the FNSP can confound the relationship between the crime levels and the dependent variable, because it could feasibly affect both crime levels and the likelihood of military

[63] This data was obtained privately from Mr. Rodrigo Linhares, their chief data analyst, who kindly provided their original data. Many thanks to him.

deployments. The source for this data is a freedom of information request to the Brazilian government.[64]

A third necessary control for any analysis of security issues is the number of police officers. This is because the variation in the policing capacity can feasibly affect both the homicide rates and the deployment of the military. I use the number of police officers per capita. The source for the data is the Justice Ministry of Brazil.[65] Finally, the models include controls for population and state-level GDP per capita, which are standard in the literature regarding resource allocations. The source is the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) 2021).

4.4 Modeling Strategy

The choice of statistical models to analyze data depends on the panel data structure and can induce biases in the regression coefficients and error terms. Since this chapter draws on a cross-state dataset for all Brazilian states for the period between 2004-2020, choosing an econometric technique entails an assessment of several factors; if there is a need to account for autocorrelation, if there is a need to include fixed effects for both time and geographical units of analysis and to assess the existence of potential outliers that would affect the results. In terms of theory, the analysis must also control for potential measurable confounders, variables that could theoretically affect both the independent

[64] Many thanks to Dr. Tiago Ventura, incoming assistant professor at the McCourt School of Public Policy – Georgetown University, who shared the data of his Freedom of Information Request.
[65] Obtained through the Freedom of Information Request N. 08198.023674/2021-67 , with data from the National Secretary of Justice.

variables of interest and the dependent variable being analyzed, which have already been mentioned in the previous section. Table 4.1 below portrays the summary statistics of all variables used in the statistical analysis.

Table 4. 1 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Per capita Dependent Variable Scaled (0-100)	756	.884	5.341	0	100
Count Dependent Variable	810	.213	.471	0	3
Per capita Dependent Variable	756	8.10e-08	2.85e-07	0	3.75e-06
Homicide Rate per 100,000	783	27.776	13.587	3.7	71.8
Allied governor	783	.627	.484	0	1
Co-partisan governor	783	.184	.388	0	1
Non-Copartisan allied governor	783	.451	.498	0	1
N of Gendarmerie Operations	460	1.463	2.107	0	14
Police Officers per 100,000	369	468.134	308.942	65.977	4872.908
N of Police Strikes	783	.1	.343	0	4
Gdp Per capita	702	366430.07	1992335.3	554.433	21774724
Population	756	6789443	8080000.2	228749	46289333
National Election Year	783	.241	.428	0	1

The results of the Hausman model specification test (Hausman 1978) support the hypothesis that there is a need to model heterogeneity using fixed effects.[66]A test for autocorrelation in panel data (Drukker 2003; Wooldridge 2010) supports the hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation of first order.[67] Yet, there is still a need to include a lagged

[66]Hausman (1978) specification test

	Coef.
Chi-square test value	12.512
P-value	.085

[67] Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
F(1, 26) = 1.568
Prob > F = 0.2216

dependent variable in the models for theoretical reasons, as military deployments may have an inertial component (i.e., deployments of the previous year may affect the deployments of the current year). Furthermore, a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (Breusch and Pagan 1979) was run and indicated its existence on the data.[68] Therefore, I followed a standard method for analyzing time-series cross-sectional data in political science (Beck and Katz 2006). These models displayed are Prais-Weinstein regressions with panel-corrected standard errors. I include year and state fixed effects to control for unobserved factors at the state and year levels. This is a panel data with Middle T (15) and Large N (27). Except for the binary variable representing national elections, all independent variables are lagged in one year, to fend off concerns regarding endogeneity.

Finally, a note on missing data for Brazil is in order. Though the count dependent variable has no missing data, data on homicide rates and police effectives are somewhat limited. For example, if the expected sample size, given the number of states and years, is 405, due to missing data on one or more variables, the total sample size of the main models is 343.[69] Since I did not want to make assumptions regarding the nature of why there is missing data, I have not performed any data imputation methods at the peril of losing many

[68] Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of local_sec_deployment100
chi2(1) = 1133.74
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

[69] There is no missing data on the count dependent variable, yielding 810 observations. Models were run with it and are robust. But we cannot draw minimally credible inferences from models where we cannot control for observable confounders. Doing so reduces the sample size as a tradeoff.

observations and running into issues of statistical power when calculating coefficients and error terms.[70]

5 Empirical Analysis: the sources of military deployment for public security missions in Brazil

The empirical analysis reported here shows results with the scaled version of the per capita dependent variable.[71] The main effects are shown in Table 4.2. Homicide rates are associated with more GLOs per capita according to my models, supporting my first hypothesis.

[70] Given missing data on variables may have to deal with degrees of state capacity, our tests represent a conservative estimate of the associations between variables since theoretically countries with less state capacity should be more likely to deploy the military. If there is missing data, they are dropped from the statistical analysis.

[71] Results with the count dependent variable are robust for the independent variables of interest and are reported on Appendix 4A.

Table 4. 2 Regression Coefficients for Per capita Scaled Dependent Variable, Main Effects

	Model 1 Per capita Scaled DV
Lagged DV	-.042
	(.223)
Homicide Rate t-1	.146**
	(.065)
Police Officers Per capita t-1	0
	(.001)
N of Police Strikes t-1	.04
	(.668)
Gendarmerie Operations t-1	.644***
	(.247)
GDP Per capita t-1	0*
	(0)
National Election Year	-4.938
	(8.804)
Population t-1	0
	(0)
Observations	343
R^2	.216
Number of states	27

Note: Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs). Panel-Corrected Standard Errors in parentheses. *** *p<.01,* ** *p<.05,* * *p<.1* Constant suppressed from the Table for brevity. All models included year and fixed effects and were implemented in Stata 16.

Then, we must understand the interactive models portrayed in Table 4.3. They test hypotheses, 2, 3a and 3b, which are key parts of my theory about how political variables interact with crime levels to explain the outcome of interest. First, the interactive term for allied governor and homicide rates is positive and statistically significant in both dependent variables, supporting hypothesis 2. In other words, as crime rises, not all governors are likely to receive deployments, but allies of the president receive higher levels of troops deployments.

Counter hypothesis 3a, which digs deeper into the character of such alliances, the interactive term for co-partisanship does not reach statistical significance. Providing support for hypothesis 3b, the variable for non-partisan allied moderates positively the impact of crime rates ($p<0.05$). Substantively, this means that being a member of the presidents' party in the context of high crimes does not increase levels of the deployment of the military for public security purposes. On the other hand, in violent states with flimsy allies, where alliances are not firmly solidified between governors and the president, deployments are more likely.

Table 4. 3 Regression Coefficients for Per capita Scaled Dependent Variable – Interactive Models

	(2) DV Per capita Scaled	(3) DV Per capita Scaled	(4) DV Per capita Scaled
Lagged DV	-.045	-.042	-.043
	(.212)	(.223)	(.212)
Homicide Rate t-1	.091	.152**	.078
	(.06)	(.067)	(.055)
Allied governor t-1	-3.605*		
	(2.191)		
Allied governor t-1 * Homicide Rate t-1	**.138****		
	(.063)		
Co-partisan governor t-1		1.916	
		(2.576)	
Co-partisan governor t-1 * Homicide Rate t-1		**-.037**	
		(.06)	
Non-Copartisan allied governor t-1			-4.703***
			(1.786)
Non-Copartisan allied governor t-1 * Homicide Rate t-1			**.161*****
			(.061)
Police Officers Per capita t-1	0	0	0
	(0)	(.001)	(0)
N of Police Strikes t-1	.044	.108	.032
	(.651)	(.698)	(.635)
Gendarmerie Operations t-1	.569**	.633***	.551**
	(.227)	(.243)	(.225)
GDP Per capita t-1	0*	0	0*
	(0)	(0)	(0)
National Election Year	-7.265	-4.859	-6.615
	(8.307)	(8.809)	(7.835)
Population t-1	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)
Observations	343	343	343
R^2	.25	.219	.254
Number of states	27	27	

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) in parentheses. *** *p<.01,* ** *p<.05,* * *p<.1* Constant suppressed from the table for brevity. All models included year and fixed effects and were implemented in Stata 16.

As done previously, it is useful to visualize interaction terms graphically, by varying observed values of crime rates. As the graphs in the Figure 4.3 show below, the crime rates grow if the governor is a member of the president's coalition, and this relationship starts to be statistically significant when homicide rates are larger than 41 per 100,000 inhabitants. At no existing value in our dataset is being a co-partisan ally positively associated with more deployments, as shown in the Figure 4.3. Finally, as hypothesis 3b proposed, as homicide rates grow, being a non-copartisan ally increases deployment levels. In other words, deployments are not done indiscriminately and as crime grows, being a member of the coalition matters, particularly if the governor and the president do not share a party identification. Per Figure 4.3, when levels of violence are low, if the governor and the president are allies and do not share the same party, there is a negative association between that and military deployments. When crime rises, being an ally of the president – but not a co-partisan – comes in handy and military deployment levels increase.

Figure 4. 3 Marginal Effects Plots







As far as the control variables, the potential confounders must first be examined. Across the board, the number of gendarmerie operations is statistically significant and positively associated with more deployments, but not in the theoretically expected way. One would have expected that gendarmerie ops would lead to a decrease in military deployments, but the opposite seems to occur, and this warrants further empirical scrutiny. The number of police officers per capita is not a significant predictor of the dependent variable nor is the number of police strikes. Finally, I did not find evidence that either the population size or the level of wealth predicts deployments.

6 Illustrating the argument: the Rio de Janeiro 2010 deployment

What follows is a brief case study to illustrate the argument tested quantitatively in this chapter. It shows how a president deployed the military to support a flimsy, non-copartisan ally. In 2010, at the end or his second and final term, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva received a request by then-Governor of Rio de Janeiro Sérgio Cabral to send in the army in a public security deployment. An acute public security crisis had taken place, as drug dealers from the *Penha* and *Alemão* communities had ordered the burning of buses and forced curfews in their areas of influence. Rio de Janeiro police has a special operations unit called BOPE (special operations battalion, *Batalhão de Operações Especiais*), but they were no match for hundreds of heavily armed criminals hiding in a part of the city where they would have all the higher ground advantage.

The first request from the state government included an authorization to borrow armored marine corps vehicles to take the troops of the BOPE into the *favelas* without

harm. The request was rather clear and only asked for logistical support and transportation, emphasizing that no military personnel beyond support was being requested (C. (retired) C. A. de L. Lima 2012, 19; Cabral 2010a). A second request, a day later, mentions contact with the Minister of Defense asking for 800 professional troops (i.e., individuals not doing volunteer military service, likely from the Paratroopers Brigade, headquartered in Rio), two helicopters and ten armored vehicles (Cabral 2010b). On November 28, 2010, four days after the governor's initial request, the CLANF vehicles (Vietnam-Era style amphibious armored vehicles) were making their way into the *Alemão* and *Penha* communities with the BOPE police officers inside, and hundreds of army troops are surrounding the perimeter. In the following days, the governor requested the creation of a "pacification force"(Cabral 2010d), to sustain the occupation and allow for the recruitment of police officers that would constitute a new "pacifying policing unit" (Veronica Fenocchio Azzi 2020; Mathias, Campos, and Santos 2016). Troops with blue hats resembling blue helmets of the United Nations made up the bulk of the forces in the terrain, under the operational command of a two-star army General, with troops rotating every three months. After several waves prolonging that deployment, they stayed in the area for 28 months, making it the longest lasting military deployment for public security purposes in the history of Brazil.

What does this have to do with the alliance dynamics of Brazilian politics? Sending in the military was an effort to support a flimsy ally, and the president leveraged his control over the military to do so. When the first request by the governor took place, electoral and political concerns started to appear. Governor Cabral was not a co-partisan but an ally from

the *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (PMDB), Brazil's then largest political party and considered a key for the country's governability. It always holds a sizeable share of the seats in both houses and holds the largest numbers of mayors and frequently governors. President Lula was on his second term and had supported his chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, on her bid for the Presidency. Her candidacy as a political neophyte needed all the support possible, particularly from a powerful governor in a relevant state such as Rio de Janeiro.

Cabral, Lula and Rousseff are not from the same party. In fact, Cabral was not particularly an ally of the local labor party, but Governor Sérgio Cabral lent massive support to her campaign, leading her to win in 60% of the vote in that state in a national alliance. Dilma Rousseff was elected president of Brazil in October 2010. Then-Governor Cabral was in a position to reap the rewards of political support from the Federal Government (Carneiro 2010). It would not take one month until Governor Cabral had the opportunity to do so when drug dealers started the unrest that led to the military intervention in *Penha* and Alemão. After four years and one more military long-term operation in the *Maré favelas* and Sérgio Cabral would put all his support behind President Rousseff's bid for re-election (Constancio 2014).

All of the articulations to have troops in Rio de Janeiro in 2010 went through the then defense minister Nelson Jobim, who was also a member of the PMDB, and Governor Cabral, in a context where the PMDB was a key member of the ruling coalition of Brazil. In a recent book by investigative journalist Natália Viana, based on interviews with figures like Jobim himself, it becomes clear that he was instrumental in implementing directives

given by the president to help his ally Cabral in sending in army troops (Viana 2021, 51). At every step of the way, when the governor put in a new request to update the terms of deployment, there are literal mentions of calls between the minister and the governor, possibly to define what should be requested to the Presidency in writing (Cabral 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d). Moreover, when it came to drafting the rules of engagement, according to then head of the Joint Chiefs General de Nardi, Jobim was in the room with his military aides providing key input on how the conduct of the troops would be set up (C. (retired) C. A. de L. Lima 2012, 24). In other words, the defense minister, a member of the PMDB, on behalf of the PT government, and in response to the close relationship to the state governor (a member of the PMDB), shaped the guidelines of this deployment, broadening its scope and granting unprecedented authority to the army (Viana 2021, 51)

Understanding how deployment orders went from answering to a request of logistical support to a military intervention, that was the first long-term domestic military deployment for public security purposes in the history of Brazil, is about knowing the political interests of both the governor and the president. This brief section illustrates how the Federal Government can use the military to put forward its agendas, such as securing allies and their political support. These are features for which the PT government used its newly established mechanisms to compel the military, despite their reluctance, to execute public security missions.

7 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the first-ever quantitative analysis of military deployments for public security missions in Brazil. Empirically, the chapter draws on an original dataset of deployments and on qualitative evidence. I find that taken in isolation, in most models, crime rates are not a statistically significant predictor of deployment levels.

More interestingly, politics are pertinent to predict how the military is used for public security in Brazil. Presidents provide more deployments to allied governors and opposition governors. Leveraging insights from the literature on the political economy of redistribution under federalism, transfers to allies do not take place at the same rate. Because of the character of the Brazilian party system, co-partisan allies are not more likely to receive deployments, but governors who are allies of the president but not co-partisan (flimsy allies), in the context of rising crime, receive more troops.

This chapter does not permit me to uncover the underlying reasons why support for co-partisan governors does not take place. It may be the case that presidents who are members of the labor party, which led Brazil from 2003 to 2016, cater to partisan agendas of not deploying the military. The labor party is the strongest in Brazil in party organization and mass partisanship (D. J. Samuels and Zucco 2018; D. Samuels 2006; D. Samuels and Zucco 2015). It has well-defined internal factions and a vivid internal democracy at the party level, with a debate regarding several policies. Given the history of military influence over politics in Brazil and the human rights violations during the military regime, a left-wing party such as the labor party would be a constituency pushing the president against deployments. In states not ruled by Labor Party governors, presidents do not face such

predicament and are able to secure support of swing governors. Indeed, these are potential mechanisms that could be occurring, but cannot be tested with this design and should warrant further qualitative investigation.

We have only begun to understand the political sources of military deployments at the subnational level, beyond the conventional wisdom of theorizing about the impact of rates of criminal violence, and normatively criticizing the potential excesses of *militarization* and its impact on human rights and democratic stability. In investigating its sources at the subnational level, the chapter unveiled a mechanism by which a political source of preferences of civilian leaders takes place. They must have some degree of civilian control to act on them, as shown cross-nationally and argued for previously. One implication is that we should keep drawing on frameworks from the broader comparative politics onto the civil-military relations subfield, and to understand that civilian leaders must be held accountable for the decisions they make. Decades after Latin American countries transitioned to democracy, troops are now used as bargaining chips to execute the political will of democratically elected politicians: it seems to be the case in Brazil and in Mexico, and more scholarship must be pursued comparatively.

Chapter 5

Concluding Notes

In this dissertation, which focused on the topic of military deployment for public security missions, we stepped back from the long-standing debate about the consequences of domestic military operations, be it pathologies of civil-military relations, democratic deconsolidation, and a myriad of potential human rights violations. Instead, and filling a substantial gap in the literature, this dissertation sought to analyze the sources of variation in domestic deployment of the armed forces for public security missions in Latin America. It heeded the call of Pion-Berlin (2016) that scholars, despite their normative preferences how they would like the armed forces to behave, must treat domestic deployments for what they are: a dependent variable in search for explanation.

The dissertation was executed in the spirit of a combination of large-*N* strategies, as well as by triangulating the answers to different research questions using multiple methods to shed light on the topic. It was a systematic study of 14 Latin American democracies' patterns of deployment of the military for public security operations. Second, it also contributed to the literature with a theorization of the phenomena putting in context contextual factors and highlighting the role of political factors - be it civilian control over the military or the reasoning to leverage it – and organizational factors in explaining how governments resort to using the military to address the provision of the public good of security.

Empirically, its main contribution is, aside from testing and finding support for the untested conventional wisdom that crime levels are an important explanatory factor, to highlight the importance of political variables explaining the phenomena. It showed that civilian control over the military and its interaction with the degree of military propensity are associated with more military deployments. It did so by employing a multi-method research design, leveraging original quantitative data, novel uses of existing events data and archival and interview data from fieldwork carried out during the covid-19 global pandemic.

Here is a summary of the findings presented in this dissertation. First, leveraging a novel measure of deployments from an existing dataset of events, I pursued a cross-national statistical analysis of military deployments for public security purposes from 1995 to 2020 for all Latin American democracies with sizeable militaries. The analysis found support for the untested conventional wisdom that crime rates matter to explain deployments. In addition to this contextual factor, political variables matter: civilian control over the military is an important explanatory factor for deployments. The more civilians control the defense sector, the more deployments will happen. I also find that crime rates and civilian control over the military positively interact to explain the outcome. In addition, I find that civilian control over the military and military propensity to execute public security missions interact to explain the outcome of interest, which highlights the weight of organizational factors.

Second, leveraging a set of interviews with high-ranking military officers, archival research and FOIA requests, the second empirical chapter digs deeper into the decision-making process and the interactions between politicians, who seek to deploy the military, and the troops, who would rather not execute such missions but must comply with civilian orders. It finds that civilian control over the decision-making process explains large-scale deployments and that the military, in the context of declining civilian control levels will either re-design interventions or avoid them altogether. What motivates the military's propensity to execute these missions, is both their thinking on how appropriate they are and the risks – reputational and of prosecution – in the event that misdeeds and collateral damage take place while they execute these missions.

Third, leveraging an original dataset, I pursued a subnational statistical analysis for the military deployments for public security in Brazil. The chapter finds, congruent with cross-national findings, partial support for the untested conventional wisdom that crime rates are a predictor of deployments. In addition, framing the issue of military deployments as a problem of redistribution in the context of federalism, I find that crime rates interact with a political variable based on whether the state governors where deployments take place are allies to the president, who orders military deployments. Findings are illustrated by a brief case study of a massive military deployment in 2010, where the president and the governor were allies but not co-partisans and the military was sent in. These findings suggest that there is a political logic behind civilian politicians leveraging their level of civilian control over the military to send them to the streets.

One implication of my findings is that we cannot fall prey to the assumption of principled civilian leadership. The literature on civil-military relations possesses solid grounding on democratic theory. Solving the everlasting problem of "who guards the guardians" entails realizing that war is too serious of a subject to be left just to military officers. It also entails that democratically elected leaders must effectively monitor the military to ensure coups do not occur and opportunistic behavior does not creep up. The assumption in the conventional literature is that the more civilians control the military, the more they will keep them in the barracks instead of dealing with non-defense issues. This is particularly highlighted in countries with a legacy of military repression during the authoritarian period that was either run or supported by men in uniform.

Reflecting on this problem in an alternative way means seeing this grounding in democratic theory cannot lead us to assume that democratically elected civilians are principled and virtuous, so much so that they would not order soldiers to turn inward. The findings I present are counterintuitive in this sense. The more civilian control, the more deployments. If the literature on civil-limitary relations is grounded on democratic theory to allow for a normative preference for civilian control over the military, my findings imply that it should also be grounded in democratic theory to account for the political interests of the governmental leaders who are the principals in the civil-military relations, or the citizenry, who are the ultimate principals.

Pressed for results and seeking to secure political support, to signal to citizens and allies that they are addressing security issues expeditiously, politicians will defer to the military, turning them inward and delegating the execution of security policy. To do so,

civilian politicians must have enough sway over the military. It they have it, civilian politicians will use troops as an instrument of government policy, reallocating them from their primary mission to auxiliary missions.

Future research agendas should seek to understand the sources of civilian leadership preferences regarding these deployments as well as military preferences. For that, it is necessary to conduct additional interview work with political decision-makers. For the book project this dissertation will become, these will be certainly carried out, but conducting surveys with political leadership should not be off the table as scholars have once again been growingly interested in civil-military relations.

The role of citizen preferences regarding military deployment, present in the theoretical framework of this dissertation, remains largely untested because of measurement and data problems. That being said, scholars should study both their impact on deployments and the impact of deployments on citizen attitudes as this endogenous relationship is certainly fertile ground for insightful social science.

Future scholarship should also include a better understanding of the patterns of deployment for out-of-sample countries, seeking to generalize the findings and unpack potential causal mechanisms. As far as the role of political alliances between the central and local governments it is important to validate the findings of this dissertation on cases other than Brazil. Domestic military deployments are not an exception, they are the rule in developing countries and ever more common in developed countries, as the United States has seen in the January 6 insurrection and as experienced by many countries every time there is a terrorist attack.

With a way of accurately measuring military deployments for public security purposes from an inexpensive and reliable source, the possibilities for hypothesis testing are endless. One can turn back to the questions about democracy and human rights consequences of public security deployments to move beyond case-based research and systematically test the hypotheses in the literature. In addition, we can recover hypotheses from the literature regarding the character of external threats and assess if the lack thereof is conducive to more domestic deployments.

All in all, and reflecting on the normative implications of this research agenda, I hope not be interpreted as someone advocating for more military deployments for public security purposes. I am certainly and unequivocally not. What I sought to do is to set the normative concerns aside – whether deployments should or should not take place because of reasons x, y or z – in the service of investigating why they take place in the first place. In answering it, I have realized that crime concerns are severe but also that it is not officers creeping up on the authorities to carry out counter crime missions, it is the democratically elected authorities retooling their armed forces to do their bidding. The long-term implications of such policies are currently being studied but parsing out its origins is still a fundamentally unexplored research agenda.

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Appendix

2A Full Regression Tables, Lagged DV, Panel Corrected Standard Errors.

	(1) Scaled DV	(2) Scaled DV	(3) Scaled DV
Lagged dependent variable	.316	.122	-.037
	(1.119)	(1.102)	(1.106)
Civilian control over the military (t-1)	12.165***	13.544***	9.348***
	(3.733)	(3.324)	(3.197)
Homicide rate (t-1)	4.922**	9.722**	4.891*
	(2.385)	(4.921)	(2.522)
Degree of hardware internalism (t-1)	-.397	-1.084	-4.283*
	(1.246)	(1.322)	(2.288)
Civilian control (t-1) * Homicide rate (t-1)		-4.804	
		(3.662)	
Civilian control (t-1) * Degree of hardware internalism (t-1)			7.32**
			(3.086)
U.S. security assistance ratio (t-1)	.274	.573	-.39
	(.751)	(.829)	(.757)
Left wing government (t-1)	-1.06	-1.26	.723
	(1.475)	(1.436)	(1.337)
Democracy (t-1)	-3.436	-1.487	-4.006
	(3.506)	(3.45)	(3.743)
Military expenditures as a share of GDP (t-1)	-5.495*	-4.648	-5.863**
	(2.898)	(3.057)	(2.82)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-9.397***	-9.277***	-11.112***
	(3.056)	(3.149)	(3.083)
Level of federalism (t-1)	-.313	-.256	-.329
	(.994)	(1.019)	(1.051)
Per capita security forces (t-1)	7.758*	8.194*	8.058*
	(4.347)	(4.286)	(4.506)
Trust in the military (t-1)	1.519	1.413	1.689
	(1.153)	(1.119)	(1.167)
Observations	207	207	207
R-squared	.518	.524	.531

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) in parentheses. *** *p<.01,* ** *p<.05,* * *p<.1* Constant suppressed from the table for brevity. All models included year and fixed effects and were implemented in Stata 16.

3A Selected Legislation (1992-2021)

YEAR	LEGAL DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT SUMMARY
1991	COMPLEMENTARY LAW Nº 69, FROM JULY 23rd, 1991	PROVIDES FOR GENERAL RULES FOR THE ORGANIZATION, PREPARATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES
1995	COMPLEMENTARY LAW Nº 83, FROM SEPTEMBER 12th, 1995	AMENDS PROVISION OF COMPLEMENTARY LAW No. 69, OF JULY 23, 1991, WHICH PROVIDES ON GENERAL RULES FOR THE ORGANIZATION, PREPARATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES.
1996	NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY	
1999	COMPLEMENTARY LAW Nº 97, FROM JUNE 9th, 1999	PROVIDES FOR GENERAL RULES FOR THE ORGANIZATION, PREPARATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES. CREATES THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
2001	DECREE Nº 3.897, FROM AUGUST 24th, 2001	ESTABLISHES THE GUIDELINES FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE GUARANTEE OF LAW AND ORDER, AND GIVES OTHER PROVISIONS
2001	PROVISIONAL MEASURE Nº 2.216-37, FROM AUGUST 31st, 2001.	AMENDS PROVISIONS OF LAW NO. 9.649, OF MAY 27, 1998, WHICH PROVIDES ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC AND MINISTERS, AND GIVES OTHER PROVISIONS
2004	COMPLEMENTARY LAW Nº 117, FROM SEPTEMBER 2nd, 2004	AMENDS COMPLEMENTARY LAW No. 97, OF JUNE 9, 1999, WHICH PROVIDES ON GENERAL RULES FOR THE ORGANIZATION, PREPARATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES, TO ESTABLISH NEW SUBSIDIARIES ASSIGNMENTS. PROVIDES FOR GENERAL RULES FOR THE ORGANIZATION, PREPARATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES..
2004	DECREE Nº 5.261 FROM NOVEMBER 3rd, 2004	IT PROVIDES FOR THE 11th ARMORED INFANTRY BRIGADE, THE 5th ARMORED CAVALRY BRIGADE AND THE 5th ARMORED INFANTRY BRIGADE AND GIVES OTHER PROVISIONS.
2005	ORDINANCE Nº 41-SEF, FROM JUNE 14th, 2005	ADMINISTRATIVELY UNLINKS THE LAW AND ORDER OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION CENTER FROM THE 11th LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE COMMAND FROM LAW AND ORDER, LINKING IT TO THE 13TH MECHANIZED CAVALRY REGIMENT.
2005	DECREE Nº 5.484, FROM JUNE 30th, 2005	APPROVES THE NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY, AND GIVES OTHER PROVISIONS

2008	DECREE Nº 6.703, FROM DECEMBER 18th, 2008	APPROVES THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY, AND GIVES OTHER PROVISIONS.
2010	COMPLEMENTARY LAW Nº 136, FROM AUGUST 25th, 2010	AMENDS COMPLEMENTARY LAW NO. 97, OF JUNE 9, 1999, WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE GENERAL RULES FOR THE ORGANIZATION, PREPARATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES, TO CREATE THE JOINT STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES AND DISCIPLINE THE DUTIES OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE STATE.
2010	ORDINANCE N 1.429/MD, FROM SEPTEMBER 6th, 2010	ESTABLISHES GUIDELINES FOR THE JOINT STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
2013	DECREE Nº 8.098, FROM SEPTEMBER 4th, 2013	CHANGES THE NATURE OF THE 4TH MOTORIZED INFANTRY BRIGADE AND THE 15TH MOTORIZED INFANTRY BRIGADE AND THE NAME OF THE 11TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE - GUARANTEE OF LAW AND ORDER.
2014	NORMATIVE ORDINANCE N 186/MD, FROM JANUARY 31st, 2014.*	PROVIDES ON THE PUBLICATION "GUARANTEE OF LAW AND ORDER" MOD MANUAL
2014	NORMATIVE GUIDANCE N 1/CONJUR/MD, FROM APRIL 16th, 2014	ASSIGNS TO THE GENERAL COORDINATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND MILITARY LAW OF THE LEGAL CONSULTANCY TOGETHER WITH THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE THE LEGAL FOLLOW-UP SERVICE IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ARISING FROM THE TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES IN ACTIONS TO GUARANTEE THE LAW AND ORDER INTENDED TO PRESERVE PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY OF PEOPLE AND HERITAGE, IN THE COMMUNITIES OF THE MARÉ COMPLEX, IN THE CITY OF RIO DE JANEIRO
2015	ORDINANCE Nº005 - EME, FROM JANUARY 5th, 2015**	APPROVES CAMPAIGN MANUAL EB20-MC-10.217 PACIFICATION OPERATIONS, 1ST EDITION, 2015
2016	DECREE Nº 8.733, FROM MAY 2nd, 2016	REGULAMENTA A GRATIFICAÇÃO DE REPRESENTAÇÃO DE QUE TRATA A MEDIDA PROVISÓRIA Nº 2.215-10, DE 31 DE AGOSTO DE 2001
2017	LAW Nº 13.491, FROM OCTOBER 13th, 2017	ALTERS DECREE-LAW No. 1001, OF OCTOBER 21, 1969 - MILITARY PENAL CODE.

2018	ORDINANCE N 146 COTER, FROM NOVEMBER 27th, 2018	APPROVES CAMPAIGN MANUAL EB70-MC-10.242 OPERATION OF LAW AND ORDER GUARANTEE, 1ST EDITION, 2018, AND GIVES OTHER ACTION
2019	ORDINANCE Nº 3.576/GM-MD, FROM AUGUST 23rd, 2019	APPROVE MINISTERIAL GUIDELINES No. 15/2019, WHICH REGULATES THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES, UNDER THE COORDINATION OF THIS MINISTRY, IN GUARANTEE OF LAW AND ORDER (GLO) AND FOR SUBSIDIARIES, IN ARTICULATION WITH PUBLIC SECURITY BODIES AND BODIES AND PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENTITIES, AS ANNEX TO THIS ORDINANCE.
2019	ORDINANCE Nº 3.929/GM-MD, FROM SEPTEMBER 20th, 2019	APPROVES MINISTERIAL GUIDELINES No. 16/2019, OF SEPTEMBER 20, 2019, WHICH REGULATES THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES, UNDER THE COORDINATION OF THIS MINISTRY, IN GUARANTEE OF LAW AND ORDER (GLO) AND FOR SUBSIDIARY ACTIONS, IN ARTICULATION WITH THE BODIES OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND WITH PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BODIES AND ENTITIES.
2021	ORDINANCE – EME/C EX N º 623, FROM DECEMBER 24th, 2021	APPROVES THE IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES OF THE PROJECT OF TRANSFORMATION OF THE INSTRUCTION CENTER OF WARRANTY OPERATIONS OF LAW AND ORDER FOR URBAN OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION CENTER, ON THE 28TH LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALION (CAMPINAS-SP) (EB20-D-03,055).
*REVOKES THE NORMATIVE ORDINANCE Nº 3.461, FROM DECEMBER 19, 2013.		
**REVOKED BY THE ORDINANCE N.326 - EME, FROM OCTOBER 31, 2019.		
***REVOKES CAMPAIGN MANUAL C85-1 GUARANTEEING LAW AND ORDER OPERATIONS, 2 ED 2010. ORDINANCE 042-EME-RES, FROM JUNE 9, 2010.		

Source: (Brazilian Army 2022; Federal Government of Brazil 2022a)

3B Public Security Guaranteeing Law and Order Operations in Brazil (1992-2021)

YEAR	OPERATION	STATED OPERATIONAL GOAL	PLACE OF OPERATION
1992	ECO 92	CONTRIBUTE TO PUBLIC SAFETY ON THE OCCASION OF A LARGE EVENT.	RJ
1994-95	RIO AND ALVORADA	COOPERATE WITH PUBLIC SAFETY BODIES FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE ACTIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME.	RJ
1997	MILITARY POLICE STRIKE	RESTABLISH ORDER AND PROTECT PRIVATE PROTERTY DURING POLICE STRIKES	RS, CE, AL, PE, PB, RN, CE, SE, MG
1999	MILITARY POLICE STRIKE	RESTABLISH ORDER AND PROTECT PRIVATE PROTERTY DURING POLICE STRIKES	PB
1999	TRANCA FORTE	CONTRIBUTE TO PUBLIC SECURITY	WHOLE COUNTRY
1999	ASA BRANCA, MANDACARU AND PAZ NAS ESTRADAS	CONTRIBUTE TO THE FEDERAL AND FEDERAL ROAD POLICE IN THE STATES OF PERNAMBUCO AND BAHIA.	PE, BA
2000	MILITARY POLICE STRIKE	RESTABLISH ORDER AND PROTECT PRIVATE PROTERTY DURING POLICE STRIKES	DF, PE, BA, AL
2001	MILITARY POLICE STRIKE	RESTABLISH ORDER AND PROTECT PRIVATE PROTERTY DURING POLICE STRIKES	PE, DF, TO, AL, BA
2001	ORGANIZED CRIME	CONTRIBUTE TO PUBLIC SECURITY IN RIO DE JANEIRO-RJ.	RJ
2003	MILITARY POLICE STRIKE	RESTABLISH ORDER AND PROTECT PRIVATE PROTERTY DURING POLICE STRIKES	MG
2003	GUANABARA	CONTRIBUTE TO PUBLIC SECURITY IN RIO DE JANEIRO-RJ.	RJ
2004	PIAUÍ, MINAS GERAIS AND VITÓRIA	CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS PRESERVING ORDER AND PROTECT PRIVATE PROTERTY	PI, MG, ES
2005	PARÁ	CONTRIBUTE TO FEDERAL, MILITARY AND CIVIL POLICE IN THE STATE OF PARÁ.	PA
2006	SURUMURU	CONTRIBUTE WITH GOVERNMENT BODIES TO THE PUBLIC SAFETY IN THE STATE OF RORAIMA.	RR
2006	IGUATEMI	CONTRIBUTE TO PUBLIC ORDER IN THE STATE OF MATO GROSSO DO SUL.	MS

2007	ENTORNO	RESTABLISH ORDER AND PROTECT PRIVATE PROTERTY IN THE RIO DE JANEIRO METRO AREA	RJ
2010-2012	ARCANJO (PENHA AND ALEMÃO COMPLEXES)	CONTRIBUTE TO THE PUBLIC SAFETY BODIES OF RIO DE JANEIRO STATE.	RJ
2011	MILITARY POLICE STRIKE	RESTABLISH ORDER AND PROTECT PRIVATE PROTERTY IN THE RIO DE JANEIRO METRO AREA	MA, RO, CE
2012	MILITARY POLICE STRIKE	RESTABLISH ORDER AND PROTECT PRIVATE PROTERTY IN THE RIO DE JANEIRO METRO AREA	CE, BA
2012	RIO +20	CONTRIBUTE TO PUBLIC SAFETY ON THE OCCASION OF A LARGE EVENT	RJ
2012	PRE-ELECTIONS	CONTRIBUTE TO THE PUBLIC SAFETY IN RIO DE JANEIRO STATE.	RJ
2013-2014	CONFEDERATIONS CUP AND FIFA WORLD CUP 2014	CONTRIBUTE TO PUBLIC SAFETY ON THE OCCASION OF A LARGE EVENT	WHOLE COUNTRY
2014	MILITARY POLICE STRIKE	RESTABLISH ORDER AND PROTECT PRIVATE PROTERTY DURING POLICE STRIKE	BA, PE
2014	ILHÉUS	CONTRIBUTE TO PUBLIC ORDER IN THE SOUTHERN REGION STATE OF BAHIA.	BA
2014-2015	SÃO FRANCISCO (COMPLEXO DA MARÉ)	CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC ORDER AND INCOLUMITY OF PEOPLE AND PRIVATE PROPERTY	RJ
2015	DOURADOS	CONTRIBUTE TO THE GUARANTEE OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE STATE OF MATO GROSSO DO SUL.	MS
2016	MILITARY POLICE STRIKE	RESTABLISH ORDER AND PROTECT PRIVATE PROTERTY DURING POLICE STRIKE	PE, DF, TO, AL, BA
2016	OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES 2016	CONTRIBUTE TO PUBLIC SAFETY ON THE OCCASION OF A LARGE EVENT	RJ, MG, DF, AM, BA, SP
2016	POTIGUAR	CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRESERVATION OF ORDER AND PROTECT PRIVATE PROTERTY, IN THE NATAL METRO AREA	RN
2017	LAW Nº 13.491, FROM OCTOBER 13th, 2017	ALTERA O DECRETO-LEI Nº 1.001, DE 21 DE OUTUBRO DE 1969 - CÓDIGO PENAL MILITAR.	
2017-2018	VARREDURA	CONTRIBUTE TO THE PERFORMANCE OF INSPECTIONS IN PRISONS.	WHOLE COUNTRY
2017-2018	RIO DE JANEIRO (FEDERAL INTERVENTION)	CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC ORDER AND THE SAFETY OF PEOPLE AND PRIVATE PROPERTY	RJ

		IN THE STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO, IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL PUBLIC SECURITY PLAN, RIO DE JANEIRO PHASE.	
2017	MILITARY POLICE STRIKE	RESTABLISH ORDER AND PROTECT PRIVATE PROTERTY DURING POLICE STRIKE	ES, RN
2017	CARIOCA	CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC ORDER AND THE SAFETY OF PEOPLE AND PRIVATE PROPERTY IN THE RIO DE JANEIRO METRO AREA	RJ
2017	ESPLANADA	GUARANTEE THE INTEGRITY OF THE FACILITIES OF THE MINISTRIES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS IN THE CAPITAL	DF
2018	SÃO CRISTÓVÃO (TRUCK DRIVER'S STRIKE)	CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC ORDER AND INCOLUMITY OF PEOPLE AND PRIVATE PROPERTY.	WHOLE COUNTRY
2019	TRANCA FORTE	PROTEÇÃO DO PERÍMETRO DE SEGURANÇA DAS PENITENCIÁRIAS FEDERAIS EM MOSSORÓ E EM PORTO VELHO	RN, RR
2020	MILITARY POLICE STRIKE (MANDACARU)	RESTABLISH ORDER AND PROTECT PRIVATE PROTERTY DURING POLICE STRIKES	CE
2020	CÉRBERO	PROTECTION OF THE EXTERNAL PERIMETER OF THE PENITENTIARY FEDERAL IN BRASILIA, FEDERAL DISTRICT	DF, PE, BA, AL
Source: (Ministry of Defense of Brazil 2022b)			

3C List of interviews used in the dissertation

a) Name: General Roberto Jugurtha CÂMARA SENNA
Post: Commander of the first-ever major GLO in Rio de Janeiro (1994), former military commander of the Northeast and of COTER in the 2000s.
Military Rank: Retired Four-Star, Retired General
Date of the interview: 04/12/2021
Interviewers: Igor Acácio with colleagues at the Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (CPDOC-FGV)

b) Name: General Sérgio Luiz TRATZ
Post: Head of Army Doctrine Center
Military Rank: Active-Duty Army three-star General
Date of the interview: 06/22/2021
Interviewers: Igor Acácio with colleagues at the Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (CPDOC-FGV)

c) Name: RICHARD Fernandez Nunez
Post: Former *Maré* Commander and former state Secretary of Security during the Federal Intervention, former chief of the Army Social Communications Center
Military Rank: Active-Duty Four-Star Army General
Date of the interview: 05/24/2021
Interviewers: Igor Acácio with colleagues at the Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (CPDOC-FGV)

d) Name: João Luiz LAMPERT
Post: Battalion Commander and Operations Officer in GLOs (2010-2018) and GLO instructor at the Army Command and Staff School
Military Rank: Active-Duty Army Colonel
Date of the interview: 11/27/2020
Interviewer: Igor Acácio

e) Name: Francisco Mamede de BRITO
Post: Former advisor of the Institutional Security Cabinet and military commander of Operation *São Francisco* (*Maré*).
Military Rank: Retired Two-Star Army General
Date of the interview: 12/03/2020
Interviewer: Igor Acácio

f) Name: ADRIANO Pereira Junior
Post: former Eastern Military Commander (Rio de Janeiro)
Military Rank: Retired Four-Star Army General
Date of the interview: 05/13/2021
Interviewers: Igor Acácio with colleagues at the Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (CPDOC-FGV)

g) Name: SÉRGIO José Pereira
Post: Current Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense, former advisor to the Federal Intervention and Commander of the Army Staff School
Military Rank: Retired Two-Star Army General
Date of the interview: 01/13/2022
Interviewers: Celso Castro and Adriana Marques, Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (CPDOC-FGV)

h) Name: José ELITO Carvalho Siqueira
Post: Former commander of the state police of Alagoas, former Force Commander of the MINUSTAH (2011-2015), Former Head of the Joint Staff (2008-2010) and Minister of Institutional Security (2011-2015)
Military Rank: Retired Four-Star Army General
Date of the interview: 08/31/2020
Interviewers: Igor Acácio with colleagues at the Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (CPDOC-FGV)

i) Name: Sérgio Westphalen ETCHEGOYEN
Post: Former Commander of the Staff School (2006-2009), Deputy Army Commandant (Chief of Amy Staff) (2015-2016), and Minister of Institutional Security (2016-2018)
Military Rank: Retired Four-Star Army General
Date of the interview: 01/10/2022
Interviewers: Igor Acácio with colleagues at the Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (CPDOC-FGV)

j) Name: Joaquim da SILVA e LUNA
Post: Former Chief of Staff to the Army Commandant (2007-2011), Deputy Army Commandant (Chief of Amy Staff) (2011-2014), former Deputy Defense Minister (2015-2018), and former Defense Minister (2018).
Military Rank: Retired Four-Star Army General
Date of the interview: 02/11/2022

Interviewers: Igor Acácio with colleagues at the Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (CPDOC-FGV)

k) Name: TOMÁS Miguel Miné Ribeiro Paiva
Post: Former Military Commander in *Alemão* and *Penha*, former Military Academy Commander, former chief of staff to the Army Commandant (2015-2018) and current Southeast Army Commander (São Paulo)
Military Rank: Active-Duty Army General
Date of the interview: 12/13/2021
Interviewers: Igor Acácio with colleagues at the Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (CPDOC-FGV)

l) Name: FERNANDO Azevedo Silva
Post: Former Commander of the Parachutist Brigade, former Eastern Military Commander (Rio de Janeiro) and former Minister of Defense (2019-2021)
Military Rank: Retired Four-Star Army General
Date of the interview: 01/06/2022
Interviewers: Igor Acácio with colleagues at the Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (CPDOC-FGV)

m) Name: Walter BRAGA NETTO
Post: Former Minister of Defense (2021), former Army Eastern Commander and head of the Federal Intervention in 2018
Military Rank: Retired Four-Star Army General
Date of the interview: 01/13/2022
Interviewers: Celso Castro and Adriana Marques, Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (CPDOC-FGV)

n) Name: Edson Massayuki HIROSHI
Post: Commander of the 11th Brigade, formerly known as GLO Brigade
Military Rank: Active-Duty Two-Star General
Date of the interview: 11/30/2021
Interviewers: Igor Acácio with colleagues at the Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (CPDOC-FGV)

o) Name: Reinaldo Reis de MEDEIROS
Post: Former Marine Commander in the Federal Intervention (Operation Arpoador) and operations officer in other GLOs
Military Rank: Two-Star Admiral
Date of the interview: 11/16/2021
Interviewers: Igor Acácio with colleagues at the Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (CPDOC-FGV)

3D General Questions asked in semi-structured interviews

- Can you describe to me your experience with these operations in general? What was your role?
- Can you tell me more about your views on the military readiness to execute policing missions? For example, how much of your training of your professional military education had to do with policing missions? Do you believe that these missions harm the military's ability to prepare for function of national defense?
- If governments would like the military to execute policing missions, what must the government do in return?
- Brazil's armed forces have been constantly used in fighting drug cartels. Successes have been achieved, and mistakes have been made. In your view, what are the biggest successes and biggest mistakes? What do you believe are the biggest obstacles for the military when executing these missions?
- To what extent, in your view, has the Brazilian state been able to maintain a monopoly of security provision? In your estimation, why is this? Is it simply a function of the immediacy of the threat posed by drug cartels?
- Why do you believe does the government send the military to perform policing missions?
- What do you believe accounts for the success of the military's internal security operations? In the operations, to what extent are they of military pressure? Politicians pressure? Pressure from the citizenry?
- Brazil lives an epidemic in violent crime. Why are the most frequent deployments of the military in the metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro? Why not elsewhere?
- I would like to hear your thoughts about the creation of an alternative security force that could alleviate the need for using the military.
- Do you believe the doctrine and protocols Brazil has developed are adequate to have the Army policing the *favelas*?
- I would like to hear your views on military justice. What aspects of the military justice system have proved most difficult to overcome? In your view, are investigations into human rights abuses relatively easy or not? Why? Do you think rules are an obstacle for military effectiveness?
- Con you talk more about the cooperation between security forces when these operations occur? In joint operations, which force takes the lead? The military? The civilian police? The military police?

4A Regression table, with count dependent variable, lagged DV and Panel Corrected Standard Errors

	(1) Count Dependent Variable	(2) Count Dependent Variable	(3) Count Dependent Variable	(4) Count Dependent Variable
Lagged DV (t-1)	-.12	-.133	-.129	-.126
	(.17)	(.168)	(.168)	(.166)
Homicide Rate per 100,000 (t-1)	.001	-.001	.001	-.003
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Police Officers per 100,000 (t-1)	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
N of Police Strikes (t-1)	.076	.08	.087	.078
	(.065)	(.066)	(.065)	(.066)
N of Gendarmerie Operations (t-1)	.031	.028	.03	.027
	(.02)	(.02)	(.019)	(.02)
Gdp Per capita (t-1)	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
National Election Year	.147	.064	.143	.058
	(.914)	(.881)	(.914)	(.873)
Population (t-1)	0	0	0	0*
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Allied governor (t-1)		-.127		
		(.115)		
Allied governor (t-1) * Homicide Rate per 100,000 (t-1)		.006*		
		(.003)		
			.187**	
			(.078)	
			-.003	
			(.002)	
Non-copartisan governor (t-1)				-.243**
				(.123)
Non-copartisan governor (t-1) * Homicide Rate per 100,000 (t-1)				.007**
				(.004)
Observations	343	343	343	343
R-squared	.253	.27	.266	.269

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) in parentheses. *** *p<.01,* ** *p<.05,* * *p<.1* Constant suppressed from the table for brevity. All models included year and fixed effects and were implemented in Stata 16. Coefficients standardized.