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Journal

The Journal of Race Ethnicity and Politics, 9(2)

ISSN

2056-6085

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Publication Date

2024

DOI

10.1017/rep.2024.4

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Peer reviewed

Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics

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--Manuscript Draft--

Manuscript Number:	JREP-D-23-00067R2
Full Title:	Ethnic-Racial Socialization in White American Families and Young Adult Political Attitudes
Article Type:	Research Article
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Corresponding Author Secondary Information:	
Corresponding Author's Institution:	University of California Riverside
Corresponding Author's Secondary Institution:	
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Order of Authors Secondary Information:	
Abstract:	<p>The United States is in a time of reckoning with Whiteness. Despite white people benefiting from a disproportionate amount of power at every level of government, a significant racial wealth gap, preferential treatment in the legal system, and a rise in white supremacy, "colorblind" critics continue to argue against the relevance of race in a purportedly post-racial society. We assert that parents' ethnic-racial socialization (ERS) of their children shape how children view their racial identity and thus influence important political attitudes. ERS is a process by which individuals are taught values, beliefs, and attitudes about ethnicity and race. Most existing research among families of color suggests ERS is strongly linked to a variety of adult political attitudes. However, less is known about the impact of ERS on political attitudes for white young adults. Drawing on survey data from a national U.S. sample of 944 white, young adults (18-25 years old), we find that white ERS is linked with political attitudes. Specifically, we find that increased cultural socialization, preparation for bias, and egalitarianism are positively related to politically conservative ideology, while anti-racism is positively related to politically liberal ideology. Preparation for bias and egalitarianism are positively related to Republican party identification. Promotion of mistrust, silent racial socialization, and anti-racism are positively related to Democratic party affiliation. We suggest ERS impacts the way a person conceptualizes ethnicity and race and is inextricably linked to political outcomes.</p>

**Ethnic-Racial Socialization in White American Families and Young Adult Political
Attitudes**

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Ethnic-Racial Socialization in White American Families and Young Adult Political Attitudes

Abstract

The United States is in a time of reckoning with Whiteness. Despite white people benefiting from a disproportionate amount of power at every level of government, a significant racial wealth gap, preferential treatment in the legal system, and a rise in white supremacy, “colorblind” critics continue to argue against the relevance of race in a purportedly post-racial society. We assert that parents’ ethnic-racial socialization (ERS) of their children shape how children view their racial identity and thus influence important political attitudes. ERS is a process by which individuals are taught values, beliefs, and attitudes about ethnicity and race. Most existing research among families of color suggests ERS is strongly linked to a variety of adult political attitudes. However, less is known about the impact of ERS on political attitudes for white young adults. Drawing on survey data from a national U.S. sample of 944 white, young adults (18-25 years old), we find that white ERS is linked with political attitudes. Specifically, we find that increased *cultural socialization*, *preparation for bias*, and *egalitarianism* are positively related to politically conservative ideology, while *anti-racism* is positively related to politically liberal ideology. *Preparation for bias* and *egalitarianism* are positively related to Republican party identification. *Promotion of mistrust*, *silent racial socialization*, and *anti-racism* are positively related to Democratic party affiliation. We suggest ERS impacts the way a person conceptualizes ethnicity and race and is inextricably linked to political outcomes.

Keywords: ethnic-racial socialization, white racial socialization, political attitudes, white race, white families

Ethnic-Racial Socialization in White American Families and Young Adult Political Attitudes

With the notable rise in the United States in explicitly white supremacist activities (Byman 2022), increased political polarization (Pierson and Schickler 2020), Christian nationalists' ongoing attempts to seize power (Whitehead and Perry 2020), and the emergence of a national racial reckoning (McDermott and Ferguson 2022), it is important to understand what factors contribute to political attitudes among white Americans. While political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists have focused on either socialization or political attitudes (Anoll, Engelhardt, and Israel-Trummel 2022; Burke et al. 2013; De Mesquita 2002; Diekman and Schneider 2010; Godefroidt 2022; Loyd and Gaither 2018; McCall and Manza 2011; Peterson, Smith, and Hibbing 2020; Schoon et al. 2010; Stockemer 2017; Umaña-Taylor and Hill 2020), we found none that have examined the relationship of childhood ethnic-racial socialization by parents to young adult political attitudes among white Americans, despite abundant evidence of the key role that families play in imbuing children with feelings towards various social, political, and religious experiences (Guhin et al. 2021) and shaping adult attitudes and behaviors (Degner and Dalege 2013; Grindal 2017; Hughes et al. 2006; Lesane-Brown 2006).

Engaging in timely research to explore this relationship is critical, especially given the increasingly enmeshed nature of political attitudes and race (Gimpel and Tam Cho 2004; Inwood 2020). Socialization is a factory of ideological reproduction (Feagin 2006) and affects how inequalities are created, maintained, and distributed. Political attitudes predict voting behaviors (Wang 2016) subsequently affecting social inequalities (Reeves and Mackenbach 2019). This paper examines the relations between perceived ethnic-racial socialization in childhood and political attitudes in young adulthood among white Americans – that is, people who label themselves and their parents as “white.” We examine a national sample to capture diversity

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4 within the U.S. population of white young adults. We employ a comprehensive set of ERS
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6 measures that capture participants' recollections of the ERS strategies their parents employed
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8 while the participant was growing up. These strategies include those historically studied in
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10 families of color and those recently identified in research with white families.
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13 14 ETHNIC-RACIAL SOCIALIZATION

15
16 Socialization refers to the process of transmitting cultural norms, values, attitudes, and
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18 mores, such that the receiver is better equipped to function appropriately in a given series of
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20 roles (Grindal and Nieri 2015; Guhin et al. 2021). While many different agents can engage in
21
22 socialization, we focus here on socialization by parents. Furthermore, we focus on ethnic-racial
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24 socialization (ERS), the process by which parents transmit ideas, attitudes, and values about race
25
26 and ethnicity to their children (Hughes et al. 2006). The most studied dimensions of ERS are
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28 cultural socialization (messages about the family's racial and/or ethnic traditions, such as food,
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30 holidays, etc.), preparation for bias (messages preparing children for the possibility of ethnic-
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32 racial discrimination), and promotion of mistrust (messages encouraging a skepticism of and
33
34 guardedness against ethnic-racial outgroups).
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41 Early work on ERS focused on families of color and aimed to reveal how parents used
42
43 these three socialization messages to foster a positive self-concept and navigate racism in a
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45 society with inequitable opportunities (Umaña-Taylor and Hill 2020; Priest et al. 2014). In recent
46
47 years, greater attention has been paid to ERS in white families (Loyd and Gaither 2018; Nieri
48
49 and Huft 2023; Simon 2021). The research on white families generally recognizes that white
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51 families differ from families of color in that whites inhabit a socially privileged position in
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53 American society (Bowen Matthew 2022; Brown 2021). Therefore, the content, patterns, and
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55 outcomes of ERS in white families may differ from those in families of color. For example,
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4 socialization about egalitarianism, which involves messages about the equality of ethnic-racial
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6 groups, in families of color may be intended to teach children of color that they are as good as
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8 white children, despite the racist messages that they receive in society (Loyd and Gaither 2018;
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10 Umaña-Taylor and Hill 2020). In contrast, in white families, this strategy may teach white
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12 children that people of color should not receive special treatment, even in spite of historical and
13
14 ongoing inequities between people of color and whites. Similarly, mainstream socialization,
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16 which involves messages endorsing mainstream (white) institutions and values, such as
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18 individualism, and as such, deemphasizing group identities, such as race (Loyd and Gaither
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20 2018; Umaña-Taylor and Hill 2020; Hecht et al. 2003; Rollins 2019), in families of color may be
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22 intended to teach children of color how to navigate and succeed in a society structured by and for
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24 white people (Bowen Matthew 2022; Brown 2021). In contrast, in white families, this strategy
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26 may operate to teach white children that mainstream white values are the only or correct values
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28 by which American society should operate.
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36 Prior research has shown that white parents engage in less frequent and somewhat
37
38 different ERS (Loyd and Gaither 2018; Simon 2021). While white parents may employ ERS
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40 strategies used by parents of color (i.e., those mentioned in earlier paragraphs), they also employ
41
42 other strategies. White parents may practice silence on race, teaching that race and racism should
43
44 not be discussed (Bartoli et al. 2016; Briscoe 2003; Pahlke, Patterson, and Hughes 2020;
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46 Underhill 2016, 2018; Zucker and Patterson 2018). They may promote exposure to diversity,
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48 seeking to expose their children to other ethnic-racial children and teach that diversity is valuable
49
50 (Underhill 2016, 2019; Hagerman 2018; Vittrup 2018; Zucker 2019). Finally, they may engage
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52 in anti-racism socialization which involves messages about types of racism (e.g., internalized,
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54 tacit, institutional, structural) other than just interpersonal racism, white privilege, standing up to
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4 racism, and allyship with people of color (Anoll et al. 2022; Gillen-O’Neel et al. 2021;
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6 Hagerman 2017, 2018; Heberle et al. 2021. Thomann & Suyemoto 2018; Thomas 2019;
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8 Underhill and Simms 2022). While some other strategies (e.g., exposure to diversity) may also
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10 be motivated by parents’ anti-racist sentiments, we distinguish between those socialization
11
12 strategies and antiracism socialization that aims to teach about systemic racism.
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14

15
16 Some white parents are relatively successful in their attempts to prevent racist attitudes,
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18 promote ethnic-racial diversity appreciation, or cultivate anti-racist attitudes in their children
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20 (Gillen-O’Neel et al. 2021; Underhill and Simms 2022; Hagerman 2017, 2018; Pahlke et al.
21
22 2020; Thomas 2019). Others use ERS strategies that undermine their efforts and reinforce
23
24 attitudes and practices that enable ethnic-racial inequities (Vittrup 2018; Gillen-O’Neel et al.
25
26 2021; Underhill 2016, 2018; Hagerman 2018; Pineseault 2015). Simply, ERS among white
27
28 families remains an understudied area of research, and one wrought with conflicting findings on
29
30 the outcomes of ERS. This is the first of two notable gaps in the literature that we attempt to
31
32 address. The second gap regards the relation of ERS to political attitudes.
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38 ETHNIC-RACIAL SOCIALIZATION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES 39

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41 Although racial attitudes inform political attitudes (Jardina 2021; Peterson and Riley
42
43 2022), we found only two studies that examine how ERS in white families relates to young
44
45 adults’ political attitudes. Eveland and Nathanson (2020) found that Republican parents, relative
46
47 to Democratic parents, discussed race with their children less frequently than Democratic
48
49 parents. Thompson (2021) found that political party affiliation moderated the relationship
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51 between progressive ERS (messages about the structural advantages of whiteness) and awareness
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53 of structural racial disadvantages. Progressive ERS while growing up was associated with
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4 increased awareness in adulthood of the structural disadvantages faced by Blacks, and this
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6 relation was stronger for white Democrats than for white Republicans.
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9 Prior research has linked various ERS strategies in white families to ethnic identity.
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11 Cultural socialization is linked to greater ethnic identity exploration and commitment (Morse
12
13 2012; Else-Quest and Morse 2014; Wilson 2008) and ethnic identity affirmation/belonging
14
15 (Wilson 2008; Hughes et al. 2009). Preparation for bias is also linked to ethnic identity, but the
16
17 evidence of the specific direction of the relation is inconsistent (Hughes et al. 2009; Wilson
18
19 2008). Promotion of mistrust is linked to greater ethnic identity affirmation/belonging and
20
21 exploration (Wilson 2008). To the extent that these forms of socialization emphasize white
22
23 identity, we expect that they may also increase a sense of fear, threat, and anxiety related to
24
25 whites' group membership. Many conservative and Republican political positions are bound up
26
27 in racial ideology emphasizing whiteness (Byman 2022; Metzl 2019; Ehrenberg 2022;
28
29 Whitehead and Perry 2020). Political conservatism is motivated, in part, by perceived fear and
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31 threats (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway 2003; Burke, Kosloff, and Landau 2013). This is
32
33 seen clearly in the current narratives circulated among political conservatives, many of which
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35 revolve around fear of immigrants, Muslims, and LGBTQ+ people, and modern public education
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37 curriculum. Therefore, we expect that:
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45 H1: Participants who perceive more frequent cultural socialization, preparation for bias,
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47 or promotion of mistrust will be more conservative and affiliate more with the
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49 Republican party in young adulthood.
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53 Egalitarianism, mainstream socialization, and silent racial socialization are strategies that,
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55 particularly in white families, deemphasize race and its role in enabling people to experience
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57 success in American society. For example, egalitarianism focuses on equality between ethnic-
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4 racial groups and, as such, does not teach about structural racism, which produces and maintains
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6 ethnic-racial inequities (Vittrup 2018). Mainstream socialization aims to facilitate navigation of
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8 the current system, however flawed due to racism, rather than resistance to or modification of it
9
10 (Rollins 2019). Mainstream socialization focuses on seemingly individual and non-racialized
11
12 ideas of success, including work ethic, good citizenship, and moral righteousness (Thornton et al.
13
14 1990). Of course, the propagated ideas of work, citizenship, and morality are premised on
15
16 mainstream white culture. While mainstream socialization highlights the importance of
17
18 ahistorical, de-racialized ideas of individual success on one hand, it also deemphasizes the role of
19
20 racism and discrimination affecting groups on the other (Rollins 2019; Thornton et al. 1990).
21
22 Lastly, silent racial socialization refers to strategies that actively discourage the discussion of
23
24 race and the role it plays in the larger society (Keum and Ahn 2021)
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31 Scholars of ERS in white families (e.g., Abaied and Perry 2021; Anoll et al. 2022; Bartoli
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33 2017; Briscoe 2003; Pahlke, Patterson, & Hughes 2020; Underhill 2016, 2018; Vittrup 2018;
34
35 Zucker & Patterson 2018) have shown how the deployment of these strategies can be reflective
36
37 of colorblind or race evasive ideology, which argues that race is no longer relevant in American
38
39 society and that to focus on race is to be racist (Neville et al. 2013). Research has documented
40
41 the association of this ideology with political positions against race-conscious policies, such as
42
43 affirmative action (Mazzocco, Cooper, and Flint 2012). Other research suggests that this
44
45 ideology has greater resonance in conservative and Republican circles (Gutierrez 2016;
46
47 Mazzocco 2017; Carr 1997). For example, political liberals are more likely than conservatives to
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49 engage in equity-focused (rather than egalitarian-focused) decision making (Axt, Ebersole, and
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51 Nosek 2016). Therefore, we expect that:
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4 H2: Participants who perceive more frequent egalitarian socialization, mainstream
5 socialization, or silent racial socialization will express more conservative political
6 attitudes and affiliate more with the Republican party in young adulthood.
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11 Exposure to diversity is a color-conscious socialization strategy. White parents employ it
12 on the grounds that familiarity with ethnic-racial diversity is beneficial. For some parents,
13 exposure to diversity is a way for children to learn about other ethnic-racial groups and be less
14 prejudiced (Hagerman 2018; Underhill 2016; 2019). For other parents, exposure to diversity is a
15 way for children to cultivate their social capital to navigate an ethnically-racially diverse society,
16 though not necessarily to be less prejudiced (Hagerman 2018). Because parents with different
17 motivations may employ this strategy (Anoll et al. 2022), the political attitudes that flow from
18 exposure to this strategy may vary. We found no prior study examining the relation of this
19 socialization strategy to political attitudes. We found only two studies examining exposure to
20 diversity, though not as a socialization strategy, that linked greater exposure to more liberal
21 political attitudes in adulthood (Billings, Chyn, and Haggag 2021; Brown et al. 2021). Given this
22 background, we do not hypothesize a specific direction, but we expect that:
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40 H3: Perceived exposure to diversity socialization will be related to political ideology and
41 political party identification in young adulthood.
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45 Like exposure to diversity, anti-racism socialization can be a color-conscious strategy.
46 However, they differ along two dimensions. First, anti-racist socialization, as studied to date,
47 often involves a more direct attempt to recognize systemic forces that perpetuate racism. While
48 exposure to diversity socialization tends to be more individualistic in its underlying tenets (i.e.,
49 racism can be addressed on an individual level with greater exposure to and tolerance for
50 different groups) , anti-racist socialization often pushes for more meso- and macro-level changes.
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4 Anti-racist socialization may include creating racial justice groups in schools (Underhill and
5 Simms 2022), building a critical consciousness about race (Heberle et al. 2021), directly
6
7 confronting racism (Hagerman 2017; Heberle et al. 2021), teaching about racial privilege
8
9 (Hagerman 2017; Heberle et al. 2021), and sheltering undocumented immigrants (Underhill and
10
11 Simms 2022).
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15
16 Second, the two strategies differ in how their benefits are framed. Exposure to diversity is
17
18 often portrayed as a benefit to oneself. Middle-class white families largely expose their children
19
20 to diversity to enrich their own children's lives, not necessarily to benefit members of other
21
22 ethnic-racial groups (Underhill 2019). In contrast, anti-racist socialization often focuses on
23
24 benefiting outgroup members. By identifying and challenging hegemonic whiteness, white
25
26 families can better support ethnic and racial minorities (Hagerman 2017). Recognizing systemic
27
28 racism and striving for systemic changes, as promoted by anti-racist socialization, is likely
29
30 connected to more liberal political views. While an individualistic perspective, such as that
31
32 highlighted in exposure to diversity, might be found across the political spectrum, the structural
33
34 critique is often linked to people on the political left. Consequently, this difference in
35
36 understanding the root of racial issues might explain the political attitudes of people with
37
38 exposure to different socialization strategies.
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46 Some scholars of ERS in white families have documented the use of anti-racism
47
48 socialization specifically by parents who identify as politically liberal or progressive (Underhill
49
50 and Simms 2022; Hagerman 2017) or as Democrats (Anoll et al. 2022). Other scholars have
51
52 documented the use of this strategy by white parents but did not assess the political attitudes of
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54 the parents (Gillen-O'Neel et al. 2021; Hagerman 2018; Thomann & Suyemoto 2018; Thomas
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56 2019; Pinsoneault 2015). Conservatives and Republicans have been largely underrepresented and
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4 mostly inactive in the anti-racism movement, particularly in recent mobilizations associated with
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6 Black Lives Matter (Bhattacharyya, Virdee, and Winter 2020; Bonnett 2000; Bray 2017;
7
8 Drakulich and Denver 2022; Thompson 2001; Zamalin 2019). Because of the clear relation
9
10 between political views and anti-racism, as well as the tendency to view racial issues as
11
12 structural rather than individual, we expect that:
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15
16 H4: Participants who perceive more frequent anti-racism socialization will express less
17
18 conservative political attitudes and affiliate less with the Republican party in young
19
20 adulthood.
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23 METHODS

24 *Sample*

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26 Participants were between the ages of 18-25, which is considered to be an emerging adult
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28 (Arnett 2000). Consistent with much of the socialization literature (Priest et al. 2014), we focus
29
30 on young adults because they entered adulthood during a time of demographic shift towards
31
32 greater racial-ethnic diversity in the United States (Robinson-Wood et al. 2021; Frey 2020),
33
34 which has enhanced the racial identity of white people (Jardina 2019). Furthermore, this age
35
36 allows for participants to be good informants of culture and insightful about their own
37
38 experiences, while still being able to accurately reflect on their socialization experiences while
39
40 growing up. All participants identified as white, currently lived in the United States, and were
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42 raised by two white birth parents. The final sample used for this analysis consisted of 933
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44 participants.
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53 The average age of participants was 21.69. The sample was 53.4% female, 45.1% male,
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55 and 1.5% non-binary or other gender. A third (30.5%) identified as a Republican, 31.1%
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57 identified as a Democrat, and 33.4% identified as an Independent or other party. Similarly,
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4 31.6% identified as conservative, 30.7% identified as liberal, and 37.7% identified as moderate.
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7 Regarding religious beliefs, 53.5% identified as Christian, with 23.2% of Christians identifying
8
9 as Evangelical. We find our sample to be comparable to the national population of white young
10
11 adults in terms of age, gender, political attitudes, and religious affiliation (Pew Research Center
12
13 2020; 2017).
14

15 16 *Procedure*

17
18 We utilized Qualtrics, an online survey platform, to recruit and gather data from 1,009
19
20 participants. Participant quotas were balanced along gender and four geographic regions (West,
21
22 Northeast, Midwest, South). Qualtrics maintains a panel of participants around the country; we
23
24 contracted with them to access a sample. Qualtrics then gathered and screened the data and
25
26 delivered an anonymized dataset to us.
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28
29

30 31 *Measures*

32
33 We measured dimensions of ERS that have been traditionally studied in the ERS
34
35 literature (Hughes et al., 2006) as well as dimensions identified in the literature on white families
36
37 (Nieri, Montoya, & Carlos 2023). We measured eight total dimensions: cultural socialization,
38
39 preparation for bias, promotion of mistrust, egalitarianism, mainstream socialization, silent racial
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41 socialization, exposure to diversity, and anti-racist socialization. The questions asked the
42
43 respondents to retrospectively report the frequency of ERS messages and strategies they received
44
45 from their parents during their youth (e.g., “When you were growing up, how often did your
46
47 parents encourage you to be proud of your racial/ethnic group?”), an approach consistent with
48
49 prior ERS research with young adults (Grindal, 2017). We focus on perceptions of parental
50
51 socialization because they reveal how parenting is directly experienced (Stevenson et al. 2002).
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4 Each dimension of ERS was measured with a scale containing multiple items. For each
5
6 item, participants reported their perceptions of ERS from their youth with one of five response
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8 options ranging from 1 (“Never”) to 5 (“Very often”). The items in each scale were averaged and
9
10 served as our measure for that dimension of ERS. We used empirically-validated measures
11
12 whenever possible, modifying them slightly to allow for comparisons across measures.
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15
16 Cultural socialization consisted of five items measuring parental strategies that encourage
17
18 pride for and promote a greater understanding of one’s race (e.g., “...Encourage you to attend
19
20 cultural events of your racial/ethnic group”) ($\alpha = .88$). Preparation for bias consisted of five items
21
22 measuring ways in which parents prepared their children to withstand racial discrimination (e.g.,
23
24 “...Speak with you about how your race/ethnicity might affect how others view your abilities?”)
25
26 ($\alpha = .87$). Promotion of mistrust consisted of three items measuring the extent to which parents
27
28 promoted an overt distrust of racial outgroups (e.g., “...Tell you to avoid other racial/ethnic
29
30 groups because of their members’ prejudice against your racial/ethnic group?”) ($\alpha = .91$). All
31
32 three measures were based on Tran and Lee’s (2010) version of Hughes and Chen’s measures
33
34 (1999). Egalitarianism consisted of six items exploring ways participants learned from their
35
36 parents that America had equal opportunities for all races (e.g., “...Tell you that American
37
38 society is fair to all races?”) ($\alpha = .81$) (Langrehr, Thomas, and Morgan 2016). Mainstream
39
40 socialization consisted of four items measuring how parents minimized the importance of race in
41
42 favor of other individual traits (e.g., “...Tell you that a person’s individual characteristics are
43
44 more important than the characteristics of the group(s) to which they belong?”) ($\alpha = .76$). This
45
46 was created by the researchers based on work by Rollins (2019). Silent racial socialization
47
48 consisted of five items measuring how parents discouraged discussions about race (e.g., “...Tell
49
50 you to avoid talking about race with other people?”) ($\alpha = .89$) (Keum and Ahn 2021). Exposure to
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4 diversity consisted of four items measuring how parents fostered interracial relationships (e.g.,
5 “...Encourage you to be friends with people from other racial-ethnic groups.”) ($\alpha = .87$). Anti-
6
7 racism consisted of three items measuring how parents directly acknowledged and addressed the
8
9 negative impacts of racism (e.g., ...Speak with you about famous racial incidents like the
10
11 Ferguson riots.”) These two measures were created based on qualitative research on whites’
12
13 socialization (Hagerman 2018; Pahlke et al. 2020; Underhill 2019; Vittrup 2018). Please see
14
15 Appendix A for the items within each ERS measure.
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21 Political attitudes were measured using two questions. Political ideology was measured
22
23 by asking, “What best describes your current political attitudes?” Participants responded on a 7-
24
25 point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly liberal” to “Strongly conservative.” Political party
26
27 affiliation was measured by asking, “What best describes your current political party affiliation?”
28
29 Participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Democrat” to “Strongly
30
31 Republican,” with an eighth answer for “Other political party” available. Cases reporting “Other
32
33 party” were excluded. Both questions are based on similar measures in the General Social
34
35 Survey (Smith et al. 2019), which measure political ideology and political party identification
36
37 along a bipolar 7-point Likert scale.
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43 Rather than creating an index variable combining conservative attitudes and Republican
44
45 party affiliation, we examined the variables separately. While there is a strong correlation
46
47 between political attitudes and party affiliation, some individuals may disaffiliate with the party
48
49 most closely aligned with their political attitudes (Pew Research Center 2021). Additionally,
50
51 some may choose to affiliate with a party to mobilize voting power while not fully endorsing the
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53 political party’s platform. For these reasons, we pursued a more nuanced assessment of political
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55 attitudes, analyzing political ideology separately from political party affiliation.
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4 Covariates included gender, education level, religious affiliation, and identification as an
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6 Evangelical Christian, which previous research indicates tend to be related to political attitudes
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8 (Collet & Lizardo 2009; Diekman and Schneider 2010; Hayes 1995). Gender was measured
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10 using one question (i.e., “What is your gender?”), with the available options being “Man,”
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12 “Woman,” and “Non-binary or other gender.” Man was the reference category. Education level
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14 was asked with the question, “What best describes your highest level of education,” with options
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16 ranging from “less than 8th grade” up to “master’s degree or higher degree.” Religious affiliation
17
18 was captured by the question, “What best describes your religious affiliation (if any)?”
19
20 Consistent with existing religiosity measures, participants could choose “Protestant,” “Catholic,”
21
22 “Other Christian,” “Jewish,” “Atheist,” “Agnostic,” and “Other affiliation.” During data analysis,
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24 “Jewish” and “Other affiliation” were collapsed into a single “Non-Christian” category, and
25
26 “Atheist” and “Agnostic” were collapsed into “Secular.” Protestant was used as the reference
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28 category during analyses. Participants identified as being Evangelical or not (i.e., “Do you
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30 identify as an Evangelical Christian?”), answering, “Yes” or “No.” The latter was the reference
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32 category. Preliminary models also explored age and region of residence as covariates. However,
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34 they were not related to the outcomes and thus, were not included in subsequent analyses in the
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36 interest of parsimony.
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45 *Analyses*

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47 We produced descriptive statistics on all measures (Table 1) and bivariate correlations of
48
49 ERS variables, political attitudes, and covariates (Table 2). We then conducted two ordinary least
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51 squares (OLS) regressions (Table 3). The regression models examined the direct relation of each
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53 type of perceived ERS to each of the two outcomes, including all ERS strategies and controlling
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4 for covariates (religious affiliation, Evangelical identification, gender, and highest level of
5 education). We report standardized regression coefficients.
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8 9 RESULTS

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11 On average, the frequency of ERS strategies participants reported experiencing is low
12 (Table 1). Participants report having experienced silent racial socialization least frequently and
13 cultural socialization most frequently. On average, participants experienced all ERS strategies
14 rarely. Participants leaned slightly conservative and slightly Republican. The Pearson
15 correlations of all ERS strategies among themselves are positive and statistically significant
16 (Table 2).
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26 We find that most childhood ERS strategies relate to young adult political attitudes. We
27 find partial support for Hypotheses 1. Cultural socialization was positively related to
28 conservatism ($\beta = .124, p < .01$) and the relation to Republican party affiliation trended toward
29 but did not reach statistical significance ($\beta = .074, p < .10$). Preparation for bias was positively
30 related to both conservatism ($\beta = .112, p < .05$) and Republican party identification ($\beta = .11, p <$
31 $.05$), implying a more direct connection between this form of ERS and both ideological and
32 partisan alignment. Promotion of mistrust was not associated with conservatism but was
33 inversely associated with Republican party affiliation ($\beta = -.091, p < .05$). These divergent
34 results raise questions about how different components of ERS align or misalign with political
35 ideology and partisanship, suggesting that some forms of ERS might reinforce ideological beliefs
36 without directly influencing party affiliation. Broadly, they suggest that cultural socialization
37 may be more strongly connected to conservative ideology than to Republican affiliation.
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39 Conversely, promotion of mistrust appears more strongly related to Republican affiliation than
40 conservative ideology. Preparation for bias is equally related to both.
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4 With regard to Hypothesis 2, we find partial support. Egalitarianism was positively
5 related to conservatism ($\beta = .147, p < .001$) and Republican party affiliation ($\beta = .097, p < .05$).
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7 This indicates that egalitarian socialization, despite its ostensibly neutral stance, may subtly
8 encourage conservative leanings. Mainstream socialization was not associated with conservatism
9 or Republican party affiliation. Silent racial socialization was not associated with conservatism
10 but was inversely associated with Republican party identification ($\beta = -.115, p < .01$). This
11 complex pattern suggests that color-blind approaches to ERS can have diverse and sometimes
12 counterintuitive effects on political attitudes and affiliation. Broadly, this suggests that silent
13 racial socialization is related more strongly to Republican party affiliation than to conservative
14 ideology. Overall, among these three approaches, we find that egalitarianism and silent racial
15 socialization are linked to conservative attitudes (though in opposite directions).
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31 We do not find support for Hypothesis 3. Exposure to diversity is not related to
32 conservative ideology or Republican party affiliation. This finding could indicate that exposure
33 to diversity is either a more neutral or complex factor in shaping political attitudes. Consistent
34 with Hypothesis 4, anti-racism is negatively related to conservative ideology ($\beta = -.165, p <$
35 $.001$) and Republican party affiliation ($\beta = -.157, p < .001$). This finding highlights the strong
36 relation of anti-racism socialization to liberalism and Democratic affiliation.
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46 The OLS models (Table 3) indicate that ERS strategies and the covariates explain 25% of
47 the variance in political attitudes and 21% of the variance in Republican party affiliation. Finally,
48 in a post-hoc analysis to explore multicollinearity, we examined Variance Inflation Factors (VIF)
49 after running OLS regressions and found no collinearity using a cutoff score of 3.5. The VIF
50 scores ranged from 1.06 to 3.32, well below a level of concern warranted for removing variables
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4 from the models. This cutoff is consistent with literature, which often utilizes a cutoff score of
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7 3.5, 5, or 10 (Craney and Surles 2002; O’Brien 2007).

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9 DISCUSSION

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11 Using a large national sample, we employed a comprehensive set of measures of
12
13 perceived ERS to explore the relation between ERS strategies within white families and young
14
15 adults’ political attitudes. We find full or partial support for three of our four hypotheses.

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17 Consistent with multiple bodies of literature identifying the links between race and politics as
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19 well as socialization and adult attitudes (Degner and Dalege 2013; Emerson and Smith 2000;
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21 Eveland and Nathanson 2020; Froese and Mencken 2009; Green and Dionne 2008; Hughes et al.
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23 2006; Lesane-Brown 2006; Thompson 2021; Tranby and Hartmann 2008), we find that multiple
24
25 ERS strategies relate to white young adult political attitudes. More specifically, we find that
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27 many ERS strategies are strongly related to political ideology and party identification and more
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29 so than demographic predictors (e.g., religious affiliation, education level, gender).

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36 *Cultural socialization, preparation for bias, and promotion of mistrust*

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38 We find that cultural socialization is related to more politically conservative views, and
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40 preparation for bias is related to both conservatism and Republican party affiliation. Cultural
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42 socialization and preparation for bias are socialization strategies that emphasize ethnic-racial
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44 identity, and the salience of white identity may make white young adults more receptive to
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46 conservative and Republican platforms that emphasize the need to be concerned about and
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48 protect one’s position in society, particularly as told through white victimization narratives (Jost
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50 et al. 2003; Phipps 2021; Boehme and Isom Scott 2020; Sengul 2022).

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57 The finding that cultural socialization is more strongly related to conservative ideology
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59 than Republican party affiliation is interesting. It may be that exposure to cultural socialization in
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4 childhood was more common among those who identify as conservative than those who identify
5 as Republican. For example, it may be that children who were taught racial/ethnic traditions and
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7 customs, important people in the history of racial/ethnic groups, and pride in their racial/ethnic
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9 group appreciate, as young adults, conservative ideology's high value on tradition and heritage.
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Conservatives' emotional investment (and subsequent fury upon removal) of Confederate monuments, flags, and symbology is a prime example of this (Cooper et al. 2021; Cooper and Knots 2006). While the Republican party may also value tradition and heritage, it must necessarily focus on the present and future in addition to the past, given electoral politics. As a result, cultural socialization may not as clearly relate to party affiliation.

The finding that preparation for bias was related to conservative attitudes and Republican party identification is not surprising, given the strong relation between conservative views and Republican party identification. While conservative ideology often includes broader values, such as fiscal responsibility and individual liberty, the Republican party has recently relied heavily on narratives of white victimization in much of their campaigning. This includes messages around in-group protection, national identity, and skepticism towards out-groups. The rise in alt-right and alt-lite political figures (Trump, Marjorie Taylor Green, Lauren Boebert, Alex Jones) and organizations (Three Percenters, Proud Boys, Oath Keepers) has been predicated, in part, on framing white Americans as systematically disenfranchised, marginalized, and victimized (Boehme and Isom Scott 2020; Sengul 2022).

Although promotion of mistrust also emphasizes ethnic-racial identity, it was not related to political attitudes as hypothesized. Promotion of mistrust and anti-racism socialization are positively correlated. For participants who received both of these strategies, they may conclude that avoiding interaction with other groups, as encouraged by promotion of mistrust messages, is

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4 a way to respect others (and the social spaces they occupy). Thus, avoiding interaction with
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6 another ethnic-racial group may be interpreted as avoiding performing racism (i.e., avoidance *is*
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8 anti-racist). If this is true, an outcome of this would be that socialization through promotion of
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10 mistrust may not breed fear, as it provides a way to avoid racism. Mistrust is particularly fear-
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12 inspiring if one is also not equipped with tools to address mistrust. However, if individuals are
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14 delivered or perceive a two-pronged message - mistrust other groups *and* avoid them as a way to
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16 avoid performing racism - then they may feel less fearful or anxious. In turn, a person who
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18 receives this two-pronged socialization may find less reason to affiliate with the Republican
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20 party in young adulthood, as fear is a motivator of conservative attitudes and Republican party
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22 affiliation (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway 2003; Burke, Kosloff, and Landau 2013). This
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24 fear, however, may not directly translate into having more conservative views, as conservatism
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26 often includes broader ideologies unrelated to fear.
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33 *Egalitarianism, mainstream socialization, and silent racial socialization*
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36 Although we hypothesized that exposure to egalitarianism, mainstream socialization, and
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38 silent racial socialization would be positively associated with political attitudes, the results were
39
40 mixed. We anticipated that the colorblind nature of these socialization strategies would lead
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42 young adults to respond favorably to conservative and Republican platforms which reflect
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44 colorblind ideology (Gutierrez 2016; Mazzocco 2017; Carr 1997). We do find egalitarianism
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46 socialization – which promotes the idea that all individuals in the United States, regardless of
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48 race, have equal opportunities – is positively related to conservative ideology and Republican
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50 party affiliation.
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55 Regarding mainstream socialization, we find there is no clear relation to political
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57 outcomes. Some of items in this measure captured messages minimizing racial differences.
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4 People who received these messages from parents may be less willing to endorse white
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6 victimization narratives, which highlight racial differences – at least at the group level, and thus,
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8 be less likely in young adulthood to endorse conservative ideology and the Republican party.
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10 This complicated result highlights the need to better capture the nuance in socialization
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12 messages. Some messages convey equality among individuals while others convey equality
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14 among groups. Some messages affirm the existence of racial differences due to interpersonal
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16 racism while others affirm the existence of racial differences due to systemic racism. Some focus
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18 on the status of people of color while others focus on the status of whites. Our measure of
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20 mainstream socialization may tap better into liberal colorblind ideology, emphasizing people of
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22 color as victims of interpersonal racism, than into conservative colorblind ideology, emphasizing
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24 whites as victims of systemic racism.
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31 Regarding silent racial socialization, which involves messages minimizing discussion of
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33 and attention to race, we find it not to be related to conservative ideology and, unexpectedly,
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35 negatively related to Republican party affiliation. As with promotion of mistrust, silent racial
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37 socialization was positively correlated with anti-racism socialization. It may be that those who
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39 receive these messages together interpret them to mean that not talking about race is a good way
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41 to avoid being racist. Studies have shown that some white parents, including some politically
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43 liberal parents, believe avoidance of race talk will prevent their child from becoming racist
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45 (Briscoe 2003; Pahlke et al. 2020; Underhill 2016, 2018). Young adults who were socialized in
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47 this way may be less likely to affiliate with the Republican party. Meanwhile, it may be that
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49 Republican young adults had parents who explicitly spoke with them about race, including about
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51 the potential victimization of whites as a group. In such families, the children would be more
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53 likely to affiliate with the Republican party in young adulthood since the party claims to defend
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4 against a supposed threat to whites (Jost et al. 2003; Phipps 2021; Boehme and Isom Scott 2020;
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6 Sengul 2022). These beliefs about threats to whiteness may not be closely connected to the
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8 conservative ideology though. Thus, the relation between silent racial socialization and
9
10 conservative ideology may be weaker than between silent racial socialization and party
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12 affiliation.
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16 With all three of these strategies, we note that while colorblind ideology is a strong
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18 feature of conservative ideology and Republican doctrine, as previously described, research has
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20 shown that whites across the political spectrum may endorse colorblind ideology (Bonilla Silva
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22 2017), and furthermore, white parents wanting to socialize their children to be anti-racist may
23
24 employ strategies that reflect their own endorsement of colorblind ideology (Pahlke et al. 2012;
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26 Hagerman 2018; Vittrup 2018; Zucker and Patterson; Zucker 2019; Pinsoneault 2015). Going
27
28 forward, therefore, it is important to attend to differences in silent racial socialization messages:
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30 some minimize ethnicity-race with the goal of preventing racism and others minimize it because
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32 the belief is that racism does not exist or race is not salient to white people. While both messages
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34 are problematic in that they minimize race, they may inform future political attitudes in opposing
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36 ways. Researchers should explore silent racial socialization, not just by assessing frequency of
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38 messaging, but also the content and intent of messaging, which may help clarify how and why
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40 parents talk about whiteness.
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47 *Exposure to diversity*

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49 While we did not predict the direction of the relation, we expected to find a statistically
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51 significant relation between exposure to diversity and political attitudes. However, we did not
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53 find exposure to diversity to be associated with political attitudes. It may be that this effect is
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55 contingent on the reasons why parents employ these strategies and the specific content of these
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4 messages that underlie the parents' rationale. For instance, if parents contextualize exposure to
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6 diversity strategies within a broader discussion of racial injustice, this might yield a stronger
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8 relationship with liberal ideology and party identification. In our analyses, since we did not
9
10 identify parental intent in exposure to diversity strategies, these unmeasured countervailing
11
12 effects may have washed out in the models. As with silent racial socialization, then, it will be
13
14 important in future research to better capture the intent of messages about exposure to diversity
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16 and whether they involve acknowledging the existence and injustice of racism. Gathering data
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18 about parents' ERS goals (e.g., children's attitudinal, behavioral, or affective change) can help
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20 provide clarity.
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25 26 *Anti-racism socialization*

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28 We find that, as expected, anti-racism socialization is negatively related to conservative
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30 ideology and Republican party affiliation. This result is consistent with findings from the Pew
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32 Research Center (2020) that white Democrats in 2020 were more likely to acknowledge
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34 structural racism than other whites. It is also consistent with historical precedence that anti-racist
35
36 projects were more commonly engaged in by liberals than conservatives (see: Black Panthers,
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38 Black Lives Matter, By Any Means Necessary, Showing Up for Racial Justice, Anti-Racist
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40 Action Network [Alkebulan 2007; Clay et al. 2023; Crass 2013; Cullors 2018; Moore and Tracy
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42 2020]).
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48 Our findings on anti-racism socialization also illustrate complicated messaging in white
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50 families, however. Anti-racism socialization is highly correlated to the promotion of mistrust,
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52 indicating that the two may be delivered together. The fact that these seemingly opposing
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54 messages are being communicated within the same family seems to indicate a larger pattern with
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56 white parents - they mean well but may not be succeeding at the anti-racism in which they
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4 believe themselves to be engaging. This possibility is consistent with the literature suggesting
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6 white parents who engage in anti-racist socialization struggle with various tensions and conflicts
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8 (Heberle et al. 2021). Some white parents, whether liberal or conservative, appear to have good
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10 intentions (i.e., developing an anti-racist political consciousness in their children), but their goal
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12 is complicated by the promotion of mistrust messaging.
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16 Further investigation is needed to better uncover the content, quality, and intent of anti-
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18 racist messaging in particular. We need to expand the quantitative measurement of anti-racism
19
20 socialization to capture the various messages parents may share - for example, about how to be
21
22 an ally and how to divest from white privilege. Furthermore, whether quantitatively or
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24 qualitatively, we need to explore the extent to which parents' anti-racism messaging includes or
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26 co-occurs with talk of specific political issues, political parties, or politicians. It could also be
27
28 helpful to assess whether and how parents' tensions and conflicts associated with anti-racism
29
30 socialization relate to children's experience and processing of that socialization, potentially
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32 moderating its relation to political attitudes. It could also be helpful to model together parents'
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34 ERS goals and strategies to assess for alignment and its impact. It is not clear, for example, if
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36 white liberal and conservative parents have the same intent behind their anti-racist socialization
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38 messages. However, suppose it is true that both liberals and conservatives alike want a less
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40 racist, non-racist, or anti-racist future. In that case, we need to explore how racial attitudes are
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42 socialized within the home, and how those attitudes may differ across the political spectrum.
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44 This is crucial, as anti-racist messaging is a primary site of racial attitude creation, replication,
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46 and subversion.
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55 In summary, these findings reveal that childhood ERS is related to young adult political
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57 attitudes but in nuanced and varied ways. The distinct patterns observed for each ERS strategy
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4 demand from future researchers a deeper exploration of how these socialization practices relate
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6 to the development of political beliefs and identities.
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9 *Limitations and Future Directions*

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11 Some limitations of note are the cross-sectional and retrospective nature of the data.
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14 There may be inaccuracies in participants' memories when asked to reflect on childhood
15
16 experiences. Additionally, given the data being collected at a single point in time, it is impossible
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18 to identify causal relations. While our strength lies in the comprehensive measurement of the
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20 types of perceived socialization by parents, we did not collect information from other socializing
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22 agents (e.g., religious institution, peers, school, media). Another limitation is that we combined
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24 race and ethnicity; we did not tease apart a white racial identity from a white ethnic identity.
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29 Future research could collect longitudinal and prospective data to explore causal relations
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31 in ERS strategies and political attitudes. Additionally, future research could explore other
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33 socializing agents and their role in the processing of parental socialization messages. We suggest
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35 refinement of the quantitative measures of ERS, particularly those for egalitarianism, mainstream
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37 socialization, silent racial socialization, and exposure to diversity to better capture the nuances of
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39 the messages in white families across the political spectrum. Additionally, future researchers
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41 could examine how parental political ideology influences selection of ERS strategies they utilize
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43 with their children. Finally, we suggest employing qualitative methods to explore how different
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45 ERS strategies contribute to young adult political attitudes. Specifically, we suggest in-depth
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47 interviews with young white adults to better ascertain the meanings they ascribe to various ERS
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49 strategies they experienced growing up, as well as their perceptions on the relations between
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51 ERS strategies and political attitudes.
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4 The ERS strategies we are seeing in white families are clearly complicated. It is certainly
5
6 not as simple as labeling one portion of the political spectrum more or less racist. Moving
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8 forward, we urge researchers to explore the content and intent of ERS messaging. Further, we
9
10 recognize that racial attitudes have real political implications. Because attitudes translate to
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12 positions on policy matters, we note the need to explore perspectives on other specific social and
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14 political matters (e.g., voting rights, affirmative action policies, immigration attitudes, Far Right
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16 support).
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24 **FUNDING STATEMENT**

25
26 The data collection was supported by a grant from the CLASS Excellence Fund from University
27
28 of Idaho. The analysis was supported by a grant from the Academic Senate, University of
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30 California at Riverside.
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36 **COMPETING INTERESTS**

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38 The authors have no competing interests to declare.
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Table 1: Means and standard deviations of perceived ethnic-racial socialization and participant characteristics

	Mean (SD)	Min	Max
Cultural socialization	2.71 (1.02)	1	5
Promotion of mistrust	2.04 (1.15)	1	5
Preparation for bias	2.46 (1.01)	1	5
Egalitarianism	2.59 (.96)	1	5
Mainstream socialization	2.64 (1.00)	1	5
Anti-racism socialization	2.50 (1.16)	1	5
Silent racial socialization	1.93 (1.00)	1	5
Exposure to diversity	2.66 (1.12)	1	5
Conservative ideology	3.98 (1.76)	1	7
Republican party affiliation	4.05 (1.84)	1	7
Evangelical	1.24 (.43)	1	2
Education	3.64 (.96)	1	6

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Table 2: Correlations between perceived ethnic-racial socialization and political attitudes

	Con	Rep. aff.	CS	PB	PM	Eg	MS	SR	ED	AR	Evan g
Con.	1										
Rep. aff.	0.712*	1									
CS	.188**	0.092*	1								
PB	0.161*	.067*	0.686*	1							
PM	.043	-.056	0.372*	0.525*	1						
Eg	0.17*	0.078*	0.523*	0.546*	.428*	1					
MS	.071*	0.034	0.405*	0.447*	0.352*	0.608*	1				
SR	0.025	-0.08*	0.32*	0.42*	0.635*	0.442*	0.46*	1			
ED	-0.002	-0.061	0.453*	0.441*	0.128*	0.456*	0.36*	0.228*	1		
AR	-0.084*	-.144*	0.433*	0.491*	0.293*	0.419*	0.376*	0.346*	0.66*	1	
Evang	.22*	.168*	0.103*	0.112*	0.082*	0.134*	0.079*	0.143*	0.079*	0.121*	1

* p < .05

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Table 2: Correlations between perceived ethnic-racial socialization and political attitudes

Con	Rep. aff.	CS	PB	PM	Eg	MS	SR	ED	AR	Evan g
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Con. = conservative ideology, Rep aff. = Republican affiliation, CS = cultural socialization, PB = Prep for bias, PM = promotion of mistrust, Eg = egalitarian socialization, MS =mainstream socialization, SR = silent racial socialization, ED = exposure to diversity, AR = anti-racism, Evang = evangelical

Table 3: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of perceived ERS on political attitudes (standardized coefficients)

	Conservative ideology	Republican party affiliation
Cultural socialization	0.124**	0.074+
Preparation for bias	0.112*	0.11*
Promotion of mistrust	-0.055	-0.091*
Egalitarianism socialization	0.147***	0.097*
Mainstream socialization	-0.04	0.027
Silent racial socialization	-0.053	-0.115**
Exposure to diversity	-0.055	-0.074+
Anti-racism socialization	-0.165***	-0.157***
Female	-0.104***	-0.078*
Non-binary gender	-.103***	-.073*
Catholic	-0.058	-.054
Other Christian	-.012	.011
Non-Christian	-0.103*	-.124**
Secular	-.329***	-.315***
Evangelical	0.137***	.102***
Ed. level	-0.088*	-.087*
R squared	0.253	0.212

+ p < .10 * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001

APPENDIX A. Measurement of Ethnic-Racial Socialization

Common prompt: When you were growing up, how often did your parent(s):

Cultural socialization (adopted from Hughes and Chen 1999; Tran and Lee 2010)

Teach you about important people or events in the history of your racial/ethnic group?

Teach you about the traditions and customs of your racial/ethnic group?

Encourage you to read material (books, online articles) about your own racial/ethnic group?

Encourage you to be proud of your racial/ethnic group?

Encourage you to attend cultural events of your racial/ethnic group (e.g., parades, festivals, plays, etc.)?

Preparation for bias (adopted from Hughes and Chen 1999; Tran and Lee 2010)

Speak with you about stereotypes, prejudice, and/or discrimination against people of your racial/ethnic group?

Speak with you about other people who may try to limit you because of your race/ethnicity?

Speak with you about unfair treatment people experience because of their race and ethnicity?

Speak with you about how your race/ethnicity might affect how others view your abilities?

Tell you that you must be better in order to get the same rewards given to others because of your race/ethnicity?

Promotion of mistrust (adopted from Hughes and Chen 1999; Tran and Lee 2010)

Tell you to avoid other racial/ethnic groups because of their members' prejudice against your racial/ethnic group?

Do or say things that encouraged you to keep a distance from people belonging to other racial/ethnic groups?

Do or say things to keep you from trusting members from other racial/ethnic groups?

Egalitarianism socialization (adopted from Langrehr, Thomas, and Morgan 2016)

Tell you that your race will not really affect your success at life?

Tell you that racism and discrimination will not be the hardest things for you to face?

Tell you that American society is fair to all races?

Tell you that if you try hard, you can overcome racism?

Tell you that you can succeed just as easily as someone else from another race?

Tell you that all races are considered equal?

Mainstream socialization (adopted from Rollins 2019)

Tell you that highlighting racial or ethnic differences is bad?

Tell you that a person's individual characteristics are more important than the characteristics of the group(s) to which they belong?

Tell you to avoid discussions of race, racism, or discrimination?

Tell you that since society is now multicultural, we should not focus on the issues of specific racial/ethnic groups?

Silent racial socialization (adopted from Keum and Ahn 2021)

Dismiss your experience of race?

Discourage conversations about race in the United States?

Discourage you from exploring your racial heritage?

Avoid discussing their own racial experiences with you?

Tell you to avoid talking about race with other people?

Exposure to diversity

Encourage you to visit neighborhoods where people of color live?

Encourage you to be friends with people from other racial- ethnic groups?

Encourage you to date people from other racial-ethnic groups?

Encourage you to participate in activities that emphasize the cultural heritage of people from other racial-ethnic groups (e.g., museum exhibits, cultural festivals, plays, movies, etc.)?

Anti-racism socialization

Speak with you about how white people have an advantage in life because of their race?

Speak with you about injustices experienced by communities of color (e.g., police brutality)?

Speak with you about famous racial incidents like the Ferguson riots?

Response to Reviewers' Comments

Reviewer #1:

I thought "Ethnic-Racial Socialization in White American Families and Young Adult Political Attitudes" was well-written and made an interesting contribution to the literature on the relationship between parent-child racial socialization in white families and the development of political attitudes. While a very strong draft, I would like to see the author(s) address the following suggestions/comments before publishing.

Suggestions/Comments

Introduction

- * It isn't clear in your introduction if you are referring to parent-child racial socialization or racial socialization within the broader family (inclusive of siblings, grandparents, etc). I would like to see you include a statement in your introduction precisely what you "white families" and if it's not possible for you to be more precise due to your survey questions, then I think that is important to acknowledge too.
- * **We added clarification to the abstract and introduction that our focus is on socialization by parents and not other family members. We also clarified that “white” in our study is determined by participants’ labeling of themselves and their parents as white.**
- * I would also make sure to note at the end of your introduction that you are the relationship between WRS and white young adults' political attitudes based on participants' memories or recollection of the ERS practices of their parents/family members. You make this point clearly on page 9 (in the Measures subsection) but it bears stating in the introduction as well.
- * **We added this clarification in the introduction section. Also, throughout the paper we reference “perceived socialization” to clarify our reliance on perceptions of childhood experiences.**

Background

* Your subsection on Ethnic Racial Socialization is strong; you did an excellent job articulating how ERS varies between families of color and white families. That said, I think you need to dig a little deeper in your discussion of antiracist socialization (p. 7). The term "antiracist" is being bandied about a lot these days, but few scholars offer a definition of what that means, or more importantly what it entails. I would examine the following articles (several of which you already cite) for a definition and examples of antiracist parenting practices among white parents:

o Amy E. Heberle, Noah Hoch, Anna C. Wagner, Reihonna L. Frost & Melissa H. Manley (2021) "SHE IS SUCH A SPONGE AND I WANT TO GET IT RIGHT": TENSIONS, FAILURES, AND HOPE IN WHITE PARENTS' ASPIRATIONS TO ENACT ANTI-RACIST PARENTING WITH THEIR YOUNG WHITE CHILDREN, *Research in Human Development*, 18:1-2, 75-104, DOI: 10.1080/15427609.2021.1926869

o Hagerman, Margaret A. 2017. "White Racial Socialization: Progressive Fathers on Raising 'Antiracist' Children." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 79(1):60-74.

o Underhill, Megan R and Lauren Simms. 2022. "Parents of the White Awakening." *Contexts*. **Thank you for the suggestion. We added more examples of anti-racist socialization and cited the recommended works. We clarified that our focus is on anti-racism socialization messages about systemic racism because that is what our measure captures. In the section that follows in the paper, we highlight how outcomes can vary by socialization strategy - not all strategies cultivate anti-racism, even when anti-racism may be parents' goal.**

* I'm curious as to why you chose "mainstream" socialization as a measure rather than "color-blind" socialization? How is mainstream socialization distinct (and from your perspective, superior) to color-blind socialization? Additionally, it reads as if "mainstream socialization" is a product of white norms/beliefs. Is that an accurate assessment? If so, I think you need to include a brief discussion of this association.

* **We focus on mainstream socialization for three reasons. First, the construct is examined in prior work on families of color and our goal is to measure in white families all the strategies previously measured with families of color. In the research on families of color, mainstream socialization reflects parents' effort to teach their kids white ways so they can succeed in a society that is structured by and for white people. Our measure focuses on messages about the white cultural value of individualism and messages downplaying group identity and issues. As we articulate in the paper, we anticipate that mainstream socialization in white kids may not operate the same way as for kids of color.**

* **Second, prior research has shown that multiple socialization strategies may reflect colorblindism either in terms of parents' underlying attitudes and motivations or in children's outcomes. Thus, we do not view mainstream socialization as a superior measure, but we wanted to distinguish it from other strategies identified in prior literature.**

* **Third, most of the research on colorblind socialization as a strategy is qualitative. In this prior work scholars tend to categorize different socialization messages/actions together when they reflect an underlying colorblind ideology. This is a reasonable approach. However, we did not identify a quantitative measure of colorblind socialization, especially one that did not overlap with other measures, including mainstream socialization, egalitarianism socialization, and silent racial socialization. Furthermore, as expressed above, our effort was to capture all the different strategies that have been identified in prior literature, especially with families of color. Thus, we erred on the side of discrete measures rather than on the side of umbrella measures.**

* **We view mainstream socialization as messages about the white culture underlying the way things run in society. We do not mean to convey that white culture causes mainstream socialization. We modified the text to clarify that mainstream is white. We also clarified the way this measure has been examined in prior literature on families of color to better contrast it with the way it might operate in families of color. Finally, we**

added text to clarify our connection between mainstream socialization and colorblindism. Is it possible that mainstream socialization, silence about race, and egalitarian might all tap into a form of colorblind socialization, but we attempt to the specific dimensions covered in past research.

Discussion

o There are a few instances in your discussion section where the authors note that future researchers should "attend for differences in ____socialization messages" (p. 17 for example where you discuss silent socialization and exposure to diversity, and again on page 18 where you discuss antiracist socialization). I appreciate these statements. However, I think it would be even more helpful if you could provide the reader (and potential future researcher) with an idea of how they might do that—what question(s) or methods might they employ to better attend to differences in WRS messages?

We added specific suggestions in these areas.

Best of luck with your revisions! I look forward to seeing your article in print (and citing it in my own work down the road).

Thank you.

Reviewer #2:

In the manuscript "Ethnic-Racial Socialization in White American Families and Young Adult Political Attitudes," the authors are interested in examining how ERS is associated with white Americans political views. They do so by conducting a Qualtrics survey with nearly 1,000 white Americans, including measures of ERS as well as measures of ideology and partisanship. The manuscript has potential to make an impact on the literature regarding racial socialization with significant revision to clarify the authors' theoretical contribution and methodological/measurement decisions. I discuss these suggestions in more detail below.

With respect to the front end of the paper, the authors include a thorough literature review. I would recommend they streamline this overview and more explicitly center the literature that is relevant to this project - i.e., briefly summarize what holes exist in the literature, how ERS is tied to political views, how you expect the existing literature ties into our current political moment, your theoretical argument and contribution, etc. The roots of a lot of this are here already, but they could be made clearer in a more focused narrative (e.g., streamlining the two lit review sections into one) and revised to put forth the authors' argument and contribution more clearly. **Thank you. We streamlined the front end of the paper. We added explicit statements about what holes exist in the literature. We also more clearly connected ERS strategies to the current political moment. We also wish to highlight for the reviewer the first paragraph of the paper which describes current events and their relation to this study.**

H3 and H4 read as somewhat conflicting to me. I'd like to get a better sense from the author of why they view one as not having an obvious direction, but the other as being directional. Put differently, what exactly is the difference between "diversity socialization" and "anti-racism socialization"? I can see how they have the potential to be distinct, but also could imagine that they are highly correlated concepts. Perhaps part of this is related to the fact that the concepts and measures are not really fleshed out at this point in the manuscript (a point to which I return later in my comments).

We added more discussion about what anti-racist socialization can look like and how it differs from exposure to diversity. We discuss two ways in which we think the measures differ from each other, and identify why these dimensions likely connect to political attitudes.

Also with respect to measurement, I wondered where the authors' measures of ideology and partisanship were drawn from. They are not standard measures used in the ANES or CCES, as far as I can tell. It would be useful to know where these items came from in the political science literature and why they were selected over more traditional question wordings. This might help to make sense of the patterns of findings and non-findings the authors uncover.

The measures are based on those from the General Social Survey, a well-established national survey of American attitudes. We added this detail to the manuscript.

In the results section it would be helpful for the reader to not only state the pattern of results but also to add some discussion or reflection on these patterns. I was left wondering what it means that certain components of ERS are associated with political outcomes but not others? For example, in the case of H1, what does it mean that "cultural socialization" is associated with

White conservatism but not partisanship, whereas "preparation for bias" and "promotion of mistrust" are associated with both conservatism and Republican party identification? Again, it feels like these concepts have still not been really fleshed out for those who are not already quite intimate with the ERS even at this stage of the paper.

Overall, the results section is quite brief and reads very quickly, so it would be helpful for the author to do some more handholding for the reader to help make sense of the patterns uncovered and the substantive significance of the effects. One suggestion might be incorporating some of the discussion section into the methods section, and then refocusing the concluding section on a brief recap and then the bigger picture takeaways and future directions for research.

We added more clarification about what the results mean, as well as more discussion about the overall patterns of findings. We also added more discussion about the patterns of findings.

A few points with respect to the authors' analytical decisions: Why are some standard sociodemographic factors - like income, education, and region - excluded from the models? Similarly, it would be helpful to know how the authors imagine ERS to work in conjunction with or against other factors that are more commonly examined with respect to political socialization. It is not clear from the present manuscript whether the authors view ERS as being especially powerful for influencing socialization, or if it is just one of many other factors that have been examined in the literature (e.g., neighborhood demographic characteristics, parents' political views)? If any other measures were included in your data collection, it would be helpful to clarify that and include those measures in your models to show how robust the effects of ERS are.

Education level is included as a covariate. We realized we mentioned it in the analysis section, but not the measures section. So in this revision we added a description of it to the measures section. Also, in preliminary analyses we explored age and region of residence as covariates, but since they were not statistically significant and we had no hypotheses about them, we did not include them in final analyses in the interest of parsimony. We added info to the manuscript to document this. We did not have income data and so relied on education as the indicator of socioeconomic status. We chose not to collect data on income given the relative youth of the sample. The variable wouldn't yield sufficient variation to be a meaningful measure of SES. Thus, we chose education instead.

Our focus in this paper was on ERS and whether it related to the outcomes. Political attitudes are an understudied outcome of ERS. Our study found that ERS was related to political attitudes, and our models explained one fourth to one fifth of the variance in the outcomes. That is our contribution. While we are aware that other factors may relate to political attitudes, we make no claims about ERS' importance relative to them. Our goal was to assess whether ERS was related at all and if so, how. We added to the front end of the paper that one of our key contributions was exploring political attitudes as an outcome – that is, the relation of ERS to political attitudes. We also added to the last part of the discussion section a statement about the findings of the role of ERS.

In the paper's section on ERS and Political Attitudes, we describe various pathways to political attitudes based on prior literature on ERS and political attitudes. This description

includes info on how ethnic-racial socialization works in conjunction with other factors, such as ethnic identity, fear, and colorblindism, to relate to political attitudes.

Smaller points and questions:

Is there a theoretical reason that the sample was balanced based on geographical reason? That is, do you plan to examine regional effects? As it stands, geography is excluded from the main OLS models.

We balanced the sample on geographic region to ensure representation from all the regions of the country. While we cannot claim our sample is nationally representative (we did not have funds for that), we can claim a national sample, balanced on region. In preliminary analyses, we explored region as a control variable, but it was not statistically significant. So, in the interest of parsimony, we did not include it in the final model. We added this info to the manuscript.

I would recommend signaling in-text that the appendix includes detailed measures from ERS. There is only a preview given on page 10, which is appropriate for the manuscript but I don't see an in-text reference to the appendix so I was not sure if it would be there or not.

We added to the methods/measures section an in-text reference to the appendix.

Why include "other political party" option on the partisanship question if this data was just going to be dropped? (And how many people fell into this category?)

The original measure of party affiliation includes the category of other party. We wanted to be consistent with the original measure and to preserve flexibility for other analyses in which other party might be relevant. This paper is one of many we are working on with this dataset; some focus on ERS while other focus on other topics. For this paper other party was not relevant and resulted only in the loss of 50 cases out of nearly 1,000. Our understanding of this measure is that our treatment of other party (i.e., dropping the cases) is common when the focus of analysis is on mainstream political attitudes. Additionally, given the current political climate, "other party" might not reflect a middle/neutral category. Rather, it might reflect people with far-right and far-left political affiliations. Thus, dropping it makes it consistent with the ordinal ranking structure of Democrat to Republican.

To editor:

Overall, we addressed each suggestion made by the reviewers. Because Reviewer 2 recommended some changes that would have been in conflict with Reviewer 1's comments (e.g., cutting down the literature review, incorporating some of the discussion section into the methodology), we attempted to provide a balanced response to the two reviewer's comments. We added clarity and depth of discussion when appropriate, and streamlined sections when needed. In particular, we cut unnecessary discussion out of the literature review section, and clarified some portions. We also identified the overall patterns of findings and clarified the meaning of the results. We think this is an improved paper - one that addresses the reviewers suggestions - and we look forward to your response!