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The Evolving Role of Organizational Theory within Economic Sociology*

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Abstract

Organizational theory was one of the roots of the "new" economic sociology. In recent years, a set of complementary research programs have come to the fore that fill in our understanding of the social structuring of markets. These include an interest in the role of conventions and commensuration, market devices, the performativity of economics, and the role of morality in the construction of markets. These other interests have come to enrich our conceptions of the ways in which "the social" structures market activities. While this has de-centered some of the focus on organizations, there are still active research programs pushing forward new ideas that are focused on organizations, institutions, and networks in economic sociology. We discuss some of the recent work on organizational logics, inter- and intra-organizational networks, and social movements and organization. We note there has also been some hybridity as scholars borrow from each other's toolkits in order to deepen our knowledge of the way the economy works. Organizational theory remains a main theoretical mainstay of economic sociology, but it has now been joined by additional perspectives.

Introduction

The study of organizations in the postwar era has focused on all kinds of organizations including government and non-profit organizations as well as corporations. But, there was always a part of organizational theory that focused on firms, especially the work of the Carnegie School (March and Simon, 1957; Cyert and March 1963) and contingencies theory (Thompson, 1967; for a review of pre-1980s theories in organizations, see Haveman and Wetts, 2019). These schools of thought were interested in how to explain firm strategies and structures and the ability of managers to change their firms in response to new challenges in their environments. When the field of economic sociology began to emerge in the 1980s, organizational theories were one natural source of ideas for how to study the economy. The two fields remained closely integrated until the development of distinctly different research programs in economic sociology beginning in the 1990s.

A research program can be considered a group of scholars who share theoretical assumptions which have a set of core ideas that are not easily susceptible to testing or revision. Indeed, adherence to these principles helps researchers define the nature of the research object and the methods to study it. This explains why scholars who belong to particular research programs tend not to take scholars in other research programs into account in their scholarly practice. While research programs can be elaborated in the face of empirical work, their core ideas cannot change without the breakdown of the program (Lakatos, 1970). In the case of economic sociology, research programs developed around an interest in markets and morality (Zelizer, 1978; 1994); the performativity of economics (Callon, 1998) and market devices (Muniesa, et. al., 2007); and conventions (Biggart and Beamish, 2003) and commensuration

(Espeland and Stephens, 1998). Each of these programs began with a different set of core theoretical assumptions which differed from the earlier work that had started with firms as the central actors who structured markets. These research programs meant a turn away from organizations and towards the social structuring of markets as it manifests itself in physical objects, cultural schemas, and different conceptions of the relations between firms, products, and consumers (Aspers, et. al. 2015).[1]

There is still a great deal of economic sociology that concerns itself with organizations as part of how to study market processes. Institutional theory and network analysis are two branches of organizational theory that have been particularly influential in economic sociology. They form somewhat distinct research programs, though there have been scholars who have drawn from both traditions. Institutional theory has propagated several new research programs since 1990. A large and voluminous literature specifies how markets are structured by organizational logics and embedded in firms and organizational fields (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). The study of the link between states and markets continues to focus on corporations. Within institutional theory, there is a large body of work on social movements and markets where scholars observe connections between social movements and the activities of corporations (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012; King and Pearce, 2010). Social movements can have a direct impact on corporate behavior by organizing to force corporations to change. More provocatively, the creation of new markets is sometimes itself seen as a social movement.[2] Network analysis remains one of the critical tools of organizational sociology as well. It continues to be used to study both inter-and intra-organizational processes including interest in interlocking directorates (Chu and Davis, 2016; Benton, 2016), alliances and joint ventures (Powell, Koput, White, and

Owen-Smith, 2005), and hiring and promotion practices in firms (Fernandez and Galperin, 2014).

In this article, we provide both a historical and conceptual dimension to our discussion about the relationship between organizational studies and economic sociology. We begin by focusing on the roots of economic sociology in two branches of organizational theory, institutional theory and network analysis. As already noted, these perspectives still dominate many discussions in economic sociology. We consider how these originating ideas still resonate with current research that focuses on the role of organizations and networks in economic processes.

Then, we move on to discuss how research programs that began to develop in the 1990s provided different ways to think about social structures in markets. Markets and morality, performativity of economics and market devices, and conventions and commensuration are significant theoretical frameworks that have grown in popularity in economic sociology in recent years. These understandings enrich and deepen the ways in which social structures and commonly held understandings evolve in and around markets. But instead of seeing organizations as central to understanding the functions of the market, they argue for the primacy of mechanisms by which actors within and across organizations come to understand and structure market interactions (Aspers, et. al., 2015).

All of these research programs have scholars who are working firmly within the bounds of those ideas. However, one can also think of these research programs as complementary and not contradictory. Some scholars have explicitly combined elements of organizational theories with elements of newer research programs (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; Sauder and Espeland, 2009). With the proliferation of research programs, it is certainly the case that organizational theory has been supplemented by other approaches in economic sociology, but it remains a focus of much economic sociological work.[3]

Institutional Theory: Neo-Institutional Theory and Institutional Logics

While organizations can be institutions and vice versa, the two categories differ in crucial ways. Many of these differences have been key to the development of institutional theory. Organizations take the form of groups of individuals bounded by membership rules whereas institutions can be more diverse, taking the form of a set of formal rules or informal social customs or even physical objects, places, or symbols (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Institutions tend to be long-lived and are embodied by states, religions, and cultures that have influence across generations (Bourdieu, 1985). The so-called "old" institutional theory recognized organizations as a site of institutionalization, leading to an integration of the two (Selznick, 1949). "New" institutional theory draws on Berger and Luckmann (1966) for its theory of institutions (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). For the new institutional theory, much of the process of institutionalization takes place in organizational fields, arenas where organizations take one another as a reference group (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). Markets, in the "new" institutional tradition, can become institutionalized when their long-term stability is in the interests of participants who learn to compete under a common set of understandings (Fligstein, 2001).

New institutional theory is traced to the publication of two articles. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that institutional structures and processes inevitably decouple from their formal institutional rules in and across organizations. Even as this decoupling occurs, institutional rules continue to function as myths, preserving the confidence and integrity of actors in and around organizations. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) are interested in how sets of organizations orient their actions towards one another within organizational fields. These fields become homogenous with respect to common understandings about what is going on and how things are to be done. They posit that there are three types of mechanisms that produce institutional isomorphism: mimetic (organizations mimic other organizations they perceive as successful), normative (organizations conform to the recommendations and expectations of external actors, sometimes professionals, who explain what is normative), and coercive (governments or other actors enforce rules or laws to produce conformity). These represent different mechanisms through which organizations converge in their structures or behaviors to form an institutionalized field.

Scholars early on recognized that this approach stressed a theory of how stable organizational fields with conforming organizations come into existence. But, this perspective lacked any way to account for how such fields might change. One strand of institutional theory proposed to use the idea of conflicting institutional logics as a basis for a theory of change (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Haveman and Gualtieri, 2019). Logics imply that there is a cultural set of understandings that help define how a particular organizational field works, what actions make sense for actors, and what rules govern interaction both formally and informally. Scholars have posited that there is always a certain amount of contention amongst actors as to the nature of the logic being deployed. These conflicts can lead to new understandings of the way a field works (Friedland and Alford, 1991). The conflict between logics is particularly observable at the formation of an organizational field. But, such conflicts can also reflect the normal jockeying going on in a stable field. Field crises can precipitate the alteration of a logic or the creation of an entirely new and novel logic. Empirical studies have found that once a particular logic becomes dominant in an organizational field, the goals and strategies of the firms in the field tend to conform (Dobbin and Dowd, 1997, 2000; Haveman and Rao 1997; Thornton and Ocasio 1999).

Fligstein (1990; 2001) and Dobbin (1994), among others, have used institutional theory to demonstrate the importance of how states and markets are co-constituted by both formal processes of rule-making but also informal logics constructed at the market level by organizations. In the U.S., large corporations rose to dominant positions as the leaders of firms constructed new logics of action in response to challenges by competitors and the government. But, links to the state always played a role in either prompting such changes or ratifying the evolution of new logics of action, what Fligstein (1990) calls "conceptions of control". Similarly, railroad policy in the U.S., U.K., and France took distinctly different forms based on how the respective nation's cultural inheritance influenced their perception of market problems (Dobbin, 1994). This, in turn, shaped the formation of institutions and consequently the public policies governing the railroads.

Recently, another variety of institutional theory has developed in organizational analysis. While much of economic sociology focuses on the stabilizing aspects of markets and the diffusion of common understandings, the social movement perspective emphasizes the role that contentiousness plays in bringing institutional change and innovation to markets (King and Pearce, 2010; Davis, McAdam, and Scott, 2005). One way that new logics can come into emerging or established organizational fields is through the actions of social movements. Markets are inherently political, both because of their ties to the regulatory functions of the state and because markets are contested by actors outside of markets who are dissatisfied with market outcomes (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). Research in this area focuses on the pathways to market change pursued by social movements, including direct challenges to corporations (Kluttz, 2019), the institutionalization of systems of private regulation (Bartley, 2007), and the creation of new market categories through institutional entrepreneurship on the part of firms (Haveman, et. al, 1997). The social movement perspective on organizations and markets brings together concerns about the emergence and creation of new logics of action, the linkages between states, politics, and markets, and the active contentiousness of actors to contest the structures of existing social spaces.

Network Analysis and the Problem of Embeddedness

Social network analysis is the process of investigating social structures by examining the network of relationships between actors. It characterizes networked structures in terms of nodes (individual actors, people, organizations, or things within the network) and the ties, edges, or links (relationships or interactions) that connect them (Wellman, 1988). Examples of social structures and processes commonly used in social network analysis include friendship and acquaintance networks, business networks, collaboration patterns amongst different kinds of actors, kinship networks, and diffusion processes including disease transmission (for a review, see Smith-Doerr and Powell, 2004). These networks are often visualized through sociograms in which nodes are represented as points and ties are represented as lines. These visualizations provide a means of making sense of the connectedness of social life by showing the link between nodes and ties to reflect attributes of interest.

The meaning of these visualizations depends on the content of the social relations under examination. This flexibility of network analysis has made it a powerful tool in studying a great many organizational and economic processes in a wide variety of contexts. Its use in organizational and economic sociology is widespread. Networks are used in organizational analysis to specify the linkages between organizations and how it affects their performance. It is also used to understand the internal informal social structure by which people are recruited, promoted, and build careers in organizations.

In his seminal article, Granovetter argued for what he called the "embeddedness of social life" (1985). He highlighted that networks in the economy frequently reflected the creation of trust whereby people or organizations who had multiple interactions developed trust that allowed them to interact without fear of malfeasance. Research on industries such as construction (Eccles, 1981), women's clothing (Uzzi, 1996), music (Faulkner, 1983) and the film industry (Faulkner and Anderson (1987) rely on stable and enduring networks based on loyalty and friendship which aid in producing trust.

There has been controversy about Granovetter's expropriation of the term embeddedness from Karl Polanyi. Polanyi used the idea of embeddedness to describe how the eighteenth-century English market society had become detached from the social relations that had, until that point, governed economic exchanges (2001 [1957]). He saw capitalism as fundamentally disembedding actors by forcing them into market relations. Granovetter's use of the term implies that there was not a disappearance of social embedding in capitalism but a change in the types of social relationships and ties that existed. Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) argue that Granovetter's definition of embeddedness is limited to social ties while Polanyi's concerns political embeddedness (1990). They propose two other varieties of embeddedness relevant to economic life— cultural and cognitive. The two authors associate the organizational perspective more closely with Granovetter and the political-economic perspective with Polanyi. Krippner and Alvarez (2007) mostly agree with Zukin and DiMaggio's distinction. They argue that these two perspectives utilize an identical term to different ends. While Granovetter's embeddedness is interested in building from individual and organization-level interactions to broader economic trends, Polanyi's embeddedness is more concerned with how economic systems interact with economic ideas, the state, politics, social classes, and the law.

While trust is one possible understanding of networks, scholars have invested a great deal of time using network analysis to the various ways that networks can index information, power, and coalitions (for a review see Smith-Doerr and Powell, 2005). Granovetter's "The Strength of Weak Ties" (1973) presented a case that networks containing a significant number of weak ties were more effective for gathering information about job-seeking. White's theory of markets proposed that markets are networks whereby information is communicated across firms to produce "self-reproducing social structures" where actors "evolve roles from observations of each other's behavior" (1981, p. 517). Markets, according to White's thesis, arise from the conscious effort of firms to observe one another and to choose what quantity and quality of goods to produce on the basis of trying to avoid directly competing with too many other firms.

Networks can be used as a source of power whereby one organization has control over information, vital resources, or ownership of another. This resource dependence has been shown to affect organizational structures, actions, and performance (Burt, 1992). To reduce vulnerability and uncertainty and so stabilize operations and improve performance, organizations create strategic alliances, joint ventures, and director interlocks (for a review, see Davis & Cobb, 2010). Studies have shown how network ties centered on organizations explain strategic alliances and joint ventures and supplier/buyer ties (Baker, 1990; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Uzzi, 1997). Baker's study (1990) of relationships between investment banks and corporations found support for a power interpretation of networks by showing how resource dependence structures who transacts with whom. Among listed firms in China, political embeddedness has been shown to improve firm performance by increasing access to bank loans and assuaging the interests of controlling shareholders (Haveman, Jia, Shi, Wang, 2017). Ties to powerful firms may not always have positive effects. They can make firms vulnerable to shocks, require time and resources to maintain, and insulate firms from outside information (Uzzi, 1997). But ties to powerful partners also create the potential for appropriation and coercion (Katila, Rosenberger, and Eisenhardt, 2008).

It may also be the case that the network within a single industry might capture many of these dynamics. A study of the life sciences industry finds four different "logics of attachment" in inter-organizational collaboration (Powell, Koput, White, and Owen-Smith, 2005). These include what they call "accumulative advantage", when the most connected organizations continue to accrue the most ties, "homophily", when ties between organizations are formed based on existing similarities, "follow-the-trend", when organizations form ties to imitate dominant actors or ideas, and multiconnectivity", when organizations form ties in order to foster greater network diversity (2005, p. 1140). Here, networks form and break as firms react to changing circumstance to form new groups based on sharing information, knowledge, finance, and commercialization of products.

Theory Outside of Organizations: Markets and Morality, Performativity, Conventions and Commensuration

Institutional and network theory are concerned with understanding how the relations between firms and their understandings of those relationships in a market allow them to form markets, enact new strategies and change their structures, control competition, and aid in their success. But, in the 1990s, a different set of concerns about market processes began to interest scholars with theoretical frameworks that originated outside of organizational theory. Some economic sociologists wanted to understand more about the actual social structuring of markets in terms of how they allowed producers and consumers to interact. These scholars started with different theoretical positions and began to explore the role of culture, conventions, economic and financial models and theories, and the non-human market devices that help to structure market interactions. These theoretical starting points were mostly different than those which centered on institutional theory or network analysis. These differing starting points made for three different research programs: (1) markets and morality, (2) conventions and commensuration and (3) the performativity of economics and market devices.

The markets and morality tradition in economic sociology recognizes that individuals have moral commitments that determine their economic actions. These are often in opposition to their rational self-interests (Fourcade and Healy, 2007).[4] Aspects of this tradition can be traced to earlier theoretical work by Emile Durkheim and Ferdinand Tönnies which distinguished between social life governed by personal interactions and relations as opposed to social life structured by impersonal mediators, such as markets (Durkheim, 2014; Tönnies, 2001).

In her study of life insurance in the U.S., Zelizer (1978) demonstrated that the early industry ran into a problem of perception. People thought life insurance was ghoulish as it essentially was a bet on someone losing their life. The industry had to work within the boundaries of existing social conventions to convince their customers to purchase life insurance. They did so by convincing people that such policies were in fact morally upright as they provided money for their loved ones after death. This re-framing of life insurance helped the market succeed and expand. Zelizer went on to elaborate how societies establish guidelines on market mediation in other intimate spheres of life, including the valuation of children, the social meaning of money, and the role of economic processes in close personal relationships (1985; 1994; 2005). Zelizer promoted the idea that while sociology often starts with the idea that markets and conventional morality are directly opposed, she suggests that markets and moral boundaries shift and recombine over time, producing solutions that reflected complex outcomes to moral dilemmas.

Scholars influenced by Zelizer have expanded upon this cultural framework to study such topics as organ and blood donation, the globalization of local handicraft markets, and the economics of palliative care (Healy 2006; Wherry, 2008; Livne, 2019). While much of the work in economic sociology up until this point had been concerned with production, this tradition has also helped start a sociology of consumption. It examines how people view their consumption practices, how consumers justify the moral efficacy of products, and how this, in turn, impacts markets (Zukin and Maguire, 2004; Schor, Slater, Zukin, and Zelizer, 2010).

The theoretical framework of commensuration and conventions is influenced by traditions ranging from American pragmatism to the economics of convention, and institutional theory (Biggart and Beamish, 2003).[5] Conventions and related concepts such as habits, customs, routines, and standard practices are understandings, often tacit but also conscious, that organize and coordinate action in predictable ways (Karpik, 2012). Conventions are agreed-upon, if flexible, guides for economic interpretation and interaction. Although used by individuals as they buy, bargain, and sell, conventions do not reside in, and are not reducible to, individuals. Conventions are shared templates for interpreting situations and planning courses of action in mutually comprehensible ways that involve social accountability. That is, they provide a basis for judging the appropriateness of acts by self and others. Conventions thus are a means of economic coordination between actors that are inherently collective, social, and even moral in nature.

One set of conventions that have been widely studied are processes of valuation. When goods are difficult to judge or have uncertain qualities, deciding how to value them often requires expert judgment and rules of thumb (Stark, 2009; Karpik, 2010; Beckert and Aspers, 2011). Recently, work on uncertainty in capitalism has also contributed to this tradition (Beckert, 2016; Beckert & Bronk, 2018). This work focuses on how actors use conventions to reduce their uncertainty about the nature of products, but also to predict the future.

One important kind of convention is the act of commensuration (Espeland and Stephens, 1998). Commensuration is the expression or measurement of characteristics normally represented by different units according to a common metric. Commensuration allows actors to make judgments of value for goods and services that might otherwise not be easy to compare (Karpik, 2010). The logic of commensuration is implicit in a very wide range of valuing systems such as college rankings that numerically compare organizations and credit scores (Espeland and Sauder, 2007; Carruthers, 2013). Conventions and commensuration are important to both producers and consumers because they allow them to assess the qualities of goods and services and making judgments about the worthiness of exchange partners.

The performativity and market devices perspectives have their origins in the work of Latour (2008) who has proposed what he calls “actor-network theory” as an approach to understanding how social life is organized. For Latour, the social world is flat. He resists the idea that there is micro and macro. Instead, he argues that all the factors involved in a social situation be considered on the same level, and thus there are no external social forces beyond the network in and around participants. Material objects, ideas, processes, and any other relevant factors are part of the network and can count as actors as much as humans.

Callon (1998) has taken up this idea in the context of economic sociology. He proposed that economics was not just a set of ideas used to describe the world, but an active way to organize things we call markets. He calls the use of ideas to structure markets performativity, implying that actors take their ideas and perform them. One of the earliest empirical studies within the performativity literature demonstrates how an economist purposefully set about to create a market for the regional sale of strawberries, a process which required significant planning and coalition building, in contrast to the dominant narrative of markets arising spontaneously (Garcia-Parpet, 2007). Utilizing actor-network theory, the economic sociology literature has tried to generalize how ideas, objects and processes come to structure markets. Muniesa, et. al., use the term "market devices" to describe the "material and discursive assemblages" that construct markets and keep them functioning (2007: 2). Market devices can take a wide range of forms, including financial models, market indices, professions, and physical objects such as stock tickers (MacKenzie, 2006; Millo, 2007; Beunza and Garud, 2007; Preda, 2006).[6]

It is useful to compare these three perspectives. One can see that the markets and morality, conventions and commensuration, and performativity and market devices research programs are all ways to understand how markets get structured by market participants, both producers and consumers. Without these kind of shared meanings and conventions, it would be difficult for producers and consumers to decide the quality of products and what to buy and sell. While each of these terms highlights different features of the cultural constructions in and around markets, they provide an in-depth look at what it actually takes for buyers and customers to make sense of their exchanges. The perspectives also overlap in the cultural and physical objects they propose that aid the creation of markets. They do draw, to some degree, on institutional theory and even network analysis. What distinguishes these traditions is an emphasis on meso-level practices, shared across individuals but not limited *per se* to any organization. The units of study are not institutions, organizations, or individuals but instead the informal understandings and collective cultural devices that make market interaction possible.

Conclusion

While the research programs of economic sociology and organizational sociology have diverged somewhat in the past 25 years, the fields still share a substantial overlap in scholarly interest. In 2018, the Organizations, Occupations, and Work (OOW) section of the American Sociological Association had a greater degree of overlap in membership with the Economic Sociology section (38%) than with any other section. The Economic Sociology section shared 48% of its members with the OOW section.[7] Undoubtedly, organizational research continues to maintain significant ties to economic sociology and vice versa.

The proliferation of research programs has produced many studies where scholars apply a single perspective to the object in which they are interested. But it is important to note that these perspectives can be seen as a toolkit and multiple concepts can prove useful in making better sense of what is going on in or around a market. The creation of so many distinct research programs in organizational and economic sociology suggests that one way forward is for scholars to reacquaint themselves with the virtues of the other perspectives. This, of course, is already reflected in some empirical work.

So, for example, within the performativity and market devices tradition, MacKenzie and Millo's study of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) combines elements of organizational theory, the markets and morality perspective, performativity, and market devices to produce a satisfying account of the emergence of options trading. They make the point that markets can be considered "moral communities in which collective action problems can be solved" (2003, p. 107). To create the options market, individuals had to collectively participate in changing the culture of a particular organization (Chicago Board of Exchange), convince government regulators to let them expand the options market, and introduce a set of market devices to help that market work. MacKenzie and Millo (2003, p.139-40) argue that performativity theory must be integrated with both a Granovetterian and Polyanian notion of embedding in order to move beyond conventional views of the rational, individualistic economic actor.

Another example comes from Sauder and Espeland's study of law school rankings (2009) as a case of commensuration. Their account combines elements of institutional theory and performativity to make sense of how the existence of rankings changes the way that organizations (i.e. law schools) work. The rankings were created to help students choose between law schools, and they gave law schools a sense of where they stood in the organizational field. But, the existence of the rankings had an unintended consequence. Once law schools became aware of where they stood, they realized that they could shift their organizational practices in order to improve their position in the rankings. This created a new organizational logic for the field and changed the organization of activities on the part of law schools. It also involved performativity as law schools began to understand what drove the rankings and then implement changes to conform to that new understanding.[8]

Research programs have the advantage of being productive by focusing on a few things. But all research programs, by definition, have blinders. This means that their ability to produce a more holistic understanding of phenomena is limited. In practice, many studies draw from a set of research programs. Combining theories can provide deeper and richer accounts of the way in which the economy produces change and occasionally even leads to new programs. Firms, organizations, and markets are fields where we can observe how different research programs play out. As fields evolve, research programs evolve alongside them.

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Endnotes

[1] This essay does not include a discussion of all work in economic sociology including important work on the causes of changes in inequality, gender and work, the household division of labor, the sociology of consumption, or the sociology of finance. Our goal is not to provide a literature review of the empirical literature on all of the topics that can be considered as economic sociology. Instead, we focus on the dominant set of competing research programs that claim to have something to say about the social structuring of markets.

[2] There is a recent special issue of the *Socio-Economic Review* entitled "Markets and Social Movements (2019) that captures the variety of ideas linking states, markets, organizations, and social movements.

[3] In our discussion that follows, we review key theoretical texts and examples of empirical research. We do not claim to review all of the empirical work in each research program, but only a few to illustrate how the program has been used.

[4] This idea also exists in institutional theory.

[5] Theories of conventions and commensuration certainly rely on varieties of institutional theory, particularly Berger and Luckmann (1964). But, the literature on these topics does not usually focus on organizations as central to creating conventions or commensuration. Instead, the function of these devices in structuring market interactions is the focus on attention in these literatures.

[6] Market devices can be material things and function in markets in the same way such objects can be actors in actor-network theory.

[7] Of the 931 members of the OOW section, 353 were also members of Economic Sociology (38%) followed by 189 members in Inequality, Poverty, and Mobility (20%) and 176 members in Sociology of Sex and Gender (19%). Of the 731 members of the Economic Sociology section, OOW section members accounted for 48%, followed by 166 members in Theory (23%) and 164 members in Sociology of Culture (22%). Accessed on July 2, 2019 at https://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/section_membership_overlap_matrix_2018_0.pdf

[8] In a similar way, studies in the markets and morality research program like Healy (2001) and Livne (2014) rely on organizational analysis and social movement theory to understand how moral projects spread and work out.