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A Report for Housing Justice Organizers

Ananya Roy, Terra Graziani, Annie Powers, Pamela Stephens

University of California, Los Angeles

UCLA LUSKIN INSTITUTE ON
**INEQUALITY
AND
DEMOCRACY**
ORGANIZED 2016





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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive Summary

Mass homelessness is the visible manifestation of one of the most pressing social problems in Los Angeles: housing precarity. Such precarity is the direct effect of income and wealth inequality as well as of policies that have systematically unhoused the poor. In this report, intended for housing justice organizers, we draw attention to some key dimensions of homelessness programs in Los Angeles. Specifically, we argue that shelter and time-limited programs reach only a small proportion of those living under conditions of homelessness and that these are forms of institutionalization that perpetuate rather than mitigate precarity. We also argue that there is undue investment in such forms of institutionalization, seemingly to satisfy the demands of the interest group, LA Alliance for Human Rights, which has become a shadow governing force. Drawing on our analysis of administrative data on homelessness, which is informed by our longstanding research with encampment communities, we shine a light on this system for housing justice organizers on the frontlines of displacement.

We urge them to consider the following:

1. Street outreach, which has been vaunted as a pathway to housing program enrollments, is currently designed to police the unhoused and systematically remove encampments from the streets.
2. There are significant public expenditures on shelter and time-limited programs that do not have proven pathways to permanent housing. These have become a way of “storing the homeless” rather than of addressing housing insecurity.
3. Homelessness data systems, including the HUD-mandated Homelessness Management Information System (HMIS), hinder a clear understanding of housing outcomes.
4. The institutionalization of the poor in shelter and time-limited programs undermines civil rights, including those related to tenancy.
5. While public attention is appropriately trained on the many failures of public agencies, a shadow governing force, the LA Alliance for Human Rights, has established a neoconservative agenda of homelessness management through lawfare. We find uncanny convergence between these neoconservative interests and the liberal governance of homelessness and anticipate that such tendencies will only accelerate as LA prepares for the 2028 Olympics.

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The governance of homelessness in Los Angeles is at a crisis point. Federal investigations are exposing systemic fraud and corruption, those that the LA City Controller has long warned about. The Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority (LAHSA) is being allowed to wither away and it is unclear which public agencies will take its place. Despite public expenditures, repeatedly approved by voters, homelessness is on the rise.

But the real crisis is the structural violence experienced by unhoused persons, including [housing precarity, displacement, and criminalization](#). While such a crisis has been in the making for decades, we focus on how the resources and demands of the COVID-19 pandemic era have been transmuted by elected officials and public agencies into a set of programs and policies that are best understood as storing the homeless. By this we mean that unhoused people are purposefully removed from public spaces such as sidewalks and parks and institutionalized in shelter and time-limited programs. While many of these programs are billed as permanent housing or the path to such, we find that such housing is scarcely available and rarely permanent.

The eviction of the Echo Park Lake encampment in March 2021, by a “battle-ready” police force, and the subsequent enclosure of the park, was a pivotal moment in Los Angeles. Then-Mayor Garcetti declared this to be “the largest housing transition of an encampment in the history of the city” and promised that the displaced would be housed in a year. The [longitudinal research](#) conducted by the *After Echo Park Lake* Research Collective, which included several of us, exposed the lie at hand. More people died than were housed and scores more were disappeared. But the “ruse of housing,” a phrase we borrow from housing justice scholar and organizer, Carla Orendorff, justified the displacement and became the blueprint for the spatial governance of homelessness in Los Angeles, including Mayor Bass’s Inside Safe. While the landmark Supreme Court decision in *Grants Pass v. Johnson* (2024) expanded the authority of local governments to criminalize homeless encampments, such criminalization was already well under way in Los Angeles, including with the amendment of the city’s long-standing anti-camping ordinance, LAMC 41.18, in 2021. The [Los Angeles Community Action Network](#) characterized that amendment as a “Jim Crow, Sundown Town, segregationist throw-back,” and the hefty 2024 report by Human Rights Watch, [“You Have to Move!” The Cruel and Ineffective Criminalization of Unhoused Persons in Los Angeles](#), provides meticulous analysis of its effects.

For the purposes of this report, we wish to draw attention to two lesser known dimensions of this blueprint. The first is the transmutation of housing justice demands into policies and programs that ultimately undermine those demands. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Project Roomkey was a response to the demand to commandeer hotels for housing but quickly became a form of carceral containment with high rates of expulsion, and even [death](#). The demand for Services not Sweeps became police-led street outreach programs such as CARE. Such cooptation will not come as a surprise to housing justice organizers and it requires formations that can continuously watch, and push back, on state power and policies.

Second, since March 2020, the LA Alliance for Human Rights, a coalition between downtown BID interests and neoconservative think tanks like the Cicero Institute, has been a driving force in homelessness policy. Acting via federal lawsuits, it has successfully pushed for anti-camping laws and encampment removal, justified through shelter placements. For example, in March 2021, while public attention was focused on the militarized Echo Park Lake eviction and enclosure, the LA Alliance was seeking to establish [anti-camping “Designated Areas.”](#) A few months later, this vision came to fruition through the City Council’s expansion of LAMC 41.18.

Recently, [media attention](#) has been trained on Jon Lonsdale, the founder of the Cicero Institute. A co-founder of Palantir, a data-mining company, Lonsdale pushed for the criminalization of homelessness well before Trump floated the idea of homeless camps. Indeed, the Cicero Institute has played a pivotal role in pressing for camping bans in numerous states across the country. The [Stop LAPD Spying Coalition](#) has also pinpointed the role of Palantir in LAPD programs that unleash “data-driven...racial terror” on Black and brown communities.

We urge housing justice organizers to pay close attention to the court-brokered agreements reached between the LA Alliance and the City of Los Angeles. Shelter & Care liberalism, our phrase for the political status quo in Los Angeles, has conveniently fallen in line

with the mandates of the LA Alliance such that storing the homeless has become the primary response to homelessness in our city. We are beholden to the residents of the Aetna Street encampment in Van Nuys who after being displaced to motels by the Mayor's signature homelessness initiative, Inside Safe, described such programs not as housing or shelter but rather as "storing the homeless."

In this report directed to housing justice organizers, we focus on three forms of homelessness intervention that have gained traction in Los Angeles: Inside Safe, street outreach, and time-limited subsidies (TLS). We interpret and analyze administrative data on homelessness available to us through a Data Usage Agreement (DUA) with the Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority with oversight by UCLA's Institutional Review Board (IRB). The DUA gives us access to both HMIS and RMS data and establishes the Aetna Street encampments as the scope of our data use and analysis. While HMIS, the Homeless Management Information System, is familiar to housing justice organizers, RMS, the Resource Management System is less so. RMS is a LAHSA database launched in 2019 to track, manage and match housing resources, vouchers, and program inventories across the Los Angeles Continuum of Care. RMS essentially opens up another door after HMIS to observe permanent housing placements.

In keeping with our methodological practices as well as the DUA and IRB, we have presented HMIS and RMS data in de-identified and anonymized formats. It is also worth noting that we sought public records on Emergency Housing Vouchers from HACLA, the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. Such data was woefully inadequate and HACLA never responded to our many attempts to provide clarity on this data. In addition, we reviewed all court records, agreements, and reports related to the LA Alliance lawsuits, including the [court-mandated assessment](#) of homelessness programs conducted by Alvarez and Marsel Public Sector Associates.

Our DUA with LAHSA gives us access to fully identified data (excluding Social Security numbers) from 2014 through 2025 covering the Los Angeles County Continuum of Care (CoC), which excludes the cities of Glendale, Pasadena, and Long Beach. Our dataset is a composite of eight discrete datasets that include HUD-mandated "universal" data elements, program intake information (CES and VI-SPDAT assessments), and encampment locations. With differing units of observation (e.g. enrollment-level vs. client-level), we carefully stitched these datasets together to analyze point-in-time descriptive statistics describing program enrollments and exits. More importantly, we developed a system to generate longitudinal (un)housing trajectories that illustrate the lengthy and circuitous stream of enrollments and exits that unhoused people endure as they navigate the homelessness services system. We were also able to link HMIS and RMS data through the unique identifiers assigned to LAHSA clients. Our analysis of these forms of data is not meant to determine the efficacy of the various programs and initiatives within the homelessness services system, but rather it helps to illustrate the mechanisms and transformations of that system over time, and the impacts of that system on the people it is ostensibly supposed to serve. In keeping with the DUA, we have also had the opportunity to discuss our data analysis and findings with members of the LAHSA Data, Analytics, and Training Department.

While our larger database covers the more than half a million individuals who have been enrolled in HMIS program since 2014, we focus on the archipelago of Aetna Street encampments, which includes the 2,544 unique individuals who have been geotagged by homelessness service providers at the Aetna Street encampment in Van Nuys as well as at nearby encampments in the San Fernando Valley, including those in the Sepulveda Basin. It is important to note that a key encampment, "The Compound," which became a refuge for Aetna residents in the wake of the Inside Safe displacement in 2023, does not appear in the LAHSA encampment data, and is thus not part of the data we present in this report.

While we do not explicitly present the findings of our [long-standing ethnographic research with the Aetna Street community](#) in this report, those methodologies and frameworks serve as the ground truth for our analysis. Indeed, there is a clarity in the ethnographic data that can never be present in the elisions and obfuscations of the data systems that operate to maintain the institutionalization of homelessness. We invite housing justice organizers to take up the chapters authored by Aetna Street residents and organizers in the forthcoming book, [We Live in Public: Encampments as Resistance and Revolutionary Care in Los Angeles](#).

INSIDE SAFE

Inside Safe

Inside Safe is an encampment resolution initiative initiated in December 2022 by Mayor Karen Bass's office shortly after she declared a state of emergency on homelessness for the City of Los Angeles. The program targets specific encampments, offering encampment residents temporary shelter (now referred to as interim housing), supportive services, and "a pathway to permanent housing" in exchange for their tents or another form of personal property if no tent is available. [The LA City Controller reports](#) that as of April 13, 2026, the program has cost \$391 million.

Significantly, Inside Safe is a transmutation of demands articulated by housing justice organizations during the COVID-19 pandemic, notably that for [hotels to be transformed into housing](#). While California's Project Roomkey (PRK) program promised to make good on that vision, then Mayor Garcetti was extremely sluggish to actually put the program into practice. Organizers at Echo Park Lake, Aetna Street and other encampments collectively pushed for the City to "seize the hotels." That demand was met in a twisted way for the Echo Park Lake encampment: PRK rooms were *finally* offered, almost a year after the program began, but only when the community faced imminent eviction. Inside Safe is a new version of these same logics.

[According to LAHSA's most recent records](#), which reflect data collected through August 31, 2026, the Inside Safe program has completed 140 "encampment resolution" operations since December 12, 2022. Encampment resolution is a term used by the [State of California](#) to indicate moving people from encampments into housing but based on our ongoing research with unhoused communities, we see it as encampment destruction and displacement. Across these 140 Inside Safe operations, 6,509 encampment residents entered interim housing, that is they enrolled in an Inside Safe Hotel or Motel program, and 53 percent have remained indoors: they either are still enrolled in interim housing (1,775) or have obtained "permanent housing" (1,616). Troublingly, however, the designation of "permanent housing" is not exactly what it seems. We particularly take issue with HUD's inclusion of [Rapid Re-Housing programs](#) in the category of permanent housing, as these subsidies have established time limits of up to 24 months.

A recent [report from the Los Angeles Times](#), drawing on LAHSA data, highlights increasing returns to homelessness every year since the program's inception in December 2022. Some of these returns to homelessness occur after placement in "permanent housing." Indeed, the [2024 Community Audit of the Mayor's Inside Safe Program](#) raised that most Inside Safe participants placed in "permanent housing" were actually given vouchers through the time-limited subsidies program. These subsidies only covered rent for a year, after which the participants had to pay market-rate rents, which, of course, they could not afford, leaving them vulnerable to eviction. We return to this crucial issue in a subsequent section of this report.

Aetna Street Operation

On September 12, 2023, an Inside Safe Operation targeted the Aetna Street encampments. [According to the Mayor's Office](#), 52 people were "moved inside" and placed in "interim housing," the new language adopted by the City to describe shelter programs. Controlling for duplicate entries, we identified 45 people in the HMIS data enrolled in the Inside Safe Program administered by the Hope of the Valley Rescue Mission between September 12 and September 14 of 2023.

Two years after the Aetna/Van Nuys operation, all of the Inside Safe participants had exited their initial interim housing placements, but two people remain in new interim housing placements in different Inside Safe hotel or motel programs. Among the 43 people not currently in interim housing programs, more than half (25 people) exited into "permanent housing." The majority of these participants (19) had some sort of subsidy for their housing placements, although exactly which subsidy they exited with is unclear for nearly half (9) of them, as indicated in the table below. For example, 3 participants are considered permanently housed despite having a time-limited subsidy. On the other hand, 19 percent (8) of the participants returned to homelessness, and another 9 percent (4) exited to unknown destinations.

Table 1. Last Exit Destination as of 12/31/2025

Destination	Count	Share
Permanent Housing	25	58%
Homelessness	8	19%
Medical Facility	3	7%
Deceased	2	5%
Incarcerated	1	2%
Unknown	4	9%
<i>Total</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>100%</i>

Table 2. Type of Subsidized Housing

Project Type	Count	Share
Permanent Supportive Housing	4	21%
RRH or Equivalent	3	16%
Other Permanent Housing	2	11%
Housing Choice Voucher	1	5%
Other Ongoing Housing Subsidies	9	47%
<i>Total</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>100%</i>

Enrollment Length and Project Costs

The average length of enrollment for the Aetna/Van Nuys operation participants was 296 days, compared to 213 days for all Inside Safe participants. The range for Aetna/Van Nuys participants was from as few as 19 days enrolled to 817 days (roughly two years and three months). As the table below shows, the vast majority of participants (37) spent more than 90 days enrolled in the interim housing program. Such length of stay is noteworthy because as a [recent LAHSA presentation](#) argues, the efficacy of the “homeless response system” is determined not only by “inflow” but also by the rate and speed of exits from interim housing programs into permanent and stable housing.

Table 3. Enrollment Length, Aetna/Van Nuys Inside Safe Participants

Enrollment Length	Count	Share
1 day or less	0	0%
2-6 days	0	0%
Between 7 and 30 days	3	7%
Between 31 and 90 days	5	11%
Between 91 days and a year	24	53%
More than a year	13	29%
<i>Total</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>100%</i>

Table 4. Enrollment Length, All Inside Safe Participants (exits only)

Enrollment Length	Count	Share
1 day or less	29	1%
2-6 days	57	1%
Between 7 and 30 days	506	11%
Between 31 and 90 days	785	18%
Between 91 days and a year	2,229	50%
More than a year	810	18%
Unknown entry date	59	1%
<i>Total</i>	<i>4,475</i>	<i>100%</i>

Though the LAHSA data does not indicate exactly where Inside Safe participants were placed, we found through our ethnographic work that the majority were placed at the Palm Tree Inn, the motel contracted by the City for the operation. City contracts between the City and the owner of the Palm Tree Inn, Shyam Rushi Hospitality, LLC, show that they were compensated \$90 per night (excluding reported damages) for each room used to house Inside Safe participants. Additionally, LAHSA subcontracted all service provision to Hope of the Valley Rescue Mission for a flat rate of \$110 per night for each participant. This would indicate that the cost of housing and services for one person at the Palm Tree (\$200/night) would cost at least \$73,000 annually, and at least \$59,200 for the average participant in the Aetna/Van Nuys Inside Safe operation (based on the average length of stay).

In September 2025, a [memorandum from the City Administrative Officer](#) indicated that these costs were exceeded at the Palm Tree Inn, as the actual yearly cost for a leased bed in the City's interim housing programs was \$82,027.40, which is closer to the estimated city-wide average cost for leasing a bed under Inside Safe: \$83,950. While the discrepancy between estimated and actual costs is quite high for the Palm Tree Inn, it is worth noting that other hotels and motels, the Canoga Hotel, the Marina 7 Motel, and the Olive Motel all reported annual average rates exceeding \$100,000 per bed.

Beyond these serious discrepancies in estimated and actual program costs, the City Administrative Officer's memorandum indicates that Inside Safe interim housing placements are extraordinarily expensive. Alongside such high financial costs are high social costs. Inside Safe, like its predecessor, Project Roomkey, ensures that program participants do not have tenancy rights, even when they are residing in hotels and motels for lengthy periods of time. Inside Safe thus represents a perverse investment of public resources in storing the homeless.

Key Points for Housing Justice Organizers

Since its launch in 2022, Inside Safe has become the most prominent homelessness program in Los Angeles. We invite housing justice organizers to consider the following:

- Inside Safe must be seen as the successor of Project Roomkey, which transmuted demands for hotels as housing into programs of carceral isolation and containment. Indeed, many PRK sites such as the LA Grand became Inside Safe sites. An important throughline is the undermining of civil rights, notably those related to tenancy. Indeed, a California state law (AB 2835) passed in 2024 through the advocacy of homeless service providers ensures that tenancy cannot be established in hotels and motels being used as publicly funded shelters. It is worth recalling that, in 2021, Unhoused Tenants Against Carceral Housing (UTACH), formed to contest such forms of rightlessness that now have been codified in law.
- Inside Safe is extraordinarily expensive, with costs running in excess of \$100,000 per bed per year at some hotels and motels. Compounding these costs, Inside Safe participants spend far longer than the 90 days anticipated in interim housing, with average enrollments surpassing 200 days and yet they do not have tenancy rights in such interim housing.
- The claims of permanent housing enrollments must be carefully examined because of the sleight of hand in redefining time-limited subsidies as permanent housing and because, as the LAHSA data shows, returns to unsheltered homelessness steadily increase over time.

STREET OUTREACH

Street Outreach

Interim and permanent housing placements are not the only program enrollments in HMIS; so is street outreach. The [2026 HMIS Data Standards Manual](#) defines street outreach as: “A project that offers services necessary to reach out to people experiencing unsheltered homelessness, connect them with emergency shelter, housing, or critical services, and provide urgent, non-facility-based care to those who are unwilling or unable to access emergency shelter, housing, or an appropriate health facility.” In Los Angeles, the [County’s street outreach programs](#) include services such as street medicine and mental health teams as well as “encampment operations” that combine police, sanitation, and “housing-focused interventions.” The City of Los Angeles also funds and operates street outreach teams, including CIRCLE (Crisis and Incident Response through Community-Led Engagement) which is contracted to the nonprofit, [Urban Alchemy](#). As noted in the Introduction, our DUA with LAHSA gives us access to HMIS data for the Los Angeles Continuum of Care. We found that street outreach ranked number one in program enrollments in the LAHSA data, accounting for 32% of the 1.3 million enrollments from 2014 to 2025.

Table 5. Top 4 Project Type HMIS Enrollments

Project Type	Enrollments	Share
Street Outreach	437,830	32%
Emergency Shelter	384,541	29%
Services Only	163,622	12%
Rapid Re-Housing	145,207	11%

When we focused on the 2,544 unique individuals who have been geotagged as living in the Aetna Street encampments since 2014, we found that they had 14,000 HMIS enrollments of which street outreach was by far the largest category at 49%. By contrast only 5% of Aetna Street encampment residents had enrollments in temporary housing programs like Rapid Re-Housing and even fewer had permanent housing enrollments.

It is important to note the high rate of street outreach enrollments at the Aetna Street encampments. We hypothesize that this is the case because of the history of these encampments as both refuge and containment for homeless communities in the San Fernando Valley. Indeed, as [our work](#) has shown, these encampments were colloquially known as the “Skid Row of the Valley.”

Table 6. Top 4 Project Type Enrollments for Individuals Residing in Aetna Street Encampments

Project Type	Enrollments	Share
Street Outreach	6,879	49%
Emergency Shelter	3,766	27%
Services Only	1,814	13%
Rapid Re-Housing	666	5%

While street outreach is often billed as a pathway to housing, our analysis of the LAHSA data raises reservations about this claim, even with programs like Inside Safe that are meant to move people from encampments to housing. We analyzed HMIS data on street outreach enrollments with a focus on the two encampments geotagged as Aetna Street ABH, CD SECZ and Aetna/ Orangeline, which were the target of the 2023 Inside Safe operation. We found 1775 unique individuals in the two encampments between 2014-2023 and 4,457 enrollments in street outreach, which constituted 50% of total enrollments. We found that 1% (37) of these street outreach enrollments were followed by housing placements while another 19% (661) were followed by shelter placements.

It is important to situate these findings in relation to those highlighted in the [PATHS](#) report on Encampment Resolution, which is being published simultaneously with this report. In their longitudinal study with 1600 unhoused persons in Los Angeles from 2023 to 2026, the PATHS research team found that “two-thirds of respondents who received a shelter or housing offer during a sweep accepted it, reaching 78% for motel or hotel placements and 80% for bridge or transitional housing. Even congregate shelter, which very few identified as a preferred option, was accepted by nearly half of those offered it.” As the report underscores, “these findings challenge the common assumption that people choose to stay outside.” In short, despite such high levels of willingness among unhoused persons and communities to accept shelter and housing placements, street outreach does not necessarily lead to placements.

A Closer Look at Street Outreach

It is important to take a closer look at street outreach and what it entails. Although there is a constellation of City and County street outreach programs, we focus here on just two to emphasize that the function of these programs *is* encampment removal, engineered through sweeps of entire communities. The first is CARE+. As of 2023, [nearly 40%](#) of the City’s Homeless Engagement Teams, or HETs, focus on presence at CARE+ cleaning operations. The name itself, which stands for Comprehensive Cleaning and Rapid Engagement, only thinly conceals the program’s violent effects. CARE+, masquerading as a clean-up, instead sweeps an encampment community, with Los Angeles Sanitation and LAPD together demolishing structures, seizing tents, and often destroying irreplaceable personal possessions ranging from medication and ID cards to cremated remains. HETs facilitate this process through street outreach, which enrolls people into the HMIS system. Although such street outreach is billed as a way to connect unhoused individuals with services, including shelter, these offers at best arrive at the point of dispossession. But more often than not, street outreach functions merely as the soft hand of a violent eviction procedure. As the Services Not Sweeps Coalition explains, this is the natural outgrowth of a model based on [complaints from local property-owners](#) and small businesses rather than concerns about public health. Street outreach, driven by private grievances instead of collective well-being, serves to remove encampments rather than support them.

Another street outreach program is the Field Intervention Team (FIT), specific to the Inside Safe program, which began in 2022 to [“bring Angelenos off the street.”](#) FITs specifically connect with encampments — some of which were [“present in local neighborhoods for over five years”](#) — in advance of a scheduled Inside Safe operation. On the day, LA Sanitation would take people’s tents and demolish structures in exchange for a hotel room, facilitated by FITs. Although Inside Safe’s primary objective is not sidewalk cleaning, it nevertheless results in the same “comprehensive” removal of encampments as CARE+. LAPD presence is not required at such sweeps, but many reported Inside Safe operations [feature police](#). The process bears striking resemblance to the [blueprint for displacement](#) initiated by the City in response to the Echo Park Lake community in 2021: offers of shelter in temporary hotel rooms through Project Roomkey immediately prior to the mass eviction of a longstanding encampment. Although Inside Safe is touted by the Mayor’s Office as [“voluntary,”](#) it is difficult to discern where the choice exists when someone is offered shelter only when their street homes are targeted for destruction. These are encampment removal programs made palatable by offers of shelter, i.e. the ruse of housing. Anchoring the role of shelter offers as mechanisms for displacement are, of course, the police themselves. As the [2024 Human Rights Watch report](#) noted:

“In Los Angeles today, police and sanitation workers—whose cleaning or clearance operations are often accompanied by police and always backed by threat of citation or arrest—are the lead agents of criminalization. Homeless services outreach workers, many of whom genuinely seek to assist unhoused people, too often are pressed into participating in criminalization by facilitating the destruction of encampments and providing a veneer of compassionate treatment, in turn providing cover for these harmful actions. The provision of shelter ... allow[s] city leaders to claim legal and moral justification for removing people from public view.”

Thus, street outreach has two functions. First, because any contact with a HET team results in a HMIS enrollment, street outreach harvests data about encampments and artificially inflates the numbers of people served by city and county programs. Often, there is no offer of shelter at all. Thus, *at best*, HETs offer service provision behind the barrel of a metaphorical gun. The alternative to shelter is arrest, citation, and a return to now-empty streets.

A Recent History of Criminalizing Homelessness in Los Angeles

Los Angeles has a long history of criminalizing unhoused people and removing them from the streets of the City. Two key tentpoles in this policy are Los Angeles Municipal Code 41.18, which prohibits people from sitting, sleeping, and lying in certain areas; and 56.11, which bars the storage of personal property in public space. 56.11 includes a controversial provision enabling the City to seize so-called “bulky items” without any prior warning to the owner of said items. “Bulky” means anything larger than a sixty gallon trash container, and thus includes structures, tents (and everything that might be inside), couches, mattresses, DIY stoves, and other necessary survival supplies. These items could be confiscated on-site, thus suddenly depriving people of even the modest shelter necessary to make it through the night – to say nothing of things like medication, trashed with the rest. But unhoused people and their advocates have continued to fight back against these regimes of displacement. In 2019, housed and unhoused organizers with Street Watch LA and Ktown for All filed a [lawsuit](#) with the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles to stop the enforcement of 56.11. By April 2020, the Court issued a temporary injunction to prevent the City from using 56.11 to steal homeless people’s belongings without prior notice. 2020 facilitated other opportunities for unhoused people, too. In March, the CDC announced that evictions and homeless sweeps alike must be paused during the duration of the Covid-19 emergency. That decision allowed communities outside, which previously had to focus on encampment defense and survival of sweeps, to develop collective power on the streets. Formations like Services Not Sweeps, including advocates all over the city, pressed for changes in policy – and these campaigns flowed directly from participants’ connection to and involvement with encampment communities in struggle. During 2020, encampments and advocates together made serious headway in forcing the City to change its rhythms of encampment destruction. Those social and political victories, as they always do, also offered anti-homeless forces in LA new legal opportunities.

The LA Alliance lawsuit in 2020 provided renewed impetus for the removal of encampments, framing them as pressing threats to public health and safety. By mid-June, following a preliminary court injunction, the City and County reached the so-called “Roadmap agreement,” which focused on creating 6,700 “housing units” and services for unhoused people living near or on freeway overpasses, underpasses, and ramps. The City’s role was to produce the units or beds; the County would provide services. Roadmap focused largely (although not exclusively) on so-called “Interim Housing,” including “A Bridge Home” congregate shelters, safe parking and safe sleep sites, “Tiny Home Villages.” By 2022, the Alliance Agreement had determined that the City could [“implement and enforce public space regulations and ordinances,”](#) like 56.11 and 41.18, once it had produced housing or shelter for 60% of the people living outside on the street. As we noted earlier in this report, the terms of this agreement were drafted while the City was also implementing the militarized eviction of the Echo Park Lake encampment. In January 2026, news broke that the City Council, in closed session, had approved an [encampment removal strategy](#) in 2024 that would attempt to clear 9,800 unhoused communities over the course of four years. A [violation of the Brown Act](#), which prohibits policy decisions from being made outside of the public eye, the closed-door mass displacement plan was now up for discussion. In summer 2026, an update to the Alliance agreement took up the encampment removal question and resolved it with a compromise. Although the City would no longer be [“obligated to complete a certain number of encampment removals,”](#) it committed to ensuring that 19,600 unhoused people would “move into housing or shelter solutions” by June 30, 2027 and maintain at least 12,915 beds of temporary or permanent housing through June 30, 2029.

Despite the reversal of the closed-door decision, at minimum a victory for transparent governance in Los Angeles, the logics of encampment removal remain intact: to police the poor. In addition to presence at CARE+ and Inside Safe operations, the A&M audit, conducted as part of the LA Alliance lawsuits, found a staggering [\\$33,760,000](#) in overtime paid to LAPD between 2020 and 2024 for “ABH/Interim Homeless Housing Site.” Such funds initially brought police to “A Bridge Home” shelter sites, constructed right against existing encampments including at Aetna Street. LAPD was tasked with preventing people from coming back, itself an indication of the resilience of encampment communities even in the face of dislocating sweeps. Since 2021, however, that “ABH/IHHS” designation has expanded to include all the overtime funds devoted to homelessness. Notably, of all four bureaus, the Valley – home of the Aetna Street encampment (and ABH) – incurred the most costs around homelessness between 2020 and 2024: nearly \$6.5 million.

Key Points for Housing Justice Organizers

Street outreach promises to provide public health and housing placement services to unhoused persons living under conditions of unsheltered homelessness. We invite housing justice organizers to consider the following:

- The City's and County's street outreach programs, while billed as public sanitation and service provision, have been primarily encampment removal operations. This is obscured from view because HMIS data conveniently codes street outreach as a program enrollment.
- The encampment removals achieved by CARE+ and Inside Safe are enforced through the policing of encampments, including staggering expenditures of police overtime.
- While the new LA Alliance agreement appears to have nullified the closed-door encampment removal plan made by the City Council, the LA Alliance has played a pivotal role in justifying the criminalization of homelessness through street outreach and the accompanying ruse of shelter and housing.

(THE ILLUSION OF) PERMANENT HOUSING

(The Illusion of) Permanent Housing

During the COVID-19 pandemic, housing justice organizers achieved a significant victory: the expansion of federal housing subsidies in the form of Emergency Housing Vouchers (EHVs). Nationwide, 70,000 such vouchers made their way to public housing agencies, including 6,806 to the City and County of Los Angeles. Promoted as permanent housing, EHVs became a much sought after resource in a city where the Section 8 waiting list is typically closed for years on end. In our ethnographic research, we made note of scores of Echo Park Lake and Aetna Street encampment residents enrolling for EHVs while in Project Roomkey placements. Yet these vouchers were elusive. As people were exited from Project Roomkey, they had no recourse but to return to the streets. The few who miraculously secured housing placements either had no paperwork to indicate the type of voucher they held or had Rapid Re-Housing vouchers, which are time-limited. Indeed, a big concern of our research has been the perpetuation of housing precarity through the transmutation of permanent housing resources such as EHVs into temporary subsidies. When finally, in December 2025, some of our unhoused comrades received confirmation that they held EHVs, it was through a cruel termination notice from HACLA, the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. Stating that EHVs, which were supposed to last through 2030, would terminate in November/December 2026 because of the lack of resources, it included the following advice in bold lettering: “We suggest that you start thinking about your housing options and other resources now.” A few months later, the termination was reversed with HACLA [announcing](#) the transition of the 2,700 EHVs that were in active use in the City of Los Angeles to Housing Choice Vouchers. We applaud this reinstatement, noting that where there is a will, there is a way. However, we also note that thousands of persons and families in Los Angeles remain on the Section 8 waiting list and thousands more are waiting to get on the waiting list. As announced by HACLA, the EHV resources do not extend to them. In short, EHVs, and their reinstatement, remain the exception.

Our analysis of LAHSA data confirms these concerns about the scarcity of permanent housing resources and placements. Here is a breakdown of “exit destinations” as listed and recorded in HMIS for the Los Angeles Continuum of Care. As noted earlier, this data spans 2014 to 2025.

Table 7. Top 10 Exit Destinations

Destination	Exit Recordings	Share
No exit interview completed	331,613	31%
Emergency shelter	121,127	11%
Data not collected	119,834	11%
Place not meant for habitation	117,068	11%
Rental by client with ongoing subsidy	115,226	11%
Rental by client, no ongoing subsidy	69,965	7%
Other	40,295	4%
Staying or living with friends/family, temporarily	27,602	3%
Transitional housing	23,527	2%
Staying or living with friends/family, permanently	22,409	2%

The most significant destination category used in HMIS to record permanent housing placements, and what we would consider the most positive outcome, is ‘Rental by client with ongoing subsidy’ and it represents only a 9% share. As noted in [our previous work](#), the categories of “no exit interview completed” and “data not collected” also require some attention. These categories can include unhoused persons who are pushed out of, and erased from, the systems that are meant to serve them. It can also include unhoused persons who are between programs and who might therefore reappear in homeless response systems.

The outcomes recorded in LAHSA data are not any better for the Aetna Street encampments. To determine how many individuals from the Aetna Street encampments achieved a permanent housing placement, we used the unique identifiers in the RMS data to match the Personal IDs in the HMIS system. Of the 2,544 unique individuals geotagged in the Aetna Street encampments, only 10% (257 individuals) were recorded in RMS. Of these 257 individuals, 72 hold EHVs, 61 Section-8 tenant-based vouchers, and 123 project-based vouchers, with 1 missing entry.

Not only are permanent housing placements scarce but also unhoused persons have to undertake extraordinary journeys of endurance, with repeated enrollments in street outreach and shelter programs, over the course of years, in order to even have the chance of such a placement. As we have shown in [previous research and scholarship](#), such enrollments belie the myth of shelter-resistance and instead demonstrate that housing markets and the homeless industrial complex are designed to churn the poor through a set of institutional settings rather than house them. Continuing our methodology of generating trajectories of (un)housing that connect different HMIS datasets to provide longitudinal data on program enrollments and exits, and additionally connecting these to RMS data, we find that the few individuals from the Aetna Street encampments who have permanent housing placements have been churned through a dizzying set of programs and places. Here we share three of these trajectories, anonymized, and with the de-identification of exact locations, for the purposes of this report.

Dolores Gomez, a 60-year-old Latina woman, has a total of 41 enrollments since 2015. Ms. Gomez's first entry began at an emergency shelter. While an exit was recorded in June 2015 indicating that Ms. Gomez obtained a rental with some ongoing subsidy, she would reappear at a winter shelter in the San Fernando Valley in December 2018. Interim housing in September 2019 and various shelters during the pandemic in 2020 followed. In June 2021, she was placed in A Bridge Home shelter. The following year she was enrolled in a Tiny Home Village. Later that year she was placed at a Project Homekey site (November 2022) and then at yet another Project Homekey site the following year (October 2023). At one point she moved further away to A Bridge Home shelter in Downtown Los Angeles for several weeks. She then arrived at another Tiny Home Village back in the valley in April 2024. After five months, Ms. Gomez exited the project in September 2024 with a permanent housing placement, with the destination recorded as 'Rental by client, with ongoing housing subsidy.' We were able to locate Ms. Gomez in the RMS data and found that she was placed at a permanent supportive housing project in Panorama City, nine years after her first recorded enrollment in HMIS.

Roxanne Miller, a 40-year-old white woman, has 38 enrollments since 2014. Ms. Miller's first entry was at a winter shelter. Ms. Miller would return to the same winter shelter in December 2014. After exiting in January 2015, she would enter another shelter, this one a crisis and bridge housing site for women experiencing homelessness. A little over two months later, she exited to stay with friends, but by November 2015, she was back at a winter shelter at yet another location. In August 2016, she was enrolled in A Bridge Home shelter but after three months would return to homelessness. In January 2018, she was back at one of the earlier winter shelters and continuously returned in January 2019, January 2020, and March 2021 with various enrollments in street outreach, services only, and other emergency shelters. In August 2023, she arrived at A Bridge Home shelter, and in July 2024, an exit was recorded with the destination being a long-term care facility or nursing home. However, Ms. Miller would return to the Bridge Home in September 2024. Almost a year later, in May 2025, an exit was recorded with the destination being a 'Rental by client, with ongoing housing subsidy.' We were able to locate Ms. Miller in the RMS data where it showed that she was placed in a permanent supportive housing project in North Hollywood, 11 years after her first recorded enrollment.

Emmett Allen, a 51-year-old Black man, has a total of 23 enrollments starting with a winter shelter in December 2014. He was engaged via street outreach between 2015 and 2017, before arriving at A Bridge Home shelter in October 2017. He was enrolled in a winter shelter in December 2018 and again the following year in December 2019. Ultimately, he arrived at A Bridge Home shelter in August 2020. After remaining there for nineteen months, Mr. Allen had an exit recorded in March 2022 with the destination entry being 'Rental by client, with HCV voucher (tenant or project based).' Finally, Mr. Allen received an Emergency Housing Voucher (EHV) with an RMS effective date of September 2022. Unfortunately, even with RMS data, we cannot confirm this housing placement.

Time-Limited Subsidies as the New Panacea

While permanent housing subsidies remain scarce, the public agencies of Los Angeles have directed their efforts towards time-limited subsidies (TLS). Los Angeles' TLS program expanded rapidly ([by about 60%](#)) in the region beginning in mid-2021, leveraging a COVID-19-era deluge of city, county, state, and federal funds (Homeless Housing, Assistance, and Prevention Program (HHAP), Los Angeles County Measure A, and HUD Continuum of Care Program funds respectively). [TLS](#) includes Rapid Re-Housing, which as we noted earlier is defined by HUD as permanent housing, as well as “Shallow Subsidy” programs. In theory, TLS is intended as a temporary support while a person “gets back on their feet” and is able to pay market-rate rent without rental assistance. The problem, of course, is that market-rate rents are unaffordable even for the already employed (and even salaried): to afford a one-bedroom in Los Angeles in 2022, a person must make over [\\$39 an hour](#). Another alternative might be to transition TLS tenants into more permanent housing after the two years, but such permanent housing does not exist. The LA Alliance agreements forced the City to infuse huge amounts of cash into “housing and shelter solutions,” notably TLS.

The efficacy of TLS as a “permanent” solution is justified by data obfuscations. For example, [studies](#) that show exit data from TLS into “permanent housing” inflate the numbers because evictions are relatively slow to kick in. That is, when the TLS voucher expires, and a person “exits” the program, if they remain in their unit, that result is recorded as permanent housing. What the data does not reveal is that the person in question has lost their voucher, cannot pay rent, and so stops paying rent. The court eviction may not come for a month or more, but it will come. These outcomes — these returns to the street — are not measured, but they are inevitable in the system as it is currently designed. Thus, rather than providing needed stability, the TLS creates an internal count-down until the rent must be paid. Psychologically, this is a devastating situation, transforming this two-year period into a nerve-wracking break from the street rather than a bridge to a permanent solution. Underscoring this point is the relationship between TLS and other time-based programs, like affordability covenants, which make units reasonably priced for a span of two decades or more. As the [Hillside Villa Tenants Association](#) has demonstrated in their ongoing struggle against the expiration of their 30-year affordable housing covenant, the mass displacements produced by these lapsing agreements are catastrophic to tenants who face sudden eviction-via-rent increase.

The bureaucracy of this process creates further problems. TLS vouchers are administered through service providers, who then are required to assume the mantle of managing rental payments. This problem is most clear when compared to Section 8, a permanent housing program through federally-issued rental vouchers. Section 8 vouchers are administered by a Public Housing Authority, in this case the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA), and governed by a three-way agreement. In it, the tenant agrees to pay a portion of the rent directly to the landlord; then, through the Housing Assistance Payments (HAP) contract, HACLA directly agrees to pay the remaining portion of the rent to the landlord. In this way, the HAP ensures that a tenant cannot be evicted if HACLA ceases to pay its agreed portion of rent. (HACLA can also use that rental portion as a stick, withholding it if a landlord fails to maintain habitable housing.) Should HACLA experience delays in its funding, for example, that is a problem between the landlord and HACLA — not the tenant. This protects low-income tenants from the threat of eviction via political machinations and financial dealings far out of their control.

With TLS, by contrast, there is no such three-way agreement, and the vouchers are administered through the service providers themselves. Thus, when the funding runs out, and the service provider stops paying rent on behalf of the tenant, TLS tenants are not protected from eviction as they would be if HACLA stopped paying someone with a Section 8 voucher's rent. Furthermore, the service provider becomes the direct face of that eviction, because they are the administrator of the voucher. To a TLS holder, the service provider becomes the person responsible for the eviction because it is that provider who suddenly stops paying the rent. Thus, the caseworker who is supposed to be a conduit to services that promote mental and physical healing, keep people housed, and beyond, is now also the entity returning people to the street.

The homeless industrial complex has created a troubling solution to this problem. In place of HACLA are entities like HOM, Inc. or Brilliant Corners, which are essentially privatized versions of housing authorities. Each have been around for decades, but more recently entered the TLS game. HOM, for example, was founded in 1994 in Arizona, but only in 2025 did it begin operations in Los Angeles as a centralized entity for administering TLS payments. HOM, for whom a contract of up to [\\$45,586,000](#) was approved this year, will front the cost of rent, utilities, and security deposits on behalf of tenants. The tenant pays their portion of the rent to the

landlord, and HOM pays the rest using TLS funds. HOM thus frees service providers to refocus not on voucher management but service provision, including working with tenants to keep them housed. While HOM and its kin alleviate some tensions, however, they also produce others. Unlike the HACLA Section 8 agreement, a TLS tenant can be evicted even if they continue to pay their portion. If the voucher expires, the service provider or HOM stops paying the rent, and the tenant is evicted. Moreover, HOM helps stabilize the speculative real estate market by paying landlords' unaffordable rents and impossibly high security deposits. These are the same exorbitant rents that tenants will be expected to pay in two years when the subsidy expires. As the [Stop LAPD Spying Coalition argues](#), this operates as a version of “predatory inclusion” – getting people inside while also further entrenching the conditions that pushed them into homelessness *and* enriching the very actors that created those conditions in the first place.

Most recently, the risks of such reliance on TLS became amply evident in Los Angeles. Between fiscal years 2024-2025 and 2025-2026, the TLS program's budget, deriving from federal and state funds, was cut in half (from 240 million down to its pre-pandemic average of 123 million). At the beginning of fiscal year 2024-2025, there were 5,192 funded slots available for participants, but by the beginning of fiscal year 2026-2027, there were only 1,710. At the same time, federal funding for homelessness contracted in general, which cut into related programs like Section 8. With the TLS rug pulled out, LA's reliance on this temporary solution became abundantly clear. When LAHSA published [the results](#) of the most recent homeless count, it explained the increase in homelessness with the following: “the story of the Homeless Count is mainly the story of TLS.” Due to funding constraints, LAHSA cut TLS enrollments from their height at 10,308 in 2024 to 6,590 in 2025, contributing to an overall 7.9% increase in unsheltered homelessness and 3.4% decrease in sheltered homelessness (in the City of Los Angeles. In March 2026, the City, in compliance with the Alliance settlement, launched a redesigned “[Alliance Time-Limited Subsidy Program](#)” which provides subsidies to an additional 2,000 participants. To fund these subsidies, the [city has leveraged Measure A funds through Los Angeles County Affordable Housing Solutions Agency \(LACAHS\)](#), established in 2023 to provide homelessness prevention. In a mind-boggling policy maneuver, participants must first be enrolled in an interim housing program to “establish tenancy” in order to then receive a LACAHS-funded temporary housing subsidy. While establishing tenancy has been barred for individuals in publicly funded interim housing programs, here, the city has inverted these rules for TLS to be able to meet Alliance settlement requirements.

Rapid Re-Housing is a Part of the Churn, not a Solution for It

In our ongoing work on housing precarity in Los Angeles, we have characterized (un)housing systems as “[displaceability by design](#).” For the purposes of this report, we once again emphasize that our data analysis shows that time-limited programs are a part of the churn rather than a solution for it. Here we share three (un)housing trajectories of Aetna Street encampment residents that lead up to the Inside Safe operation of 2023. As noted earlier, we generated these trajectories by stitching together different HMIS datasets and by emphasizing longitudinal rather than point-in-time assessments. They are anonymized and the locations are de-identified.

Murray Parker is a 52-year-old Black man who has experienced homelessness since at least 2016, and has been in LAHSA's system since January 2018, where he was enrolled in the City Expansion Street Outreach program administered by LAHSA. In May 2018, he enrolled in a day shelter, exiting after 3 months with no exit interview completed. He disappeared from the system until early 2020, eventually enrolling in a Project Roomkey location, where he stayed for 11 months, exiting to a Rapid Re-Housing program in March 2021. Throughout the time he was enrolled in the Rapid Re-Housing Program, he lived in emergency shelters, finally enrolling in a Project Homekey program. But by April 2022, Mr. Parker was identified at the Aetna encampments and he enrolled in the PRK once again but exited with no interview 5 months later. Two days after his exit from PRK in September 2022 he was identified in the Aetna encampments again. In early 2023, he was enrolled in the Bridge Housing program for 2 months, exiting to homelessness. His last recorded entry in our dataset was in the Aetna encampments at the end of June of 2023. Throughout this time, Parker was enrolled in 12 street outreach projects. Though he was enrolled in a Rapid Re-Housing program, it seems as though he was never placed in an actual housing unit, continuing enrollments in shorter-term housing programs throughout the duration of that enrollment.

Karen Powell is a 33-year-old multiracial (Black and white) woman who has experienced homelessness since at least 2017 and has been in LAHSA's system since at least 2019 when she enrolled in A Bridge Home shelter, exiting just a month later in June. In November 2019, she enrolled in yet another A Bridge Home shelter, exiting in March 2020 to homelessness. In May 2021, she reemerged in the system and ended up enrolling in 4 different shelter programs: a PRK, a PHK, Bridge Housing, and a Family Solution

Center. By December 2021, she enrolled in Rapid Re-Housing seemingly related to the Family Solution Center. In May 2022, she exited to rental housing with a subsidy. To this point, Powell had been enrolled in 15 projects, 7 of which were considered shelter programs. It seems like this housing fell through: in November 2022, she enrolled in the County and City Motel Voucher programs and in January 2023 she was identified in the Aetna encampments. After continuing to navigate the system for the next few months, she exited the motel/hotel voucher program to incarceration in April 2023.

Rosie Thomas is a 46-year-old Black and Latinx woman who has experienced homelessness since at least 2016 and has been in LAHSA's system since at least that same year when she enrolled in a Rapid Re-Housing Program. In May 2017, she formally exited her Rapid Re-Housing program to rental housing with an ongoing subsidy. She reappeared in the LAHSA system in June 2021, where she enrolled in a day shelter. Through April 2022, she enrolled in 3 different housing programs ending with A Bridge Home shelter where she exited to homelessness. A few days later she was identified in the CD2-Zone1A/Saticoy Catchment A encampment, and a few days after that she enrolled in a Tiny Home. While enrolled in the Tiny Home Village, she enrolled in another Rapid Re-Housing project and by July 2022, she exited to a rental with a Housing Choice Voucher. Unfortunately, by late June 2023, she again reappeared in the LAHSA system, enrolled in the CIRCLE Valley Street Outreach project run by Urban Alchemy. A few days later she was recorded at the Aetna encampments.

Key Points for Housing Justice Organizers

As Los Angeles turns towards time-limited subsidies as a solution to homelessness, we urge housing justice organizers to consider the following:

- In the absence of permanent housing on the other side, time-limited subsidies create a cliff instead of a bridge to housing. Housing with a countdown creates psychological distress that prevents stability. Two-year subsidies provide enough time to adjust to life off the street, but not enough time to get into permanent housing, if it even existed.
- While the status of tenancy, which comes with certain rights and protections, has been barred for those placed in publicly funded interim housing, the City, in the case of TLS, has created a loophole in order to meet Alliance requirements in the face of a shrinking and morphing funding landscape. But this does not alleviate the undermining of tenancy rights that is baked into shelter and housing programs.
- While it is laudable that HACLA secured resources to convert 2,700 Emergency Housing Vouchers into permanent housing subsidies, this took place after EHV holders endured tremendous uncertainty and stress. Furthermore, these housing resources are only a miniscule of the vast need that continues to exist in Los Angeles, one driven by the systematic disinvestment of public housing by the federal government.

THE HORIZON OF HOUSING JUSTICE

The Horizon of Housing Justice

We have addressed this report to housing justice organizers in Los Angeles and beyond because we wish to contest — through our research, analysis, and scholarship — the shadow governing force that is the LA Alliance and other similar neoconservative entities. As we write, LAHSA is being dismantled as the central coordinating body for homelessness services across LA City and County, plagued as it was by mismanagement of funds and clogged bureaucratic pipelines — some of which we have detailed in this report. Yet eliminating LAHSA does not fix the underlying problems. In 1993, LAHSA was founded to settle a drawn-out court dispute between City and County over which branch of government should be responsible for addressing the problem of homelessness. LAHSA became the entity through which City and County could *together* support LA's poorest people, an extremely necessary solution to the scattered and incoherent service provision system that predated it. With LAHSA's termination, it is unclear what will arise in its place. But in this current vacuum, the logics of the LA Alliance risk defining the direction of all homeless policy in Los Angeles. The LA Alliance lacks public oversight and public accountability.

At first glance, there seems to be considerable alignment between the priorities of the LA Alliance and those concerned with housing solutions. Earlier this year, the City reached a [new agreement](#) with the LA Alliance that extends through 2029 and shifts homelessness policy goals from encampment removal to shelter and housing placements. At first glance, such a shift seems aligned with housing justice goals, including those of movement organizations such as the Los Angeles Community Action Network, an intervenor in the LA Alliance lawsuits. But the alignment is less with housing justice and more with what we have dubbed Shelter & Care liberalism. To this end, our report has scrutinized shelter and housing placements and drawn attention to the opacity and obfuscation in the various data systems that track placements. Here again it is tempting to be sympathetic to the LA Alliance lawsuits, especially as one pores through the Kafka-esque hearings in Judge Carter's courtroom, notably the prevarications by city officials on such things as bed counts.

But the LA Alliance's agenda is crystal clear: the criminalization of homelessness, the disbanding of Housing First, and the institutionalization of unhoused persons in treatment programs. Let us not mistake these goals as housing solutions, let alone housing justice. Indeed, such a vision became amply clear at the [recent Congressional testimony](#) by Paul Webster, Executive Director of the LA Alliance, in which he framed homelessness as a problem of mental illness and addiction, of lawlessness and public disorder, and of public assistance to non-citizens.

We are concerned that the shadow governance of the LA Alliance will only gain strength as momentum builds for the LA Olympics. The new addendum to the Alliance agreement, signed Summer 2026, agreed that the 12,915 units produced under the settlement will be open until June 30, 2029 — instead of shuttering by spring 2027. As of this writing, after 2029, there is no obligation to keep these units open. While this is certainly a significant improvement over a 2027 closure date, it is nevertheless tantamount to kicking the can down the road. Conveniently, in this case, “down the road” is well after the 2028 Olympics. When eyes across the globe are focused on Los Angeles, fewer unhoused people will be visible on the streets. This is no mistake. The homeless will have been effectively “stored” for the mega-event, with no permanent solution in sight.

What happens from here is up to housing justice organizers. We hope this report offers some tools for that struggle.

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