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Encountering Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta in
Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* and Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*

By

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University of California, Berkeley

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Spring 2019

Abstract

Playfighting: Encountering Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta in
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Professor Alexander von Rospatt, Chair

The present study collects, translates, and analyzes the surviving fragments of two lost Naiyāyika authors, Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, principally as they have been preserved in the works of the eighth-century Buddhist philosophers Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. (The present study argues, without coming to a definite conclusion as yet, that there is strong evidence Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are not two distinct authors but different names for the same man.) The fragments themselves often contain fascinating and idiosyncratic arguments but are also often difficult to interpret. Unpacking them requires close consultation of major Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, primarily the *Nyāyasūtra*, Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya*, which is the direct source material for most of the fragments, Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*, which often parallels the arguments in the fragments, and Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, which clarifies much of the technical terminology tersely packed into the most difficult of the fragments. The majority of the fragments are preserved in Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*, his commentary on his teacher Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Śāntarakṣita invokes, and Kamalaśīla cites, Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta in chapters concerning cosmology (2), the self (7), momentariness (8), the Vaiśeṣika categories of substance (10), quality (11), and universals (13), and the epistemological issues of perception (17), inference (18), and the existence of other means of knowledge (19). The fragments, accordingly, cover an extremely broad range of issues and, so, serve as an occasion to consider a number of questions about the intellectual commitments of the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika community and various disputes between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas. Several of the fragments also derive from Aviddhakarṇa's Cārvāka commentary, allowing for a discussion of the relation between Brahmanical philosophical traditions and the materialist Cārvāka philosophy. Finally, because the fragments are preserved in the *Pañjikā*, they make possible a thorough analysis of the structure and style of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* as a whole, as well as the way the Buddhists represent the many rival thinkers they cite. The present study mirrors the structure of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, using the fragments as anchor points in a reading of the text's overall engagement with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in order to argue that Śāntarakṣita organizes his work in a dialogical manner.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BBh	<i>Brahmasūtrabhāṣya</i> (Śāṅkarācārya) in Śāstrī 1938
Bhā	<i>Bhāmāti</i> (Vācaspatimiśra) in Śāstrī 1938
J	Jaisalmer ms. of <i>Tattvasaṃgraha</i> (Śāntarakṣita) [Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Tāḍapatrīya Granthabhaṇḍāra, no. 377] and <i>Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā</i> (Kamalaśīla) [no. 378]
K	Krishnamacharya 1984
NB	<i>Nyāyabindu</i> (Dharmakīrti) in Malvania 1971
NBh	<i>Nyāyabhāṣya</i> (Vātsyāyana) in Thakur 1997a
ND	<i>Nyāyadarpaṇa</i> (Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra) in Shrigodekar and Gandhi 1929
NK	<i>Nyāyakandalī</i> (Śrīdhara) in Dvivedin 1895
NMGBh	<i>Nyāyamañjarī-granthibhaṅga</i> (Cakradhara) in Shah 1972
NS	<i>Nyāyasūtra</i> (Gautama) in Thakur 1997a
NV	<i>Nyāyavārttika</i> (Uddyotakara) in Thakur 1997b
NViV	<i>Nyāyaviniścaya-vivaraṇa</i> (Vādirājasūri) in Jain 2000
NVṬT	<i>Nyāyavārttika-tātparyāṭikā</i> (Vācaspatimiśra) in Thakur 1996a
NVṬTP	<i>Nyāyavārttika-tātparyāṭikā-parīśuddhi</i> (Udayana) in Thakur 1996b
P	Pāṭan ms. of <i>Tattvasaṃgraha</i> (Śāntarakṣita) [Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira, no. 6679] and <i>Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā</i> (Kamalaśīla) [no. 6680]
PDhS	<i>Padārthadharmasaṃgraha</i> (Praśastapāda) in Dvivedin 1895
PPS	<i>Nyāyabindu-pūrvapakṣasaṃkṣipta</i> (Kamalaśīla) [D 4232, Tshad ma Vol. 16, we, 92a2–99b5]
PVSV	<i>Pramāṇavārttikasavṛtti</i> (Dhārmakīrti) in Gnoli 1960
PVSVṬ	<i>Pramāṇavārttikasavṛttiṭikā</i> (Kaṇṇakagomin) in Sāṃkṛtyāyana 1943
PVin	<i>Pramānaviniścaya</i> (Dhārmakīrti) in Hugon and Tomabechi 2011
Ś	Śāstrī 1968
ŚV	<i>Ślokavārttika</i> (Kumārila) in Śāstrī 1978
SVṬ	<i>Siddhiviniścaya-ṭikā</i> (Anantavīrya) in Jain 1959
T	<i>De kho na nyid bsduṣ pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa</i> (Śāntarakṣita) in Pedurma [W1PD95844 107:21-370] <i>De kho na nyid bsduṣ pa'i dka' 'grel</i> (Kamalaśīla) in Pedurma [W1PD95844 107:371-1883]
TBV	<i>Tattvabodhavidhāyinī</i> (Abhayadevasūri) in Saṅghavi and Doṣī 1984
TS	<i>Tattvasaṃgraha</i> (Śāntarakṣita) in Śāstrī 1968
TSP	<i>Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā</i> (Kamalaśīla) in Śāstrī 1968
TUS	<i>Tattvopaplavasīmha</i> (Jayarāśi) in Saṅghavi and Parikh 1940
VA	<i>Vādanyāyāṭikā Vipañcitārthā</i> (Śāntarakṣita) Śāstrī 1972
VK	<i>Vedanta-kalpataru</i> (Amalānanda) in Śāstrai 1938
VN	<i>Vādanyāya</i> (Dhārmakīrti) in Much 1991
VP	<i>Vākyapadīya</i> (Bhartrhari) in Rau 2002
VS	<i>Vaiśeṣikasūtra</i> (Kaṇāda) in Jambuvijayaji 1961
WZKS	<i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens</i>
WZKSO	<i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens</i>

INTRODUCTION

*jñeyāmbhonidhimanthanād adhigatais tattvāmṛtair yo jagaj
jātivyādhijarādiduḥkhaśamanaiḥ kārūṇyato 'tarpayat |
tasmai tattvavidāṃ varāya jagataḥ śāstre praṇamyādarāt
tattvānām iha saṃgrāhe sphuṭatarā prārabhyate pañjikā || 1 ||*

*vaktuṃ vastu na māḍṣā jaḍadhiyo 'pūrvam kadāpi kṣamaḥ
kṣuṇṇo vā bahudhā budhair aharahaḥ ko 'sau na panthāḥ kvacit |
kiṃ tu svārthaparasya me matir iyaṃ punyodayākāṅkṣinaḥ
tattvābhyāsam imaṃ śubhodayaphalaṃ kartuṃ samabhyudyatā || 2 ||*

To he who out of compassion gladdened the world with the nectars of truth, which he found
By churning the ocean of the knowable, and which ease the pain of birth, illness, old age, and death;
To that knower of truth, the finest teacher of the world, I now bow with great respect
And compose this more fully blossomed *Elaboration* of the *Collection of Truths*.

The dull-minded like me are never able to say anything that is new.
Is there a path anywhere that the wise have not yet trodden time and again?
Still, out of my selfish desire to raise merit, this mind of mine endeavors
To bring about this persistent study of truth, whose fruit is rising virtue.

—Kamalaśīla, *Tattvasaṃgraha-Pañjikā*, opening *maṅgala*

§ SUBJECT AND PURPOSE

The *Tattvasaṃgraha* (“Collection of Truths”), composed by the Indian Buddhist thinker Śāntarakṣita (c. 725–788),¹ is a mammoth work of philosophy and scholasticism. The clarity, comprehensiveness, and systematic organization of the text are staggering. In over 3,600 verses,

¹ For Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s dates and biographies, cf. Frauwallner 1961, 141–144, and Marks and Eltschinger 2019a and 2019b.

Śāntarakṣita covers the broad spectrum of philosophical theories and topics current in his time, and engages with all of the major philosophical traditions of Indian philosophy. The treatise is rarely mentioned without reference to its extensive commentary, the *Pañjikā* (“Elaboration”), by Śāntarakṣita’s direct disciple Kamalaśīla (c. 740–795).² The *Pañjikā* rivals the root text in clarity and rigor and exceeds it in comprehensiveness. Kamalaśīla fleshes out each argument in the root text, commenting on almost every word of the original, and his language is not only clear, but often eloquent, as his opening *maṅgala* verses, cited above, attest.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are renowned for their encyclopedic knowledge of Indian philosophy and their exhaustive engagement with opposing traditions. The *Pañjikā* preserves a number of fragments of thinkers whose work is otherwise lost—including the Naiyāyika thinkers Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, whose fragments occupy the bulk of the present study. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are also renowned for their synthetic approach to Buddhist thought. They seek to bring together elements of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra strands in Vasubandhu’s work, Nāgārjuna’s *Madhyamaka*, and the logico-epistemological school of Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. This syncretic project is regarded as one of the last major innovations in Indian Buddhist philosophy and one of the most important foundations of early Tibetan Buddhist thought. The *Tattvasamgraha* and the *Pañjikā* are, for these and other reasons, veritable treasure troves for scholars of Buddhist philosophy and Indian intellectual history, as well as for anyone interested in interreligious intellectual exchange, the history of debate, and scholasticism more generally.

In the introduction to the *Pañjikā*, Kamalaśīla says that the purpose of any scholarly work is threefold: (i) what the text does (*kriyā-rūpa*); (ii) the result of that activity (*kriyā-phala*); and (iii) the subsequent result of that result (*kriyā-phalasya phala*). In the case of the *Tattvasamgraha*, (i) the activity of the text is to collect (*saṃgraha*) a particular set of truths (*tattva*), specifically, the various characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of the Buddha’s teaching of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) examined over the course of the text. (ii) The result of the activity of collecting together (*saṃgraha*) these truths is the reader’s easy comprehension (*saṃgraha*) of them. (iii) The ultimate result of this easy comprehension is the reader’s attainment of the highest of spiritual goals. According to Kamalaśīla, it is the second of these that is most significant, because it is the most distinctive aspect of the work’s purpose. (The mere activity is too obvious to be of deeper significance, and the ultimate aim is shared by other texts and practices.)

The present study is intended to proceed in a similar manner, albeit with far less comprehensiveness and ambition than in Śāntarakṣita’s work. (i) The main activity of the present study is the cataloguing and close reading of the fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta that are preserved by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. I will say much more about these two thinkers in the pages to come, but for now the most important details are the following: Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are Brahmanical authors whose works have been lost but for fragments preserved by others. Their earliest fragments are found in works by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, and the vast majority of them are preserved in the *Pañjikā*. These fragments present a number of difficulties. For one thing, they are often dense, elliptical, and simply difficult to read. They are also embedded in an intricate web of varying ideas, texts, and traditions. Their intrinsic difficulty is further complicated by the fact that they are preserved by Buddhist thinkers, i.e., rivals seeking to refute them. Śāntarakṣita and

² Frauwallner 1961, 144.

Kamalaśīla lift the fragments from their original contexts—already an act of distortion—and treat them as entries in an imaginary dialogue. In addition, it is quite likely that many of the fragments are paraphrases rather than direct quotations, adding yet another layer of distortion. Nevertheless, despite these and other difficulties, the fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta present us with a number of opportunities to learn about discussions within early Nyāya and early Buddhist-Nyāya discourse. Many of their arguments are also idiosyncratic and intrinsically interesting to readers of philosophy.

Significantly, a closer look at Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta offers us a promising view onto the *Tattvasamgraha*. Specifically, while the primary activity of the present work concerns the fragments of these two Brahmanical thinkers, (ii) the result of our examination of them is to enable the reader to consider and pursue a close reading of the *Tattvasamgraha* as a coherent and systematic whole ineluctably embedded in broader (discursive, but also social, institutional, and even imaginative) contexts. (iii) Ultimately, the hope is for the reader to see how the text exceeds itself and opens onto these broader contexts, even as our sense of them, too, must remain uncertain.

In other words, while much of the actual work of the present study focuses on the fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta—their meaning and force, the light they shed on their social and institutional contexts, the different ways the Buddhist frame, employ, and respond to them—the primary motivation underlying the overall project is to move toward a reading of the *Tattvasamgraha*. Though there are a lot of things one can say about the *Tattvasamgraha*, scholars have struggled to answer a seemingly simple question about it: What exactly is it?³ As soon as one tries to answer this question, more questions begin to appear. How is the work structured? To what extent is it a polemic, to what extent a work of didacticism, to what extent an apology? Who would have read it in the eighth century? How, and why, would they have read it? Even more urgently, within what social, institutional, and political contexts did this text emerge, and what new worlds

³ Is it a study of logic, a polemic, a textbook, a doxography, an apology, a meditation on Buddhist soteriological thought?

To give a few examples: As we will see shortly, Sara McClintock (2010) and Isabelle Ratié (2014) both give a lot of thought and analysis to this set of questions. Both try to navigate between the clearly didactic quality of the text and its outward-orientation.

Matthew Kapstein focuses less on the didactic-polemic dynamic and more the rational-soteriological one: “In other words, in its deeper meaning Śāntaraksita's *Gathering* is perhaps not primarily a work on logic and epistemology, but rather a sustained exploration of a core soteriological theme of Mahāyāna Buddhism in its relation to the full range of the preoccupations of late first-millennium Indian thought. The *Gathering*, then, is not gathered together in the manner of a miscellany; it is a dialectical gathering-in, a passage through Indian systematic thought whose spiraling flight finds its center in the Buddha's message and in the person of the Buddha himself” (Kapstein 2001, 13). This is a beautiful description, and each of its components rings true, but I cannot quite say how they all fit together.

Christian Coseru, describing the *Tattvasamgraha* and *Pañjikā* almost as if they form a single text, says, “Our main source, the *Compendium* and its *Commentary*, is not only a vast collection of Buddhist doctrines recorded in the second half of the eighth century but also a highly polemical work bearing testimony to the sustained disputes between Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophers during what is perhaps the golden era of Indian philosophy” (Coseru 2009, 14). Although he highlights the polemic nature of the work, he also describes the actual activity of the text as “bearing testimony” to Buddhist-Brahmanical debate. This suggests one of the fundamental aspects of the text is a hybrid between an organizational/exegetical project and a doxographical one—both resonate with the notion of a *samgraha* of *tattvas*, a collection of principles. Yet Coseru treats the text primarily as a rational polemic and, so, a repository for philosophical arguments.

The text exhibits rational, polemical, didactic, apologetic, exegetical, soteriological, and doxographical aspects. The challenge is trying to gauge the degree to which it is oriented on each and how that should color our reading of it.

did it seek to bring about?

The last of these questions is perhaps the most enticing and yet also the furthest from reach. Due to their activities in Tibet,⁴ we know more about Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla than many of their predecessors and contemporaries. Yet we know very little of their social world, the life of a philosopher at the massive monastic institution Nālandā, where both are said to have lived and worked for a time, the practices of formal interreligious debate, and so on. We cannot say much at all, to use a granular example, about Kamalaśīla's education, how it was directed, how specialized it was, whether it was subsidized or patronized by anyone, and whether it included many interactions with non-Buddhists.

The *Tattvasamgraha* itself does not directly attest to these realities. Nevertheless, the treatise is oriented on the concept of fruitful debate. As Sara McClintock emphasizes, for example, in her description of the “rhetoric of reason” at play in the *Tattvasamgraha*, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla always have a particular, or particular set, of audience(s) in mind in formulating an argument.⁵ It is a broadly shared norm of classical Indian philosophical debates that one cannot use x to prove y in a debate with someone who does not accept that x exists. If I am not convinced that there is smoke on the mountain (say, because I suspect it to be steam or vapor, or the like [*bāṣpa-ādi-samdigdha*]), you cannot convince me, on its basis, that there is fire there. As McClintock points out, every rational argument is inextricably embedded in a rhetorical context. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's philosophical project is undergirded by a social, dialogic sensibility. Most fundamentally, it is the sensibility of formal interreligious debate.

There are many stories of great debates that feature famous representatives of rival traditions in a high stakes battle of wits.⁶ For example, Dharmapāla (mid-6th c.) is said to have engaged in a very high stakes debate at the insistence of a king who apparently intended to use the debate as a pretense to abolish Buddhism. As José Cabezón writes, “if the Buddhists lost, then their religion would be destroyed throughout the kingdom, while if the [so-called] Śāstra Master lost, he would cut off his tongue.”⁷ During the debate, the “Śāstra Master” gave an elaborate account of his own view, essentially reciting a book the king had commissioned. In response, Dharmapāla demonstrated mastery of his opponent's work by reciting it back to him perfectly. Dharmapāla won. Afterwards, he stopped the Śāstra Master from cutting off his tongue “and told him that the real way to make amends was for him to correct his views. Dharmapāla then preached the Buddhist doctrine to the Śāstra Master, and both the Śāstra Master and his royal benefactor converted to Buddhism.”⁸ Kamalaśīla is himself the subject of tales of the purported Samye debate with the Chinese Buddhist monk Moheyan.⁹ A formal debate as such is not likely to have taken place. But we know that

⁴ Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla were both instrumental in the early propagation of Buddhism in Tibet. For records of Śāntarakṣita's role as the first abbot in Tibet, see Roerich 1949, 41–44; Tucci 1980, 1–15; van Schaik 2011, 33–36.

⁵ McClintock 2010, especially 49–62.

⁶ Tales of Indian Buddhist debate victors are collected mainly in Tibetan histories and the accounts of Chinese pilgrims (Cabezón 2008), but there are many stories valorizing the great debate victories by major Jain and Brahmanical thinkers, as well (Granoff 1985).

⁷ Cabezón 2008, 81.

⁸ Cabezón 2008, 82.

⁹ For perspectives on Kamalaśīla's purported participation in the debate at Samye: Demiéville 1952; Wangdu and Diemberger 2000; Seyfort Ruegg 2013.

Kamalaśīla and Moheyan were in Tibet around the same time, and that Kamalaśīla, at least, was vaguely aware of Moheyan’s views.¹⁰ In any case, Tibetan records claim that victory was awarded to Kamalaśīla, and, as a result, Tibetan Buddhist theory and practice was modeled on the Indian system. Shortly thereafter, Kamalaśīla was assassinated. According to the history written by Bu ston (1290–1364), four killers (*shan pa mi*) sent by Moheyan “squeezed his kidneys” (*mkhal ma mnyes*).¹¹

We do not know to what extent there really were formal live debates between representatives of rival groups, how frequently they would have occurred, or what the stakes might have been. In addition to mythic and hagiographical tales of great debates, there are also many texts in which philosophers quibble about the basic rules of debate and the different kinds of contentious discussion. What we do know, then, is that there was a shared ethos of debate across traditions, and that the stakes were imagined in the highest of terms.

The *Tattvasamgraha* embodies this shared ethos and the way the social practice, real and/or mythic, was imagined. Debates about debates are themselves social practices, and the effects a text has on its readers are as real as the building in which it was composed.¹² When we think about the social practice of debate in, for example, eighth-century India, we do not have to be able to say decisively whether Śāntarakṣita ever argued with a Naiyāyika directly, publicly, or formally to be able to say something about the way that Śāntarakṣita conceived of the practice and function, and the effects, of such an exchange.

Of course, it remains the case that most of our questions will have to remain unanswered. Isabelle Ratié, in her study of Śāntarakṣita’s engagement with Kumārila’s theory of the self, laments that “the historian of medieval Indian philosophy seems condemned to collecting uncertainties.”¹³ Alas, as this playfully highlights, “collecting uncertainties” suggests considerably less room for ambition than Śāntarakṣita gives himself in his *Tattvasamgraha*, which we might call his “collection of certainties.”

Religious Reading, Attentive Reading

In considering the problem of the audience(s) of the *Tattvasamgraha* and *Pañjikā*, McClintock responds to Paul Griffiths’s notion of “religious reading” in Indian Buddhist textual history.¹⁴ Religious reading is a morally urgent and reverential engagement with a literary work, whether oral or textual, whose motivations are shaped and constrained by the religious worldview underpinning both the text itself and the reader’s engagement with it. “Religious reading,” Griffiths explains,

¹⁰ Cf. Tucci 1958; Gomez 1983; Gomez 1983a.

¹¹ *Chos ’byung*, ed. Gangs ljongs shes rig gi nying bcud, 190, 10–11; trans. Obermiller 1932, 196. Obermiller’s translation of the full sentence is: “Later on, four Chinese butchers, sent by the Hva-shang, killed the teacher Kamalaśīla by squeezing his kidneys” (*dus phyis hva zhang gi rgya’i shan pa mi bzhis slob dpon ka ma la shI la’i mkhal ma mnyes te dkrongs*).

Others have said that Kamalaśīla’s killers were sent by non-Buddhists agitated by the propagation of Buddhism in Tibet. One cannot help but wonder what exactly it was that led to Kamalaśīla’s purportedly grisly demise.

¹² This is true whether, like a Naiyāyika, one considers the building a substantial whole and the psychological effect a quality of the self, or, like a Buddhist, one considers the building a useful construct and the psychological effect an impersonal but causally contingent momentary mental event. Of course, the building in which the *Tattvasamgraha* was composed is gone; our inability to locate and measure it does not mean it was never there.

¹³ “L’historien de la philosophie indienne médiévale semble condamné à collectionner des incertitudes” (Ratié 2014, 195).

¹⁴ Griffiths 1999a, 1999b.

“requires and fosters a particular set of attitudes to what is read, as well as reading practices that comport well with those attitudes; and it implies an epistemology, a set of views about what knowledge is and about the relations between reading and the acquisition and retention of knowledge.”¹⁵ Such reading is, therefore, always rereading; it “ends only with death, and perhaps not then: it is a continuous, ever-repeated act.”¹⁶ Think of Kamalaśīla’s reference to *tattva-abhyāsa*, the persistent, repetitive study of truth.¹⁷

McClintock points out that, even if we think, as Griffiths’s reading suggests, that such texts were chiefly intended for fellow Buddhist monastics, we need not imagine that their reach was constrained by the walls of the monastery. She says “the only plausible scenario” in which the *Tattvasamgraha* and *Pañjikā* were intended exclusively for a Buddhist audience “would require that the texts were intended as pedagogical tools to prepare monks for public debates against non-Buddhist opponents.”¹⁸ Indeed, the *Tattvasamgraha* sometimes reads like a series of scripted debates to be studied and rehearsed, and the *Pañjikā* often introduces and explains basic concepts in argumentation and reasoning. The consequence, as McClintock points out, is that non-Buddhist thinkers would still be at least indirect audiences, through the medium of formal debate.

To take this one step further, I would like to pull at a thread Ratié dangles at the end of a chapter. Without denying the possibility that Buddhist readers of the *Tattvasamgraha* went on to engage rivals in debate, Ratié suggests it at least as likely that the text reached other traditions by circulating amongst educated readers.¹⁹ In addition to Griffiths’s remarks, she cites Helmut Krasser’s take on the audience of Dignāga’s work as another example.²⁰ Krasser argues that Dignāga was unlikely to win anyone over, despite his own claims to the contrary, and, so, was effectively writing for Buddhists. Yet even Krasser, Ratié notes, concedes that Dignāga et al must have known their texts would wind up in opponents’ hands, even if their opponents were never likely to be convinced. And yet, as Ratié asks, what hope should Dignāga have had that his students would succeed in debate where his texts had failed?²¹ There are good reasons to doubt the *Tattvasamgraha* was written to directly convert non-Buddhists *or* to train Buddhist monks to do the same through formal debate. Vincent Eltschinger makes a compelling case for something of a middle way between these views. He argues

¹⁵ Griffiths 1999a, 40.

¹⁶ Griffiths 1999a, 41.

¹⁷ One implication for Buddhist epistemology, McClintock notes, is that in “preaching to the converted,” Buddhist thinkers made arguments that were not suited to convince anyone of anything (McClintock 2010, 52 n 121). She goes on to argue that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla “*did* hold their arguments to have, in Griffiths’ words (1999b, 513) ‘maximal dialectical force,’ but only for members of their ideal audience, judicious persons” (*prekṣāvāt*). (Emphasis original.) I tend to agree with Griffiths that the arguments of thinkers like Śāntarakṣita and Aviddhakarṇa have more force within a relatively like-minded community. But I share McClintock’s sense that we cannot compartmentalize the various traditions, sects, and schools of classical Indian philosophy. “Indian Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers of the classical era participated in a shared intellectual milieu that *did* allow the cross-fertilization of ideas,” she writes (52 n 121, emphasis original). But trying to convince non-Buddhists to give up the worldly life is not the only way of seriously engaging with and challenging their ideas, and cross-fertilization does not necessarily entail persuasion per se

¹⁸ McClintock 2010, 56–57.

¹⁹ E.g., “...des exemplaires du TS ont également dû circuler parmi différents cercles non bouddhiques et faire l’objet d’une lecture attentive de la part des adversaires de Śāntarakṣita et de Kumāri[la sic]” (Ratié 2014, 183). The entire discussion leading up to this remark is incisive and thought-provoking.

²⁰ Krasser 2004, Krasser 2013.

²¹ Ratié 2014, 176–183.

that we should read Buddhist epistemological works as apologetic rather than proselytic.²² Defending the legitimacy of the Buddhist tradition is a different task than persuading others to join it (or training students to do so), but it is no less legitimate. The polemics of Dignāga et al seem far more effective in this light. As for the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Eltschinger argues that, “but for meeting (mainly outward) objections, Śāntarakṣita could have spared himself the trouble of composing such a treatise.”²³

This offers great insight into the motivations behind the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Eltschinger pays careful attention to the doctrinal and institutional pressures haunting some of the Buddhist epistemological works, including scriptural injunctions against contests and debates. Helmut Krasser touches upon a similar topic in a paper on the textual and chronological relationships between Dharmakīrti, Kumāriila, and Bhāviveka.²⁴ The Chinese pilgrim and logician Xuanzang was in India for sixteen years, and left Nālandā in 644, yet he does not mention Dharmakīrti. At first, Krasser considers that Xuanzang might not have been aware of Dharmakīrti. But then he raises the possibility that, despite being aware of Dharmakīrti, Xuanzang chose not to mention him. Krasser notes that Dharmakīrti himself suggests²⁵ “that people are not only disinterested in his work, but are even hostile to it.”²⁶ Perhaps this was why Xuanzang remained silent about Dharmakīrti’s work. “What could have been so terrible in Dharmakīrti’s texts,” Krasser then asks, “that people, for instance, the officials at Nālandā, even became hostile towards them?” The answer Krasser proposes is Dharmakīrti’s claim that scriptural testimony, *āgama*—including the words of the Buddha—is not a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). “How were they to propagate Buddhism if the Buddha is not even a *pramāṇa*, if there is no certainty whether what he has said about super-sensible matters is true?”²⁷ This happens to be a perfect springboard for a consideration of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, the main sources of which are the works of Dharmakīrti, and which culminates in a proof of the existence and authority of a being with vision of super sensible matters, i.e., the Buddha. In other words, the *Tattvasaṃgraha* can be read not only as a polemically-oriented apologetic for the Buddhist faith, but also as an apology on behalf of Dharmakīrti himself.

Still, I cannot help but continue to think about Ratié’s remarks on the circulation of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Pañjikā*. She points out that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s adversaries were likely to have read their texts, and read them, no less, as an “object of attentive reading.”²⁸ Just who is it who read these texts? How did they read them? Alongside what other texts? Did they recite them aloud to their students and coreligionists? Did they read them in quiet solitude?

There is one thing about the circulation of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Pañjikā* that we can say with absolute certainty: they have made it into our hands. We, scholars and historians of medieval Indian philosophy, are readers of these texts, and indeed we read them attentively. Could Śāntarakṣita have

²² Eltschinger 2012. Eltschinger points out that the Buddhist epistemologists never seem to claim that they are going to convert anyone.

²³ Eltschinger 2012, 477.

²⁴ Krasser 2012.

²⁵ Specifically, the second *maṅgala* verse of his *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti*, which we will return to below (cf. “Playfighting”).

²⁶ Krasser 2012, 585.

²⁷ Krasser 2012, 585–586.

²⁸ “...objet d’une lecture attentive” (Ratié 2014, 183).

imagined that someone like us would someday read and study his work? Should we regard ourselves as ideal or imagined audiences of the *Tattvasamgraha*? It seems unlikely, even if not impossible. McClintock, highlighting a term used throughout the text, and much of Indian philosophical discourse writ large, argues that the thoughtful people (*prekṣāvāt*) Kamalaśīla mentions in his introduction are the ideal audience. Śāntarakṣita may well have anticipated a specific, and relatively restricted, set of likely readers who fit the bill. I think he is most likely to have principally had in mind scholar-monks in and around major institutions of Buddhist learning, though he doubtless was aware of the likelihood that adversaries would read and potentially respond to his work, and he must have considered additional audiences, such as potential patrons and curious intellectuals with less of a doctrinal stake in the disagreements. Still, surely there are some among our circle of scholars who look before they leap (*prekṣāpūrvakakārin*, which coarsely means “one whose action is preceded by consideration”). Why efface our own participation in this work? We are, in fact, part of the *actual* audience of the text,²⁹ and this can inform the way we think and talk about it. The audience of the *Tattvasamgraha* is, in fact, readers.

To read is to be moved. (Should anyone be inclined to disagree, they should at least consult Śāntarakṣita’s causal theory first.) We cannot say much about Śāntarakṣita’s social context with certainty, but we can say a lot about the imaginative landscape of his text. Knowing ourselves to be among the text’s readers, we can seek to engage with it as a reader, rather than exclusively through the scholarly microscope.³⁰

The Fruits of Our Labor

We need not fear the inevitable embellishments, distortions, or constraints of these idealized conversations in which we participate. We must be vigilant to attend to them, but being honest and courageous regarding their inevitability, we can start to ask new questions. Scholars have often chosen to focus on discrete portions of the *Tattvasamgraha* in their studies.³¹ This should come as no surprise. It is a long and complex work covering an enormous array of topics, themes, and rival traditions. In addition, most scholars have chosen to give equal weight to the extensive *Pañjikā*, magnifying the amount of material to cover. Selecting a discrete passage of a few dozen verses makes possible a focused and detailed study. But it also forces a somewhat limited set of questions, such as “What does *argument x* mean?” or “What are the textual sources and the historical legacy of verses *xx-yy*?” Broader questions about the work as a whole—“What does the *Tattvasamgraha* do? How does it do it?”—need not be partitioned from our historicist and exegetical work, but can undergird and orient it. Further, and even more fundamentally, we can ask questions as readers participating in the text’s reception: “How does the *Tattvasamgraha* move its readers? How does it move us?”

Kamalaśīla gives a strong sense for how the text moved him, and how he imagines it moving his own readers. In his *maṅgala* verses, he refers to himself as dull-minded (*jaḍa-dhī*). (Of course, in contrast with the omniscience of the Buddha, all of our minds are dull.) He says that his selfish desire for

²⁹ McClintock, emphasizing our distance from Śāntarakṣita a little bit more than I am inclined to, refers to us as part of the “actual, unintended audience” (McClintock 2010, 51).

³⁰ A small example: the Jaisalmer manuscript (J) of the *Pañjikā* is covered with marks and remarks that evince “one lecture attentive” by one of its readers, including such simple things as indications of word breaks in lengthy compounds.

³¹ Funayama 1992, Kellner 1997, and Ratié 2014 are all dedicated to discrete passages of around 40–60 verses; McClintock 2010 covers wider ground but is intended as a focused study on the final chapter of the *Tattvasamgraha*.

merit (*puṇya*) led him to *tattva-abhyāsa*, a disciplined, repeated, persistent study of the truth(s).³² The result of such effort, he says, is rising virtue (*śubha*). The implication is that the reader might similarly benefit from *tattva-abhyāsa*. In fact, by the time he concludes his extensive commentary, with the final words of the *Pañjikā*, he draws the connection even more emphatically with a pun on his own name:

Thus, after becoming ever the abode for the grace of the unrivaled victor,
I have obtained that which is good, plentiful, and radiant;
By means of it, may all the world become *sugata-kamalaśīla*,
Which with its blazing splendor pleases the minds of all beings.³³

The term *sugata-kamalaśīla* has several valences here. “Kamalaśīla” is, of course, a reference to the author of these very words, but his name bears particular significance, especially in concert with the term *sugata*. *Sugata* means “gone well” and is a common epithet for the Buddha, who has “gone well” in the sense of attaining enlightenment. A *kamala* is a lotus, a ubiquitous symbol in the Buddhist world and a representation of the Buddha himself. Like a perfectly blossomed lotus flower, which sprouts in the mud at the bottom of a pond but blossoms in the pure open air above the water (i.e., is *sugata*), the Buddha was born in this world but attained the perfection that exceeds it (i.e., is *sugata*). Just as the surface of a lotus leaf wicks away water, leaving the flower stainless, so the Buddha is unmarred by the impurities of the world. The word *śīla* refers in general to any distinctive or habitual conduct and specifically to the good conduct of a pious practitioner. The *śīla* of a *kamala* is the pure conduct of a lotus, which stands in for the virtue of the Buddha himself. This makes Kamalaśīla “he whose conduct is like that of a lotus” and by extension “the Buddha-like one.” Altogether, the term *sugata-kamala-śīla* refers not only to the author himself, but to the particular Buddha-like quality contained in his name. Kamalaśīla wishes for all the world to become *sugata-kamalaśīla*, to attain the pure conduct of a perfectly blossomed lotus flower—and the stainless lotus-conduct of a Sugata—and so to have the kind of “blazing splendor” that pleases the minds of all beings. Taking all of this together with the reference to his own name, we can restate Kamalaśīla’s rousing conclusion like this: “May this teaching help all mankind become Buddha-like—like me.”

Kamalaśīla also says a number of things about how and why he expects the reader to undertake such an effort. He says that the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, in all its complexity, amounts to a single, massive

³² It is worth comparing this with Dharmakīrti’s bitter *maṅgala* in his *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti*, which appears later in this Introduction, cf. n 75. Kamalaśīla crafted his verses in the same poetic meter as Dharmakīrti’s (*śārdūla-vikrīḍita*) and similarly refers to the selfishness of the *abhyāsa* he has undertaken. But Kamalaśīla strikes the kind of humble tone that was a common feature in such verses; implicitly, his humility suggests that his readers can benefit from following his lead, and his concluding verse confirms this. Dharmakīrti’s tone, on the other hand, is only humble in the sense that he seems resigned to being dismissed and ignored. The language and structure of their respective verses are very similar, yet the actual feeling and meaning conveyed are quite different.

³³ iti kuśalam adabhraṃ yan mayā prāpi śubhraṃ nirupamajinalakṣmīsadmatām etya nityam | sakalajanamanāṃsi prīṇayan dīptakāntiḥ sugatakamalaśīlas tena sarvo ‘stu lokaḥ || (TSP 1130.16, J313r.2).

This is a tricky verse to unpack. The second line has a seeming tautology: may all beings (*loka*) become that which pleases all beings (*jana*). But, of course, it can be true that the Buddha pleases the minds of all beings *and* that one wishes for all beings to *become* buddhas.

The Tibetan rendering has a few quirks (e.g., seemingly reading °*nija*° [*rang gi*] for °*jina*°), but the latter portion of the verse in the Tibetan conforms to this reading: *dpe med rang gi dpal bden bden par nges byas las/ dge ba shin tu dri med bdag gis gang thob des/ jig rten thams cad skye bo kun gyi yid tshim mdzad pa yil mdangs gsal ba can bde gshegs pad ma’i ngang tshul gyur bar shog.*

compound sentence (*mahā-vākya*),³⁴ which is “precisely a sentence like any other” (*tad-anya-vākyaivad vākyaṃ eva śāstram*). In other words, though there are twenty-six chapters in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, each of which is composed of several—often several dozen, and sometimes several hundred—verses, all of these seemingly discrete statements cohere into a single overarching statement signifying a particular subject toward a particular end. Even if we regard individual chapters synecdochically, it seems unsatisfying to treat such a carefully structured systematic whole as if its parts can be separately excised. Consider Kamalaśīla’s playful unpacking of the word *saṃgraha* in the text’s title—collecting (*saṃ+√grah*) truths in a single text leads to their easy comprehension (*saṃ+√grah*).³⁵ Part of the work the *Tattvasaṃgraha* performs is to make comprehension of Buddhist philosophy simpler, closer at hand. Refusing to read the work specifically as a coherent whole seems to be pushing further away what Śāntarakṣita has so kindly brought closer.

This is all the clearer in light of the way the parts of the whole fit together. Ratié argues that the text’s most significant contribution—as well as its main claim to originality—is not merely in its exhaustiveness, nor merely in its synthesis of the work of various Buddhist thinkers, but precisely in its systematicity, in the way that it presents the work of these various thinkers as forming a coherent conceptual whole.³⁶ She goes on to say that we have to understand the *Tattvasaṃgraha*’s engagement with, for example, Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa as the engagement with Kumāriḷa’s system as a whole, rather than an isolated series of arguments of his.³⁷ This is the hallmark of Śāntarakṣita’s pedagogy and his interpretation of the epistemological works he inherits: one must not regard an opponent’s arguments in isolation but only within the context of his overall system of thought. In other words, Śāntarakṣita presents Buddhist philosophy as a coherent system with which one can systematically pick apart the systems of others. For this reason, each individual chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* serves, to some extent, as a microcosm of the whole. Arguments sometimes seem repetitive—and Kamalaśīla even points out many cases when roughly the same argument is being retooled yet again—but this is neither out of laziness nor a stubborn or unimaginative misunderstanding of the subtle differences between the arguments of different opponents. Rather, the point, as I see Ratié arguing, is that the overall system can be successfully brought to bear against any opponent, so long as one knows both one’s own and one’s opponent’s systems well.

At the very beginning of the *Pañjikā*, immediately after the *maṅgala*, Kamalaśīla says this:

Thoughtful people in this world determine the subject and the purpose of a scholarly work (*śāstra*) before engaging (*pravṛtti*) with it; and faith in great beings is the principal cause of the attainment of all that is good. With this in mind, in order to generate faith in the Blessed One, and so that the reader (*śrotṛ*) will engage with this work attentively, Śāntarakṣita declares its subject (*abhidheya*) and

³⁴ Kamalaśīla intends the greatness (*mahat*) of the sentence merely in terms of scale rather than eminence, unlike, e.g., the description of individual Upaniṣadic sayings as *mahā-vākya*. The question is whether an entire treatise (*sakalam śāstram*) can be understood as a single sentence with a single subject. An opponent argues that a treatise is not a sentence but a heap of sentences (*vākya-samūha*); Kamalaśīla explains that a sentence need not only be composed of words, but can be composed of sentences, as well (*na hi padair eva vākyaṃ ārabhyate, api tu vākyaair api* [TSP 9.22]).

³⁵ He uses the words *avabodha* (“awakening to”) and *udgraha* (“taking up”) to clarify that the second sense of *saṃgraha* is cognitive (TSP 11).

³⁶ Ratié 2014, 168–171.

³⁷ Ratié 2014, 169: “De même, c’est contre la pensée de Kumāriḷa *en tant que système* que Śāntarakṣita et Kamalaśīla présentent leurs arguments” (Likewise, it is against Kumāriḷa’s thought *as a system* that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla present their arguments), etc. (emphasis original).

purpose (*prayojana*) in the first verses,³⁸ while paying homage to his own teacher (*śāstr*).³⁹

Indeed, scholars within the Indian philosophical tradition often say that *śāstra* should begin with a statement about the subject and purpose of the work, as well as some indication of the manner in which the present study fulfills that purpose. As a number of scholars have noted before,⁴⁰ what follows Kamalaśīla's introduction is a lengthy essay on the nature of the subject and purpose of the *Tattvasamgraha* in particular, and the need for, and function of, an opening statement of purpose in scholarly works in general. Without naming anyone, Kamalaśīla raises and refutes several opposing opinions on these questions. Toru Funayama, focusing carefully on the language of these objections, demonstrates that Kamalaśīla is directly engaging with a number of contemporaneous Buddhist commentators.⁴¹ Kamalaśīla's essay, therefore, is an important opportunity to peer into disagreements between contemporaries within roughly the same milieu. Hiroko Matsuoka, following Funayama's lead, delves into the content of the discussion. Specifically, she offers a clear assessment of the differences of opinion between Kamalaśīla and his fellow Buddhist, and fellow Dharmakīrti commentator, Arcaṭa (c. 710–770).⁴² Unlike Kamalaśīla, Arcaṭa does not think the statement of purpose is instrumental in the reader's engagement, but only serves to ward off the claim that the treatise lacks purpose. One of Arcaṭa's claims in formulating this argument is that thoughtful people only act on the basis of certainty. Kamalaśīla's counterargument is an important foundation for the work ahead:

It is not true that thoughtful people only undertake a course of action (*pravṛtti*) on the basis of certainty (*niscaya*), as we can see that, for example, farmers act on the basis of uncertainty (*saṁśaya*), as well. You may say, "The activity of farmers is indeed preceded by certainty, because, though they may have uncertainty about future crops (*phala*), they have certainty about the means of producing them (*sādhana*)." This is wrong. The question is whether someone would undertake an action for a particular aim even if there is uncertainty about it. A farmer does not toil for the sake of the means of production. If that were the case, then, because there is, in fact, certainty about the means of production,^a we could say their work is preceded by certainty. Rather, they act for the sake of the crop, the fruit. Seeing as there may be some hindrance to the crop, they are not certain about it, and, as a result, their work is preceded by uncertainty.⁴³

³⁸ Kamalaśīla says "with the verses that begin with the word *prakṛti* and end with the word *Tattvasamgraha*" (*prakṛtīyādibhiḥ ślokaḥ tattvasamgraha ity etatparyantair*).

³⁹ *iha hi śāstre prekṣāvatām abhidheyaprayojanāvasāyapūrvikā pravṛttir mahatsu ca prasādaḥ sarvaśreyo 'dhigateḥ kāraṇaṃ prathamam ity ālocya bhagavati prasādotpādanārtham, śāstre cāsminn ādareṇa śrotuḥ pravṛttyartham svaśāstrpūjāvīdhīpūrvakam asya śāstrasya prakṛtīyādibhiḥ ślokaḥ tattvasamgraha ity etatparyantair abhidheyaprayojane prāha* (TSP 2.1, J1v.2).

⁴⁰ E.g., cf. Funayama 1995; McClintock 2010, especially 58–62 on the "ideal audience" of the text; Matsuoka 2018.

⁴¹ Funayama 1995.

⁴² Matsuoka 2018.

⁴³ *yat tāvad uktaṃ niscayenaiva prekṣāvatām pravṛttir iti tad asat, saṁśayenāpi pravṛttidarśanāt, yathā kṛṣṭivalādīnām. syād etad yady api kṛṣṭivalāder bhāvini phale saṁśayas tathāpi tatphalasāadhananiścayas teṣāṃ vidyata eva, tena niscayapūrvikaiva teṣāṃ pravṛttir iti. tad asamyak. yad arthaṃ hi yasya pravṛtīḥ sā tatsaṁśaye 'pi tasya bhavātīty etāvad iha prakṛtam. na ca kṛṣṭivalādayaḥ sādhanārthaṃ teṣu bījādiṣu^a pravartante yena sādhanaviṣayaniścayasadbhāvān^a niscayapūrvikā pravṛttir eṣāṃ upavarnyate. kiṃ tarhi. phalārthaṃ te tatra pravartante. tatra ca phale pratibandhādisambhāvān na niscayo 'stīty ataḥ saṁśayapūrvikaiva teṣāṃ pravṛtīḥ* (TSP 3.13).

^a The term *bījādiṣu* is written above the central column of J2v.1 as an insertion between *teṣu* and *pravartante*. Further along the same line, there is a long gap between *niscaya* and *sadbhāvāt*, and the term *bījādiṣu* has been traced there by

Farmers toil not, or not merely, for the means of producing their crops, but for the crops, the fruits (*phala*), themselves—and, of course, for the beneficial results of a good yield. Thoughtful readers engage with a treatise not, or not merely, for the “activity” of the text, but for the fruit (*phala*) that work yields—and for the deeper result that follows from that. Practiced farmers are well aware that they are not in complete control of their future crops. A change in the weather, a scourge of some kind, social or political strife, etc., can frustrate even the most diligent and knowledgeable among them. A thoughtful farmer, in other words, knows that there is always uncertainty about future crops. In this formulation, uncertainty (*samśaya*) is always bounded, localized, precise. The only way we might be able to describe the farmer’s actions in terms of certainty, Kamalaśīla says, is the thought, “this will necessarily be enough to produce the intended crop so long as there are neither hindrances nor deficiencies in the assisting causes.”⁴⁴ In other words, *x* will yield *y*, *conditions permitting*. But this, he explains, is not certainty about the future crop, i.e., the result, “because those with ordinary vision (*apara-darśana*) cannot ascertain whether there will be hindrances, and so on.” Knowing what you do not know, and even what you cannot know in principle, is not a hindrance to prudent activity, but a component of it.

The opposite of someone with ordinary (*apara*) vision is someone with supreme (*para*) vision. Kamalaśīla’s *maṅgala* praises the Buddha in part by juxtaposing his greatness with Kamalaśīla’s (and our) dull-mindedness. In Śāntarakṣita’s *maṅgala*, to which we will return shortly, he directly refers to the Buddha as the omniscient one (*sarva-jñā*, “all-knowing”). This term anticipates the final chapter of the *Tattvasamgraha*, the “Examination of Persons with Supersensory Vision.” The Buddha knows, with certainty, that when he gives a specific person a specific teaching, he has planted the seeds of awakening. But by contrast with the greatness of the Buddha, all of us are dull-minded. In other words, one would have to be a superhero, an extremely advanced practitioner, or maybe even a buddha, to know with certainty that a particular practice, engagement with a particular text, etc., will necessarily yield the intended result. Thoughtful people—those who think before they act—act precisely with uncertainty, which is to say with a clear sense of what they do not know.

Collecting uncertainties is not a lamentable condition. Knowing we may never transform all of our uncertainties into certainties, we can avoid the pitfalls of simplistic notions of knowledge and progress; knowing enough to be uncertain, we can investigate.

“The dull-minded like me are never able to say anything that is new.” And so, I speak.

§ DEBATES ABOUT DEBATE

One of the many difficulties in reading and interpreting works like the *Tattvasamgraha* concerns the chronology and the fragmentariness of Buddhist-Brahmanical “dialogue” or “debate.” Birgit Kellner points out that, in their engagement with Kumāriḷa, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are hosting a debate with a dead man.⁴⁵ In addition, we cannot say what scores of salvos and rejoinders have not

another, more recent hand. This would make the whole phrase *sādhana-viśaya-niścaya-bijādiṣu sadbhāvāt*, which would be difficult to make sense of grammatically or semantically. It seems someone was unhappy with the gap and chose to repeat the inserted *bijādiṣu* from earlier in the line.

⁴⁴ pratibandhakasahakāriṣaikalayor asambhave saty avāśyam abhimataphalasampādanāyālam etad ity evaṃrūpaḥ (TSP 4.5, J2v.2).

⁴⁵ Kellner 1997a, xxviii: “Dieses Element des Sprecherwechsels im argumentativen Text bedingt einen gewissen

withstood the test of time. We know, for example, that Aviddhakarṇa had a few things to say about Buddhist arguments for momentariness and selflessness, but we do not know whether anyone in his tradition voiced support for his arguments. We know some later Naiyāyikas referred to Bhāvivikta as an ancient Cārvāka thinker, but did they know him to be a commentator on the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, as well? Precisely what connects these dots will likely remain out of reach for us.

The debates in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* are imaginary. Śāntarakṣita collects the arguments of his rivals and the counterarguments and rebuttals of the Buddhist thinkers he favors, and assembles them into a series of pseudo-dialogues. Nevertheless, the form of these dialogues derives in part from the idea that representatives of opposing religious and philosophical traditions can and do sometimes hold formal debates before an audience. It is unsurprising, therefore, that many of Śāntarakṣita's source texts feature not only arguments about particular subjects and theories, but also about the rules of argumentation and debate.

In the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are presented primarily as representing the Nyāya tradition. By the time Śāntarakṣita composed the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, thinkers from the Buddhist and Nyāya traditions had already sparred—at least in textual form—for hundreds of years. Not merely with one another, and not merely across the Buddhist-Brahmanical divide, Buddhists and Naiyāyikas debated amongst themselves, as well as with real or imagined representatives of various other traditions. These textual “debates” cover broad ground. Though a great deal in the soteriological and analytic orientation of Buddhist and Nyāya logicians is shared, Nyāya asserts many things anathema to Buddhist thought: there is a permanent self; the universe has a single intelligent creator; substantial wholes exist over and above their component parts; anything that exists is nameable in principle. Buddhist logicians disagree on every count.

In the translation and study that follows, we will see several instances of these kinds of disagreements as well as the shape the “debate” takes in textual form. For now, we need to consider some of the opposing ideas from Buddhist and Nyāya thinkers on the nature of debate itself to appreciate the importance of the social practice in their engagement with one another.

Setting the Terms

There is a clear distinction between friendly and contentious debates in the *Nyāyasūtra* (NS),⁴⁶ the

‘ahistorischen’ Charakter: Wenn Kamalaśīla etwa meint, daß ‘der Gegner’ in TS₂ 1672, wo Śāntarakṣita aus ŚV *abhāva* zitiert, ein Argument gegen ein zuvor von Śāntarakṣita vorgebrachtes Argument vorbringt, ist das natürlich anachronistisch, weil Kumārīla oder ein anderer Mīmāṃsaka wohl kaum *tatsächlich* auf Śāntarakṣita bezug genommen haben kann - es sei denn, Kamalaśīla hätte nach Art eines Fernsehreporters blitzschnell einen in der Nachbarschaft ansässigen Mīmāṃsaka um seine Meinung gefragt. Summa summarum kann man einen Text dieser Gattung also aus einer bestimmten Perspektive (hier der buddhistischen) verfaßte Debatte zwischen zwei zu Idealtypen ihrer Denkrichtung abstrahierten Disputanten bezeichnen” (This element of the shift in speakers in an argumentative text entails a certain “ahistorical” character. For example, if Kamalaśīla thinks the “adversary” in TS₂ 1672, which Śāntarakṣita quotes from ŚV *abhāva*, is arguing against an argument previously raised by Śāntarakṣita, this would of course be anachronistic, because Kumārīla, or another Mīmāṃsaka, cannot have actually referred to Śāntarakṣita—unless Kamalaśīla, in the manner of a speeding television reporter, had asked a Mīmāṃsaka residing in the neighborhood for his opinion. All in all, we can describe a text in this genre as depicting from a specific perspective (here the Buddhist) a debate between two disputants that are abstracted into ideal types of their respective schools of thought).

⁴⁶ Especially in the later recension of the sutras preserved, e.g., in Vātsyāyana's commentary. Cf. Preisendanz 2000; Prets 2001.

foundational text of the Nyāya tradition and the primary source material for all of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's Naiyāyika rivals. NS identifies three different types of dialogue: debates (*vāda*), quarrels (*jalpa*), and attacks (*vitandā*).⁴⁷ These are defined as follows:

- *Vāda* entails two people: taking opposing positions on an uncertain manner; using means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and reasoning (*tarka*) to prove their respective positions and find fault with one another's; not contradicting established doctrine; and formulating their arguments in accord with the five components (*avayava*) of a valid formal argument.⁴⁸
- *Jalpa* has the same characteristics, plus proving and finding fault by means of *chala* (quibbling, equivocation), *jāti* (class, consequence[?]), and *nigrahasthāna* (grounds for defeat).⁴⁹ The first of these, "equivocation" (*chala*), involves intentionally misinterpreting the words of one's interlocutor. The second, *jāti*, is a troublesome concept, but eventually came to refer to a class of devious or sophistical objections.⁵⁰ "Grounds for defeat" (*nigrahasthāna*) are, as the term would suggest, failures in the proponent's argumentation or reasoning that warrant their defeat.⁵¹
- *Vitandā* is when one engages in *jalpa* without bothering to maintain a counterpoint.⁵²

In concert with these concepts, the *Nyāyasūtra* also defines various aspects of reasoning and formulating arguments. For example, the "five components" mentioned above refer to the formal sequence of a Nyāya syllogism. A typical example involves inferring fire on the far side of a mountain upon seeing billows of smoke rising from it. The five components are as follows:

1. Proposition (*pratijñā*): There is fire on the mountain.
2. Reason (*hetu*): Because there is smoke.
3. Exemplification (*udāharaṇa*): Where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen.
4. Application (*upanaya*): There is, in that way, smoke on the mountain.
5. Conclusion (*nigamana*): Therefore, there is fire on the mountain.

According to Nyāya, all five of these components, in this particular sequence, are necessary to successfully prove one's point. (Buddhist philosophers disagree, finding especially (4) and (5) redundant.) Carrying on discussions, quarrels, and attacks, requires an understanding of established doctrine, the processes of reasoning and argumentation, and the regulations of debate (e.g., the

⁴⁷ *Vāda* derives from the root *vad*, "to speak." *Jalpa* from *jalp*, also refers to speech, but more typically refers to chitchat, prattle, or murmurs, and, hence, to conversation. The verbal root of *vitandā* (*taḍ*) refers to beating or striking, whether in the sense of beating a drum or striking a person. The prefix *vi-* gives the sense of opposition or difference, i.e., beating against or striking away.

⁴⁸ *pramāṇatarkasādhānopālambhaḥ siddhāntāviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vādaḥ* (NS 39.5).

⁴⁹ *yathoktopapannaś chala-jātinigrahasthānasādhānopālambho jalpaḥ* (NS 40.12).

⁵⁰ Cf. Prets 2001. In early Nyāya, *jāti* may well have referred to a type of justifiable criticism about an undesirable consequence of an argument (*jāti* often means "class," but most coarsely also means "production," and may in this valence suggest something like a consequence).

⁵¹ Importantly, some "grounds for defeat" are used in *vāda*, but for the most part they are only important when the speaker is contending with a genuine rival. As we will see in a moment, Nyāya distinguishes between *samvāda*, the kind of friendly debates one holds with fellow truth-seekers, and *vigryha-kathana*, the hostile discussions one holds with someone who wishes only to vanquish a rival rather than come to an understanding of *tattva*.

⁵² *sa pratipakṣasthāpanāhīno vitandā* (NS 41.16).

various “grounds for defeat”). Importantly, components (2) and (3), the reason and the exemplification, can both be formulated in terms of similarity *or* dissimilarity. One consequence of this is that the example can either instantiate the co-presence of the reason and the property to be proven *or* their co-absence. I.e., in the argument above, a kitchen is “similar” in the sense that it possesses fire, therefore the smokiness of a kitchen demonstrates the principle that “where there is smoke, there is fire.” By contrast, the non-smokiness of a lake, which is “dissimilar” in the sense that it does not possess fire, would demonstrate the inverse principle, that “where there is no fire, there is no smoke.” The former is called positive concomitance (*anvaya*, “association”), and the latter is called negative concomitance (*vyatireka*, “separateness”). In many cases, an argument can be formulated through both similarity and dissimilarity.

Toward the end of the *Nyāyasūtra*, a passage (NS 4.2.38–51) on the cultivation of *tattva-jñāna* (knowledge of the principles)⁵³ culminates in a discussion of friendly and hostile encounters. *Tattva-jñāna* arises on the basis of internal and external yogic practices, persistent study (*abhyāsa*) of Nyāya, and *saṃvāda*, i.e., “friendly debates.” A seeker should engage in *saṃvāda* “with unenvious students, teachers, peers, and distinguished, well-wishing people.”⁵⁴ By contrast, “*jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* are for the sake of protecting the ascertainment of truth, like a covering of thorny branches to protect the germination of seeds.”⁵⁵

The following sutra, which concludes the passage, reads simply: “Hostile conversation (*vigṛhya-kathana*) with these.”⁵⁶ Vātsyāyana (c. late 5th century),⁵⁷ in his *Nyāyabhāṣya*, the earliest extant commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*, frames this statement like this:

For someone being disrespected by another party out of their indifference to knowledge (*vidyā-nirveda*), or the like, there is

Hostile conversation with these. (NS 4.2.51)

“Hostile,” i.e., with the desire for victory, not with the desire for *tattva-jñāna*. This itself is for the guarding of knowledge, not for profit, honor, or fame.⁵⁸

All of this is to say that, according to Nyāya, when one is engaging with a genuine rival, e.g., a Buddhist, it is permissible to use equivocation, sophisms, and facetious grounds for defeat. The clear implication is that a contentious debate takes place before an audience, and that the winner of the debate may win the audience’s allegiance. As we know, in some of the tales of great debates, companions of the losing party are forced to convert on the spot. The *Nyāyasūtra*, unsurprisingly, considers Nyāya the true bearer of the knowledge required for ultimate spiritual advancement;

⁵³ According to the first two sutras in the *Nyāyasūtra* (1.1.1–2), emancipation (*apavarga*) requires *tattva-jñāna*, knowledge of the sixteen principles defined throughout the *Nyāyasūtra*.

⁵⁴ *taṃ śiṣyagurusabrahmacāriviśiṣṭaśreyorthibhir anasūyibhir abhyupeyāt* ||4.2.48|| (NS 281.1).

⁵⁵ *tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe bijaparohasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ kaṅṭakaśākhāvaraṇavat* ||4.2.50|| (NS 281.14).

⁵⁶ *tābhyāṃ vigṛhyakathanam* ||4.2.51|| (NS 282.3). If we do not take *vigṛhya* as a qualification of *kathana*, the result is something like, “Taking up an argument, there is conversation with these.” But I think the point is far clearer if we read *vigṛhya* as a qualification of *kathana*, resulting in a *karmadhāraya* compound. Consider Vātsyāyana’s comments below.

⁵⁷ Franco and Preisendanz 1995.

⁵⁸ *vidyānirvedādibhiś ca pareṇāvajñāyamānasya tābhyāṃ vigṛhyakathanam* ||4.2.51|| *vigṛhyeti vijigīṣayā na tattvajñānabubhutsayeti. tad etad vidyāparipālanārthaṃ, na lābhapūjākhyātyartham iti* (NBh 282.2).

devious means are permissible in a contentious debate if they are needed to protect and preserve the truth.

On the Buddhist side, we find direct attacks on the central concepts of the Nyāya analysis of reasoning and argumentation in works by, among others, Vasubandhu (c. late 4th century),⁵⁹ Dignāga (c. 480–540),⁶⁰ and Dharmakīrti (c. 6th century),⁶¹ all of whom are themselves subjects of tales of great conquests in debate.⁶²

Vasubandhu's texts on logic are no longer extant, but the *Vādavidhi* ("Method of Debate"), likely his earliest on the subject, survives in Tibetan fragments.⁶³ In this brief text, Vasubandhu discusses the major issues in formulating an inferential argument and determining its validity and soundness. He defines the various components of an argument,⁶⁴ delineates types of defects in an argument or in a critique,⁶⁵ and contends with specific kinds of *jāti* defined in the *Nyāyasūtra*—all in distinction to way NS defines and describes these concepts. Along the way, he revises both the formal requirements of a valid argument and the underlying epistemological theory. Implicit in his revision is a critique of two key aspects of Nyāya theory. First, he entirely elides the fourth and fifth components of a Nyāya syllogism, most likely because the application is essentially a restatement of the reason, and the conclusion is literally a restatement of the proposition. More fundamentally, he demands that the exemplification demonstrate an "invariable relation" (*avinābhāva*), rather than mere co-presence or co-absence. Vasubandhu's implicit critique of Nyāya epistemology in the *Vādavidhi* is that correlation is not causation.

Dignāga's corpus is extensive, though many of his works have been lost. At least one of these lost works, the *Nyāyaparīkṣā* ("Examination of Nyāya"), seems to have been focused entirely on Nyāya theory.⁶⁶ Śāntarakṣita suggests that the *Nyāyaparīkṣā*, together with Vasubandhu's (lost) *Vādavidhāna* (a different text than the *Vādavidhi* but presumably with a similar topic), paved the way for a proper understanding of formal logic. Yet we can only speculate about the content of such a work.

Dignāga is often credited with a number of innovations in Buddhist logic that can, in fact be traced at least to Vasubandhu. Even so, his formulation and formalization of earlier innovations clearly had a great impact on later Buddhist thinkers and many of their Brahmanical rivals. One of his unique

⁵⁹ Deleanu 2006 (186–194), with a detailed examination of the complex web of evidence surrounding Vasubandhu's dates, conjectures ca. 350–430 CE.

⁶⁰ Frauwallner 1961, Hattori 1968.

⁶¹ Frauwallner (1961) proposes 600–600 as Dharmakīrti's dates, and most scholars have accepted this as a rough estimate, though the issue has received a lot of attention. Helmut Krasser (2012) more recently argues, on the basis of the textual relationships between Bhāvivikta, Kumārila, and Dharmakīrti, that we should place the latter two in the middle of the sixth century.

⁶² Cf. Cabezón 2008; Hattori 1968, "Introduction."

⁶³ Anacker 1984, pages 31–48, includes an introduction and translation of the *Vādavidhi*.

⁶⁴ Eliding components (4) and (5) and highlighting the property-to-be-proven within the statement of the proposition.


⁶⁵ Vasubandhu most significantly redefines argumentative defects by reducing the list of *hetvābhāsas* (fallacious reasons) and *nigrahasthānas* (grounds for defeat) in the *Nyāyasūtra* to three varieties of defect: unestablished (*asiddha*), inconclusive (*anaikāntika*), and contrary (*viruddha*). He may have used different terms, but the three clearly correspond to what eventually became the standard list.

⁶⁶ In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, he mentions the *Nyāyaparīkṣā* in concert with texts called *Vaiśeṣikaparīkṣā* and *Sāṃkhyaaparīkṣā*, which shows that the term *nyāya* in the title *Nyāyaparīkṣā* refers to the text tradition rather than, e.g., to abstract logic.

contributions is the so-called *hetucakra*, the wheel of reasons. The *hetucakra* is essentially a table of all of the possible relations a reason (*hetu*) can have with the similar and dissimilar cases (*sapakṣa-vipakṣa*). The idea is to show that only two out of the nine possibilities constitute valid reasons:

<i>Hetucakra</i> ⁶⁷		
1. +sapakṣa, +vipakṣa	2. +sapakṣa, -vipakṣa	3. +sapakṣa, ±vipakṣa
4. -sapakṣa, +vipakṣa	5. -sapakṣa, -vipakṣa	6. -sapakṣa, ±vipakṣa
7. ±sapakṣa, +vipakṣa	8. ±sapakṣa, -vipakṣa	9. ±sapakṣa, ±vipakṣa
Key: + a property of <i>all</i> ; - a property of <i>none</i> ; ± a property of <i>some</i> .		

This table highlights several key features of Buddhist logic according to Vasubandhu and Dignāga. Mere positive *or* negative concomitance is not sufficient. The reason must bear a specific relation to similar *and* dissimilar cases in order to prove the point. Specifically, the reason must be a property of at least one similar case (±) and must not be a property of any dissimilar case (-). As the following tree diagram highlights, (2) and (8) alone are valid; the rest are fallacious (*ābhāsa*, “apparent”):



[fig: *Hetucakra* tree diagram]

In addition, the reason must be a property of the subject of the argument (*pakṣadharmatva*)—if there is no smoke on the mountain, there is no reason to infer fire there. Altogether, the reason’s relationships to the subject (*pakṣa*), the similar case (*sapakṣa*), and the dissimilar case (*vipakṣa*) constitute what Dignāga calls the three characteristics (*trirūpa*) that a valid reason must fulfill.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Cf. Matilal 1998, 7ff, for analysis of the members of the “circle” and its development after Dignāga.

⁶⁸ As we will see though much of the present study, inferential reasoning was largely inductive prior to Dharmakīrti’s insight that there are two inference-warranting relations: causality (*tadutpatti*) and identity (*tādātmya*). This innovation allows Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla to insist on the intrinsic authority of valid inferences, rather than merely on inductive consistency.

By contrast, Uddyotakara (c. 6th century),⁶⁹ author of the *Nyāya-vārttika*, the earliest extant subcommentary on Vātsyāyana's *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, defends the validity of what later Naiyāyikas refer to as *kevala-anvayin* and *kevala-vyatirekin* arguments, i.e., those that have *only* positive or *only* negative concomitance. In some cases, according to Uddyotakara, there is in principle no dissimilar case, or no similar case, and yet a sound inference can still be drawn. Uddyotakara directly cites Vasubandhu and Dignāga several times each in the *Vārttika*. His engagement with their work got the attention of several later Buddhist thinkers, including Dharmakīrti and, later, Śāntarakṣita.

As if in defense of Vasubandhu and Dignāga against Uddyotakara's attack, Dharmakīrti composed the *Vādanyāya*, which may have been his last work. According to Dharmakīrti, good people had already demonstrated the rules of debate (*vāda-nyāya*) before his time, but wrongheaded people obscured the light of truth; therefore, he felt the need to compose the *Vādanyāya* to ward off their attacks.⁷⁰ Śāntarakṣita wrote a commentary on the *Vādanyāya*, the *Vipañcitārthā*, which contains several fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, discussed at length in Appendix A. Śāntarakṣita clarifies that the "good people" in question are Vasubandhu and Dignāga. It is here that he specifically cites Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhāna*⁷¹ and Dignāga's *Nyāyaparīkṣā* as forerunners to the *Vādanyāya*. The "wrongheaded people" are, of course, the Naiyāyikas, chiefly Uddyotakara, who occupies most of Dharmakīrti's attention in the *Vādanyāya*. Vasubandhu concerns himself primarily with *jāti* in the *Vādavidhi*, and Dharmakīrti focuses, in turn, on *nigrahassthāna*, "grounds for defeat." As far as Dharmakīrti is concerned, "grounds for defeat" are only grounds for defeat if they represent a genuine defect in the speaker's reasoning or argumentation. The fact that Naiyāyikas like Uddyotakara are willing to use devious and disingenuous methods to win debates makes them, in Dharmakīrti's estimation, cheats (*śaṭha*).

Playfighting

John Taber, in his strikingly spirited review of Kellner's study of these texts, points out that the *Tattvasamgraha* "exhaustively refutes the doctrines of competing systems, Hindu and Buddhist alike (though Madhyamaka is spared)," but then emphasizes that it "devotes particular attention to—one could even say, is obsessed with—Mīmāṃsā as represented by Kumāriḷa."⁷² Taber observes, following Frauwallner, that Śāntarakṣita likely had a copy of Kumāriḷa's now lost *Bṛhaṭṭikā*. He was clearly affected by what he read. He may not have been convinced by it, but persuasion is only one potential result of a polemic. In fact, as Phyllis Granoff has shown, narratives of the great debate victories of non-Buddhist thinkers often evince great suspicion that winning a debate really entails convincing anyone of anything. Granoff mentions, among several other examples, a story of Kumāriḷa's victory over a Buddhist thinker. Despite the victory in debate, the king is not entirely satisfied. "His

⁶⁹ Uddyotakara must have lived some time in between Dignāga, whom he quotes, and Dharmakīrti, who quotes him. He may have been a junior contemporary of the former or an older contemporary of the latter.

⁷⁰ loke 'vidyātimirapaṭalollekhanas tattvadṛṣṭer vādanyāyaḥ parahitaratair eṣa sadbhiḥ praṇītaḥ | tattvālokaṃ timirayati taṃ durvidagdhō jano 'yaṃ tasmād yatnaḥ kṛta iha mayā tatsamujjvālanāya ||3|| (VN 68.10).

⁷¹ A different text than the *Vādavidhi*, but presumably with fairly similar content. (The titles are synonymous.)

⁷² Taber 2001, 73. Indeed, even when contending with Cārvāka in the "Examination of Lokāyata," the verses with which Śāntarakṣita characterizes the Cārvāka view are from Kumāriḷa's *Ślokavārttika*. (It is possible that both thinkers are lifting the verses from another text, but I find Franco's take rather compelling: "I tend to assume that Kumāriḷa put the Cārvāka arguments into verse and that it was simply easier for Śāntarakṣita, who knew that they were Cārvāka arguments, to quote them in an already versified form" [Franco 1997, 101]).

objection,” Granoff writes, “seems natural enough; winning in a debate might be due to nothing more than skill in argument. A good debater should be able to argue successfully even for a wrong doctrine. How then, the king asks, is a bystander to know who was really right?”⁷³ Kumārila then participates in two additional tests—not of his wits, but of his divine or supernatural capacities. He survives a leap from a high cliff and then correctly guesses the contents of a pot that is obscured from view. As Granoff explains, “the debate is suspect because its results might be due to mere cleverness on the part of a debater who in fact holds the wrong position.”⁷⁴

Even Dharmakīrti, who certainly seems to hold that the truth of the matter can be rationally arrived at and proven, laments his inability to win anyone over in one of the *maṅgala* verses from his *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti*:

Usually people are addicted to vulgarity and lack the wisdom equal to the task (of understanding learned treatises); they are not only disinterested in what is said well, but, being afflicted with the filth of envy, are even hostile towards it.

Therefore, although I believe this work to be of no use to others, my heart, its determination increased through repeated study of eloquent works for a long time, has become eager for it. (Hayes and Gillon 2001, 2)⁷⁵

Kellner brings up the chronological gap between Kumārila and Śāntarakṣita in order to point out that, in fact, the dialogue can at best be only an idealized one. McClintock, though agreeing with the basic point, nevertheless warns against excluding even dead opponents from Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s intended audience. “While Kumārila, for example, may have been dead at the time of the composition of TS/P,” she says, “his tradition (the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā) appears to have been alive and well.”⁷⁶ Still, as Ratié mentions, the chronological distance between the texts that comprise the centuries-long “dialogue(s)” or “debate(s)” between Buddhists, Brahmins, and others, means, in part, that interpretations and intentions may well have shifted over time within and between these various traditions.⁷⁷ But we should also be suspicious of the notion that these textual dialogues, or even the purported public debates haunting them, were intended or accepted as efforts to win over new

⁷³ Granoff 1985, 465.

⁷⁴ Granoff 1985, 466.

⁷⁵ *prāyaḥ prakṛtasaktir apratibalaprajño janaḥ kevalam | nānārthy eva subhāsitaiḥ parigato vidveṣṭy apīrṣyāmalaiḥ | tenāyaṃ na paropakāra itī naś cintāpi cetaś ciraṃ | sūktābhyāsavivardhitavyasanam ity atrānubaddhaspṛham* (PVSV 1.4).

Note the resonance—and consonance—between the second line here and the concluding words of Kamalaśīla’s opening *maṅgala*, which is written in the same poetic meter (*śārdūla-vikrīḍita*).

⁷⁶ McClintock 2010, 58 n 132.

⁷⁷ Ratié 2014, 177–178: “Je ne prétends pas être en mesure de démontrer que l’un de ces modèles est plus adéquat que l’autre – la question me semble d’ailleurs d’autant plus difficile à trancher qu’elle comporte également un aspect diachronique : la philosophie indienne a pu, au cours de sa longue histoire, hésiter elle-même entre ces deux modèles, et il est possible que les auteurs bouddhistes eux-mêmes n’aient pas été d’accord quant à la fonction et au public de leur dialectique, sans compter que le dialogue brahmanico-bouddhique qu’on présente souvent comme le moteur ou l’essence de la philosophie indienne est sans doute apparu assez tardivement” (I do not claim to be able to show that one of these models is more fitting than the other – the question seems to me all the more difficult to settle because there is also a diachronic aspect: Indian philosophy, over its long history, may itself have wavered between these two models. It is possible that Buddhist authors themselves did not agree about the function and audience of their dialectic, not to mention that Brahmanico-Buddhist dialogue, which is often presented as the engine or the essence of Indian philosophy, in all likelihood appeared rather late).

converts.⁷⁸

We must not collapse the long spans of time that separate extant entries in the supposed exchange. Nor should we naively accept that these texts represent or imply real exchanges on the ground. But there is also no need to do so in order to see the effects of these texts, and the shared ethos undergirding them. As we have seen, Buddhist thinkers at least as far back as Vasubandhu wrote discrete texts dedicated to the views of specific text traditions. We need not *overly* idealize a simple, coherent, or discrete “Buddhist-Nyāya debate” in order to see the way a thinker like Śāntarakṣita dramatizes such a notion.

Even more centuries separate us from Śāntarakṣita than separated him from his various sources, and yet we, too, are engaged in some kind of ideal dialogue. This does not diminish the exchange. We, too, like Kamalaśīla,⁷⁹ are his readers, his students, his critics, his rivals, his others. And, like both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in their engagement with the works of their allies and their rivals, we, when we read their work, have the task of organizing, interpreting, and finding ourselves in relation to material that can only ever be partial, distant, ideal, concealed, and in part imaginary.

At this point we can return to the question of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*'s audience and purpose. In her conclusion, Ratié contends with a number of scholars who describe works like the *Tattvasaṃgraha* as bad faith exercises. For example, in his study of two works by Ratnakīrti, Katsumi Mimaki, as Ratié puts it, presents Buddhist-Mīmāṃsā debate as “a sort of dialogue of the deaf,”⁸⁰ as if the authors in question are unwilling or unable to hear one another. Like Ratié, I find such a critique misplaced—not to mention that it can be difficult to imagine what sort of text would qualify as a good faith exercise in this view. Rather than a dialogue of stubborn people, Ratié describes Buddhist-Brahmanical discourse as a “philosophical game,” the first rule of which is “that one cannot combat an adversary by attributing to him a thesis he does not hold.”⁸¹ She returns to the martial metaphor in her conclusion a couple of pages later when she argues “that despite *complete* disagreement between the protagonists, some continued to *listen* [and] that it is precisely in this dialogue that the one and the other were able to hone their conceptual weapons.”⁸² The *Tattvasaṃgraha*, she explains, bears witness to this dynamic. This strikes me as a compelling and elegant interpretation as well as

⁷⁸ As Granoff (1985) and Eltschinger (2012) both show.

⁷⁹ And also like Vācaspati Miśra, who, centuries later, quotes a verse by Śāntarakṣita, refutes it, and then moves on with a shrug: “whatever” (*yat kiṃcid etad*).

⁸⁰ “...une sorte de dialogue de sourds” (Ratié 2014, 227).

Ratié cites the passage, “En général, la polémique qui se déroule entre les deux écoles philosophiques indiennes, sans que celles-ci ne cèdent en rien les unes aux autres de leur position fondamentale, a tendance à être superficielle et à se noyer dans des détails sophistiqués. Souvent elle forge de toutes pièces ou même néglige la position des opposants” (In general, the polemic unfolding between these two schools, with neither yielding in any way to the other’s fundamental position, tends to be superficial and to drown in technical details. Sometimes, the polemic even engenders wholesale fabrications or the flat-out refusal to engage with an opponent’s position), from Mimaki 1976, 22.

⁸¹ “...car le jeu philosophique comporte ses règles, et la première d’entre elles consiste en ceci *qu’on ne peut combattre un adversaire en lui attribuant une thèse qui’il ne revendique pas*” (for the philosophical game has rules, and the first of these consists in the fact that *one cannot combat an adversary by attributing to him a thesis he does not hold* [Ratié 2014, 230, emphasis original]).

⁸² “...qu’en dépit d’un désaccord « total » entre ses protagonistes, on a continué de s’y « écouter »; que c’est précisément dans ce dialogue que les uns et les autres ont pu affiner leurs armes conceptuelles; et que le texte de Śāntarakṣita traduit ci-dessous en porte témoignage (Ratié 2014, 231–232).

one that is generous without sacrificing sophistication or feigning certitude.

As readers of the text, we might take one additional step.

It is significant that Ratié refers to the “philosophical game” and adversarial “combat” in the same sentence. The specific image of honing or sharpening one’s weapon bears an interesting resonance with the present study. Toward the end of this study, we will consider an argument I call “Aviddhakarṇa’s sword.” Aviddhakarṇa, in his skeptical guise,⁸³ argues that he need not accept the validity of abstract inferential argumentation in order to best a Buddhist in formal debate. So long as he plays by the Buddhist’s rules, he can beat his rival at his own game. Kamalaśīla imagines Aviddhakarṇa or someone similar comparing this to striking an enemy with his own sword after wresting it from his hands. But, Kamalaśīla replies, you cannot cut someone with an imaginary sword. Aviddhakarṇa, of course, does not get the chance to respond, but I can speak for him: *You can if you are playfighting.*

The Buddhist epistemologists may not have accepted the Nyāya division between *saṃvāda* (friendly debates) and *viṅṛhya-kathana* (hostile discussions), especially because Nyāya warrants the use of devious tactics in the latter. For Dharmakīrti, *vāda* (debate) is for ascertaining truth, whether contending with friends or rivals. But from our privileged position we can disregard this particular prejudice and consider Buddhist works in Nyāya terms.

Kamalaśīla’s insistence on the strict distinction between a real sword, which can cut someone whether they believe in it or not, and an imaginary sword, which cannot even cut the person deludedly imagining it, cannot but remind us of the Nyāya distinction. The devious tools and tactics of *viṅṛhya-kathana* are, as we have just seen, “for the sake of protecting the ascertainment of truth (*tattva*), like a covering of thorny branches to protect the germination of seeds.” Thorns only protect the germination of seeds because it hurts to be pricked by them. But defeat in a formal debate can sting whether the winning argument was metaphysically correct or not.⁸⁴ It would be prudent for Śāntarakṣita to fend off Aviddhakarṇa’s critique with any tools at his disposal if he believed it to be a threat to the ascertainment of truth. Indeed, I argue that he and Kamalaśīla parry Aviddhakarṇa’s attack rather than meet it directly.

But even if such a hostile encounter is integral to the form and method of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, the actual point of the text is, according to Kamalaśīla, the reader’s easy comprehension of *tattva*. One engages in hostile discussions in order to protect the ascertainment of truth. Outward-oriented apologetic work—*viṅṛhya-kathana*—is integral to the reader’s comprehension of truth⁸⁵ and also contains its own didactic force. But we need not distinguish so neatly between fending off non-Buddhists and educating Buddhists. There may well have been thinkers at Nālandā who were hostile to the Dharmakīrtian lineage, and there must have been non-Buddhist thinkers, e.g., some among the Jain thinkers who preserved the only extant manuscripts of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, who can be

⁸³ As I discuss in the next section of the Introduction, Aviddhakarṇa is credited with a Naiyāyika commentary and a Cārvāka commentary. In the latter, he expresses skepticism about the kinds of abstract inferences that Buddhists and Naiyāyikas both accept.

⁸⁴ No surprise that Dharmakīrti sought to set the rules of the game!

⁸⁵ Eltschinger calls attacking rival systems “positive apologetics” and neutralizing their objections “negative apologetics” (Eltchinger 2014, 5).

described as “unenvious students, teachers, peers, and distinguished, well-wishing people,” i.e., those with whom the *Nyāyasūtra* says a seeker should engage in *saṃvāda*. In fact, in the context of the *Nyāyasūtra*, the term *sabrahmacārin* (companion) seems most likely to imply fellow Brahmins.⁸⁶ Regarding the *Tattvasaṃgraha* in terms of *saṃvāda* extends the range of such friendly debates beyond the constrictions of caste or lineage, or the like. Śāntarākṣita may sharpen his sword to fend off the attacks of thinkers like Aviddhakarṇa, but victorious combat in the philosophical game is most fruitful if it protects—and inspires—sincere truth-seeking.

When Kamalaśīla describes the audience (*śrotr-jana*) of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* as thoughtful people (*prekṣāvāt*), people who look before they leap, he is not making a doctrinal distinction. Śāntarākṣita surely imagined the reception of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* within a relatively restricted set of socio-political contexts. And, as Ratié and others have noted, the text has an “obviously didactic character.”⁸⁷ So why have scholars continued to debate its intended audience? For one thing, as Ratié goes on to say, we do not know enough about the function of such texts to claim it was exclusively intended for, or exclusively had influence within, Buddhist circles—or, by implication, to make the contrary claim conclusively.⁸⁸ But the deeper problem is not the lack of historical data. The *Tattvasaṃgraha* exceeds whatever we consider its strict historical moment. We inquire into the audience of a text so we can better understand its force. Knowing what we do not know about its intended audience or institutional function, we must then turn to the text itself—as well as to our own encounter with it. Ratié is right to say that Śāntarākṣita must have known it would reach a broader audience, and the *Tattvasaṃgraha* does not demand an exclusively Buddhist audience, even if it clearly favors one. But it does demand a certain degree of attentiveness and persistence from its reader. The word for “reader” in medieval Sanskrit texts is *śrotr*, which means “hearer” or “listener.” This, of course, stems from the storied oral traditions of India. Often enough, a text’s audience was comprised chiefly of listeners rather than readers. (We similarly describe auditors and readers both as an “audience.”) But this also has a certain poetic resonance when we consider the audience of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. If the audience (*śrotr-jana*) of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* is readers (*śrotr*)—which is to say those who listen to it, who know how to hear it—then why neatly divide its Buddhist and non-Buddhist targets? The audience of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, the audience I would argue the text demands for itself, is anyone we can describe as a *saṃvādin*, someone who participates in *saṃvāda*: a conversation partner.

§ AVIDDHAKARṆA AND BHĀVIVIKTA

Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, the primary focal points of the present study, present us with another strange problem. To put the matter rather plainly, we cannot say definitively whether we are dealing

⁸⁶ *Brahmacārin* is used by Buddhists, as well, to refer to (typically) celibate students and practitioners, but it can also more specifically refer to the first life-stage of a Brahmin, marked by celibacy and Vedic study. The *Nyāyasūtra* is intended as an orthodox Brahmanical *śāstra*, and, so, seems likely to have the latter in mind.

⁸⁷ “...caractère évidemment didactique” (Ratié 2014, 182). The same obviously didactic character explains McClintock’s proposal that non-Buddhists were at least an indirect audience of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* by way of their formal debates with the Buddhist scholar-monks trained by the text.

⁸⁸ Ratié 2014, 182. “Nous savons en effet, pour l’heure en tout cas, bien peu de choses quant à la fonction exacte que les traités philosophiques pouvaient avoir dans l’Inde médiévale, en particulier vis-à-vis de la pratique orale du débat” (For the time being, we know very little about the exact function that philosophical treatises might have had in medieval India, especially concerning the oral practice of debate), and so on.

with four thinkers, three, two, or one. But this does not mean that we must not speak at all. If our only recourse, when dealing with lapses and uncertainties in the record of Indian thinkers and texts, etc., were to make our best guess, lament our scholarly predicament, and wish for the unearthing of clearer evidence, there could never be an end to our lamentations. But even with such a spotty archive, we have such a wealth of material to wade through, and, so, just as much reason to rejoice.

There may be two Aviddhakarṇas or only one, there may be two Bhāviviktas or only one, and Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta may or may not be one and the same man. Were this but a bit of idle prattle, we could at least reject the problem as such. I hope to show that the problem is real enough, but also that this particular problem actually creates opportunities. As is well-known, Erich Frauwallner proposed that there were two Vasubandhus, basing this view partly on apparent discrepancies in the evidence for Vasubandhu's dates and partly on the commentator Yaśomitra's apparent reference to two different thinkers by the same name.⁸⁹ Stefan Anacker, in his study of seven works by Vasubandhu, disputes Frauwallner on both counts, arguing instead that "all evidence points to one thinker."⁹⁰ The implications are not insignificant. According to Frauwallner, "we can trace differences in the doctrine of the senior and the junior Vasubandhu,"⁹¹ but if Anacker is right, we have to interpret such differences in the context of a single career. How the texts attributed to Vasubandhu bear on one another depends not only upon the authenticity of the attribution, but the identity of the author. The evidence for two Aviddhakarṇas is less robust than Frauwallner's evidence for two Vasubandhus, but it is not a trivial idea. Considering why such an idea arises, and what it means to collapse the two Aviddhakarṇas back into one, is instructive. It is especially intriguing, and important, to consider the identity of Aviddhakarṇa alongside that of Bhāvivikta, as we will see.

There has yet to be a focused study on the lost Naiyāyikas, but a number of scholars, such as Ernst Steinkellner, Albrecht Wezler, Esther Solomon, Eli Franco, and Ramkrishna Bhattacharya,⁹² have commented directly on the identities of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta. Between the various arguments these and other scholars have made over the last several decades, four possible positions emerge.

$$2 + 2 = 4$$

The case for two Aviddhakarṇas and the case for two Bhāviviktas are nearly identical. Śāntarakṣita tells us that an author named Aviddhakarṇa wrote a *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*, unmistakably referring to a commentary on the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* (cf. Appendix A). Kamalaśīla, besides attributing passages that are likely from the same commentary to a thinker named Aviddhakarṇa, also tells us that someone named Aviddhakarṇa wrote a *Tattvaṭīkā*—apparently a commentary on the *Cārvākasūtra*, the root text of Cārvāka philosophy—and cites a few passages from it (§14).⁹³ Later commentators also refer

⁸⁹ Frauwallner 1961.

⁹⁰ Anacker 1994, 4 n 14. Cf. "Vasubandhu, His Life and Times" in Anacker 1994 for an extended discussion, including page 24 n 13 on Yaśomitra and Paramārtha's references.

⁹¹ Frauwallner 1961, 132.

⁹² Steinkellner 1961; Wezler 1975; Solomon 1970 and 1971; Franco 1997; Bhattacharya 2010.

⁹³ As is common in Sanskrit philosophy, *tattva* (apparently) refers in Cārvāka to the basic constituents of reality, which in Cārvāka means the four material elements. Several sources cite *athātas tattvam vyākhyāsyāmaḥ* (Now, then, we will explain *tattva*) as the first sutra in the *Cārvākasūtra*.

to Aviddhakarṇa in the context of apparently Cārvāka arguments,⁹⁴ and one later Jain commentator, Vādirājasūri (11th c.), refers to him explicitly as a Cārvāka.

Similarly, Śāntarakṣita refers to Bhāvivikta's *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*, from which Kamalaśīla also apparently cites, and yet Cakradhara (c. 11th c.),⁹⁵ in his commentary on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's (9th c.) *Nyāyamañjarī*, describes someone named Bhāvivikta as an ancient Cārvāka teacher (*cirantana-cārvākācārya*).⁹⁶

So we have references to Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta as authors of *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*s, as well as Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta as authors of commentaries on the *Cārvākasūtra*.

Nyāya and Cārvāka are opposed in many respects. Nyāya postulates a duality between mind and matter; an eternal self, and, so, the reality of rebirth; an all-knowing creator god; four distinct means of knowledge, including scriptural authority; and so on. Cārvāka, on the other hand, holds that consciousness is purely material; that the self persists only until death; that perception is the only primary means of knowledge; etc. At first glance—and maybe even second and third glance—it is hard to imagine a thinker being simultaneously allied with both Nyāya and Cārvāka.

The question, then, is whether Aviddhakarṇa wrote both the *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* and the *Tattvaṭīkā*, or whether two separate thinkers with the same name each wrote one or the other; the same question goes for Bhāvivikta. Some scholars, like Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, argue that we cannot say one way or the other, “since there is no hard fact for either accepting or for denying such a hypothesis.”⁹⁷ Kamalaśīla does not say, for example, that the author of the *Tattvaṭīkā* is the same Aviddhakarṇa as the apparent Naiyāyika he quotes elsewhere in his *Pañjikā*. In fact, Bhattacharya goes so far as to say that the Cārvāka Aviddhakarṇa is “to be distinguished from his namesake who was a Naiyāyika,” erring on the side of two Aviddhakarṇas.⁹⁸

This leaves us with as many as four thinkers, two by each name.

$$1 + 1 = 2$$

Steinkellner makes the case for a single Aviddhakarṇa and argues that if one and the same Aviddhakarṇa wrote both the *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* and the *Tattvaṭīkā*, he must have undergone a conversion from theism to materialism or vice versa.⁹⁹ Notably, the article in which Steinkellner makes this

⁹⁴ Anantavīrya (c. late 10th/early 11th c.), in his commentary (*ṭīkā*) on Akalaṅka's (c. 720–780) *Siddhiviniścaya*, attributes Aviddhakarṇa with a Cārvāka-esque statement about cognition. See Appendix B.

⁹⁵ Shah specifies only the 10th–12th centuries of the Vikrama Samvat.

⁹⁶ See the introductory section to “Maṅgala” and Appendix B.

⁹⁷ Bhattacharya 2010, 424.

⁹⁸ Bhattacharya 2011, 57.

⁹⁹ Steinkellner 1961, 154–155: “Kamalaśīla nun, der außer dem Bhāṣyam Śabara's und einigen buddhistischen Werken kaum den Namen irgendeines Werkes der von seinem Lehrer bekämpften Autoren nennt, weist das einzige Cārvāka-Fragment unter dem Namen Aviddhakarṇa's als Zitat aus einer Tattvaṭīkā aus, die er an anderer Stelle nocheinmal nennt, um auf breitere Ausführung einer Cārvāka-Argumentation zu verweisen. Dieser Umstand ist ganz gegen die Gewohnheit Kamalaśīla's, der auch den übrigen Fragmenten Aviddhakarṇa's keine Werksangabe beifügt. Es hat den Anschein, als wollte er diese Stelle als Cārvākastelle unter den übrigen Stellen desselben Autors hervorheben; hätte er doch, wenn es die Zeilen eines anderen Aviddhakarṇa wären, den Unterschied mit dem Hinweis auf die Systemzugehörigkeit des Autors leichter und deutlicher bezeichnen können. Notwendig war ihm dann diese Unterscheidung, weil er in der nächsten Umgebung des Fragments einige Nyāya-Stellen Aviddhakarṇa's brachte [...].”

argument predates the publication of Cakradhara’s commentary. That is to say, at the time, Steinkellner was unaware of Bhāvivikta’s affiliation with Cārvāka. Wezler’s response appears around fifteen years later, and three years after Nagin Shah’s publication of Cakradhara’s commentary. Wezler is skeptical that a thinker should have to go “from Saul to Paul,” i.e., to have a full conversion, in order to comment on two different systems. The presumption that one would is, Wezler says, unconvincing.¹⁰⁰ Strikingly, Wezler’s chief argument against Aviddhakarṇa’s “Saul to Paul” conversion is the fact that Cakradhara identifies Bhāvivikta as a Cārvāka. If Aviddhakarṇa could only have commented on both traditions if he underwent a full conversion, presumably the same would be true for Bhāvivikta. Without the underlying prejudice, Wezler implies, there is no evidence for Aviddhakarṇa’s conversion. Instead, the fact that Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta both authored Nyāya *and* Cārvāka commentaries demands a rational explanation.

Steinkellner highlights Kamalaśīla’s reference to the *Tattvaṭīkā*. Kamalaśīla never mentions the title of the *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*, and, in fact, rarely mentions any titles whatsoever, yet he refers to the *Tattvaṭīkā* of Aviddhakarṇa relatively shortly after mentioning Aviddhakarṇa as the author of a clearly Naiyāyika argument. In Steinkellner’s view, this suggests that Kamalaśīla mentioned the *Tattvaṭīkā* in order to clarify that he was referring to a different text, on a different system, by the same thinker.¹⁰¹ For example, if he meant to refer to a different thinker who goes by the same name, he could easily have referred not to the title of a text, but to something like *lokāyatika-aviddhakarṇa*, “Aviddhakarṇa the materialist.” Wezler picks up on this argument against two Aviddhakarṇas to argue that there is only one Bhāvivikta, too. But he also leverages Bhāvivikta’s identity against Steinkellner’s argument that

Wenn also beide Gruppen von Fragmenten demselben Aviddhakarṇa gehören, muß dieser Autor einen Wechsel vom System der Cārvāka zum Nyāya vollzogen haben und gleichzeitig damit eine Wandlung vom Materialisten zum Theisten, oder umgekehrt” (Now, Kamalaśīla hardly mentions the name of any work of the writers opposed by his teacher apart from Śābara’s *Bhāṣya* and some Buddhist works, yet he refers to the only Cārvāka fragment under the name Aviddhakarṇa as a fragment of a *Tattvaṭīkā*, which he mentions again elsewhere to refer to broader execution of Cārvāka argumentation. This goes against Kamalaśīla’s practice, who adds no indication of the work of the remaining fragments of Aviddhakarṇa. It seems as though he would like to emphasize this passage as the Cārvāka position among the other passages of the same author; if these had been lines from a different Aviddhakarṇa, he could have more easily and clearly described the difference with reference to the system of the author’s membership. This distinction was necessary for him because he had cited some of the Nyāya positions of Aviddhakarṇa in the immediate vicinity of this fragment [...]).

So if both groups of fragments belong to the same Aviddhakarṇa, he must have made a change from the Cārvāka system to the Nyāya, and at the same time a change from a materialist to a theist, or vice versa. He, then, wrote a *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*, i.e., a commentary on the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, and is also the author of a *Tattvaṭīkā*, a Cārvāka work that, according to the fragments, should have been logical and epistemological, and, following the title, also polemically oriented).

¹⁰⁰ Wezler 1975, 144: “Die neuen Nachrichten über Bhāvivikta aber sind dazu angetan, diese These weiter zu erschüttern. Ich sage „weiter“, weil sie mir wegen des ihr zugrunde liegenden Vor-Urteils, daß ein Autor sich nicht zu zwei, weithin gegensätzlichen Systemen wissenschaftlich äußern könne, ohne sich jeweils vollständig mit dem Gegenstand zu identifizieren, ohne vom Saulus zum Paulus zu werden, oder umgekehrt, schon vorher wenig überzeugend erschien. Daß sowohl Aviddhakarṇa als auch Bhāvivikta, die auch zeitlich nicht weit voneinander entfernt sind, einen solchen Systemwechsel vollzogen haben, will noch weniger einleuchten. Für entschieden plausibler darf wohl die Annahme gelten, daß diese bemerkenswerte Konvergenz sachliche Gründe hat” (The new information on Bhāvivikta is likely to further upset this thesis. I say ‘further’ because the underlying prejudice that one author cannot formally comment on two widely different systems without fully identifying himself with the subject, without going from Saul to Paul, had already seemed unconvincing. That both Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, who were also not far apart in time, carried out such a change in system is even less clear. It is decidedly more plausible that this remarkable convergence has a factual rationale).

¹⁰¹ Steinkellner 1961, 155.

Aviddhakarṇa must have been a convert.

From all of this, we get two thinkers, a single Aviddhakarṇa and a single Bhāvivikta, each of whom wrote a Nyāya commentary and a Cārvāka commentary, either of whom may or may not have converted.

$$2 + 1 = 3$$

Of course, Steinkellner's argument, though compelling, is not conclusive (nor does he suggest it is). It is more plausible that there is a single Aviddhakarṇa than two of them, but not certain.¹⁰² In addition, neither Śāntarākṣita nor Kamalaśīla ever refers to a *Tattvaṭīkā* by Bhāvivikta, and apart from Cakradhara's remark, there are no clearly Cārvāka fragments attributed to Bhāvivikta. For this reason, Steinkellner's argument for a single Aviddhakarṇa cannot be carried over to Bhāvivikta. It is even less certain, then, that there was but one Bhāvivikta. Wezler emphasizes that, in Cakradhara's identification, Bhāvivikta represents the older Cārvākas, whereas Udbhaṭa (c. 8th c.) represents the younger, or more recent, materialists.¹⁰³ In other words, we cannot claim, on the basis of Cakradhara's identification, that there was an earlier Naiyāyika Bhāvivikta and a later Cārvāka Bhāvivikta. Occam's razor returns, and it remains most plausible that there was but one Bhāvivikta.

Still, because the arguments for each individual hinge on rather fine details—Cakradhara may, after all, simply have been mistaken; Kamalaśīla may have understood the reference to the *Tattvaṭīkā* to do what we would think a phrase like *lokāyatika-aviddhakarṇa* would have done better—either of them may, whether or not we ever find more evidence, simply be incorrect.

There is, then, an argument for a single Aviddhakarṇa, and a separate argument for a single Bhāvivikta, and it may well be the case that only one or the other is correct. Should some evidence surface that there really was a second Bhāvivikta, for example, we may find ourselves with three thinkers, two Bhāviviktas and Aviddhakarṇa the (possible) convert; or even the other way around. As far as I know, no scholar has argued for such a view, but it remains a theoretical possibility.

$$1 = 1$$

¹⁰² It is quite likely that earlier scholars who posited two Aviddhakarṇas too readily reified the discreteness of identities like "Naiyāyika" and "Cārvāka." We cannot say whether Aviddhakarṇa's contemporaries would have found commentaries on both root texts confusing, or whether they would have understood the sorts of motivations behind such work.

The distinctness of the moniker Aviddhakarṇa would also seem to caution us against presuming two of them during the same period.

¹⁰³ Wezler, 143: "Jayanta unterschied also nicht zwischen *śūśikṣitāḥ* und *dhūrtāḥ* Cārvāka, wohl aber zwischen ‚alten Cārvākas‘ wie Bhāvivikta usw. und einem jüngeren Cārvāka, bzw. jüngeren Materialisten, die sich seiner Ansicht nach durch noch größere Dummheit von ihren Vorläufern auszeichneten, indem sie zwar die Existenz eines *pramāṭṛtattva* während des Bestehens des individuellen menschlichen Organismus behaupteten, dabei aber übersahen, daß sie auf diese Weise wider Willen einen ewigen ātman anerkannten, dessen Vorhandensein notwendig aus ihrer These folgt" (Jayanta did not distinguish between *śūśikṣitāḥ* and *dhūrtāḥ* Cārvākāḥ, but between "old Cārvāka," like Bhāvivikta et al, and a younger Cārvāka, or younger materialists, who were, in his view, marked by an even greater stupidity than their predecessors insofar as they maintained the existence of a *pramāṭṛtattva* during the persistence of the individual human organism, but overlooked the fact that, in so doing, they acknowledged against their will the eternal *ātman* whose existence follows necessarily from their thesis).

Nevertheless, I fear that such a proposal is, as the Sanskrit philosophers might say, too weighty. Steinkellner and Wezler make strong arguments, respectively, for a single Aviddhakarṇa and a single Bhāvivikta. We can imagine some kind of evidence emerging for two Aviddhakarṇa or Bhāviviktas, but doing so is unnecessary. Instead, we can proceed, as Franco and others have done, by regarding each as a single thinker, while maintaining an awareness of our limitations. If Aviddhakarṇa really wrote both a Nyāya and a Cārvāka commentary, it would raise a host of questions about his life, about the relationship between these traditions, and so on. But we do not have to rely on this as a concrete fact in order to explore a variety of possible interpretations of his fragments.

That said, the elegance of these two arguments and the specific ways in which they resemble and support one another suggest yet one final reduction. Perhaps the reason there are two instances around the same time of the same surprising phenomenon—namely, a thinker writing both a subcommentary on the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* and a separate commentary on the *Cārvākasūtra*—is because there is only, in fact, one instance of it. Perhaps Aviddhakarṇa just is Bhāvivikta, and, for example, the name Aviddhakarṇa (“Unpierced Ears”) is actually a nickname or an epithet. Ear-piercing (*karna-vedha*) is a relatively common rite (*saṃskāra*) performed in the first year of a Brahmin’s life, often in the seventh or eighth month.¹⁰⁴ Alternatively, as Esther Solomon has pointed out, some gurus initiate students by “splitting” their ears with a mantra. In this light, Solomon suggests that “Aviddhakarṇa” refers to a “self-made man,” a man without a guru.¹⁰⁵ Perhaps the ears (*karna*) of Bhāvivikta, for one reason or another, were never pierced (*aviddha*)—whether literally or figuratively.

Prominent Naiyāyikas are sometimes known by two different names, a patronymic and a proper name of some sort. Vātsyāyana—a patronymic—is also known by his apparent given name Pakṣilasvāmin. Uddyotakara (“light-maker”)—perhaps a name associated with participation in a particular tradition—is also known by his patronymic Bhāradvāja. The name Bhāvivikta (“pure as light”), like Uddyotakara, may perhaps indicate some kind of affiliation. A 12th-century text¹⁰⁶ explicitly ties the prefix *Bhā-* to the names of Pāśupatas. We can imagine a man being given the name or the distinction *Bhā-vivikta* while nevertheless being commonly known as Aviddhakarṇa, but unlike Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana, or the semi-mythic authors of earlier texts,¹⁰⁷ I am unaware of

¹⁰⁴ Gonda 1977.

¹⁰⁵ Solomon 1971, 24. Also cf. Solomon 1970.

¹⁰⁶ Sarma 1934, e.g., points to the striking passage in Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra’s commentary to their own *Nātyadarpana* that explicitly ties the prefix *Bhā-* to the names of Pāśupatas (my translation): “Naked mendicants [i.e., Jains], followers of the Sugata Śākya [i.e., Buddhists], these two are ‘o *bhadanta*.’ Others, worshippers of the Pāśupata sect, and so on, should be addressed with the name for celebrated persons (*prasiddha-nāma*) according to their respective conventions (*sva-samaya*). For example, addressing a Pāśupata, begin with *bhā-*, e.g., ‘Bhāsarvajña.’” (*munir nirgranthah, śākyaḥ saugataḥ, etau bhadanteti. aparah pāśupatādivratī svasamayaprasiddhanāmabhir vācyah. yathā pāśupatasya bhāpūrvam bhāsarvajña ityādisambhāṣaṇam* (ND 212.11)).

¹⁰⁷ “Gautama” and “Akṣapāda” may both refer to the “same” man, the “author” of the *Nyāyasūtra*. The same goes for “Kāśyapa” and “Kaṇāda.” Gautama and Kāśyapa are relatively common patronymics, whereas “Akṣapāda” (Eye-feet) and “Kaṇāda” (Atom-eater) are more distinctive epithets. Where such epithets originated, and whether they were ever intended to be descriptive nicknames, is uncertain. Later commentators have sometimes attempted to instill such names with intellectual-spiritual significance. “Akṣapāda” may in some sense refer to meditative focus, either in the sense that his eyes were constantly cast toward his feet in walking meditation, or in the sense that he could “see” with his feet as he walked around with downcast or closed eyes in meditative concentration. “Kaṇāda” (or sometimes “Kaṇabhakṣa,” which has the same meaning), may refer to the fact that, according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy that Kaṇāda is supposed to have originated, the universe is made up of, and in a sense sustained by, the permanent atoms.

names like Aviddhakarṇa that seem descriptive, more like a nickname than a patronymic, proper name, or marker of sectarian affiliation, so I cannot comment with any confidence on the potential overlap of names like Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta in reference to the same author.

The strongest evidence that Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are one and the same is not the mere fact that they share some biographical quirks, but their actual arguments. As we will see below, the most elaborate, elliptical, and idiosyncratic among their respective fragments—and, so, the most likely to be real quotations rather than Śāntarakṣita's or Kamalaśīla's paraphrase—often share a number of stylistic and terminological features. This includes a penchant for elaborate qualifiers, elliptical references to Vaiśeṣika categorization (e.g., “the indeterminate, existent, etc.” [*sad-ādy-aviśeṣa*]), and a particular way of describing the subject of an argument as “having come to be the topic of dispute.” In light of their shared biographies, the similarities in their argumentative and rhetorical styles are quite striking.

In response to Wezler, then, we might say this: it may be implausible that two thinkers underwent the same otherwise unheard-of conversion, and, as you say, there may therefore be some other, more mundane explanation for their authorship of separate works on Nyāya and Cārvāka; but by similar logic, we might say it is likelier that there was only one thinker, rather than two, going from “Saul to Paul” in this manner. In his conclusion, Wezler refers to the use of the terms *lokāyata* and *ānvīkṣikī* in Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* to suggest a kind of commonality between Cārvāka and Nyāya. Nyāya treats *ānvīkṣikī*—which Wezler, referring to Paul Hacker's article on the term,¹⁰⁸ renders, “the method of investigating with reasons”—as its basic method, and the *Arthaśāstra* regards Cārvāka (or more precisely, Lokāyata) as the auxiliary science of *ānvīkṣikī*. It would have been intellectually, politically, or possibly even economically useful, Wezler suggests, for a Naiyāyika to examine, comment on, and perhaps be able to instruct others in, this near-rival.¹⁰⁹ Wezler's conclusion is striking, but some caution is warranted. As far as I can tell, we cannot even be confident that the term *lokāyata* refers, in the *Arthaśāstra*, to Cārvāka, undercutting a basic premise of Wezler's conclusion. We need to consider reasons someone may have written both Nyāya and Cārvāka commentaries, but the deeper rationale may be specific to such an individual. Indeed, even if Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta were different people, one may have been influenced by the work of the other, and their motivations might not reflect broader trends.

Ernst Prets discussed the relationship between these two thinkers at the 18th Congress of IABS conference in Toronto (2017), and I believe he argued on that occasion that they are indeed one and the same man. But I am afraid I was not present, and I am not aware of any publication on this question as yet.

To reformulate the argument for a single author, “Aviddhakarṇa” Bhāvivikta, as I understand it: it is more plausible that there was one thinker around the time of Uddyotakara with the distinction of authoring a Nyāya commentary and a Cārvāka commentary than two, and with markedly similar argumentative style, especially considering that there is no other example of such an author apart from these two. Otherwise, we are confronted with a pair of thinkers living around the same time¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Paul Hacker, “Ānvīkṣikī,” *WZKS* 2 (1958): 54–83.

¹⁰⁹ Wezler 1975, 145.

¹¹⁰ Dharmakīrti's dates are far from certain, but Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta both probably predate him. Krasser 2002 shows that Dharmakīrti responds in PV 2.10ff to Aviddhakarṇa's first theistic argument, and Śāntarakṣita is

with the same peculiarity.

1 ≠ 1

Occam's razor does not suffice in this case. We need additional evidence to collapse these two thinkers into one with any confidence, or else decisive evidence against doing so. All we have are tantalizing clues.

Kamalaśīla regularly attributes arguments that were voiced by more than one Naiyāyika to a group of thinkers, naming one or two thinkers and including others with the term *-ādi*, “et al.” He never once mentions Aviddhakarṇa in one of these groupings. In fact, apart from the fragment found (in Tibetan translation) in his commentary on the *Nyāyabindu* (Av5, cf. Appendix A), he never even attributes an argument to “Aviddhakarṇa et al,” but only to Aviddhakarṇa alone. On the other hand, on several occasions he refers to “Bhāvivikta et al” (*bhāvivikta-ādayah*), and he also attributes a lengthy series of arguments to “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al” (*uddyotakarabhāviviktādayah*). If he had mentioned an argument by *Bhāvivikta-Aviddhakarṇa-ādi*, or the like, we could have laid this problem to rest. But as Śāntarakṣita himself points out, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.¹¹¹

We need not lament all of our uncertainties, but we should certainly not pretend there are no loose ends, dead ends, and frustrations in this work. The reference to “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al” is a good example of the peculiar frustrations of this study. One of the arguments Kamalaśīla attributes to this group (Bh8) corresponds almost exactly to an argument that Śāntarakṣita, in his *Vipañcitārthā*, attributes exclusively to Aviddhakarṇa (Av1). (Cf. §8.) This opens up at least two possibilities. First, all three of these thinkers made roughly the same argument (about the existence of substances), and Śāntarakṣita elected for some reason to mention only Aviddhakarṇa. In that case, with the term *et al* Kamalaśīla is likely referring at least in part to Aviddhakarṇa. Alternatively, perhaps when Kamalaśīla cites Bhāvivikta in his *Pañjikā*, the specific passage he has in mind is the one Śāntarakṣita cites in his *Vipañcitārthā*. In other words, “Bhāvivikta” in the phrase “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al” may refer to Aviddhakarṇa.¹¹²

Within the *Pañjikā*, the clearest evidence that we are dealing with two different thinkers—apart from the fact that they have different names—comes in chapter eighteen, the “Examination of Inference.” In verses 1437–1438, Śāntarakṣita dismisses the need for the fourth component of an argument, the application. In verses 1439–1440, he dismisses the fifth, the conclusion. Kamalaśīla attributes the arguments rejected in verses 1437–1438 to “Bhāvivikta et al” (Bh12), and the arguments in 1439 and 1440 to Uddyotakara and Aviddhakarṇa (Av15), respectively (cf. §13). The reference to “Bhāvivikta et al” and the ensuing reference to Aviddhakarṇa are separated by a single verse. This is not dispositive, but it is striking that Kamalaśīla refers distinctly to Bhāvivikta and Aviddhakarṇa in

unambiguous that Bhāvivikta predates Dharmakīrti, as well (§4.3).

¹¹¹ Cf. verse 554 in the translation below.

¹¹² This opens up an interesting possibility. It may be, if Bhāvivikta = Aviddhakarṇa, that when Kamalaśīla refers to “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al,” he is not hinting at texts beyond those authored by Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, but rather to Naiyāyikas who make similar arguments *in speech*. Of course, he may be referring to less notable texts that do not even survive in the form of fragments, or, hedging his bets, to any other thinkers that may have been inclined to make the same sort of argument. In such cases, we can let ourselves wonder without wandering too far astray.

such close proximity on such similar, interconnected topics.

There is not much circumstantial evidence about Aviddhakarṇa or Bhāvivikta's chronological relationships with one another or with other thinkers like Uddyotakara. They are differently coupled with Uddyotakara by commentators. Kamalaśīla refers to "Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al," whereas the Buddhist commentator Karṇakagomin (c. 800) and the later Jain commentator Abhayadevasūri (c. 11th c.), citing the same argument, refer to "Adhyayana, Aviddhakarṇa, and Uddyotakara, et al" (cf. Appendix B). If any of these authors had mentioned both "Aviddhakarṇa and Uddyotakara, et al" *and* "Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al," respectively, we could have proposed on that basis that Aviddhakarṇa preceded Uddyotakara and that Bhāvivikta followed him. No such luck. There are a number of issues with extrapolating historical information from these lists. For one thing, the compound "Adhyayana, Aviddhakarṇa, and Uddyotakara, et al" is likely stitched together syllabically, as per Pāṇini 2.2.34¹¹³ (*Adhyayana* is four syllables, whereas the other names are five). Such compounds are often sequenced in terms of eminence, but perhaps Buddhist and Jain authors were not interested in ranking the eminence of Nyāya commentators. We know even less about Adhyayana than about Aviddhakarṇa or Bhāvivikta, and yet, as Steinkellner points out,¹¹⁴ Durveka Miśra (c. 1100) credits him with a text called the "*Ruciṭīkā*," which seems to be a subcommentary on Uddyotakara's *Vārttika*. This, of course, would mean that Adhyayana follows Uddyotakara, entirely undermining the chronological interpretation. As it stands, these different lists in different texts by different authors represent yet another set of tantalizing but inconclusive hints.

What we have, then, are two strikingly similar thinkers—similar in chronology, style, quirky doctrinal affiliation, and writings—who cannot be decisively differentiated apart from the fact that there are two different names.

I cannot say with certainty whether these men are one and the same, but for that very reason I believe that I must deal with them both. The most plausible theories are either that there is one Aviddhakarṇa and one Bhāvivikta *or* that there is one "Aviddhakarṇa" Bhāvivikta. But because I cannot rule out the latter, I cannot justify reading the fragments of only one thinker or the other. My overall project pursues the possibility that Bhāvivikta's ears were never pierced, but my specific treatment of the individual fragments is divided according to the two names.

Methodology

The study of the fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta involves a convoluted web of texts. Each fragment of Aviddhakarṇa's derives (most likely) from one of two texts: (i) his *Tattvaṭīkā* (an apparent commentary on the *Cārvākasūtra*, which is itself only preserved in partial, fragmentary form) or (ii) his *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* (a subcommentary on Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh), which is itself a commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra* (NS), the root text of the Nyāya tradition).¹¹⁵ Many of the fragments

¹¹³ Cf., e.g., Cardona 1997, 222.

¹¹⁴ Steinkellner 1961, 160. Steinkellner groups together the references to Adhyayana in Durveka Miśra's *Dharmottarapradīpa*, Karṇakagomin's PVSṬ, and Abhayadevasūri's TBV, concluding, "Offenbar gehört dieser Autor noch in die ältere Zeit" (Apparently, this author belongs to the earlier age [160]).

¹¹⁵ Either or both of these may be generic descriptions rather than proper titles. Śāntarakṣita's commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya*, for example, is a *Vādanyāya-ṭīkā* ("Commentary on the *Vādanyāya*"), but it also has the more distinctive secondary title *Vipaṅcitārthā* ("Elaborated meaning"). The name of the text in its entirety is, then, "Commentary on the *Vādanyāya* in which the Meaning is Elaborated." Authors—and/or commentators—seem not

from the *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* parallel or resemble passages in Uddyotakara’s *Nyāyavārttika* (NV), the earliest extant subcommentary on NBh, as well as Praśastapāda’s *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (PDhS), a kind of organizational commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (VS), which itself informs much of Aviddhakarṇa’s language and style of argumentation. Further, most of the fragments are preserved in Buddhist texts that are themselves commentaries on other Buddhist texts: Śāntarakṣita’s commentary on Dharmakīrti (*Vipañcitārthā*); Kamalaśīla’s commentary on Dharmakīrti (*Pūrvapakṣasaṃkṣipta*); Kamalaśīla’s commentary on Śāntarakṣita (*Pañjikā*); and others. A single fragment can directly involve a complex interplay of half a dozen texts or more, covering at least three or four philosophical traditions and a span of several hundred years.

Nearly the same web of texts ensnares the fragments of Bhāvivikta as those of Aviddhakarṇa. Like Aviddhakarṇa, Bhāvivikta is also credited with writing a Nyāya commentary and a separate Cārvāka commentary; he, too, relies on Vaiśeṣika terminology and categorization (though perhaps to a lesser extent); and he, too, is cited and refuted by both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. In addition, some of the fragments of these two thinkers share an idiosyncratic style.

The main differences are that Kamalaśīla does not mention Bhāvivikta in the *Pūrvapakṣasaṃkṣipta*, and that, at least as far as I know, the title of his Cārvāka commentary is uncertain.¹¹⁶ There are differences in the later legacies of these two thinkers, as well. The Naiyāyika commentator Cakradhara, commenting on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s reference to “ancient Cārvākas” (*cirantana-cārvāka*), specifies that he is referring to a group “beginning with Bhāvivikta” (*bhāvivikta-prabhṛtibhiḥ*). I know of no other reference to Bhāvivikta,¹¹⁷ On the other hand, several later authors cite Aviddhakarṇa, including the Jain thinker Prabhācandra, and Karṇakagomin, one of Dharmakīrti’s commentators.

The following table does not include these later commentaries that cite Aviddhakarṇa or additional Buddhist texts that may have been Aviddhakarṇa’s or Bhāvivikta’s targets, e.g., texts by Dignāga and/or possibly Vasubandhu,¹¹⁸ but only the direct sources of the present study:

always to have added such distinctive titles.

¹¹⁶ The title of this text may be more descriptive than anything (see previous note), but it is worth considering what it would imply for Aviddhakarṇa to call his *Cārvākasūtra* commentary the *Tattva-ṭīkā*. *Tattva* is a hotly contested term in Indian philosophy. It is widely accepted that *tattva-jñāna* (“knowledge of *tattva*”) is the most fundamental aim of philosophical practice, yet each tradition defines the key term *tattva* differently. According to Nyāya, there are sixteen philosophical principles that comprise the Nyāya system and that the practitioner must understand to advance philosophically and spiritually. According to Kamalaśīla, the term *tattva* in the title of Śāntarakṣita’s *Tattvasaṃgraha* refers to the various qualifications (*viśeṣaṇa*) of dependent origination that are examined throughout the treatise. The first two aphorisms in the *Cārvākasūtra*—based on the available evidence—are as follows: “Now, then, we will explain *tattva*. The *tattvas* are earth, water, fire, wind” (*athātas tattvam vyākhyāsyāmah; pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni*). According to Cārvāka, these four basic elements are all that there really is. The title of the *Tattva-ṭīkā* asserts not only that it is a commentary on the *Cārvākasūtra*, but that the *Cārvākasūtra* is the root text for *tattva*. It may be a simultaneously generic and polemical title.

¹¹⁷ On Cakradhara, cf. Shah 1972, “Introduction,” and Wezler 1975. See Appendix B for additional references.

¹¹⁸ For example, towards the end of the *Vipañcitārthā*, Śāntarakṣita suggests that Dignāga’s *Nyāyaparīkṣā* or Vasubandhu’s *Vādavidhāna* may have been attacked or intentionally obscured by stubborn or mischievous Naiyāyikas—hence the need, despite these authoritative works, for Dharmakīrti’s *Vādanyāya*. Dharmakīrti’s concluding verse in VN refers to good people who have already demonstrated the rules of debate (*vādanyāya*), but says he has composed the present treatise because wrongheaded people—Naiyāyikas—have obscured the light of truth (*loke*

NYĀYA	VAIŚEṢIKA
⊗ Nyāya Sūtras (NS)	⊗ Vaiśeṣika Sūtras (VS)
--> <i>Nyāya-bhāṣya</i> (NBh) by Vātsyāyana	--> <i>Padārtha-dharma-saṃgraha</i> (PDhS) by Praśastapāda
⇒ <i>Nyāya-vārttika</i> (NV) by Uddyotakara ⇒ <i>Bhāṣya-tīkā</i> by Aviddhakarṇa ⇒ <i>Bhāṣya-tīkā</i> by Bhāvivikta	
CĀRVĀKA	BUDDHISM
⊗ Bṛhaspati Sūtras	⊗ <i>Vādanyāya</i> (VN) by Dharmakīrti
--> <i>Tattva-tīkā</i> by Aviddhakarṇa	--> <i>Vipañcitārthā</i> by Śāntarakṣita
--> <i>Tattva-tīkā</i> [?] by Bhāvivikta	⊗ <i>Nyāyabindu</i> (NB) by Dharmakīrti
	--> <i>Pūrvapakṣa-saṃkṣipta</i> (PPS) by Kamalaśīla
	⊗ <i>Tattvasaṃgraha</i> (TS) by Śāntarakṣita
	--> <i>Pañjikā</i> by Kamalaśīla
Key: ⊗ root text --> commentary ⇒ subcommentary	bold = by Aviddhakarṇa or Bhāvivikta <u>underline</u> = cites Aviddhakarṇa or Bhāvivikta

Were we to think of all of this in terms of something like a *dramatis personae*, the main players and the primary supporting cast, together with the texts of theirs that are most directly relevant for the present study, would look something like this:

Dramatis Personae

Primary thinkers

Śāntarakṣita	[<i>Tattvasaṃgraha</i> (TS), <i>Vipañcitārthā</i>
Kamalaśīla, his student	[<i>Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā</i> (“the <i>Pañjikā</i> ”) <i>Nyāyabindu-pūrvapakṣa-saṃkṣipta</i> (PPS)
Aviddhakarṇa	[<i>Bhāṣyatīkā</i> (lost), <i>Tattvatīkā</i> (lost)
Bhāvivikta	[<i>Bhāṣyatīkā</i> (lost), unnamed <i>Cārvākasūtra</i> commentary (lost)

Semi-mythic authors

(Akṣapāda) Gautama	[Nyāya Sūtras (NS)
Kaṇāda (Kāśyapa)	[Vaiśeṣika Sūtras (VS)

*‘vidyātimirapaṭalollekhanas tattvadṛṣter vādanyāyah parahitaratair eṣa sadbhiḥ pranītaḥ / tattvālokaṃ timirayati tam durvidagho jano ‘yaṃ tasmād yatnaḥ kṛta iha mayā tatsamujjvālanāya ||3|| (VN 68.10). Śāntarakṣita characterizes this verse as an account for the necessity of a new treatise on this topic despite authoritative statements by Vasubandhu and Dignāga: “Wasn’t the way of the rules of debate made, in the *Vādavidhāna*, into a royal path by the teacher Vasubandhu, unfettered (*anibandhana*) kinsman (*bandhu*) of all the whole world? And then further trodden in the extensive *Nyāyaparīkṣā* by the revered scholar Dignāga, who is skilled in splitting the necks of elephants (*mātāṅga* = *nāga*) drunk on the doctrines of fools? Why do you insist on chewing already chewed cud?” (*nanu cāyaṃ vādanyāyamārgaḥ sakalalokānibandhanabandhunā vādavidhānādau ācāryavasubandhunā mahārājapathikṛtaḥ kṣuṇṇas ca tad anu mahatyāṃ nyāyaparīkṣāyāṃ kumatimatamattamātāṅgaśīraḥpīṭhapātanapatubhir ācāryadiñnāgapādair tat kim idaṃ punas carvitacarvanam āsthitam tvayeti.* (VA 135.28)) Here, Śāntarakṣita does a bit of intellectual history, acknowledging Dignāga’s debt to Vasubandhu’s work while also noting the degree to which his work developed and supplanted it. Vasubandhu’s *Vādavidhā* has not survived intact, but only in quotations (in Tibetan translation) by Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi (cf. Frauwallner 1957; Anacker 1998, 31–48), but this impartial record suggests that Vasubandhu was responsible for many of the innovations often attributed to Dignāga (Anacker, 34). Much, following Frauwallner, takes Dignāga to be Uddyotakara’s chief Buddhist target (Much 1991, vol. 2, XIII). Uddyotakara clearly cites Vasubandhu, as well. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that the same is true for Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta.*

Cārvāka / Bṛhaspati [*Cārvākasūtra* (fragmentary)

Brahmanical authors

(Pakṣilasvāmin) Vātsyāyana [*Nyāya-bhāṣya* (NBh, “the *Bhāṣya*”)
Uddyotakara (Bhāradvāja) [*Nyāya-vārttika* (NV, “the *Vārttika*”)
Prāśastapāda [*Padārtha-dharma-saṃgraha* (PDhS)

Buddhist authors

Vasubandhu [*Vādaśāstra*
Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya
Dignāga [*Pramāṇasamuccaya*
Nyāyaparīkṣā
Dharmakīrti [*Pramāṇa-viniścaya*
Nyāyabindu (NB)
Vādanyāya (VN)

Though more thinkers and texts than these will occasionally show up in the pages that follow, these should be kept most firmly in mind. (Some listed here authored additional texts; the list only includes works directly and consistently referenced in the present study, and is not meant to suggest prominence or eminence.) The reader should return to this list, or the table that precedes it, if names, titles, or abbreviations become confusing.¹¹⁹

This elaborate intertextuality is rendered even more complicated by the texts themselves, each of which presents its own interpretive challenges. My interpretation of each fragment necessarily involves my interpretations of each of the other texts forming the imperfect web in which it is ensnared. There are few uncontested anchor points. And the fragments themselves only deepen the challenge. Aviddhakarṇa’s style—at least, as far as we can tell from the passages Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla choose to cite—is often dense and terse, loaded with references, presumptions, and implications, but offering few clues for dealing with them. The same is true for Bhāvivikta.

Though this adds to the challenge, it also suggests an interesting opportunity. Among the most intriguing things about these thinkers are their styles—their personalities. Indeed, each of these “thinkers” has his own range of idiosyncrasies, obsessions, feelings, aims. We need not get caught up in the problems of “authorial intent” to recognize a recurrence of sarcasm, impatience, or wit; a tendency toward the pedantic; evidence of haughtiness; the mark of a grouch. The material for our study is comprised of texts, but in those texts we encounter individuals in the midst of an elaborate choreography. When Śāntarakṣita cites Aviddhakarṇa, he is, among other things, creating an imaginary conversation and then participating in it. We can learn from these moments—not only what these thinkers were thinking, but also what they cared about, what bothered them, what excited

¹¹⁹ *N.B.*, I alternate between referring to the author, the title of a work, or an abbreviation, depending on the context. This will create some difficulty for readers who are not already familiar with all of this material, but the other option—referring exclusively, e.g., to NBh, rather than to Vātsyāyana or “the *Bhāṣya*”—would create some strange, forced sentence structures. It is difficult to learn all of the names, titles, and abbreviations, but it can be even harder to make it through an awkward sentence. Besides, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla both refer sometimes to an author’s name, sometimes the title of a work, and even sometimes to a surname (e.g., Śāntarakṣita refers to Uddyotakara, to the “author of the *Vārttika*,” and to Bhāradvāja—all the same man). I hope the table and the “*dramatis personae*” will help readers become acquainted with any of these text traditions with which they are not yet familiar.

them, and what modes of reading their work demands.

The fact that Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta may be two names for the same man compels us to study their fragments alongside one another, both in order to compare and contrast them, and in order to get a fuller picture of the potential individual. The fact that they may well be different thinkers forces us to treat them separately rather than over-hastily collapse their separate works into one another's. The fact that we cannot be sure one way or the other is the most interesting of all, because it pushes us not only to consider the two thinkers alongside one another, but to actively move between their potential identity and difference. If they are the same man, his is a singular biography (specifically regarding his focus on both Nyāya and Cārvāka); if not, their striking biographical and chronological similarities demand our attention. We must inhabit this space of uncertainty with as much flexibility as precision, with as much imagination as attention to detail.

Of course, should we someday discover a manuscript that is dispositive, such as a partial text of one of Bhāvivikta's works in which he cites Aviddhakarṇa as a different thinker, we will proceed from there. But in the meantime, the historico-biographical reality does not really matter. Rather than seek to progress toward the "real" Bhāvivikta—which, as things stand, is nothing but an abstract idea—we can flesh out the imaginary Bhāviviktas who are really present in our contact with these texts. We cannot describe Bhāvivikta as being identical with or different from Aviddhakarṇa—but we can imagine both.

The present study is structured around translations of excerpts from nine chapters, along with the opening *maṅgala*, of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*:

<i>TATTVASAMGRAHA</i>	
CHAPTERS	
0. Maṅgala	10. Substance
1. Examination of Prakṛti	11. Quality
2. Examination of Īśvara	12. Action
3. " " Both	13. Universal
4. " " the Theory of a Spontaneous World	14. Particular
5. " " Brahman the Word	15. Inherence
6. Puruṣa	16. The Meaning of Words
7. Self	17. Perception
a. as conceived by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika	18. Inference
b. as conceived by Mīmāṃsā	19. Other Means of Knowledge
c. " " Sāṃkhya	20. Syādvāda (Jain standpoint theory)
d. " " Digambara Jainism	21. The Three Times
e. " " Aupaniṣadika (Advaita Vedānta)	22. Lokāyata (Cārvāka)
f. " " Vātsīputriya	23. External Things
8. Permanence	24. Śruti
9. The Relation between Action and Result	25. Intrinsic Authority
	26. Persons with Extra-Sensory Vision

Included are the entirety of the second chapter on cosmology and the first section of the examination of the self, and excerpts from the defense of momentariness, several chapters concerning Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, and each of the three chapters on epistemology. The rest of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* will have to remain on the relative outskirts of our purview for the time being, though I describe and occasionally quote from the material we pass over.

As should be clear, this means that a lot of interesting and important material lies outside of the translation and study below, and yet, it also means that we are covering quite a lot of ground. Our organizing principle is simple: we include every passage in the *Tattvasamgraha* that elicits a citation of a fragment of Aviddhakarṇa or Bhāvivikta in Kamalaśīla’s *Pañjikā*. Most directly, this refers to verses in which Śāntarakṣita paraphrases or invokes the argument contained in one of the fragments. But this also includes Śāntarakṣita’s direct responses to these arguments. In some cases, Śāntarakṣita’s response is contained in one or a few short verses, and in other cases it stretches across dozens of verses. When I feel it helps to give the reader a sense of the style of the text, or important context surrounding the engagement with Aviddhakarṇa or Bhāvivikta, I also include additional surrounding material. For example, I include the entirety of chapter two, and the entire section from chapter seven that concerns the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the self, both because Aviddhakarṇa features heavily in them, and because reading the entire chapters gives the reader a good sense for the flow of the text. After the translation of a particular chapter or section of the root text, we then hone in on specific moments in Kamalaśīla’s commentary.

Examining the fragments helps us better understand the nearly lost thinkers who authored them, their place in the early Nyāya and Cārvāka traditions, and their potential impact, whether as authors or as figures in the work of their Buddhist rivals, in the bustling interreligious intellectual milieu of classical Indian philosophy. But when we read their fragments, we are never really outside the (mostly) Buddhist texts that preserve them.¹²⁰ This is an important thing to keep in mind in historicizing the fragments, but beyond the necessary caution, I urge my own readers to consider the opportunities. Aviddhakarṇa is a historical figure, but he is also what we might call a literary figure in the polyphonic atmosphere of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s texts. Learning more about the figure behind the fragments helps us better understand how the Buddhists construct the figure that features in their own works. The fact that his and Bhāvivikta’s fragments are found throughout much of the first half of the *Tattvasamgraha* means that, in order to examine all of their fragments, we have to—we get to—move through all of that material together.

The reader should consult the Appendices as necessary. The fragments from the *Vipañcitārthā* and *Pūrvapakṣasamkṣipta* are examined in Appendix A in the same manner as the fragments of the *Pañjikā*. All of the fragments and reports of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, including those outside the purview of the present study, are collected and translated in Appendix B. Appendix C is a detailed outline of the *Nyāyasūtra*; the various passages examined throughout the present study are emphasized in order to give the reader a sense for their broader context. Finally, Appendix D contains an edition of the selections of verses from the *Tattvasamgraha* that are translated below. All translations in the present study are original unless otherwise noted.

Why Uncertainty

In his triad of texts on the theory and practice of meditation (*Bhāvanākrama*, “Stages of Cultivation”), Kamalaśīla argues that the cultivation of wisdom requires an exhaustive, even obsessive, examination of all things (*bhūta-pratyavekṣā*, “the discernment of reality”).¹²¹ The ultimate

¹²⁰ As mentioned, Bhāvivikta is not cited outside of Śāntarakṣita’s *Vipañcitārthā* and Kamalaśīla’s *Pañjikā*, though the Naiyāyika Cakradhara refers to him. Aviddhakarṇa is cited or mentioned by several other thinkers, but the vast bulk of his fragments are found in the *Pañjikā*. See Appendix B.

¹²¹ Cf. Adam 2002, which focuses largely on the various ways Kamalaśīla employs this term. The *Bhāvanākramas*,

result of such a practice is the direct encounter with the true nature of reality—omniscience. There is an infinite gap between, on the one hand, the grand scope of all of reality and, on the other, the fragments of two lost Naiyāyikas. Thankfully, my ambition does not extend to the same cosmic dimensions as Kamalaśīla's. Yet I, too, have been, and continue to be, deeply inspired and moved by my own obsessive examination of this little corner of reality.

I want to suggest one more thing about the approach I am taking. Scholars of all stripes who turn their attention to the history of India know how precious evidence can be. We only know, for example, about Bhāvivikta's Cārvāka affiliation from a single remark in a text that was only published for the first time half a century ago. It is important to endeavor an interpretation or an account when the opportunity presents itself. There is great risk in being too brazen or too fanciful in spinning out our tales; yet we cannot always seek safety in reserve. What I propose is not simply to avoid staking a claim, nor merely to say as much as I can up to the limit of uncertainty, but rather to stake uncertainty as my foundation.

Being uncertain, I get more from resting on the groundless ground of that uncertainty than I would by pretending to find firm footing or by claiming that no footing at all can be found. Take Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta. We cannot say with any confidence whether he/they converted, or whether he/they commented on both Nyāya and Cārvāka for some other set of reasons; if they are the same individual, we still cannot safely regard all of their words as speaking to one and the same worldview. (Even if we were to take their side in the *ātman* debate!) If we were to accept with confidence that there is but one Aviddhakarṇa, we should still not presume to be able to link together the words of Aviddhakarṇa the Naiyāyika and Aviddhakarṇa the Cārvāka with certitude.

In the *Tattvasamgraha*, Śāntarakṣita often puts forward a provisional thesis in order to demonstrate the reasons it cannot be true (i.e., the *pūrvapakṣa*). Implicitly, there is value in attempting to inhabit a worldview in which such a thesis would be true, and, so, in going through the process of picking it apart from within. Later, in the *Madhyamakāloka*, Śāntarakṣita will more pointedly suggest that an idea, or a view, that is only partially correct can nevertheless be useful in bringing us closer to true understanding. I am not under the impression that I will ever really understand, for example, even such a small matter as the motivation behind Aviddhakarṇa's *Tattvaṭīkā*. Not unlike Kamalaśīla, I strive while knowing my limitations, that I may come at least to know them with greater clarity.

especially the so-called third *Bhāvanākrama*, offers the clearest evidence that Kamalaśīla was aware of the views of Moheyan, the Chinese monk Kamalaśīla is supposed to have debated at Samye. At one point, after giving a dismissive description of an opposing view that resembles Moheyan's, he says that anyone who believes such things goes against Mahāyāna—a stinging insult, if he knew his rival (Moheyan = Mahāyāna) by name. Cf. n 9–11.

MAṄGALA

Genre conventions, technical terms, and notes on the translations

Śāntarakṣita wrote the *Tattvasaṃgraha* in meter, but this is not a work of poetry. The so-called *śloka* meter was a common form for scholarly works; it gives the text a familiar and consistent shape. Rather than attempt to preserve non-poetic meter or ignore the meter but still print the translation with verse breaks, I have chosen a form that is as familiar in English as the *śloka* is in Sanskrit: paragraphs. The metrical form sometimes creates awkward and forced constructions, and Śāntarakṣita's technical and at times terse language creates some interpretive challenges. The text is accessible, but not always particularly easy to read, and requires the reader's active participation. This is, I think, as true of the translation as of the original. That said, when there is ambiguity, I attempt an interpretation and substantiate my decisions with notes and citations from the *Pañjikā*. Footnotes to the translations are intended for all readers but especially non-specialists. Translator's notes are included now and then to give the reader a sense of some of the material that is not included in the translation.

One of the most consistently challenging aspects of works of philosophy in Sanskrit is simply keeping track of who is talking at any given moment. The most basic structure in such a work is the dialectic between the *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa*. *Pakṣa* means "side" or "position" (or the wing of a bird); *pūrvā* and *uttara* mean "former" and "latter," "lower" and "higher," "first" and "ultimate." The *pūrvapakṣa*, then, is the view of one's opponent, real or imaginary, formulated as a *prima facie* view to be refuted; the *uttarapakṣa* is one's response, which, of course, also happens to be the correct position from the author's perspective. Within this clear-cut structure, there is room for flexibility. In some cases, Śāntarakṣita fully inhabits the *pūrvapakṣa*, articulating his opponents' arguments as if they were his own. In other cases, he simply describes, or even merely implies, them. Sometimes rather than a single *pūrvā-uttara* structure, there is a series of exchanges. And quite often, within what we might consider an *uttarapakṣa*, Śāntarakṣita will entertain brief objections from his opponents. Headings in the translations (e.g., "Nyāya arguments," "Refutation") are meant to clue the reader into who is speaking at any given moment. These headings, along with punctuation and sentence and paragraph breaks, are all my own, and are meant to guide and orient the reader.

The passive voice, though rarified in English, is ubiquitous in Sanskrit. I often render passive constructions into the active voice in English. In the opening *maṅgala* of the text, the words *ayaṃ kriyate tattvasaṃgrahaḥ*, “this *Tattvasaṃgraha* is composed,” becomes “I compose this *Tattvasaṃgraha*.” More commonly, I use the first person plural, the “royal we,” when Śāntarakṣita is speaking not of his own composition, but on behalf of what he considers the orthodox view. Depending on who is speaking and how, I alternate between first, second, and third person pronouns for the sake of clarity and to clarify my own interpretations. When Śāntarakṣita is describing his opponents’ views, he speaks of them in the third person; when he is attacking or interrogating them, the second; when inhabiting their view, the first. This is often true in the original text, but Śāntarakṣita uses actual first and second person forms less frequently.

Finally, it will be helpful to discuss some of the most common technical terms and concepts that come up throughout the translation and study. The most important and recurrent technical terms all relate to the discourse around *pramāṇa*, “means of knowledge.” In particular, the reader should be aware of the basic structure of an inferential argument (*anumāna*), and the characteristics that, according to Śāntarakṣita, distinguish a valid and an invalid argument. We have already considered some of these concepts in the Introduction (cf. “Debates about Debate”), but it is worth emphasizing Śāntarakṣita’s scholastic understanding of debate and argumentation. Readers who are as-yet unfamiliar with these terms will, I hope, find this quick survey helpful, but some may also find it overwhelming. In the latter case, readers should feel free to skim this section and return to it when the need arises.

A common example of a valid argument is as follows:

1. “Where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen.”
2. “And there is smoke on the mountain.”

According to the Buddhist epistemologists, these two statements suffice to prove the point. There is no need for a separate statement of the proposition/conclusion, “There is fire on the mountain.” In fact, if the two statements above do not generate the realization that there is fire on the mountain, simply saying so is not likely to have that effect.

Still—as Śāntarakṣita says in verse 1434—in a scholarly work like this, we can separate out various elements of this argument for the sake of discourse. First, the basic building blocks of the argument are: (i) the locus or subject (*pakṣa*), or property-possessor (*dharmin*), of the argument, i.e., the mountain; (ii) the property to be proven (*sādhya*), the fire; and (iii) the reason (*hetu*), or the mark (*liṅga*) or proving property (*sādhana*), i.e., the smoke. To use the more common way of formulating the argument above, “There is fire (*property to be proven*) on the mountain (*subject*) because there is smoke there (*reason*).”

But how do we know that the reason proves the property to be proven? This is where the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) comes into play. According to Nyāya, an example can either be similar or dissimilar, but, as we know, Vasubandhu and Dignāga argue that every valid reason bears a particular relationship to *both* similar and dissimilar examples. A similar case (*sapakṣa*) is a property-possessor that is known to have the property to be proven, e.g., there is fire in a(n in-use) kitchen. A dissimilar case (*vipakṣa*) is any property-possessor known not to have the property to be proven, e.g., a lake.

There are a variety of technical terms surrounding the relationships between the reason and the subject, similar case, and dissimilar case. The reason is valid if it fulfills three characteristics (*trirūpa*): First, it must be a property of the subject, i.e., there must really be smoke on the mountain. This is called *pakṣadharmatā*, “being a property of the subject.” Statement (2) above is the statement of *pakṣadharmatā*. Second, the reason must be a property of at least some similar case; a kitchen is, indeed, smoky. This is called “positive concomitance” (*anvaya*), as in, “wherever there is smoke, there is fire.” Third, the reason must not be a property of any dissimilar cases; there is never smoke in a lake, nor anywhere else absent of fire. This is called “negative concomitance” (*vyatireka*), i.e., “where there is no fire, there is no smoke.” Taken together, positive and negative concomitance demonstrate the invariable relation (*avinābhāva*), or the relationship of pervasion (*vyāpti*), between the reason and the property to be proven. Smoke, one could say, is pervaded by fire. (Fire need not be pervaded by smoke—an instance of fire without smoke would not undermine pervasion in the argument we are considering, but only an effort to prove that there is smoke on the basis of fire.) Statement (1) above is the statement of pervasion.

According to Dharmakīrti, there are two fundamental kinds of invariable relation: identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*tadutpatti*). This is a pivotal insight, as these two relations render inference a deductive rather than inductive process. Śāntarakṣita returns to this pair again and again. Being-a-tree is intrinsic to being-a-redwood, so if one can prove that a particular plant is a redwood, then one can prove on that basis that it is a tree. If one can establish this sort of innate relation, then it can serve as the basis for establishing pervasion. And as we have seen, it is also possible to establish pervasion on the basis of causality: fire causes smoke, therefore smoke is pervaded by fire, and we can infer the existence of fire from the presence of smoke.

There are many ways, on the other hand, for an argument to fail. There are three main varieties of fallacious reason (*hetv-ābhāsa*): unestablished (*asiddha*), which most basically means that it itself has yet to be proven; inconclusive (*anaikāntika*), or deviating (*savyabhicāra*), which generally means that it does not have the right relationships with the similar and/or dissimilar cases; or contrary (*viruddha*), which includes any kind of contradiction with the subject or the property to be proven. There are various species of each (some of which can be described or identified in more ways than one). For example, a particular species of “unestablished” reason: If a theist argues against a non-theist, “God is perfect because he is eternal,” the non-theist could reply, “You haven’t proven that God exists yet!” One could say that the subject of the argument, God, is unestablished. But Śāntarakṣita typically prefers to describe defects in terms of the reason, and in the present case he might say that the reason, i.e., “because of being eternal,” is “unestablished in its substratum” (*āśraya-asiddha*). This means that God, the subject of the argument and so the purported substratum of eternity, is himself unestablished.

There are many more technical terms than these that pop up here and there, but this, I think, gives the reader a sufficient backdrop to follow the discussions that follow. When new terms, or specific variations on the terms above, show up in the translation, I explain them in footnotes. My hope is that this kind of language will gradually become more familiar as the reader moves through the translations and analyses that follow.

We begin with the opening words of the *Tattvasamgraha*, which guide the reader’s engagement with the entire work.

TRANSLATION

MAṄGALA

That which is free from the activity of *prakṛti*, Īśvara, the two together, the self, etc.; is in flux; is the basis for the constancy of the relation between actions and their fruits; is empty of the conditions that are quality, substance, action, universal, inherence, etc.; is the referent of words and cognitions as superimposed images; is ascertained by the two means of knowledge, which are endowed with clear definitions; does not consist of anything that has come to be mixed even in the slightest; does not pass over; is without beginning or end; is like a reflection, and the like; is free from the mass of all proliferations; and is not understood by others—such is dependent origination, which the foremost of teachers taught, without clinging to independent scriptures, and after habituating great compassion over many countless eons out of his desire to benefit the world. Bowing to that omniscient one, I compose this, the *Collection of Truths*. (1–6)¹²²

¹²² Throughout the translations of the root text, these are the verse numbers of the *Tattvasamgraha*. The Sanskrit text of this and every such translation is found in Appendix D.

§0. THE OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE TATTVASAMGRAHA

As many scholars have noted before, Śāntarakṣita provides a basic outline of the *Tattvasamgraha* in his *maṅgala*, i.e., the six verses that comprise the opening benediction of the text.¹²³

¹²³ These are probably the most commonly translated verses in the entire text. Ganganatha Jha, Sara McClintock, and Christian Coseru have all chosen, in their renderings, to alter the syntax to make the sentence more comprehensible. Matthew Kapstein follows the original syntax. Śāntarakṣita opens with four verses listing a series of attributes in the accusative case, and then in the fifth verses he reveals that the direct object to which they correspond is dependent origination (also in the accusative), that the subject of the sentence is the Buddha (the “foremost of teachers”), and that the verbal connection between these two is that the Buddha “taught” dependent origination. Then, in the final words of the *maṅgala*, Śāntarakṣita, after bowing to the Buddha, states that he has composed the *Tattvasamgraha*. Rather than following this sequence, Jha, McClintock, and Coseru all open with the composition of the text and close with the characteristics of dependent origination. First, Jha, indicating verse numbers in parentheses, offers this rendering:

This *Tattvasamgraha*, ‘Compendium of True Doctrines,’ is being composed after bowing to that Omniscient Person, the greatest of expounders, who, with a view to bringing about the welfare of the world,—propounded the Doctrine of the ‘Wheel of Intervolved Causation,’—independently of any self-sufficient revelation, supreme mercy having entered into His very soul through long innumerable cycles.—(5–6)—This ‘Wheel of Causation’ is free from all notions of the functioning of any such cause as ‘Primordial Matter,’—‘God,’—both of these (Primordial Matter and God),—Soul,—and other such entities (postulated by Philosophers);—it is mobile;—it is the basis of all such notions as ‘Karma’ (Actions, good and bad), the fruits of acts, the connection between these two.—(1)—It is devoid of all such concepts as ‘Quality,’ ‘Substance,’ ‘Movement,’ ‘Universal,’ ‘Inherence,’ and so on;—it is amenable to ‘words’ and ‘cognitions’ only in an assumed (superimposed) form.—(2)—It is definitely cognized by means of two clearly defined Means of Cognition; it is not mixed up with the nature of anything else, even in the slightest degree.—(3)—It admits of no translocation; it is without beginning and without end; it is like a reflected image and other such things; it is absolutely free from the whole lot of fantasies; it has not been apprehended by others.—(4). (Jha 1937, 1–2)

Here is McClintock’s version:

I compose this *Tattvasamgraha*, having bowed to that omniscient one, who is the best of speakers, who does not depend on an autonomous scripture, who through his desire to benefit the world inculcated a nature of great compassion throughout many innumerable ages, [and] who proclaimed the dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) that others do not understand and that is free from the operations (*vyāpāra*) of primordial nature (*prakṛti*), God, both [primordial nature and God], self (*ātman*) and so on; that is in flux (*cala*); that is the basis for the postulation of the relation between actions (*karman*) and their effects and so on; that is devoid of the attributes (*upādhi*) of quality (*guṇa*), substance (*dravya*), action (*kriyā*), universal (*jāti*), inherence (*samavāya*), and so forth; that is the object of words and cognitions with superimposed images; that is ascertained by the two trustworthy awarenesses (*pramā*) whose definitions are clear and whose nature is not mixed with even the tiniest part of any thing else; that is not [temporally] concatenated (*asamkrānti*); that has neither beginning nor end; that is like a reflection and so forth; [and] that is entirely free from the mass of conceptual elaborations. (McClintock 2010, 98)

And Coseru’s translation is as follows:

This *Compendium of True Principles* is composed after having bowed to that all-knowing one, who is the best of speakers, who does not rely on an independent scripture, who, in wishing for the welfare of the world, developed great compassion over innumerable eons, [and] proposed the doctrine of dependent arising, which is difficult to understand, in that it bears no relation to causes such as primordial nature, the divine, both [the divine and primordial nature], the self, and other entities; which is transitory; which is the ground on the basis of which actions, their results, and the connection between the two is postulated; which is devoid of superimposed attributes such as quality, substance, action, genus, inherence, and so forth; which is the object of words and cognitions only [insofar as they operate] as superimposed attributes; which is cognized by the two clearly defined sources of knowledge; whose nature is not mixed with anything else in the slightest degree; which is not intercalated; which has no beginning and no end; which is like a reflected image and other similar things; [and] which is free from conceptual elaborations. (Coseru 2012, 126)

In essence, all six verses amount to two simple sentences: “The foremost of teachers taught dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*); bowing to that omniscient one (*sarvajña*), I compose the *Tattvasaṃgraha*.” Even reduced to this simple formulation, these two sentences provide a basic statement of the topic and purpose of the overall treatise, and pay homage to the Buddha. But the first of these two sentences includes an intricate series of qualifications of dependent origination, each of which corresponds to one of, or one grouping of, the first twenty-three chapters of the text, in sequence. The first sentence also includes several additional descriptions of the Buddha, such as his great compassion, and the fact that he “did not rely on independent scriptures” (*svatantra-śruti-niḥsaṅga*). The latter quality anticipates chapters 24 and 25, which concern core doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā tradition. The description of the Buddha as “omniscient” at the end of the *maṅgala* anticipates the final chapter, chapter 26, concerning, naturally enough, the Buddha’s omniscience.

This table shows the manner in which the opening six verses anticipate the twenty-six chapters of the text. In the left column are the individual attributes of dependent origination and the Buddha, and in the right column are the titles of the corresponding chapters of the text:

<i>Dependent origination is:</i>	<i>Chapter number and title [number of verses]</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Free from the activity of <i>prakṛti</i>, Īśvara, both, the self, etc. (<i>prakṛti-iśa-ubhaya-ātma-ādi-vyāpārahita</i>) 	1. Examination of <i>Prakṛti</i> [39]
	2. Examination of Īśvara [48]
	3. “ ” both (in concert) [16]
	4. “ ” the theory of a spontaneous world [18]
	5. Brahman the word ¹²⁴ [25]
	6. Puruṣa (miscellaneous creation theories) [18]
	7. The self [179]
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fluctuating (<i>cala</i>) 	8. Permanence [126]
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The basis for the constancy of the relation between actions and their fruits (<i>karma-tatphala-sambandha-vyavasthā-samāśraya</i>) 	9. The relation between actions and their results [70]
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Empty of the conditions that are substance, quality, action, universal, particular, and inherence¹²⁵ (<i>guṇa-dravya-kriyā-jāti-samāvāya-ādy-upādhibhiḥ śūnya</i>) 	10. Substance [87]
	11. Quality [58]
	12. Action [16]

In different ways, all three of these scholars, especially McClintock and Coseru, emphasize the ingenuity and precision that went into the sequence of these six verses. Suffice it to say, though the reader benefits from an explanation of the logic of this sequence, I do not think the sequence has to be destroyed in order to render the verses in a comprehensible manner.

Kapstein’s translation follows the original syntax and in that way comports more closely with my rendering:

Movement devoid of prime matter, a divine creator, their conjunction, self and similar constructions; / Ground for the deed and its fruit, their relationship, ascertainment and such; / Empty with respect to quality, substance, function, genus, inherence and other superimposed categories, / But within the scope of words and concepts relating to posited features; / Ascertained by the two epistemic operations possessing distinct characteristics; / Unmixed with so much as even a mote of extraneous nature; / Without temporal extension, without beginning or end, like unto reflections and so on; / Free from the whole mass of conceptual projections, unrealized by other [teachers]— / This interdependent arising was propounded by the best of proponents, / Who was unattached to self-justifying revelations, and moved to benefit the whole world; / Who throughout no fewer than numberless aeons became the very self of compassion; / Having bowed before him, the Omniscient, I gather here the *tattvas*. (Kapstein 2001, 11).

¹²⁴ Every chapter is titled the “Examination of” (*-parīkṣā*) the particular topic in question.

¹²⁵ Śāntaraḥṣita names five categories out of their usual order, alluding to the sixth with the term *-ādi*, but it is

	13. Universal [105]
	14. Particular [10]
	15. Inherence [44]
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • That onto which the scope of words and cognitions about form are imposed (<i>āropita-ākāra-śabda-pratyaya-gocara</i>) 	16. The meaning of words [346]
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ascertained by the two means of knowledge, which are endowed with clear definitions (<i>spṛṣṭa-lakṣaṇa-samyukta-pramā-dvitya-niścita</i>) 	17. The definition of perception [149]
	18. Inference [125]
	19. Other means of knowledge [222]
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not consisting of anything that has come to be mixed even in the slightest (<i>aṇīyasā 'pi nāṃsena miśribhūta-aparātmaka</i>) 	20. <i>Syādvāda</i> (Jain standpoint theory) [77]
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not passing over (<i>asamkrānti</i>) 	21. The three times (Sarvāstivāda Buddhism) [71]
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Without beginning or end (<i>anādyanta</i>) 	22. Lokāyata (Cārvāka materialism) [108]
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Like a reflection, etc. (<i>pratibimbā-ādi-sannibha</i>) 	23. External things (Yogācāra idealism) [120]
<i>The Buddha (compassionate, foremost of teachers):</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does not cling to independent scriptures (<i>svatantra-śruti-niḥsaṅga</i>) 	24. Śruti [726]
	25. Intrinsic authority [313]
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is omniscient (<i>sarvajñā</i>) 	26. Persons with supersensory vision [523]

There is a certain logic to dividing the text this way, and it conforms to the titles Kamalaśīla gives to each of the twenty-six chapters. But simply listing the twenty-six does not provide a clear enough sense of the structure of the whole.

Several scholars have discussed the way the opening verses map onto the work as a whole, and the light they shed on the text's philosophical or didactic orientation. For example, McClintock emphasizes the degree to which these verses parallel the opening of Nāgārjuna's *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā*. (A point Kapstein highlights, as well.) This suggests that the work is oriented on the Madhyamaka philosophical lineage typically credited to Nāgārjuna, even though the *Tattvasaṃgraha* as a whole offers relatively little Madhyamaka-style analysis. In terms of the structure of the work, McClintock takes the two aspects of the opening sentence, the qualifications of dependent origination and those of the Buddha, to indicate that the text itself is roughly divisible into two. "Once we have discerned this twofold structure of the work through a study of the opening verses," she explains, "we can more easily recognize that the two sections of the work serve different purposes. That is, the greater part of the work concerns the nature of reality, and it moves quite clearly from a critique of gross misunderstandings to more subtle ones."¹²⁶ She also argues that the text moves roughly from ontological matters to epistemological ones, shifting in the sixteenth chapter, which concerns theory of language.¹²⁷ The strongest point in this claim is that chapter 23, which, in McClintock's reading, marks the final chapter in the first part of the work, concerns the idealist Yogācāra position, "the highest explicit level of analysis in the work." From here, the final three chapters "involve a conscious stepping back from the Yogācāra perspective and a general re-

unambiguous that he is referring to this standard list of six.

¹²⁶ McClintock 2010, 97.

¹²⁷ McClintock 2010, 100.

adoption, for the purposes of persuasion, of the less controversial Sautrāntika system.”¹²⁸ For this reason, McClintock goes so far as to say that the final three chapters can be read as a kind of appendix to the body of the work as a whole.

Taking Ratié’s point¹²⁹ about the systematicity of the text as seriously as I think we should, this division is not entirely satisfying. I am not sure, to take a random example, that the miscellaneous “other means of knowledge” that concern the final portion of chapter 19 really represent more subtle misunderstandings than, e.g., the illusion of the self (chapter 7), which Buddhist theory broadly considers the most fundamental of human misunderstandings, and the most difficult to remedy. In addition, we can find arguments oriented on ontology, epistemology, theory of language, and so on, scattered throughout most of the chapters in the text. The authority and omniscience of the Buddha, as McClintock is careful to highlight, comes up as a rhetorical and logical point of emphasis at various points throughout. The precise arguments one employs must shift in accordance with the system of one’s interlocutor, but the orienting factor remains the same: the Buddha’s teaching of dependent origination is supreme; it enables one to disprove all erroneous views; it accounts for the nature of reality and experience better than any other theories; it does so with simultaneously more rigor and more elegance; it inspires and deserves faith and confidence; and it uniquely leads to enlightenment. The fact that the opening statement comprises a single sentence, rather than a sentence about dependent origination and a separate one about the Buddha, is itself instructive. It is not merely dependent origination in a vacuum, but precisely the Buddha’s teaching of dependent origination that serves as both an example and an expedient for those interested in the height of spiritual attainment.

We should bear in mind the division between the roughly half of the text ostensibly devoted to the characteristics of dependent origination and that devoted to the Buddha, but dividing the text in half does not greatly clarify the logic of its internal structure. In addition, if we follow Śāntarākṣita’s opening verses carefully, we find a more nuanced division of the text:

<i>Dependent origination is:</i>	<i>General topic (corresponding chapter numbers):</i>
Free from the activity of <i>prakṛti</i> , <i>Īśvara</i> , both, the self, etc.;	Critique of various metaphysics of creation and experience (chs. 1–7)
Fluctuating;	Defense of momentariness theory (8)
The basis for the constancy of the relation between actions and their fruits;	Account of causality (9)
Empty of the conditions that are substance, quality, action, universal, particular, and inherence;	Critique of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology (10–15)
That onto which the scope of words and cognitions about form are imposed;	Theory of Language (16)
Ascertained by the two means of knowledge, which are endowed with clear definitions;	Epistemology (17–19)
Not consisting of anything that has come to be mixed even in the slightest;	Critique of Jain standpoint theory (20)
Not passing over;	Critique of Sarvāstivāda (21)

¹²⁸ McClintock 2010, 97.

¹²⁹ Cf. n 36, for example.

Without beginning or end;	Critique of Lokāyata (Cārvāka) (22)
Like a reflection, or the like.	Defense of Vijñānavāda (23)
<i>Dependent origination is taught by someone who:</i>	
Does not depend on independent scriptures;	Critique of Mīmāṃsā (24–25)
Is omniscient.	Defense of the Buddha’s omniscience (26)

In this reading, rather than mapping discrete chapters onto the attributes of dependent origination, we group together the sections of chapters that correspond to each discrete attribute mentioned in the opening verses. The first attribute, “free from the activity of *prakṛti*, Īśvara, both, the self, etc.,” does not just anticipate seven discrete chapters, but the section of the text comprised of those chapters. We can take this a step further by further grouping together chapters that correspond in an important sense: chapters 8 and 9 both concern aspects of the Buddhist account that serves in place of the metaphysical theories of chapters 1–7; chapters 20–23 all concern distinctive teachings from specific traditions that do not fall within any of the earlier categories. This leaves us with the following outline of the text as a whole:

- I. Opposing metaphysics [*total verses: 349*]
 - a. Cosmological theories
 - b. Theories of the self
- II. Buddhist metaphysics [*196*]
 - a. Momentariness theory
 - b. Causality
- III. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology [*320*]
- IV. Theory of language [*346*]
- V. Epistemology [*496*]
- VI. Miscellany [*376*]
 - a. Jainism
 - b. Sarvāstivāda
 - c. Cārvāka
 - d. Vijñānavāda
- VII. Mīmāṃsā theory [*1039*]
- VIII. The omniscience of the Buddha¹³⁰ [*523*]

This rightly leaves us with the impression that the two most important opposing traditions in the text are Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Each is given its own dedicated set of chapters, especially lengthy in the case of Mīmāṃsā. Traditions like Jainism or Cārvāka each has a distinctive enough theory that it has to be dealt with separately, and is occasionally raised under the umbrella categories of theories of the self, epistemology, and so on; yet they do not receive anywhere near as exhaustive a treatment as Mīmāṃsā, and especially Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa, or, secondarily, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

This outline also emphasizes the fluid nature of the text. Rather than a simple movement up a ladder, or a division into discrete kinds of topics or discrete traditions, the text moves according to a different logic. It will take more time to think through all of Śāntaraḷṣita’s structural decisions, but,

¹³⁰ The entire text has a dialogic structure, and Śāntaraḷṣita presents the final chapter, concerning the omniscience of the Buddha, as a continuation of the dispute with Mīmāṃsā from the lengthy chapters 24 and 25.

following Kamalaśīla’s lead, I would argue that the text moves in a dialogical manner. Put differently, we might say that it moves according to the logic of dependent origination. Topics, voices, and arguments arise in dependence on the material that precedes and informs them, not in a simplistic causal chain, but rather like the intricate causal complex surrounding the sprouting of seeds. Śāntarakṣita shapes the dialogue—but he also participates in it. His own movement throughout the text responds to the cacophony of voices pushing the discussion forward. Note the transitional verses that open chapters 8 and 10, for example. After seven chapters, and almost 350 verses, dedicated to refuting a series of metaphysical theories, Śāntarakṣita says this:

Perhaps we are making this effort toward unworthy subjects, since *prakṛti* and so on are refuted by a proof of momentariness. Hence, we will establish momentariness clearly in order to refute what we have already mentioned as well as what we will discuss later, universals, etc., without distinction. (350–351)¹³¹

In other words, after entertaining the views of Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, and several other traditions on cosmology and the nature of the self, Śāntarakṣita defends the doctrine that disproves all of them. If every entity is momentary, which is to say perishes immediately upon arising, then notions of permanent, or even merely enduring, creators or agents of experience are simply untenable. But then, around 200 verses later, after proving momentariness and explaining the corresponding account of causality, Śāntarakṣita says this:

With nothing but scripture, the followers of Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda¹³² say: “We proclaimed earlier that universals, etc., cannot be devoid of essence; the six categories, substance, etc., really exist.”

Therefore, we briefly convey the refutation of substance, and so on. (546–547)¹³³

Even though, according to Śāntarakṣita, it should be needless to say anything more about notions already disproved by momentariness, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas are dogmatically fixated on their ontological categories. Hence, the conversation must continue. Note the casual insult that opens this remark: “with nothing but scripture.” Scriptural authority is a powerful force, and, for some, is more deeply compelling than mere logical reasoning. The conversation continues from there. While examining the six categories, Śāntarakṣita increasingly refers to our conceptual imposition of shared conventions. This leads naturally into the “Examination of the Meaning of Words,” and a confrontation with the major theories of language opposed to Buddhist “exclusion” (*apoha*) theory.

We do not have to impose a fixed and simple structure, or one corresponding in some sense to philosophical surveys of Euro-American philosophy, to recognize the way the text as a whole moves. When creating an enumerative compound in Sanskrit (a + b + c), authors are typically expected to start with shorter words and gradually move to longer ones, or to start or end with the most eminent term or the chronologically prior or posterior person in a group; barring such strictures, they can follow whatever other aesthetic rationale they prefer. Dependent origination is arguably the core Buddhist teaching, the most robust analysis of reality and experience, and the most broadly

¹³¹ atha vā ‘sthāna evāyam āyāsaḥ kriyate yataḥ | kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasiddhyaiva prakṛtyādi nirākṛtam ||350|| uktasya vaksyamāṇasya jātyādeś cāvīśeṣataḥ | niśedhāya tataḥ spaṣṭam kṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ prasādhyate ||351|| (TS 166).

¹³² This refers to Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, respectively, as Kamalaśīla notes.

¹³³ jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvam ayuktaṃ prāk prakāśitam | dravyādayaḥ ṣaḍarthā ye vidyante pāramārthikāḥ ||546|| ity ākṣapādakāṇādāḥ prāhur āgamamātrakāḥ^a | dravyādipratīṣedho 'yaṃ saṅkṣepeṇa tad ucyate ||547|| (TS 231, J27v.3)

efficacious in impelling the practitioner towards enlightenment. Strictly speaking, any number of structures oriented on various aspects of dependent origination could have worked. What is most important is that we see that the text functions as a coherent yet fluid whole.

ĪŚVARA

We begin the work proper, as Śāntarakṣita does, with cosmology.

After the *maṅgala*, the first words of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* are:

Different effects, such as they are,¹³⁴ come forth from, and have as their intrinsic form, nothing but (*kevala*) the primordial (*pradhāna*) alone (*eva*), in which every potency is contained. (7)¹³⁵

This is a slightly jarring transition. The very first words of the *maṅgala*, and so of the text as a whole, state that dependent origination is “free from the primordial (*prakṛti*).” Clearly Śāntarakṣita is no longer speaking in his own voice, but inhabiting the view of a proponent of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. According to Sāṃkhya, the transient constituents of the universe emerge as a series of transformations (*pariṇāma*) of “the primordial” (*prakṛti* or *pradhāna*), and are ultimately reducible to it.

This verse marks the beginning of the first chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, the “Examination of *Prakṛti*.” Śāntarakṣita inhabits the Sāṃkhya view for nine verses and then closes his first *pūrvapakṣa* with the words “thus say followers of Kapila” (*iti kāpilāḥ*), i.e., Sāṃkhyas.

The first several chapters of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* concern cosmological and theological theories. We are most concerned with the second chapter, the “Examination of Īśvara,” on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theism. Readers more versed in Buddhist thought than Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika may find the proceeding unit on the self more familiar than this one. But it is essential to consider the way the *Tattvasaṃgraha* begins and to look closely at the breadth of its engagement with Nyāya. In addition, Aviddhakarṇa’s theistic arguments, which we will examine below, are pivotal to understanding his work. They are difficult arguments—especially the first, Av6—but they shed a lot of light on

¹³⁴ More coarsely, “according to condition” or “due to existence.” Kamalaśīla offers two explanations: though they are ultimately identical with the primordial, nevertheless it is accurate to describe them separately because they each result from a particular transformation *or* their intrinsic condition, i.e., their particular arrangement of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, determines apparent differences between them. In either sense, “due to existence” or “according to condition,” etc., means that they are “different” (*bheda*) *in a sense*. Hence, “such as they are.”

¹³⁵ aśeṣaśaktipracitāt pradhānād eva kevalāt | kāryabhedāḥ pravartante tadrūpā eva bhāvataḥ ||7|| (TS 20)

Aviddhakarṇa's argumentative and rhetorical style, metaphysical commitments, and conversation partners.

Before turning to Īśvara, a quick summary of the "Examination of *Prakṛti*" is needed.

To begin with, it is worth noting that, for Sāṃkhya, the primordial is utterly separate from the sentient witnessing agent (*puruṣa*), i.e., the self.¹³⁶ The intellect, *buddhi*, is not concomitant with *puruṣa*, but is in fact the first evolute of *prakṛti*. Self-consciousness (*ahaṃkāra*) and various other aspects of cognition are modifications of *buddhi*, and so, ultimately, of the primordial rather than the self, which remains an unchanged and unchanging witness. But *puruṣa* confuses itself with the elaborate unfolding of *prakṛti* that it witnesses. The diversity of the manifest universe, and of an individual's experience of it, are the results of this cosmic confusion.

Since all of the constituents of the universe (apart from *puruṣa*, which stands on its own) are ultimately reducible to *prakṛti*, effects must already exist in a latent form in their cause. This is commonly called *sat-kārya-vāda* (doctrine of the existent effect) or *parināma-vāda* (doctrine of transformations, i.e., the view that an effect is but a transformation or modification of the cause, rather than a new creation). The proponent of Sāṃkhya in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* substantiates this view with five reasons, which, Kamalaśīla explains, derive from *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 9: "the effect exists because: there is no production of what is non-existent; we grasp material causes; not everything is possible; the potential is produced by the potent; and the cause exists."¹³⁷

After closing the *pūrvapakṣa* in verse 15, Śāntarākṣita begins his refutation of the Sāṃkhya view with a cheeky remark:

Concerning this, the wise (*sudhī*) say the same as an objection against the existence [of the effect].
Your (*vaḥ*) response to that would be the same for the wise, too. (16)¹³⁸

In other words, Buddhist thinkers ("the wise") can simply restate *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 9 as a refutation of the very claim the "followers of Kapila" had intended to prove. The details of the dispute are outside our present purview, but the basic point is that the Sāṃkhya argument is inconclusive at best, and entirely self-destructive at worst.

Unsurprisingly, it is the doctrine that the effect pre-exists in the cause that most occupies Śāntarākṣita's attention in this opening chapter. If an effect already exists, there is nothing for its cause to cause; it ceases to be an effect, and its cause ceases to be a cause. If its existence is hidden or concealed and requires some additional factor (*atiśaya*) to make it manifest, is this additional factor also already latent in *prakṛti*? If so, the same problem arises; if not, then how does Sāṃkhya account for this additional something beyond *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*?

¹³⁶ Sāṃkhya eventually comes to hold that there are infinite selves (*puruṣa*, *ātman*) in order to account for the division between the bodies, etc., that we each illusorily experience ourselves as being or having. Ultimately, *puruṣa* is sentient without being an agent of action (*akārṣ*); yet *prakṛti*, which is, of course, quite active, has no sentience, and moves purely for *puruṣa*'s benefit. (Cf. Hulin 1978.) It should perhaps be no surprise that *puruṣa* is also the word for a man (as in, male) and that *prakṛti* (nature, source) is a feminine noun.

¹³⁷ asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt | śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam ||9|| (Esnoul, 14).

¹³⁸ tad atra sudhiyaḥ prāhus tulyā sattve 'pi codanā | yat tasyām uttaraṃ vaḥ syāt tat tulyaṃ sudhiyām api ||16|| (TS 28).

Notably, Śāntarākṣita does not appear to engage with any particular theorists in the “Examination of *Prakṛti*.” Kamalaśīla mentions only Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the semi-mythic author of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. In Śāntarākṣita’s rational reconstruction, Sāṃkhya appears almost as a hypothetical position, a point of reference for the ensuing discussion.

In the second chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, the “Examination of Īśvara,” Śāntarākṣita turns to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theism. This is a natural transition. Sāṃkhya’s cosmology is strictly non-theistic. In fact, Kamalaśīla says that the double emphasis of the phrase “*nothing but the primordial alone*” in verse 7 is meant to highlight this dichotomy. That is to say, the very first words of the *pūrvapakṣa* of chapter one already anticipate the response from the *pūrvapakṣa* of chapter two. The proponent of Sāṃkhya is not only engaged in a debate with Śāntarākṣita, but with Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, as well.

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika theisms differ fundamentally from Sāṃkhya in two key respects. First, there is the division between the *pariṇāma-vāda* of Sāṃkhya and the *ārambha-vāda* (doctrine of generation) of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Sāṃkhya claims that the worlds, and the bodies, of the universe are all ultimately identical with *prakṛti*, of which they are but a series of transformations (*pariṇāma*), whereas Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika claim that genuinely new substances, distinct from their material causes, are generated (*ārambha*).

Second, in Sāṃkhya the process is impersonal; the only role of sentience in creation is as an unwitting witness. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, credit an omniscient sentient agent with the intentional creation of the universe. Specifically, Nyāya theology holds that the creator god, Īśvara, manipulates atoms and karmic merit (*dharma*), which are otherwise inert, into the shape of the universe, its worlds and its inhabitants. He is the efficient cause, the craftsman and overseer, the cosmic potter. Unsurprisingly, some Naiyāyikas, like Aviddhakarṇa, infer his existence on the basis of design.

In the “Examination of Īśvara,” after very briefly describing Nyāya theism, Śāntarākṣita again begins by inhabiting the view of his opponents, stating a series of arguments as if they were his own. Kamalaśīla tells us that the first two arguments were originally composed by Aviddhakarṇa. Śāntarākṣita devotes most of the remainder of the chapter to refuting the first of these, “Av6,” Aviddhakarṇa’s first theistic argument.

The entirety of the “Examination of Īśvara” is translated below. It is not easy material. We are most immediately concerned with the first two arguments of the *pūrvapakṣa*, and the reader should feel free to skim much of the rest of the chapter and/or return to it after reading the analysis that follows.

CHAPTER TWO EXAMINATION OF ĪŚVARA

Introduction

There are some who claim that God is the cause of everything that has an origin.

*Nyāya theistic arguments*¹³⁹

As is known, what is insentient does not generate its effects on its own. (46)

(i) A substantial whole, which is something with a particular arrangement of parts that are its inhering causes, can only be understood in terms of an intelligent agent. The locus of debate, i.e., such a thing that is graspable by the two sense faculties, sight and touch, or ungraspable, is preceded by an intelligent agent, like a pot, unlike atoms, etc.¹⁴⁰ (47–48)

(ii) The material causes of bodies, etc., are seen to produce their respective effects insofar as they are presided over by a sentient agent, because they possess color, etc., like threads, etc.¹⁴¹ (49)

(iii) Merit, demerit, and atoms, all generate their respective effects insofar as they are governed by a sentient agent, because they act after having been immobile, like a shuttle and thread. (50)

(iv) Further, at the beginning of creation, the conventional discourse (*vyavahāra*) of men is generated by the instruction of another, because it is restricted for those who are informed, like the conventional discourse of the young.¹⁴² (51)

(v) It is distinctly the case that the great elements, etc., are governed by an intelligent cause in their becoming the causes of pleasure and pain for all the world, because they are insentient, because

¹³⁹ Section headings, throughout the translations, are my own.

¹⁴⁰ This is one of the more difficult pairs of verses in the selected translation, which is unsurprising, because with these verses Śāntarākṣita paraphrases one of the most difficult of Aviddhakarṇa's fragments (Av6, §1). The gist is that the structure of things like trees and bodies entails intelligent creation, not unlike Paley's famous watchmaker argument.

"Inhering causes" are, in this case, things like threads, clay, or atoms. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, a substantial whole, such as a cloth or a pot, "inheres in" its component parts. This means the existence of the cloth is inseparable from its relation to the threads. When the "conjunctions" between the different threads ceases, the threads continue to exist; but when the "inherence" of the cloth "in" the threads ceases, the cloth disappears. Aviddhakarṇa is arguing that just as threads do not spontaneously arrange themselves into cloths, nor do atoms, bodies.

"Graspable by the two sense faculties or ungraspable" is an elliptical reference to the nine substances of Vaiśeṣika ontology. Most importantly, the idea that a single thing can be both seen and touched is pivotal to the Nyāya worldview (e.g., NS 3.1.1) but anathema to Śāntarākṣita's.

A coarser translation, i.e., one closer to the syntax and diction of the Sanskrit, is, "Whatever has a particular arrangement of parts that generate effects in themselves should be understood in terms of intelligence. Therefore, the locus of debate, i.e., such a thing that is graspable by the two sense faculties or ungraspable, is preceded by intelligence, like a pot, unlike atoms, etc."

¹⁴¹ This corresponds with fragment Av7 (§1).

¹⁴² The example Kamalaśīla cites is, "Just as a child who is not yet familiar with verbal conventions comes to possess the verbal convention restricted to particular objects, e.g., cows, on the basis of the instruction, e.g., of their mother" (*aprasiddhavāgyavahārāṇām kumārāṇām gavādiṣu pratyarthaniyato vāgyavahāro yathā mātrādyupadeśapūrvakah*).

they are effects, because they perish, etc., like an adze, or the like.¹⁴³ Hence, his existence¹⁴⁴ is clearly apprehended. (52–53)

(vi) Once it has been established that he is the creator of everything, his omniscience is proven effortlessly, because a creator knows the form, etc., of his creation. (54)

(vii) The entities that are the basis for dispute are clearly perceptible to someone, because they are entities, because of their existence, etc., like different instances of pleasure, pain, etc.¹⁴⁵ (55)

Refutation

The reason in the first of these arguments is unestablished.¹⁴⁶ It has not been proven that “arrangement” is a kind of relation, nor that wholes exist, because you accept both of these to be visible, yet we apprehend neither. For the same reason, the example lacks the proving property.¹⁴⁷ (56–57)

Visual and tactile cognition are each produced with distinct images. They do not share a single object. The same is true for olfaction, and so on. A unifying cognition, which is essentially conceptual and arises on the force of those [cognitions], determines the aggregate [of them]. Such things as water and fire, e.g., are not, in fact, perceptible to two sense faculties. [The reason,] therefore, is unestablished in its substratum,¹⁴⁸ because this property is itself unestablished. (58–60)

In the case of something like a temple, the fact of its having a particular arrangement is such that when one sees it, even without perceiving its creator, one arrives at [the fact that there is] an intelligent being [behind its construction]. If the same sort of thing were perceived in the property possessor, namely, things like bodies and trees, then, because it proves [intelligence], it would be tenable to make the intended argument on its basis. For any x determined to be the effect of y on the basis of positive and negative concomitance,¹⁴⁹ a determination of y follows upon seeing x . This is established reasoning. But the particular arrangement found in different bodies, trees, etc., is not of such a sort. Rather, there is only the word itself [to compare these two sorts of “arrangement”]. If such a property [i.e., one that is only nominally similar,] is put forth [to prove something], it results in doubtful negative concomitance, as if one were to argue, e.g., that an ant-hill was fashioned by a potter [merely because it is “a modification of clay”].¹⁵⁰ (61–65)

¹⁴³ As an adze cannot cut and shape wood without a carpenter using it, so the material elements cannot form into bodies, etc., without an intelligent agent employing them to do so.

¹⁴⁴ Krishnamacharya and Shastri print *sarvam* (everything), but the manuscripts both read *satvam* (existence), which is also preferable.

¹⁴⁵ This, like argument (vi), would seem intended to prove Īśvara’s omniscience: even the growth of a blade of grass must be perceptible to someone, and only an omniscient being could perceive such a thing.

¹⁴⁶ Krasser 2002 tracks the development of Aviddhakarṇa’s argument beginning with Dharmakīrti’s response in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. The details of Śāntarakṣita’s response, as the general orientation of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* would suggest, trace back to Dharmakīrti’s discussion there.

¹⁴⁷ Even a pot, Śāntarakṣita is claiming, has not been proven to be a substantial whole, a singular entity with “an arrangement of parts” and so on. The term “proving property” (*sādhana-dharma*) is another word for the “reason” (*hetu*).

¹⁴⁸ In other words, if the subject of the argument has not been proven to exist, the reason cannot subsist in it. If there is no mountain, then the reason “because there is smoke on the mountain” cannot prove there is fire there.

¹⁴⁹ “Positive concomitance” (*anvaya*): where there is x , there is y ; “negative concomitance” (*vyatireka*): where there is no y , there is no x . Where there is smoke, there is fire; where there is no fire, there is no smoke.

¹⁵⁰ This is an important supplementary phrase that Kamalaśīla adds (*mṛdvikāratvamātram iti śeṣaḥ*). “Negative concomitance” here would be, “what has not been fashioned by a potter is not a modification of clay,” which, indeed, is doubtful.

Shastri prints °*kṛtādiṣu*, but J reads °*kṛtāv iva*, as does Kamalaśīla’s *pratīka*.

Objection: “This response is a false objection (*jāti*) because it entails a variation (*vikalpa*) in a distinct property. The proving property we have put forward, an effect, is only a generality.” (66)¹⁵¹

A mere entity, which is excluded from what does not have that form, proves impermanence on the basis of identity.¹⁵² This reasoning is not found in the argument in question. The white that is seen never to deviate from fire is essentially smoke. Knowledge of fire does not also follow from snow, which only shares in being denotable as “white.”¹⁵³ (67–68)

The response would be a false objection if, in response to an invariable connection with a generality, we had issued an objection that takes recourse to something particular. Otherwise, should we not hold firm to this reasoning, it would be possible to prove that thunderbolts, and such, have horns merely because the word “cow” (*go*) can refer to them.¹⁵⁴ But if no invariable connection is found in this argument, no one can have a dispute about proof through this reasoning.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, no permanent, singular basis of a permanent, all-knowing intellect has been established, because, due to the lack of a property to be proven, there is no pervasion. (68–72)

To explain: It is certain that houses, staircases, gates, towers, and so on, are preceded by many impermanent mental events. For this very reason, you must admit that it [i.e., your own argument,] contradicts your desired [conclusion], because it proves the fact of being preceded by many impermanent mental events. For you have said that there is only invariable connection in terms of an intelligent cause, but we have explained it perfectly clearly in terms of an alternative. (73–75)

Insofar as sequence and simultaneity are incompatible, we maintain that permanent things do not produce effects; and insofar as objects are sequential, there is also a sequence in cognitions of them. Īśvara’s cognition would arise in a sequence because of its connection with sequential objects of knowledge, like, e.g., Devadatta’s awareness of a flame. (76–77)

We also hold that a pot, e.g., is but a heap of atoms. The creator of such a thing, the potter, is the creator of atoms only. The property that you want to prove is not excluded from atoms, which you have put forth as the dissimilar example. (78–79)

Moreover, if you claim such things are preceded by intelligence in a general sense, then we do not have any disagreement about that at all, since diversity is produced by karma. If you argue that it is preceded by a permanent, singular intellect, it is devoid of the quality to be proven, and it is also inconclusive, since we can see that houses, etc., are made by many. (80–81)

¹⁵¹ The term for “false objection” here is *jāti*, a technical category in the Nyāya taxonomy of devious debate tactics. Generally, it is when one falsely claims a particular defect in one’s opponents argument—if the opponent cannot answer the charge, then, even though it is not true, the opponent is still defeated. Cf. “Debates about debate” in the Introduction; Gokhale 1992; Prets 2001.

¹⁵² According to Dharmakīrti, there are two acceptable relations on the basis of which one can draw an inference, identity (*being-a-redwood* proves *being-a-tree*) and causality (*smoke* proves *fire*). Śāntarakṣita is going over both options to show that neither works in the present case. Existence and impermanence entail one another, according to the Buddhists, so something’s merely being an existent proves its impermanence.

¹⁵³ Put differently, it is the causal relationship between fire and smoke that allows one to infer the one from the other, not the whiteness of smoke.

¹⁵⁴ Indeed, the word *go* (cow) in Sanskrit can refer to quite a broad range of phenomena, including thunderbolts.

¹⁵⁵ This verse is a little unclear to me. Shastri prints *siddhe* (in *or* with respect to what is proven), but J reads *siddher* (of *or* from proof). Kamalaśīla only says that this verse is in response to the implicit objection that there is an invariable connection.

This same critique should be applied to the remaining reasons as suitable. Besides this, only a few points [against the remaining reasons] are demonstrated [in the following verses]. (82)

Argument (iii)

It has not been established that atoms, etc., act after immobility, because of momentariness.¹⁵⁶ And [this reason also] deviates due to [Īśvara] himself, because he would also act in a sequence.¹⁵⁷ (83)

Argument (iv)

We do not accept that the consciousnesses and memories of people are lost at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*),¹⁵⁸ because they are born, e.g., as gods of the radiant class (*ābhāsvara*), and because they are born into this world from the same. (84)

That a mouthless being is a teacher could only be grasped through faith, and [we know that] he is mouthless because, due to his freedom from merit and demerit, he is bodiless.¹⁵⁹ (85)

Arguments (i)–(v)

Further, pervasion (*vyāpti*)¹⁶⁰ is contradicted by inference in all of these arguments. A reason cannot pervade a property that contradicts it. Īśvara is not the cause of all beings because he himself is devoid of origination, like a sky-lotus. Otherwise, all things would arise simultaneously.¹⁶¹ (86–87)

Alternatively, things that arise in sequence cannot at all have Īśvara as their cause, e.g., fools' convictions that arise on the basis of these very arguments. If these [convictions] are also produced by Īśvara, then, since he is eternal, it would be pointless to state these arguments. It could not help someone untreatable.¹⁶² (88–89)

You have observed [that *x* is present]¹⁶³ when certain things exist, and never when they do

¹⁵⁶ The doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇabhāṅga*, *kṣaṇikatva*) is elaborated and defended in chapter eight below.

¹⁵⁷ I.e., as Kamalaśīla explains, he would have to have been immobile at some point, requiring an infinite regress of immobile beings whose initial activity is governed by some additional sentient agent (*anaikāntikaś ca tenaiśvareṇa, yata īśvaraḥ kramavatsu kāryeṣu sthitvā pravarttate. atha ca nāsau cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitāḥ, anavasthāprasāṅgāt*).

¹⁵⁸ According to a common cosmological trope in India, the universe undergoes a cycle of creation, maintenance, and dissolution, leading ultimately to the end of each universal epoch and the beginning of the next. According to Vaiśeṣika, after dissolution, permanent things like atoms continue to exist, but without organization or animation. Creation is the reconstruction of a universe out of these raw materials.

¹⁵⁹ Nyāya claims, as Uddyotakara makes clear in argument (iii), that merit and demerit (*dharma-adharma*) are among the causes of material bodies, and also that Īśvara is free from merit and demerit. Here Śāntarakṣita takes this to its literal and logical end: Īśvara must not have a mouth. How, then, should he impart instructions?

¹⁶⁰ “Pervasion” refers to the formal logical pervasion of the reason (*hetu*) by the property to be proven (*sādhyā*). When proving fire on the mountain, the reason is smoke: it is in virtue of the smoke that we know that the property to be proven, fire, is present. According to the Buddhists, this argument only works because smoke is “pervaded” by fire: wherever there is smoke, there is fire; and where there is no fire, there can be no smoke.

¹⁶¹ Variations of this classic Buddhist argument are found through much of the early chapters of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. A present, functioning cause gives rise to its effect(s) immediately, therefore, the perfect, eternal cause of all things would have to give rise to all of creation at once. The point, in effect, is that theists are trying to square a circle.

¹⁶² This is a slightly surprising way to put it, but someone “untreatable” (*acikitsya*) is essentially beyond the reach of any help. Ordinarily, of course, this means that someone is terminally ill. In the case of Īśvara, the point is that if he is an eternal being, he must be the same for all eternity. If his mere existence does not prove the point, there can be no helping him; trying to do so would be like giving medicine to someone untreatable.

¹⁶³ Kamalaśīla says to add the relative pronoun *yat* here, to which *tasya*, “of *x*,” in the next clause would correspond (*bhavadr̥ṣṭam yat ity upaskārah*).

not. If you imagine an additional cause of x , how can you avoid an infinite regress? (90)

Arguments (vi) and (vii)

And one should understand that his omniscience is refuted by the denial of his agency, since it is on the force of that that his omniscience is proven. (91)

Even if these arguments are not spoiled by the defects that we have stated, there cannot be a single creator, because we have demonstrated that this deviates. And if a singular agent is not established, then what is the basis of [your proof of] omniscience? If that[, i.e., merely omniscience as such,] is what is established, the argument you have stated is only relevant against followers of Jaimini.¹⁶⁴ (92–93)

¹⁶⁴ Mīmāṃsakas (followers of Jaimini) do not accept the existence of an omniscient being. The *Tattvasaṃgraha* itself concludes with a defense, against Mīmāṃsā, of the Buddha's omniscience, so a mere proof of omniscience would not be relevant in a debate against Buddhists, but against Mīmāṃsakas.

§1. AV6 AND AV7: GOD AND OTHER POTTERS

Śāntarakṣita devotes just over half of the entire “Examination of Īśvara” to refuting Aviddhakarṇa’s first theistic argument—not because it takes him so long to disprove it, but because of how many different ways he has, following Dharmakīrti,¹⁶⁵ to go about doing so. He regards Aviddhakarṇa’s second theistic argument, Av7, as almost an afterthought,¹⁶⁶ but the two arguments share an underlying vision, and inform one another’s reasoning, so I consider them closely together.

The concepts of wholes, arrangements of parts, and things that are graspable by both vision and touch are, Śāntarakṣita claims, unproven. In other words, the Buddhists do not accept such concepts. Aviddhakarṇa’s use of any one of them against his Buddhist rivals would render his argument invalid. Further, Aviddhakarṇa has not, according to Śāntarakṣita, established anything more than nominal commonality between the locus and the example: just because we can arbitrarily use the term “arrangement” (*samṇiveśa*) to describe both human artifacts and human bodies does not mean their respective arrangements amount to the same thing. Even if *y* and *p* are invariably connected, we cannot prove *p* on the basis of some *x* that shares one of *y*’s qualities. Further, Śāntarakṣita continues, the invariable connection is itself unproven in this case. The arrangement of a pot or a temple (*devakula*),¹⁶⁷ for example, entails many mind-moments rather than a single, permanent intellect. It takes many people to build a temple, but because of momentariness and selflessness, even a pot is in reality built by many different mind moments rather than by a single, stable individual. In short, the notion of a permanent creator creates a host of problems, and the Buddhists can refer to karma or causal concomitance¹⁶⁸ to explain the shape of the universe without raising such problems.

It would seem, on the basis of Śāntarakṣita’s response, that Av6 is a thoroughly naïve argument, utterly failing the basic test of interreligious argumentation in this period by stitching together concepts that are unacceptable to its Buddhist opponents. But is this true? Instead, perhaps Aviddhakarṇa was indifferent to the Buddhist appraisal of Av6 and Av7, intending the force of these arguments to land elsewhere. Let us turn to the arguments themselves for clues.

The basic gist of Aviddhakarṇa’s proof of Īśvara is relatively clear and relatively familiar: the arrangement of the world entails its intelligent creation. But the actual force of the arguments, and the dense language, especially of Av6, is difficult to unpack. Kamalaśīla cites it as follows:

aviddhakarṇopanyastam īśvarasādhane pramāṇadvayam āha [...]. tad uktam dvīndriyagrāhyāgrāhyam vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannam buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakam svārambhakāvayavasamṇiveśaviśiṣṭatvāt,

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Krasser 2002 begins with an assessment of PV 2.8–16 and tracks the development of Nyāya arguments for Īśvara in the wake of Dharmakīrti’s rebuttal of Uddyotakara and Aviddhakarṇa. In the “Examination of Īśvara,” Śāntarakṣita drawing on this passage in PV.

¹⁶⁶ Specifically, they say the same goes for Av7, *mutatis mutandis*. This is also true for the additional arguments cited later in the *pūrvapakṣa*, but, apart from Av7, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla still offer a few additional remarks on each of them.

¹⁶⁷ This is a particularly striking example, given that temples are often seen as microcosms of the universe—though the typical examples are ordinary pots and threads. A devout man may consider a pot and a temple to be different sorts of things altogether, but the most obvious difference in present circumstances is that it is uncontroversial that it takes many different people to produce a temple than in the case of the many different “moments” of the potter who makes the pot.

¹⁶⁸ They may also rely on beginninglessness, which may be implicit in the discussion but is not directly raised.

ghatādivat, vaidharmyeṇa paramāṇava iti. (*Pañjikā* on vv. 47–48)¹⁶⁹

*Śāntarakṣita*¹⁷⁰ states a pair of arguments raised by Aviddhakarṇa to prove *Īśvara*. [...] Aviddhakarṇa has said: What is perceptible and what is imperceptible to the two sense faculties that has come to be the topic of dispute is preceded by an intelligent cause (*buddhimat-kāraṇa*) because of being distinguished by an arrangement of parts that generate [effects] in themselves (*svārambhaka*), like a pot, etc., and unlike atoms.

In the classic example of inferential reasoning, the *mountain* is the subject, and we prove that it must be *fiery* (the property to be proven) in virtue of the fact that it is *smoky* (the reason); we compare this positively to a *kitchen* (the similar case), which is fiery when in use (and consequently smoky), and negatively to a *lake* (the dissimilar case), which is never fiery (and, so, never smoky). Here in Av6, the subject of the argument consists in a pair of elliptical phrases, “what is perceptible and what is imperceptible to the two sense faculties” and “has come to be the topic of dispute.” Aviddhakarṇa is trying to prove that this subject is “preceded by an intelligent cause” in virtue of the fact that it is “distinguished by an arrangement of parts that generate [effects] in themselves.” But what does any of this actually mean?

Kamalaśīla helps to unpack these dense phrases to some extent. With reference to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, he clarifies that “what is perceptible to the two sense faculties” refers to earth, wind, and fire, as these three are all both visible and tangible, whereas “what is imperceptible” refers to “wind, etc.,” i.e., the remaining six of the nine Vaiśeṣika substances, as wind is tangible but not visible, and the rest (ether, time, space, self, and mind) are neither. Altogether, then, the phrase “what is perceptible and what is imperceptible to the two sense faculties” refers to the nine substances. But this locus is further qualified. The phrase “that has come to be the topic of dispute,” Kamalaśīla explains, is not gratuitous, but serves to restrict the locus to such things as “bodies, sense faculties, and worlds” (*śarīra-indriya-bhuvana*), rather than things like pots¹⁷¹ or atoms, which are already agreed upon. In other words, there is no controversy over whether pots or atoms are intelligently created (pots are, atoms are not). Indeed, the fact that Aviddhakarṇa uses these as his examples (pots being the similar case, atoms the dissimilar) shows he considers them uncontroversial. “Bodies, sense faculties, and worlds,” on the other hand, are in dispute. To put it simply: every pot has a potter; who, or what, fashions living bodies?

The reason is a rather elaborate compound: “Because distinguished by an arrangement of parts that generate [effects] in themselves.” This is not easy to unpack. Kamalaśīla argues that Aviddhakarṇa

¹⁶⁹ TSP 52.13, J30r.5. Abhayadevasūri cites the same argument verbatim and also attributes it to Aviddhakarṇa (TBV 100; see Appendix B). In fact, Abhayadevasūri lifts whole passages, such as Kamalaśīla’s explanatory gloss of Av6, from the *Pañjikā*. In addition, Kumārila seems to refer to this argument in *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 74 of the *Ślokavārttika*: sanniveśaviśiṣṭānām utpattim yo gṛhādivat | sādhyec cetanādhiṣṭhām dehānām tasya cottaram, “The [proceeding verses give the] response to someone who would argue that the origination of bodies, with their particular arrangements, is overseen by something sentient” (ŚV 467.21).

¹⁷⁰ “He says” (*āha*). Kamalaśīla often introduces verses this way. Given that the *Pañjikā* is a commentary on Śāntarakṣita, there is no need for him to specify just who is speaking. The only time this creates substantial ambiguity is when Śāntarakṣita quotes Kumārila (or occasionally someone else) verbatim. Śāntarakṣita uses the same *śloka* meter as Kumārila’s *Ślokavārttika* (and now-lost *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, it would seem), and he quotes Kumārila word-for-word in the *Tattvasamgraha* itself. In such cases, it may be right to understand Kamalaśīla’s *āha* as referring directly to Kumārila—though even then, it is still Śāntarakṣita “speaking” Kumārila’s words.

¹⁷¹ Or watches.

includes the phrase “generate [effects] in themselves” (*svārambhaka*) because the reason would otherwise be inconclusive. Universals like cowness are “distinguished by an arrangement of parts that generate [effects] in a substance (*dravya-ārambhaka*)” and yet they are not preceded by an intelligent cause. Aviddhakarṇa, it would seem, has to specify the kinds of parts that are.

“Therefore,” Kamalaśīla abruptly concludes, “the intelligence in question is Īśvara.”¹⁷²

But what precisely is a part “that generates [effects] in itself” (*svārambhaka*), and why does its arrangement entail an intelligent cause? Further clarification requires a detour through Vaiśeṣika.

Interlude: Inherence in Vaiśeṣika

It is neither accidental nor surprising that Kamalaśīla invokes the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* in his comments on Aviddhakarṇa’s first fragment in the *Pañjikā*. Aviddhakarṇa makes frequent reference to the terminology of Vaiśeṣika. In some cases, his reasoning cannot be understood without connecting it to the Vaiśeṣika tradition. Unfortunately, most of the texts of early Vaiśeṣika are lost, save for the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (VS), and Praśastapāda’s *Padārthadharmasamgraha* (PDhS), which plays a much more central role than VS in later Vaiśeṣika and Navya-Nyāya, essentially eclipsing the original sutras. Kamalaśīla refers several times to a thinker named Praśastamati, which has been identified as another name for Praśastapāda.¹⁷³ The fragments attributed to Praśastamati that are not found in PDhS apparently come from a lost polemical commentary by the author of PDhS.¹⁷⁴ At any rate, for whatever reason, Kamalaśīla often cites VS rather than PDhS when explaining the basics of Vaiśeṣika ontology. Still, though we cannot say much about Aviddhakarṇa’s relationship to Praśastapāda, it is often instructive to compare the ways they respectively handle and employ specific concepts and terms.

Unto itself, the term *sva-ārambhaka* could mean “self-generating” or “generating [effects] independently,” but Praśastapāda offers an alternative that better suits Vaiśeṣika theory. The term in PDhS that most closely resembles *svārambhaka* is *svātmāny ārambhakatva*. The chief semantic distinction between these phrases is that the case relation, “in itself,” is explicit in PDhS, but collapsed into a compound in Av6. Śrīdhara (late 10th century), commenting on PDhS, glosses *svātmāny ārambhakatva* as “producing effects inhering in itself” (*sva-samaveta-kārya-janakatva*).¹⁷⁵ Indeed, the term “generating” (*ārambhaka*) specifically conveys the sense of generating an effect, as Śrīdhara’s gloss suggests; recall that *ārambha-vāda*, the doctrine that causes generate genuinely new effects, is the Vaiśeṣika alternative to Sāṃkhya’s *pariṇāma-vāda*, the view that effects are but transformations of the stable underlying material, i.e., *prakṛti*. Śrīdhara’s gloss is essentially a definition of the Vaiśeṣika technical term “inhering cause” (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*), a cause whose effect

¹⁷² gotvādīni tu dravyārambhakāvayavasanniveśena viśeṣyante, na tu svārambhakāvayavasanniveśeneti. tena yo ‘sau buddhimān sa īśvara iti (TSP 53.13, J30v.4).

¹⁷³ Cf. Chemparathy 1970, who follows Thakur and Frauwallner in identifying Praśastamati with Praśastapāda. Chemparathy collects fragments of Praśastapāda’s that are attributed to variations on his name, including Praśastamati.

¹⁷⁴ Chemparathy (1969; 1970) demonstrates that fragments attributed to Praśastamati that cannot be traced to PDhS must come from another text of his, a *ṭīkā*, that includes more extensive comments on issues like the existence of Īśvara.

¹⁷⁵ NK 21.3. Notably, Manorathanandin uses this same term to gloss “inhering cause” (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) in his comments on PV 2.69. Franco points out that Dharmakīrti’s commentators seem in several cases—including this verse—to waffle between reading a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent and a Cārvāka one. It is hard not to wonder whether Aviddhakarṇa/Bhāvivikta’s affiliation with Cārvāka connects in some way to this ambivalence. Cf. Franco 1997, 317ff.

inheres in itself.¹⁷⁶

The relation of inherence is distinctive to Vaiśeṣika ontology.

In Vaiśeṣika, there are two basic relations: conjunction (*saṃyoga*) and inherence (*samavāya*). Two things are conjoined if they are contiguous but still separable. The yogurt (*dadhi*) in a bowl is conjoined to it, but if you scoop out the yogurt, though it is no longer conjoined to the pot, it, like the pot, continues to exist.¹⁷⁷ Similarly, when *x* inheres in *y*, *x* is situated “in” *y* (it is *iha*, “here”). But inherence is a fundamental relation. Praśastapāda describes it as a relation of inseparability (*ayuta-siddhi*). He demonstrates the distinction with a series of examples:

The cognition, “the *dadhi* is here in the bowl” is observed when there is a connection [of conjunction]. So, we observe the cognitions, “The cloth is here in the threads,” “the mat is here in the straw,” “the quality and the action are here in the substance,” “being is here in the substance, the quality, and the action,” “substance-hood is here in the substance,” “quality-hood is here in the quality,” “action-hood is here in the action,” and, “the ultimate differentiae (*antya-viśeṣa*) are here in the permanent substances.” From this, we know the relation of these [i.e., inherence].¹⁷⁸

A pot may contain a liquid, but not in an inseparable manner. Such is only a case of conjunction. On the other hand, threads—however odd it may seem to say so—contain the cloth fundamentally. The cloth is, according to Vaiśeṣika, a distinct substance from the threads, but only exists insofar as the inherence relation obtains. We can divide Praśastapāda’s examples into four sorts of inherence: (i) a whole inheres in its parts (cloth in thread; mat in straw); (ii) qualities and actions inhere in a substance (a cloth is blue; an axe is swung); (iii) universals inhere in their instantiations (though this can be subdivided because being (*sattā*) is different from all other universals in being purely universal, rather than distinctive); and (iv) differentiae (*viśeṣa*) inhere in the permanent atoms. Inherence case (i) can be exemplified by cloths, pots, mats. Case (ii) can be usefully exemplified by cognitions, which are qualities of the self, and, so, inhere in the self. Although the situation is rather different than a cloth and threads, the fundamentality of the relation remains: a cognition only exists so long as its inherence in the self obtains. Case (iii) can be described in terms of substances (cowness inheres in a cow) or in terms of qualities or actions (blueness inheres in the particular blue shade of a cloth). This, again, is rather different from the first two cases but is, again, a fundamental

¹⁷⁶ Though Praśastapāda does not comment any further on the phrase *svātmany ārambhakatva*, it seems to correspond, in his description of substances, to the phrase “inhering cause” in VS 1.1.14: “Possessing action, possessing quality, inhering cause—characteristics of substance” (*kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam* [VS 5.7]). Specifically, as context makes clear, he is referring both to the permanent substances and to substantial wholes like threads: “The nine, earth etc., belong to the class *substance*, are generators in themselves (*svātmani?*), possess qualities, do not have an incompatibility between cause and effect, possess ultimate differentiae, and, apart from substantial wholes, are independent and permanent” (*prthivyādīnām navānām api dravyatvayogaḥ svātmany ārambhakatvam guṇavattvam kāryakāraṇāvirodhitvam antyaviśeṣavattvam anāśritatvanityatve cānyatrāvayavidravyebhyaḥ* [PDhS 20.14, 21.11]). The phrase “parts that generate [effects] in themselves” refers, it follows, to inhering causes that are also parts. Inhering causes that are not also parts include, e.g., the self, the inhering cause of *buddhi*, or ether, of sound.

¹⁷⁷ The actual analysis of the process whereby two substances come to be conjoined and disjoined is fascinatingly intricate. Conjunction is technically a quality that inheres in what is conjoined, ergo it is not itself a process. Vaiśeṣika analyzes the step-by-step process whereby two things come to be conjoined and disjoined on the level of moments.

¹⁷⁸ *yatheha kuṇḍe dadhīti pratyayaḥ sambandhe sati dṛṣṭas, tatheha tantuṣu paṭaḥ, iha vīraṇeṣu kaṭaḥ, iha dravye guṇakarmaṇī, iha dravyaguṇakarmasu sattā, iha dravye dravyatvam, iha guṇe guṇatvam, iha karmaṇi karmatvam, iha nityadravye 'ntyā viśeṣā iti pratyayadarśanād asty eṣāṃ sambandha iti jñāyate* (PDhS 325.2).

relation. Yet the direction of necessity seems to be reversed. Cowness inheres in a cow and yet it is the cow, the substrate, that cannot exist—at least, not as such—without the inherence relation. A blue cloth is only blue so long as blueness inheres in its shade, yet, after the ravages of time, though the cloth may no longer be blue, blueness itself will remain. Universals are eternal. Case (iv) is a little trickier, and less relevant for our purposes, but, in short, according to Vaiśeṣika two atoms of the same substance are identical, so, to account for the fact that they cannot be collapsed into one another, each must have a unique differentia (*viśeṣa*) that inheres in it and distinguishes it from any other otherwise-identical atom.

At least superficially, some of this sounds similar to the concept of supervenience, which is commonly used, e.g., in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind to analyze the relation between mind and body (though its applications are far broader than just that). If conscious events supervene on physical events, then, though they are distinct, the conscious events cannot change without a corresponding change in the physical events in the brain on which they supervene. This relation is often discussed in terms of higher and lower levels of properties. McLaughlin and Bennett¹⁷⁹ use the example of the shapes and colors of a painting (higher-level) and the “microphysical” properties of the painting (lower-level). A forgery is visibly distinguishable from its model only insofar as its microphysical properties differ, and yet, the visible properties cannot be reduced to the microphysical properties—after all, we can only see, and be moved by the sight of, the former.

To what extent does such a notion correspond to inherence? It is not a simple matter. Jonardan Ganeri writes, “We might say that the cow's existence supervenes on that of the universal cowhood. However, it is not so clear that we can say in the same way that the parts (of a car, say) cannot exist unless the whole (car) exists.”¹⁸⁰ On the other hand, this would seem to flip the way these respective relations work. Cowness inheres in the cow, and the whole car supervenes in its parts; so if the existence of the cow supervenes on cowness, the parallel would be that the existence of one of the parts supervenes on the whole car. But this, too, is less than clear. To invert matters, there may be a way of describing the car, or the cloth, as supervening on its parts, or some arrangement of them, but it is hard to imagine how we might describe cowness, in the Vaiśeṣika sense, as supervening on a particular cow.

The odd asymmetry between these cases is actually instructive. According to Kamalaśīla, in Av6, it is to exclude universals that Aviddhakarṇa specifies an arrangement of parts *generating effects in themselves*:

He mentions ‘generating [effects in] themselves’ because distinction by an arrangement of parts deviates to cowness and the like. Cowness and the like are distinguished by an arrangement of parts that generate [effects in] substances, but not by parts that generate [effects in] themselves.¹⁸¹

Universals are eternal and, so, uncreated. A reason that qualifies universals cannot prove intelligent creation. A particular cow's dewlap is one of the parts in which that whole cow inheres: the dewlap, together with the other parts, generates the cow's inherence in itself. But the cow does not inhere in

¹⁷⁹ McLaughlin and Bennett 2018.

¹⁸⁰ Ganeri 2015.

¹⁸¹ avayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭatvaṃ gotvādibhir vyabhicārity ataḥ svārambhakagrahaṇam. gotvādīni tu dravyārambhakāvayavasanniveśena viśeṣyante, na tu svārambhakāvayavasanniveśeneti (TSP 53.13).

the components that distinguish the universal cowness.

In addition, Śāntarakṣita's lengthy refutation of Av6 emphasizes the part-whole relation. Aviddhakarṇa presumes the existence of wholes, but against a Buddhist he would first have to prove that wholes exist in order to use them in an argument. The reason of Av6, in other words, amounts to the claim that being a substantial whole entails being the effect of an intelligent agent.

At this point we should look at Av7, Aviddhakarṇa's second theistic argument, which is the inversion of Av6. Here, rather than the effects of creation, Aviddhakarṇa zeroes in on its material causes (*upādāna*):

dviṭīyaṃ ca tad uktam pramāṇam [...] yathoktam tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāni cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitāni svakāryam ārabhanta iti pratijānīmahe, rūpādīmatvāt tantvādivad iti. (v. 49)¹⁸²

And his second argument [...], as he has said: We know that the material causes of bodies, worlds, and instruments¹⁸³ generate (*ārabhante*) their respective effects (*svakārya*) when overseen (*adhiṣṭhita*) by a sentient agent (*cetanāvāt*), because of possessing color, etc., like threads, etc.

It is only with the guidance and design of some sentient agent that atoms take shape. In the first argument, Aviddhakarṇa compares the creator to a potter; here he compares the creation to a cloth. The shape and form of a pot entails a potter, and so does that of the universe (Av6); threads do not spontaneously create cloth, and nor do atoms, bodies (Av7).¹⁸⁴ Further, threads, through the action of the weaver, generate an effect (*ārambhaka, kāryajanaka*), i.e., a cloth, that inheres in themselves

¹⁸² TSP 54.1, J30v.6. Abhayadevasūri cites the same two arguments, Av6 and Av7, in his *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*, also referring to them as Aviddhakarṇa's pair of arguments to prove God. He cites Av7 in a slightly more expansive form: *tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāni cetanācetanāni cetanādhiṣṭhitāni svakāryam ārabhanta iti pratijānīmahe, rūpādīmatvāt, yad yad rūpādīmat tat tat cetanādhiṣṭhitam svakāryam ārabhate, yo 'sau cetanas tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāder adhiṣṭātā sa bhagavān īśvara*, "We know that the material causes of bodies, worlds, and instruments, both sentient and insentient, generate their respective effects presided over by something sentient, because of possessing color, etc. Whatever possesses color, etc., generates its effects presided over by something sentient, and this sentient thing that presides over such things as the material causes of bodies and worlds is the lord Īśvara" (TBV 101.12). Kamalaśīla may have elided the phrase "both sentient and insentient" (*cetanācetanāni*) as well as the statement of exemplification and the conclusion, but it seems equally likely that Abhayadevasūri, who often copies Kamalaśīla verbatim, is developing his citation of Av7 better to match the more elaborate comments on Av6 that he lifts from the *Pañjikā*.

¹⁸³ I.e., the sense faculties. The difference between Kamalaśīla's phrase "bodies, sense faculties, and worlds (*śarīrendriyabhuvana*)" and Aviddhakarṇa's "bodies, worlds, and instruments (*tanubhuvanakaraṇa*)" is superficial—*śarīra* and *tanu* are synonyms, and Praśastapāda, for example, consistently refers to the sense faculties as *karāṇas*, "instruments," or uses the term *karāṇa* to describe them. Aviddhakarṇa may have intended to include the mind, the "inner instrument," in addition to the sense faculties, which would give the term a slightly wider scope than *indriya*.

The difference in the syntax of the compounds is similarly superficial—*dvandva* compounds are typically arranged in terms of things like syllable count (shortest words to longest), and the sonic resonance of *nu* and *bhu* make them a more natural sequence than *tanu-karāṇa-bhuvana*. I.e., a speaker does not have to change their mouth-shape to read *tanubhu-*, nor *vanaka-*, so, despite the fact that bodies and sense faculties are conjoined, it is sonically preferable to separate them in this compound. Other kinds of instruments, like a pot or an adze, are, as Kamalaśīla points out and as evidenced by the fact that Aviddhakarṇa uses them as examples, already agreed upon, so the term *karāṇa* works best as a sonically variant synonym for *indriya* in this compound.

¹⁸⁴ The invocation of design brings to mind William Paley; the consistent comparison to craftspeople recalls Plato's *Timaeus*. A closer examination is warranted in both cases. E.g., Paley's argument has been interpreted as an instance of induction, abduction, or deduction, and we can similarly read Aviddhakarṇa's argument in each of these three ways.

(*sva-*, *svātmani*, *svasamaveta*); our bodies are like the cloth.

In light of this, we know Av6 means roughly the following: living bodies and the worlds they inhabit must have Īśvara as their efficient cause because they are specific arrangements of their inhering causes, like pots and cloths, unlike atoms. Av6 supplies the reasoning behind this: the inhering causes (clay, threads) require an overseer to generate the substances (pots, cloths) that inhere in them.

What this still does not quite tell us is how the reasoning is supposed to work. Why would this argument compel Buddhists to accept Nyāya theology? Alternatively, how, or for whom, would this compellingly defend against an explicit or implicit Buddhist attack? For further clues, we turn again to Vaiśeṣika.

Creation in Vaiśeṣika

There is no reference in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* to Īśvara or any other creator god. The unfolding of the universe seems, there, only to be urged by an impersonal “unseen” force (*adr̥ṣṭa*). When Praśastapāda describes the process of the dissolution and re-creation of the universe in PDhS, on the other hand, he gives Īśvara a prominent role. Johannes Bronkhorst, without taking a definite position on whether Praśastapāda was the first Vaiśeṣika to credit Īśvara with creation, nevertheless argues that it is “likely that among the major authors of Vaiśeṣika he may have been the first to reserve an important place for God.”¹⁸⁵ The passage in question comes in the middle of the chapter on substance, after the sections on the first four (earth, water, fire, and wind), and before the remaining five (ether, time, space, self, mind). There are nine substances, but only the first four have both a permanent and an impermanent aspect. Although there is a role in Praśastapāda’s creation story for all nine substances,¹⁸⁶ it would seem that he includes the creation story immediately after detailing the first four because it explains the relation between the permanent atoms and the impermanent elements composed of them. Creation involves all of the permanent substances, but it is the impermanent material world that is actually created.

This is the story he tells:

After a hundred years by the measure of Brahmā, Īśvara desires to give the beings of the universe a rest; the constituents of the world, including Brahmā and eventually the individual elements themselves, dissolve down to the atoms. The atoms remain, along with the infinite selves of the universe, divided and disconnected from one another. When Īśvara has the desire to create (*sisṛkṣā*), it

¹⁸⁵ Bronkhorst 1996a, 286.

¹⁸⁶ The first four go without saying. The manifestation of the great wind takes place in ether (*nabhas*), and the action of its atoms relies on the karmic merit pertaining to the infinite selves (*ātman*). Time (*kāla*) and space (*dik*) are repeatedly invoked in terms of the relationships between each of the substances. The element of earth manifests *after* the great ocean and *in* that great ocean. Mind (*manas*) is not mentioned, but seems bound up with several moments in the narrative. Like earth, wind, water, and fire, mind is material and has atomic dimension. The five external sense faculties correspond to the first five substances, whereas the atomic mind, of which each living body has one, is itself the internal faculty. When the conjunctions between selves, bodies, sense faculties, and atoms are disjoined at the dissolution of the universe, minds must also stand divided and isolated, like the other atomic substances. When Brahmā, at Īśvara’s command, creates beings, this entails conjoining selves, in accordance with their karmic merit, to bodies and sense faculties—including one mind per being.

immediately follows that¹⁸⁷ the atoms of the first four substances, in sequence, begin a process of accumulation into the four elements. First arises the element of wind, “the great wind” (*mahāvāyu*),¹⁸⁸ in which trembling air there arises the element of water, the great ocean (*mahān salilanidhi*); the elements of earth and fire, in turn, form in that great ocean; then, due to the desire of Īśvara, the great egg emerges from atoms of fire supported by atoms of earth; and in that egg Īśvara generates the worlds of the universe and the new Brahmā, to whom Īśvara gives the task of creating the beings of the many worlds.

This interplay between the four elements, their underlying permanent atoms, the rest of the permanent substances, and the formation of the world and its inhabitants appears to be what is at stake in Av6 and Av7. If we accept that the nine permanent substances are inert after dissolution—the self, for example, can act upon the body to which it is conjoined, but only once it has become conjoined to that body—and yet that “bodies, sense faculties, and worlds” emerge out of some combination of these substances in relation to one another, we cannot but raise the question: How does inert matter and merit congeal into the vast material world? According to Sāṃkhya, it emerges as a transformation of the primordial, and can ultimately dissolve back into that undifferentiated state. According to Vaiśeṣika, as we have just seen, atoms are permanent and indissoluble. Creation involves the accumulation of already-existing atoms into new, impermanent substances—*ārambha*. Herein lies the fundamental divergence between Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika. At this point, accepting the basic Vaiśeṣika ontological account, one may nevertheless be satisfied—as perhaps Kaṇāda, the purported author of VS, was—with the notion that an unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*) impels such activity. Praśastapāda tells a different story, and Aviddhakarṇa tries to prove it.

In the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārttika*, Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara sometimes tailor their arguments to Buddhists, but just as often focus on other traditions like Sāṃkhya, or other voices within the Nyāya milieu. In many cases, it is impossible to know for sure whether Aviddhakarṇa (or Bhāvivikta) crafted his arguments, whether in defense of his own view or to attack his rivals, with Buddhists primarily in mind. In his comments on Av6, Kamalaśīla (provisionally taking the *pūrvapakṣa*’s side) defends Aviddhakarṇa’s specification that the cause is “intelligent” (*buddhimat*) in part by juxtaposing it with the Sāṃkhya view that intellect (*buddhi*) is identical to its cause, *prakṛti*. “Because,” he says, “possession of intellect (*buddhimattva*) would be impossible against Sāṃkhya, it is not the case that the property to be proven has already been established (*siddhasādhyatā*). Indeed, Sāṃkhya claims that intellect is indistinct from the primordial, and it is not the case that something comes to possess itself by means of itself.”¹⁸⁹ Kamalaśīla’s comment here serves partly to connect the “Examination of Īśvara” with the preceding chapter, the “Examination of *Prakṛti*,” but also suggests that Sāṃkhya is one of the overt or implicit targets of Aviddhakarṇa’s theistic arguments.

Praśastapāda’s creation story appears to be an innovation in the Vaiśeṣika system, but because other

¹⁸⁷ *maheśvarasiṣṭyānantaram*, “immediately following Maheśvara’s desire to create” (PDhS 48.19). Īśvara’s desire is an essential ingredient but Praśastapāda does not quite say that he desires to create and then does the work. Praśastapāda’s description reads like a spontaneous event instigated in some way by, or simply contiguous to, Īśvara’s desire. It is not until the creation of Brahmā and the worlds (*bhuvana*) that Īśvara is unambiguously active.

¹⁸⁸ It is important that the wind is “great” (*mahā-*) not only to emphasize its being a *mahābhūta* (often translated “element”), but also because that means it has become a gross substance. “Great” is the contrary dimension to “atomic.”

¹⁸⁹ *sāṃkhyam prati buddhimattvānupapatter na siddhasādhyatā. avyatiriktā hi buddhiḥ pradhānāt sāmkyair iṣyate, na ca tenaiva tad eva tad vad bhavati* (TSP 53.10).

early Vaiśeṣika texts have been lost, it is not clear how controversial it was. Noting Praśastapāda's invocation of "mythological conceptions about the origin of the universe [that] were current in the 'anonymous literature' of Hinduism¹⁹⁰ even before Praśastapāda," George Chemparathy argues that

one is inclined to believe that Praśastapāda took up the already existing mythological conceptions of the dissolution and the creation of the universe in order to give them a philosophical basis and to systematise them. That he does not make Īśvara the direct creator of all beings, but rather he makes Īśvara share with Brahmā the creative function, is a clear indication of his attempt to reconcile the existing mythological conceptions with philosophic thought.¹⁹¹

Praśastapāda, it would seem, sought to organize the interrelations between common conceptions of the cyclical patterns of the universe, the authority of Vedic scriptures (authorship of which Praśastapāda may have attributed to Īśvara¹⁹²), and Vaiśeṣika ontology and systematic analysis. Perhaps Aviddhakarṇa was appealing to those who shared his own preference for the basic Vaiśeṣika schema but had not yet come to an agreement about the role or nature of Īśvara.¹⁹³ The argument then carries a lot more force. If an interlocutor accepts that bodies are accumulations of the atoms, etc., in which they inhere, and that atoms, etc., are inert unto themselves, an explanation is needed. In essence, this makes the gist of the argument simple and forceful: if you accept Vaiśeṣika ontology, you must also accept that there is a creator god.

More precisely, the argument proves the *intelligence* behind creation. Despite his reliance on Vaiśeṣika, Aviddhakarṇa's motivation to prove specifically that creation has an intelligent (*buddhimat*) cause clarifies the relationship between Av6/Av7 and the *Bhāṣya*, and also further demonstrates that they work best as arguments within Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika circles.

Creation in Nyāya

Īśvara has a rather small role in the *Nyāyasūtra*, but it seems to reflect some degree of internal dialogue or debate. At first glance, the one passage that directly addresses the creator god could be read as refuting his existence. The larger passage of NS 4.1.14–43 (cf. Appendix C) raises and refutes a series of eight theories about cosmology and causation. Sutras 19–21 in this passage concern Īśvara, but, according to Vātsyāyana and later commentators, these verses defend rather than refute Īśvara's role as efficient cause. The error in need of refutation or correction—in keeping with the structure of the overall passage—may be the idea that men's actions are independent, or that they are irrelevant. In any case, the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārttika* both define and defend the existence of Īśvara and his role in creation in their comments on these sutras, and Aviddhakarṇa almost surely did the same.

The sequence of NS 4.1.19–21 has been interpreted variously by later commentators. It reads as follows:

Īśvara is the cause because we observe human action to be fruitless. (4.1.19)

No, because there is no accomplishment of fruit in the absence of human action. (4.1.20)

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Bronkhorst 1996a for a comparison of the PDhS creation story with similar accounts in earlier texts.

¹⁹¹ Chemparathy 1969, 73.

¹⁹² Cf. Chemparathy 1969, 73–74.

¹⁹³ Cf. Bronkhorst 1996a regarding the "relatively late date" of "God's arrival in Vaiśeṣika" (281).

This is no reason, because it is effected by him. (4.1.21)¹⁹⁴

We can interpret these three sutras as a sequence of three voices, or we can read sutra 21 as the disputant in sutra 19 clarifying the position in light of sutra 20's objection. In the former reading, the first disputant is only partially correct (*ekadeśin*). Sutra 19 implies that humans lack agency and that Īśvara is the only cause of the fruitfulness of fruitful actions.¹⁹⁵ The objector in 20 is correct that a human must act for his action to have results, but wrong to think that this refutes the intervention of Īśvara. The final disputant, who holds the correct doctrine (*siddhāntin*), clarifies that Īśvara undergirds and impels the process by which humans reap the fruits of their labor. Alternatively, the voice in sutra 19 has the correct view and clarifies it, in sutra 21, in light of sutra 20.

In either case, sutra 21 is, shall we say, riper for extended commentary than sutra 19, given that it contains the preceding discussion and almost surely states, or at least relates to, the correct doctrine.

Vātsyāyana's comments on 19 and 20 are concise and to the point. Sutra 19 argues that fruitful action requires the intervention of Īśvara, sutra 20 objects that fruitfulness is concomitant with human action, and sutra 21 says that 20 fails to correctly understand Īśvara's role.¹⁹⁶

Importantly, Vātsyāyana goes on to define the notion of Īśvara at greater length in his comments on sutra 21, including the following remark: "Apart from his intellect (*buddhi*), no property can be pointed out as being his distinctive mark (*liṅga*)."¹⁹⁷ In other words, we can only infer his existence on the basis of his intellect. In this light, it would seem that Aviddhakarṇa's arguments both set out to prove the peculiar case of intelligence (*buddhimattva*) that is itself the indicative mark of Īśvara's existence. That is to say, accepting Vātsyāyana's claim that Īśvara's *buddhi* is his *liṅga*, Aviddhakarṇa has only to establish the *buddhi*, and the rest follows.¹⁹⁸

Uddyotakara is nearly as concise as Vātsyāyana in his comments on sutras 19 and 20. He treats them as setting up the terms of the conversation. His comments on 21 are much more extensive. He regards sutra 21 as the opportunity to answer all questions regarding Īśvara, his existence, and the manner in which it can be proven. Early on in these comments he says:

But what is the argument that Īśvara is the cause? We state this argument: the primordial (*pradhāna*), atoms, and karma act when overseen (*adhiṣṭhita*) by an intelligent (*buddhimat*) cause prior to [their] activity, because they are insentient, like an adze, etc.¹⁹⁹

Note the superficial similarity but underlying consonance with Sāṃkhya. According to Sāṃkhya, the

¹⁹⁴ *īśvaraḥ kāraṇaṃ puruṣakarmāphalyadarśanāt ||4.1.19|| (NS 227.9);
na, puruṣakarmābhāve phalāniṣpatteḥ ||4.1.20|| (227.13);
tatkāritatvād ahetuḥ ||4.1.21|| (228.2).*

¹⁹⁵ Perhaps Gautama had in mind fruitful action (*karman*) in the Vedic sense of successful sacrifice.

¹⁹⁶ Whether this begs the question depends partly on our identification of sutra 20. Sutra 21 is a poor argument against a Buddhist, but, following Uddyotakara's suggestion, if sutra 20 is more of a principled objection against the disputant in sutra 19, who would argue that Īśvara is wholly independent of human action, the argument has more integrity.

¹⁹⁷ *na tāvad asya buddhim antareṇa kaścid dharmo liṅgabhūtaḥ śakya upapādayitum. (NBh 228.12)*

¹⁹⁸ This perhaps explains Kamalaśīla's abrupt conclusion, in provisional defense of Aviddhakarṇa, that the argument proves that the intelligence in question is Īśvara.

¹⁹⁹ *kaḥ punar īśvarasya kāraṇatve nyāyaḥ. ayaṃ nyāyo 'bhidhīyate. pradhānaparamāṇukarmāṇi prāk pravṛtter buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni pravartante, avetanatvād vāsyādivad iti. (NV 433.12)*

primordial is insentient, and the cosmic misidentification of the sentient witness leads to the evolution of the universe. Uddyotakara, on the other hand, attributes intellect (*buddhi*) to the sentient overseer, and describes creation as a conscious, intentional act. As we have seen, Kamalaśīla, commenting on Av6, says, “It is not the case that something comes to possess itself by means of itself.” In other words, Av6, like Uddyotakara’s argument, serves in part to point out, or to resist, the circularity of the Sāṃkhya story. The same can be said of Av7, which is closely paralleled by Uddyotakara’s argument above. The phrasing is different, and the similar case emphasizes a craftsman’s instrument (an adze) rather than his material (thread), but the idea is very similar: it is only insofar as they are overseen by an intelligent agent that insentient matter, karma, etc., perform their generative actions. (As it happens, Uddyotakara invokes the common weaving analogy several times in his comments on sutra 21.)

Uddyotakara makes several more arguments—or, more precisely, versions of this general argument—in his comments on sutra 21, and goes on to discuss issues like Īśvara’s motivation for creating the world and the permanence of his intellect. Before concluding his remarks with an invocation of scripture, he returns to the argument that insentient matter requires an intelligent overseer. He points out that things like grass (*trṇā-ādi*), insofar as they are effects, can be treated as the locus of essentially the same argument, the reason being that they are objects of both sight and touch.²⁰⁰ This is not a parallel for Av6. Its locus is more restricted, and although it similarly focuses on the effects of creation, its reasoning is rather different. Nevertheless, here we see Uddyotakara alternating between an argument based on the material and instrumental causes of creation and one based on its effects. Aviddhakarṇa made a similar move, almost surely in commenting on the same passage in the *Bhāṣya*, in order to establish the mark that proves Īśvara’s existence.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla find an impressive array of defects in Aviddhakarṇa’s arguments, but they do so largely on the presumption that Aviddhakarṇa intended Av6 and Av7 to compel them to accept his theology. If Aviddhakarṇa was trying to convince anyone,²⁰¹ it makes far more sense that he was speaking to a generally likeminded group of people who were torn between the apparently impersonal cosmology of VS and a theistic narrative like the one in PDhS, or defending what had come to be the orthodox view in light of lingering traces of the doubts and debates of the past. Or, of course, the arguments could be apologetic, and intended to demonstrate to likeminded thinkers that, despite real or imagined Buddhist critiques, Īśvara could be rationally proven. The Buddhists may have been straw men, or rhetorically irrelevant, rather than direct targets in any sense.

§ § §

This quick survey of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika theology helps to demonstrate the manner in which we have to examine Aviddhakarṇa’s fragments. The Buddhists’ presentation of, and response to, his fragments is not always satisfactory for our needs. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika source material helps to flesh out Aviddhakarṇa’s dense arguments. But simply understanding the words of the argument is not enough. Behind each of the fragments lurks a world of theory, discussion, and debate. It is pivotal that we consider the potential context and target of each argument. As we will see throughout the

²⁰⁰ *evaṃ kāryatvāt trṇādīni pakṣīkrtya darśanasparśanaviṣayatvād iti vaktavyam* (VN 441.8). (I.e., when a tree falls in an empty forest, *because* it makes a sound we know it was felled by God?)

²⁰¹ Nor would these arguments work any better against Cārvāka or Mīmāṃsā.

present study, the Buddhists do not always present Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta in the best light; they may not always present their arguments fairly. If they are unfair, we have to consider whether it is intentional or accidental, or whether they are indifferent to certain kinds of fairness or accuracy in certain cases.

ĀTMAN

After refuting several additional cosmologies in chapters three through six, Śāntarakṣita shifts from the universal to the individual.

Chapter 3 concerns theistic Sāṃkhya, the view that Īśvara and *prakṛti* jointly cause the universe; chapter 4, the notion that the universe is spontaneous (*svābhāvika*) and, so, uncaused; chapter 5, the theory that the word (*śabda*, i.e., the Veda) is Brahman and the universe emerges from this primordial source; and chapter 6, miscellaneous Upaniṣadic and other creation myths, typified by a creator god called Puruṣa, who crafts the universe out of himself without diminishing himself, like a spider, her web.²⁰²

According to Śāntarakṣita, arguments for Puruṣa and other such creator-gods can all be rebuffed by the same arguments brought to bear against Īśvara. In fact, the very brief sixth chapter serves as a kind of hinge in the conversation from cosmology to theories of the self by bringing the conversation back to Nyāya. (His choice to focus ostensibly on “Puruṣa” has this effect, as well, both by reminding the reader of Sāṃkhya, in which *puruṣa* is the sentient counterpart to *prakṛti*, and because *puruṣa* generally refers to a man, a human, or a person, and is sometimes used to refer to the self.) Immediately after reminding the reader of his counterarguments from the “Examination of Īśvara,” Śāntarakṣita raises a question that goes beyond the discussion there:

The same refutation as for Īśvara should also be stated for him (i.e., Puruṣa). In addition, for what

²⁰² Śāntarakṣita presents Īśvara as the cosmic potter and Puruṣa as the cosmic spider; yet he regards them very similarly. The “Examination of Puruṣa” does not go into much detail, but god *qua* spider is a striking metaphor. A spider that spins a web can be said to rely on some existing infrastructure to anchor it, but that, of course, is not the point of the metaphor. The actual act of creation entails the spider creating something separate from herself of herself without diminishing herself. This is very different from the work of a potter—even a cosmic potter. Yet some species, like the various species of trapdoor spiders, relate to their surroundings more like Īśvara does. Trapdoor spiders spend most of their lives in burrows. They get their name from the covering of silk, earth, and vegetation they craft to conceal the opening of the burrow, and they emerge in quick bursts to snatch prey and drag it down into the burrow. God *qua* black widow relates very differently to her web, and the world she spins out of it, than god *qua* trapdoor spider.

purpose does he do this sort of activity. (155)²⁰³

Provisionally accepting Puruṣa's agency for the moment, Śāntarakṣita inquires about his underlying motivation. Why would Puruṣa—and, perhaps more pressingly, why would Īśvara—create the universe, its worlds and inhabitants, and so on? Rather than engage with proponents of Puruṣa or other miscellaneous creation myths, several of the arguments that follow derive, Kamalaśīla informs us, from Naiyāyika authors. Towards the end of the chapter, Śāntarakṣita briefly entertains Uddyotakara's account of Īśvara's motivation for creation: it is just his nature (*prakṛti*), the way that fire burns, or the way that a spider spins her thread. Of course, though Śāntarakṣita had not considered this argument in the “Examination of Īśvara,” he gives a similar answer to his counterargument against Īśvara's existence: if it were Īśvara's nature to create the universe, and if he were a single, stable being, the entire universe would be created all at once every moment. In fact, even spiders do not have a fixed essential nature:

Even in the case of a spider, we do not accept that it is the cause of thread due to its very nature, since it makes its web²⁰⁴ out of hunger for devouring living beings. (168)²⁰⁵

The nature of the spider is not fixed. The construction of the spider's web is contingent on the spider's hunger, which, Kamalaśīla explains, is occasional (*kādācitka*). If Īśvara, or Puruṣa, were like a spider, he would not be fixed for all time, and, so, could not be the permanent, all-knowing creator Naiyāyikas and others propose.

The conclusion of the “Examination of Puruṣa” puts a decisive end to the conversation about creation:

Those beings like Śauri and Ātmaja (Self-born) who are also imagined as being creators are, as a matter of fact, rejected by this same means, as well.²⁰⁶ (170)²⁰⁷

By pivoting, toward the end of the chapter, back to Naiyāyika arguments about the nature of Īśvara, Śāntarakṣita turns this conclusion into a natural transition into the first section²⁰⁸ of the

²⁰³ asyāpīśvaravat sarvaṃ vacanīyaṃ niṣedhanam | kimarthaṃ ca karoty eṣa vyāpāram imam īdṛśam ||155|| (TS 97, J8v.2).

²⁰⁴ *Lālā-jālam*, “web of saliva.”

²⁰⁵ prakṛtyaivāṃśuhetutvam ūrṇānābhe 'pi neṣyate | prāṇibhakṣaṇalāmpatyāl lālājālam karoti yat ||168|| (TS 100, J9r.3).

²⁰⁶ Kamalaśīla says: “Concerning these, Śauri is Viṣṇu and Ātmaja is Brahma. Others suppose that time is an intentional agent; this is conveyed by the phrase, ‘and the like.’ As it is said: ‘Time ripens things, time kills beings, time watches over the sleeping; indeed, time cannot be overcome.’ The meaning of ‘the sleeping’ is the world that is pressed at the time of dissolution. [The phrase ‘and the like’] conveys still others of this sort—also imagined by the foolish (*kumati*)—from which this is an abridged list (*saṃgraha*)” (tatra śaurir viṣṇuḥ, ātmajo brahmā, ādiśabdena yo buddhimān kālaḥ parair iṣyate, tasya grahaṇam. yathoktam^a kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṃharate prajāḥ kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti kālo hi durati krama iti. supteṣu iti pralayakālalīneṣu lokeṣu ity arthaḥ. anyasyāpy evambhūtasya kumatiparikalpitasyāpi grahaṇāt saṃgraha iti.^b [TS 101.2, J44r.6]).

^a J dittography of *ktam*.

^b TS omits *iti*.

²⁰⁷ śauryātmaajādayo ye 'pi dhātāraḥ parikalpitāḥ | etenaiva prakāreṇa nirastās te 'pi vastutaḥ ||170|| (TS 101, J9r.4).

²⁰⁸ The “Examination of the Self” has six discrete sections, the first of which contends with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments for the self. The remaining five sections of the “Examination of the Self” concern, in turn, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, Digambara Jain, Advaita Vedānta, and Vātsīputrīya theories of the self.

“Examination of the Self,” namely, the self (*ātman*)²⁰⁹ as imagined by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.

Śāntarakṣita opens the “Examination of the Self” with six verses defining the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory: the self is a special substance, distinct from the body, sense-faculties, and mind; it is the inhering cause of desire, aversion, effort, pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), cognition (*jñāna*), karmic merit, and mental impressions (*saṃskāra*); it is not, as Sāṃkhya claims, intrinsically sentient, but, rather, is only so in conjunction with consciousness; it is eternal and all-pervading; and it is the agent of good and bad deeds, as well as of the experiencer of their results.²¹⁰ In anticipation of the objection from the Buddhists that a permanent, unchanging substance could not be an actor at one point and an experiencer at another,²¹¹ the *pūrvapakṣa* continues: such designations are figurative, depending on what impermanent cognitions or feelings of pleasure, etc., inhere in the self at a particular moment. Similarly, death and birth are spoken of only figuratively to designate the self’s disjunction from a particular body or conjunction to a new body, respectively.²¹² The first six verses of the chapter communicate all of this, and then, ten verses later, to sum up the *pūrvapakṣa*, Śāntarakṣita makes the dialogic character of the exchange explicit:

In this way, the existence, permanence, and omnipresence²¹³ of the self have been ascertained; that being so, it is proven that all phenomena are not selfless. (187)²¹⁴

This signals to the reader that all of the arguments encountered in the “Examination of the Self” are attacks on or defenses against Buddhist claims or criticisms.

According to the Naiyāyikas cited in this section, the self’s existence can be inferred on the basis of the difference between living and lifeless bodies; the fact that desire requires a container; the very word “self” (*ātman*); and the synchronic and diachronic unities of perception. They also argue that the self is actually an object of direct perception, and so need not be inferred to be proven. Aviddhakarṇa emphasizes the unity of experience, specifically the *mineness* of experience. Here again, as in the “Examination of Īśvara,” after Śāntarakṣita’s initial, generic statement of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position, Aviddhakarṇa’s is the first voice we hear. His three arguments for the self (Av8, Av9, and Av10) open and close the *pūrvapakṣa* of this chapter. As with his theistic arguments, here again we see reasons to doubt that his arguments were directed primarily at Buddhist rivals. We cannot presume that Aviddhakarṇa’s arguments always fit the frames into which Śāntarakṣita and

²⁰⁹ And note that the epithet Śāntarakṣita chooses for one of the two imaginary creators he mentions in the final verse of the “Examination of Puruṣa” is Ātmaja, “self-born.”

²¹⁰ anye punar ihātmānam icchādīnāṃ samāśrayam | svato ‘cidrūpam icchanti nityaṃ sarvagataṃ tathā ||171||
śubhāśubhānāṃ karttāraṃ karmanāṃ tatphalasya ca | bhoktāraṃ cetanāyogāc cetanaṃ na svarūpataḥ ||172|| (TS 101, J9r.5).

²¹¹ jñānayatnādisambandhaḥ kartṛtvaṃ tasya bhāṇyate | sukhaduḥkhādisaṃvittisamavāyas tu bhoktṛtā ||173|| (TS 102, J9r.6).

²¹² nikāyena viśiṣṭābhir apūrvābhiś ca saṅgatiḥ | buddhibhir vedanābhiś ca janma tasyābhidhīyate ||174||prāgāttābhir^a
viyogasya tu maraṇaṃ jīvanaṃ punaḥ | sadehasya manoyogo dharmādharmaḥbhisamskṛtaḥ^b ||175||śarīracakṣurādīnāṃ
vadhād dhiṃsāsyā kalpyate | itthaṃ nitye ‘pi puṃsy eṣā prakriyā vimalekṣyate ||176|| (TS 102, J9r.6).

^a TS prag°, J9v1 prāg°

^b TS °satkṛtaḥ, J9v1 saṃskṛtaḥ

²¹³ As Praśastapāda puts it, the self, like time, space, and ether, has infinite dimension (*paramamahattva*). That which inheres in or conjoins to the self is spatially and temporally localized, but the self pervades.

²¹⁴ evaṃ ca sattvanityatvavibhutvānāṃ viniścaye | ātmano na nirātmānaḥ sarvadharmā iti sthitam ||187|| (TS 106, J10r.2).

Kamalaśīla squeeze them.

Bhāvivikta features only modestly in the opening portion of the *Pañjikā*. Kamalaśīla cites him twice in the “Examination of the Self.” He presents Bh4, a mere sentence fragment, as a qualification of one of Uddyotakara’s arguments for the self. With Bh5, Kamalaśīla attributes an argument for the perceptibility of the self to “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al.”

It is worth highlighting that Kamalaśīla attributes several of Bhāvivikta’s fragments in the *Pañjikā* to “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al” or to “Bhāvivikta et al” rather than to Bhāvivikta alone. (Kamalaśīla always puts Uddyotakara first in the compound, never referring, e.g., to “Bhāvivikta and Uddyotakara, et al.”) There is only one instance in which Śāntarakṣita or Kamalaśīla frame one of Aviddhakarṇa’s fragments in this way, namely, Kamalaśīla’s reference in (the Tibetan translation of) PPS to “Aviddhakarṇa et al” (cf. Appendix A, section VII).²¹⁵ In the *Pañjikā*, Bhāvivikta comes across partly as an idiosyncratic thinker with arguments rivaling the elaborateness of some of Aviddhakarṇa’s most distinctive fragments and partly as a representative of common threads in early Nyāya commentarial circles. Quite likely, he was both. We will see further evidence in the pages to come that Bhāvivikta may have followed and responded to Uddyotakara.

In addition, the two fragments of Bhāvivikta in this section demonstrate the extent to which Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla often isolate arguments from their broader contexts, and, sometimes, freely alter the arguments so that they work in isolation. It is commonly accepted that these two Buddhist thinkers at least aim to treat their opponents fairly, but even if we accept this as their aim, it is not always the result.

²¹⁵ Between the *Vipañcitārthā* and the *Pañjikā*, there are only two-thirds as many fragments of Bhāvivikta as Aviddhakarṇa. He is not cited in PPS.

CHAPTER SEVEN (A)

EXAMINATION OF THE SELF AS IMAGINED BY NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA

Introduction

There are some in this world who hold that the self (*ātman*) is the basis of desire, [aversion, effort, pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), and cognition (*jñāna*)];²¹⁶ that it is not intrinsically conscious; that it is permanent; and that it is all-pervading. (171)

Nyāya conception of the self

It is the agent of good and bad actions, and the one who enjoys their results. It is conscious through a connection with consciousness, rather than intrinsically. We refer to its connection with cognition, effort, etc., as its “agency,” and to the inherence in it of feelings of pleasure, pain, etc., as its “experience.” We call its association, in a particular class, with new and distinct cognitions and feelings, its “birth;” its disjunction from previously assumed ones is its “death;” its “life” is the connection, constructed by merit and demerit, that it has, as an embodied thing, with a mind. We consider its “harm” to result from strikes against the body, the eye, etc. Even though it is permanent, we observe that this sort of procedure (*prakriyā*) with regard to the self (*puruṣ*) is without stain. (172–176)

Nyāya arguments for the self

(i) My cognitions (*jñāna*) are knowable by a knower distinct from the body, etc., because they are cognitions (*pratyaya*),²¹⁷ like others of those.²¹⁸ (177)

(ii) Desire, etc., are all situated in something because, while being entities, they are effects, like color. We consider the self (*puruṣ*) to be that something. Because of the use of the phrase, “while being entities,” this does not deviate in regard to destruction, because, though it has a cause, destruction is not at all an entity. (178–179)

(iii) [A single being’s] perceptions of color, etc., all have one and many causes because they are unified with the cognition “by me,” like the perceptions of many at the frowning of the dancer’s brow. Otherwise, without a basis, unification could not arise. (180–181)

(iv) The expression “self” is expressive of something distinct from cognitions, sense faculties, etc., or an aggregation [of them], because it is accepted to be a single term, under the condition that it is different from established synonyms. And what is ascertained in this manner is joined with the

²¹⁶ Śāntarākṣita’s phrase “desire, etc.” refers to NS 1.1.10, “desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain, and cognition are the marks of the self” (*icchā-dveṣa-prayatna-sukha-duḥkhāny ātmano liṅgam*).

²¹⁷ There are various words in Sanskrit for cognition, knowledge, etc. In some cases they are differentiated in some sense. For example, *jñāna* (cognition) is not always identical with *vijñāna* (consciousness). Nevertheless, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are explicit that words like *jñāna*, *pratyaya*, *buddhi*, and *upalabdhi* are synonyms (cf. n 258).

²¹⁸ This corresponds to one of Aviddhakarṇa’s most elaborate fragments (§2); Śāntarākṣita’s paraphrase here is impressively streamlined.

The verse says “like others of those” (*tad-anya-vat*), but in the prose cited by Kamalaśīla, Aviddhakarṇa’s example is “like the cognitions of other people” (*puruṣāntarapratyayavat*). As Śāntarākṣita’s response in verse 190 below suggests, *tad-anya-vat* is ambiguous and need not refer to other people’s cognitions in general. Kamalaśīla may be clarifying what he regards as Aviddhakarṇa’s intent rather than citing Aviddhakarṇa original unambiguous phrase.

property as indicated, like the word “pot.” (182–183)

(v) A living body would be divorced from vital breath, etc., because of its selflessness, as in the case of a pot; therefore, it is not at all the case that it is selfless. (184)

(vi) Every subsequent cognition is known by the same knower of the first cognition after birth because they are “my” cognitions, like the first of them. (185)

(vii) Earth, etc., though situated at a remove, are connected with my self because they possess material form, etc., like my body.²¹⁹ (186)

In this way, the existence, permanence, and omnipresence of the self have been ascertained; this being so, it is proven that all phenomena are not selfless. (187)

Refutation

In the first of these arguments, what is to be proven is already established, since we accept that “your cognitions” can be known, e.g., by an omniscient person. (188)

In addition, the cognitions of others arise independently of an illuminator, i.e., they are self-reflexively known, so this example is devoid of the property to be proven.²²⁰ Even if the example were the [cognition] known by another [cognition] colored by its form, there would be doubt about another [cognition].²²¹ (189–190)

Argument (ii)

If you are trying to prove that desire, and so on, are situated in something, in the sense that the basis is but the cause, then this proves what is already accepted.

If you consider the basis to be its container, in that case, your conception of a container of something devoid of movement is futile. A container, such as the basin of a jujube plant, either arises as a result of restricting movement, or the production of a distinction. (191–193)

And it is not tenable that destruction, which is formless, is an effect, hence the qualification the other party has stated with respect to this reason is pointless. (194)

Argument (iii)

The unification “by me” follows from the affliction of ignorance. Insofar as all is momentary, the conceit of the unity of the knower is a mistaken concept. Therefore, it is untenable as a condition of reality. Even though it is divided, it is the basis for a single thing because of having a distinct capacity. (195–196)

²¹⁹ Kamalaśīla attributes arguments (vi) and (vii) to Aviddhakarṇa (§3). Argument (vii) is not easy to pin down, but the idea seems to be this: Each of the senses corresponds to one of the elements, e.g., earth is the basis of the sense of smell. The fact that the different senses, composed of different elements and localized separately in the body, are organized into a coherent experience across space and time entails the existence of the self.

²²⁰ “The cognitions of others” are, like all cognitions, self-reflexive, according to the Buddhists; ergo the notion that they must be known by some distinct knower has not been established.

²²¹ Kamalaśīla offers the opponent’s interjection: “We assert the example in this case to be that cognition, regarding a particular object, that arises as that by which the form of the object is grasped” (*yaśmin viṣaye vijñānam āgrhītatadākāram upajāyate, tad ihodāharaṇam iṣṭam*). He then reformulates Śāntarakṣita’s response: “In this case, too, there would be uncertainty with respect to the very self-reflexive cognition that arises devoid of the knowledge of another cognition” (*evam api yat svasamvidrūpam eva jñānam jñānantarasamvedanarahitam utpadyate, tena saṁśayo bhavet*). In other words—if I am understanding rightly—in this case the locus of the argument would be too restricted; this would not prove the existence of any knower beyond the cognition of the example in question.

If it were the effect of a single companion, this would contradict the sequence of the cognitions of color, sound, etc., because of the presence of a functioning cause. It is clearly known that six cognitions [corresponding to the five senses plus mind]²²² arise simultaneously from a single contiguous cognition, so the argument is already accepted. But sequential things cannot share one and the same cause, thus what was just stated. Hence, we clearly observe the invalidation by inference of the pervasion in this case. (197–199)

The frowning of the dancer's brow is not singular in reality, because it is a heap of many atoms. Its singleness is imagined. Because of being connected to a single effect, it falls in the scope of a single term. If you accept this sort of thing to be the property to be proven, then you are proving what is already established. (200–201)

Argument (iv)

Though they are single terms, the words “cognition,” “mind,” etc., which are synonyms, do not, for us, [each] denote something distinct, hence the reason is inconclusive. (202–203a)

Objection: “We added a qualification to this.”

But it has not been established, because it has been established that it is a synonym of sentence (*cetas*). Insofar as it is the basis for self-consciousness, we conventionally call the mind (*citta*) “the self,” even though the referent of this does not exist in reality. (203b–204)

We can see that this [reason] also deviates because a single term, like “producer,” can be applied to things like sky-lotuses. Words arise from mere conventions. In what case are they inapplicable? Terms like “self” do not illuminate things by their nature.²²³ (205–206)

Argument (v)

If it were established that there is a connection between the self and vital breath, etc., then this unintended consequence would follow [from our position].²²⁴ Otherwise, it is irrelevant. The absence of vital breath, etc., in the living body does not follow from the absence of the son of a barren woman. The same goes for your *reductio* argument, as well. (207–208)

First, the two members of the argument are not identical, as you accept there to be a difference between them. Nor do they have a causal relationship, because of the unwanted consequence of simultaneity.²²⁵ Why would the body's vital airs disappear in the absence of the self

²²² Kamalaśīla uses the example of the dancer's brow to explain that a single cognitive event is the immediately preceding condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*) for the six kinds of cognitive event that follow: “For in this way, the very moment he sees the form of the dancer, he hears the sound of the drums, smells the fragrance of the water-lilies, savors the taste of camphor, feels the touch of the fan-breeze, and thinks to give cloths, and such and so forth” (*tathā hi yadaiva narttakīrūpaṃ paśyati tadaiva murajādiśabdaṃ śṛṇoti, kuvalayādigandhaṃ ca jighrati, karpūradīrasam āsvādayati, vyajanānilādisparśaṃ cānubhavati, vastrādi ca manasādātum vintayati*). “Etc.” (*ādi*) follows each of the nouns—drums, water-lilies, etc.—in the Sanskrit.

²²³ This passage, as Kamalaśīla notes, is in response to an argument by Uddyotakara, but at the end of his remarks on verse 206, Kamalaśīla briefly brings up an alternative qualification of the argument that he attributes to Bhāvivikta (§4). It is not reflected in the root text.

²²⁴ As Eltschinger and Ratié (2013, 117–138) note in their assessment of Dharmakīrti's arguments against the self in PVSV 12.26–13.11, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla here “give a synthetic account of Dharmakīrti's criticism” (134).

²²⁵ Note again Śāntarakṣita's reference to the two kinds of relation, identity and causality. If neither has been established, no inference can be drawn.

when they do not have any connection with it? (209–210)

Arguments (vi) and (vii)

And so, since none of these arguments prove the existence of the self, the stated examples for its permanence and all-pervasion are devoid of a property to be proven. (211)

Is the self perceptible?

Some imagine that the self is established by perception, because self-consciousness is known reflexively; they think the self is its object.²²⁶ (212)

This is untenable, because its form is not manifest in self-consciousness. Indeed, we do not observe the appearance of permanence or all-pervasion there. What we do quite clearly perceive there is the appearance of such things as pallor, but you do not accept that to be the nature of the self, so the self is not the object of [self-consciousness]. (213–214)

If the self (*puruṣa*) could rightly be grasped perceptually, then what would be the point of this dispute about its existence, and so on? To explain: self-consciousness is essentially determinate, but determinations and cognitions of superimposition are fixed in the relation of invalidation. (215–216)

Conclusion

Therefore, desire, etc., all do not inhere in the self, because they arise in sequence, like such things as seed, sprout, and tendril. (217)

Alternatively, everything internal has a form that is selfless through and through because of being entities, because of existing, and so on, just like external things like pots. Indeed, if there were a self, everything that had it as a cause would be permanent, and yet permanent things are incapable of efficacious action, so their existence, etc., would cease to be possible.²²⁷ (218–219)

The other party seeks to deny that the selflessness common to pots, etc., pertains to the living body. We prove that it does pertain to it. And so, given that the self has not been proven, the procedure you perform with regard to it is entirely unsupported, like the son of a barren woman. (220–221)

²²⁶ Kamalaśīla paraphrases arguments by Uddyotakara and Bhāvivika et al to elaborate this verse (§4).

²²⁷ Here again, note the argument, as at the end of the chapter on Īśvara, that a permanent thing would have to give rise to all of its effects at once because it cannot be assisted by auxiliaries or affected by its changing causal potency over time, rendering the underlying concept of a “permanent cause” absurd.

§2. AV8: ME, MY SELF, AND MY COGNITIONS

Before turning to Av8, the manuscript evidence from this part of the *Pañjikā* has to be briefly mentioned. There is a lacuna in one of the manuscripts that ends in the midst of fragment Av8. It does not greatly impede our interpretation of the fragment, but it does further confirm the relationship between the two available sets of complete manuscripts of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Pañjikā*, one held in Pāṭan (P) and one held in Jaisalmer (J).²²⁸ As Paolo Giunta has explained in detail,²²⁹ we know for several reasons that the Pāṭan manuscripts are each based on the respective Jaisalmer manuscript. With regard to Av8, the Pāṭan manuscript of the *Pañjikā* (from which Krishnamacharya produced his 1926 edition) is missing a large portion of text from the end of chapter six and the beginning of chapter seven. This lacuna corresponds precisely to a single folio side of the Jaisalmer manuscript (from which Śāstrī primarily produced his 1968 edition).²³⁰ This only adds to the clear evidence²³¹ that the Pāṭan manuscript was copied from the Jaisalmer manuscript. Though there are two distinct manuscripts, functionally speaking, we have a single manuscript along with an aesthetically exemplary but occasionally corrupt transcription of it.²³²

In the “Examination of the Self,” after commenting on the opening six verses, Kamalaśīla asks, “But how can the existence of the self be known?” Aviddhakarṇa offers the first response:

atrāviddhakarṇas tāvat pramāṇayati sadādyaviśeṣaviśayāviśayajñeyaviśayā madīyā pratyakṣānumānopamānaśābdasmṛtipratyabhijñānasiddhadarśanārṣārekaviparyayānādhyavasāyavapnasvapnāntikāḥ^a prajñānaviśeṣā madīyaśarīrādivyatiriktasaṃvedakasaṃvedyāḥ svakāraṇāyattajanmavattvasāmānya-viśeṣavattvabodhātmatvāśutaravināśitvasaṃskārādāyakatvapatyayavabhyāḥ puruṣāntarapatyayavat vaidharmyeṇa ghaṭādaya iti. (177)²³³

²²⁸ Both sets of manuscripts are held in Jain temples in northwest India, around 400 km apart.

²²⁹ See Giunta 2008–2009, 125–141, for a comprehensive and detailed description of the manuscripts and the editions, as well as the relationships between them.

²³⁰ To be precise, on P28v.5, the “Examination of Puruṣa” ends abruptly with the following words: *tasya grahaṇam yathoktam*. The implied quotation never appears. Instead, after a *danḍa*, the proceeding syllables that appear are: *na vyavasāyavapnasvapnāntikā[h] prajñānaviśeṣā*. These words are part of Av8, several verses into the “Examination of the Self.” There is, therefore, an obvious lacuna covering the end of chapter six and the beginning of chapter seven. The final words on J44v are the very same: *tasya grahaṇam yathoktam*. The implied quotation, and several further concluding remarks, are the first words on J45r. This includes the words that explicitly close chapter six. (Curiously, the scribe inadvertently repeats the *ktam* of *yathoktam* at the beginning of J45r.) Chapter seven then begins, and J45r concludes, in the midst of Av8, with *pratyakṣānumānopamānaśābdasmṛtipratyabhijñānasiddhadarśanārṣārekaviparyayā*. Flipping to 45v, the first words we see are *na vyavasāyavapnasvapnāntikāḥ prajñānaviśeṣā*. The lacuna in P, then, corresponds exactly, down to the syllable, with J45r. The scribe simply missed one side of one folio.

²³¹ For another example, some of the marginalia in J read like the notes of someone (modern?) studying the text rather than the scribe’s self-corrections; the ink is sometimes fainter, the writing less legible, the content a little out of place. P consistently includes these comments, verbatim, in neat and legible handwriting in the margins, suggesting the Pāṭan scribe copied these margins and erred on the side of caution by keeping them in the margins.

Giunta gives a number of reasons we can be confident that the Pāṭan manuscripts (as well as the fragmentary and unreliable Koba manuscript of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*) are based on the Jaisalmer manuscripts (Giunta 2008–2009, 131, 133, 138).

²³² As Funayama (1992, 52) and others have noted, the Tibetan is not particularly helpful, either, but we can be thankful that Kamalaśīla was a good writer—J does not leave us with too many serious issues.

²³³ TSP 103.7, J45r.7.

^a Shastri prints °prabhijñānasiddhātidarśanārṣārekaviparyayāḥ and omits °nādhyavasāya°.

Firstly, Aviddhakarṇa argues: Particular cognitions of mine (*madīya*)—whether perception, inference, analogy, testimony, memory, recognition, established teaching, sagely wisdom, doubt (*āreka*), mistake, indefinite cognition, dream, or end of dream (*svapnāntika*), whose objects are the knowable things that fall within the scope and those that do not fall within the scope of the indeterminate, existent and so forth (*sad-ādy-aviśeṣa*)—can only be known by a knower distinct from my (*madīya*) body and the like, because of possessing an origin relying on its cause, possessing particular universals, consisting in awareness (*bodha*), perishing quickly, bestowing impressions, and being cognitions (*pratyaya*), like the cognitions of other people, unlike pots and such.

To reframe the argument in somewhat simpler terms: there must be a single agent of knowledge for all of my different kinds of cognition, and that agent cannot be reduced to the body, the sense faculties, and so on.

This fragment demonstrates Aviddhakarṇa’s apparent penchant for extensive qualifiers, compound reasons, and elliptical references to Vaiśeṣika terminology. Unpacking the argument is a difficult task. Kamalaśīla helps but does not resolve all of the questions—or, at least, not all of my questions.

Categorizing the Categories

Notably, Kamalaśīla’s comments refer us back to an argument from the end of the “Examination of Īśvara.” In that context, Śāntarakṣita had nearly finished listing the different arguments of the *pūrvapakṣa*: the definition of Īśvara (verse 54), a series of proofs, beginning with Av6 and Av7, of Īśvara’s existence (47–53), and the argument that the existence of an omnipotent creator entails his omniscience (54). Before beginning the refutation (*uttarapakṣa*), Śāntarakṣita cites one last argument, or rather what Kamalaśīla calls an “argument-cluster” (*pramāṇa-kadambaka*).²³⁴ Kamalaśīla attributes this cluster only to the group “beginning with Praśastamati” (*Praśastamati-prabhṛtayaḥ*)²³⁵ that he had mentioned in his comments on the previous verse. He quotes two specific arguments—call them X1 and X2—without any further attribution, both of which resonate with the language found in some of the fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta:

vicitrodayapraspandāspadānāspadaṃ vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannam
dvitīyādīpramāṇapañcakavyatiriktapramāṇāntarāvacchedyaṃ, vastutvādibhyo rūpādivat,
vaidharmyeṇa kūrmaromādaya *iti*. (55)²³⁶

What has come to be the topic of disagreement, that which is the seat, and that which is not the seat, of that whose arising is variegated (*vicitra-udaya*) and of movement (*praspanda*), can be delimited by the other means of knowledge apart from the group of five means of knowledge²³⁷ beginning with

²³⁴ The metaphor of the *kadamba* blossom is magnificent. Dense clusters of the flowers encircle beautiful orange bulbs; a single blossom (*kadambaka*) is also a cluster (*kadambaka*) of individual flowers. I have, frankly, no idea how more fully to convey this in an English translation. English is highly idiomatic, and metaphor is the foundation of much of human discourse, but this precise kind of metaphor, which is so commonplace in Sanskrit, would seem rarified in English prose. “Cluster” is accurate, and yet, in a word, sterile.

²³⁵ More immediately, to “them” (*tailḥ*), but this pronoun clearly refers back to the compound *praśastamati-prabhṛtayaḥ*.

²³⁶ TSP 56.5, J31v.2. Cf. n 173 regarding Praśastamati’s identification with Praśastapāda.

²³⁷ It is generally said that Nyāya accepts four means of knowledge and Vaiśeṣika only two. Who, then, is referring to this group of six? According to Mīmāṃsā, in addition to perception, inference, testimony, and analogy, presumption (*arthāpatti*) and absence (*abhāva*) are means of knowledge. Nyāya is typically understood as subsuming *arthāpatti* under inference. Kumāriḷa gives the typical example: “Upon hearing that a portly man does not eat during the day, the awareness that he eats at night is called presumption on the basis of what has been heard” (*pīno divā na bhunkte cety*

the second, for such reasons as being an entity (*vastutva*), like color and such, unlike the hair of a tortoise and so on.

[...]

sadādyaviśeṣāskanditānāskanditaṃ vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannaṃ kasyacit pratyakṣaṃ sattvād rūpādivad *iti*. (55)²³⁸

What has come to be the topic of disagreement, that which is assailed (*āskandita*), and that which is not assailed (*anāskandita*), by the indeterminate, existent and so forth (*sad-ādy-aviśeṣa*), is perceptible to someone because of existence (*sattva*), as with color and the like.

Skimming over some of the dense Vaiśeṣika terminology, these arguments both amount to the following: existence (*vastutva* or *sattva*) entails perceptibility,²³⁹ and perceptibility entails a perceiver; who could perceive, e.g., the elements in their divided atomic state but Īśvara? This is reminiscent of Uddyotakara’s argument that the perceptibility of natural phenomena like grass proves the existence of their intelligent overseer. (If a tree falls in an unpopulated forest, *because* it makes a sound we know God must be present?) Most importantly for our purposes, the second of these arguments shares the same reference to the Vaiśeṣika concept of “the indeterminate, existent and so forth” (*sadādy-aviśeṣa*) as found in Av8—not to mention the ornate, elliptical style of many of the fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta. In fact, I cannot help but wonder whether the group of thinkers “beginning with Praśastamati” who put forth these kinds of arguments includes Aviddhakarṇa and/or Bhāvivikta. If so, and given that Praśastamati is another name for Praśastapāda,²⁴⁰ a host of questions arises about their chronological and doctrinal associations. For example, did Aviddhakarṇa and/or Bhāvivikta respond in some way to Praśastapāda, or perhaps vice versa?²⁴¹ In any case, Kamalaśīla explains this term in his comments on verse 55, and refers us back to this passage when it reappears in Av8.

After citing the two arguments above, Kamalaśīla quotes VS 1.1.7 (curiously, without marking it as a citation): “These are indeterminate (*aviśeṣa*) for substance, quality, and action: existent (*sat*); impermanent; substantial; an effect; a cause; possessing particular universals.”²⁴² That is to say, these six characteristics do not differentiate the three categories; all six qualify all three. Substance, quality, and action are, accordingly, “that which is assailed” by these attributes, and the other three categories are “that which is not assailed” by them. All in all, the elaborate, elliptical compound *sadādy-aviśeṣa-āskandita-anāskandita* boils down to: the six categories of Vaiśeṣika. The same can be said for the compound that opens Av8, “whose objects are the knowable things that fall within the scope and

evamādivacaḥ śrutau / rātribhojanavijñānaṃ śrutārthāpattir ucyate (Arthāpattipariccheda 51 (ŚV 329)). Perhaps some early Naiyāyikas argued for, or accepted, *arthāpatti* as a distinct means of knowledge. *Arthāpatti* is similar to the idea of “inference to the best explanation,” which is one of the interpretations of Paley’s watchmaker argument. If Aviddhakarṇa, as one of the voices behind X1, accepted *arthāpatti*, he may have formulated his theistic arguments as inferences to the best explanation, a far stronger claim than the way the Buddhists interpret Av6 and Av7. On the other hand, the fact that *arthāpatti* is not in his list of kinds of cognition in Av8 cautions against this idea.

²³⁸ TSP 56.12, J31v.3.

²³⁹ All six categories are *jñeya: śaṅṅām api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni* (PDhS 16.1).

²⁴⁰ Cf. n 173.

²⁴¹ It would be no surprise that Praśastapāda is the “first” (*prabhṛti*), given that he likely preceded Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta.

²⁴² *sad anityaṃ dravyavat kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣavad iti dravyaguṇakarmanām aviśeṣaḥ ||1.1.8|| (VS, 3.10).*

those that do not fall within the scope of the indeterminate, existent and so forth,” which is extremely close to *sadādy-aviśeṣa-āskandita-anāskandita*. Indeed, this is also true for the even more elaborate compound that opens the first of the “argument-cluster” cited above: “that which is the seat, and that which is not the seat, of that whose arising is variegated (*vicitrodaya*) and of movement.” Kamalaśīla explains this as follows: “Variegated arising (*vicitrodaya*) conveys the category *quality*, in the sense ‘that whose arising is variegated.’ Movement (*praspanḍa*) is the category *action*. Their basis, their inhering cause, is *substance*, and the non-basis is the five beginning with *quality* and ending with *inherence*.”²⁴³ The whole compound, this suggests, amounts to a description of the six categories. Yet it does not quite suffice to say only that in these compounds Aviddhakarṇa et al elliptically refer to the categories. *Categorizing* the categories is an important topic in VS and PDhS. These compounds do not only tell us that the six categories are the topic of dispute or the objects of perception. They also inform us of different ways of grouping the categories together, whether in terms of relations among them (“the basis of quality and action,” etc.) or lists of qualities (“existent and so forth,” etc.). Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, et al, seem to have insisted on bringing references to Vaiśeṣika terminology, categorization, and theory into their commentaries on the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, as if to transform the *Bhāṣya* into even more of an occasion for instruction on Vaiśeṣika.

Knowledge and Ignorance

Av8 is primarily comprised of four compounds. The first—“whose objects are the knowable things that fall within the scope and those that do not fall within the scope of the indeterminate, existent and so forth”—refers to the objects of cognition, i.e., the six categories, which are all, according to Vaiśeṣika, cognizable (*jñeyatva*). The second compound enumerates the various kinds of cognition, and amply demonstrates Aviddhakarṇa’s penchant for exhaustive enumeration: “Perception, inference, analogy, testimony, memory, recognition, established teaching, sagely wisdom, doubt, mistake, indefinite cognition, dream, or end of dream.” This striking list calls to mind Praśastapāda’s analysis of cognition in PDhS—even as it diverges from it. (It is also nearly identical to a list found in Bh7 (§6).)

Praśastapāda lists and describes four kinds of ignorance and four kinds of knowledge, along with a number of additional kinds of cognition subsumed within one or another of these eight, as follows:

Ignorance

- i. Doubt (*saṃśaya*)
- ii. Error (*viparyaya*)
- iii. Indefinite cognition (*anadhyavasāya*)
- iv. Dream (*svapna*)
 - a. End of dream (*svapnāntika*)

Knowledge

- i. Perception (*pratyakṣa*)
- ii. Inference (*laiṅgika*)²⁴⁴
 - a. Testimony (*śabda*)
 - b. Well-known gesture (*prasiddhābhinaya*)

²⁴³ vicitrodayo guṇapadārtha ucyaṭe vicitra udayo 'syeti kṛtvā. praspanḍaḥ karmapadārthaḥ. tayor āspadaṃ samavāyikāraṇaṃ dravyam, anāspadaṃ guṇādayaḥ pañca samavāyaparyantāḥ (TSP 56.8, J31v.3).

²⁴⁴ I.e., knowledge pertaining to an inferential mark (*liṅga*).

- c. Analogy (*upamāna*)
- d. Presumption (*arthāpatti*)
- e. Possibility (*sambhava*)
- f. Absence (*abhāva*)
- g. Tradition (*aitihya*)
- iii. Memory (*smṛti*)
- iv. Sagely wisdom (*ārṣa*)
 - a. Established teachings (*siddhadarśana*)

Praśastapāda discusses “end of dream” cognition (*svapnāntika*) immediately after his analysis of dreams, but he also describes it as a sort of memory, so I am not sure precisely where to place it in this list. He says relatively little about it: “Although end of dream arises for one whose senses (*indriya-grāma*) are inactive (*uparata*), it is actually a memory, because it attends to a past series of cognitions.”²⁴⁵ What precise state is this?

Śrīdhara glosses it this way: “Sometimes a recollection (*pratisamdhāna*) of something seen in a dream, ‘This I saw,’ arises in the dream state (*svapna-avasthā*), and this arises at the end, at the conclusion, of the previously experienced dream, so it is called ‘end of dream.’”²⁴⁶ Kamalaśīla’s gloss of the term in Av6 is fairly similar: “Dream (*svapna*) is the cognition arising in the first dream state (*svapna-avasthā*); end of dream is a later cognition, also in dream (*svapne pi*), that has the former as its object.”²⁴⁷ Both describe “end of dream” cognition as arising in the dream state (*svapna-avasthā*, *svapne pi*). In his study of Nyāya philosophy of mind, Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti goes so far as to characterize the sentence in PDhS as saying, “Sometimes dreams may also have a snowball effect and generate further dreams (*svapnāntika*).”²⁴⁸ Yet Śrīdhara himself goes on to emphasize that Praśastapāda’s point is to deny that “end of dream” is dream cognition (*svapna-jñāna*) per se.

Śrīdhara and Kamalaśīla’s descriptions both sound somewhat like lucid dreaming, but even if we describe the moment one recognizes a dream as such as the “end” of the ordinary dream state, it is unclear whether Praśastapāda’s description applies to the actual lucid dream that follows. Eli Franco, glossing Prajñākaragupta’s invocation of “the transition of the body at the end of dream” (*svapnāntika-śarīra-sañcāra*), refers to “the last phase of a dream” and, later, to the movement from

²⁴⁵ *svapnāntikaṃ yady apy uparatendriyagrāmasya bhavati tathāpy atītasya jñānaprabandhasya pratyavekṣaṇāt smṛtir eveti bhavati* (PDhS 184.13). The term *grāma* refers to a village but can also refer simply to a collection or totality, or to “all” of something. *Indriya-grāma*, in this more prosaic sense, simply means *the senses*. Over time, metaphors often harden and all but disappear for native speakers. But scholars should resist the urge to run from metaphors. Workaday language is not the mark of sophistication, and the metaphors lurking underneath seemingly prosaic phrases—sometimes just below the surface—are often revelatory. “The village of the senses is at rest” is an evocative metaphor that speaks to the kind of totality the senses comprise and the relation between the senses and the being whose waking life they animate—whether the metaphor was alive or dead for Praśastapāda. Not to mention the fact that many thinkers and speakers recognize and take joy in the underlying metaphors and idioms of their words even when their neighbors have, so to speak, forgotten them, and their forgetful neighbors’ views and attitudes are often shaped by these sorts of features of language even when they are unaware of them.

²⁴⁶ *kadācit svapnadṛṣṭasyārthasya svapnāvasthāyām eva pratisamdhānaṃ bhavaty ayaṃ mayā dṛṣṭa iti tac ca pūrvānubhūtasya svapnasyānte 'vasāne bhavatīti svapnāntikaṃ ucyate* (NK 185.26).

²⁴⁷ *prathamāsvapnāvasthābhāvī^a pratyayaḥ svapnaḥ, tadviṣayaṃ svapne 'pi yad aparaṃ jñānaṃ bhavati sa svapnāntikaḥ* (TSP 103.19, J45v.3).

^a J prathamah

²⁴⁸ Chakrabarti 1999, 42.

the dream state to the waking state; but Franco also points out that he himself is “not sure whether Prajñākaragupta means [e.g.] that if one dreams intensely of jumping and running at the end of a dream, the awaking body jumps and starts running.”²⁴⁹ This seems closer, but the division between dream, “end of dream,” and whatever follows, remains blurry—and surely that is part of the point. Praśastapāda describes two preconditions for dream cognition, the repose of the sense faculties (*uparata-indriya-grāma*), and mental suspension (*pralīna-manaska*)—i.e., sleep.²⁵⁰ He only cites the first as a precondition for “end of dream” cognition, suggesting that the mind has become active again, though the senses remain at rest. Perhaps what he has in mind is something like hypnopompia, or certain descriptions of so-called sleep inertia, a liminal cognitive stage between sleep and wakefulness. In such states, one often recognizes that one was just dreaming—or is dreaming still—but has not yet awoken, does not yet perceive the outside world, and cannot yet move one’s limbs. The village (*grāma*) is still asleep (*uparata*). No longer dreaming, not yet awake—it is a little surprising not to find examples of Buddhists using this as a metaphor for the sometimes unsettling effects of meditation!

In any case, Aviddhakarṇa’s list covers much of the same ground as Praśastapāda’s with a few notable divergences. The sequence of Aviddhakarṇa’s list is partly different because he starts with forms of knowledge rather than ignorance but also because he attributes different values to each of the entries. He elevates analogy and testimony from species of inference to distinct forms of knowledge (more precisely, probably as distinct *means* of knowledge (*pramāṇa*)) prior to memory. He then adds recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), which is not in Praśastapāda’s list, and elevates established teaching to its own place in the list, rather than subsumed under sagely wisdom. He does not mention well-known gestures, presumption, possibility, absence, or tradition. The forms of ignorance follow in the exact same sequence, only Aviddhakarṇa uses the term *āreka* for doubt rather than *saṃśaya*, the latter of which has a very important technical role in the *Nyāyasūtra*. Whatever the actual relation between Aviddhakarṇa and Praśastapāda, it seems clear that here, in an argument for the existence of the self, Aviddhakarṇa is staking a claim to a particular number and sequence of kinds of cognition.

Mineness

The third compound in Av8 is the property to be proven: “knowable by a knower distinct from my body, etc.” The possessive pronoun *madīya* (my) is important not only for Av8 but also Av9 and Av10, as we will see shortly. Its relevance can perhaps best be brought out with reference to the *Bhāṣya* on NS 3.1.14.

NS 3.1.4–17 (cf. Appendix C) establishes, in turn, that the self is distinct from the body, the sense faculties, and the mind. Sūtras 12–14 close the excerpt on the sense faculties. The self is distinct from the sense faculties,

Because of the modification of another sense faculty. (3.1.12)

[*Objection:*] No, because the referent of memory is that which is recalled. (3.1.13)

²⁴⁹ Franco 1997, 176; also, 249.

²⁵⁰ PDhS 271.3.

[Response:] This denial does not hold because that really is a quality of the self. (3.1.14)²⁵¹

Sutra 12 (following Vātsyāyana's interpretation), pursues a line of reasoning that traces back to NS 3.1.1: there must be a sentient agent apart from the sense faculties because one sensory experience can trigger the recollection of a different sense, as when one sees the color of a lemon and recalls a lemon's sour taste. (I see what I have tasted.)²⁵² In sutra 13, an opponent responds: the object of memory is the remembered object alone; cross-sensory recollection is not possible. Uddyotakara describes this as a denial that recollection can prove the existence of the self, setting up sutra 14 to affirm that it can. And indeed, sutra 14 rejects the reasoning of this denial on the basis of the fact that memory is actually a quality of the self.

In his comments on sutra 14, Vātsyāyana treats memory as but a paradigmatic case of cognition. He concludes that, on the basis of memory, "It is inferred that there is one agent who, in each body (*pratideha*), has all objects, and joins together (*prati+sam+√dhā*) the series of cognitions pertaining to itself (*sva-*) and the series of recollections."²⁵³ Memory is, therefore, distinctive because I can recall, in the present moment, any sort of cognition *of mine* from the past. This means that an instance of memory can encapsulate any number of cognitions, whether a perception, a doubt, a dream, or the like. In fact, immediately before making this comment, Vātsyāyana specifically emphasizes the fact that memories and other cognitions are experienced as "mine," and his reasoning hinges on the difference between *my* cognitions and those of others. Countering the Buddhist view, he says:

As for the idea that a being is nothing but a series of impressions (*saṃskāra*): Impressions arise one after the other and disappear. There is no single impression that could experience cognition characterized by the three times or memory. And without this experience, [if there were no self,] there would arise no joining together of cognition (*jñāna*) or memory (*smṛti*) with [the notions] "I" and "mine" (*ahaṃ mameti ca*), just as this does not arise in the case of other bodies.²⁵⁴

Av8 would be a coherent elaboration on, and formalization of, this passage with a strong emphasis on Vaiśeṣika terminology and categorization. Rather than refer generally to "cognition (*jñāna*)" and "all objects (*sarvaviśaya*)," Aviddhakarṇa lists every kind of cognition and, using an elliptical reference to the six categories of Vaiśeṣika, every sort of object. Like Vātsyāyana, he also emphasizes the role of self-identification: the agent of *my* cognitions is distinct from *my* body. He refers to the reflexive nature of our experience without using the disputed term "self" in the actual argument, instead focusing on the undisputed sense of *mineness*.²⁵⁵ Vātsyāyana first identifies the view that

²⁵¹ *indriyāntaravikārāt ||3.1.12|| (NS 143.3);
na smṛteḥ smartavyaviśayatvāt ||3.1.13|| (143.8);
tadātmagūṇasadbhāvād apratiśedhaḥ ||3.1.14|| (143.12).*

²⁵² Praśastapāda offers something quite similar as one of many reasons we can infer the existence of the self: "Because we observe a transformation in the faculty of taste in the sequence of recalling the taste immediately after observing the object with the eye" (*nayanaviśayālocanānantaram rasānusr̥tikramena rasanavikriyādarśanād* (PDhS 70.3)).

²⁵³ ato 'numīyate asty ekaḥ sarvaviśayo yaḥ pratidehaṃ svajñānaprabandhaṃ smṛtiprabandhaṃ ca pratisandhatta iti. (NBh 144.2)

²⁵⁴ saṃskārasantatimātre tu sattve utpadyotpadya saṃskārās tirobhavanti. sa nāsty eko 'pi saṃskāro yas trikalāviśiṣṭaṃ jñānaṃ smṛtiṃ cānubhavet. na cānubhavam antareṇa jñānasya smṛteś ca pratisandhānam ahaṃ mameti cotpadyate dehāntaravat. (NBh 143.22)

²⁵⁵ Dignāga uses memory to prove that cognition is self-reflexive: we remember both the object *and* the past cognition of it. Many thinkers take issue with this notion. Kumārila, for example, does not think we remember cognitions. As Birgit Kellner describes his position, "we erroneously think we remember cognitions, but this is merely because our memory of

beings are but series of impressions; he concludes by comparing this to the difference between different people's bodies. In short, if I cannot remember someone else's memories, why, if I am not identical with my past self, can I remember my own?²⁵⁶ His argument is a specific challenge to Buddhists, the proponents of no-self. Aviddhakarṇa's example works the same way. The sense of *mineness*, whether in terms of our bodies or our cognitions, cannot take hold if there is nothing—no *thing*—that makes a single body more than a series of fleeting impressions.

Time and Memory

This still leaves us with the last compound of Av8, the crux of the argument, the list of six reasons. How exactly do these six reasons relate to one another? Does each function as a separate argument? Do all six collectively prove the point? Should they be read cumulatively, building upon one another towards the final conclusion? Or are they grouped together somehow, e.g., in twos or threes?

First, a quick run through of each of the six (slightly out of sequence): (1) “Having an origin that relies on its own causes” (*svakāraṇāyattajanmavat*). Aviddhakarṇa does not simply say, “because of being an effect” (*kāryatva*), but specifies that the origin of each cognition relies on its particular causes. This may seem like a relatively banal point, but the subtext may be that the respective causes of each kind of cognition are distinct, just as the objects of the different sense faculties are distinct. This relates to the next reason, too. (2) “Possessing particular universals.” Particular universals (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*) are all of the universals apart from the highest universal, being (*sattā*). They are “universal” in the sense that they give rise to the notion of similarity across all of their instantiations, and yet “particular” because they serve to differentiate one class of thing from others. “Substancehood” is universal to all substances and yet particular to substances alone. “Being,” by contrast, is truly universal. If I understand Aviddhakarṇa, the fact that *each* of my different kinds of cognitions possesses a particular universal means that they are each differentiated from one another, perceptionness inheres in all perceptions, but only perceptions, not dreams, and so on. (3) “Perishing quickly”

objects would not be explicable without the existence of their previous cognition” (Kellner 2011, 415). Nyāya neither accepts that cognitions are self-reflexive nor that every cognitive event includes the cognition-of-cognition structure. We do not need to have a cognition of our cognition of a pot in order to see the pot—the cognition of the pot suffices. It is possible to then regard that cognition itself as an object of cognition, but because this is not essential for cognitive functioning, there is no infinite regress.

²⁵⁶ The example “as in the case of other bodies” hearkens back to NBh 1.1.10. Sutra 1.1.10 lists the six inferential marks (*liṅga*) of the self: desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain, and cognition. Vātsyāyana first explains how each of these can be used to infer the existence of the self. Twice he uses the example “as in the case of other bodies.” At the end of his comments on this sutra, Vātsyāyana explains the phrase: “Concerning this, the phrase ‘as in the case of other bodies’ is taken up: Just as, according to proponents of no-self, different cognitions whose objects are restricted to other bodies are not recalled, nor could they be recalled if they were the objects of a single body, because there would be nothing to differentiate these cases. It is the actual practice for a single being to recall what he has seen, not what was seen by another, nor what he has not seen. In the same way, it is the actual practice of many beings that one does not remember what was seen by another. The proponent of no-self cannot account for either of these cases, and so, it obtains that there is a self” (*tatra dehāntaravad iti vibhajyate. yathā anātmavādīno dehāntareṣu niyataviṣayā buddhibhedā na pratisandhīyante, tathāikadehaviṣayā api na pratisandhīyeraṇ, aviśeṣāt. so' yam ekasattvasya samācārah svayaṃdr̥ṣṭasya smaraṇam, nānyadr̥ṣṭasya nādr̥ṣṭasyeti. evaṃ khalu nānāsattvānām samācāro 'nyadr̥ṣṭam anyo na smarātīti. tad etad ubhayam aśakyam anātmavādīnā vyavasthāpayitum ity evam upapannam asty ātmeti* (NBh 16.16)). That is to say, the Buddhist can neither explain why I am able to remember my own memories (given that I am as distinct from my former self as I am from an entirely different being) nor why I am not able to remember anyone else's (given that I am as identical with my former self as with anyone else).

(*āśutaravināśitva*). This is the same term that Śrīdhara uses to gloss Praśastapāda's use of the term "momentariness" (*kṣaṇikatva*). According to Praśastapāda, all actions and some qualities are momentary: "Ether and the self both possess qualities that are entirely specific to them, that are momentary, and that reside in only a portion of their substratum."²⁵⁷ Individual cognitions do not persist through time, and yet something seems to bind them all together. (4) "Bestowing impressions" (*saṃskārādhāyakatva*). There are three kinds of impression, and Aviddhakarṇa presumably has the cognitive sort in mind here, i.e., mental impressions formed by repetition, novelty, shock value, or the like. Praśastapāda specifically says that this is the cause of recollection and recognition (*smṛti-pratyabhijñāna-hetur*). Finally, (5 and 6) two of the six reasons, "because of consisting in awareness (*bodhātmakatva*)" and "because of being cognitions (*pratyayatva*)," are nearly, or perhaps entirely, synonymous.²⁵⁸ This would suggest that there may be something to the sequence, or else that Kamalaśīla is paraphrasing a number of distinct arguments, at least two of which rest on roughly the same reason.

There is an interesting resonance between these two near-synonyms and Kumārila's engagement with Buddhists. In a well-known verse (that Śāntarakṣita quotes in the *Mīmāṃsā* section of the "Examination of the Self"), Kumārila defends the intrinsic validity of knowledge on the basis of *bodhātmakatva*;²⁵⁹ elsewhere he paints the Buddhist point of view as the polar opposite, i.e., that knowledge is intrinsically erroneous because *pratyayatva*.²⁶⁰ Kumārila emphasizes the confidence with which we (rightly, in his view) regard our own cognitions, whereas the Buddhists emphasize the unreliability of cognition that can often be revealed upon examination. Significantly, Aviddhakarṇa's argument concerns neither validity nor unreliability. He includes in his list both established means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and undoubtedly erroneous cognitions, such as "mistake" (*viparyaya*), i.e., mistaking one thing for something else. Nevertheless, he thinks there is something else to be gleaned from the fact that cognitions are cognitions, or have the nature of awareness, namely, that they entail a specific kind of perceiver distinct from the body, sense faculties, and mind.

This undoubtedly calls to mind the *Bhāṣya* on NS 3.1.3. Sutras 3.1.1–3 are as follows:

²⁵⁷ ākāśātmanāṃ kṣaṇikaikadeśavṛttiviśeṣaguṇavattvam (PDhS 25.4).

²⁵⁸ A student of J (cf. n 231) was apparently concerned about this, writing in the margin, "The difference between consisting in cognition (*bodha*) and being a cognition (*pratyaya*) is only made in the succession, though really there is no difference (*bodhātmakapratyayatvayoḥ paryāyākṛta eva bhedah paramārthatas tv abhedah*)." (P, as usual, has the same comment, also in the margin, but with the same precise, elegant hand as the rest of the manuscript.) NS 1.1.15 states, "*buddhi, upalabdhi, jñāna*: no difference in meaning (*anarthāntaram*)" (NS 18.13), and PDhS that "*buddhi, upalabdhi, jñāna, pratyaya* are synonyms (*paryāya*)" (PDhS 171.16).

²⁵⁹ *Śabdānityatādhikaraṇa* 409 (ŚV 591). "In this regard, cognition is recognized insofar as it consists in consciousness; people regard it as the cognition of a pot, an elephant, etc., on account of the difference of these [objects]" (*tatra bodhātmakatvena pratyabhijñāyate matiḥ | ghaṭahastyādibuddhitvaṃ tadbbhedāl lokasammatam*).

²⁶⁰ *Nirālambanavāda* 23 (ŚV 159): "A cognition of, e.g., a post is false because it is a cognition. To explain: what is a cognition is observed to be illusory, like the cognition of a dream, etc" (*stambhādipratyayo mithyā pratyayatvāt tathā hi yah | pratyayah sa mṛṣā drṣṭah svapnādipratyayo yathā*). As Taber 1994 points out, Kumārila may have had in mind the first verse of Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā*. Vasubandhu offers a relatively similar example, but does not give an explicit reason (*hetu*) for the illusoriness of cognition, inviting Brahmanical thinkers to furnish the reason themselves. "Although the Hindus were attacking a straw man," Taber says, "their charges did draw attention to the shortcomings in Vasubandhu's attempt to base idealism on the fact that we are sometimes presented in experience with objects that do not exist" (31). One does not always strike down an imaginary opponent in vain (cf. §14 on Aviddhakarṇa's sword).

[The self exists] because a single thing is grasped by sight and touch. (3.1.1)

[*Objection:*] No, because of the differential arrangement (*vyavasthāna*) of the objects. (3.1.2)

[*Response:*] In fact, the real existence of the self follows as a result of the arrangement of those, so the objection is invalid. (3.1.3)²⁶¹

In his comments on NS 3.1.1, Vātsyāyana points out that a sense faculty can only recall an object that was grasped by itself, not by another faculty.²⁶² For this reason, there must be a single agent to account for the joining together of different sensory experiences in our recollections. After 3.1.1, sutra 2 cites an objection: “No, because of the differential arrangement of the objects.” The basic gist of the objection, following Vātsyāyana’s interpretation, is that there cannot be a single agent of both sight and touch, etc., because the object of visual cognition is restricted to the operation of the eye, of tactile cognition to the skin, and so on. Most important for our purposes is the response in sutra 3, which turns the argument on its head: it is precisely this differential arrangement of the objects of the senses that proves the existence of the self.

In the *Bhāṣya* on 3.1.3, Vātsyāyana largely extends the reasoning from 3.1.1, but emphasizes the manifoldness of cognitive objects and kinds of cognition. Some of the language of this passage of the *Bhāṣya* is notably resonant with Av8:

Now, if there were a single sense faculty that were unrestricted in its objects, all-knowing, grasping all objects, and sentient, then who could infer a sentient thing other than it? Since the sense faculties are, in fact, restricted in their objects, we infer, on that basis, that there is a sentient agent apart from them who is all-knowing, grasps all objects, and exceeds any restriction in object. [...] One recalls (*pratisamdhāya*) and recognizes (*vedayate*) the cognitions (*pratyaya*) of perception, inference, testimony (*āgama*), doubt (*saṁśaya*), or intuition (*pratibhā*), with their manifold objects (*nānā-viśaya*), as all having oneself (*svātma*) as their agent (*kartṛ*).²⁶³

To slightly rephrase this, we could say the various kinds of cognitions, with their respective objects, that are all experienced as *mine* must have a single knower, and that knower must be sentient and unrestricted with respect to objects of knowledge. Here we see an abbreviated list of the kinds of cognitions that must all pertain to the same sentient agent. Aviddhakarṇa—at least, as preserved by Kamalaśīla—makes of this an elaborate formal argument.

And this, taken together with all of the Vaiśeṣika background condensed into Av8, suggests something of the potential sequence of Aviddhakarṇa’s reasoning: different kinds of cognitions all have the same nature (*bodhātmakatva*), and yet they are distinct from one another

²⁶¹ darśanasparśanābhyām ekārthagrahaṇāt ||3.1.1|| (NS 135.13);
na, viśayavyavasthānāt ||3.1.2|| (136.6);

tadvyavasthānād evātmasadbhāvād apratiśedhaḥ ||3.1.3|| (136.18).

²⁶² indriyaṃ khalu svaṃ svaṃ viśayagrahaṇam ananyakartṛkaṃ pratisamdhātum arhati nendriyāntarasya viśayāntaragrahaṇam iti (NBh 135.19).

²⁶³ yadi khalv ekam indriyam avyavasthitaviśayaṃ sarvajñam sarvaviśayagrāhi cetanaṃ syāt, kas tato 'nyam cetanam anumātum śaknuyāt. yasmāt vyavasthitaviśayāṇīndriyāṇi, tasmāt tebhyo 'nyaś cetanaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvaviśayagrāhi viśayavyavasthitim atīto 'numīyate. [...] pratyakṣānumānāgamasaṁśayapratibhāpratyayāṃś ca nānāviśayān svātmakartṛkān pratisamdhāya vedayate. (NBh 136.1 [...] 136.7)

(*sāmānyaviśeṣavattva*) because they are restricted in their objects,²⁶⁴ and, so, restricted in their respective causes (*svakāraṇāyattajanmavattva*).²⁶⁵ They do not persist through time (*āśutaravināśitva*), but leave some kind of trace (*samskārahāyakatva*) that can lead, at a later point, to recollection or recognition. This ephemerality and restriction is part of the nature of cognition (*pratyayatva*), which is a quality, and, so, depends on a substance for its existence. That is all to say, a cognition requires both an object of cognition *and* an agent of cognition, and, more precisely, all of *my* cognitions—diverse sorts, regarding diverse objects, both knowing and ignorant—must all be known by a single sentient agent who is not restricted to particular kinds of objects, particular kinds of cognitions, or particular temporal sequences (*madīyaśarīrādivyatiriktasaṃvedakasamvedya*).

²⁶⁴ Cognition “has many forms because there are endless objects and because it is restricted to each object” (*sācānekaprakārārthānantyāt pratyarthaniyatatvāc ca* (PDhS 172.13)).

²⁶⁵ Color, e.g., “is an auxiliary of the eye” (*nayanasahakāri* (PDhS 104.2)).

§3. AV9 AND AV10: MINE MEANS MINE

The emphasis on *mineness* only grows in Av9 and Av10.

After Av8, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla cite one argument by Śaṅkarasvāmin, another early Naiyāyika whose work has been lost, and three arguments by Uddyotakara, all four of which aim, like Av8, to prove the existence of the self. Śāntarakṣita then closes the *pūrvapakṣa* with Av9 and Av10, which, according to Kamalaśīla, argue for the permanence and omnipresence of the self, respectively:

atha nityatvavibhutve katham asya pratipattavye ity atrāviddhakarṇas tāvat pramāṇayati mātur udaraniṣkramaṇottarakālaṃ madīyādyaprajñānaśaṃvedakasaṃvedyāny atatkālāni madīyāni prajñānāni madīyaprajñānatvāt ādyamadīyaprajñānavat. (185)²⁶⁶

How are the permanence and omnipresence of the self to be apprehended? Concerning this, Aviddhakarṇa first argues: After emerging from my mother's womb, my cognitions (*madīya-prajñāna*) across time can only be known by the knower of my first cognition (*madīya-ādya-prajñāna*) because they are my cognitions, like my first cognition (*madīya-ādya-prajñāna*).

[...]

vibhutvasiddhaye pramāṇayati avanijalānilamanāṃsi vipratipattiṣayabhāvāpannāni dūrataravarttīni madīyenātmanā saha sambadhyante mūrtatvavegavattvaparatvāparatvamithaḥsaṃyogavibhāga-vattvebhyo, madīyaśarīrādivad *iti*. (186)²⁶⁷

He makes this argument in order to prove omnipresence: What have come to be the subjects of dispute, earth, water, wind, and mind (*avani-jala-anila-manāṃsi*), which are situated at a remove (*dūrataravarttīni*), are connected with my self (*madīyena ātmanā*), because they have a fixed shape (*mūrtatva*), they possess momentum, they have proximity and distance (*paratvāparatva*), and they possess conjunction and disjunction to each other (*mithaḥ-saṃyoga-vibhāga-vattva*), like my body (*madīya-śarīra*), etc.

Kamalaśīla's description of Av9 as proof of the self's permanence suggests that its source is somewhere within the passage NS 3.1.18–26, which consists in three arguments that the self persists across lifetimes. All three of these arguments hinge on the innate experience of a newborn baby, and Av9 similarly refers to the first cognition after emerging from the womb. But this passage in the *Nyāyasūtra* is concerned with the question of whether the self disappears upon death. The opponent of these arguments is not someone like a Buddhist, who argues against the notion of the self altogether, but someone more like a Cārvāka who argues against the notion of agency, experience, or karmic merit persisting from one life to the next. Av9 argues for the necessity of a single agent across one lifetime, connected with a single body. In other words, despite Kamalaśīla's framing, Av9 serves more to prove the existence of the self than its permanence. In fact, in Av9 the self's persistence through time is axiomatic. It is by dint of the fact that the reflexive nature of experience entails an agent persisting through time that we know there must be a self, since that is precisely what a self is.

Further, Aviddhakarṇa's use of the first-person possessive determiner “my” (*madīya*) seems to beg the question, and in Av10 he even explicitly mentions “the self” (*ātman*). He should know that the

²⁶⁶ TSP 106.1, J46r.2.

²⁶⁷ TSP 106.7, J46r.3.

Buddhists would reject any such argument. (In fact, later in the “Examination of the Self,” Śāntarakṣita cursorily dismisses these arguments precisely because he has already refuted the existence of the self, on which they both rest.) If instead we read Av9 and Av10 in terms of NBh 3.1.14—which, as we just saw, proves the existence of the self on the basis of memory—it would suggest Aviddhakarṇa has a proponent of no-self in mind. Yet he may well be arguing against someone else in these fragments, or perhaps arguing only in principle against the denial of the self. Or perhaps by this point in his comments he considers the self’s existence to be established, and now he wants to establish some of its qualities.

In any case, it is clear that *mineness* plays a pivotal role in both of these fragments, perhaps even more so than NBh 3.1.14 and Av8. Av9 reads almost like a taunt: our cognitions come with a sense of mineness, but proponents of no-self cannot account for the fact that my cognitions across my lifetime are restricted to me and my body. The force of Av9 hinges on the temporality of mineness. Av10, on the other hand, focuses on the spatial reach of the self. My cognitions across time entail a temporally persistent *me*; my sensory, bodily, and mental experience entails a *me* that is spatially unbounded—it pervades the entirety of my body, mind, and sense faculties as they move together through space.

As for the content of the arguments, Av9 is fairly clear. Kamalaśīla does not say much about it, but does point out that “pleasure and the like” (*sukha-ādi*, and, so, any of the other inferential marks of the self²⁶⁸) could also be made into the subject of the argument. My desire must be the desire of the same being who, in the past, desired what I desired in the past. Av10, on the other hand, Kamalaśīla quotes without comment. Is this because he considers it easy enough to understand or unworthy of unpacking? (His expectations and our desires are not always in sync.) Av10 necessitates another detour through Vaiśeṣika classification, yet even then I do not find it very easy to understand.

The Number of Sense Faculties

The first puzzle is the absence of fire. The compound “earth, water, wind, and mind” is fairly surprising, both because there is no obvious reason to exclude fire, one of the four elements, and because Praśastapāda characterizes this group, including fire, in almost the same way as Aviddhakarṇa: “Earth, water, fire, wind, and mind possess actions, have a fixed shape, have proximity and distance, and possess momentum.”²⁶⁹ The Tibetan translation of the *Pañjikā* does include fire, but, unfortunately, only lends support to the reading in the Sanskrit manuscripts. Rather than include all four elements, the Tibetan reads “earth, water, fire, and mind” (*sa dang/ chu dang/ me dang yid*), substituting fire for wind. Perhaps the translator, or the translator’s manuscript, read *anala* (fire) for *anila* (wind). Despite the divergence, in other words, the Tibetan confirms there are three elements plus mind. It is easy to see how the list of all five (*avanijalānilānalamanāmsi*) could become either of these groups of four (*avanijalānilamanāmsi*, as in the Sanskrit mss., or *avanijalānalamanāmsi*, corresponding to the Tibetan), but we must also wonder whether Aviddhakarṇa may have had some reason for limiting the list in one of these ways. (Ether, the fifth substance and the element corresponding to the organ of hearing, does not have a fixed shape, and

²⁶⁸ If we were reconstructing a hypothetical—fragmentary—*Bhāṣyaṭīkā*, this would suggest we strongly consider Av9 as a comment on NBh 1.1.10.

²⁶⁹ kṣitijalajyotiranilamanasām kriyāvattvamūrtatvaparatvāparatvavegavattvāni (PDhS 21.21).

so is not amenable to the same set of reasons).

The next puzzle is the oft-repeated qualifier, “what has come to be the subject of dispute.”²⁷⁰ As we saw in Av6, this is not necessarily a gratuitous phrase, but can significantly restrict the locus. If it operates in such a way here, it may restrict the locus to the elements qua causes of the sense faculties.²⁷¹ The elements would then correspond to the external sense faculties, i.e., the external instruments (*bāhya-karaṇa*), a natural pair with the mind, the internal instrument (*antaḥ-karaṇa*). Yet if the qualifier restricts the locus in this way, the exclusion of fire is particularly confusing. Fire is the elemental cause of the eye, which, like the faculties of smell (earth), taste (water), and touch (wind), conjoins directly to the self. The faculty of hearing consists of ether, and, as Kamalaśīla explains toward the beginning of the *pūrvapakṣa*,²⁷² is only secondarily conjoined to the self. It neither suits the reasons in Av10 nor the property to be proven. But what sense would it make to exclude sight?

On the other hand, this potentially make sense of the Tibetan reading. The sense faculty caused by wind is the skin, the tactile organ. There is a discussion in NS 3.1.51–60, i.e., the final third of the detailed examination of the sense faculties, concerning the view that there is only one sense faculty, the skin (*tvac*). NS 3.1.59 argues, in part, that the other sense faculties are proven on account of the different sites (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of each. As Vātsyāyana explains, the faculty of sight is situated in the pupil of the eye, smell in the nose, etc.²⁷³ (Roughly the same could be said for hearing and the ear, but, as mentioned, hearing is a special case.)

Perhaps Av10 is an interjection into this discussion. In other words, Av10 may not be an argument for the existence or omnipresence of the self but for the independent functioning of the sense faculties. Udayana—writing around half a millennium after Aviddhakarṇa—explains the stakes very clearly in his introduction to the section on the number of sense faculties:

The previous section has proven that the sense faculties are material (*bhautika*) and that they operate after direct contact (*prāpya-kārin*). Now we must undertake the section on the variety (*nānātva*) of the sense faculties. After a general introduction (*upodeghāta*), we dive in (*avatāra*).

To explain: without establishing their manifoldness, we could not establish their materiality; nor, without establishing that, that they operate after direct contact. Indeed, if there were only one faculty, it would not be possible to establish the arguments demonstrating materiality, such as, “Because, with its restriction among color and the like, [sight] illuminates color alone,” and so on [for the remaining senses].²⁷⁴ Hence, it would not be possible to establish that they operate after direct contact, because

²⁷⁰ Subtle differences in phrasing in this formula (*vimati* vs. *vipratipatti*, *adhikaraṇa* vs. *viśaya*) do not alter the meaning.

²⁷¹ Other possibilities include restricting the locus to the atoms that comprise “my” body or the elements qua objects corresponding to their respective sense faculties.

²⁷² *katham śrotreṇa saṃyogaḥ. tatrāpi saṃyuktasaṃyogo 'sti, ātmanā hi saṃyuktā tadīyā dṛṣṭābhisamskṛtā karnaśaṣkuli, tayā ca saṃyuktam ākāśātmakam śrotram* (TSP 102.14, J45r.5).

²⁷³ *adhiṣṭhāny api khalu pañcendriyāṇaṃ sarvaśarīrādhiṣṭhānaṃ sparśanaṃ sparśagrahaṇāliṅgam, kṛṣṇasārādhiṣṭhānaṃ cakṣurbahirniṣṭaṃ rūpagrahaṇāliṅgam, nāsādhiṣṭhānaṃ ghrāṇam, jihvādhiṣṭhānaṃ rasanam, karṇacchidrādhiṣṭhānaṃ śrotram, gandharasarūpasparśābdagrahaṇāliṅgatvād iti* (NBh 167.10).

²⁷⁴ The inclusion of the term “with the restriction” (*niyamena*) renders this sentence a little tricky to translate. It is possible that Udayana intends this to refer to two different phrasings of the same argument, “because of the restriction among color and the like” and “because of illuminating color alone.” In either case, he surely has in mind Uddyotakara and Vācaspati’s comments on NS 1.1.12, the sutra that defines the sense faculties: “Smell, taste, sight, touch, and

this is a property of material things (*bhūta*).

And the purpose (*prayojana*) of this is: the proof of the self distinct from the sense faculties, by means of the passage beginning with NS 3.1.1, “Because a single thing is grasped by sight and touch,” entails²⁷⁵ the proof of the variety of the sense faculties. Otherwise, because it would be singular, the sense faculty alone could combine (*prati+sam+√dhā*) [the different perceptual modes].²⁷⁶

To put it briefly: proof of the self hinges on the distinctness of the five senses. The proof of the self is presented a little earlier in the Sūtras, and in that context, i.e., in sūtra 3.1.1 onward, the manifoldness of the sense faculties is taken for granted. Now, in order to undergird the proof of the self, the manifoldness of the sense faculties must be substantiated.

If in Av10 we read *anala* (fire) for *anila* (wind), as in the Tibetan, this would exclude the element corresponding to the faculty of touch—because the hypothetical opponent already accepts the function of the skin (*tvac*). This would make Av10 a rather sophisticated argument, not against a Buddhist no-self theorist, but in defense of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika analysis of the sense faculties, their relationships with the material elements, the mind, and the self, and the way these corroborate one another.

This is all, admittedly, rather speculative. I do not mean to say that this is what Aviddhakarṇa had in mind, but only to show what worlds of meaning potentially hide behind these fragments.

hearing are the sense faculties, from the material elements (*bhūtebhyah*)” (*ghrāṇa-rasana-cakṣur-tvac-śrotrāṇīndriyāṇi bhūtebhyah* ||1.1.12|| (NV 66.7)). Uddyotakara, commenting on the final term in the sūtra, says: “The term ‘from the material elements’ (*bhūtebhyah*) indicates that earth, etc., are the causes, in the sense of a restriction. But what is this restriction? That each is the means of grasping the peculiar quality of an element. It is not the case that every sense faculty grasps the peculiar qualities of all of the elements. Rather, each peculiar quality, such as scent, which is the basis for the differentiation of one element from the others, pertains to its homogeneous sense faculty; that peculiar quality is grasped by that faculty alone. This is the restriction” (*bhūtebhyah iti pṛthivyādīkāraṇopadeśaḥ niyamārthaḥ. kaḥ punar ayam niyamaḥ? bhūtaguṇaviśeṣagrahaṇasādhanatvam, na sarvam indriyaṃ sarvabhūtaguṇaviśeṣaṃ grhṇāti. api tu yaj jātīyaṃ indriyaṃ bhavati, tasya yo guṇaviśeṣa itaretarabhūtavayavacchedahetur gandhādīḥ sa tenaivendriyena grhyata ity ayam niyamaḥ*. (NV, 66.15)). Vācaspati expands on this, eventually explaining that scent is “derived from earth (*pārthiva*) because, insofar as it is a substance, it manifests odor alone among color and the like (*rūpādiṣu madhye*), like another earthen thing (*pārthiva-antara-vat*). The same can be applied in the cases of taste, etc., as well. This is what he calls ‘the homogeneous sense faculty’” (*tac ca pārthivam. dravyatve sati rūpādiṣu madhye gandhasyaiva vyañjakatvāt pārthivāntaravat. evaṃ rasanādiṣv api yojyam. tad idam uktam yaj jātīyaṃ indriyaṃ...* (NVṪT 185.18)). When Udayana refers to “the restriction among color and the like,” he is referring specifically to the fact that each sense faculty is restricted to the peculiar quality of a particular material element, which accounts for its materiality (*bhautikatva*).

²⁷⁵ I understand Udayana’s use of the locative absolute phrase *indriya-nānātva-siddhau satyām* (given the establishment of the variety of the sense faculties) as describing a necessary condition for the proof of self. Though he does not use the emphatic particle *eva*, the point of the passage is clearly not simply that the proof of self happens to occur when the variety of the sense faculties is proven, but that the latter is a condition of possibility for the former.

²⁷⁶ *evaṃ bhautikatvaṃ prāpyakāritvaṃ cendriyāṇām anena prakaraṇena prasādhendriyanānāvaprakaraṇam ārambhaṇīyam. tasya copodghātād avatāraḥ. nānāvāsiddhau hi bhautikatvaṃ na siddhyet. tadasiddhau ca na prāpyakāritvam. ekatve hi rūpādiṣu madhye niyamaṇa rūpasyaiva prakāśakatvād ity ādīnām bhautikatvaprasādhakānām asiddhiḥ syād iti. tathā ca prāpyakāritvaṃ na siddhyet, tasya bhūtheadharmatvād iti. prayojanaṃ cāsyendriyanānāvāsiddhau satyām darśanasparśanābhyām ekārthagrahaṇād ity ādibhir indriyavyatirikatmasiddhiḥ. anyathendriyam evaikatvāt pratisaṃdadhītetī (NVṪTP 453.19).*

Body and Mind

That leaves the last puzzle, the compound reason. As mentioned, Praśastapāda offers almost the same list as a description of earth, water, fire, wind, and mind. Praśastapāda says these five:

(i) possess actions, (ii) have a fixed shape, (iii) possess momentum, and (iv) have proximity and distance.

Aviddhakarṇa's says that earth, water, wind/fire, and mind:

(a) have a fixed shape, (b) possess momentum, (c) have proximity and distance, and (d) possess conjunction and disjunction to each other.

(a) through (c) in Aviddhakarṇa's list is identical to (ii) through (iv) in Praśastapāda's; (i) is absent, and (d) is added.

As is true for all of the fragments, Av10 may not be a direct quotation, but an abbreviation or paraphrase of a more complicated passage. Because the Buddhists do not take this argument very seriously, we have very little to go on. As with Av8, it may well be that Aviddhakarṇa's actual argument here entails a specific relationship between all four reasons. The best I can offer at present is an assessment of the meaning and relevance of each of the four reasons, and a hypothesis about the reasoning of the argument as a whole.

Praśastapāda says a number of things about possession of a fixed shape, momentum, proximity/distance, and conjunction/disjunction over the course of PDhS. In his account, having a fixed shape is the basis for both momentum and proximity/distance, as they are only qualities of things with a fixed shape. Momentum, like conjunction and disjunction, is born of action,²⁷⁷ and requires some kind of impulse, often predicated on effort. Proximity and distance rely on cognition,²⁷⁸ which is to say, they are relative to an observer rather than absolute, and they can be both spatial and temporal. Conjunction is a generic relation of contact between two things that remain separate (unlike in a relation of inherence); disjunction, of course, is when two things in contact are separated.

The term *mithas*, which I have rendered "to each other," is ambiguous. Each of the four members of the locus has a fixed shape, each possesses momentum, and each has proximity and distance, so, at first glance, it would follow that each possesses the fourth reason unto itself. (In this case we may translate *mithas* as "mutual," ergo "mutual conjunction and disjunction," though the meaning of this would not be perfectly clear.) This would seem to imply that each can conjoin and disjoin from other members of the same class, earth to earth, etc. But mind does not work like that, so the term *mithas* must indicate a different grammatical relation with the locus than the other three reasons.

More likely, this refers to the role of the mind in sensory experience. The mind is an atomic substance with a fixed shape. Though it is very fast, it has to move between the different sense

²⁷⁷ saṃyogavibhāgavegāḥ karmajāḥ (PDhS 99.6).

²⁷⁸ paratvāparatvadvitvadvipṛthaktvādayo buddhyapekṣāḥ (PDhS 99.11). Something is nearer or farther relative to my observation of it, just as the duality in the two cups on my table is relative to my encounter with them. This is a tricky subject, and one that eventually led Navya Nyāya thinkers to posit a special kind of relation (cf. §9).

faculties, conjoining and disjoining from each in turn. As a result, we do not experience cognitions or perceptions perfectly simultaneously. This is why Aviddhakarṇa emphasizes that earth, water, wind/fire, and mind, “are situated at a remove.”

In this reading, the four reasons follow a kind of sequence: Insofar as the mind, etc., have a fixed shape, they possess momentum, and have proximity and distance; because of this, the mind can conjoin and disjoin from each of the other instruments in turn—and, by implication, can only conjoin from one after disjoining from another. Finally, because of all of this—together with the shape of our experience, such as our recollection of sourness upon seeing a lemon—they must all be connected with a single self, operating independently but joined together by the stable underlying agent of experience.

This proves the self’s pervasion of the body-mind complex, the existence of several distinct sense faculties, and the relation between the body, the senses, the mind, and the self, undergirding the all-important reasoning of NS 3.1.1—so long as one has bought into several aspects of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. Whether this interpretation matches Aviddhakarṇa’s intention, it underscores that any number of his fragments could have been intended as arguments within his community, rather than charges launched at his Buddhist rivals.

§4. BH4 AND BH5: BHĀVIVIKTA ON THE SELF

As we know, before Av9 and Av10, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla consider three of Uddyotakara's arguments for the existence of the self. The first is the analogy of the dancer's brow, Uddyotakara's fanciful take on NS 3.1.1: The self is a singular agent that unifies diverse sensory modes just as the furrowing of a dancer's brow, signifying the end of her performance, is a singular gesture that unifies the minds of the different members of the audience. They all recognize the gesture at the same moment and have the same thought, namely, that the show is over and it is time to offer praise and payment. The second argument, which is the one Bh4 qualifies, is Uddyotakara's terminological argument for the self. The word *ātman* is a single term with no synonyms: it must refer to something distinct from the referent of terms like "body," "sense faculty," etc. (Uddyotakara actually formulates the argument somewhat differently than Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do, as we will see in a moment. It is instructive in our attempt to understand the way the Buddhists employ their rivals' ideas and arguments.) Uddyotakara's third argument in the "Examination of the Self" is metaphysical: if a living body were devoid of self, it would also be devoid of vital breath (*prāṇa*). In other words, breath, and the regulation of breathing, cannot be explained in the absence of a stable, organizing agent.

It is the second of these, the terminological argument, that frames Bh4.

In his introduction to NS 3.1.1, Uddyotakara explicitly brings up the Buddhist analysis of the five aggregates (*skandha*), the five streams of psychophysical phenomena that we confuse (sometimes singly, sometimes in concert) for a singular, stable being.²⁷⁹ After citing Buddhist scripture, Uddyotakara asks his Buddhist interlocutor to explain the apprehension of an I (*aham-pratyaya*), that is, the fact that our experience of the world is accompanied by a sense of self. If this "I" does not correspond to any of the aggregates, nor to a distinct substance comprised of them, then the Buddhist account must not hold. Much of the discussion centers on the grammar of affirmation and denial and the logic of saying "there is no self" or referring abstractly to "selflessness." (Uddyotakara also argues here that the self is grasped by perception, which we will return to when we discuss Bh5 momentarily.) Eventually, after refuting a number of (potential) Buddhist denials of the self, he counters with this argument for its existence:

The word "self" has a referent that is distinct from the referents of the words expressing the aggregates (*skandha*), form (*rūpa*), etc., because, given that it is distinct from the words "form" and the like, it is a single term (*eka-pada*), like the word "pot." This explains the apprehension of an I (*aham-pratyaya*).²⁸⁰

²⁷⁹ Specifically: material form (*rūpa*), i.e., the body; feelings (*vedanā*), which can be pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral; conceptions (*saṃjñā*), or the cognitions by which we recognize and classify things; volitions (*saṃskāra*), habitual tendencies, desires, etc.; and consciousness (*viññāna*).

²⁸⁰ rūpādiskandhavācakaśabdaviśayavyatirikṭavīśaya ātmaśabdaḥ rūpādīśabdebhyo 'nyatve sati ekapadatvād, ghaṭaśabdavad iti. etenāhampratyayo vyākhyātaḥ (NV 325.7). Uddyotakara goes on to defend against two objections. First, that the example is unestablished. Second, that the word "darkness" undermines the argument. Against the first objection, Uddyotakara's response is simply to refer to the argument that "the quality-possessor is distinct from the quality." Specifically, he says, "What was said to this is, for example, 'the quality-possessor is distinct from the quality.'" As far as I can tell, he never uses quite that phrasing earlier or later in the *Vārttika*, though that is the precise phrase with which Kamalaśīla opens Bh8 (§8). The passage to which Bh8 refers does not appear until later in Uddyotakara's

Though the force of the argument would seem to hinge on the meaning of the reason, “because of being a single term,” the exact sense of *ekapada* is not perfectly clear to me. We will return to this shortly.

Kamalaśīla’s citation of the terminological argument evinces some editorial intervention,²⁸¹ but he is clearly responding to the words of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Before looking at Kamalaśīla’s prose, then, here is Śāntarakṣita’s versified paraphrase of this argument:

The expression “self” is expressive of something distinct from cognitions (*buddhi*), sense faculties (*indriya*), etc., or an aggregation (*saṅghāta*) [of them], since it is accepted to be a single term (*ekapada*), given that it is different from established synonyms. And what is ascertained in this manner is joined with the property as indicated, like the word “pot.”²⁸²

The phrase “cognitions, sense faculties, etc., or an aggregation” would more naturally be interpreted as a genitive *tatpuruṣa* compound in the sense “an aggregation of cognitions, sense faculties, etc.,” but I favor the former reading. This reading suggested by Kamalaśīla’s commentary as well as by the overall passage in the *Vārttika*. Uddyotakara’s argument is preceded by a lengthy interaction with a Buddhist interlocutor, who at one point argues that the Buddha’s denial that any of the aggregates is the self implies that the referent of the self is the aggregation (*samudāya*) of all of them. Śāntarakṣita’s reference to their aggregation (*saṅghāta*) thus incorporates this earlier discussion. In Śāntarakṣita’s verses, the entire clause about “what is ascertained in this manner” is essentially metrical filler, making explicit what is ordinarily left implicit: the fact that the locus possesses the reason (“is ascertained in this manner”) entails that it also possesses the property to be proven (“is joined with the property as indicated”).

Kamalaśīla rightly attributes this argument to Uddyotakara, but his prose formulation also corresponds more with Śāntarakṣita’s verses than Uddyotakara’s actual words:

The term “self” is an expression for something distinct from the body (*śarīra*), sense faculties (*indriya*), mind (*manas*), cognitions (*buddhi*), sensations (*vedanā*), or the aggregation (*saṅghāta*), because, given that it is distinct from well-known synonyms (*prasiddha-paryāya*), it is a single term, like words such as “pot.”²⁸³

Uddyotakara’s reference to the aggregates is replaced with a different fivefold list: body, sense faculties, mind, cognitions, and sensations. In addition, following Śāntarakṣita’s version, Uddyotakara’s qualifier, “distinction from the words *rūpa*, etc.,” is replaced with “distinction from well-known synonyms.” Later in the chapter, Śāntarakṣita will point out, first, that words like cognition (*buddhi*) and mind (*citta*) have synonyms, which would undermine the reason without the qualification; but then he also points out that the word “self” is actually synonymous with words like

comments on 3.1.1. Perhaps Uddyotakara is pointing forward to that discussion (though using the past passive participle, “said” [*ukta*]), or perhaps to a similar argument in his comments on NS 1.2.6, in which he states that substance is distinct from quality.

²⁸¹ Not as drastically as other instances we will consider; cf. §5.

²⁸² buddhīndriyādisaṅghātavyatiriktābhīdhāyakam | ātmeti vacanaṃ yasmād idam ekapadaṃ matam ||182||
siddhaparyāyabhinnatve yac caivaṃ pariniścitam | yathānirdiṣṭadharmeṇa tad yuktaṃ ghaṭaśabdavat ||183|| (TS 105, J9v.5).

²⁸³ ātmeti padaṃ śarīrendriyamanobuddhivedanāsaṅghātavyatiriktavacanam prasiddhaparyāyavyatiriktatve saty ekapadatvāt, ghaṭādiśabdavat (TSP 105.5, J45v.6).

“consciousness” (*cetas*), which undermines the qualification, too. This does not necessarily work when the qualification is distinction from the words for the five aggregates, though perhaps Śāntarakṣita would equate *cetas* with the fifth aggregate, *vijñāna*, as well. Still, Śāntarakṣita’s version sidesteps the discussion of the aggregates. Even if Kamalaśīla read the exact same text of the *Vārttika* printed in the modern edition, he had to adjust the argument accordingly.

When we consider the full context of this argument in the *Nyāya-vārttika*, Śāntarakṣita’s revision seems all the more manipulative. Uddyotakara engages in a lengthy exchange with an imaginary Buddhist interlocutor. He argues that the sentence “there is no self” (*nāsty ātmā*) simply cannot function as the outright denial the Buddhists claim, both because of the way that language functions and because it would contradict certain Buddhist doctrines and scriptural statements. Here is a lengthy excerpt:

One who denies the self should say what the referent of the term “self” is. In fact, we do not see a single term (*ekam padam*) that is without meaning (*nirarthaka*).²⁸⁴ If you were to explain that the word (*śabda*) “self” has as its referent the body, etc. (*śarīra-ādī*), even then, the contradiction remains (*anivṛtto vyāghātaḥ*). Why? The meaning of the statement “the self does not exist” would, in that case, be “the body, etc., do not exist.”

You may say, “That which you imagine (*√kṛp*) to be the self does not exist.” We do not imagine the self. Imagination (*kalpanā*) is the cognition of one thing as something it is not through the imposition of a property of that thing on the basis of a commonality (*sāmānya*) with something that is like that. And we do not explain the self in such a manner. Saying, “What you imagine to be the self,” you are liable to being asked: in what manner do we imagine the self, with existence (*sattvena*) or non-existence (*asattvena*)? If with existence, then what is the commonality a non-existent has with an existent on account of which the self would be the object of imagination (*kalpanā-viśaya*)? And by saying no-self has some commonality with the self (*ātmasāmānyam cānātmano*), you admit the self. In fact, there is no commonality between a non-existent and an existent. You might say, “You err because you imagine that the conception of the self (*abamkāra*), whose referent is actually the body, etc., refers to the self.” In this case, too, the contradiction remains, because you admit the existence of a referent of the conception of the self distinct from the body, etc.

You may think, “It is not necessary for a single term (*eka-pada*) to have a meaning, e.g., void (*śūnya*), or darkness (*tamas*).” This is not right, because the contradiction remains. First, this is the meaning of the word void: a substance for which there is no protection (*rakṣitā*) is called void (*śūnya*) because it is fit for dogs (*śvabhyo hitatvāt*).²⁸⁵ The referent of the word *darkness* is a substance, quality, or action that has come to be characterized by non-apprehension. Where light is absent, substance, etc., is denoted by the word *darkness*. And if you say that the word *darkness* is meaningless, you contradict your own doctrine, because darkness is the material cause of the four [elements] (*catūrṇām*

²⁸⁴ For Uddyotakara, the meaning (*artha*) of a word and the thing (*artha*) to which it refers are one and the same. To be is to be speakable. One can just as well render words like *nirarthaka* as “without an object” or even “without a referent,” rather than “meaningless,” throughout this passage. Though Uddyotakara would understand the distinction, he would not accept that it really makes a difference. Indeed, that is part of his point.

²⁸⁵ This is a pun or an interpretive etymology (*nirukti*) that hinges on the close phonological similarity between the word for a dog (*śvan*) and the first syllable (*śūn-*) of the word empty (*śūnya*). The gerundive suffix *-ya* can lend the sense of being ready for or fit for something. (This suffix is generally attached to verbal roots, but Uddyotakara is playing with the phonology of *śūn+ya*.)

upādānarūpatvāt tamasah).²⁸⁶ Therefore, there is not a single word (*ekaṃ padam*) that is meaningless.²⁸⁷

There is a lot of material here, and the passage continues for some time. Most urgently, this passage makes it clear that the full force of Uddyotakara's terminological argument relies on the dialogical context of the overall passage.

As for the term *ekapada*. John Taber, in a delightful essay on Śabara and Kumāriḷa's interjection into the Buddhist-Nyāya debate on the self, characterizes Uddyotakara's terminological argument as saying that "the word 'I,' insofar as it is a unique word different from the words 'body,' 'idea,' and so forth, requires a unique occasion for its use."²⁸⁸ But it is not the uniqueness of the term *ātman* that concerns Uddyotakara here, only its distinctness from any of the terms that a Buddhist, a proponent of *an-ātman*, "no-self," could claim as the referent of the term. Note the refrain in the passage above: the contradiction remains (*anivṛtto vyāghātaḥ*). Uddyotakara is not arguing abstractly that the term "self" proves the existence of the self—though he does believe that to be the case—but rather that Buddhists cannot satisfyingly account for the term without contradicting themselves. Isabelle Ratié, after citing Taber's description, translates the terminological argument and renders *ekapada*, "a term [designating] a single [entity]."²⁸⁹ This puts a nice spin on Taber's interpretation, and suggests a clear analysis of the actual term *ekapada*.²⁹⁰ Yet it remains somewhat ambiguous. What determines whether a term designates a single entity? Would a compound like *śaśa-viśāṇa* (hare's-horn) qualify? What about an adjective? There are several instances in the *Vārttika* where Uddyotakara refers to a

²⁸⁶ I am not sure what specific text or teaching or statement Uddyotakara has in mind here.

²⁸⁷ ātmapratiśedhaṃ ca kurvāṇenātmaśabdasya viśayo vaktavyaḥ. na hy ekaṃ padaṃ nirarthakaṃ paśyāmaḥ. athāpi śarīrādiviśayam ātmaśabdaṃ pratipadyethāḥ, evam apy anivṛtto vyāghātaḥ. katham iti. nāsty ātmety asya vākyasya tadānīm ayam artho bhavati śarīrādayo na santīti.

atha yaṃ bhavanta ātmānaṃ kalpayanti sa nāstīti. na vyaṃ ātmānaṃ kalpayāmaḥ. kalpanā hi nāmātathābhūtasya tathābhāvibhiḥ sāmānyāt taddharmādhyāropeṇa tatpratyaḥ. na cātmanam evambhūtaṃ pratipadyāmahe. yaṃ bhavanta ātmānaṃ kalpayantīti bruvāṇo bhavān praṣṭavyo jāyate, kathaṃ vyaṃ ātmānaṃ kalpayāma iti, kiṃ sattvenāthāsattvena vā. yadi sattvena, kim asataḥ satā sādharmaṃ yena kalpanāviśaya ātmā, ātmasāmānyam cānātmano bruvatā ātmā abhyupagato bhavati. na hy asataḥ satā sāmānyam asti. atha śarīrādiviśayam ahaṃkāram ātmani kalpayitvā viparyeti. evaṃ ca śarīrādivyatiriktāhaṃkāraḥ viśayasattvābhyupagamād anivṛtto vyāghātaḥ.

atha manyase ekapadasya nāvaśyam arthena bhavitavyam iti yathā śūnyaṃ tama iti ca. tan na, vyāghātānivr̥tteḥ. śūnyaśabdasya tāvad ayam arthaḥ, yasya rakṣitā dravyasya na vidyate, tad dravyaṃ śvabhya hitatvāt śūnyam ity ucyate. tamaśabdasyānupalabdihlakṣaṇapṛāptāni dravyaguṇakarmāṇi viśayaḥ. yatra yatrāsannidhis tejasaḥ, tatra tatra dravyādi tamaśabdenābhidhīyate. tamaśabdaś cānarthaka iti bruvāṇaḥ svasiddhāntaṃ bādhaḥ, catūrṇam upādānarūpatvāt tamasa iti. tasmāt nānarthakam ekaṃ padam iti (NV 320.16).

Bronkhorst has an interesting analysis of this passage in *Language and Reality*. Skimming over the finer points of the passage, he concludes as follows: "Regardless of the exact arguments Uddyotakara uses to defend his position, what matters is his insistence on the fact that every word, including the word 'soul' in the sentence 'the soul does not exist,' must refer to an object. We thus have an instance of a sentence which, though correctly formed, is considered meaningless, and that by reason of adherence to the correspondence principle" (Bronkhorst 2011, 120).

Matthew Kapstein translates much of Uddyotakara's introduction to NS 3.1.1, including this passage, in an appendix to *Reason's Traces*.

²⁸⁸ Taber 1990, 38.

²⁸⁹ "...un terme [désignant] une seule [entité]" (Ratié 2014, 69 n 188).

²⁹⁰ Unlike, e.g., Bronkhorst's (1984) striking take on Yāska's use of the term: "unanalyzed word." This may be right, but it raises the question: How, exactly, does *eka* give the sense *unanalyzed*? Or, in other words, why would Yāska use *ekapada* when what he means is "unanalyzed word?"

compound or a derivative as *ekapada*,²⁹¹ and in the present context he even refers to the indeclinable *nāsti*, “is not,” as a *pada*.²⁹² The term *ekapada* has a broad range of possible valences, and even though Uddyotakara uses it seldom, it has a broad range of applications in the *Vārttika*.

I am not sure whether Uddyotakara has in mind some precise or technical definition of *ekapada*²⁹³ in the present case, or whether he uses the term consistently throughout the *Vārttika*. What becomes clear over the course of the passage in question is that the potential scope of meaninglessness is what is at stake here. Significantly, Uddyotakara imagines his interlocutor invoking the standard examples of non-existent things, hare’s horns and sky-flowers. Uddyotakara cannot disagree that “a hare’s horn does not exist.” Why is this any different than saying, “The self does not exist?” “The referent of the word *hare’s-horn*,” he says, “is the connection (*sambandha*), therefore it is the denial of the connection, rather than a denial of the horn.”²⁹⁴ The implication may well be that *śāśa-viṣāṇa* (hare’s-horn) is not *ekapada* because it designates not a single entity but a connection between two and thus does not have the same property that renders the term *ātman* intrinsically meaningful (*arthaka*). Yet even if we say that *śāśa-viṣāṇa* is an *ekapada* as a single compound, the nature of the denial is different from the Buddhists’ absolute denial of the self. Uddyotakara continues:

And someone making the statement, “A hare’s-horn (*śāśa-viṣāṇa*) does not exist,” should be asked: Is this a generic denial, or a specific one?

If it is a generic denial, then it is not tenable, as it is impossible. What follows from the statement, “For a hare (*śāśasya*), a horn (*viṣāṇa*) does not exist,” is, “Even the horns of cows, etc., do not exist for a hare.” But this is impossible, for it is not the case that they do not exist. [That is to say, there are various valences of the genitive case, and the blanket denial “for a hare, a horn does not exist,” would entail the denial of all horns.]

If it is a specific denial, what is the horn of the hare that is denied? It is just the causal relation that is denied: “Of which a hare is not the effect,” or, “which is not the cause of a hare.” But the causal relation, which has been observed in other cases, is denied in this case, so this cannot be the example in an explanation of absolute non-existence.

This is [also] meant to explain the non-existence of sky-flowers, etc.²⁹⁵

The term *śāśa-viṣāṇa* (hare’s-horn) cannot be the subject of a blanket negation. Devadatta may not

²⁹¹ Cf. his analysis of the thirty-one possible readings of NS 1.1.4, which depend on whether one interprets its definition of perception as comprising of just one of the terms (*ekapada*) in the sutra or some combination of all five of them.

²⁹² More precisely, he refers to the two terms (*pade*) of the statement, “the self is not” (*nāsty ātmā*).

²⁹³ E.g., consider the two instances of *ekapada* in Yāska’s *Nirukta*, which present some interpretive challenges—especially when coupled with the two instances of *aikapadika*. Does Yāska use the term the same way both times? If so, it seems telling that he juxtaposes *ekapada* with *samāsas* and *taddhitas*, but is an *ekapada* only a simple noun, or something more restricted, such as a term, as Bronkhorst (1984) puts it, that is “unanalyzed”?

²⁹⁴ śāśaviṣāṇaśabdasya sambandhaviṣayavāt sambandhapraṭiśedho na viṣāṇapraṭiśedhaḥ. (NV 322.20)

²⁹⁵ idaṃ ca śāśaviṣāṇaṃ nāstīti bruvāṇaḥ praṣṭavyaḥ kim ayaṃ sāmānyapraṭiśedho ‘tha viśeṣapraṭiśedha itī.

yadi sāmānyapraṭiśedhaḥ, tan na yuktam aśakyavāt. śāśasya viṣāṇaṃ nāstīti gavādiviṣāṇāny api śāśasya na santīti prāptam. etac cāśakyam. na hi tāni na santīti.

atha viśeṣapraṭiśedhaḥ, kiṃcid viṣāṇaṃ śāśasya praṭiśidhyate, yasya śāśo na kāryam, yac ca śāśasya na kāraṇam itī. so ‘yaṃ kāryakāraṇasambandha eva praṭiśidhyate. kāryakāraṇasambandhas tv anyatra dr̥ṣṭa iha praṭiśidhyata itī nātyantāsattvapratipādane dr̥ṣṭānto bhavati.

etena khapuṣpādyasattvaṃ vyākhyātaṃ veditavyam (NV 323.4).

be the cause, or the effect, of his pot, but that does not mean that “Devadatta’s pot” does not exist. Odd though it seems, it is not all that hard to imagine senses in which a real horn, such as a cow’s horn, may be said to be “a hare’s.” Commonly speaking, by “hare’s horn” people mean a horn growing naturally on the head of a hare, and this, surely, does not exist—but this is a specific denial, and it hinges on the fact that the kind of connection being denied in this case can be observed in other cases. A term unto itself (*eka-pada*) may be incorrectly applied in a specific case, but it—or at least its components²⁹⁶—exists in the first place because it refers to something (*artha*). A statement—“the self does not exist”—may be meaningless, but a term unto itself cannot. “A hare’s horn does not exist” is meaningful only insofar as there is an actual referent being denied, namely, a specific connection between hares and horns, each of which really exists. “The self is not the body” is a sensible statement. But, according to Uddyotakara, the Buddhists have to explain where the word “self” comes from and what it refers to, and they have to do so without contradicting their own doctrines.

Śāntarakṣita does not quite take up this challenge.

This raises a number of questions. Why did Śāntarakṣita change the argument? There is a chance that he had in mind a different argument from a different text, or that he misremembered Uddyotakara’s words, or even that he had a different or defective text. In other words, it may have been an innocent mistake—but most likely not. Uddyotakara’s argument is not an *a priori* argument for the existence of the self, but a sharp criticism of the Buddhist view. Buddhists claim there is nothing but the aggregates, but how, then, do they account for the sense of self? If the word “self” does not refer to any of the aggregates, then what does it refer to? What is the self such that the Buddha denies that the word refers to *rūpa*, etc.? Taking the Buddhist terminology seriously, Uddyotakara finds no way to account for our actual experience, nor for the way we describe it. In Śāntarakṣita’s revision, on the other hand, Uddyotakara is simply making an argument for the self. The upside is that the revision can be attacked purely on its own terms. And yet—does this mean that Śāntarakṣita is quixotically parrying windmills?

To conclude the discussion of the terminological argument, Kamalaśīla considers Bh4, a modest interjection by Bhāvivikta (not unlike Bh1, cf. Appendix A):

athāviśeṣāspadapadārthāntarbhūtajñeyaviṣayatve satīty aparaṃ viśeṣaṇam upādīyate yathoktaṃ bhāviviktena. (206)²⁹⁷

One may wish to use another qualification, “[because it is a single term] under the condition that its referent is a knowable thing (*jñeya*) included in the categories that are the seat (*āspada*) of the indeterminate (*aviśeṣa*),” *as Bhāvivikta stated.*

This qualification is reminiscent of three of the arguments from §2, the two unattributed arguments for Īśvara that we labelled X1 and X2, as well as Av8, Aviddhakarṇa’s first proof of self. X1 uses the obscure concept of “that which is the seat (*āspada*) of that whose arising is variegated (*vicitra-udaya*) and of movement (*praspanda*)” to refer obliquely to the categories of substance, quality, and action.

²⁹⁶ Again, *ekapada* can refer, in a technical sense, to an unmodified noun, but Uddyotakara uses it to refer to derivatives and compounds on occasion, so the most general sense of the term must be something like “a term unto itself,” or “a single term” out of a grouping of more than one.

²⁹⁷ TSP 113.14, J48v.2.

X2 and Av8 both referred to the indeterminate (*aviśeṣa*) to similarly convey a grouping of the categories. As we saw in §2, VS 1.1.8 describes the six characteristics falling under the label “the indeterminate” as pertaining to substance, quality, and action. The qualification in Bh4 can, therefore, be rephrased, “[because the word *self* is a single term] under the condition that its referent is a knowable object within the categories substance, quality, or action.”

It is difficult to see why Kamalaśīla would include this reference apart from a sense of thoroughness. Rather than relying on the uniqueness of the term *ātman*, Bhāvivikta perhaps means to emphasize that its referent must be a real thing. Śāntarakṣita claims that the terminological argument could be made just as easily for nonexistent things like sky flowers.²⁹⁸ The real problem, then, is the underlying metaphysics of language. (Of course, this would only apply to the discrete formulation of the argument itself, not to the entire passage, considering Uddyotakara’s remarks about hare’s horns.) Bhāvivikta’s qualification would perhaps sidestep this problem; perhaps Bh4 is a subtle clue that Bhāvivikta followed Uddyotakara. But in any case, the fragment gives us little to go on, and Kamalaśīla adds nothing. All he says in response is that this qualification is unestablished like (pseudo-)Uddyotakara’s, rendering the reason itself unestablished, and that the reason is still inconclusive because of the absence of pervasion.²⁹⁹

§ § §

After refuting the inferential arguments for the existence, impermanence, and omnipresence of the self (cf. §2–3), Śāntarakṣita considers an additional possibility:

Some imagine that the self is established by perception, because self-consciousness (*ahaṃkāra*) is known reflexively (*svasaṃvedya*); they think the self is its object.³⁰⁰

Glossing this, Kamalaśīla cites Bh5, in which he collapses Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta’s arguments into one:

uddiyotakarabhāviviktāder matam āśaṅkate. te hy evam ābuh pratyakṣata evātmā siddhaḥ. tathā hi liṅgaliṅgisambandhasmrṭyanapekṣam aham iti jñānaṃ rūpādijñānavat pratyakṣam. asya ca na rūpādir viṣayaḥ tadvijñānabhinnapratiḥāsāt. tasmād anya eva viṣaya iti. (212)³⁰¹

He considers the view of Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al. They argue as follows: The self is actually established through perception. To explain: Without requiring a recollection of the connection (*sambandha*) between mark (*liṅga*) and marked (*liṅgin*), the cognition “I” is a perception, like the cognition of color, etc (*rūpa-ādi*). But its object is not color, etc., because it has a different appearance than that. Therefore, its object is something else.

Just as color is the object of visual perception, the self is the object of I-cognition. The proof is in the primacy and immediacy of our sense of self—it does not require the cognitive process of inferential reasoning, but attends to the perceptual, prelinguistic cognition itself.

²⁹⁸ nabhastalāravindādau yad ekaṃ viniveśyate | kārakādipadaṃ tena vyabhicāro ‘pi dṛśyate ||205|| (TS 113, J10v.5).

²⁹⁹ evam api yathoktaviśeṣaṇāsiddher asiddho hetur vyāptyabhāvāc cānaikāntikaḥ (TSP 113.15, J48v.2).

³⁰⁰ anyaiḥ pratyakṣasiddhatvam ātmanaḥ parikalpitam | svasaṃvedyo hy ahaṃkāras tasyātmā viṣayo mataḥ ||212|| (TS 115, J11r.3).

³⁰¹ TS 115.11, J49r.3.

Uddyotakara makes essentially this argument amidst his comments on NS 3.1.1. Immediately after his remarks on the denial of hare's horns and sky flowers, he responds to the idea that the self is not apprehended:

First, the self is apprehended perceptually. In what manner perceptually? Without requiring a recollection of the connection between mark and marked, conforming to the distinct character (*svabhāva*) of its object, the cognition “I” is a perception, like the cognition of color, etc (*rūpa-ādi*).³⁰²

This is quite clearly one of the passages Kamalaśīla has in mind in attributing Bh5 to “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al.” Bhāvivikta, presumably, made a very similar argument.

There is an important ambiguity in the example in Bh5 and the one Uddyotakara uses: the cognition of *rūpa*. The term *rūpa* typically refers, in the fragments we have seen and in much of Nyāya and Buddhist epistemological writing, to the object corresponding to visual cognition—paradigmatically, color. (A Naiyāyika or a Sarvāstivāda Buddhist may also accept that we see things like shape (cf. Bh8/Av1, §8), but color is common ground, as well as the most common example, of *rūpa* qua object of visual perception.) It would make good sense for *rūpa* to refer to color in the present case, since the argument is that the sense of self is a perception but with a different object than the five external senses.

But in the Buddha's deconstruction of our sense of self, *rūpa* represents the first aggregate (*skandha*), material form, i.e., (what we take to be) the body. Uddyotakara's use of the term *rūpa* in his argument contains this ambiguity. According to him, Buddhists cannot argue that *rūpa*, etc., forms the basis of the *perception* of self, because the Buddha himself says, “I am not this *rūpa*, O monk, nor are you this *rūpa*.”³⁰³ The fact that the sense of self is *like* the cognition of *rūpa* (color), etc., but cannot—even according to the Buddha himself—have *rūpa* (body, form), etc., as its object, means there must be some distinct thing as its basis: the self.

After pointing this out, Uddyotakara then imagines his opponent raising a counterexample that contains the two valences of *rūpa*: the thought, “I am pale.” The opponent's idea is that when we refer to ourselves as, e.g., pale- or dark-skinned, we are identifying ourselves with our *rūpa* (body); therefore, *rūpa* does, in fact, form the basis of our sense of self, even if only illusorily. But, Uddyotakara replies, when we say “I am pale,” we are not conflating ourselves with our *rūpas*, but simply metonymically eliding the possessive phrase “my body” and replacing it with the first-person pronoun. “I am pale” means “my body is pale,” and this is a perfectly natural figurative use of language, so the example does nothing against the argument that our sense of self is perceptual.

To be clear, Uddyotakara is not conflating the two valences of *rūpa* nor engaging in sophistry. His argument is that the perception of self is *analogous* to the perception of *rūpa*-as-color; *rūpa*-as-body is relevant to him only because he wants to emphasize his agreement with the Buddha that the body is not the self. Nevertheless, I find it striking that he uses the term *rūpa* in both the sense of the object of visual cognition and in the sense of the first aggregate in such close proximity.

³⁰² pratyakṣeṇa tāvad ātmā upalabhyate. katham pratyakṣeṇa? liṅgaliṅgisambandhasmrṭyanapekṣam viṣayasvabhāvabhedānuvidhāy aham iti vijñānaṃ rūpādivijñānavat pratyakṣam (NV 323.14).

³⁰³ pratiṣiddho 'haṃkāro rūpādiṣu—rūpaṃ nāham, evam tad bhikṣo rūpaṃ na tvam asi. tasmād rūpādaya eva tāvad ahaṅkārasya viṣayā na bhavanti (NV 323.21).

Also strikingly, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla carefully delineate the two valences of *rūpa* in their engagement with Uddyotakara’s argument. First, they explain that if the cognition of the self were a perception of the self, it would appear in the image (*ākāra*) of the self. To explain, Kamalaśīla refers to *rūpa* only implicitly: “Visual cognition does not have sound as its object.”³⁰⁴ The restrictions and divisions among the senses are clear and distinct, and if the self were the object of a special sense, its appearance, and its distinctness from other perceptible objects, should be just as clear. But the cognitive image of the self does not conform to the Naiyāyika notion of a permanent, all-pervading sentient agent. This, however, leads into Uddyotakara’s train of thought, and notions like “I am pale.” Here, too, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla avoid the ambiguous term *rūpa*. Śāntarakṣita refers instead to a pale complexion (*gaura-varṇa*), and Kamalaśīla refers directly to the body (*deha*), arguing that “self-consciousness, which arises through the sensation (*saṃsparśa*) of states of the body, etc. (*deha-ādī*), has nothing but the body, etc., as its objective support (*ālambana*).”³⁰⁵ According to Uddyotakara, when we say, “I am pale,” we do not mean it literally. The self has no shade. Instead, we are figuratively highlighting the relationship between the self and the body. But, according to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, figurative expressions function in part on the basis of a subtle kind of cognitive dissonance. The rhetorical and figurative force, e.g., of an expression like “the boy is a lion” hinges on the obviousness of the fact that the boy is not actually a lion. The thought, they say, “wavers” (*skhaladgata*). No such wavering occurs when someone says, “I am pale.” We think it, say it, and understand it directly and distinctly. In other words, when we say, “I am pale,” we mean it. It is not a figurative expression, just a plain old cognitive illusion like our entire conceptually-imposed apprehension of reality.

We can summarize the discussion as follow:

Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al: The sense of self is like the five external senses, but with a distinct object.

The Buddhists: If so, it would correspond to its object the way visual cognition corresponds to color. In fact, the sense of self relies on our sensations of states of the body and the other aggregates.

Uddyotakara: We only figuratively conflate the body with the self; we are actually elliptically referring to “my body.”

The Buddhists: If that were so, the cognition, “I am pale” should waver the same way a figurative expression like “the boy is a lion” wavers, but instead it is clear and distinct.

Finally, the Buddhists conclude, if the self were the object of perception, the entire dispute would be impossible, as we would clearly and distinctly perceive it. Or, put differently, the fact that there is a dispute means that it cannot be an instance of perception. There is no dispute, for example, about whether we perceive color.

We cannot say to what extent Bhāvivikta’s distinctive thinking lurks behind Bh5. Vātsyāyana remarks, at the beginning of his comments on NS 1.1.10, that the self is not perceptible.³⁰⁶ Some

³⁰⁴ cakṣurjñānaṃ na śabdaviṣayam (TSP 115.16, J49r.4).

³⁰⁵ tasmād dehādyavasthāsaṃsparśenotpadyamāno ‘haṃkāro dehādyālambana eveti jñāyate (TSP 116.3, J49r.5)

³⁰⁶ “Concerning these, the self, first, is not grasped through perception” (*tatrātmā tāvat pratyakṣato na grhyate* (NBh 16.2)).

commentators apparently interpreted this as a definitive statement, and did not accept that the self is an object of perception.³⁰⁷ With Bh5, Kamalaśīla implies that many of those who did made similar arguments.

§ § §

In both of these cases, we can see some of the ways that Śāntarakṣita's project shapes his, and, by consequence, Kamalaśīla's, employment and engagement of Naiyāyika authors and arguments. Śāntarakṣita rationally reconstructs a generic Naiyāyika position, stitching his versified variations of specific passages into a coherent dialogic sequence. But this entails more than just reformulating arguments to fit into the confines of a *śloka* verse. At the very least, he has to isolate discrete sentences from their original context—even if Kamalaśīla cites it word-for-word, its full force may be lost in translation. Depending on the argument, he may have to manipulate it more dramatically to make it resemble a discrete formal argument to be picked apart on formal and logical grounds.

³⁰⁷ Udayana, for example, suggests that the perception of the self is coreferential with perceptions of the body, so that the distinction between the self and the body has to be established (*tatra svasamvedanaṃ mūlam, ihāpi mānasam iti na kaścid viśeṣaḥ. tat katham ātmani pratyakṣapratishedhakaṃ bhāṣyam ity ata āhāham iti. yady api savastuko 'yaṃ tathāpi śarīrapratyayasāmānādhikaraṇyāt tadvastuka evāyam ity api syāt. ato na tadatirikte vastuni pramāṇayitum śakyate tāvad yāvad dehādibhyo bhinna ātmā pramāṇāntareṇa na sādhyata ityarthah*, etc. [NVTTP 233.2]).

STHIRABHĀVA

In the remaining five sections of the “Examination of the Self,” Śāntarakṣita responds first to the Mīmāṃsā (or more precisely, Kumārila Bhāṭṭa’s) theory of the self, then, more briefly, the Sāṃkhya and the Digambara Jain theories, and, finally and very briefly, the views of the inchoate Advaita Vedānta, and the Buddhist Vātsīputrīyas (i.e., the so-called *pudgala-vādins*, “proponents of a person”). The particulars differ in each of the six approaches to the self considered in the “Examination of the Self,” and Śāntarakṣita’s mode of engagement differs depending in part, I think, on how urgently he regards each view. (It is very different, for example, to read through the very tidy and tightly organized *pūrvapakṣa* of the section on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments for the self, and the more sprawling engagement with Kumārila, whose own *śloka* verses often take temporary possession of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*.³⁰⁸)

On several occasions, the non-Buddhists claim that Buddhists cannot account for karmic retribution without recourse to a stable self, charging them with *kṛta-nāśa-akṛta-abhyāgama-doṣa*, “the defect that what one has done disappears, and what one has not done befalls one.” If a permanent self transmigrates to a new body after death, then the results of one’s actions in this life can visit one in the next; if there is no such stable underlying agent, then we reap the rewards of others’ good deeds and suffer the consequences of others’ sins. Śāntarakṣita, without substantiating his point just yet, returns again and again to the same basic response: a permanent thing cannot be a cause, and all existing things are momentary. For example, he regards the Advaita view favorably, but with a caveat: “Their view has a slight transgression (*alpa-aparādha*),” he says in verse 330, “because they insist on permanence (*nityatā-uktitaḥ*).” It is no surprise, therefore, that when he has finally made his way through each of these theories of the self, he turns to this fundamental issue in chapter eight, the “Examination of Permanence (*sthirabhāva*).”

In the “Examination of Permanence,” Śāntarakṣita proves the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), or the idea that entities cease to exist the moment they have originated (*kṣaṇa-*

³⁰⁸ In addition, the dialogic character of the overall “Examination of the Self” is worth noting. Just as the Sāṃkhya view in chapter one anticipates the Nyāya view in chapter two, so the Mīmāṃsā theory of the self is set up to anticipate the contrasting Sāṃkhya theory that follows it, and so on.

bhaṅga).³⁰⁹ Katsumi Mimaki traces the analysis and defense of momentariness in Indian Buddhist philosophical works from Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, through Śāntarakṣita, and ultimately to and beyond Ratnakīrti, whose *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa* he translates and examines.³¹⁰ Mimaki, following Steinkellner, highlights the importance of Dharmakīrti’s so-called *sattvānumāna*, i.e., the argument that non-momentary entities cannot function as causes and, therefore, that mere existence proves an entity’s momentariness. Śāntarakṣita follows Dharmakīrti closely in the “Examination of Permanence,” as Mimaki himself notes.³¹¹

Unlike most of the chapters of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, here Śāntarakṣita starts not with a *prima facie* view to be corrected but with a few arguments for his own position. He then proceeds through a series of definitions, arguments, objections, and responses. This includes a discussion of the nature of destruction; definitions of key terms like “causal efficacy” (*arthakriyā*) and “moment” (*kṣaṇa*); reflections on the relationship between these two; and responses to objections. Aviddhakarṇa’s is the first voice Śāntarakṣita raises in objection to momentariness (Av11).

At the end of the chapter, Śāntarakṣita entertains further objections by Bhāvivikta and Uddyotakara. They argue that we could not experience the world as we do—namely, as comprised of stable objects that we interact with over time—if everything were perfectly distinct each and every moment. Bhāvivikta’s two fragments here, Bh6 and Bh7, give the strongest stylistic evidence for equating him with Aviddhakarṇa. Bh6 and Bh7 share some of the distinctively dense style and phrasing of several of Aviddhakarṇa’s fragments. But it is especially important to keep the absence of context in mind with these particular fragments. They are, to say the least, difficult to understand (*durbodha*). I can only ask the reader to bear with me as we trudge through some awfully dense material. We can only imagine how much clearer this might have been, or might someday be, with access to the full passages from which these fragments were lifted. Kamalaśīla does not always seem to have much firmer of a grasp on these fragments than I do. This is a little disconcerting. But even so, at least he gave us something to puzzle over—better to collect uncertainties than nothing at all! Or at least more fun.

§ § §

What happens when something ceases to be? According to Śāntarakṣita, and Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti before him, any conditioned entity ceases to be immediately upon arising and is in that sense “momentary.”³¹² We have already seen traces of this idea. Śāntarakṣita argues that a permanent cause, like Īśvara, could not give rise to effects over time—on this basis, we can infer from an entity’s

³⁰⁹ For a detailed examination of the doctrine of momentariness, see von Rospatt 1995.

³¹⁰ Mimaki 1976. Mimaki’s analysis of the *sattvānumāna* follows Steinkellner 1968/1969. See also von Rospatt 1995 and von Rospatt 1998 for the importance of the *sattvānumāna* to the Buddhist defense of momentariness.

³¹¹ See, e.g., Mimaki 1976, 62–64, which leads to the remark, “Le premier ouvrage qui a traité consciemment cette discussion en tant que problème logique, c-à-d. pour établir l’inclusion (*vyāpti*) du *sattvānumāna*, est le *Pramāṇaviniścaya* de Dharmakīrti. [...] Désormais cette discussion se déroule [...] comme nous l’avons vu ci-dessus, dans le *Tattvasaṃgraha* de Śāntarakṣita, le *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* de Kamalaśīla [...]” (The first work to knowingly treat this discussion as a logical problem, i.e., to establish pervasion (*vyāpti*) in the *sattvānumāna*, is Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. [...] Subsequently, the discussion unfolds [...], as we saw above, in Śāntarakṣita’s *Tattvasaṃgraha* [and] Kamalaśīla’s *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*)” (64).

³¹² Cf. Mimaki 1976. See von Rospatt 1995, 94–110, for different definitions of the pivotal terms *kṣaṇa* (moment) and *kṣaṇika* (momentary).

mere existence that it must be momentary, i.e., that it perishes immediately upon arising, and, in so doing, gives rise to the next momentary flash in an incessant stream. There appears to be stability because of the speed of the unceasing process, and because each momentary existent gives rise to another moment just like it. Nevertheless, causal relationships do not unfold in a vacuum, hence the appearance of stability is also marked by the appearance of change. Take the common example of a seed and a sprout. A single seed is really a seed-complex, a heap of atoms that bear upon one another in such a manner that we can usefully conceive of them altogether as a single thing. But over time, what we think of as “the seed” is actually a fluctuation of momentary “seeds,” each of which happens to be nearly identical to the preceding momentary “seed” that gave rise to it. At a certain point, changes in the causal complex surrounding and informing the fluctuation of seed-moments leads to “the seed” becoming the sort of seed that sprouts. Because the whole process occurs with such apparent consistency, we think the sprouting seed is *the same* as the seed we planted. In reality, the seed has never been the same seed. Moment to moment “it” is an entirely new heap caused by the heap that originated and vanished in the preceding moment. The way that Śāntarakṣita defends this account at the beginning of the “Examination of Permanence” is largely to deny that destruction (*vināśa*), i.e., something’s ceasing to be, has a cause. Rather, immediate destruction just is what it is to be momentary, which just is what it is to be. Hence, in Śāntarakṣita’s phrasing, an entity is “independent” with respect to its own destruction. It requires no outside assistance to cease to be. Its perishing is intrinsic to its existing.

CHAPTER EIGHT EXAMINATION OF PERMANENCE

Introduction

Perhaps we are making this effort [in the preceding seven chapters] toward unworthy subjects, since primordial matter and so on are refuted by a proof of momentariness (*kṣaṇa-bhaṅga*). Hence, we will establish momentariness clearly in order to refute what we have already mentioned as well as what we will discuss later, universals, etc., without distinction. (350–351)

There are some who claim that there is a dichotomy between entities that are produced and those that are unproduced; others believe there is one between those that are momentary and those that are non-momentary. (352)

Among these, the entities that are [considered to be] produced (*kṛtaka*) are momentary (*kṣaṇa-bhaṅgin*) because, being independent [of any other causes]³¹³ with respect to [their own] destruction, they are fixed with respect to it. If *x* is independent of any other cause with respect to the existence of *y*, *x* is understood to be invariable (*niyata*) with respect to *y*, because it arises in such a manner from its own causes.³¹⁴ For example, a causal complex free from obstruction is invariable with respect to the arising of its effects. And all produced things are independent with respect to destruction.³¹⁵ If, though independent, it could arise at another time or place, it would depend on that [time or place], and, as a result, it would not be independent. And in every case, all produced things are independent with regard to [their own] destruction, because [purported] causes of destruction would do absolutely nothing to them. (353–357)

To explain: The destroying cause could not bring about a destruction that is indistinct from the entity, because the entity is produced from its own cause. An entity's essence (*ātman*) arises from its cause fully intact, so a destruction that is identical with the entity could not be delivered by any other causes. (358–359)

On the other hand, if there were something called “destruction” that were produced apart from the entity, there would be nothing for its cause to bring about in the entity itself. Therefore, such effects as the perception [of the thing] would follow as before. And, because it would have a fixed condition, it also could not [be said to] be concealed, etc., [on account of which its functioning would be delayed]. (360–361)

One might say, “An entity is destroyed by a thing called destruction.” This is not so, because the [problematic] alternatives [that were just mentioned], difference, etc., would still remain. (362)

If one were to say that the “destruction” that is brought about is another name for disappearance and consists in the absence (*abhāva*) of existence, then it is still not tenable for that to be produced. Or, if non-existence (*abhāva*), whose form is incessantly devoid of origination, were an effect, it would have to be an entity, like a sprout, because it would be produced by the power of its

³¹³ Śāntarakṣita does not add this phrase here but does in the formula that follows.

³¹⁴ Moments like these speak to the text's didactic potential.

³¹⁵ I struggle to see how this does not beg the question. Something that is produced is, in virtue of being produced, independent of any other cause with respect to its own perishing, therefore it must be momentary. But being momentary itself means arising with a form that intrinsically decays and disappears after the moment it arises. That said, the proceeding analysis does go beyond this seeming tautology.

cause. Non-existence brought about in this affirmative sense, on the basis of implicative negation,³¹⁶ would, again, be liable to the same alternatives, difference, etc. If one were to say that the negation of an action does not produce an entity, then it would be established that the agent [of destruction] is not a cause, as it would be deficient in the nature of a cause. (363–366)

Nyāya objection

(i) *Objection:* Destruction is certainly not present when the entity exists, nor prior, nor much later, but only immediately after the entity. Thus, it is tenable that it has a cause because, given that you have denied that something independent can be incidental, it is temporally restricted. And, because it exists immediately after the entity, it is also tenable that it has a cause because it exists after not having existed, just as you accept that there is another momentary entity [immediately after each preceding momentary entity].³¹⁷ (367–369)

(ii) Further, if it has no cause, is it non-existent like the son of a barren woman, or permanent like ether, since there is no other option? If it does not exist, then every entity would have to be permanent, because they would not perish, and the perception that every produced thing perishes would be baseless. If it is permanent, every entity would have to abide together with its destruction, because there would be no hindrance to this state of affairs. And it is not reasonable to refer to the destruction of something that has not been generated. (370–372)

Refutation

To this, we say: What sort of destruction are you asking about? Is it what we declare, the fact that an entity is subject to last only a moment, or is it “annihilation,” i.e., the cessation of a thing’s character (*svarūpa*)? If you are asking about the former, then there is no quarrel. We accept that an entity that lasts only a moment has a cause, and one can call this “destruction.” But because the latter does not exist, it cannot have a cause. (373–375)

The property of arising immediately after the entity cannot pertain to such a thing, as the fluctuating character of an entity arises along with the entity itself. Therefore, because destruction really exists, produced things are not eternal, and it does not follow that the notion of perishability is baseless. (376–377)

On the other hand, because annihilation is selfless, like a sky-lotus, etc., it cannot arise immediately after the entity, nor does it exist after not having existed. We understand “there is annihilation” to mean “the entity does not exist,” and we do not believe that this is an affirmation of anything. Indeed, it is not the case that simply calling someone an ass entails perceiving every property of a donkey in him. And if this were an affirmation of a separate thing called annihilation, it would not bring anything about for the entity, so why would that [entity] cease? (378–381)

We hold that destruction, the annihilation of an entity, does not exist in that manner, i.e., with a disjunction from the form of an entity; not due to [i.e., not in the sense of] the non-existence

³¹⁶ The phrase “there is a non-pot on the table” (implicative negation [*paryudāsa*]) posits something that is not a pot, whereas, “there is no pot on the table” (non-implicative negation [*prasajya*]) simply denies that there is a pot without positing anything else.

³¹⁷ Kamalaśīla attributes this set of reasoning to Aviddhakarṇa (§5). According to the Buddhists, the destruction or decay of a momentary existent is intrinsic to it. Given that all things are momentary, a thing’s existence just is its existing for only a moment. There is no separate event called “destruction” nor a separate agent of destruction. According to Nyāya, however, a substance would persist without something causing its destruction.

of the entity.³¹⁸ We do not say that it consists of cessation in an affirmative sense, and we deny that the form of the entity continues after a moment. Hence, we do not affirm that it has any fixed form, so it is baseless to ascribe the notion of permanence to it. (382–384)

[...]

[Translator’s note: After explaining that produced things are momentary, Śāntarakṣita turns to the question of unproduced things. In this discussion, he further defines the terms “moment” (*kṣaṇa*), “momentary” (*kṣaṇika*), “unproduced” (*akṛtaka*), and “causal efficacy” (*arthakriyā*). Nothing can create a new effect while remaining the same; anything that participates in a causal stream must be impermanent, and, so, momentary. Existence entails causal efficacy and therefore momentariness. After this, Śāntarakṣita fends off objections from several different thinkers, culminating in the following exchange to conclude the chapter.]

Nyāya objection

(i) Either the point of your thesis is lost, or the all-encompassing pervasion in all of your reasons is annulled by this inference: A later cognition [of the sun, the moon, etc.] must have as its referent the sun, etc., existing at the time of the [earlier] cognition whose referent was the sun, or the moon, etc., as intended, because, under the condition that it does not have something earthly as its referent, it is denotable as being the cognition of that, like the first cognition whose object was the sun, or the like, at that time.³¹⁹ (461–463)

(ii) The substrata of universals, color-ness, etc. [e.g., the color blue], their substrata [e.g., a blue cloth], and the perceptions that are produced with those [i.e., with the color blue and the cloth] as their objects, all must not be subject to perishing immediately after arising, for such reasons as being knowable and being denotable, unlike sky-lotuses.³²⁰ (464–465)

(iii) Our proclamation is that the sequentially-arising perceptions that are the objects of debate all have one and the same object as their referent. This is because, while there is no basis for annulling [their coreferentiality], the same expression is employed [to describe all of them], just like manifold cognitions in a single present moment. (466–467)

Refutation

To begin with, in the first argument, the example lacks the property to be proven, because it is a cause.³²¹ Indeed, every referent is non-coextensive with its cognition. Also, words like “sun,”

³¹⁸ This verse puzzles me, but the point seems to be to delineate the kind of “destruction” that Śāntarakṣita admits from the kind that he denies. Kamalaśīla says, “In that manner, i.e., non-existence [of destruction] is due to its having the form of the disjunction of the intrinsic condition of the entity, rather than due to the cessation of the intrinsic form of that which is the intrinsic condition of the entity, so why should everything be permanent?” (*evam iti vastusvabhāvaviyogarūpatvāt, na tu bhāvasvabhāvasya sataḥ svarūpanivṛtter asattvam, tat katham sarvabhāvānām nityatvam syāt*). In other words—I think—we do not deny the mere cessation of a thing, only that there is a separation between the thing and its destruction, or that its destruction involves a separation between the thing and its intrinsic form.

³¹⁹ Kamalaśīla attributes this and the next argument to Bhāvivikta (§6). Both prove that the objects of cognition must persist at least long enough for us to perceive, think about, and name them. He thinks most things persist longer than that, but that alone would suffice to disprove momentariness.

³²⁰ As in English, the term “like” (*yathā*) in Sanskrit is sometimes ambiguous when following a negation. E.g., “This is not a novel, like the *Decameron*.” Does this mean the *Decameron* is similar in not being a novel, or dissimilar in being one? In the present case, I remove the ambiguity by adding *un-*, but there is some uncertainty about this argument. The example is different in the fragment cited by Kamalaśīla, as will be discussed in §6 below.

³²¹ Kamalaśīla cites Dharmakīrti (PV 3.246) to defend the view that objects cannot be simultaneous with cognitions of

which only arise on the basis of a speaker's whim, can be applied to things like lamps; the argument deviates because of such cognitions. (468–469)

Argument (ii)

Because universals, etc., lack intrinsic existence, we do not claim momentariness [in their case]. The argument for the sake of proving its non-existence is presented in vain. (470)

Argument (iii)

Even the perceptions of lamps, etc., are expressible by the same word, so the reason deviates with respect to that. If you think coreferentiality is annulled in these cases, then why don't you see this transparent annulment in the intended case, as well? (471–472)

The cognitions that have come under dispute do not all have one and the same object as their referent, because they are produced sequentially, like the cognitions of lightning, a lamp, etc. Indeed, it is contradictory for cognitions with one and the same object to be sequential, because it is contradictory for something that cannot be affected by others to rely on them.³²² (473–474)

The negative concomitance in all of your reasons is doubtful, because there is nothing to annul their presence in a dissimilar case.³²³ (475)

them (*nāto 'rthaḥ svadhīyā saha*), because a cause must precede its effect (*prāgḅhāvaḥ sarvabhūtaṃ*). The first cognition of the moon does not have the moon delimited at that very moment as its object because that object is the cause of that cognition, and, because of momentariness, by the time the cognition arises, its cause has already vanished.

³²² Śāntarakṣita lifts the final clause here from Dharmakīrti (PV 2.242). In Dharmakīrti's autocommentary, as well as in the overall passage, he makes it clear that the phrase *anyair akāryabhedasya* (which I am rendering, "something that cannot be affected by others") refers to a permanent (*sthira*) entity. Coarsely, the phrase means, "something for which a difference cannot be brought about by others." As with Īśvara, if the moon were permanent, its form would be fixed once and for all, and, so, could not be affected by anything else. If the moon had to rely on auxiliary causes to bring about different cognitions of itself across time, it would, in relying on those auxiliaries, cease to be fixed once and for all. At the end of Kamalaśīla's commentary on this verse, one can almost hear an audible sigh: "And it cannot be that it relies on another cause, because a permanent thing cannot be assisted by that. Nor is it tenable that it relies on something that does not give assistance, as that is absurd. Or, if there were assistance, the consequence would be the loss of permanence. We've repeated this a hundred times." (*nāpi kāraṇāntarāpekṣā nityasya tenānupakāryatvāt. na cānupakārinnyapekṣā yuktā, atiprasaṅgāt. upakāre vā nityatvabhāniḥprasāṅga itī śataśaś carcitam etat.* [TSP 207.2].)

³²³ "Where there is smoke, there is fire, *unlike in a lake.*" The lake is "dissimilar" in that it does not possess the property to be proven, fire. The "negative concomitance" (where there is no fire, there is no smoke) is not doubtful, because there is no doubt that the reason, smoke, can never be present in dissimilar cases like lakes. But there is nothing annulling the presence of reasons like "being knowable" in dissimilar cases, i.e., momentary phenomena.

§5. AV11: DESTRUCTION

When we say that a fallen pot was destroyed, that milk is gone once it has curdled, or that firewood is spent once it has burned up, what are we referring to? Is a thing's "destruction" some separate phenomenon apart from the thing destroyed? Are all instances of destruction caused by the same kind of destroyer?

According to momentariness theory, everything that exists does so for only a moment. Moreover, to exist just is to perish upon arising. We may say "the pot was destroyed" after it shatters, but in reality "the pot" was only a convenient fiction to begin with. The constituents of "the pot," the unique particulars we conceptually identify as a pot, are destroyed and newly generated each and every moment. "The pot" is actually a continually newly arising heap of momentary particulars. Destruction, as Śāntarakṣita explains, is neither a separate thing, nor the result of some separate thing. Rather, the destruction of every momentary entity is just that entity's being momentary.

Aviddhakarṇa, as paraphrased by Śāntarakṣita in verses 367–369, offers the opposing view, namely, that an entity's destruction is indeed a separate phenomenon, that it exists immediately after the last moment of the entity's existence, and that it has a cause.³²⁴ Kamalaśīla cites fragment Av11 as follows:

*tad evam ete trayo hetava uktāḥ sahetuko vināśaḥ kādācitkatvāt vastūpattyanantarabhāvitvena
baudhair abhyupagamyamānatvāt prāḡ abhūtvātmalābhāc ca kṣaṇāntaravat, vaidharmyeṇa
śaśaviṣāṇādaya iti. (369)³²⁵*

In this way, he has stated three reasons: Destruction has a cause (i) because it is incidental (*kādācitkatva*), (ii) because it is accepted by Buddhists (*baudha*) as coming into its own immediately after the arising of the entity, and (iii) because it comes into its own after not previously existing, like another moment, and unlike hare's horns, etc.

There are three overlapping arguments here. Kamalaśīla describes the first in terms of the chronology of origination, existence, and destruction. An entity's destruction cannot exist while the entity exists, nor prior to its origination, nor long after it has ceased to be, but rather, "in the second moment, immediately after the entity" (*vastvanantaram dvitīye kṣaṇe vināśa*). The fact that destruction is temporally restricted (*kādācitkatva*) means it is contingent, so it must have a cause. If it were contingent yet independent, nothing would induce it to arise, and so, destruction never arising, nothing would ever be destroyed. Second, given momentariness theory, Buddhists accept that the destruction of an entity follows immediately upon the entity's arising—they must, then, also accept that this phenomenon has a cause. Third, just like the preceding momentary entity, which does not exist until the moment it arises, destruction also comes into existence after not existing previously,

³²⁴ In my reading, the fragment itself, Av11, is restricted to the final citation of three reasons, which reads more like a concise summary than an actual quotation. Kamalaśīla uses the verb *nir+√diś* (to point out, indicate) to describe Śāntarakṣita's paraphrase of Aviddhakarṇa's arguments, rather than the causative of *√dṛś* (to present, demonstrate), suggesting more of an indirect invocation than in many other cases. And it is only at the end that Kamalaśīla introduces and concludes a statement with quotation markers (*uktāḥ... iti*). Otherwise the entire passage appears to be a description of Aviddhakarṇa's reasoning rather than a citation or even a kind of direct paraphrase.

³²⁵ TSP 172.13, J65v.5.

and its appearance, again, must therefore be caused.

These arguments are not purely distinct from one another, but emphasize different aspects of the temporality and causation of destruction. All three speak in terms of moments, the smallest temporal unit, or phenomena whose existence is defined by it. The latter two in particular hinge on the concept of momentariness. Unlike several of the fragments we have seen so far, this triplet of arguments is unquestionably targeted at Buddhists, whether or not the reference to Buddhists (*bauddha*) in Kamalaśīla's paraphrase is an interpretive interpolation.

Interruptions

There are several passages in the *Nyāyasūtra* that are germane to these arguments,³²⁶ but Aviddhakarṇa's direct invocation of momentariness to prove that there is a cause of destruction points most strongly to NS 3.2.10–14. This passage is an interlude in the examination of *buddhi* (cognition, intellect) that introduces momentariness as a Buddhist interjection into Nyāya's engagement with a Sāṃkhya *pūrvapakṣa*.

³²⁶ Apart from NS 3.2.10–14, the most relevant passages are (i) NS 2.1.39–43, an auxiliary section to the examination of inference, and (ii) 4.1.29–33, one of the eight theories from NS 4.1.14–43.

(i) After the examination of perception (NS 2.1.31–36), NS 2.1.37 features an objection that inference is not a means of knowledge (*apramāṇa*), and sutra 38 dismisses the *pūrvapakṣa*'s reasoning outright.^a What follows is an objection to the purported temporality of inferential reasoning, and specifically to the notion of the present. The objection in sutra 39 is that something descending (*patat*) can only occur in the temporality of what has fallen (*patita*) or what is going to fall (*patitavya*), so that there is no present moment (*vartamānābhāva*). The following four sutras refute the reasoning of the objection (40–41), assert the necessity of the present for perception and thus knowledge (42), and point out that we use the present to refer both to existence as such, and to refer to processes that implicate or are implicated by the past and future (43). The relation between the three moments of time plays an important role in Av11, so this passage is worth bearing in mind, though it is only tangentially relevant.

(ii) We have already seen the sequence NS 4.1.14–43 in regard to Īśvara (§1). Momentariness itself does not come up in this sequence, but it still bears mention. In Av11, Aviddhakarṇa may be commenting on the fifth of the eight theories rejected in this sequence, NS 4.1.29, “everything is permanent” (*sarvaṃ nityam*), which follows immediately upon the fourth theory, in 4.1.25, that “everything is impermanent” (*sarvaṃ anityam*). It is important for Nyāya that both theories are wrong: the atoms, e.g., are permanent, while the elements composed of them are impermanent. The reason the *pūrvapakṣa* puts forth in sutra 25 is that all things are subject to origination and destruction (*utpatti-vināśa-dharmakatva*). After a brief discussion,^b the final position is that permanent entities are determined to exist in accordance with observation, so they cannot be spoken against (*nityasyāpratyaḅhānam yathopalabdhi vyavasthānāt*). In other words, there is no denying what we can directly observe and we can directly observe permanent entities. This then leads to the fifth theory: everything is permanent because the five elements are permanent (*sarvaṃ nityam pañcabhūtanityatvāt*). The initial response argues that we perceive the causes of origination and destruction, ergo at least some things must be impermanent. The discussion hinges on the relationship between the permanent constituents of matter and the gross substances composed of them. If, being composed of them, gross substances are essentially identical with their elemental constituents, then the permanence of the constituents must also apply to the substances. According to Nyāya, since we actually perceive the causes of the origination and destruction of entities, this view cannot be correct. This passage partially concerns the cause of destruction but is really about whether things are destroyed as in fact they seem to be, rather than the temporal relationship between existence and destruction.

^a Inferential reasoning is, of course, an important part of Nyāya, “Logic,” but the examination of inference itself is very concise, likely because various aspects of reasoning and argumentation are dealt with throughout NS.

^b This discussion, notably, introduces the example of the exhaustion of fire, though not regarding the ashes to which a fire is reduced, but rather the fuel that keeps the fire going. Destroying the fuel, the fire is also destroyed. Sutra 27 raises this in response to the preliminary objection in sutra 26 that impermanence is itself permanent. In other words, an entity's impermanence, just like the fire that burns the fuel, is exhausted once the entity itself is destroyed.

The nature of *buddhi* is a central point of contention between Nyāya and Sāṃkhya, as we have already seen. Sāṃkhya believes the *buddhi* is a singular transformation of the primordial. Being ultimately identical with the primordial, it is permanent and all-pervading. Nyāya, on the other hand, considers the term *buddhi* but a synonym for cognition (*jñāna*),³²⁷ and considers individual *buddhis* to be transient properties of the self. Against Sāṃkhya's view, Buddhists and Naiyāyikas are provisional allies, and NS 3.2.10–14 is partly predicated on their shared ground. But, of course, they disagree vehemently when it comes to the finer details. Nyāya's claim that cognitions inhere in the self, for example, or the Buddhist claim that cognitions are transient because everything is momentary.

In the *Nyāyasūtra*, the examination of *buddhi* (sūtras 3.2.1–55) begins with a discussion hinging on three points from the Sāṃkhya point of view.

- In sūtra 3.2.2, the Sāṃkhya interlocutor argues that we know *buddhi* is permanent and all-pervading because of recognition—how could we know something to be the same as something we have seen in the past without a fixed substrate of intellection?³²⁸
- In sūtra 3.2.9: We only imagine that there are different *buddhis* (*tad-anyatva-abhimāna*), just as we imagine that there is a different crystal when it is placed on something of a different color (*sphaṭika-anyatva-abhimāna-vat*).³²⁹
- And in sūtra 3.2.15: The diversity of our cognitions is just the sequential manifestation of transformations of the primordial, i.e., reality is just the singular primordial, but it appears to be manifold.

Following each of these three sūtras is a brief refutation in justification of Nyāya doctrine.³³⁰ We are concerned with sūtras 10–14, following the Sāṃkhya interlocutor's argument in 3.2.9 that *buddhi* is like a crystal that only appears to change when it is moved:

[*The Buddhist objects:*] This is no reason, because, given that individuals are momentary (*kṣaṇikatva*), there is successive origination even in the case of a crystal. (3.2.10)

[*Nyāya:*] Because there is no basis for [momentariness being] a fixed rule (*niyama*), it is permitted only in accordance with observation. (3.2.11)

[Further,] it is not so, because of the apprehension of the cause of origination and destruction. (3.2.12)

[*Buddhist:*] Just as in the case of the destruction of milk, or the origination of curd, there is non-apprehension of the cause, [so in the case of] the origination of this [i.e., the crystal, as well]. (3.2.13)

[*Nyāya:*] Because we grasp it on the basis of an inferential mark, this is not a case of non-apprehension. (3.2.14)³³¹

³²⁷ buddhir upalabdhir jñānam ity anarthāntaram ||1.1.15|| (NS 18.13).

³²⁸ viśayapratyabhijñānāt ||3.2.2|| (NS 176.3).

³²⁹ sphaṭikānyatvābhimānavat tadanyatvābhimānaḥ ||3.1.9|| (NS 179.18).

³³⁰ na payasaḥ pariṇāmaguṇāntaraprādurbhāvāt ||3.2.15|| (NS 182.15).

³³¹ sphaṭike 'py aparāparotpatteḥ kṣaṇikatvād vyaktinām ahetuḥ ||3.2.10|| (NS 180.12);

After the Sāṃkhya *pūrvapakṣa* raises the example of the crystal in sutra 9, a Buddhist interloper chimes in to say that momentariness disproves the fixity of the crystal. In other words, not only does the crystal really change when it is placed atop a different-colored surface; in fact, there is a different crystal each and every moment. The very example Sāṃkhya raises in order to challenge the transience of the intellect serves only to substantiate that *buddhi*, like crystals and everything else, is momentary.

Nyāya agrees with the conclusion of this argument: *buddhi* is transient. But sutra 11, immediately following this Buddhist interjection, discounts its underlying premise. There is nothing to prove the necessity of momentariness, so we can only accept that things are momentary insofar as they are observed to be so. Vātsyāyana notes that we do not actually observe in crystals the kinds of shifts and changes we observe in living bodies; not everything is in constant flux. Therefore, though the Sāṃkhya view is wrong, momentariness cannot be the reason it is wrong. In addition, as sutra 12 continues, the theory of momentariness is also mistaken because we perceive the cause (*kāraṇa*) of origination (*utpatti*) and destruction (*vināśa*). In sutra 13, the imaginary Buddhist interloper points out that we do not perceive the cause of milk's destruction or curd's origination—we do not see milk ceasing to be milk or becoming curd. Then, finally, in sutra 14, the response is that we may not see “the cause of milk's destruction,” but we can infer it.

According to Vātsyāyana, who says surprisingly little on sutra 3.2.14, “the cause of the destruction of the milk has the destruction of the milk as its inferential mark.”³³² In other words, we can infer that something causes milk's ceasing to be milk, and becoming curd, on the basis of the fact that it has, in fact, ceased to be milk.

Uddyotakara, speaking at considerable length, confronts momentariness more directly. This is the argument Śāntarakṣita paraphrases in verses 370–372, immediately following his paraphrase of Av11. “You may think,” Uddyotakara says, “that there is no cause of destruction in this case, and, therefore, that the entity perishes merely as it is arisen; not so, because there is no possible option.”³³³ He goes through each available option for this view, as we will see in a moment, and demonstrates that each is impossible. He does not positively prove that there is a cause of destruction, but only attacks the view that there is not.

Aviddhakarṇa, on the other hand, uses the Buddhists' conception of time against them in order to prove directly that there is a such a cause. This is a little different than Uddyotakara's approach, but, of course, the end result is similarly to bolster the Nyāya position.

In addition to the meaning of the fragment, it is important to consider the manner of Kamalaśīla's citation of Av11. It comes across as a potential paraphrase, condensing, as it does, three overlapping yet seemingly distinct arguments into a single statement. But even a faithful paraphrase is an

niyamahetvabhāvād yathādarśanam abhyanuḥjñā ||3.2.11|| (181.5);

notpattivināśakāraṇopalabdheḥ ||3.2.12|| (181.15);

kṣīravinaśe kāraṇānupalabddivad dadhyutpattivac ca tadupapattiḥ ||3.2.13|| (182.4);

liṅgato grahaṇān nānupalabdhiḥ ||3.2.14|| (182.9).

³³² kṣīravinaśaliṅgaṃ kṣīravinaśakāraṇaṃ (NS 182.10).

³³³ atha manyase nātra vināśasya kāraṇam asti, tasmād utpannamātra evāyaṃ bhāvo vinaśyatīti. na, vikalpānupapatteḥ (NV 389.11).

intervention. In this light, it is helpful to look at Kamalaśīla's citation—or, more precisely, revision—of Uddyotakara.

Interlude: Kamalaśīla as Editor

Immediately after saying “there is no possible option” for the Buddhist view, Uddyotakara goes on to assess the options on offer and demonstrate their impossibility. As mentioned, Śāntarakṣita invokes this passage in verses 370–372; as usual, Kamalaśīla cites the corresponding passage in prose.

In some cases, as we know, Kamalaśīla quotes Uddyotakara verbatim, and in other cases he paraphrases him. Sometimes Kamalaśīla's paraphrase will condense a longer, more complicated passage into a simple formal argument, but in some cases, as here in his comments on verses 370–372, he does not abbreviate Uddyotakara's words so much as revise them, almost like an editor clarifying Uddyotakara's sometimes knotty prose.

We will have to look at the two passages at length. Uddyotakara says the following:

He who says there is no cause of destruction should be asked: Is it that (a) because destruction does not have a cause, it does not exist, or that (b) because it does not have a cause, it is permanent? In your view, what is causeless is twofold, permanent or non-existent, whereas in ours, it is only permanent.

(b) If destruction were permanent because of its causelessness, the arising of the effect would not obtain, and there would be the destruction of something that has not yet arisen. There is also a defect because an entity's destruction cannot coexist with it. And so, because entities (*bhāvānām*) would not be incompatible with non-existence (*abhāva*), abiding would be perpetual.

(a) If destruction were non-existent, in this case, too, everything would be permanent because there would be no destruction. If destruction were non-existent, no such notion as “it perishes” would obtain with regard to a destruction that does not actually exist; there is no “it moves” if movement is non-existent.

(c) If you think destruction is causeless because it is imperishable (*avināśin*), then why [in your view] does destruction (*vināśa*) not come to an end (*vinaśyati*)? You might say, “Because what has perished (*vināṣṭa*) does not regenerate.” If what you are thinking is that a thing that has perished would regenerate if its destruction were to come to an end, this is not tenable. For it is not the case that the non-existence (*abhāva*) of destruction is an entity (*bhāva*) that would arise on the basis of the destruction of destruction (*vināśa-vināśa*). Rather, an entity (*bhāva*) has a cause, and when its cause comes to be, then it arises; but destruction has a cause and yet does not come to an end, because it is a non-entity (*abhāva*). It is a property of entities (*bhāva*) that what has a cause perishes; as for a non-entity (*abhāva*), one that is causeless, such as prior non-existence (*prāg-abhāva*), comes to an end, whereas one that has a cause, such as non-existence after annihilation (*pradhvaṃsa-abhāva*), does not.³³⁴

³³⁴ vināśasya hetur nāstīti bruvāṇaḥ paryanuyoktavyaḥ kim akāraṇatvād vināśo nāsti, utākāraṇatvān nitya iti. bhavatām pakṣe akāraṇaṃ dvidhā nityam asac ca. asmākaṃ tu nityam eva.

tad yady akāraṇatvāt nityo vināśaḥ, kāryasyotpādo na prāpnoti. anutpannasya ca vināśo. bhāvasya vināśo na sahāvasthānam iti ca doṣaḥ. tataś ca bhāvānām abhāvāvirodhitvād atyantāvasthānam iti.

athāsan vināśaḥ, evam api sarvanityatvaṃ vināśābhāvāt. yadi cāsan vināśaḥ, vinaśyatīty asati vināśe pratyayo na

The point in the final paragraph is tricky to parse, but pivotal to Uddyotakara's argument. Rather than simply refuting the different options for the causelessness of destruction, Uddyotakara declares a position about the nature of destruction: it is not an entity, an existing thing (*bhāva*), but rather a non-entity, an absence (*abhāva*). The relationship between causation and destruction is inverted for entities and non-entities. An existing thing that has a cause arises when its cause is capable of generating it, and then eventually ceases to be. An absence, on the other hand, is either uncaused, but eventually ceases to be, or is caused, but never comes to an end. Case in point: before something exists, it has a "prior non-existence," which, though itself never caused, comes to an end when the entity arises; after the entity has perished, it has "non-existence after annihilation," which was caused by the entity's destruction and yet never comes to an end itself.

Kamalaśīla's revision of this passage is somewhat easier to read overall, and more clearly structured, but it also omits the conclusion:

The reasoning stated by Uddyotakara [...]:

He who says there is no cause of destruction should be asked: Is it that (a) because destruction does not have a cause, it does not exist, like a sky lotus, etc., or that (b) because it does not have a cause, it is permanent, like the sky, etc.? For in your view, what is causeless is observed to be twofold, permanent or non-existent, since there is no other mode apart from existence (*sattva*) and nonexistence (*asattva*).

Concerning these, (a) if destruction were non-existent because of its causelessness, then it would follow that all entities would be permanent, because there would be no destruction. Moreover, the notion that all constructed things (*saṃskāra*) are destroyed would become baseless, for there is no "it moves" if movement is non-existent.

(b) If it were permanent, then it would obtain that an entity would abide with its destruction, because its destruction would always be there. This is not tenable, because existence and non-existence are characterized as standing in mutual exclusion. If you do not accept that they coexist, then the arising of the effect could not obtain, because destruction, the very contrary of arising, would always remain. And so, the destruction of what is unproduced does not arise, either, because, as is commonly accepted, unproduced things like hare's horns do not perish. Therefore, it would not at all conform to reason to say that there is destruction of something unproduced.³³⁵

prāpnoti. nāsatyāṃ gatau gacchatīti bhavati.

athāvināśitvād akāraṇo vināśa iti manyase. vināśo na vinaśyātīti kuta etat. vinaśtānāṃ punar anutpatter iti cet. atha manyase yadi vināśo vinaśyed vinaśtaṃ punar utpadyate. na yuktam etad. na hi vināśābhāvo bhāvo yato vināśavināśād bhavet, api tu kāraṇavān bhāvaḥ tasya yadā kāraṇam bhavati tadotpāda iti. api ca vināśaḥ kāraṇavāms ca na ca vinaśyaty abhāvavād. bhāvadharmā eṣo yat kāraṇavat tad vinaśyātīty. abhāvas tv akāraṇo 'pi vinaśyati, yathā prāgabhāvaḥ. kāraṇavān api na vinaśyati, yathā pradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ (NV 389.12).

³³⁵ uddyotakaroktām api yuktim [...] vināśasya hetur nāstīti bruvāṇaḥ paryanuyojyaḥ kim akāraṇatvād vināśo nāsti vyomotpalādivat, athākāraṇatvān nityo vyomādivad iti. bhavatāṃ hi pakṣe 'kāraṇam dvidhā dṛṣṭam nityam asac ca. na hi sattvāsattvavyatirekeṇa prakārāntaram asti.

tatra yady akāraṇatvād asat vināśas tadā sarvabhāvānāṃ nityatvaprasaṅgo vināśābhāvāt. kim ca sarvasaṃskārā vinaśyantīty eṣa pratyayo nirmimittaḥ prāpnoti, na hy asatyāṃ gatau gacchatīti bhavati.

atha nityas tadā bhāvasya vināśena sahāvasthānaṃ prāpnoti, sarvadāvasthānāt. na ca itad yuktam, bhāvābhāvayoḥ parasparaparīharasthitalakṣaṇatvāt. atha sahāvasthānaṃ neṣyate tadā kāryasyotpādo na prāpnoti, tatpratyanīkabhūtasya nāśasya sadāvasthītatvāt.^a tatas cājātasya vināśo 'pi na saṅgacchate, na hy ajātāḥ śaśaviṣṇādayo vinaśyantīti loke pratītam,

What do Kamalaśīla's revisions tell us about his method, his approach, his relationship to his rival sources?

To begin with, Kamalaśīla flips the second and third paragraphs in conformity to the sequence of the initial question, "Is it that destruction does not exist or that it is permanent?" Uddyotakara's passage follows the chiasmic pattern a-b-b-a—"Is it (a) or (b)? If it's (b), *x*; if it's (a), *y*"—which is perfectly acceptable in Sanskrit philosophical writing, but Kamalaśīla consistently favors the more regimented a-b-a-b—"Is it (a) or (b)? If it's (a), *y*; if it's (b), *x*." Kamalaśīla also adds clarifying transitions like "concerning these" (*tatra*), "moreover" (*kiṃ ca*), "consequently" (*tataś ca*), etc. By explicitly mentioning constructed things (*saṃskāra*), Kamalaśīla points to a discussion from later in the same *Vārttika* passage concerning the Buddhist view that all constructed things are momentary. He removes several ambiguities and redundancies and seems intent on clarifying the overall logical sequence of the passage.

Kamalaśīla essentially elides the final paragraph and instead expands on the reasoning of option (b). Uddyotakara makes three points about this option, densely layered atop one another: (1) If destruction were permanent, an effect, i.e., something that has to be brought into being, could never arise. (2) It is absurd for an entity to persist alongside its own destruction. (3) If a thing's existence and its non-existence are not contrary, nothing would ever cease to be. Kamalaśīla's Uddyotakara splits this up differently: First, if destruction were permanent, anything that exists would exist alongside its own destruction. Second, if the opponent rejects this coexistence but continues to claim that destruction is permanent, it follows that the entity could never arise, because its destruction would already be there. The only other possibility is that destruction is the destruction of something that has not yet arisen, but this is clearly absurd.

Kamalaśīla's version is closely modeled on Uddyotakara's and seems largely intended to make it match the systematic approach of Śāntarakṣita. Does this affect or misrepresent Uddyotakara's argument at all?

Uddyotakara's concluding remarks about entities and non-entities is crucial for his appraisal of destruction. But Kamalaśīla probably elides these remarks because they are not material to Śāntarakṣita's characterization or refutation of Uddyotakara's argument. Consider instead a seemingly minor revision at the beginning of the passage. Uddyotakara writes:

In your view, what is causeless is twofold, permanent or non-existent, whereas in ours, it is only permanent.³³⁶

Kamalaśīla's version:

For in your view what is causeless is observed to be twofold, permanent or non-existent, since there is no other mode apart from existence (*sattva*) and nonexistence (*asattva*).³³⁷

Kamalaśīla begins in the same dialogic form ("in your view"), but then removes Uddyotakara's

tenājātasya vināśa iti vacanaṃ naiva yuktyanupāti (TSP 172.16, J65v.6).

^a TSP reads *sadāsthita*°.

³³⁶ bhavatāṃ pakṣe akāraṇaṃ dvidhā nityam asac ca. asmākaṃ tu nityam eva.

³³⁷ bhavatāṃ hi pakṣe 'kāraṇaṃ dvidhā dṛṣṭaṃ nityam asac ca. na hi sattvāsattvavyatirekeṇa prakārāntaram asti.

remark about his own view (“whereas in ours”); instead, Kamalaśīla substitutes a justification of the Buddhist position as if it were a statement of fact (“since there is...”). From the get go, Kamalaśīla’s revision mimics Uddyotakara’s words while subtly reinforcing the Buddhist position.

Kamalaśīla is not merely paraphrasing or condensing here, but editing. One could argue that he is making the passage easier to read or adding somewhat to the logical sequence of the passage, but we nevertheless must refer to the voice in this passage as Kamalaśīla’s Uddyotakara, a character of Kamalaśīla’s invention, modeled on Uddyotakara, but voiced by Kamalaśīla himself. Since he often quotes Uddyotakara word-for-word, this intervention stands out all the more—and yet, this ventriloquizing also implicates the verbatim quotations. Even when he speaks in Uddyotakara’s own words, we are hearing Kamalaśīla’s Uddyotakara.

The same, no doubt, must also be said for Aviddhakarṇa. We will likely never know, as we can with Uddyotakara, when Kamalaśīla cites Aviddhakarṇa, when he paraphrases him, and when he revises him altogether—moments like these remind us to recognize that these uncertainties are often the ground of a study of such thinkers.

As we have already seen, and will see even more dramatically in the next two fragments, the *Tattvasamgraha* does not always give us enough information to understand the view of its purported rivals. From the perspective of a modern scholar like me, it practically demands to be put under a microscope for evidence of the texts, theories, and thinkers that it synthesizes and simplifies. When we listen for the voices of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, we do not always hear much beyond the faint whispers preserved in the *Pañjikā*. Yet even this is significant. We know from the *Vipañcitārtthā* (cf. Appendix A) that Śāntarakṣita, like Kamalaśīla after him, was intent on directly citing and attributing the arguments of these two thinkers. Yet, like Kamalaśīla, he sometimes does so without sufficient surrounding or explanatory context. Is this at all instrumental to his rhetorical technique? Is it only an artifact of the education he expected his readers to receive? Though unanswered and likely unanswerable, we can allow these sorts of questions to inform our reading of the *Tattvasamgraha*, the way we imagine the worlds to which it responded, and the responses it anticipates and shapes.

§6. BH6 AND BH7: MOON-GAZING

To conclude the “Examination of Permanence,” Śāntarakṣita takes on two arguments by Bhāvivikta and another by Uddyotakara. First, in Bh6, Bhāvivikta argues that all cognitions of particular heavenly bodies share the same stable referents—in other words, the moon is the same moon today as yesterday. Then, in Bh7, he similarly argues, on the basis of a complicated collection of reasons, that qualities, the substances in which they inhere, and our cognitions of them, cannot be momentary. Finally, Uddyotakara makes an argument quite like Bh6, but without Bhāvivikta’s flair. The point of all three arguments is to prove that there must be stable objects persisting through time: momentariness theory is wrong.

Kamalaśīla cites Bh6 as follows:

*nanv anenetyādinā bhāviviktoktāni pramāṇāny āśānkate [...]. tad uktam
vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannāni candrārkaagrahanakṣatradījñānāni
vivakṣitacandrārkaagrahanakṣatratārakādīviṣayaṃ yad devadattādivijñānaṃ
tat-kālāvacchinna-candrārkaagrahanakṣatratārakādīviṣayāṇy eva,
pṛthvisambandhitvenānupalabhyamānatve sati candrārkaagrahanakṣatratārakādījñānaśabdavācyatvāt,
prathamakālabhāvidevadattatārakādījñānavad iti. (461–463)³³⁸*

With the following verses [461–465], Śāntarakṣita considers arguments made by Bhāvivikta. [...] He has said this: The cognitions of things like the moon (candra), the sun (arka), planets (graha), lunar mansions (nakṣatra), and so on, that have come to be the topic of disagreement, must have as their objects the moon, sun, planets, lunar mansions, stars (tāraka), and so on, restricted (avacchinna)³³⁹ to the time of the cognition of, e.g., Devadatta’s that had as its object the moon, sun, planet, lunar mansion, star, or the like, intended (vivakṣita). This is because, under the condition that they are not perceived with a connection to the earth, they are expressible (vācya) by the words for cognitions of the moon, the sun, planets, lunar mansions, stars, and so on, like, Devadatta’s cognition of stars, etc., that arose in the first instance.

This argument rivals Aviddhakarṇa’s most elaborate fragments. To follow the reasoning, it is important to keep its distinct components in order.

First, the gist of the argument is relatively simple: When I look up and see the moon, I am seeing the same moon that others have seen in the past, because we can describe it in the same terms. We saw a fairly similar style and structure of argument in Av9 (§3). Aviddhakarṇa argues in Av9 that “my cognitions” across time can only be known by the knower of “my first cognition” after birth. The point of the argument is that the agent of cognition persists through time. Here in Bh6, Bhāvivikta

³³⁸ TSP 202.8; J75r.5.

³³⁹ This term is tricky to deal with. If Bhāvivikta had instead written this term with a negation (*an-*), i.e., *tat-kāla-anavacchinna*, his proposition would be precisely what we would expect, and would correspond precisely to my analysis below: the objects of cognitions of the moon, etc., at t_2 are not temporally discontinuous (*kāla-anavacchinna*) with the objects of cognitions of the moon, etc., at t_1 . See, e.g., Ratié 2011’s analysis of Abhinavagupta’s use of the phrase *kāla-anavacchinna* in his *Īsvara-pratyabhijñānāvivṛṭivimarśinī* in the sense “pas limitée par le temps” (234–235). It is possible that the scribe missed the *na*, but the Tibetan would not support such an emendation: *de’i dus su bcad pa’i zla ba dang*. Perhaps Bhāvivikta is trying to say something like: I concede that we can distinguish between the object of the cognition of the moon at t_2 from that at t_1 insofar as their respective temporalities are distinct (*kāla-anavacchinna*), and yet the objects themselves must be identical.

aims to prove that the object of cognition does, as well. Significantly, he does not rely on a single agent's cognitions across time. Rather, anyone's cognition of the sun subsequent to Devadatta's first cognition of the sun must have the same sun as its object—the sun is constant, independent of the observer.

As for the formal structure of the argument. To streamline matters somewhat:

- (1) *subject* cognitions of specific heavenly bodies
- (2) *to be proven* have as their objects the same heavenly bodies as earlier cognitions of them
- (3) *reason* because they are expressible with words for cognitions of those heavenly bodies
- (3b) *qualification* given that they are not being perceived as earthly
- (4) *example* like the cognition of them that arose in the first instance

In more detail, (1) cognitions of heavenly bodies are the subject. This subject is qualified as *vimaty-adhikarāṇa-bhāva-āpanna* (what has come to be the topic of disagreement), which is roughly the same qualification found in Av6, Av10,³⁴⁰ and the two anonymous arguments we referred to as X1 and X2 (§2). When Uddyotakara qualifies an argument in this way, he more simply calls it “disputed” (*vipratipanna*), as we will see shortly. (2) The property to be proven is quite elaborate. The primary phrase in the property to be proven is the compound, “having as their objects the moon, sun, planets, lunar mansions, stars, or the like, that were singled out at the time of *that*.” The particular time in question is clarified by the subordinate clause, “the cognition of, say, Devadatta that had as its object the moon, sun, planet, lunar mansion, star, or the like, intended.”³⁴¹ (3) The reason is “because of being expressible by the words for cognitions of the moon, sun, planet, lunar mansion, star, or the like,” and (3b) it is qualified by the phrase, “given that they are not being perceived as having a connection with the earth.” Kamalaśīla points out that the qualification excludes cognitions of things like paintings of the sun (*citra-ādi-gata-āditya-ādi*)—we are talking only of the heavenly bodies themselves, rather than, e.g., representations of them. (4) The example is “Devadatta's cognition of stars, etc., that arose in the first instance.”

The apparent constancy of the heavenly bodies is an intuitively compelling focus for an argument that things persist through time. When, for example, I read medieval poets pondering the beauty of the moon—in Sanskrit, in translation from Japanese, and so on—I am moved in part because I feel I can look up on a clear night and tap into something shared across massive spans of space and time. In fact, though this extends beyond the bounds of Bh6 itself, one might well argue that the fact that *candra* translates so well to *moon* substantiates Bhāvivikta's intuition that the conventionality of words extends only as far as their coining. Sanskrit, English, Japanese, etc., all have words for the celestial object conventionally called *candra*, moon, *tsuki*, etc., because that celestial object is really there. Once we have established whatever linguistic convention we use to describe it, that word then

³⁴⁰ In the synonymous form *vipratipattiviṣayabhāvāpannāni*.

³⁴¹ The point of the term “intended” (*vivakṣita*, “desired to be said”) seems to be to underline that later cognitions of the moon correspond to Devadatta's earlier cognition of the moon—and of the sun, the sun, and so on—rather than that later cognitions of the moon might correspond in some way to Devadatta's earlier cognition of the sun.

really refers to that real thing.

Uddyotakara makes a very similar argument, though without reference to any particular objects, at the end of his comments on NS 3.2.14.³⁴² This is the argument Śāntarakṣita paraphrases in the verses following Bh7. Sutra 3.2.14, to remind the reader, is the Nyāya rejoinder to a Buddhist argument in defense of momentariness theory.

As the Buddhists argue: Just as we do not apprehend the causes of destruction or origination in, e.g., the transformation of milk into curd, so we fail to register the destruction and origination, each passing moment, of an apparently stable crystal. In fact, “the” crystal is a brand new momentary crystal each and every moment, but we, in our ignorance, are incapable of recognizing such subtle changes.

Uddyotakara, referring to our cognitions of the crystal across time—i.e., the varying appearance of the crystal as it is moved onto a surface of a different color—says the following:

The diachronic cognitions that are disputed (*vipratipanna*) have one and the same object, because, given coreferentiality (*sāmānādhikarānya*) with indubitable (*avyutthāyi*) cognitions of that [object], they are expressible (*vācya*) by the same words, like the cognitions of many people present at one and the same moment.³⁴³

When, for example, I see a crystal resting on a blue surface, recognize it as such, reach out to pick it up, and then find, as I lift it towards my eyes, that it is actually colorless, the moment I first see the apparently-blue crystal and the subsequent moment when I recognize its crystalline transparency are both cognitions of the same stone. If my friend and I are together, we can both look up at one and the same moment at one and the same thing, and we can both be said to be gazing at the moon. In the same way, when I look up at the moon again a few days later, though it is a different moment, and the moon itself is in a different phase, I am nevertheless moon-gazing again. It follows, according to the Naiyāyikas, that it is the same moon up in the sky.

§ § §

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla cite Bh7 immediately after Bh6 and immediately before Uddyotakara’s take on diachronic cognitions. Bh7 is not very easy to read nor to understand or interpret. Kamalaśīla cites it as follows:

idam aparaṃ tadīyam eva pramāṇam ye rūpatvādisāmānyāśrayāḥ, ye ca tadāśrayāḥ, tadviśayās ca ye pratyakṣānumānopamānaśābdasmṛtipratyabhijñānārhasiddhadarśanārekaviparyayānadyavasāyasvapn asvapnāntikāḥ^a prajñānaviśeṣāḥ te sarve svātmalābhānantarapradhvamsino na bhavanti jñeyatvaprameyatvābhidheyatvasadasadanyataratvasadasadvyatiriktajñeyaviśayajñānānavacchedyatvāgrāhyaviśayagrahaṇāgrāhyatvānabhidheyābhidhāyakānabhidheyatvasamānāsamānājātiyadravyasaṃyogav

³⁴² Shortly after his argument against destruction’s causelessness (§5).

³⁴³ *vipratipannā ayugapatkālāḥ pratyayā ekaviśayā avyutthāyitatpratyayasāmānādhikarānye sati samānaśabdavācyaṭvāt vartamānaikakṣaṇānekapuruṣapratyayavat* (NV 393.2). I render *avyutthāyi* (not possessing *vyutthāya*) “indubitable.” To possess *vyutthāya* seemingly means something that can be disagreed about; something that does not possess *vyutthāya*, then, is something indisputable. Uddyotakara is specifically referring, here, to the cognition of a crystal. Cf. §5.

ibhāgajanitaśabdakāryaśabdābhidheyatvebhyaḥ prāgabhāvādivad *iti*. (464–465)³⁴⁴

This is another argument by the same man: The substrata of universals like color-ness [e.g., the color blue], their substrata [e.g., a blue cloth], and the particular cognitions—whether perception, inference, analogy, testimony, memory, recognition, sagely wisdom, established teaching, doubt, mistake, indefinite cognition (*anadhyavasāya*), dream, or end of dream—that have those [i.e., the color blue and the cloth] as their objects are all not subject to destruction immediately after coming into their own (*svātmalābha*). This is because they are cognizable (*jñeyatva*); because knowable (*prameyatva*); because denotable (*abhidheyatva*); because either existent or non-existent (*sad-asad-anyataratva*); because of not being delimitable by a cognition of cognizable objects apart from what is existent or non-existent (*sad-asad-vyatirikta-jñeya-viśaya-jñāna-anavacchedyatva*); because of not being graspable by the grasping of an ungraspable object (*agrāhya-viśaya-grahaṇa-agrāhyatva*); because of not being denotable by what denotes the undenotable (*anabhidheya-abhidhāyaka-anabhidheyatva*); and because of being denotable by a sound that is the effect of a sound produced by the conjunction and disjunction of homogeneous and heterogeneous substances (*samāna-asamāna-jātīya-dravya-samyoga-vibhāga-janita-śabda-kārya-śabda-abhidheyatva*); like prior non-existence, etc.

Well now. Here in Bh7, Bhāvivikta matches, and to some extent exceeds, the elaborateness of Av8, Aviddhakarna’s first proof of the self. Where Av8 nests together six reasons, Bh7 includes eight of increasing intricacy, ranging from mere cognizability to the fact of “being nameable by a sound that is the effect of a sound produced by the conjunction and disjunction of substances of similar and dissimilar classes.” Where Av8 features a single, if complex, subject—“my cognitions” marked with a set of qualifications—Bh7 joins three different loci, including the same exhaustive list of species of cognition as Av8, from perception to “end of dream” cognition (§2).

The trickiest aspect of Bh7 is its massive list of reasons. Is this a single complex argument—as Av8 appears to be—or Kamalaśīla’s paraphrase of a series of arguments by Bhāvivikta? Kamalaśīla refers to it as a *pramāṇa*, in the singular, but then, after unpacking it, also refers to it as a *hetu-kadambaka* (reason-cluster), which is also in the singular, but which may refer to several separate reasons toward the same conclusion rather than a single complex set of reasons (as in Kamalaśīla’s characterization of X1 and X2 as *pramāṇa-kadambaka*).³⁴⁵ In any case, the basic point of the argument would seem to be that we can only know and discuss things that persist through time.

Before sorting through the reasons, it is worth noting that cognitions are actually transient for Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. The complex subject of Bh7 includes the particular cognitions that have “the substrata of universals and their substrata” as objects, but Bhāvivikta must have in mind here a looser, more naturalistic description of cognitive events than a strict Vaiśeṣika-style analysis of each momentary flash of cognition. And if, as seems to be the case, he specifically has Buddhist momentariness theory in mind in formulating this reason-cluster, he likely also takes for granted that anything that is genuinely denotable must be distinct from what Buddhists consider momentary. Unique particulars, after all, cannot be captured in words. This argument appears to imply that, even if cognitions are momentary in a sense, they are not technically momentary by the Buddhist

³⁴⁴ TSP 203.1, J75v.2.

^a TSP reads °ārtha° instead of °ārṣa°, and °ānuyavasāya° instead of °ānadhyavasāya°, but J confirms that the list is the same as in Av8.

³⁴⁵ The metaphor would seem to work as well either way; cf. n 234 about *kadambaka*.

definition.

As for the reasons. There may well be a method to the madness. Here are the eight reasons in sequence:

- (1) cognizable (*jñeyatva*, or “object of cognition”)
- (2) knowable (*prameyatva*, or “object of knowledge”)³⁴⁶
- (3) denotable (*abhidheyatva*, or “object of language”)
- (4) either existent or non-existent (*sad-asad-anyataratva*)
- (5) not delimitable by a cognition of cognizable objects apart from what is existent or non-existent (*sad-asad-vyatirikta-jñeya-viṣaya-jñāna-anavacchedyatva*)
- (6) not graspable by the grasping of an ungraspable object (*agrāhya-viṣaya-grahaṇa-agrāhyatva*)
- (7) not denotable by what denotes the undenotable (*anabhidheya-abhidhāyaka-anabhidheyatva*)
- (8) denotable by a sound that is the effect of a sound produced by the conjunction and disjunction of homogenous and heterogeneous substances (*samāna-asamāna-jātīya-dravya-samyoga-vibhāga-janita-śabda-kārya-śabda-abhidheyatva*)

Reasons (5), (6), and (7) refer to impossibilities: there is nothing that is “delimitable by a cognition of cognizable objects apart from what is existent or non-existent,” as there is no such cognizable thing. To be cognizable entails being “either existent or non-existent.” Similarly, nothing is “graspable by the grasping of an ungraspable object,” as there is no such means of (cognitively) grasping what cannot be grasped; nor of denoting the undenotable. Vātsyāyana says, very early on in the *Bhāṣya*, that means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) illuminate what is *sat* and what is *asat*, i.e., positive or negative facts.³⁴⁷ There is nothing else to be made known.

But these seeming tautologies do not stand in isolation. They seem to mirror the first three reasons, respectively, and perhaps to substantiate the relationships between these three and reason (4). That is to say, because “the substrata of universals,” etc., are cognizable (1), they are either existent or non-existent (4), because being cognizable entails that they can be delimited by a cognition of what is either existent or non-existent (5). Similarly, their being objects of knowledge (*prameya*) entails being existent or non-existent because they could only be grasped by an instrument of cognitive grasping (*grahaṇa* in the sense of *pramāṇa*) of what is actually graspable, i.e., what is existent or non-existent. The same goes for their being denotable, and for denotability more generally.

It is possible, in other words, that Bhāvivikta is offering a sequence of reasoning rather than a single logical reason or a collection of independent but similar arguments. Take “indefinite cognition”

³⁴⁶ These two terms, *jñeya* and *prameya*, are often treated as synonyms, but since Bh6 clearly divides them, I am treating *jñeya* as any object of cognition, including things that have already been cognized (and so are not new information), as well as objects of erroneous cognitions, and *prameya* as objects grasped by genuine means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

³⁴⁷ sataḥ prakāśakaṃ pramāṇam asat api prakāśayatīti, “A means of knowledge, which is an illuminator of what is existent, also illuminates what is non-existent” (NBh 2.4)

(*anadhyavasāya*) for example. In Praśastapāda's description,³⁴⁸ such a cognition concerns a specific object of perception or inference that one does not fully understand upon encountering it. Say one has never seen a particular kind of fruit tree nor the fruit that grows on it. Coming upon such a tree, one sees that it is a tree, that it is a fruit tree, and that it is not, e.g., a mango tree, yet one does not definitively know what it is. Thus one has “cognized” the tree without fully “knowing” it or being able to “denote” it. Eventually, one may learn more about the tree through experience, or by asking someone about it, and, so, may eventually come to know what kind of tree it is, as well as the tree's name. Taken sequentially, it is not merely the fact that it is cognizable, or merely that it is cognizable *and* knowable, etc., but specifically the fact that our cognition, knowledge, and language for that tree arise over time and yet all regard the same object.

In this reading, the final reason, reason (8), is the sequence's overall termination. Kamalaśīla, in his brief explication of Bh6, glosses “homogeneous substances” (*samāna-jātīya-dravya*) as things like lips and teeth, which are similar (to the subjects of the argument) in being produced, and “heterogeneous substances” (*asamāna-jātīya-dravya*) as things like ether, which is dissimilar in being unproduced; both sets are essential for hearing language, as lips and teeth form words, and ether is the medium of sound. Kamalaśīla then explains that when the conjunction and disjunction (*samyoga-vibhāga*) of lips and teeth, etc., form the initial sound, a series of sounds traverses the ether, and it is only the sound that reaches the cavity of the ear that is itself perceived.³⁴⁹ He does not explain the bearing this has on the argument's reasoning, but the implication seems to be this: The color, for example, of a cloth, can be named by a sound that results from the series of sounds beginning with the conjunction of lips, teeth, ether, and so on, but if things like the color of the cloth perish immediately after arising, then the actual sound that reaches the ear, the sound that technically “denotes” (*abhidhāyaka*) the color of the cloth, would be denoting something that no longer exists. The sequence with the unfamiliar tree need not unfold over a long sequence of time to prove the point. I am walking through the woods with a friend, we come upon a tree, and I ask her what it is. My friend may not recognize it immediately, but looks carefully at its needles, quickly deduces the species, and right then says, “it's a Colorado blue spruce.” The entire sequence may only take a couple of seconds, and yet that would already be long enough to refute momentariness theory.

³⁴⁸ anadhyavasāyo 'pi pratyakṣānumānaviṣaya eva saṃjāyate. tatra pratyakṣaviṣaye tāvat prasiddhārtheṣv aprasiddhārtheṣu vā vyāsaṅgād arthitvād vā kim ity ālocanamātram anadhyavasāyaḥ. yathā vāhikasya panasādiṣv anadhyavasāyo bhavati. tatra sattādravyatvapṛthivṛtavṛkṣatvarūpavattvādiśākhāyapekṣo 'dhyavasāyo bhavati. panasatvam api panasēṣv anuvṛttam āmrādibhyo vyāvṛttam pratyakṣam eva kevalam tūpadeśābhāvād viśeṣasaṃjñāpratipattir na bhavati. anumānaviṣaye 'pi nārikeladvīpavāsiṇaḥ sāsnāmātradarśanāt ko nu khalv ayaṃ prāṇī syād ity anadhyavasāyo bhavati (*Anadhyavasāya* also arises with regard to objects of perception or inference. First, regarding objects of perception: The mere consideration, “What is it?” in regard to something well-known or something unfamiliar, whether because of distraction or desire, is *anadhyavasāya*. For example, a Vāhika person has *anadhyavasāya* in regard to a jackfruit tree, or the like. In such a case, he has *adhyavasāya* with regard to its existence, the fact that it is a substance, its earthiness, the fact that it possesses color, its branches, and so on. Being a jackfruit, as including jackfruit trees and excluding mango trees, etc., is also perceptible. Only, there is no clear apprehension of the name of the specific thing because there has been no instruction. Regarding objects of inference: An inhabitant of Nārikela island, after seeing but the dewlap of a gayal, has the *anadhyavasāya*, “Well, now, what might this animal be?” [PDhS 182]).

³⁴⁹ samānajātīyāni dravyāṅy adharadaśanādīni kṛtakatvādisāmānyād asamānajātīyāny ākāśādīni teṣāṃ yau mithaḥsamyogavibhāgau tābhyāṃ janito yaḥ prathamāḥ śabdas tasya paramparayā yaḥ kāryabhūtaḥ śrutipatham avatīrṇas tenābhidheyatvam. tathā hy eṣāṃ iyaṃ prakriyā prathamāḥ kila śabdaḥ samyogavibhāgayonis tasmāc chabdāntarāṇi kadambagolakanyāyena prādurbhavanti. tebhyaḥ pratyekam ekaikaśo mandataratamanyāyena prādurbhavati. tatra yaḥ karṇaśaṣkulimadhyam ākāśadeśam āpnoti sa upalabhyate netara iti (TSP 203.16, J75v.4).

Otherwise, as with the blue cloth, the word “spruce” that reaches my ears would denote something that no longer exists. This, it would seem, does not accord with Bhāvivikta’s understanding of the real referentiality of language.

Of course, it accords quite well with the Buddhist understanding of the illusory conceptual imposition of language—but that raises an obvious question: Would Bhāvivikta have considered this a sound argument against Buddhists? Clearly he must have had Buddhist theory in mind in formulating such an argument, but his specific characterization of an individual instance of color as the substratum of the universal color-ness—the first phrase in Bh7—is already in discord with Buddhist theory. It is hard to figure out just what Bhāvivikta is up to with this argument.

We know from Uddyotakara’s analysis of destruction (§5) that there is a difference between a non-entity (*abhāva*) that is nevertheless a fact, such as the non-existence of something before it comes into being (*prāg-abhāva*), and a non-entity that simply does not exist, such as a sky-lotus. (Kamalaśīla elided that aspect of Uddyotakara’s analysis when reformulating his comments on destruction.) In Śāntarakṣita’s paraphrase of Bh6, he replaces Bhāvivikta’s example, “prior non-existence (*prāg-abhāva*),” with a sky-lotus. A thing’s prior non-existence has no cause, and never comes into being, and so “does not perish immediately after arising.” But unlike a sky-lotus, prior non-existence is a real non-entity, a negative fact that can be gleaned through a means of knowledge. Did Śāntarakṣita interpret prior non-existence as a similar case (*sapakṣa*) or a dissimilar case (*vipakṣa*), i.e., as something that possesses the property to be proven or something that does not? It would be absurd to say that a sky-lotus, which never arises, perishes immediately after arising, so it would seemingly have to be a similar case, yet this makes for a strange argument. The “prior non-existence” of, say, a pot is a cognizable negative fact that persists for longer than a moment. A sky lotus does not perish but nor does it persist. If we keep in mind Uddyotakara’s distinction between different kinds of non-entities, prior non-existence is a sensible example for Bhāvivikta to use, far more so than a sky-lotus would be. The small shift in Śāntarakṣita’s version of the argument makes a real difference in the argument’s function.

Śāntarakṣita’s response to Bh7 is brief—and very slightly off target:

Because universals, etc. (*jāti-āder*), lack intrinsic existence (*niḥsvabhāvatva*), we do not claim momentariness (*kṣaṇa-bhaṅgitā*) [in their case]. The argument for the sake of proving its³⁵⁰ non-existence is presented in vain. (470)³⁵¹

Bhāvivikta’s argument is clearly not intended to disprove the momentariness of universals, but of particular qualities (the specific blue that is the substratum of the universal blueness), substances (the cloth that is the substratum of that color blue), and—apparently—cognitions of them. (The subject in Śāntarakṣita’s paraphrase of the argument, in verses 464–465, matches Bh7 nearly exactly.) The word “etc.” in the phrase “universals, etc.” in the verse clearly encapsulates substances, qualities, and the other categories, so Śāntarakṣita’s point more or less holds, but it is still a little odd that he

³⁵⁰ Kamalaśīla says: *tasmāt teṣu tasyāḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgitāyā abhāvasiddhyartham yad uktam sādhanam tad vṛthā* (TSP 205.6, J76r.5).

³⁵¹ jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvān naiveṣṭā kṣaṇabhaṅgitā | tadabhāvaprasiddhyartham nirḍiṣṭam sādhanam vṛthā ||470|| (TS 205, J23v.4).

specifically mentions universals. (Metrically, *dravyāder* (substances, etc.) and *jātyāder* do not differ.)

The way Kamalaśīla puts it, Śāntarakṣita simply does not bother looking at the argument in any finer detail (*sūkṣmekṣikā*). “If one were to do so,” he explains, “one would fall into an even greater web of defects.”³⁵² He specifically objects to reason (4):

The reason “because either (*anyatara*) existent or non-existent” is not established in the subject or in the example, because the word “either” refers to an option, and there can only be an option (*vikalpa*) when more than one thing is possible, rather than just one. It is not the case that both existence and non-existence are possible in the subject, because, given that it has the form of an entity (*vastu*), only existence is possible. Nor are both possible in the case of the example, because, given that it is a non-entity (*avastu*), only non-existence is possible.³⁵³

I cannot help but wonder whether Bhāvivikta had in the back of his mind something quite like the so-called *sadvitīya-prayoga*, a skeptical argument in which the disjunctive term “either” (*anyatara*) is meant precisely to work as a kind of hinge between the subject and the example. This would perhaps suggest some degree of Cārvāka influence, as we will see when we look at the *sadvitīya-prayoga* in more detail in §15. Kamalaśīla claims that something can only have “either-ness” if the option is genuine. The sky, we might say, is “either bright or dark” because this is a genuine option, depending on the time of day. This is clearly not Bhāvivikta’s understanding of the disjunction, and seems more like Kamalaśīla wringing his hands than making a real argument against this usage.

Bh7 remains fairly opaque to me. I cannot help but wonder what form it might have had in the *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*, and whether Kamalaśīla has tinkered with it, or simply what light its original context could shed on its precise reasoning and intent.

³⁵² atrāpi sūkṣmekṣikā na kṛtā. yadi sā kriyate, tadā bahutaram atra doṣajālam avatarati (TSP 205.7, J76r.5).

³⁵³ yad etat sadasadanyataratvam sādhanam uktam tat sādhyadharminiḥ dṛṣṭāntadharminiḥ^a cāsiddham vikalpaviṣayattvād anyataraśabdasya vikalpaś cānekapadārthasambhavesati bhavati naikasmin, na ca sādhyadharminiḥ dvayoh sadasattvayoh sambhavo ‘sti, tasya vasturūpatvena sattvasyaiva sambhavāt. nāpi dṛṣṭāntadharminiḥ dvayasambhavaḥ, tasyāvastutvenāsattvasyaiva sambhavāt (TSP 205.8, J76v.1).

^a J °dharmani.

DRAVYA

After arguing that all of the claims against momentariness are inconclusive at best, Śāntarakṣita returns, at the beginning of chapter nine, the “Examination of the Relation between Actions and Results (*karma-phala-sambandha*),” to the objection that momentariness renders causality, and so karmic accountability, impossible. (Kumārila is the primary voice of this objection.) Śāntarakṣita’s response is a rousing defense of core Buddhist doctrines about the fundamental delusions of our mundane experience of reality. Not only is there no agent of action,³⁵⁴ but even the concepts of bondage and liberation are just words for states of mind.³⁵⁵ Selflessness and momentariness inform purified minds; the rest of us, Kumārila et al, who foolishly impute unity where it does not really exist, struggle to act well.³⁵⁶

With chapter ten, the “Examination of Substance (*dravya*),” Śāntarakṣita begins his analysis of the six categories of Vaiśeṣika: substance, quality, action, universal, particular, and inherence. At the beginning of the chapter, as we have already seen (§0), Śāntarakṣita explains why it is necessary for him to refute the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories despite the fact that momentariness theory undermines them:

With nothing but scripture, the followers of Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda say, “We proclaimed earlier [i.e., in the “Examination of Permanence,”] that universals, etc., cannot be devoid of essence; the six categories, substance, etc., really exist.”

Therefore, we briefly convey the refutation of substance, etc. (546–547)³⁵⁷

³⁵⁴ kartṛtvādivyavasthā tu santānaikyavivakṣayā | kalpanāropitaiveṣṭā nāṅgaṃ sā tattvasaṃsthiteḥ ||504|| (TS 215, J25v.2).

³⁵⁵ kāryakāraṇabhūtās ca tatrāvidyādayo matāḥ | bandhas tadvigamād iṣṭā muktir nirmalatā dhiyaḥ ||543|| (TS 229, J27v.2).

³⁵⁶ ahīnasattvadṛṣṭinām kṣaṇabhedavikalpanā | santānaikyābhimānena na kathañcit pravartate ||540||
abhisambuddhatattvās tu pratikṣaṇavināśiṣu | hetūnām niyamaṃ buddhvā prārabhante^a śubhāḥ kriyāḥ ||541|| (TS 228, J27r.6).

^a J prārabhante.

³⁵⁷ jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvam ayuktaṃ prāk prakāśitam | dravyādayaḥ ṣaḍarthā ye vidyante pāramārthikāḥ ||546|| ity
ākṣapādakāṇādāḥ prāhur āgamamātrakāḥ^a | dravyādipratīṣedho 'yaṃ sañkṣepeṇa tad ucyate ||547|| (TS 231, J27v.3).

In other words, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, clinging to their doctrines, refuse to acknowledge that the proof of momentariness renders all six categories invalid. The Buddhists will have to refute the categories one by one.

After lamenting the stubbornness of Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, Śāntarakṣita turns to the nature of substance. He delineates the substances listed in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, focusing especially on the permanent substances, primarily the atoms. Proving momentariness disproves the permanence of atoms, but to do so more directly, Śāntarakṣita revisits an argument found in many of the earlier chapters of the text, the *yugapad* argument: If atoms were permanent, and yet were also the causes of the gross material objects of the world, the diversity of the world would arise *all at once* (*yugapad*) each and every moment. A present, functioning cause produces its effect immediately.

Av12, Aviddhakarṇa's proof of the permanence of atoms, follows, along with Śāntarakṣita's swift rebuttal.

After this, Śāntarakṣita makes the claim that there are no wholes distinct from their parts. He then considers a series of four arguments to prove this distinction, beginning with Bh8, an argument that Kamalaśīla attributes to "Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al." The way Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla frame Bh8 within the "Examination of Substance" exemplifies Śāntarakṣita's systematic approach to rival philosophical theories.

Kamalaśīla points out that "followers of Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda" are, respectively, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas.

^a J mātrikāḥ.

CHAPTER TEN

EXAMINATION OF SUBSTANCE

Introduction

With nothing but scripture, the followers of Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda³⁵⁸ say: “We proclaimed earlier that universals, etc., cannot be devoid of essence; the six categories, substance, etc., really exist.”

Therefore, we briefly convey the refutation of substance, and so on. (546–547)

They maintain that substance is nine-fold, divided in terms of earth, [water, fire, air, ether, time, space, self, and mind]. The four beginning with earth are each twofold, insofar as each has a permanent and an impermanent aspect. The atoms, consisting in earth, etc., are held to be permanent, whereas those [elements] that are generated by these are perishable.³⁵⁹ (548–549)

Concerning this, we have already demonstrated the non-existence of the permanent form of atoms, because we have proven that momentariness pertains to all entities. In fact, if the atoms were permanent, gross things would be brought about all at once.³⁶⁰ In addition, they could not rely on conjunction, or the like, because they are without distinction (*aviśeṣa*).³⁶¹ (550–551)

Objection: “We hold that the generator of atoms is not furnished with the property of existing, because it does not fall within the scope of a means of knowledge that apprehends something present.”³⁶² (552)

Not so, because this is unestablished. We observe that weavers, etc., are the cause of atoms, because all things, such as cloths, consist of atoms. Non-existence is not proven through the absence of a means of knowledge grasping something existent. Indeed, if there is no functioning of a means of knowledge, there is no certainty about the absence of a thing.³⁶³ (553–554)

On the other hand, we do not at all perceive a whole substance constituted by these [permanent atoms], which is supposed to be distinct from qualities and parts. Therefore, having no means of proof, it is not established.³⁶⁴ (555)

³⁵⁸ This refers to Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, respectively, as Kamalaśīla notes.

³⁵⁹ When we refer to “earth, water, fire, and air,” we may either be referring to earth atoms, water atoms, etc., which are permanent, or to impermanent earth, etc., i.e., the substances composed of those atoms.

³⁶⁰ Again, as with Īśvara and the moon, a permanent cause could not change over time, and thus would have to bring about all of its effects at once.

³⁶¹ And yet again, Kamalaśīla says: “Atoms cannot be given a distinction by others, because they are permanent” (*parair anādheyaviśeṣā evānavah, nityatvāt*).

³⁶² I.e., there is no proof that atoms have a cause. Kamalaśīla attributes this argument to Aviddhakarṇa (§7).

³⁶³ I.e., absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

³⁶⁴ “You have not proven *x*” is not the same as “we have proven *not-x*.” (See the previous two notes.) But, according to the Buddhists, it is possible to prove that something does not exist through the non-apprehension of it *if* we can demonstrate that it would be perceived were it really there. Elephants are visible, the lights are on, and our eyes are functioning, so if there were an elephant in the kitchen, we would know it; the fact that we can open the silverware drawer without bumping into the massive animal—i.e., our non-apprehension of an elephant—proves the absence of an elephant there.

Nyāya mereological arguments

[According to Nyāya thinkers:]

(i) We see a rock that is crystalline when it is in contact with a surface even though we do not grasp its color. In the same way, we see a crane, etc. When a man is cloaked in armor, even without knowing his complexion, we can see that we have the perception of a man. We have a perception of a cloth when the cloth has been dyed.³⁶⁵ (556–557)

(ii) Color, etc., can be absolutely differentiated from, e.g., a lotus flower, because of the delimitation of the one by the other, as can [Caitra's] horse from Caitra. And earth, etc., can be ultimately differentiated from color, scent, etc., because of the difference between the singular and plural numbers, as with the difference between the moon and the lunar mansions.³⁶⁶ (558–559)

(iii) In this manner, cloth and thread are distinct because they have different makers, powers, etc., just as there is a difference between pillars and pots, and so on, because they are furnished with contrasting (*viruddha*) qualities. (560)

(iv) But if gross things were impossible, there could be no perception of things like trees, because atoms are beyond the senses. Nor could there be the term “atom,” because it is in reference to gross entities that things are thus said to be very minute. If there were no gross, singular entities, in relation to what would it be minute? (561–562)

Refutation

We grasp crystals, etc., with a color, such as red, and yet they cannot have these as their colors, because that would entail the loss of your own position. But we do not perceive the essence of something else apart from the color. And it is untenable that such things could be known by a cognition with the image of something else, because of overextension. Or, if, e.g., the clear (*śukla*) [crystal] could be known in this manner, then the cognition would be mistaken, like the cognition of a conch being yellow. (563–565)

As for the man cloaked in armor, that cognition is inferential, because we perceive the armor, the arrangement of which is the reason for [our inference of] him. (566)

In the case of the cloth, due to the red dye or saffron, etc., there is another color upon the destruction of the previous color, because the cloth is momentary. From that color, yet another color, white, is produced through reliance on water, etc., similarly to the blackness of iron [after heating and cooling].³⁶⁷ If it were fixed, nothing else would suppress the color, because the unsuppressed

³⁶⁵ Kamalaśīla attributes this line of argumentation to Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al (§8), but in the *Vipañcitārthā*, Śāntarakṣita attributes nearly the exact same argument to Aviddhakarṇa.

³⁶⁶ This argument derives from a passage in Uddyotakara's *Nyāya-vārttika*. There, Uddyotakara imagines his Buddhist interlocutor saying, “Earth is nothing but color [or, rather, *rūpa*], etc; color, etc., is nothing but earth. Earth is itself color, etc.; color, etc., are themselves earth” (*evam rūpādīmātram pṛthivī, pṛthivīmātram rūpādaya iti pṛthivy eva rūpādayo rūpādaya eva pṛthivīti* (ND2, 71.20)). In these sentences, “earth” is in the singular and “color, etc.” is in the plural. He uses a striking example, in addition to the moon and the lunar mansions, to demonstrate that this sort of difference in grammatical number really matters: “The term *cāturāśramyam* [the condition of four stages of life] denotes the fact that all four stages of life are commonly conducive to dharma (*cāturāśramyam iti caturṇām āśramāṇām samānam dharmasādhanatvam abhidhīyate* (ND2, 72.5)). In other words, there is a difference between referring, in the plural, to “the four stages of life,” which refers to each of the four as separate stages, and “the condition of four stages of life” in the singular, which indicates something about the fact that there are four stages.

³⁶⁷ Kamalaśīla: “As a black color arises again in an iron in which a bright color had been produced through contact with fire.” (*yathāgnisamparkāt samupajātabhāsuraḍīrūpasya lohādeḥ punaḥ śyāmādirūpotpattih*).

earlier character would continue. (567–569)

Argument (ii)

Things like the genitive case, and differences in number, come only from the speaker's whim. It is untenable to determine the form of the true state (*tattva*) of things from that. To explain: the other party does not accept that the *existence* of the six [categories] is something else, nor that the *set* of them is some singular thing. (570–571)

Objection: “We hold the existence of the six to be the fact (*tattva*) of being an object of the means of knowledge making it known.”³⁶⁸

This entails something beyond your six. (572)

Objection: “We call these six property-possessors. We only hold that the properties are distinct from them.”

Then what do you think the relation between them is? Conjunction is untenable, because it is restricted to substances; nor can there be another inherence;³⁶⁹ nor do you accept any other relation. And if no relation is possible, then how could they have that property? Should you say, “merely through being produced by them,” then there would have to be others of the same sort. (573–575)

There is also a differentiating case relation in such a phrase as “the existence (*astitva*) of that [existence],” and so, given the existence (*bhāva*) of yet another thing, an infinite regress follows. And, due to the presence in it of another property, its being a property-possessor would obtain, yet you have also claimed that substance, etc., are property possessors on this same basis.³⁷⁰ (576–577)

Argument (iii)

If you are trying to prove the cloth's difference from the first threads,³⁷¹ then you will not be able to keep the argument from being fruitless. The following threads that are produced, having

³⁶⁸ More coarsely, “the fact *with regard to* an object of the means of knowledge...” (*viśaye tattvam*). Kamalaśīla says the interlocutor is claiming that the existence of the six is “another property, namely, the fact of being the object of a means of knowledge by which one apprehends something existent” (*saṃjñāpakapramāṇaviśayasya bhāvas tattvam sadupalambhakapramāṇaviśayatvam nāma dharmāntaram ṣaṅṅām astitvam iśyata ity arthaḥ*).

³⁶⁹ Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accepts two relations: conjunction (*saṃyoga*) and inherence (*samavāya*). The former is a separable relation (when you put down your cup of coffee, the conjunction between your skin and the surface of the cup ceases, yet both *relata* remain), while the latter is inseparable (the existence of a cloth depends on its inherence in its threads, if the relation comes to an end, the cloth itself can no longer exist). Conjunction falls under the category of quality, but inherence is unto itself the sixth category; according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it is uniform. Therefore, as Kamalaśīla explains, “If the relation [of existence, etc.] with inherence consisted of inherence, you would have to accept a second inherence” (*samavāyena ca samavāyātmake sambandhe sati dvitīyaḥ samavāyo 'ngikṛtaḥ syāt*).

³⁷⁰ In other words, yet again there would be something beyond the six that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika claim as having special status.

³⁷¹ At this point in the text, Śāntarākṣita presumes momentariness. The “first” and the “following” threads are all the momentary fluctuations we conveniently refer to as “threads.” They are causally related: the “first” thread perishes the moment it arises, and, in so doing, effects the “second” thread, and so on. So the later threads are not utterly distinct from the first threads and yet they are not identical moment by moment, either.

obtained a distinct state, and capable of distinguished efficacious activity, are not utterly distinct from the first ones. (578–579)

When hearing about them separately, there may be the defects of weightiness, impotence, or fruitlessness.³⁷² Out of a desire to avoid these, and in order to communicate the fact that [all of the threads] pertain to one and the same effect, speakers make a single word for them, keeping in mind that usage is easier with a comprehensive expression. But they do not prove that the cloth, which is temporally coextensive [with its threads], has a distinct maker, capacity, dimension, and other such qualities. (580–582)

Argument (iv)

In this way, the atoms that are produced as mutual companions³⁷³ are certainly not supersensible, as they are within the scope of the eyes. Blue, etc., is imagined as being the innate form of atoms, and visual cognition, etc., is recognized as having blue, etc., as its appearance. Even if they are not marked with the distinction of succession, yet it remains that there is nothing annulling their perceptibility, as is also true of potions and so on. (583–585)

Also, in the observation of all things, which are characterized by exclusion from all [else], in that same manner, it is not the case that there is certainty in every respect. Even if the intact unique particular of an object is known by indeterminate perception, we clearly apprehend the cause of the determination of difference. Just like the illusion of a single light from the arising of [a series of] similar flames, so there is one type in the perception of many subtle [atoms] residing contiguously. If you do not accept the perceptibility of these [atoms] because they are not marked by distinction, then how is it that we find [perceptibility] in the case of flames and such? Or do you accept that wholes are like that? (586–589)

You might reply,³⁷⁴ “Given that we do not ascertain [atoms], how could blue, etc., be the form of atoms?” Even this is baseless, since the cognition does not lack an object, and does not have a single gross object, because there is a contradiction between grossness and singularity. If a gross object had a single intrinsic condition, then, when [a tiny portion of] it is covered by the mere leg of a fly, all of it (*sarva*) would consequently be covered, because it has no divisions. And if one portion is dyed, all of it (*sarva*) would be radiant with dye. Or if there are contrary properties, then, by consequence, there is multiplicity. (590–593)

Objection: “It has a single intrinsic condition, so why is the word ‘all’ (*sarva*) used with respect to it? In fact, that [word] refers to more than one thing, and a whole is not multiple.” (594)

You only describe things like cloths, bodies, and mountains, which are established through worldly usage, as wholes. Phrases like “the cloth is all (*sarva*) dyed,” “the cloth is dyed without gap,” “without remainder,” “completely,” arise on the basis of mere whim, so all of these (*sarve*) can be used. With the same sort of intention, we, too, say things like, “all of it (*sarva*) would be dyed.”

³⁷² I.e., it would simply take too many words (weightiness) to refer to all of the different momentary threads pertaining to a single point one wanted to make about “the” cloth; one would probably not be able to refer to all of them, anyway (impotence); and, in the end, the extra effort would be futile (fruitlessness).

³⁷³ The sense of “mutual companions” is that they are one another’s auxiliary causes, as in the sort of heap of atoms that Naiyāyikas mistake for real substantial wholes.

³⁷⁴ “What is understood is...” (*iti gamyate*), but this verb sometimes refers to a criticism, and Kamalaśīla introduces this verse by saying, “With this, he teaches the other party to object” (*etāvad ity ādinā param codayitum śikṣayati*).

Indeed, speakers have no limit. (595–597)

If you say it is a figurative (*bhākta*) expression [rather than an arbitrary one],³⁷⁵ this would entail a change in grammatical number.³⁷⁶ In addition, there is no difference in the cognition of the two things you are claiming to be primary and secondary (*gauṇa*).³⁷⁷ (598)

Objection: “It does not follow that all of it is dyed, nor do we observe the entire thing to be covered, because conjunction is not all-pervading.”

But if a substance does not have portions, then how would its intrinsic form stand without being pervaded? Or, if that is its condition, then, for the same reason, difference is established. There is no basis for a single thing to stand in many places, hence it is established that cloths, and the like, are multiform down to the atoms.³⁷⁸ (600–601)

And yet, those who have yet to understand the true nature of reality believe there is a single mass, and they speak of “atoms” in regard to this construction. Or the name is applied to such a thing without reference to any particular basis, but only in connection with convention, just as we might even apply the term “Īśvara,” “lord,” to someone destitute. (602–603)

[...]

³⁷⁵ Kamalaśīla imagines this objection: “This is not a defect for us, either, because the term ‘cloth,’ e.g., is applied to threads, i.e., to its parts, in a figurative, metaphorical manner, insofar as they are its cause. Therefore, the word ‘all’ can be used” (*syād etad mamāpy adoṣa eva, yasmād bhāktam upacaritam etat tantvādiṣv avayaveṣu tatkāraṇatayā paṭādyabhidhānam, tena sarvādiśabdaprayogo bhaviṣyatīti*).

³⁷⁶ Given Uddyotakara’s insistence on the non-arbitrariness of grammatical number.

³⁷⁷ If we are figuratively describing the threads by speaking of the cloth, there should be some distinction in the clarity and distinctness of the cognition of the dyed threads and “the dyed cloth,” like the difference between calling a lion “a lion” and calling a boy “a lion.” Kamalaśīla gives two readings, the second of which I find preferable: “Alternatively, there is no difference, no manifoldness, in the cognition of the two things accepted as primary and secondary in this case. Indeed, we do not perceive a different form on the part of the threads and the cloth, as we do, e.g., between color and taste. And it is not possible that two things in which different forms are not perceived have the relation of primary and secondary” (*atha vā buddher bhedo nānātvam, so ‘smin gauṇamukhyatveneṣṭayor na vidyate. na hi tantuvastrayor bhinnam rūpam samupalabhyate rūparasādivat, na cānupalabdhabbinnarūpayor gauṇamukhyabhāvaḥ sambhavati*).

³⁷⁸ Kamalaśīla restates the conclusion in accord with an earlier objection: “Therefore, it is established that blue, etc., is the form of atoms” (*tena nilādi paramānūnām akāra iti siddham*). The ablative in the verse, “due to atoms,” or “than atoms,” etc., is a little puzzling, but the point must amount to the same thing that Kamalaśīla says.

§7. AV12: PERMANENCE

Śāntarakṣita presents Av12 as an objection to the impermanence of atoms. Kamalaśīla cites the fragment as follows:

aviddhakarnaś tv aṅṅūnām nityatvaprasādhānāya pramāṇam āha paramāṅṅūnām utpādakābhimatam saddharmopagataṃ na bhavati sattvapratipādakapramāṅṅāviṣayatvāt kharaviṣāṅṅavad iti. (552)³⁷⁹

In order to prove the permanence of atoms, Aviddhakarṇa states this argument: What is imagined to be the generator (*utpādaka*) of atoms does not actually exist³⁸⁰ because it does not fall within the scope of any means of knowledge that can prove existence (*sattva*), as in the case of a donkey's horns.

We neither perceive nor infer a donkey's horns; nor, Aviddhakarṇa argues, do we perceive or infer the generator of atoms.³⁸¹ (Only perception or inference, at least in the Buddhists' estimation, qualifies as "a means of knowledge that can prove existence.")

Śāntarakṣita—unsurprisingly—is not convinced by this claim. First, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.³⁸² More importantly, if momentariness is established, it follows that atoms are impermanent and are, in fact, generated. Av12, then, becomes the occasion for Śāntarakṣita to highlight and undergird this point—almost conspicuously so.

The passage NS 4.2.4–17 concerns the relation between parts and wholes.³⁸³ The discussion there resolves eventually, in sutras 16 and 17, on the topic of atoms. As the smallest unit of measure, atoms are, by definition, without parts. This generates a discussion of atomic theory, beginning, in sutras 18 and 19, with an objection to the Nyāya view:

[*Objection:*] Because of the penetration of ether (*ākāśa*), this is impossible. (4.2.18)

³⁷⁹ TSP 233.5, 84v.4.

³⁸⁰ *Sad-dharma-upagata*: More coarsely put, "furnished with the property of the real" or "instantiating an existing phenomenon," or the like, but, as Kamalaśīla says, the point is simply that it has not obtained existence: *sato vidyamānasya dharmah saddharmo 'stivam, tenopagataṃ prāptam astity arthaḥ* (TSP 233.7, J84v.4).

³⁸¹ The implied opponent of this argument may be someone like a Buddhist, who does not accept the permanence of atoms, but it may also be someone like the proponent of the Upaniṣadic creator-god Puruṣa, who is refuted in chapter six of the *Tattvasamgraha*, the "Examination of Puruṣa." According to Śāntarakṣita, Puruṣa is said to create the universe out of himself, the way a spider spins a web of herself without diminishing herself. Perhaps the proponent of such a view would claim that, unlike Īśvara, Puruṣa generates the atoms from which he spins the web of the universe.

³⁸² "In fact, there is no certainty regarding the absence of a thing if there is no functioning of *pramāṇa*" (*pramāṇavinivṛttau hi nārthābhāve 'sti niścayaḥ* ||554|| (TS 233, J28r.2)). As is well-known, Dharmakīrti developed *dr̥ṣya-anupalabdhi* (nonapprehension of a perceptible) as a logical reason distinct from reasons based on causality (*tadutpatti*) and identity (*tādātmya*). As Birgit Kellner explicates, "If an object such as ajar is present in proximity of all other causes which are required for its perception, such as a sense faculty and the like, it is, as Dharmakīrti clarifies at a later point in the same text, not possible for it not to be perceived" (2003, 124). In such a situation, the absence a perception of the jar warrants the inference that the jar does not exist. In light of this, then, we might rephrase Śāntarakṣita's remark as saying that failure to apprehend something is not the same as the kind of nonapprehension from which we can properly infer something's non-existence. (For more on *dr̥ṣya-anupalabdhi*, cf. Kellner 1999 and Kellner 2001.)

³⁸³ Overall, NS 4.2 concerns knowledge of truth (*tattva-jñāna*), which, as the very first sutra in NS says, leads to the highest spiritual goal (*nir̥śreyasa*). For a discussion of the historical development of this lesson, particularly regarding the final portion of NS 4.2, see Preisendanz 2000.

[Continued:] Or else ether is not all-pervading (*sarva-gata*). (4.2.19)

[Response:] “Inside” and “outside” (*antar bahiś ca*)—because they are expressions for other causes (*kāraṇa-antara*) of a substance that is an effect (*kārya*), they are absent in what is not an effect. (4.2.20)³⁸⁴

The discussion continues for several more sutras, but our concern is here in sutra 20, the clearest claim in the *Nyāyasūtra* that atoms do not have a cause.³⁸⁵

The interlocutor argues in sutra 18 that, because ether is all-pervading, it must penetrate each atom. This implies that ether pervades the atom inside and out, and therefore that atoms have parts (an “inside” part and an “outside” part). Sutra 19 further explains that if ether does not penetrate atoms in this way, it would absurdly follow that all-pervading ether does not pervade all.

In response, sutra 20 grants that atoms would indeed have parts if we could accurately describe them as having an inside and an outside, but that this would be an error in terms. The term “atom,” as Vātsyāyana notes, refer to “that than which there is nothing smaller.” An atom cannot be constituted by anything else, such as an internal portion and an external portion.³⁸⁶ The interlocutor’s suggestion makes no sense.

Sutra 20 regards the fact that atoms are not effects (*a-kārya*) as axiomatic. Vātsyāyana does the same. He does not spell it out, but for him the indivisibility and indestructibility of atoms basically go hand in hand, so not having the “causes” (*kāraṇa*) that are an “inside” and an “outside” also entails not being produced:

“Inside” conveys a cause (*kāraṇa*) that is enveloped by other causes. “Outside” conveys a cause that is not enveloped, that envelops [others]. This itself is possible on the part of a substance that is an effect, but not for an atom (*aṇu*), because it is not an effect. Indeed, in what is not an effect, an atom (*paramāṇu*), there is no “inside” and “outside.” Where there is “inside” and “outside,” that is an effect of atoms (*aṇu-kārya*), not an atom (*paramāṇu*), for an atom is that than which there is nothing smaller.³⁸⁷

In his comments on these verses, Uddyotakara³⁸⁸ repeatedly takes the fact that atoms are not produced as axiomatic, as well.

³⁸⁴ ākāśavyatibhedāt tadanupapattiḥ ||4.2.18|| (NS 267.7);

ākāśāsarvagatatvaṃ vā ||4.2.19|| (267.12);

antar bahir iti kāryadravyasya kāraṇāntaravacanād akārye tadabhāvaḥ ||4.2.20|| (267.15).

³⁸⁵ Cf. NS 2.1.36, which we will discuss in §8, and NS 2.2.24 (*nāṇunityatvāt* [NS 111.16]), which presupposes the permanence of atoms in refuting an argument for the permanence of sound but does not actually argue for the permanence of atoms.

³⁸⁶ yato hi nālpataṛam asti sa paramāṇur iti (NBh 268.4).

³⁸⁷ antar iti vyavahitaṃ kāraṇāntaraiḥ kāraṇam ucyate. bahir iti ca vyavadhāyakam avyavahitaṃ kāraṇam evocyate. tad etat kāryadravyasya sambhavati, nāṇor akāryatvāt. akārye hi paramāṇāv antar bahir ity asyābhāvaḥ. yatra cāsyā bhāvo ‘ṅukāryaṃ tat, na paramāṇuḥ. yato hi nālpataṛam asti sa paramāṇur iti (NBh 268.1).

³⁸⁸ In his comments on NBh 3.2.14, Uddyotakara substantiates the criticism of momentariness with reference to several arguments for the permanence of the self—even there, he does not invoke the permanence of atoms to disprove momentariness, perhaps because he regards knowledge of their permanence as axiomatic rather than inferentially derived (like the self’s existence and permanence, or the cause of destruction).

Aviddhakarṇa, in Av12, actually proposes an argument for the causelessness of atoms, even though it boils down to a mere rejection of any argument to the contrary. This is convenient for Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. In order to disprove the Nyāya argument for the permanence of atoms, there must be an actual argument to disprove. Aviddhakarṇa helpfully supplies just such an argument!

§8. BH8 (AND AV1): DIM LIGHT, DIM MINDS

By the time he begins the “Examination of Substance,” Śāntarakṣita has already disproven the concept of a permanent cause in general, as well as a variety of specific permanent entities. He wastes little time focusing on the permanent substances of Vaiśeṣika and instead dedicates the bulk of the chapter to the impermanent substances, beginning with Bh8.

Before diving into the way that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla frame Bh8, we have to momentarily turn our attention to Śāntarakṣita’s *Vipañcitārthā*, his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s *Vādanyāya* (cf. Appendix A). Early on in the *Vādanyāya*, Dharmakīrti contends with Nyāya mereology, i.e., Nyāya’s analysis of the relation between parts and wholes. According to Nyāya, substances are distinct from their qualities, and wholes exist above and beyond their parts. Dharmakīrti—and Śāntarakṣita—holds that this is logically untenable as well as contrary to experience. If, as Nyāya maintains, substances are perceptible and substance and quality are distinct, then why do we never perceive a substance on its own, apart from its qualities?³⁸⁹ Commenting on this, Śāntarakṣita cites Av1:

avidbhakarṇas tv āha rūpādyagrahe ‘pi dravyagrahaṇam asty eva, yato mandamandaprakāśe ‘nupalabhyamānarūpādikaṃ dravyam upalabhyate ‘niścitarūpam, gauḥ aśvo veti.

nanu ca tatrāpi saṃsthānamātram upalabhyate.

satyam upalabhyate na tu tadrūpādyātmakam. rūpādyātmakatve vā nilapītādiviśeṣagrahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ. tathāyaskañcukāntargate puruṣe puruṣarūpādyagrahe ‘pi puruṣapratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ. rātrau ca balākānām śuklarūpādyagrahe³⁹⁰ ‘pi pakṣipratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ. tathā nilādyupadhānabhedānuvidhāyinaḥ sphaṭikamaṇeḥ sphaṭikarūpādyagrahe ‘pi sphaṭikapratyayaḥ. tathā kaṣāyarūpeṇa paṭarūpābhībhava paṭarūpādyagrahe ‘pi paṭapratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ *iti*. (VA 34.15)³⁹¹

Avidbhakarṇa, for his part, says: We do, in fact, grasp a substance even when we do not grasp color, etc. For, in dim light (*mandamanda-prakāśa*), a substance, without its color, etc., being perceived, is perceived in an uncertain form, e.g., as a cow or a horse.

But even in this case, isn’t it that the shape alone is perceived?

True,³⁹² it is perceived, yet does not consist in its color, etc. After all, if it consisted of color, etc.,

³⁸⁹ Dharmakīrti: “So what if a single thing, say, a pot, were entirely different from color and the like? Were that so, given that this thing is perceptible, and has a form apart from color and the like, what would obstruct its appearance, in its own form, to cognition, in distinction to those things?” (*yady anya eva rūpādībhyo ghaṭa iti ekaḥ syāt, kim syāt. astu, pratyakṣasya sato ‘rūpādirūpasya tadvivēkena buddhau svarūpeṇa pratibhāsenā kim āvaraṇam* (Much, 8.1)). Śāntarakṣita: “Because you accept it can be grasped by the sense faculties of sight and touch... because you accept a difference between quality and substance” (*caḥṣuḥsparsānendriyagrāhyatayābhyupagatatvāt [...] guṇadravyayor bhedaḥbhyupagamāt* (VA 34.9–11)).

³⁹⁰ Steinkellner (16) valākāvyāmukta rūpādyagraha r : valākāmām śuklarūpādyagrahe ms > balākānām śuklarūpādyagrahe em.

³⁹¹ I am using the Śāstrī 1972 edition, consulting the SARIT 2014 encoding of Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935–36, and tracking the corrections and emendations in Steinkellner 2014. When applicable, Steinkellner’s notes are cited verbatim together with their page number, as in the preceding note. “r” refers to Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s edition; “re” to his emendations; “ms” refers to readings in the manuscript; “em” refers to Steinkellner’s proposed emendations; “:” means “against ms (no evaluation implied);” and “>” means “to be changed to.” Cf. Steinkellner 2014, xvii.

³⁹² The position of the *tu* suggests that we read *na* as a new clause, yet *satyam... tu* suggests a direct response to the objection, “true, and yet...” Perhaps we should understand an implicit syntactic connection with the preceding

[then, perceiving it,] we would have to grasp its particular color, blue, yellow, or the like. In this way, we have observed that when a person is cloaked in iron armor, even though we do not grasp his complexion, we perceive a person; or, at night, even though we do not grasp the white color, etc., of cranes, we perceive birds. Similarly, when a jewel that is crystalline conforms to a particular surface, like something blue, even though we do not grasp the crystal color, etc., we perceive the jewel. Likewise, we have observed that when we see the color of a [dyed] cloth as the reddish tint [of its dye],³⁹³ even though we are not seeing the color of the cloth itself, we perceive the cloth.

Śāntarakṣita's immediate response to Av1 is to denigrate the dimness—*māndya*, like the dim light (*mandamanda-prakāśa*) of his argument—of Aviddhakarṇa's mind. The product, he says, of studying false doctrines.³⁹⁴ It is a cute pun, and one of several casual insults in the *Vipañcitārthā*. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla seem genuinely to relish picking apart Aviddhakarṇa's arguments, occasionally commenting on what they consider his intellectual deficiencies. We only see it in brief flashes, but we see it throughout their engagement with him. These moments have an effect on the reader. They involve the reader in a social context, and reveal the reader to be the audience to a performance. Śāntarakṣita treats Aviddhakarṇa as an individual, rather than a repository or source of arguments and ideas. He also makes an example of him: This is what happens when you devote yourself to the study of Nyāya.

This is not only reminiscent of, but nearly identical to, Bh8, which Kamalaśīla cites in his comments on verses 556–557:

uddyotakarabhāviviktādayo [...] *āhur* guṇavyatirikto guṇī samupalabhyata eva, tadrūpādiguṇāgrahaṇe 'pi tasya grahaṇāt. tathā hi sphaṭikopalaḥ sannihitopadhānāvasthāyāṃ svagataśuklaguṇānupalambhe 'pi dṛśyata eva. balākādīś ca rātrau mandamandaprakāśāyāṃ tadgatasitādirūpādarśane 'pi gṛhyata eva. tathāprapadinakāñcukāvachannaśarīre puṃsi tadīyaśyāmādirūpādyagrahaṇe 'pi pumān pumān iti pratyayaḥ prasūyata eva. kaśāyakuñkumādirakte vāsasi tadrūpasya saṃsarpirūpeṇābhībhūtasyānupalambhe 'pi vastradhīr bhavaty eva. (*Pañjikā* on v. 556–557)³⁹⁵

Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al [...] *say*: The quality-possessor is actually perceived apart from its qualities, because it is grasped even when its qualities, color and the like, are not grasped. To explain: We see a rock that is crystalline when it is situated on an adjacent surface even if the quality of clearness that pertains to it is not perceived; and a crane, or the like, is grasped even at night, in dim light, when the color pertaining to it, white or the like, is not grasped. Similarly, when a man's body is covered in armor from head to toe, even though we do not see the color of, e.g., his dark complexion, the cognition, “man,” does in fact arise. When a cloth is dyed reddish yellow, saffron, or the like, even though we do not perceive its color, which has been overcome by the permeating color [of the dye], there is in fact a cognition of a cloth.

The similarity between this fragment and Av1 is evident, but the relationship between them is uncertain. Kamalaśīla attributes Bh8 to “Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al.” In all likelihood, then, this fragment is not a direct quotation but a paraphrase of at least two passages, one from a text by

samsthānamātram, “True, [mere form] is perceived, yet does not consist of color, etc.”

³⁹³ As we will see in Bh8 and the parallel passage in NV, this most likely refers to a dyed cloth rather than, say, paint on a canvas. Dye also presents a more distinctive example than paint, because the color of the threads is permeated by the color of the dye rather than simply being covered over, which would be somewhat like armor concealing a man's flesh.

³⁹⁴ tad etat sarvam asyālpakālopacitakudarśanābhyaśopajātabuddhimāndyavijṛmbhitam eva prakāṭayati vacaḥ (VA 34.23).

³⁹⁵ TSP 234.12, J85r.5. J reads °āpradīpana° for °āprapadīna° and appears to read °sargni° for °sarpi°.

Bhāvivikta, another by Uddyotakara. Sure enough, we find a strikingly similar passage in Uddyotakara's NV on sutra 3.1.1:³⁹⁶

[*Objection:*] Because grasping by sight and touch have, respectively, color and touch as their objects, they do not have pots, etc., as their objects.

[*Reply:*] Not so, because, when there is non-apprehension of color and touch, we observe the perception characterized by it. When someone perceives something without perceiving its color, there arises for him a perception that is characterized by that thing. For example, the perception of a crystal that has been placed on something blue, or the like, arises in the non-apprehension of [the crystal's intrinsic] color, etc. And at night, regarding cranes, because there is no grasping of the white color, etc., there is the perception of birds. Therefore, the cognition of a pot has a basis apart from color and touch.³⁹⁷

We have three passages with roughly the same content: (1) an excerpt from Uddyotakara's NV, (2) a fragment Śāntarakṣita attributes to Aviddhakarṇa, and (3) a fragment Kamalaśīla attributes to Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, et al. Kamalaśīla's "et al" (*ādi*) is as tantalizing as it is frustrating. What does this tell us about the relationships between these thinkers? As we have already discussed in the Introduction (cf. "Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta"), the convergence of these three passages may suggest that Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are one and the same man.

As for the content of the argument itself, Bh8 is relatively easy to understand, with clear significance for Nyāya's commitment to Vaiśeṣika ontology, specifically the distinct existence of whole substances from their various qualities. In short, Av1/Bh8 raises four subtly different instances in which we not only can infer but in fact directly perceive that substances exist separately from their qualities, in particular, color. Whether a thing's color is shrouded by darkness (a crane at night), obscured by a covering (an armored man), overcome by a color shining through it (a crystal on top of something), or permeated (a dyed cloth), despite not seeing the color of the thing, we nevertheless perceive the thing itself.

There are several sections of the *Bhāṣya* that particularly stand out as potentially shedding light on Av1 and whatever precise argument of Bhāvivikta's lurks behind Bh8,³⁹⁸ but two specific sutras strike me as most resonant: 2.1.31 and 3.1.1. It is worth considering both to see how the fragments are affected by interpreting them as comments on different sutras.

NS 2.1.31–36, an interlude on mereology within NS's examination of perception, reads as follows:

[*Objection:*] Perception is actually inference, because apprehension follows the grasping of a single

³⁹⁶ Uddyotakara also makes a number of arguments along these lines in his comments on NS 1.1.14.

³⁹⁷ darśanasparśanagrahaṇayo rūpasparśaviśayatvāt na ghaṭādiviśayatvam. na, rūpasparśānupalabdḥau tadviśiṣṭapratyayadarśanāt. yadāyam anulabhyamānarūpādikaṃ vastūpalabhyate, tadāsyā tadviśiṣṭaḥ pratyaya upajāyate. yathā nilādyupahite sphaṭike pratyayo rūpādyanupalabdḥau bhavati. rātrau ca balākāyāṃ śuklarūpādyagrahaṇāt pakṣipratyayaḥ. tasmāt rūpasparśavyatiriktanimitto ghaṭapratyayaḥ. (NV 328.17)

³⁹⁸ Specifically, 2.1.31–36, 4.1.34–36, 4.2.4–17, and, of course, 3.1.1 (the context of Uddyotakara's argument). The first three all concern mereology and directly raise the relation between substances and qualities. Av1 may have served to substantiate any of these three (though 2.1.32 strikes me as particularly resonant), and they all contextualize the role of mereology in Nyāya and its discourse with Buddhism. The exact parallel in NV 3.1.1 is most suggestive, and it is informative to consider Av1 in light of the problem of the self.

part. (2.1.31)

[*Response*:] No, because to the extent that it is apprehended, it is by perception. (2.1.32)

[*Objection*:] There is doubt concerning wholes because they have yet to be proved. (2.1.33)

[*Response*:] Non-grasping of all would follow from the non-establishment of wholes. (2.1.34)

And because holding and pulling are possible. (2.1.35)

If you say, “Grasping is like that of an army or a forest,” no, because atoms are supersensory. (2.1.36)³⁹⁹

Sutra 31 raises the objection that we never see the entirety of a thing, so that perception must in fact entail inference. Sutra 32 points out that even in this case perception is admitted by the opponent. The opponent then raises a deeper objection: the notion that when we perceive a portion of something there is a whole thing that is being perceived (even if only in part) is itself a presumption. Sutras 34–36 then argue for the necessity of wholes—in short, neither perception nor a host of practical activities would be possible if there were no true whole substances over and above their parts.

In the *Bhāṣya* on sutra 32, Vātsyāyana argues that we do not perceive parts or portions on their own, but rather substantial wholes together with whatever parts are currently accessible to the senses. Av1 could certainly serve to add to and substantiate this argument. In the *Bhāṣya*, it is said that we see a tree, a “whole,” despite never seeing certain of its parts, such as its roots. In Av1/Bh8, it is said that we see a crane, a substantial whole, even when we do not see some of its qualities, such as its color.

In Uddyotakara’s detailed comments on the following objection in sutra 33, he mentions, as a *pūrvapakṣa*, the argument that no substance is ever seen without color, etc., but he does not go into any greater detail at this point in the *Vārttika*. Perhaps Aviddhakarṇa and/or Bhāvivikta had a similar impulse and chose to raise and respond to this kind of *pūrvapakṣa* in this context. It is notable that Uddyotakara does not really respond to this *pūrvapakṣa* until 3.1.1.

Sutra 36, the last of the three arguments against sutra 33, distinguishes between substantial wholes that are comprised of atoms and collective wholes that are comprised of gross individuals: we do not grasp wholes the way we grasp a forest or an army, because the individual members of a forest or an army are each perceptible, unlike atoms, which are beyond the reach of the senses.

An even more likely home⁴⁰⁰ for Av1/Bh8 can be found in NS 3.1.1, which is surely one of the most

³⁹⁹ pratyakṣam anumānam ekadeśagrahaṇād upalabdheḥ ||2.1.31|| (NS 72.17);
na, pratyakṣeṇa yāvat tāvad apy upalambhāt ||2.1.32|| (73.12);
sādhyatvād avayavini sandehaḥ ||2.1.33|| (75.5);
sarvāgrahaṇam avayavyasiddheḥ ||2.1.34|| (75.10);
dhāraṇākaraṇopapatteś ca ||2.1.35|| (76.2);
senāvanavad grahaṇam iti cen nātīndriyatvād aṅūnām ||2.1.36|| (75.13).

⁴⁰⁰ There are two more clear possibilities, though neither seems as compelling as 2.1.32 or 3.1.1.

NS 4.1.14–43 is an important sequence that raises and refutes eight distinct causal theories (within the larger context of the examination of rebirth). We have already seen the three verses dedicated to the existence of Īśvara within this passage. The sixth argument (NS 4.1.34–6) in the sequence of eight is the (roughly) Buddhist argument that “everything

important single sutras for Buddhist-Nyāya debates on the self: *darśanasparśanābhyām ekārthagrahaṇāt*, “Because a single thing is grasped by sight and touch.”⁴⁰¹

Vātsyāyana introduces 3.1.1 by distinguishing two kinds of designation (*vyapadeśa*). A designation, he says, denotes the relationship of an agent with an action and an instrument. The designation “self” (*ātman*), he says, raises a question that thematizes the grammatical orientation of so much of philosophy written in Sanskrit: when we say that *someone* (agent) *sees* (action) *with the eye* (instrument), are we describing a single whole (*samudāya*) using one of its parts (*avayava*), like a tree standing by means of its roots, or one thing using something else as a tool, like a person chopping wood with an axe? According to Vātsyāyana, the Nyāya view is the latter: a self relates to its sense faculties the way a lumberjack relates to an axe rather than the way a tree relates to its roots. According to this, what the sutra says is that one and the same agent (the self) uses two different instruments (sight and touch) to perform two separate actions (seeing and touching) on one and the same object (a lemon, a friend, or whatever).

is separate,” i.e., that there are no unities, no substantial wholes.

4.1.34: All is separate, because of the separateness of the mark (*lakṣaṇa*) of an entity. (*sarvaṃ pṛthag bhāvalakṣaṇapṛthaktvāt*, NS 234.12);

4.1.35: No, because a single entity has its completion by means of more than one mark (*lakṣaṇa*) (*nānekalakṣaṇair ekabhāvanīspattheḥ*, 234.18);

4.1.36: There is no refutation [of unities] because of the differential establishment (*vyavasthāna*) of the mark (*lakṣaṇa*) (*lakṣaṇavyavasthānād evāpratiśedhaḥ*, 235.6).

The valence of the term *lakṣaṇa* (mark, definition) may not be perfectly stable throughout these three sutras. Commenting on sutra 34, Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara regard the “mark” (*lakṣaṇa*) of a thing as its name, the symbol that refers to it (rather than, say, to the characteristic feature by which it can be identified). The term “pot,” according to this reading of the opponent’s view, may be the name for a single entity, but its actual referent is not singular; it refers to the various qualities of “the” pot, as well as to “its” various parts. Sutra 35’s response boils down to there really being a single entity, albeit with various characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*). Sutra 36 then returns—it would seem—to the name of a thing. When we refer to a pot, we are referring to a single thing with various characteristics rather than to a mere assortment of characteristics, especially when we refer to a particular pot: “I am touching the same pot I saw earlier.”

In his comments on sutra 36, Vātsyāyana rephrases the counter-argument: Everything is separate because we refer, when we use words for substantial entities, to heaps or aggregations. In response, Vātsyāyana argues that there can be no aggregate without what is aggregated, i.e., that the components of an aggregate must themselves be unities, so the argument is self-contradictory. The upside is that wholes exist, which is, of course, the gist of Av1/Bh8. It would make sense, given the content of NS 4.1.34–36, that if Av1/Bh8 were a comment on sutra 36, later Buddhists would read it as a direct attack and fire back. But I read Av1/Bh8 as a defense of substantial wholes, whereas I read this passage in the *Bhāṣya* as more of an attack on an argument for momentariness, or the selflessness of *dharma*s, or the like. Meanwhile, Uddyotakara, in NV 4.1.35, points out that he has already proven the distinct existence of parts and wholes—referring most likely to his comments on 3.1.1.

In addition, the passage NS 4.2.4–17 revisits the problem of mereology at length. NS 4.2 revisits the central notion of *tattva-jñāna* (knowledge of truth, which is said in NS 1.1.1 to lead to the attainment of the highest goal [*nirśreyasā-adhigama*]). Sutra 4.2.3 says that the basis for defects (*doṣa-nimitta*) is regard for wholes (*avayavyabhimānaḥ*). Naturally, an opponent raises doubt about whether wholes really exist and a discussion ensues. Though there is a clear thematic overlap between this discussion and Av1/Bh8, there is no obvious role for Av1/Bh8 to play in this passage. Sutras 6–10 contain an extended *pūrvapakṣa* against the existence of wholes, and sutras 11–12 dismiss this *pūrvapakṣa*’s reasoning, rather than propose any arguments for wholes. Sutra 13 seems to return to the discussion from 2.1.31–36, raising the claim that we do, in fact, perceive masses of atoms, just as someone with partial blindness (*taimirika*) sees a mass of hair, i.e., despite not having the faculty to see each strand individually. But rather than the existence of substances over and above their parts, this leads into another discussion of the existence of atoms and their inaccessibility to the senses.

⁴⁰¹ Consider Chakrabarti’s classic “I Touch What I Saw” (1992).

This gives the Buddhists two clear targets. The first is, of course, the self. Yet Kamalaśīla does not cite Bh8 in the “Examination of the Self,” but several chapters later, in the “Examination of Substance (*dravya*).” This points to the second target created by 3.1.1, the concept of substance itself, especially substantial wholes that are impermanent but persist through time (the “single thing” of the sutra, such as a lemon). According to the Buddhists, this notion fails to account for the momentariness of all phenomena, and, in any case, is contrary to experience. Nyāya claims substances are perceptible but we never actually perceive them.

Though Vātsyāyana invokes the part-whole relationship in his comments on 3.1.1, and, of course, seeks to establish the existence of whole substances elsewhere in the *Bhāṣya*, he does not here defend the underlying concept of substance in its specific connection to the proof of self. That task falls to thinkers like Uddyotakara and Aviddhakarṇa. As we have seen, Uddyotakara does, in fact, make the Bh8 argument at the end of his remarks on 3.1.1. This parallel is suggestive unto itself, but NBh 3.1.1 would also be a striking root text for Av1 and whatever passage of Bhāvivikta’s is included within Bh8. While the *Bhāṣya* on 2.1.32 offers at least a natural home for these fragments, it does not particularly *do* anything to the argument itself. That is, reading Av1/Bh8 as a comment on NBh 2.1.32 only situates them, without augmenting our understanding of them. When we read them along with NBh 3.1.1, the argument takes on a powerful apologetic force. This reading suggests that Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are, like Uddyotakara, highlighting lapses in the *Bhāṣya* that rivals had sought to exploit, and raising the issue of substances specifically in defense of the self. This highlights the centrality of substance to the issue of the self, and the relation between Buddhist critiques of substance and Nyāya arguments for the self’s existence. Rather than simply prove that substances exist, Av1/Bh8 specifically substantiates the central premise of sutra 3.1.1. The grasping of a single thing, *ekārthagrahaṇa*, is possible; when we see something, we are seeing some *thing* that is singular, that persists through time, and that is distinct from its various qualities, such that our perception of it proves that we exist, that our *selves* exist. The way that perception works, and the way perception relates to substantial wholes, as examined in 2.1.32, serves as a backdrop for this broader argument about the nature of reality and its bearing on one of the central issues in the quest for knowledge of reality (*tattvajñāna*), the existence of the self. As a comment on 3.1.1, Av1 and Bh8 develop what was only a kernel in the *Bhāṣya*.

In the *Tattvasamgraha*, Śāntarakṣita does not only paraphrase and respond to the argument in Av1/Bh8, but uses it to create a particular reading of Nyāya mereology. Following Kamalaśīla’s framing, this is but the first in a carefully sequenced quartet of arguments. In verses 556–562, Kamalaśīla explains, Śāntarakṣita presents four (sets of) arguments from the Nyāya perspective in this sequence:

<i>Verses</i>	<i>Conclusion</i>	<i>Means of Knowledge</i>
556–557	quality/possessor distinction	perception
558–559	quality/possessor distinction	inference
560	part/whole distinction	inference
561–562	part/whole distinction	perception

With Bh8, “he has demonstrated that [from the Nyāya perspective] the difference between quality (*guṇa*) and quality-possessor (*guṇin*) is established through perception.” After this, “demonstrating that[, according to Nyāya,] it is established through inference, too,”⁴⁰² Śāntarakṣita states verses 558–559:

Color, etc., can be absolutely differentiated from, e.g., a lotus flower, because of the delimitation of the one by the other, as [Caitra’s] horse from Caitra. And earth, etc., can be ultimately differentiated from color, scent, etc., because of the difference between the singular and plural numbers, as with the difference between the moon and the lunar mansions.⁴⁰³ (558–559)

Expressions like “a blue lotus” or “Caitra’s horse” work, according to Nyāya, precisely because the quality (blue; being Caitra’s) can be distinguished from the possessors of that quality (the lotus; the horse). The fact that we refer to the moon in the singular and the lunar mansions in the plural serves in part to distinguish these as different things; similarly, we refer to earth in the singular as the bearer of *such things* as color and odor, which we refer to in the plural, marking a difference between them.

This latter argument clearly draws on a passage from Uddyotakara’s sprawling comments on NS 1.1.14 (§9), where he says, “‘Earth’ is singular; ‘color and the like’ is plural; and where there is conformity (*anuvīdhāna*) to a different number, there is a different object, as with the lunar mansions (*nakṣatra*) and the moon (*śaśin*).”⁴⁰⁴ Kamalaśīla formulates this argument like this: “The substances, earth, water, fire, and wind, are individually distinct from color, taste, odor, and touch, because these are, respectively, objects of the singular and plural numbers, as with the moon and the lunar mansions.”⁴⁰⁵

But Kamalaśīla does not attribute this to Uddyotakara. After Bh8, he does not make any direct attributions in his comments on verses 558–562. The important thing about these arguments, for Kamalaśīla, is not so much where they come from as how they fit together.

“After proving, in this way, the difference between quality and quality-possessor,” Kamalaśīla says, “in order to prove the difference between part and whole, he states” verse 560.⁴⁰⁶ (More precisely, in order to present Nyāya arguments intended to prove this difference.) This verse argues that a cloth and its threads are different “because they have different makers, powers, and so on” (*vibhinna-karṭṛ-śakty-āder*). As Kamalaśīla rephrases it: “Things that have different makers, effects, temporalities, and dimensions, like pillars and pots, are different, and the objects under investigation [i.e., parts and wholes] have different makers, effects, temporalities, and dimensions.”⁴⁰⁷ Ergo, from the Nyāya

⁴⁰² tad evaṃ tāvāt pratyakṣata eva guṇaguṇinor bhedaḥ siddha iti pratipāditam. idānīm anumānato ‘pi siddha iti pratipādayann āha rūpādityādi (TSP 235.4, J85v.1)

⁴⁰³ rūpādindīvarādibhya ekāntena vibhidiate | tena tasya vyavacchedāc caitrād iva turaṅgamaḥ ||558|| kṣityādi rūpagandhāder atyantam vā vibhidiate | ekānekavacobhedāc candranakṣatrabhedavat ||559|| (TS 235, J28r.4).

⁴⁰⁴ pṛthivīti ekavacanam rūpādaya iti bahuvacanam, vacanabhedānuvidhānam ca yatra tatrārthabhedah, tad yathā nakṣatrāṇi śaśīti (NV 72.1).

⁴⁰⁵ tathāparaḥ prayogaḥ pratyekaṃ pṛthivyāptejovāyavo^a dravyāṇi rūparasagandhasparśebhyo bhinnāni, ekavacanabahuvacanaviṣayatvāt, yathā candro nakṣatrāṇīti (TSP 235.8, J85v.2).

^a J °ap°

⁴⁰⁶ evaṃ guṇaguṇinor bhedaṃ prasādhyāvayavāvayavinor bhedaprasādhanāyāha vibhinnetyādi (TSP 235.14, J85v.3).

⁴⁰⁷ prayogo ye bhinnakartṛkāryakālaparimāṇās te vibhinnāḥ yathā stambhakumbhādayaḥ, vibhinnakartṛkāryakālaparimāṇās ca vicāraṣayāḥ (TSP 235.15, J85v.3).

perspective, they must be different.

Finally, “having first proven the distinction between parts and wholes through inference, he states [verses 561–562] so as to prove it through perception, too.”⁴⁰⁸ Reminding us of several now-familiar passages (NBh 2.1.36 and 4.2.20, as well as Uddyotakara and Aviddhakarṇa’s arguments for number, which we will turn to shortly), Śāntarakṣita says:

But if gross things were impossible, there could be no perception of things like trees, because atoms are beyond the senses. Nor could there be the term ‘atom,’ because it is in reference to gross entities that things are thus said to be very minute. If there were no gross, singular entities, in relation to what would it be minute?⁴⁰⁹ (561–562)

Apart from restating the first verse to clarify the syntax, Kamalaśīla has only one word for this: *subodham*, easy to understand.

This quartet affords Śāntarakṣita the opportunity to pick apart a whole series of issues: First, he argues against the idea that we see a crystal apart from its blue appearance, or that we see, rather than infer, a man underneath his armor (563–569); he then argues that the genitive case does not capture a real relation, but is just brought about by whim, by our desire to speak (*vivakṣā*) (570–577);⁴¹⁰ third, he argues, partly on the basis of momentariness, that a cloth is just a concept we need in order to make use of a particular collection of threads (578–582); and, finally, he argues that atoms are not, in fact, beyond the reach of the senses, and, as Kamalaśīla puts it, that this only holds true if one accepts that atoms are permanent (583–588).⁴¹¹

Bh8, then, is the first step in Śāntarakṣita’s rational reconstruction of Nyāya mereology, and the entry point for his systematic analysis of it.

⁴⁰⁸ *evaṃ tāvad anumānato 'vayavāvayavinor bhedaṃ prasādhyā pratyakṣato 'pi sādhyann āha sthūlarthetyādi.* (TSP 236.5, J86r.1).

⁴⁰⁹ *sthūlarthāsambhave tu syān naiva vṛkṣādidarśanam | atīndriyatayāññāṃ na cāṇuvacanam bhavet || 561 || sthūlavastuvyapekṣo hi susūkṣmo 'rthas tathocyate | sthūlaikavastvabhāve tu kim apekṣāsyā sūkṣmatā || 562 ||* (TSP 236, J28r.5).

⁴¹⁰ Otherwise, he argues, Naiyāyikas would have to accept more than six categories.

⁴¹¹ *yasya hi nityāḥ paramāṇava iti pakṣaḥ, taṃ pratyaññāṃ viśeṣābhāvāt sarvadaivātīndriyatvaṃ syāt, nāsmān prati* (TSP 243.7, 88r.2).

GUNA

After dealing with substances, Śāntarakṣita turns to the second Vaiśeṣika category, quality (*guṇa*). First, he points out that it should not be necessary to discuss any of the remaining categories, as they all rely on substance, which has now been disproven. And, of course, proving momentariness already undermined the lot of them. Nevertheless, as he has already explained, he proceeds through each individually.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.1.5 lists seventeen qualities: “Color, taste, odor, touch; number; dimensions; separateness; conjunction, disjunction; proximity, distance; cognitions; pleasure, pain; desire, aversion; and (*ca*) effort.”⁴¹² Praśastapāda says that the word “and” (*ca*) incorporates an additional seven: weight, fluidity, viscosity, formations, merit and demerit, and sound.⁴¹³ Kamalaśīla quotes VS, and then lists these additional seven with roughly the same explanation but without any direct reference to Praśastapāda.

This list is complicated, and, indeed, the underlying logic of the schema of the six categories is not perfectly clear. Praśastapāda’s definition of quality does not shed much light on the matter: “All qualities, color, etc., are connected with quality-ness, situated in a substance, devoid of qualities, and devoid of action.”⁴¹⁴ Several of the qualities are relevant to Śāntarakṣita’s engagement with Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta,⁴¹⁵ but for present purposes we are chiefly concerned with only two:

⁴¹² rūparasagandhasparśāḥ saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnā ca guṇāḥ (VS, 2.17). Semicolons in the translation separate compounds: color through touch are grouped together, as are conjunction and disjunction, etc. “Measures” and “cognitions” are both plural.

⁴¹³ caśabdasamuccitā ca gurutvadravatvasnehasaṃskārādṛṣṭaśabdāḥ saptaivety evaṃ caturviṃśatir guṇāḥ (PDhS 10.13).

⁴¹⁴ rūpādīnāṃ guṇānāṃ sarveṣāṃ guṇatvābhisambandho dravyāśritatvaṃ nirguṇatvaṃ niṣkriyatvaṃ (PDhS 94.6).

⁴¹⁵ Conjunction and disjunction are important to a number of fragments, especially those that relate to arguments about the impermanence of sound (cf. Appendix A). Conjunction is a quality because only substances can be conjoined. Inherence, on the other hand, can be the relation, for example, between a universal (blueness) and a quality (an instance of blue); though there must be a blue substance for this relation to hold, strictly speaking the universal inheres directly in the color, i.e., the quality, which itself inheres in the substance. In addition, “formations” (*saṃskāra*) are broadly significant to much of Buddhist-Nyāya discourse, but partly because the term has such a variety of applications in such texts; pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), desire, aversion, and effort are germane to the arguments about the self and the nature of human experience; merit and demerit (*dharma-adharma*) are among the “material causes” (*upādāna*) in Īśvara’s

color and number. For Śāntarakṣita, color is paradigmatic of the Vaiśeṣika analysis of quality. For thinkers like Aviddhakarṇa, number is a problematic concept in need of defense.

The broad idea is not merely that there is such a thing as color, or the like, but that an individual color is a separate existent that inheres in and qualifies a particular substance. If a blue pot stands on the other side of a wall, but a crack in the wall allows us to see its blue hue, we may not recognize the pot as such, but we can still see its color. We do not have to apprehend the substance in order to apprehend its color because, even though the color “inheres in,” and so is inseparable from, the substance, it is nevertheless a distinct existent. Number is somewhat more complicated, so we will delve more deeply into the Vaiśeṣika analysis of number in §9 below.

Śāntarakṣita proceeds through the list of qualities in sequence, beginning with a brief refutation of color. This stands in for a refutation of taste, odor, and touch, as well. He then turns to number, which is the basis (*hetu*), according to Vaiśeṣika, of the conventions of one, two, plurality, and so on (*ekādi-vyavahāra*). In Av13, Aviddhakarṇa seeks to prove the reality and distinctness of number on the basis of our perception of things like elephants and chariots—the plurality of which, we know from Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, form the basis of the notion of an army. In Av14, later on in the chapter, Aviddhakarṇa apparently argues against an earlier claim by Dignāga that we cannot define “heaps, streams, and states,” or the relationships between them, in terms of identity or difference.

creation of the universe; and the metaphysics of sound plays an important underlying role in arguments about the self and in examples used in debates about debate.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

EXAMINATION OF QUALITY

Introduction

We maintain that quality, action, and so on, are rejected by the refutation of substances, as they all rely on substances. And once the bearers of the relation have been discarded, what would have an inherence in what? Nevertheless, we relate the refutation of each [of the five remaining categories] individually.⁴¹⁶ (633–634)

*Refutation of color*⁴¹⁷

If you claim there is only one blue color, or the like, in a gross substance, [such as a pot,] then when that [pot] is manifested by light coming through a small fissure, why is that [entire single blue color] not manifested and seen? And we do not observe blue, or the like, residing over a spatial expanse, or else what is manifested at that time by that [point of light] would be an atomic portion of it.⁴¹⁸ (635–636)

*Refutation of number*⁴¹⁹

Number does not appear in cognition apart from, e.g., the [one] elephant, which is excluded from what is not that.⁴²⁰ Yet you claim it is visible. Ergo, it does not exist. Rather, just as in the case of [one] cognition, [or two cognitions,]⁴²¹ etc., the consciousness of one, [two,] etc., in the case of a pot, or the like, is concomitant with concentration (*manaskāra*) on conventions⁴²² fashioned by

⁴¹⁶ This chapter only concerns quality, but Śāntarakṣita points out here at the beginning of the chapter that all five remaining categories are untenable once substance has been refuted. His repetition of this point throughout the chapters on the categories has a striking rhetorical effect.

⁴¹⁷ As we have seen, the standard list of qualities, following Praśastapāda, is: color, taste, odor, touch; number; measure; separateness; conjunction, disjunction; proximity, distance; cognitions; pleasure, pain; desire, aversion; effort; weight; fluidity; viscosity; formations; merit, demerit; and sound. (Semicolons separate pairs that are compounded together in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*.) Quality inheres in substance. This means that, e.g., a color, number, cognition, or sound only exists insofar as its inseparable connection to a particular substance remains. There can be no blue without something blue; there can be no *three* without three things; there can be no cognition without a knower; there can be no sound without a medium of sound.

⁴¹⁸ The implication, according to Kamalaśīla, is that it would itself possess qualities, which would render the overarching color, blue, a separate substance, rather than a quality, which renders the entire schema absurd (*guṇavattvād dravyarūpataiva syāt, na guṇatvam*, and so on). Note that Śāntarakṣita does not even entertain a single argument in defense of the concept of color as a real quality apart from the substance it qualifies.

⁴¹⁹ By skipping from color to number, Śāntarakṣita implies that his refutation of color holds as well for taste, odor, and touch.

⁴²⁰ “Exclusion” (*apoha*) theory will not be fully elaborated until chapter sixteen (not treated in the present study). The gist is that when we see an elephant, we are not actually seeing an elephant, but superimposing the conventional notion “elephant” onto the momentary heap of atoms before us, *and yet* not in a positive sense, but through a process of exclusion. The elephant’s being “an elephant” is its “exclusion from what that is not that.”

⁴²¹ Kamalaśīla unpacks “etc.” in this way: “Indeed, just as there is a cognition of one, etc., even without number in the case of one cognition, two cognitions, etc.,” and so on (*yathā hy ekam jñānaṃ dve jñāna ityādau saṃkhyām antareṇāpy ekādibuddhir bhavati*).

⁴²² Cf. n 425 below.

whim. There is no distinctive number in any of these things because they are not substances, and it is untenable that the cognition of it is derivative (*bhākta*), because it is unwavering. (637–639)

Perhaps you think the cognition of one in the qualities, etc., follows from the oneness that inheres in the substance because they inhere in one and the same object. Let this be so in the case of a cognition of one. But on what basis does the notion of two, or the like, pertain to these, or to the *six* categories, etc.? The notion of inherence in one and the same object would be secondary (*gauṇa*), since it is wavering in such a manner, like the notion of fire in regard to a boy.⁴²³ (640–642)

[*Objection:*] “Because it is entirely distinct from the perceptions of elephants, etc., it is proven that the notion “army” arises from something else, as with the cognitions of things like blue and a cloth.”⁴²⁴ (643)

This proves what we already maintain, because such things as concentration on conventions fashioned by whim are [the something else that is] the means [for the notion of number].⁴²⁵ Or else the number would be in the cognition, etc., by the same reason. If you describe number’s emergence in relation to cognition (*buddhi-apekṣā*),⁴²⁶ then why don’t you accept the cognition of it on the basis of mere concentration on convention? (644–645)

[...]

[TN: After refuting number, Śāntarakṣita turns to measure, separateness, conjunction and disjunction, and proximity and distance. Then, in following brief passage, he raises the possibility that number, etc., are only conventionally distinct from the substances they qualify, but his imagined interlocutor—Aviddhakarṇa—asserts that the distinction is real.]

Summary of number, conjunction, etc.

The other party might believe that number, conjunction, etc., are all *not indistinct* from

⁴²³ Praśastapāda, in his organizational commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, the *Padārtha-dharma-saṃgraha*, goes into quite a lot of detail explaining how the concepts of duality, etc., emerge in our consciousness from an initial recognition of oneness. (When we see a pot resting on a table, we see, among other things, two *single* things, *one* pot and *one* table, and those unities together make two.) But, according to Śāntarakṣita, when we see two pots, we do so clearly and distinctly, without the kind of cognitive stammer that accompanies figurative expressions. If “seeing inherence in the substance” is similar to “seeing fire in the boy,” then the former cannot be the basis for our perception of two pots, because that would be like saying we know the boy to have brown hair because we see that he is like fire in some sense.

⁴²⁴ Kamalaśīla attributes this argument—which, without explicitly stating it, is clearly intended to prove the fact that number is a distinct quality—to Aviddhakarṇa (§9).

⁴²⁵ Miyako Notake (2011) discusses the differences between Śāntarakṣita’s use of the term *saṃketa-ābhoga* and Dharmakīrti’s before him. Notake renders the term *saṃketa-ābhoga*, “directing one’s mind to a convention,” which makes nice use of the exact grammatical construction of the term. Kamalaśīla says the expression “such things as” (*-ādi*) is meant to contain *saṃketa-smaraṇa* (recollection of conventions), and so on (*ādiśabdena saṃketasmarāṇādiparigrahaḥ*). He is, therefore, drawing a distinction between the *smaraṇa* (recollection) of conventions and the *manaskāra* (awareness, concentration) or *ābhoga* (experience, effort) of them. (Śāntarakṣita uses the latter two synonymously.) The distinction seems to be, in part, a matter of degree. E.g., in Kamalaśīla’s *Bhāvanākramas*, he distinguishes between “calling to mind” (*smṛti*) the image of the Buddha as an antidote to restlessness or inattention, and “keeping it in mind” (*manaskāra*) as the object of meditative focus.

⁴²⁶ By using the term *buddhi-apekṣā*, “in relation to cognition,” Śāntarakṣita appears to be playing with the Vaiśeṣika term *apekṣā-buddhi* (relational cognition), with which thinkers like Praśastapāda explain the observer-dependence of qualities like number, proximity, and so on. Cf. §9.

substances because they differentiate them, as with a stick [of Devadatta's].⁴²⁷ So far as this describes them in terms of conventional existence, it proves what we already maintain, because that which exists conventionally cannot be described in terms of identity (*tattva*) or difference (*anyatva*). (676–677)

Objection: “We deny that a heap, or the like, is inexpressible, since its properties are restricted, as in the case of color, sound, taste, and so on.”⁴²⁸ (678)

In reality, this [heap, or the like,] lacks intrinsic existence, like a sky-lotus, so its restricted qualities are not established; rather, they are imposed by conceptuality. Stated in just this way, it is inconclusive because of sky-lotuses, etc., since identity (*abheda*) and difference (*vyatireka*) are only present in an entity. (679–680)

If you are explaining, in this way,⁴²⁹ that number, etc., is different from substance, then the reason is unestablished in its substratum,⁴³⁰ because number and so on have not been proven. On the other hand, should you be saying, in this way, that substance itself is different from heaps, etc., then you would prove the contradiction that substance is distinct from its own form. (681–682)

[...]

⁴²⁷ Kamalaśīla, as one would expect, adds this term (*devadattasya*).

⁴²⁸ Kamalaśīla attributes this to Aviddhakarṇa; the language of the fragment, and the way Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla frames their engagement with it, suggests it may have been a direct response to an argument by Dignāga (§10).

⁴²⁹ Kamalaśīla remarks, “In this way,’ i.e., not non-distinct from substance. How, then? Having a distinction. That’s the meaning” (*evam iti na dravyāvyatirekiṇaḥ. kiṃ tarhi. vyatirekiṇa ity arthaḥ*).

⁴³⁰ If there is no mountain, one cannot prove that there is fire on the mountain. If there is no such thing as number, there can be no “difference from substance” in it.

§9. AV13: ELEPHANTS AND ARMIES

Before considering Śāntarākṣita's engagement with Av13, it is important to consider the way number is handled in early Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika works.

Number in Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya

For Praśastapāda, number relies in part on the eye of the beholder, as do proximity and distance. Wilhelm Halbfass refers to these as the “relational *guṇas*,” i.e. those qualities that “involve a plurality of substances that are related to each other, or grouped together, in relation to a perceiving subject.”⁴³¹ Praśastapāda uses duality as the model case. When one perceives two objects and recognizes each to be its own singular thing, one has a single cognition (*buddhi*) of two instances of the universal “unity.” Praśastapāda describes this universal as “inherent in the inherent-in-the-conjoined” (*saṃyukta-samaveta-samaveta*). This is a complicated term, but it sheds significant light on the entire sequence:

- The two objects are in direct contact (*sannikarṣa*) with the eye; this means the two objects are “conjoined” (*saṃyukta*) to the eye.
- Each of the two objects is a singular thing unto itself, and, so, is qualified by the quality “one;” this “one” quality that inheres in them is “inherent in the conjoined” (*saṃyukta-samaveta*).
- The universal “unity” inheres in each instantiation of unity, and, so, inheres in the “one” quality that itself inheres in the two objects in question; the universal, then, is “inherent in the inherent-in-the-conjoined” (*saṃyukta-samaveta-samaveta*).

Despite this level of abstraction and indirectness, we actually perceive the universal. When a single substance is in direct contact with our faculty of sight, we have a cognition of the substance, the quality of unity that inheres in it, and the universal unity that itself inheres in that quality. To return to the model case: When there are, say, two pots before our eyes, each of which is its own unity, we then have a single cognition regarding both of them. This is referred to as the “reference cognition” or “relational cognition” (*apekṣā-buddhi*), i.e., the cognition (*buddhi*) in relation (*apekṣya*) to which duality comes to be generated (*ārabhyate*) in the two pots.⁴³²

Other than the number one, number qualifies more than one substance—duality exists in two substances, etc. But this creates a problem. As Jonardon Ganeri puts it, the sentence, “the table has wooden legs,” entails that each leg is wooden, but the sentence, “the table has four legs,” does not

⁴³¹ Halbfass 1992, 122.

⁴³² yadā boddhuś cakṣuṣā samānāsamānajātīyayor dravyayoḥ sannikarṣe sati tatsaṃyuktasamavetasamavetaikatvasāmānyajñānotpattāv ekatvasāmānyatatsambandhatajjñānebhya ekatvaguṇayor anekaviṣayiṇy ekā buddhir utpadyate, tadā tām apekṣyaikatvābhyāṃ svāśrayayor dvitvam ārabhyate. tataḥ punas tasmin dvitvasāmānyajñānam utpadyate, tataḥ punar dvitvasāmānyajñānād apekṣābuddher vinaśyattā dvitvasāmānyatatsambandhatajjñānebhyo dvitvaguṇabuddher utpadyamānatety ekaḥ kālāḥ. tata idānim apekṣābuddhivināśād dvitvaguṇasya vinaśyattā dvitvaguṇabuddhitaḥ sāmānyabuddher vinaśyattā dvitvaguṇatajjñānatatsambandhebhyo dve dravye sati dravyabuddher utpadyamānatety ekaḥ kālāḥ. tadanantaram dve dravye iti jñānotpādaḥ dvitvasya vināśaḥ dvitvaguṇabuddher vinaśyattā dravyajñānāt saṃskārasyotpadyamānatety ekaḥ kālāḥ. tadanantaram dravyajñānād dvitvaguṇabuddher vināśo dravyabuddher api saṃskārād iti. (Dvivedi, 196.1)

entail that each leg is four.⁴³³

Later “Navya Nyāya” thinkers, several centuries after Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla, attempted to resolve this by coining a new relation beyond conjunction and inherence, “completion” (*paryāpti*), to account for the distributive aspect of number. If number is a genuine quality, then it must reside somewhere in particular, i.e., it must qualify something. But by what metaphysics does a number larger than one come to reside jointly in more than one substance? Inherence and conjunction would seem to lead to the “each leg is four” problem. “Completion,” in Navya Nyāya, is seemingly devised to resolve it.

This issue seems not to have occupied earlier Nyāya thinkers. Uddyotakara, for example, is concerned mainly with the fact that number sheds light on the division between substance and quality. He discusses this in his comments on NS 1.1.14, the definition of the “objects” (*artha*).

NS 1.1.14 lists the objects⁴³⁴ of the senses (*tad-artha*), the latter of which were defined in sutras 12 and 13:

gandharasarūpasparśaśabdāḥ pṛthivyādiguṇās tadarthāḥ ||1.1.14||⁴³⁵

Odor, taste, color, touch, and sound, the **qualities of earth, etc.**, are the objects of these [sense faculties]. (1.1.14)

This, at least, is how Vātsyāyana reads it. There are three compounds in the sutra: *gandha-rasa-rūpa-sparśa-śabdāḥ* (odor, taste, color, touch, sound), *pṛthivy-ādi-guṇāḥ* (earth-etc.-qualities), and *tad-arthāḥ* (their-objects). It is natural to take the second compound as a predicate of the first: “Odor, taste, color, touch, and sound, *which are* the qualities of earth, etc., are the objects of these.” Indeed, this is what Vātsyāyana does. He has little else to say about this seemingly simple definition.

Uddyotakara has a different idea. He argues that what follows from this reading is that every object would be restricted to a single sense faculty (sight *or* hearing, etc). This, he explains, would conflict with the underlying premise of NS 3.1.1 that a single object can be grasped by both sight and touch. Instead, he reads the second compound as an enumerative compound (*dvandva*) meaning “earth, etc., *and* the qualities,” and regards the first two compounds separately:

gandharasarūpasparśaśabdāḥ pṛthivyādiguṇās tadarthāḥ.

Odor, taste, color, touch, and sound; **earth, etc., and the qualities**—the objects of [the senses].

Uddyotakara entertains the objection that this renders the first compound superfluous: given that odor, etc., are qualities, they are contained in the word “quality” (*guṇa*) in the second compound, and there would be no need for the sutra to mention them separately. His response is that odor, taste,

⁴³³ Ganeri 2015.

⁴³⁴ The twelve objects of knowledge (*prameya*)—second in the list of sixteen principles (*tattva*) laid out in NS 1.1.1—receive extensive treatment in NS, occupying all of 3.1, 3.2, and 4.1, but they are first enumerated and defined in NS 1.1.10–22. Sutra 10 lists the inferential marks of the self; sutra 11 defines the body as the substratum (*āśraya*) of the limbs, the sense faculties, and their objects; sutras 12 and 13 list the five sense faculties (smell, taste, sight, touch, hearing) and the elements from which they arise (earth, water, fire, air, ether, respectively).

⁴³⁵ NS 18.8.

color, touch, and sound really are each restricted to a single sense faculty. They are stated separately in order to distinguish them from the objects (earth, etc., and the other qualities) that can be perceived by more than one sense. Accordingly, Uddyotakara thinks that “earth, etc., and the qualities” refers elliptically to number, dimension, proximity and distance, etc. As a result, he goes on to consider each of these qualities in turn—including, naturally, a discussion of number.

Uddyotakara then cites a Buddhist-sounding rival, who claims that we never perceive a substance apart from its qualities. If one thing is identical with another, the Buddhist explains, then we can see that we never grasp the one without grasping the other: we only perceive a “row” (*pañkti*) when we perceive the items standing in a row, therefore the row is nothing but its members.⁴³⁶ After an initial series of counterarguments,⁴³⁷ Uddyotakara discusses the row and the issue of plurality. Specifically, Uddyotakara considers things like armies and forests. He describes a group of elephants, men, horses, and chariots (*gaja-puruṣa-turaṅgama-syandana*) standing in close proximity, but without their exact extent necessarily being determined, and says that the number *plurality* (*bahutva*) present in them is referred to as an army.⁴³⁸ In other words, when we perceive a row, what we are perceiving is number, specifically the number *plurality*, which is, in fact, distinct from the things qualified by that number.⁴³⁹

Eventually, Uddyotakara’s opponent explicitly denies that number exists.⁴⁴⁰ Uddyotakara replies:

A cognition of one or many (*eka-aneka-pratyaya*) has a basis (*nimitta*) that is different from the basis of the cognition of a pot, because it is utterly distinct from the cognition of a pot, like the cognition of blue. Therefore, the basis (*nimitta*) of the cognition of that is number.⁴⁴¹

He then explains the difference between the color blue and the substance it qualifies, using a blue cloth as an example: We perceive the quality as qualifying the substance, but we recognize that the basis for the perception of the quality is distinct from that of the substance itself; the blue of a blue cloth is not itself the cloth. Number is a quality, like color.

§ § §

Śāntarakṣita argues that we never perceive the *number* of elephants, etc. (*gaja-ādi*), apart from the elephants themselves, even though number is purportedly perceptible and distinct from the substance it qualifies.⁴⁴² Cognitions of number are, he explains, associated with our awareness of conventions that are themselves fashioned by whim (*icchā-racita-saṃketa-manaskāra-anvayam*). Number is not distinct.

⁴³⁶ na nāsti, tadagrahe tadbuddhyabhāvāt, yad yasmād anarthāntaram bhavati tadagrahe tasyāgraho dṛṣṭaḥ, tad yathā yūṣasya pañkteś ca (NV 70.22).

⁴³⁷ Including an abbreviated version of the *Vārttika* passage paraphrased in Bh8 (§8).

⁴³⁸ evam aniyatadigdeśasambandhiṣu gajapuruṣaturāṅgamasyandaneṣu parasparapratyāsattiyupagr̥hīteṣu avadhāritānavadhāriteyateṣu vartamānā bahutvasaṃkhyaiḥ senety ucyaṭe (NV 72.14).

⁴³⁹ This, of course, points toward his discussion in NV 2.1.36, regarding Vātsyāyana’s description of forests and armies in proving the existence of substantial wholes (§8).

⁴⁴⁰ tad asattvam iti cet. athāpy evaṃ kalpyeta, saṃkhyaiḥ tāvaṃ nāsti, kuto ‘rthāntarabhāva iti (NV 73.6).

⁴⁴¹ kumbhapratyayanimitānyanimittaka ekānekapratyayaḥ kumbhapratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt, nilādiapatyayavat. tasmāt yat tatpatyayanimitam sā saṃkhyeti (NV 73.9).

⁴⁴² atadrūpaparāvṛttagajādīvyatirekiṇī | na saṅkhyā bhāṣate jñāne dṛṣṭeṣṭā naiva sāsti tat ||637|| (TS 263).

In response, Aviddhakarṇa rises to the defense of the distinctness of number, bringing Śāntarakṣita's example of "elephants, etc." into focus. Av13 reads as follows:

*sa hy āha senāpratyayo^a gajaturaṅgasyandanādivyatiriktanibandhano gajādipratyayavilakṣaṇatvān
nīlapāṭapratyayavad iti. (643)⁴⁴³*

[Aviddhakarṇa] says: The perception of an army has a basis (nibandhana) that is distinct from such things as elephants, horses, and chariots, because it has a different character than the perceptions of those things, as in the case of the perceptions of blue and a cloth (nīla-pāṭa-pratyaya).⁴⁴⁴

Aviddhakarṇa may have been, like Uddyotakara, expounding NS 1.1.14 and pre-empting later discussions, or, just as likely, glossing a later passage like NBh 2.1.36 that directly addresses the issue of number. In either case, Av13 contains the same basic reasoning as Uddyotakara's remarks in NV 1.1.14 distilled into a simple formal inference. (Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that the simplicity and clarity of the argument owes more to Kamalaśīla than to Aviddhakarṇa.) There is a clear and present difference between perceiving an army and perceiving the members of the army, and this difference suffices, for Aviddhakarṇa, to prove the necessity of the number *plurality*, and, as a consequence, number as a distinct quality.

In §8 we looked at Aviddhakarṇa, Bhāvivikta, and Uddyotakara's arguments that substance is distinct from quality. Here we see Aviddhakarṇa arguing from the other side of the equation: number, a quality, is distinct from the substance it qualifies. In both cases, we find a strikingly similar argument in the *Vārttika*. Did Aviddhakarṇa borrow from and build on Uddyotakara's work, or perhaps vice versa? Or were both simply drawing from a shared milieu? Aviddhakarṇa has been described as one of the authors of the dark period between Uddyotakara and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa,⁴⁴⁵ yet, apart from his likely chronological priority to Dharmakīrti, his dates are just as often described as being entirely uncertain.⁴⁴⁶

The convergence between Aviddhakarṇa and Uddyotakara also raises questions about Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's decisions to highlight his work. If we knew how Nyāya circles in the eighth century

⁴⁴³ TSP 265.6, J95v.2. Abhayadevasūri cites this argument, and attributes it to Aviddhakarṇa, in a slightly different form: gajaturagasyandanādivyatiriktanimittaprabhavaḥ senāpratyayaḥ, gajādipratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt, vastracarmakambaleṣu nīlapratyayavad, "The perception of number has as its source a basis distinct from such things as elephants, horses, and chariots, because it has a different character than the perceptions of those things, as in the case of the perception of blue in cloths, hides, and blankets" (TBV 674.17). Kamalaśīla may have streamlined the formulation of the example.

^a Shastri prints saṅkhyā° instead of senā°. Although the conclusion is essentially the same in either case, this is not a trivial distinction.

⁴⁴⁴ "Like the perception of blue and a cloth," i.e., just as the basis of the perception of blue is distinct from the basis of the perception of the cloth, so, too, with an army and its constituent members. Alternatively, we might render it merely as "a blue cloth," in the sense that when we see a plurality of elephants etc. as "an army" it is like perceiving a cloth as "a blue cloth." But the example as cited by Abhayadevasūri substantiates the former reading: "As in the case of the perception of blue in cloths, hides, and blankets" (*vastra-carma-kambaleṣu nīla-pratyayavat*). Perhaps the idea is that a pile of similar-hued fabrics appears to a perceiver as a singular instance of that hue: a pile of blue things is one blue thing. But in reality, according to Nyāya, the quality of blue that inheres in each individual fabric is unique to that fabric. The pile of fabrics, or, rather, the individual fabrics that comprise it, is not the basis of the perception of "the" blue; the universal *blue-ness*, which inheres in each of the individual instances of blue, is. In any case, Kamalaśīla seems likely to have elected to streamline this phrase.

⁴⁴⁵ Potter 1977, 338.

⁴⁴⁶ Steinkellner 1963, 153.

regarded Aviddhakarṇa, and how well the Buddhists were familiar with these views, we could draw conclusions about Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's underlying motivations. Perhaps they were—or at least considered themselves to be—simply contending with an important, well-regarded rival. Yet it is just as possible that they were knowingly raising Aviddhakarṇa's profile—whether because his work was didactically useful, in order to force other Naiyāyikas to defend his arguments, or for any number of other reasons.

It is the very uncertainty of the social context of these texts that necessitates looking at them for more than just rational content. We cannot know precisely what Śāntarakṣita or Kamalaśīla are up to, nor how their projects reflect or refract the work of Aviddhakarṇa. This is precisely why we must not take such matters for granted. In interpreting this material, any confidence or certainty we may have should be grounded by skepticism and doubt.

§10. AV14: HEAPS, STREAMS, AND STATES

Toward the end of the “Examination of Quality,” well after refuting the distinctness of number, and after discussing dimension (*parimāṇa*), separateness (*prthaktva*), conjunction and disjunction (*saṃyoga-vibhāga*), and proximity and distance (*paratva-apatatva*), Śāntarakṣita imagines his opponents arguing that all of these “are not indistinct from substance” (*na dravya-avyatirekin*) precisely because they qualify substances.⁴⁴⁷ As Kamalaśīla rephrases the double negative, “What differentiates something cannot be without distinction from it.”⁴⁴⁸

This accords quite well with Uddyotakara’s comments and seems to underlie Aviddhakarṇa’s arguments about substance and quality. But as the Buddhists point out here, conventionally speaking, this is perfectly acceptable to them, too. We cannot say any more than conventionally that *x* is definitively *not-y*: “...that which exists conventionally cannot be described in terms of identity (*tattva*) or difference (*anyatva*).” There are two main ways of reading the phrase “not indistinct from.” The first is as an affirmation (*vidhi*). This entails reading the two negations (“not” and “in-”) together as an emphatic double negative, in the sense that quality is absolutely distinct from substance (affirmation).⁴⁴⁹ The second, mere negation (*niṣedha*), entails reading the negative particle *na*, “not,” independently, and so as merely denying that quality is indistinct rather than positing or affirming anything in particular.⁴⁵⁰ This is the sense in which it is acceptable to the Buddhists to say that “quality is not indistinct from substance.”

After explaining this, Śāntarakṣita entertains an objection by Aviddhakarṇa, which Kamalaśīla cites as follows (Av14):

*sa hy āha samūhasantānāvasthāviśeṣās tattvānyatvābhyām avacanīyā na bhavanti pratinīyatadharmayogitvād rūparasādivad iti. (678)*⁴⁵¹

[Aviddhakarṇa] says: It is not the case that specific (*viśeṣa*) heaps (*samūha*), streams (*santāna*), or states (*avasthā*) are inexpressible (*avacanīyā*) in terms of identity or difference (*tattva-anyatva*), because they are endowed with properties restricted in each case, as in the case of color, taste, and so on.

We can, Aviddhakarṇa argues, state conclusively that a “heap” is a pot, and that its “states” are, though they inhere in it, distinct from it. As we know, according to Nyāya, substantial wholes are distinct from the parts in which they inhere; they are perceptible by different sense faculties; they persist through time; they have both particular and universal aspects; and they can be linguistically denoted. Provisionally accepting that the world is populated by heaps and streams, Aviddhakarṇa

⁴⁴⁷ saṃkhyāyogādayaḥ sarve na dravyāvyatirekiṇaḥ | tadvyavacchedakatvena daṇḍādir iva cen matam ||676|| (TS 279, J34r.2).

⁴⁴⁸ yo hi yadvyavacchedako nāsau tadavyatirekī (TSP 279.10, J101v.4).

⁴⁴⁹ Or perhaps one could describe this as implicative negation (*paryudāsa-pratiśedha*) in the sense “there is non-indistinctness from substance,” i.e., as positing, by way of the negation, that it is distinct. A standard example would be something like, “There is a non-pot on this table,” which clearly posits that there is something on the table and excludes its being a pot.

⁴⁵⁰ In keeping with the previous note, one could perhaps describe this as a case of non-implicative negation (*prasajya-pratiśedha*), in the sense “there is not indistinctness from substance,” though this is a little bit of a hermeneutic strain. A standard example of this would be, “There is no pot on this table,” which does not imply that there is anything there, but merely denies that there is a pot.

⁴⁵¹ TSP 279.14, J101v.5.

nevertheless insists that we are able to accurately describe such heaps and streams in accordance with their specific identifiable properties—just like the properties themselves.

Though Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla present Av14 as an argument for quality’s distinctness from substance, it is just as much an argument about the way that language interfaces perception and reality: What is it that we perceive? To what do our words point? And do our words correspond to reality? In other words, what is the relationship between a word, the thing it denotes, and our perception of it? Śāntarākṣita’s response to Av14 emphasizes this nexus of issues. “In reality,” he says, a heap or the like, “lacks intrinsic existence, like a sky-lotus, so its restricted qualities are not established; rather, they are imposed by conceptuality (*kalpanā*).”⁴⁵²

The relation between language and perception arises early in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*. The first statement on perception (*pratyakṣa*) in the *Nyāyasūtra*, NS 1.1.4, bears partly on this question:

Perception is a cognition (*jñāna*) that is generated by contact between a sense faculty and an object; it is not-to-be-designated (*avyapadeśya*), non-deviating, and consists in determination (*avasāya-ātmaka*).⁴⁵³

Each term in this sutra has generated a diversity of controversies and interpretations in the Nyāya tradition—as have the relations between them. Is every instance of perception both *avyapadeśya* and *avasāya-ātmaka*, or does this distinguish two modes of perception?⁴⁵⁴ Does the sutra define perceptual cognition or the knowledge (*jñāna*) that derives from it?⁴⁵⁵ Most pertinent for us, however, is the term *avyapadeśya*. What does it mean for perceptual, or perceptually-derived, knowledge to be *not-to-be-designated*? According to Dignāga, perceptual content is essentially *avyapadeśya*, in the sense that perceptions register unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) and words can never truly capture or signify them. Nyāya disagrees. According to Nyāya, the word “pot” may be a shared convention, but when we say “this is a pot,” we are, in fact, pointing to (*vy+apa+√dis*) a specific substance in which inheres the universal we call *pot*.

Here is what Vātsyāyana thinks: Words and things are bound up in our encounter with the world, but we can still differentiate between knowledge that is derived from words (or from testimony, etc.) and that which is derived from direct perceptual knowledge of a thing. There is a difference between the moment we cognize a thing (*artha-jñāna-kāla*) and the moment of some kind of conventional usage (*vyavahāra-kāla*); in the latter, we employ (*vy+ā+√pr*) the name for a thing (*samākhyā-śabda*), whereas in the former we do not. “The knowledge generated by contact between a sense faculty and an object,” he explains, “does not derive from words (*aśābda*).”⁴⁵⁶ When we say “this is a pot,” we are using linguistically-derived knowledge to designate an object, but we are also referring to the content of the perceptual knowledge we have of a particular object in front of us. We can only speak about such content—naturally enough—with words, but strictly speaking the knowledge itself is non-

⁴⁵² niḥsvabhāvatayā tasya tattvato ‘mbarapadmavat | na siddhā niyatā dharmāḥ kalpanāropitās tu te ||679|| (TS 280, J34r.3).

⁴⁵³ indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam ||1.1.4|| (NS 10.3).

⁴⁵⁴ Vācaspati Mīśra puts forth the latter view, against the grain of earlier commentators. Cf. Mondal 1982.

⁴⁵⁵ E.g., Vācaspati, Jayanta, etc., insert “from which” (*yataḥ*) into the sutra, so that it describes perception as that *from which* such-and-such knowledge arises. Cf. Mondal 1982.

⁴⁵⁶ tad evam arthajñānakāle san a samākhyāśabdo vyāpriyate, vyavahārakāle tu vyāpriyate. tasmād aśābdam arthajñānam indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam iti (NV 10.20).

verbal. Pradyot Kumar Mondal describes it clearly and concisely: “Although the statement conveying perceptual cognition requires the knowledge of the meaning of words, perceptual cognition as such is in no way dependent on the knowledge of words. Perceptual knowledge is not word-associated at the time of its origin.”⁴⁵⁷ The actual moment of perception is not derived from words, but that does not mean the content of perception is inexpressible.

Uddyotakara, commenting on NBh 1.1.4, cites Dignāga’s definition of perception as “free from conceptuality” (*kalpanā-apodha*),⁴⁵⁸ i.e., from “what is linked to name, class, etc.” (*nāma-jāty-ādi-yojanā*). Unlike Vātsyāyana, Dignāga holds firmly that the content of perception is inexpressible, rather than merely not being strictly derived from language. In turn, Uddyotakara finds it ironic that Dignāga tries to define something as inexpressible. If it is inexpressible, then what does its definition define? If the word “perception” denotes perception itself, then perception is not inexpressible!⁴⁵⁹

Still later, Dharmakīrti defends the practicality of using language that does not strictly correspond to the perceptual content it purports to denote. In his autocommentary on *Pramāṇa-vārttika* 1.137–142, using the same phrase in Av14, “specific heaps, streams, or states,” he says (in Dunne’s rendering):

To be specific, they, being all of such-and-such a kind, are expressed by expressions that indicate a certain conglomeration (*samūha*), continuum (*santāna*), or state (*avasthā*). Those particulars that when conglomerated perform a single effect have no distinction from each other with regard to that effect. Therefore, it would be pointless to express any such distinction. For this reason, in order to refer (*niyojana*) to all of them at once, people apply one expression to them, such as “water-jug.” (Dunne 2004, 356–357)⁴⁶⁰

Put differently, though our words do not have one-to-one correspondences with the kinds of singular entities they point towards, it is practical to use them as if they did. Attempting to precisely indicate the specific momentary heap of particulars that is presently of concern would serve no useful purpose, and would probably be impossible, anyway. Dharmakīrti may have had Av14 in mind here—more assuredly, he and Aviddhakarṇa were both thinking of Dignāga.

The **Upādāya-prajñapti-prakarana* (Taishō vol. 31, T1622: 885a20), attributed to Dignāga, which is only extant in its Chinese translation, may be the source against which Aviddhakarṇa crafted Av14. In this text, the author explains that the Buddha classified existing things into these three groupings, “heaps, streams, and particular states” 一者總聚。二者相續。三者分位差別, in order to preach the Dharma.⁴⁶¹ (In the Chinese, the word corresponding to *viśeṣa* (particular, specific), is compounded exclusively with “state,” rather than distributed across all three, so that *samūha-santāna-avasthā-viśeṣa* in Av14—and the excerpt from Dharmakīrti—should perhaps be rendered “heaps,

⁴⁵⁷ Mondal 1982, 369–370.

⁴⁵⁸ “Free from” is the standard rendering of *apodha* here, but I think something like “at a remove from” might be more evocative, as well as closer to the spirit of the term.

⁴⁵⁹ NV 39.6ff. Dignāga’s linguistic theory owes a lot to Bhartṛhari, who will occupy much of our attention in the Epilogue. Cf. Herzberger 1986.

⁴⁶⁰ *evaṃjātīyās ca sarve samūhasaṃtānāvasthāviśeṣaśabdā ye samastāḥ kiṃcid ekam kāryam kurvanti teṣāṃ tatra viśeṣābhāvād apārthikā viśeṣacodaneti sakṛt sarveṣāṃ niyojanārtham ekam ayaṃ lokaḥ śabdaṃ teṣu niyuṅkte ghaṭa iti* (PVSV, 68.6).

⁴⁶¹ T1622 885a28–29.

streams, and specific states,” rather than “specific heaps, streams, and states.”) He exemplifies heaps with bodies and forests, streams with the span of a human life, and states with conditions or characteristics of heaps or streams, like arising or perceptibility. Heaps, then, are spatial unities, streams are temporal unities, and states discretely qualify one or the other. These three, the author says, are “inexpressible in terms of identity or difference; nor are they entirely non-existent” 不可說爲一性異性。及總無性。⁴⁶² This must be a translation of something very close to *tattvānyatvābhyām avacanīya*, as is found in Av14, together with a phrase about non-existence (such as *na ca niḥsvabhāvatā*, or the like). The author’s point requires pivoting to the fact that the existence of “heaps, streams, and states” cannot be denied entirely—though we cannot qualify them definitively, nor can we deny them outright—but he examines these claims separately. The bulk of this short text is devoted to Madhyamaka-style *reductio* arguments against identity and/or difference. If we presume the overall identity of a single stream, for example, or the difference between a heap and its particular states, various logical absurdities ensue. If this text was Aviddhakarṇa’s target, or one of his targets, in Av14, it seems it is this portion of the text that most interested him.

Av14 plays a very small role in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, occupying a handful of verses towards the end of a chapter Śāntarakṣita himself describes as almost superfluous, since the proof of momentariness has already destroyed the foundation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika analysis of quality. Yet, for our purposes, this little fragment has a certain poignancy, as it brings into sharp focus the way the *Tattvasaṃgraha* represents Buddhist-Nyāya debate writ large. Essencelessness, conceptuality, and the relation between our conceptual framework for the world and the reality on which it is imposed—this is an expansive discourse in Buddhist thought, and in the confrontation between Buddhist and Nyāya metaphysics and epistemology. The question is not merely whether quality is a distinct ontological category, but what quality’s distinctness from substance would entail for the nature of reality, the way we encounter it, and our ability to know, think about, and talk about it.

⁴⁶² T1622 885b7–8.

SĀMĀNYA

After the examinations of substance and quality, chapters 12–15 continue with the remaining categories: actions, universals, differentiae, and inherence.

Chapter twelve, the “Examination of Action (*karman*),” is rather brief, sixteen verses in all. Momentariness undermines the notion of a single entity extending spatially and persisting through time, so the notion of the movement of such a thing must similarly be abandoned. As Śāntarakṣita explains, the notion of a single entity persisting long enough to move and yet remaining the same fixed thing is absurd in light of momentariness. Is it a mover or a non-mover? If it is a mover, it must always move. The notion of a thing that is moving entails its being fixed throughout the movement; if it is a non-mover, it could never move without becoming something else, ergo it would not be fixed. Not only does momentariness prove that motion is but a figment of the imagination, but the concept of motion itself proves that momentariness must be true.

In chapter thirteen, the “Examination of Universals,” Śāntarakṣita parries arguments by Uddyotakara, Bhāvivikta, and another lost Naiyāyika named Śāṅkarasvāmin, who features less frequently in the *Pañjikā* than Aviddhakarṇa or Bhāvivikta. Two fragments are attributed to Bhāvivikta in this chapter: Bh9, which is the first (non-generic) argument in the chapter, and Bh10, which appears as something like the Naiyāyikas’ last ditch effort towards the end of the chapter to save the notion of universals against the Buddhist attack.

Śāntarakṣita begins the chapter⁴⁶³ by delineating between the ultimate universal, being (*sattā*), the particular universals (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*), such as cowness, color-ness, and so on, and ultimate differentiae (*antya-viśeṣa*), which he discusses in (the very brief) fourteenth chapter, the “Examination of Differentiae (*viśeṣa*).” Śāntarakṣita says that, according to Nyāya, “Universals, such as existence (*sattā*) and cowness (*gotva*), are proven through perception, because the cognition of something existent, etc. (*sad-ādi-pratyaya*), only arises upon the proper functioning of the senses.”⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁶³ At least, after his initial statement (v. 707), as elsewhere in the “Examination of the Six Categories,” that universals are already undermined by the refutation of substance, etc.

⁴⁶⁴ *pratyakṣataḥ prasiddhās tu sattvagotvādi jātayaḥ | akṣavyāpārasadbhāve sadādi-pratyayodayāt ||713||* (TS 294, 36r.1).

In other words, each time we perceive a cow, we also perceive its being-a-cow, which means we directly perceive its cowness. More fundamentally, each time we perceive *anything*, we perceive its *existing*, which means we perceive the universal *existence* (*sattā*) that inheres in it. “We also,” Śāntarakṣita continues, still in the voice of Nyāya, “clearly apprehend their existence on the force of inference, since the perception of difference (*viśeṣa-pratyaya*) must arise on the basis of a different cause.”⁴⁶⁵ An individual cow’s conformity to the class *cow* causes our perception of its cowness; the fact that we perceive its individual characteristics apart from its class-conformity allows us to infer its cowness, as well. After making these two generic statements, Śāntarakṣita cites several specific arguments by Bhāvivikta and Uddyotakara.

As we have now seen, Śāntarakṣita refers, throughout his examination of the six categories, to linguistic-conceptual conventions (*saṃketa*, *samaya*) with increasing consistency and clarity. More specifically, he says that the phenomena Naiyāyikas attempt to explain with reference to the six categories are really just the results of the mental effort (*manaskāra*, *ābhoga*) that we continually make to apply our shared conventions to the world. In part, he is just using the tools at his disposal to disprove the opposing view and establish his own. But he is also stitching together an intricate dialogue. The examination of the six categories ultimately gives way to chapter sixteen, the “Examination of the Meaning of Words.” There Śāntarakṣita defends the *apoha* (exclusion) theory, i.e., the idea that we superimpose conventionally shared words and concepts onto reality by excluding from our cognition of any given phenomenon every concept that is “not-that.” The pot we are looking at is really just a fluctuation of unique particulars, but we regard it as a pot because we exclude from our conceptual apprehension of it everything that is not-a-pot. Śāntarakṣita does not go into much detail about this idea in any of the chapters on the categories, but here in the “Examination of Universals” the conversation continues to turn in that direction. Bhāvivikta’s first argument in the chapter, Bh9, contends in part with the idea that a cow’s cowness is nothing but the fact that we conventionally share the notion of a cow. The discussion culminates eventually in Śāntarakṣita’s dismissive response to Bh10, which amounts to saying, “Well, then, why not just accept our view about conventionality?”

⁴⁶⁵ anumānabalenāpi sattvam āsāṃ pratīyate | viśeṣapratyayo yena nimittāntarabhāvikaḥ ||714|| (TS 294, J36r.2),

CHAPTER THIRTEEN EXAMINATION OF UNIVERSALS

Introduction

When substance, etc., are refuted, the universals⁴⁶⁶ are rejected, as well, since they are all imagined as residing in those first three categories. (707)

Nyāya position

The other party claims that universals are twofold: “Existence” (*sattā*) is the pure universal, due to its correspondence to all things. [All other universals], “substance-hood,” and the like, are universals in the sense that they give rise to a perception of correspondence in their respective substrata, but they are also said to possess particularity because they distinguish their respective substrata from everything belonging to another class.⁴⁶⁷ Hence, it is established that only the latter [of the two kinds of universal] cause cognitions of exclusion. (708–710)

On the other hand, they call “ultimate differentiae” those things that are particular only, that are only causes of exclusion, and that are fixed in permanent substances. It is because of these that practitioners (*yogin*) have perceptions like, “This is entirely different than that,” with regard to atoms, etc., individually.⁴⁶⁸ (711–712)

Universals, such as existence (*sattā*) and cowness (*gotva*), are proven through perception, because the cognition of something existent, etc., only arises upon the proper functioning of the senses.⁴⁶⁹ We also clearly apprehend their existence on the force of inference, since the perception of difference must arise on the basis of a different cause. [So the other party claims.]⁴⁷⁰ (713–714)

Arguments

(i) With respect to cows, elephants, etc., the particular words and cognitions “cow,” etc., have causes that are distinct from conventions, forms, bodies, and so on, because, under the condition that cows, etc., are their objects, they are different from the words and cognitions for those [conventions, etc.], just like the terms “with calf” or “goaded” with respect to the same [cows, elephants, etc.]. The qualification [i.e., “under the condition that cows, etc., are their objects”] is due

⁴⁶⁶ A cow is a cow insofar as it instantiates cowness. According to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, the universal of cowness is a real singular entity that inheres in multiple individuals. Universals can inhere in substances (cowness, substancehood), qualities (blueness, coloriness), or actions (upward-motion-ness).

⁴⁶⁷ Being (*sattā*) is the pure universal; everything else, “cowness,” and so on, is a “particular universal.” Being does not distinguish anything from anything else, but is only a point of commonality between all existing things. “Cowness” is a point of commonality between all cows, but also differentiates cows from horses, pots, etc.

⁴⁶⁸ I.e., an advanced yogic practitioner is able to discern the distinctions between individual atoms, but because all “earth” atoms, etc., are essentially identical, there must be something to account for their ability to be individually differentiated. “Ultimate differentiae” are an explanatory abstraction to account for this phenomenon. Śāntarakṣita deals with this concept in the brief fourteenth chapter (not translated in the present study).

⁴⁶⁹ Without the senses, we would not perceive something as existing, or as a cow, or whatever; to perceive something “as a cow” entails perceiving its cowness.

⁴⁷⁰ Note the systematicity in Śāntarakṣita’s presentation—the hallmark, as Isabelle Ratié (2014) points out most clearly, of his work.

to the deviation [that would otherwise occur] with respect to cognitions of hare's horns, etc. The terms for the intrinsic nature of those [conventions, etc.] is meant to be the dissimilar [example].⁴⁷¹ (715–717)

(ii) The cognition corresponding to a cow, or the like, arises on the basis of something other than the body, etc., because it has a distinction, like the cognition of blue, etc. (718)

(iii) Cowness is a different thing than the actual cow itself, because it is the object of a different cognition, as in the cases of color and touch, etc., and because we refer to it as “[the cowness] of that [cow],” like a horse of Caitra's. (719)

Preliminary response

All of this is without substance. It describes but a theory. There is no means of knowledge that can make it known. Cognitions of the existent, etc., are not established as arising immediately after the proper functioning of the senses, but from directing one's mind (*ābhoga*) to conventions. (720–721)

This is just like *dhātrī*, *abhayā*, and other plants, which, though manifold, are all found to have the capacity to heal various illnesses, whether individually or jointly.⁴⁷² There is no universal in them that has the capacity for that, because we perceive the pacification of illnesses with differences in slowness or speed, etc. Indeed, there is no additional feature in a universal resulting from things like differences in soil, because it [is supposed to have] one and the same form permanently; rather, it belongs to the *dhātrī*, and so on. In this way, though ultimately different, some things, and not others, come to be the causes of the recognition of similar things, etc., due to their restricted capacities. (722–725)

In addition, given one's desire to express mere fitness for action, one creates the convention for the term “existent” in regard to those things, or for another term, according to whim. Speakers create conventions for terms like “cow” with respect to things with the capacity for particular actions, such as carrying, giving milk, and so on. We can observe that these cognitions of “the existent,” [“a cow,”] etc., arise due to concentration (*manaskāra*) on those conventions, rather than immediately after the functioning of the senses. (726–728)

A non-linguistic cognition arises at first, and only after that the directing of one's mind to a convention. Therefore, this is recollective, and for the same reason those [cognitions of the existent, etc., are, as well]. For this very reason, someone whose mind is elsewhere has an apprehension of a mere entity without all of its qualifications.⁴⁷³ (729–730)

Refutation

As for the first reason, it is fruitless. We already accept that these arise on the basis of directing one's mind to conventions. It is this that is associated⁴⁷⁴ and that possesses positive and

⁴⁷¹ According to Kamalaśīla, this elaborate argument was made by Bhāvivikta (§11).

⁴⁷² Śāntaraṅgīta is very closely following Dharmakīrti's arguments here. Cf. Eltschinger, Taber, Much and Ratié 2018. For example, Eltschinger et al render PV 1.74: “Or else, to give another example (*yathā*), one observes that in spite of [their] diversity, certain plants and not others [are capable], whether individually or collectively, of alleviating fever, etc.” (85).

⁴⁷³ When we are distracted, we do not have the kind of mental focus to apply conventions to, e.g., objects in our visual field. When we refocus our attention on the world around us, we again bring to mind the conventions with which we make sense of things. The actual recognition of things is, therefore, a recollective process, rather than an immediate one.

⁴⁷⁴ This term (*samsargin*) appears in the fragment cited by Kamalaśīla (§11), in which case it seems to refer to the notion

negative concomitance. (731)

If that [i.e., directing of one's mind to conventions] is not external to the subject of the argument, the example is devoid of the property to be proven. It is not at all the case that external things, such as a calf or a goad, are directly the causes of those [notions]. Terms and conceptions do not pertain to unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*),⁴⁷⁵ since the form of a unique particular exceeds the scope of language. Rather, they proceed by relying on conventional notions like “goad,” on which externality is imposed, and which are only approached by internal [cognitive processes].⁴⁷⁶ (732–734)

And you describe the absence (*abhāva*) of activity, quality, or appellation as the basis of the notion (*pratyaya*) of non-existence (*abhāva*), so the qualification is useless. In addition, this is untenable. If it is a cause, it must be an entity due to its capacity, and the notion of non-existence would obtain for existence (*sattā*), and so on, because there would be no distinction. (735–736)

It is also unestablished that cognitions of these are utterly distinct from the cognitions of bodies, forms, etc., so the reason is also unestablished, since the corresponding (*anvayin*) cognition has the appearance of words and individuals, even though you describe universals as being devoid of the form of color, form, and sound. (737–738)

Moreover,⁴⁷⁷ if the universal has the form of blue, or the like, what is the difference between this and the quality?⁴⁷⁸ In addition, we do not observe a single corresponding “blue,” or the like. Even if you say it manifests, it is not perceived distinctly, so how can the cognition and the name (*dhī-dhvanī*) occur in the individual on the force of that? And you claim that the cognition of the universal is essentially determinate. It cannot be that we do not perceive it because it is imperceptible. Even if it were established that there is a different basis [for the term and cognition, etc.], you have not proven that there is a single corresponding universal that is free from impermanence, because of the sequential arising [of the cognitions, etc.]. (739–742)

And what is the other cause on the basis of which the word “category” is applied to the six, or on the basis of which the notion “it is” occurs in regard to existence, etc.? If you say it has another property as its basis, then you accept the existence of existence, given that that [too] would have another property as its basis, and being a property-possessor would entail an infinite regress. Thus, we can see that this reason deviates because of these, and its all-encompassing pervasion has not been established. (743–745)

[...]

that cowness, e.g., inheres in (i.e., is associated with) an individual cow that instantiates it. Śāntaraṅkṣita seems to be playing with the terminology of Bhāvivikta's argument, even though he does not actually use this term when in his paraphrase of the argument (verses 715–717).

⁴⁷⁵ That whose nature is unique to it. The real constituents of the world are in constant flux; there is no actual commonality between one momentary heap and another; and so, our terms cannot apply to them directly or truly.

⁴⁷⁶ Kamalaśīla says, “Only the internal, i.e., cognition” (*antarmātrā buddhiḥ*).

⁴⁷⁷ According to Kamalaśīla, here Śāntaraṅkṣita is pivoting to an argument by Śāṅkarasvāmin that did not previously appear in the chapter (*śāṅkarasvāminī prāṇa*, etc.), namely, that every negation, non-existence, or absence, is a negation of *something*, and it is the universal intrinsic to that *something* that creates the correspondence between different notions of non-existence, rather than an absurd-seeming universal “non-existence-ness,” or the like.

⁴⁷⁸ As it happens, quality inheres only in substances, whereas universals can inhere in substances, qualities, and actions; in addition, qualities are impermanent and each inheres in only a single substance, whereas universals are eternal and each inheres in manifold individuals.

[TN: Śāntarakṣita goes on to refute arguments (ii) and (iii), which leads to a brief exchange with Uddyotakara and Śāṅkarasvāmin (another lost Naiyāyika like Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta) on a variety of issues, such as what happens when the substratum of a universal perishes. According to Nyāya, the generic concept of a cow derives from the fact that all cows share in cowness; but what about the generic concept of negation or absence? Is there a universal of non-existence? Śāntarakṣita says that our notion of a thing's absence, or destruction, etc., follows from mere convention. In the passage that follows, he considers an account (that Kamalaśīla attributes to Śāṅkarasvāmin) for the relationship between universals and specific notions of absence.]

Objection: “The notions of the prior non-existence of a pot and of the annihilation of the pot concern instances of non-existence that have the entity itself as a qualifying attribute. In every case, there is only a correspondence in these on the force of the universal pertaining to that qualification.” (766–767c)

Not so, because there is an utter distinction [between them], and because it cannot have that as its basis.⁴⁷⁹ It is tenable that the corresponding notion “pot,” or the like, is due to those, but not non-existence. The notion of existence is entirely distinct from it. For you do not accept that the notion “cow” or “horse” comes about on the force of *existence*, otherwise you would have to consider a single universal accomplishing everything. (767d-769)

Objection: “We do not claim that a cognition conforms to its basis in every case, since we claim that number, e.g., is the basis of the notion of an army, etc.”⁴⁸⁰ (770)

If that is so, then why not accept that this notion, which concerns many different things, attends to the directing of one's mind toward different conventions fashioned by whim? (771)

Indeed, there is a desire to establish a convention when there is a cognition of difference. Then it is established; then it is heard; then one directs one's mind toward it; then one has the notion of it. Such alone is ascertained as a capable cause by positive and negative concomitance, since anything else would entail an infinite regress. (772–773)

[...]

⁴⁷⁹ Kamalaśīla analyzes this compound (*vailakṣaṇyātadāśrayāi*) in two different ways, but the gist is the same. The second analysis is, “because of the utter distinction *and* because of not having that as its basis” (*samāhāradvandvo vāvailakṣaṇyād atadāśrayac ca naiva yuktam ity arthaḥ*).

⁴⁸⁰ This is an argument by Bhāvivikta, according to Kamalaśīla (§11). In the prose passage Kamalaśīla cites, the argument seems similar to Aviddhakarṇa's argument in defense of number (verse 643, §9).

§11. BH9 AND BH10: CORRESPONDENCE AND CONVENTION

The most elaborate argument in the *pūrvapakṣa* of chapter thirteen—and one of the most elaborate of all the fragments we are examining—is Bhāvivikta’s argument about cows, Bh9, which Kamalaśīla cites as follows:

bhāviviktaḥ prāha gavāśvamahiṣavarāhamātaṅgādiṣu gavādyabhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣaḥ samayākṛti-piṇḍādivyatiriktasvarūpānurūpasamsarginimittāntaranibandhanā ity avaghoṣaṇā. gavādiviṣayatve sati piṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānavyatiriktābhidhānajñānavāt, teṣv eva gavādiṣu savatsā gaur bhārākrānto mahiṣaḥ saśalyo varāhaḥ sāṅkuṣo mātāṅga ityādyabhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣavat, vaidharmyeṇa piṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣaḥ. yāni ca tāni nimittāntarāṇi tāni gotvādīnīti siddham. (715–717)⁴⁸¹

*Bhāvivikta*⁴⁸² has said: With regard to cows, horses, buffalo, boar, elephants, and so on, particular terms (*abhidhāna*) and cognitions (*prajñāna*), such as “cow,” have as their basis other causes (*nimitta-antara*) that are distinct from (*vyatirikta*) conventions (*samaya*), forms (*ākṛti*), bodies (*piṇḍa*), etc., and that are associated (*samsargin*) with what conforms to their character (*svarūpa-anurūpa*)—that is the proclamation. This is because, under the condition that cows, etc., are their objects, they are terms and cognitions distinct from the terms and cognitions of the nature of bodies, etc. It is like the particular terms and cognitions, “cow with calf,” “overloaded buffalo,” “wounded boar,” “goaded elephant,” and so on, with regard to the same cows, etc., and unlike the particular terms and cognitions of the nature of bodies, etc. And these other causes (*nimitta-antara*) are cowness—so it is established.

This is not a very easy fragment to follow. For the sake of clarity, here are the individual components, slightly streamlined:

- | | |
|----------------------------|--|
| (1) <i>subject</i> | the particular term and cognition, “cow,” with regard to a cow |
| (2) <i>to be proven</i> | is based on another cause, apart from convention, form, body, etc., that is associated with what conforms to its character |
| (3) <i>reason</i> | because it is a term and cognition distinct from the term and cognition of the character of the body, etc. |
| (3b) <i>qualification</i> | under the condition that it has the cow as its object |
| (4) <i>similar case</i> | like a particular term and cognition, such as, “cow with her calf,” concerning the same cow |
| (5) <i>dissimilar case</i> | unlike the particular term and cognition of the character of the body, etc. |

There are a number of challenges in interpreting this fragment, but the most imposing is surely (2), the property to be proven. Kamalaśīla offers two analyses of the dense compound that comprises the property to be proven, neither of which is wholly satisfying. (I ask the reader to bear with me for a moment—this is not particularly straightforward or concrete material.) The basic difference between

⁴⁸¹ TSP 294.16, J106r.6.

⁴⁸² Kamalaśīla introduces the next several verses by saying that Śāntarakṣita “mentions arguments fashioned by Bhāvivikta et al” (*bhāviviktādiracitapramāṇopanyāseṇa*) and then says “Bhāvivikta has said” (*bhāviviktaḥ prāha*) regarding 715–717 in particular.

his two readings concerns the syntax of the term “character” (*svarūpa*). In the first reading, it is the character of the “other causes” that is distinct from convention, etc. In the second reading, the other causes are themselves distinct from convention, etc., and also, in some sense, “conform to a character.” I favor the basic structure of the second reading, but I do not entirely understand Kamalaśīla’s analysis. The compound, together with a diplomatic word-for-word transcription in English, is this:

samaya-ākṛti-piṇḍa-ādi-vyatirikta-svarūpa-anurūpa-saṃsargi-nimitta-antara-nibandhana
 convention-form-body-etc.-distinct-character-conforming-associated-cause-other-basis

After first glossing the terms “convention,” “form,” and “body” with common synonyms, Kamalaśīla then couples “character” (*svarūpa*) with “distinct” (*vyatirikta*) as an internal *bahuvrīhi* compound meaning “other causes whose character is distinct from convention, form, body, etc.” He then separates “conforming” (*anurūpa*) and “associated” (*saṃsargin*), describing the “other causes” as “conforming to their respective term and cognition” and as “associated because of being an attribute (*upādhi*).” This yields the sense,

The particular terms and cognitions, such as “cow,” have as their basis other causes whose character is distinct from convention, form, body, etc.; which conform to the terms and cognitions in question; and which are associated insofar as they are attributes.⁴⁸³

This reading, especially the internal compound “whose character is distinct,” is slightly tortured—but perhaps that is fitting for this fragment.

His alternative is to regard “distinct” (*vyatirikta*) as a separate predicate, and to couple “conforming” (*anurūpa*) and “associated” (*saṃsargin*), as I have done above, but without spelling out the relation between the latter two:

Alternatively, they are distinct from convention, etc., and associated [with? and?] conforming to the character of each (*prati-svarūpa*) cognition and term (*pratyaya-abhidhāna*) of something existent, etc. (*sad-ādi*).⁴⁸⁴

I cannot fully make sense of this alternative analysis. Kamalaśīla simply keeps “conforming” and “associated” in compound, eliding the question of their syntactic relationship. Nevertheless, most fundamentally, Kamalaśīla divides the intricate reason in Bh9 into two halves: *distinct from* (*vyatireka*) and *associated with* (*anurūpa*). This corresponds to the division in Śāntarākṣita’s initial generic depiction of the Nyāya position: we can prove the existence of universals on the basis of class conformity (perceiving the existence of something existent, *sad-ādi-pratyaya*) and on the basis of difference (perceiving the cow’s being-a-cow distinctly from its individuality, *viśeṣa-pratyaya*). I am

⁴⁸³ samayaḥ saṅketaḥ, ākṛtiḥ saṃsthānaṃ, piṇḍo dravyam, ādiśabdena rūpādirigrahaḥ, ebhya vyatiriktaṃ^a svarūpaṃ yeṣāṃ svābhidhānapratyayaṃ pratyānurūpāṇāṃ upādhitvāt saṃsargināṃ nimittāntarāṇāṃ tāni nibandhanaṃ yeṣāṃ iti vigrahaḥ (TSP 295.6, K106v.1). I take it that *yeṣāṃ*, *pratyānurūpāṇāṃ*, and *saṃsargināṃ* all qualify *nimittāntarāṇāṃ*, and that the latter is in the genitive plural to clarify the internal *bahuvrīhi* analyzed by *yeṣāṃ*; *yeṣāṃ* is then correlated by *tāni*. This would not be the most elegant compound analysis, but I am not sure how else to read it.

^a J viviktaṃ

⁴⁸⁴ athavā samayādivyatiriktāni ca tāni sadādiratyāyābhidhānaṃ pratisvarūpānurūpasamṣargiṇi ceti vigrahaḥ kāryaḥ. śeṣaṃ pūrvavat (TSP 295.9, J106v.2).

inclined to accept the division of the compound into two predicates of “other causes,” and to offer my own reading of the syntactic relationship between “conforming” and “associated:” the “other causes” that are the basis of the terms and cognitions in question are “distinct from convention, etc.,” and “associated with what conforms to their character.”

The next question, of course, is what all of this actually means.

Bh9’s reference to “terms and cognitions” (*abhidhāna-prajñāna*) prefigures a later remark by Trilocana, the teacher of the important tenth-century Naiyāyika Vācaspati Miśra. Lawrence McCrea and Parimal Patil translate (Jñānaśrīmitra’s quotation of) Trilocana’s statement like this:

The inherence of the particular universals—horse-ness, cow-ness, and the like—in their own loci (*svāśrayeṣu*) is the basis (*nimitta*) for the awareness (*pratyaya*) and the term (*abhidhāna*) ‘universal.’ (McCrea and Patil 2010, 82)⁴⁸⁵

We could reformulate this as an argument for, rather than a characterization of, universals, like this: “The awareness and the term ‘universal’ has as its basis (*nimitta*) the inherence of the particular universals, such as cowness, in their own loci.” Put differently, it is because universals like cowness inhere in particular cows that we can recognize and refer to things as universals. This is a declaration rather than an argument, but it must not be far from what Bhāvivikta is trying to say. “Inherence in their own loci” (*svāśrayeṣu samavāya*) may be a close approximation for what Bhāvivikta intends with the phrase “associated with what conforms to their character” (*svarūpa-anurūpa-samsargin*). Bhāvivikta cannot simply state that the universals are “associated” with their respective loci, because the entire point of the argument is to prove that there is a need for the separate category of universals. Instead, he refers only to “other causes” of terms and cognitions like “cow” that are associated with “what conforms to their character,” which is to say to their respective loci. A specific cow *conforms to the character* of whatever it is in virtue of which we recognize it to be a cow. This, then, proves what Trilocana takes for granted, that there must be such a thing as real universals.

Before continuing with Bh9, it is helpful to turn briefly to Uddyotakara’s parallel arguments, which Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla cite in the immediately preceding verses (718–719), and which appear in Uddyotakara’s comments on NS 2.2.69, the final sūtra of the second book of the *Nyāyasūtra*.

The final dozen sūtras of NS 2.2, which close out a longer discussion of language and sound, focus on the referents of words. Specifically, this passage is meant to resolve an uncertainty about whether a word refers to an individual (*vyakti*), form (*ākṛti*), or class (*jāti*). After each option has been rejected individually, sūtra 2.2.66 establishes the Nyāya position as all three. Sūtras 67, 68, and 69 then define the three terms in turn:

Individual (*vyakti*) is a material body (*mūrti*) that is the substratum of particular qualities. (2.2.67)

Form (*ākṛti*) denotes the marks of a class (*jāti*). (2.2.68)

Class (*jāti*) consists in generating (*prasava*) generality (*samāna*). (2.2.69)⁴⁸⁶

⁴⁸⁵ *aśvatvagotvādīnāṃ sāmānyaviśeṣāṇāṃ svāśrayeṣu samavāyah sāmānyam ity abhidhānapratyayayo nimittam iti* (McCrea and Patil, 119).

⁴⁸⁶ *vyaktir guṇaviśeṣāśrayo mūrṭiḥ ||2.2.67|| (NS 133.3);*

The word “cow” can refer to an individual animal, the features that mark it as belonging to the class of cows, and/or the class itself.

At the end of his comments on sutra 69 (concerning class/universal as a referent of words), Uddyotakara offers these four arguments:

- (i) We observe that the cognition of correspondence (*anuvṛtti-pratyaya*) with regard to cows, etc., comes from a cause (*nimitta*) distinct from bodies (*piṇḍa*) because of possessing a distinction (*viśeṣavat*), like the cognition of blue, etc. (ii) Cowness is something other (*artha-antara*) than a cow because it is the object of a different cognition (*bhinna-pratyaya-viśaya*), as in the case of the cognitions of color and touch. (iii) Cowness is something other than a cow because it is the object of a designating word (*vyapadeśa-śabda-viśaya*), like Caitra’s horse. (iv) The cognition of a cow’s correspondence to cowness has a different cause because of possessing a distinction, like the cognition of color, etc.⁴⁸⁷

Uddyotakara does not mention convention, does not rely on weighty compounds, and does not collapse terms and cognitions into the subject of a single argument, but apart from these obvious differences, there are some helpful parallels with Bh9: When we see a cow, our recognition that it belongs to the same class as other cows (its “correspondence to cowness”) must be caused by something other than the body of the animal itself; the cow’s being-a-cow is something other than the individual cow itself, because there is a difference between our perception of the individual and our recognition of its being a cow like any other, and because we separately designate the cow and its cowness, as we can separately refer to Caitra and his horse. The word “cow” does refer to the individual (*vyakti*), the body (*piṇḍa*), standing before us, but our denotation of the fact of its belonging to a class, its correspondence or inclusion within the group that we call “cow,” is distinguishable from our denotation of its individuality.

Several features of Bh9 are immediately clearer in light of this passage from the *Vārttika*. Bhāvivikta specifies and excludes at least three causal factors in our “term and cognition” of the cow as a cow: convention (*samaya*), form (*ākṛti*), and body (*piṇḍa*). The latter two correspond to the terms defined in sutras 68 and 67, respectively, and “convention” refers to the more or less arbitrary aspect of language, the actual coining of the particular terms with which we pick out types and tokens. Bhāvivikta may well be commenting, like Uddyotakara, on sutra 69, and explaining why and how a term like “cow” refers not only, or not always, to an individual (*vyakti*) or a form (*ākṛti*), but also to a class (*jāti*).

Another important feature of Bh9 is Bhāvivikta’s insistence that cows, etc., are the referents. The conditional phrase “with regard to cows, etc.” does not get lost in Uddyotakara’s first argument because each other component is clear and concise. In Bh9, on the other hand, Bhāvivikta has to

ākṛtir jātiliṅgākhyā ||2.2.68|| (133.8);
samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ ||2.2.69|| (133.15).

⁴⁸⁷ gavādiṣv anuvṛtipratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ piṇḍavyatiriktāt nimittāt bhavati viśeṣavattvāt nilādiḥpratyayavad iti. goto ‘rthāntaram gotvaṃ bhinnapratyayaviśayatvād rūpasparśapratyayavat. goto ‘rthāntaram gotvaṃ vyapadeśaśabdaviśayatvāt caitrāśvat. gor gotvānuvṛtipratyayo bhinnanimittaḥ viśeṣavattvād rūpādiḥpratyayavad iti (NV 318.7). In addition to eliding the fourth argument, Kamalaśīla’s citation of this passage lacks the word *dṛṣṭaḥ* in the first argument; the word *pratyaya* in the example of the second argument; and the word *śabda* in the third; and Kamalaśīla unpacks and explains the reasoning of the example in the third argument.

mention this condition three separate times: he begins the argument with the phrase, “with regard to cows, horses, buffalo, boar, elephants, and so on” (as opposed to Uddyotakara’s far simpler, “with regard to cows, etc.”), then qualifies the reason by saying “under the condition that that cows, etc., are their objects,” and again qualifies the similar case as being “with regard to the same cows, etc.”

One last feature highlighted by Uddyotakara’s quartet is correspondence (*anurūpa*, *anuvṛtti*—cf. NBh 2.1.36). When Bhāvivikta refers to conformity to a character (*svarūpa-anurūpa*), he quite possibly has in mind the “correspondence” that Uddyotakara discusses above. It is not just the material body, the class features, or the whims of convention that we refer to when we call a cow a cow, but also its conformity (*anurūpa*) or correspondence (*anuvṛtti*) to the peculiar character (*svarūpa*) of a class (*jāti*).

With all of this in mind, we can see that Bh9 packs two separate arguments into a three word compound (which is itself only part of the longer compound comprising the property to be proven): the phrase “associated with (*samsargin*) what conforms to (*anurūpa*) their character (*svarūpa*)” refers, first, to the fact that our denotation of a cow as a cow captures its correspondence to a particular class, i.e., “conformity to a character,” and, second, to the fact that the basis of the denotation must itself inhere in, or be “associated” with, the locus of the denotation and the correspondence, i.e., the particular cow. If we imagine Bhāvivikta following and responding to Uddyotakara, Bh9 would represent his attempt to render a longer discussion into a single, very robust formal inference. On the other hand, if Bhāvivikta predated Uddyotakara, perhaps we could read Bh9 as an earlier, messier argument that Uddyotakara attempted to streamline!

All in all, the argument—contra Dignāga’s denial of universals, and his insistence that language functions on the basis of exclusions that are conventional through-and-through—is that the cognition of a cow as a “cow” bears directly on the cow’s being-a-cow. We use the word “cow” to refer to cows, but the actual referential function that makes the convention possible, the reason we recognize the animal as one member of a broader class, does not rely solely on cultural agreement, but instead on a real universal attribute, the cow’s cowness, which is itself intrinsic to the individual cow.

Subodham—right?

§ § §

Towards the end of the chapter, Śāntarakṣita weaves together his responses to a series of arguments and interjections that Kamalaśīla attributes alternately to Bhāvivikta, Uddyotakara, and Śāṅkarasvāmin. Śāntarakṣita argues that there there cannot be a universal of absence or negation (*abhāva*) behind cognitions of negation. In response, Śāṅkarasvāmin argues that every negation has an entity as a qualifying attribute (*upādhi*), i.e., that every negation or absence is *of something*, such as the pot referred to in the notion of the destruction *of a* pot. In every case (*sarvatra*), Śāṅkarasvāmin says, a notion of negation entails correspondence (*anuvṛttatā*) on the force of the universal that is intrinsic to the entity that qualifies it (*upādhi-gata-sāmānya-vaśāt*).⁴⁸⁸ In other words, the example of

⁴⁸⁸ ghaṭasya prāgabhāvo ‘yaṃ ghaṭapradhvamsa ity ayam | tadvastūpādhikān eva dhīr abhāvān prapadyate^a ||766|| upādhigatasāmānyavaśād evānuvṛttatā | tasyāḥ sarvatra cen naivaṃ vailakṣaṇyātadāśrayāt ||767|| (TS 309, J38v.2).

^a TS pratipadyate

negation or absence does not undermine the idea that cognitions of correspondence are caused by universals. In response, Śāntarakṣita explains that the notion of *bhāva*—being, presence, an entity—is entirely distinct (*vilakṣaṇa*) from *abhāva*—negation, absence. The all-encompassing universal “being” (*sattā*) is not, he continues, the basis for the notions “cow,” “horse,” etc.⁴⁸⁹ The implication is that Śāṅkarasvāmin’s argument simply makes no sense. The notion of one thing’s correspondence cannot be based on an entirely different universal, otherwise any universal could serve as the basis for any notion.

This then leads to an interjection by Bhāvivikta, Bh10, which Kamalaśīla cites as follows:

bhāviviktas tv āha na hi sarvatra nimittānurūpaḥ pratyaya iṣyate. tathā hi gajaturagadhavakhadirādi-samavāyīnī bahutvasaṅkhyā senāvanādibuddhīnām nimittam, pānakakāṅjikādibuddhīnām vijāṭiyadravyasaṃyogo nimittam, anyathā hi bahavaḥ saṃyuktā iti ca pratyayaḥ syād *iti*. (770)⁴⁹⁰

But Bhāvivikta says: In fact, we do not hold that a cognition (*pratyaya*) conforms to (*anurūpa*) its basis (*nimitta*) in every case (*sarvatra*). To explain: The number *plurality*, which inheres in elephants and horses, and in axewoods and acacias, etc., is the basis of cognitions (*buddhi*) of an army or a forest, etc.; the conjunction of heterogeneous substances is the basis of cognitions (*buddhi*) of a potion or a soup, etc. For otherwise the cognition would be “many” or “conjoined.”

In the previous fragment, Bh9—if I have understood it properly—Bhāvivikta argues that a particular animal conforms to the character of the universal *cowness*, and then that universal, which inheres in that animal, forms the basis for the cognition of that animal as a cow. Here in Bh10, however, he argues that in some cases there is not such a clean correspondence between the universal, the individual that instantiates it, and the cognition that registers or relies on this correspondence. When we see a densely clustered collection of axewoods, acacias, and so on, we do not think, “many trees,” but rather, “a forest,” but what we are actually referring to when we name the cluster “a forest” is the number itself, the multiplicity of trees, rather than some actual, distinct, singular substance.

As we have seen before, NS 2.1.36 proves the existence of substantial wholes against the (roughly) Buddhist view that notions like unity are conceptually superimposed onto heaps of atoms. Toward the beginning of his comments on this sutra, Vātsyāyana argues that the Buddhist view creates problems it cannot solve.

If the Buddhist view is true, Vātsyāyana explains, then our notion of unity in regard to something like an army or a forest would be a specific kind of error, namely, “a cognition of *x* with regard to *not-x*” (*atasmimś tad iti pratyaya*). The opponent says only, “So what?” (*tataḥ kim*). Vātsyāyana then continues: “A cognition of *x* with regard to *not-x* relies on a paradigm (*pradhāna*), thus establishing the paradigm.”⁴⁹¹ His example is the standard case of mistaking a post, or a pillar, for a man (*sthāṇau puruṣa-pratyaya*). In other words, Vātsyāyana accepts that we sometimes mistake a post for a man, but this does not prove that there is no such thing as a man—quite the contrary, in fact. Naiyāyikas can account for situations in which we refer to a multiplicity as a case of unity, because they can point to paradigmatic cases of unity, whereas the Buddhists cannot explain where we rightly got the

⁴⁸⁹ na hi sattāvaśād buddhir gaur aśva iti cesyate | ekam evānyathā kalpyaṃ sāmānyaṃ sarvasādhanam ||769|| (TS 309, J38v.3).

⁴⁹⁰ TSP 309.13, J110v.1.

⁴⁹¹ atasmimś tad iti pratyayasya pradhānāpekṣitvāt pradhānasiddhiḥ (NBh 77.12).

idea we are now wrongly applying.

The specific examples that Bhāvivikta raises in Bh10 lead me to think he is commenting on this passage of the *Bhāṣya*. Vātsyāyana's discussion in 2.1.36 eventually turns to universals—specifically, to the idea that, given the existence of universals, there must be some substance in which a universal like “cow” or “horse” inheres. How would the cognition of correspondence arise if all we perceived were heaps of imperceptible atoms? But Bh10 does not explicitly address universals and seemingly only appears in this chapter of the *Tattvasamgraha* because it fits neatly within Śāntarakṣita's discussion with Śāṅkarasvāmin about correspondence. It serves better as a comment on Vātsyāyana's discussion in NBh 2.1.36 of our cognitions of number.

PRATYAKṢALAKṢAṆA

After dismissing Bh10, Śāntarakṣita lays out a few additional arguments against the existence of universals. How does a universal, which is singular and unchanging, exist in manifold individuals? To what extent does a universal rely on its respective individuals? Being permanent, as we now know, renders it causally ineffective. Just what sorts of ontological relations are involved in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika story? Śāntarakṣita speaks as if he is searching for some kind of sensible account, but cannot find one. To conclude chapter thirteen, he reminds his reader of his careful systematic approach in the *Tattvasamgraha*:

In this way, we have refuted the idea that universals are exclusively distinct, whereas we will reject the universals accepted by followers of Jaimini in regard to *Syādvāda*. (811)

He will not discuss *syādvāda*, Jain standpoint theory, until chapter twenty. The topic there partly relates to the topic of chapter thirteen, and he alerts the reader to this overlap. But he still has to conclude his examination of the six categories and follow the logic of the conversation that ensues.

§ § §

We are skipping over three chapters at this point.

The “Examination of Differentiae (*viśeṣa*),” chapter fourteen, is very brief, just ten verses. Ultimate differentiae are explanatory abstractions to account for the fact that the atoms of each element, earth, etc., are identical and yet differentiable. Śāntarakṣita’s basic argument against this idea is simple: Substances having been refuted, differentiae have nothing to differentiate. But he also asks whether differentiae are even useful in theory. Are atoms intrinsically distinct or not? If so, what is the use of ultimate differentiae? If not, then is distinctness intrinsic to differentiae? In response, Śāntarakṣita considers the argument, attributed by Kamalaśīla to Praśastamati,⁴⁹² that differentiation is indeed intrinsic to differentiae, and the atoms obtain their differentiation by contact with them, as one substance is rendered impure by contact with an impure substance like dogmeat (*śva-māṃsa*, an axiomatic case of impurity). Śāntarakṣita draws on familiar arguments to point out two problems

⁴⁹² Praśastamati is another name for Praśastapāda, cf. n 173.

with Praśastamati's account: First, impurity is conventional, so the example does nothing for Praśastamati. Second, atoms are permanent, so even if we accept that differentiation is intrinsic to differentiae, given that atoms have no causes, the differentiae could not serve to differentiate them.

Chapter fifteen, the "Examination of Inherence (*samavāya*)" closes Śāntarakṣita's rebuttal of the categories. According to Vaiśeṣika ontology, a cloth inheres in its threads. But we do not perceive a cloth, Śāntarakṣita says, like a *bilva* fruit in a bowl (*kunḍādau śrīphalādivat*). There is a discussion of the idea that inherence is singular, which suggests, according to Śāntarakṣita, that the inherence of cloths in threads should be present in other substances, as well. In short, inherence does not pick up any real relation, but only reflects its proponents' fixation on their own doctrines.

As mentioned, after finishing his examination of the categories, Śāntarakṣita turns to theory of language. Chapter sixteen, the "Examination of the Meaning of Words," is the third longest in the entire *Tattvasamgraha*, spanning almost 350 verses. Śāntarakṣita opens this chapter with an opponent's last ditch effort to save the categories: Words express real things; how could language function without the ontological ground of the categories (866–867)? Śāntarakṣita gives the expected response: There is no real basis for words; language is conventional; what is real is inexpressible (868–869).

In the next few dozen verses (870–908), Śāntarakṣita considers potential candidates, apart from the categories, for linguistic correspondence: unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇa*); universals (*sāmānya*); and a list of seven quoted verbatim from Bhartṛhari.⁴⁹³ The next section (909–1200) comprises the bulk of the chapter: objections to *apoha* (exclusion) theory from Bhāmaha, Kumāri, and Uddyotakara, and Śāntarakṣita's engagement with and refutation of them. This section, ostensibly dedicated to refuting the specific arguments of these three opponents, serves also to clarify, define, and defend Dignāga's formulation of *apoha* theory. Linguistic exclusion is not an entity; it does not have any intrinsic form; it does not touch objects. It is, rather, a description of the manner in which our words, rooted in convention, indirectly filter the conceptual schema we impose on our deluded picture of the world. A conceptual complex is always already in place. Dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) entails that no conditioned thing exists unto itself, in isolation; the same is true for words and concepts. In the closing verses (1201–1211), Śāntarakṣita dismisses a few minor remaining concerns, and then concludes with an elegant invocation of the common example of the eye condition called *timira*:

Just as someone whose eyes are beset by *timira* says to someone like himself that there is a double moon, so do we consider all verbal usage.⁴⁹⁴ (1210)

In other words, enough is shared in our confused sense of reality that we can communicate despite the fact that our words point only to more or less reliable illusions.

Finally, we will now turn to the chapters on epistemology (17–19), where we find the last of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta.

⁴⁹³ For a brief but excellent analysis of a few aspects of this passage, see Hattori 1993, "Kamalaśīla's Interpretation of Some Verses in the Vākyakāṇḍa of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya." Cf. §14 for Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's engagement with Bhartṛhari's epistemological views.

⁴⁹⁴ timiropahatākṣo hi yathā prāha śaśidvayam | svasamāya tathā sarvā śābdī vyavahṛtir matā ||1210|| (TS 448, J61r.6).

According to Kamalaśīla's framing device for the *Tattvasamgraha* as a whole, each chapter serves to establish one of the qualifications (*viśeṣaṇa*, i.e., facts [*tattva*]) of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). Quite a few of the first sixteen chapters serve to prove a negative qualification: dependent origination is free from (*rahita*) the operation of any god, self, etc., and devoid of (*śūnya*) the conditions of substance, quality, etc. The single concept of dependent origination suffices to account for the vast diversity of the world and of experience, but it takes a lot of work to strip away our attachments to additional, needless—and, worse, deluding—explanatory concepts.

Underpinning the entire discussion up until this point are the basic concepts of epistemology. The chapter on the theory of language leads naturally into the chapters on epistemology—according to Dignāga, there are only two objects of cognition, the fluctuating unique particulars that we perceive, and the universals, i.e., the conceptual abstractions, that we infer. *Apoha* theory explains how we superimpose the latter onto the former. The chapters on epistemology then explain how these two cognitive processes, perception and inference, function, and why there are none but these two.

In chapter seventeen, the “Examination of the Definition of Perception,” Śāntarakṣita defends Dignāga's analysis of perception as non-conceptual (particularly in his *Nyāyamukha*), and Dharmakīrti's addition of “non-erroneous” to the definition. In fact, the entire chapter can be divided into two major sections corresponding to these two contentious qualifications. First, Śāntarakṣita defines conceptuality and the relationship between language, experience, and reality (certain cognitions are shaped by language whether or not they entail usage of a particular word; the connection between words and things is erroneous; traces of past impressions account for our conceptual capacity, even as ostensibly pre-linguistic infants; etc.). Then, he examines and defends Dignāga's analysis of the non-conceptuality of perception. He then considers three main objections to this idea. Around 100 verses into the chapter, where we briefly pick up the discussion, he considers the last of these objections to perception's non-conceptuality. His engagement with Bhāvivikta here is not very substantial, so we will only consider a quick excerpt from this chapter.

Chapter Seventeen

Examination of the Definition of Perception

[...]

The capacity of the non-conceptual

Even non-conceptual cognition has the capacity to generate the conceptual (*vikalpa*). Hence, by that means, it is an expedient of all conventional activity. (1305)

Objection: “The non-conceptual does not have this capacity with regard to the conceptual, because of having a different referent, like cognitions of color [and sound], etc.,⁴⁹⁵ and because of being non-conceptual, like eyes, etc.”⁴⁹⁶ (1306)

To this, we say: These two [reasons] are not incompatible with the conceptual.⁴⁹⁷ And[, in any case,] the referent is not different, because [a conceptual cognition is] the apprehension of the object of that [non-conceptual perception]. In reality, conceptuality arises without an objective support; it does not have any referent at all, so there is nothing to differentiate. Cognitions of color, sound, etc., are, in fact, mutual causes. Therefore, the example that has been raised is not known to have the property to be proven. In addition, we can clearly perceive deviation in this [argument], because there is a causal relation between cognitions of fire and smoke, etc.⁴⁹⁸ (1307–1310)

[...]

⁴⁹⁵ A cognition of color has a different referent than a cognition of sound, etc., and, so, cannot generate it.

⁴⁹⁶ This clearly condenses at least two distinct arguments that Kamalaśīla credits to Bhāvivikta et al (§12).

⁴⁹⁷ For the reason *z* to prove that *x* is *not-y*, *z* must be incompatible with *y*. Imagine someone pointing to smoke billowing up from the far side of a mountain, and saying, “there’s a fire!” Someone else chimes in: “No, that mountain is not fiery, because it is green.” The mountain may well be covered in lush vegetation, but its greenness is not incompatible with its being the locus of a fire somewhere out of sight. Śāntarakṣita is arguing that the objection is like that: even if we accept that non-conceptual cognition has a different referent than conceptual thought, that does not mean that the one cannot be causally connected with the other.

⁴⁹⁸ To continue from the previous note, a cognition of smoke has a different referent than a cognition of fire, and yet, the one is causally connected to the other, because it is in consequence of one’s perception of smoke that one comes to understand that there is fire. Therefore, “having a different referent” does not prove “not having the capacity to generate.”

§12. BH11: PERCEPTION IS DETERMINATE

After defining “conceptuality” (*kalpanā*) and explaining, in accordance with Dignāga’s definition, that perception is “free from conceptuality,” Śāntarakṣita argues that non-conceptual perceptions lead to conceptual cognition. This is extremely important for Buddhist epistemology. If perception is restricted to unique particulars, but words and concepts can never actually reach or capture particulars, it is not immediately clear what practical role perception plays in experience, communication, and worldly activity. If perception is non-conceptual, how can we undertake a course of action, or act on the basis of an inference? Kamalaśīla formulates the objection like this:

At the time of an inference, the property-possessor and the property must, by necessity, be grasped in a determinate manner (*niścita*) by another means of knowledge, but they could not be grasped in a determinate manner by perception, which [in your view] is essentially indeterminate (*a-niścaya-ātmaka*). Nor could they be grasped by inference, as that would incur an infinite regress. Nor [according to you Buddhists] is there any other means of knowledge; what would obtain, therefore, is the eradication of all conventional activity (*vyavahāra*).⁴⁹⁹

The task for the Buddhists is to account for worldly activity. We know that we act in the world in certain ways, but, according to this objection, none of our conventional activities would be possible if perception were ineluctably indeterminate.

The Buddhists’ response is that, though our conceptual picture of the world is not entirely in accordance with reality, it is practically consistent with it because it is grounded in non-conceptual perception. Precisely how—and when—the non-conceptual leads into the conceptual is somewhat unclear, at least to me. Śāntarakṣita says,

Even non-conceptual (*avikalpa*) cognition has the capacity to generate conceptions (*vikalpa*). So, by means of that (*taddvāreṇa*), it is an expedient (*aṅga*) of all conventional activity (*vyavahāra*).⁵⁰⁰

Kamalaśīla explains that perception, though non-conceptual, arises as delimiting an object through the generation of the object’s conceptual image (*ākāra*). His example is a fire. The fire is excluded from both similar and dissimilar things—it is not just *a* fire, but *this* fire; and it is a fire *rather than*, say, a cluster of orange flowers. He describes these affirmative and negative concepts of the fire as “not inconsistent” (*avisamvādaka*) with the object,⁵⁰¹ and yet not authoritative (*prāmāṇya*), either, because they do not apprehend something as-yet unapprehended.⁵⁰² Strictly speaking, the idea that

⁴⁹⁹ tathā hy anumānakāle ‘vaśyaṃ dharmī dharmo vā pramāṇāntareṇa niścito gṛhītavyaḥ, sa ca na pratyakṣeṇāniścayātmakena niścito gṛhītuṃ śakyate. nāpy anumānena, anavasthādoṣāt. na cānyatpramāṇāntaram^a astīti sarvavyavahārocchedaḥ prāpnoti. (TSP 477.6, J157v.7 [this entire excerpt is part of a longer marginal insertion]).

^a Śāstri wrongly prints *na cānyāt*.

⁵⁰⁰ avikalpam^a api jñānaṃ vikalpotpattīśaktimat | niḥśeṣavyavahārāṅgaṃ taddvāreṇa bhavaty ataḥ ||1305|| (TS 477, J66r.1).

^a The mss. read *vikalpam*, but the context demands *avikalpam*; in addition, Kamalaśīla introduces the verse by citing *avikalpam* as the first word and the Tibetan reads *rtog pa med pa’i shes pa yang*.

⁵⁰¹ Also cf. Dharmottara’s comments toward the beginning of his *Nyāyabindu-tīkā*.

⁵⁰² pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham api sajjātiyavijātiyavyāvṛttam analādikam arthaṃ tadākāranirbhāsoḥpattitāḥ paricchindat utpadyate. tac ca niyatarūpavyavasthitavastugrāhitvād vijātiyavyāvṛttavastvākārānugatavāc ca tatraiva vastuni vidhipratiṣedhāv āvirbhāvayaty analo ‘yaṃ nāsau kusumastabakādir iti. tayoś ca vikalpayoḥ pāramparyeṇa vastuni pratibandhād avisamvāditve^a ‘pi na prāmāṇyam iṣṭam, dr̥ṣyavikalpayor ekatvādhyavasāyena pravṛtter

there is a fire is a conceptual imposition, but because the delimitation of what we conceive as the fire accompanies the arising of the perception of the unique particular(s), the conception is roughly consistent with reality. Practically speaking, we are correct in acting upon the world as if there were a fire where we conceive the fire to be. If we crave warmth, we can move toward the fire, and our action will bear fruit. The conception is ultimately erroneous while practically consistent, accurate without being authoritative, derivative yet determinate.

In Bh11, Bhāvivikta et al object. Kamalaśīla cites a pair of arguments as follows:

atra bhāviviktādayo vikalpotpādadvārenāpi vyavahārāṅgatvaṃ vighaṭayanto yat pramāṇayanti [...] nendriyavijñānaṃ savikalpakamanovijñānakāraṇaṃ bhinnaviṣayatvād rūpasparśādijñānavat, nirvikalpakatvāc ca cakṣurādivad iti. (1306)⁵⁰³

In regard to this, Bhāvivikta et al, laying into the idea that, even by means of the generation of conceptions, [non-conceptual perception] is an expedient of conventional activity, argue like this [...]: Sensory cognition (indriya-vijñāna) is not the cause of conceptual mental cognition (savikalpaka-mano-vijñāna) because of having a different object, like cognitions of color, touch, etc., and because it is non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka), like the eye, etc.

The fragment contains two arguments: First, sensory cognition cannot be the cause of conceptual cognition because of having a different object, just as the objects cognitions of color and touch, e.g., differ respectively. Second, sensory cognition cannot be the cause of conceptual cognition because it itself is non-conceptual, like the eye, etc.

The example in the first case is not, strictly speaking, a “similar case,” as it does not instantiate the property to be proven as it is stated here. To say that “cognitions of color, touch, etc.,” are “not the cause of conceptual mental cognition” would not prove the point, but only beg the question. This example only make senses as an exemplification of the principle that “what has a different object than *something* cannot be *its* cause,” just as the cognition of color, e.g., is not the cause of the cognition of touch. In the same way, non-conceptual sensory cognition has a different object than conceptual mental cognition, ergo it must not be its cause. Kamalaśīla attributes these arguments to “Bhāvivikta et al” and collapses the two of them into a single statement, so it is likely that he is eliding, or simplifying, longer discussions. Such details may well have been more fully spelled out in some of their original formulations.

Śāntarakṣita’s brief response to Bh11 focuses on the first argument. He says, firstly, that from the conventional perspective, there is no difference in object, as conceptual cognition just renders determinate the indeterminate content of the non-conceptual perception. Ultimately, however, conceptual cognition has no real object; from this perspective, the reason, “because of having a different object,” is even less coherent. Further, the example lacks the property to be proven because “cognitions of color, touch, etc.” are “mutual causes” (*anyonya-hetutā*), or as Kamalaśīla puts it, they are one another’s immediately preceding conditions (*paraspara-samanantara-pratyaya*). Finally, the cognition of smoke and the cognition of fire have different objects, yet they have a causal

anadhigatavasturūpādhiḡamābhāvāt (TSP 477.13, J158r.1).

^a TSP °ād vi°, J °ād avi°.

⁵⁰³ TSP 478.12, J58r.5.

relationship, so the reason is inconclusive.⁵⁰⁴

We cannot say for sure whether Bhāvivikta accepted that sensory cognition is ever non-conceptual,⁵⁰⁵ but it seems likely that he is aiming here to draw absurd conclusions out of the Buddhists' premises. Perhaps Bhāvivikta understood NS 1.1.4 as implying that perception has a non-conceptual moment or aspect and a conceptual moment or aspect; perhaps the distinction as such was not entirely material for him. In any case, it is clear from Bh11 that Bhāvivikta et al must have held that our (conceptual) picture of the world stems from determinate perceptions rather than indeterminate (non-conceptual) perceptions. In other words, when we see a fire, we directly perceive the substance that we then call a fire, not just the unique particulars onto which we subsequently impose the concept of fire.

⁵⁰⁴ tad atra na virodho 'sti vikalpena sahānayoḥ | na cāpi viṣayo bhinnas tadarthādhyavasāyataḥ ||1307|| vastutas^a tu nirālambo vikalpaḥ sampravarttate | tasyāsti viṣayo naiva yo vibhidyeta kaścana ||1308|| rūpaśabdādibuddhīnām asty evānyonyaheturā | tato 'prasiddhasādhyo 'yaṃ drṣṭāntaḥ samudīritaḥ ||1309|| agnidhūmādibuddhīnām kāryakāraṇabhāvataḥ | vyabhicāro 'pi viśpaṣṭam etasminn upalabhyate ||1310|| (TS 478, J66r.2).

^a TS wrongly prints *vastus*.

⁵⁰⁵ Later Naiyāyika commentators differed on these issues; cf. §10 on the definition in NS of perception as *avyapadeśya*.

ANUMĀNA

The “Examination of Inference,” chapter eighteen, has four main sections, each with an independent *pūrvapakṣa* followed by its rebuttal. First, Śāntarakṣita refutes the Jain thinker Pātravāmin’s notion that there is only one characteristic of a valid reason, namely, being “otherwise impossible” (vv. 1363–1428).⁵⁰⁶ Then he turns to Nyāya theory of argumentation (1429–1440). Third, Śāntarakṣita responds to Kumārila’s twofold taxonomy of inference (1441–1454). Finally, in the final thirty verses of the chapter (1455–1485), he considers skeptical arguments against inference by Cārvāka thinkers (such as Aviddhakarṇa), Bhartrhari, and others. In this context, Kamalaśīla twice refers to a *Tattvaṭīkā*, in the second instance citing Aviddhakarṇa by name.

The portion of the “Examination of Inference” dedicated to disagreements with Nyāya largely concerns the five components (*aṅga*, *avayava*) of an inferential argument: proposition, reason, exemplification, application, and conclusion. Śāntarakṣita argues that the proposition is useless (*anupayogin*) because it is not an expedient of proof (*a-sādhana-aṅga*).⁵⁰⁷ He then considers the objection that without a proposition, which indicates the subject (*pakṣa*) of the argument, there can be no similar case (*sapakṣa*) or dissimilar case (*vipakṣa*), nor can the reason fulfill the three characteristics (*trirūpa*), given that they deal, respectively, with the subject, the similar case, and the dissimilar case.

Śāntarakṣita’s response is practical. First, we only make these kinds of distinctions in *śāstra*, i.e., in a technical discussion, instruction, or text, rather than when making an argument.⁵⁰⁸ Second, in a dispute, the proponent does not formulate an argument out of nowhere (*akāṇḍa eva*). Disputants know what they are disputing.

⁵⁰⁶ See the section on Kamalaśīla’s *Pūrvapakṣasamkṣipta* in Appendix A for more on the way he and Śāntarakṣita engage with Pātravāmin’s inferential theory. The Jain thinker Akalaṅka (Śāntarakṣita’s contemporary) and other later Dīgambara thinkers came to use this and similar formulations, but it appears that from Śāntarakṣita’s perspective the idea was still distinctive to Pātravāmin.

⁵⁰⁷ This recalls the *Vādanyāya*, where Dharmakīrti defines grounds for the proponent’s defeat in terms of *a-sādhana-aṅga*, and where he repeatedly criticizes the concept of the proposition as redundant.

⁵⁰⁸ na sādhanābhidhāne ‘sti sapakṣādivikalpanā | śāstre tu pravibhājyante vyavahārāya te tathā ||1434|| (TS 513, J72v.2).

After this, Śāntarakṣita neatly dispatches an argument by Bhāvivikta in defense of the application (Bh12), then one by Uddyotakara for the conclusion (*nigamana*), and another for the conclusion by Aviddhakarṇa (Av15).

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN EXAMINATION OF INFERENCE

Definition of inference

We hold that inference is twofold: “for-oneself” (*svārtha*) and “for-others” (*parārtha*). “For-oneself” is the observation of an inferable object on the basis of a mark (*liṅga*) with three characteristics (*trirūpa*).⁵⁰⁹ We call the statement of the mark with three characteristics “for-others.” We hold that an object with some one or two of the characteristics is a fallacious mark. (1361–1362)

[...]

[TN: After this initial definition, Śāntaraḥṣita entertains the Jaina thinker Pātrasvāmin’s conception of inference, and his case against the three characteristics. Then he turns to the Nyāya view.]

Nyāya theory of argumentation

Some describe the “for-others” (*parārtha*) inference as the statement of the proposition, reason, exemplification, application, and conclusion.⁵¹⁰ (1429ab)

Against the statement of the proposition

The proposition is useless because it is not a component of proof.⁵¹¹ It is untenable that it proves the matter directly, because there is no connection. It is also untenable that it does so indirectly, because it does not point to something capable (*śakta*) [of proving it].⁵¹² If we accept it to be a component of proof,⁵¹³ like the example, because it indicates the scope of [the reason, i.e.,] the property that proves what is to be proven, then it would deviate because of statements of authorization, etc. And in this case, too, the indication of the scope would be useless. (1429cd-1432)

Objection: “[In your view, then,] there is no formulation of the subject (*pakṣa*), so how can there be a differentiation (*vyavasthā*) of the similar case (*sapakṣa*) and so on? Because of that, there could be no fulfillment of the three characteristics, either, as reliance on that is its basis.” (1433)

⁵⁰⁹ To reiterate: The “mark” by which one infers something, or the “reason” (*hetu*) with which one proves it, must fulfill three characteristics: (i) It must be a property of the thing being inferred; (ii) it must be a property of some similar case (i.e., something that is known to possess the property being inferred); and (iii) it must not be a property of any dissimilar case (i.e., something that is known not to possess that property). The latter two correspond to “positive and negative concomitance,” respectively.

The manuscripts read *svarūpa* (intrinsic form) rather than *trirūpa* (three characteristics)

⁵¹⁰ Śāntaraḥṣita writes only “the proposition, etc.,” but this is purely for metrical reasons, and in this case there is absolutely no ambiguity about the remaining members of the list.

⁵¹¹ The term “component of proof” (*sādhanaṅga*), or more precisely, “non-component of proof” (*a-sādhanaṅga*) plays an important role in Dharmakīrti’s *Vādanyāya*; cf. Appendix A.

⁵¹² An epistemically efficacious statement is like pointing to the smoke over the mountain; the act of pointing does not directly reveal the fact that there is fire there, but does give an indication of something that can, namely, the smoke.

⁵¹³ A successful inferential statement does not generate knowledge directly, but instigates an inferential cognition in the listener. The proposition is epistemically worthless because it cannot even instigate such a cognition.

The contrivance (*vikalpanā*) of the similar case, etc., is not present in the statement of a proof. Rather, these are divided in this way in a scholarly work (*śāstra*) for the sake of discourse (*vyavahāra*). Or, even if it has the matter under discussion as its basis, this does not contradict [our view]. Indeed, the proponent does not state the argument, even for the other party, out of the blue. (1434–1435)

In fact, being a property of the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*) follows from presence in the subject of inquiry; the similar case (*sapakṣa*) is from the commonality of that; the dissimilar case (*sapakṣa*) is from the absence of that.⁵¹⁴ (1436)

Statement of the application

There can be no statement of the reason if there is no statement of the proposition, so the statement of the application cannot be brought about to prove the real existence [of the reason in the subject of the argument]. And when the mere existence [of the reason in the subject] has already been stated, after demonstrating pervasion, the representation of the proof of the intended matter is fruitless.⁵¹⁵ (1437–1438)

Statement of the conclusion

Because the argument is proven entirely on the force of the indication of a reason fulfilling the three characteristics, there is no suspicion of the contrary. Hence the conclusion is useless. (1439)

A single matter is explained only with connected statements. So there is no need to state a separate conclusion to establish the connection.⁵¹⁶ (1440)

[...]

[TN: After contending with Nyāya, Śāntarakṣita briefly discusses Kumārila's twofold taxonomy of inference, and then turns, in the final portion of the chapter, to skeptical arguments against inference.]

Skepticism

But there are some shortsighted folks who say, “inference is not a means of knowledge,” while conveying their intention with these very words.⁵¹⁷ (1455)

Anonymous skeptics' arguments

(i) [What you call] “for-oneself” [inference] cannot be a means of knowledge, because it is preceded by a mark that fulfills the three characteristics, like a false cognition, which, as is known, can be generated by a reason that refutes what is intended (*iṣṭaghātakṛt*).⁵¹⁸ (1456)

⁵¹⁴ In other words, we can delineate the three characteristics in terms of the subject, similar case, and dissimilar case, but really this is just a useful distinction in a work of scholarship. In an actual discussion, so long as the reason fulfills the three characteristics, the functions of the subject, etc., are fulfilled without their having to be mentioned as such.

⁵¹⁵ Buried in here somewhere, according to Kamalaśīla, is an invocation of at least two arguments by Bhāvavikta et al in defense of the need for a separate statement of the application (§13)

⁵¹⁶ As Kamalaśīla notes, this is essentially the inversion of a brief argument by Aviddhakarṇa (§13).

⁵¹⁷ According to Śāntarakṣita, we infer someone's intention from their words. To say “inference is not a means of knowledge” is like saying “you cannot understand what I am saying” and expecting that the listener understands. (Cf. “Aviddhakarṇa's sword.”) Kamalaśīla describes “some folks” as “followers of Bṛhaspati, et al” (*bārhaspatyādayaḥ*).

⁵¹⁸ The manuscript quite clearly reads °*kṛtā*, the instrumental of *kṛt*, but Shastri for some reason emends this to *kṛtāj*°.

(ii) And the mark's fulfillment of the three characteristics, like its fulfillment of two characteristics, occurs even when there is no inference, so it is not the cause of inference, and hence there is no inference. (1457)

(iii) And also because there is always the possibility of contradictions in the argument through a further inference or the opposite inference.⁵¹⁹ (1458)

Bhartṛhari's skepticism

(iv) [*Vākyapadīya* 1.32–34:] Given that capacities differ according to differences in state, place, and time, proof of the nature of things (*bhāva*) is extremely difficult to obtain via inference. Even if the capacity of something with respect to a certain purposeful action is already known,⁵²⁰ that capacity can be impeded when there is contact with specific substances. Even if folks who are skilled in inferential reasoning carefully infer something, others who are more well versed may explain it entirely otherwise. (1459–1461)

*Anonymous continued*⁵²¹

(v) The “for-others” inference, on the other hand, is not a means of knowledge because it is but a restatement with respect to the speaker; he does not learn something by means of it. Even with respect to the listener, what occurs is “for-oneself.” Indeed, what is the difference between a cognition rooted in hearing [the statement of the inferential mark] or in seeing [it]? With respect to the listener, the statement is not an inference “for-others” because it causes a cognition in his stream of sound perception and [through this] generates knowledge. Just as there is no direct illumination of the inferable thing on the part of the sense faculty, so for the same reason that [statement] is not [an inference “for others”], like the cognition of the invariable relation.⁵²² If you say it is “for-others” with regard to the activity of others, that, too, is untenable, because it follows that even a “for-oneself” would be “for-others.” (1462–1466)

Refutation

the ablative of *kr̥ta*. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti both refer to a contradictory reason that is *iṣṭa(vi)ghātakṛt*, and Kamalaśīla cites the same example they use: “the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another because they are composite (*saṃghāta*), like the components of a bed.” The proponent of this argument intends to prove the self, the singular and stable entity for which the eyes, etc., are composed, but according to the Buddhists, the reasoning only goes to show that the being for whom the eyes are composed is itself composite. Thus the reason “refutes what is intended” by the proponent.

⁵¹⁹ Kamalaśīla attributes the reasoning behind some of these points to a text called *Tattvaṭīkā*, but does not mention the name of the author (§14). He introduces verse 1456 by saying, “Firstly, Cārvākas make the arguments...” (*tāvāc cārvākāḥ prāmāṇyanti*).

⁵²⁰ There are two differences between Bhartṛhari's and Śāntarakṣita's versions of this clause. The first *pāda* of Bhartṛhari's version are *nirjñāta-śakter dravyasya*; of Śāntarakṣita's, *vijñāta-śakter apy asya*. The difference is fairly trivial, but Śāntarakṣita's version does read slightly more clearly, so it is quite possible that he adjusted it for the benefit of his readers. Without the *api* (even), the disjunctive aspect of the verse is less explicit, and the form *nir+√jñā* is less common than *vi+√jñā*.

J reads *vijñāna*° rather than *vijñāta*°, which makes the compound somewhat difficult to interpret. I am inclined to think it is simply a minor error in transcription. Kamalaśīla, without citing a *pratīka*, glosses it *niścita*, “ascertained.”

⁵²¹ Kamalaśīla notably attributes this line of argument to “someone else” (*anyaḥ*). It may well be Śāntarakṣita's imaginary interpolation on behalf of skepticism rather than his paraphrase of the arguments of any particular thinker or group.

⁵²² Seeing smoke over the mountain is not *seeing* the fire, even if one learns by means of it that there is fire there. Cognizing or recognizing the invariable relation between fire and smoke does not directly illuminate a fire on the other side of a mountain.

Isn't being preceded by a mark that fulfills the three characteristics indicative of agreement (*saṃvādin*) [i.e., being “not inconsistent” (*avisamvādaka*) with reality], and isn't the indication of that what it is to be a means of knowledge? What, then, is denied through this [argument]? And we describe the cognition generated by a reason that refutes what is intended as similar to a false cognition in relation to the *pūrvapakṣa*, not in reality. For in reality, the cognition is ascertained to be non-inconsistent. For this very reason, it is a means of knowledge of the inverse of what is intended by the disputant. Hence, the reason [in argument (i)] is contrary and unestablished in the example.⁵²³ (1467–1470ab)

The very same shows the reason in the second argument to be unestablished. (1470cd)

Argument (iii)

Proponents of reason have stated that it is only a connection firmly ascertained through identity or causality that is effective (*sādhana*) in proof (*siddhi*). There can be no contradiction through inference in regard to such a reason (*sādhana*), for [such a reason] is in no case possible without identity (*ātma*) or causality (*hetu*). Two mutually contradictory properties do not occur in one and the same thing, hence the opposite inference is not possible. (1471–1473)

Argument (iv)

We say that inferences about things whose characteristics are known through repeated experience (*abhyasta*) proceed when a valid mark is ascertained; other practices are not inferences. Hence, though capacities differ according to differences in state, place, and time, proof of the nature of things (*bhāva*) is not so difficult to obtain via inference. (1474–1475)

Also, if folks who are skilled in inferential reasoning carefully infer something, others cannot prove otherwise, even if they are more well versed. For there is no intrinsic condition without an intrinsic condition and no effect without a cause—otherwise difference or causlessness would obtain, respectively—and there is no inference without these two. (1476–1477)

Argument (v)

When we refer to the fact that a statement of a mark that fulfills the three characteristics is a “for-others” inference, we do so with respect to the listener, because such a statement points to something capable [of instigating the inferential cognition]. In this way, it is figurative and conventional with respect to its inferentiality insofar as it points to something capable. Therefore, [referring to it in this way] does not overextend. If you say inference is not a means of knowledge, your declaration is fruitless, for no one could learn your intention from the statement. (1478–1480)

Conclusion

You may say, “We accept a commonplace (*laukika*) mark, not what is imagined by others.”⁵²⁴

⁵²³ For a discussion of reasons that are *iṣṭa(vi)ghātakṛt*, see Tillemans 2000, 52ff.

⁵²⁴ Shastri emends this verse in accordance with an interlinear insertion in the manuscript of the commentary. Kamalaśīla seems to refer to the words *na tv anyat* in the root text, and an interlinear comment either adds to this, or else replaces or glosses it, *tatvataḥ* [sic]. This strikes me as inconclusive. The manuscript of the root text matches Krishnamacharya's reading (*laukikam liṅgam iṣṭam cen na tv anyaiḥ parikalpitam*), which is how I render it. The *tattvatas* in the commentary seems to me to refer to the term in verse 1482.

But doesn't a common man also understand a cause from its effect,⁵²⁵ and so on? And in truth,⁵²⁶ proponents of logic say that alone suffices. So if you admit the commonplace, what is it you set aside? And how does the other party learn with this non-means of knowledge (*apramāṇa*)? And what sort of cognition would be produced by a non-means of knowledge (*apramāṇa*)? (1481–1483)

You may say, "Inference, which consists in a statement, is not a means of knowledge for the speaker. Just as he illuminates something with that, so could this be thus."⁵²⁷ (1484)

We accept it to be a non-means of knowledge because it does not⁵²⁸ illuminate something as yet unknown, not because it does not point to something capable. But isn't yours like that? (1485)

⁵²⁵ Śāntarākṣita actually says "causes, etc., from an effect, etc." (*kāryāder hetvādīn*) and Kamalaśīla explains that (i) the term "etc." (*-ādi*) refers to intrinsic conditions (*svabhāva*), which is to say to reasons based on identity rather than causality, and (ii) the grammatical number is different because there are many different instances of causes (or intrinsic conditions) that can be inferred from an effect, but each is inferred on the basis of *its* (singular) effect.

⁵²⁶ According to Kamalaśīla, the phrase "in truth" (*tattvataḥ*) construes with "recognizes causes...", but this is a fairly awkward reading of the Sanskrit with no clear upside. I have opted to read the root text as it scans naturally.

⁵²⁷ Kamalaśīla not only attributes this to Aviddhakarṇa, but states explicitly that it is from his *Tattvāṭīkā*, meaning his Cārvāka commentary (§14).

⁵²⁸ The J manuscript does not include the negation of illumination (*aparakāśa*), but both editions print it, as Kamalaśīla's gloss, and, by consequence, the verse, makes more sense if the negation is there. "We do not claim," Kamalaśīla says, "that a statement is a non-means of knowledge on account of not pointing to something with respect to the speaker. Why, then? Because it does not illuminate something as yet unknown. It [i.e., a valid inferential statement] actually does point to something capable [of instigating an inferential cognition]. Your inferential argument, on the other hand, does not [even] point to something capable, so it is not comparable. Indeed, otherwise it would be established for both parties. It is proper that this means of knowledge, which does not deviate from logic, is tenable for all, like perception" (*na hi vacanasya vaktrapekṣayāsaṃsūcanād^a aprāmāṇyam iṣtam. kim tarhi. ajñātārthāprakāśanāt. śaktasūcakatvam^b asyāsty eva bhavet. tvadīyam tv anumānam na śaktasaṃsūcakam ity asamānam etat. anyathā hy ubhayasiddham eva bhavet. tasmān nyāyād anapetaṃ pramānam sarveṣāṃ yuktaṃ pratyakṣavad iti nyāyjam*).

^a TSP prints a space, eliding the negation here.

^b J does not always distinguish between *s* and *ś* in the commentary, but the ms. of the verses is fairly clear, and here *alśakta* makes more sense than *alsakta*.

§13. BH12 AND AV15: GLOSSES OF NBH 1.1.38–39

As we have seen, there are, according to Nyāya, five components of a valid argument. The five components (*avayava*) are discussed in NS 1.1.32–39. In sutra 39, Vātsyāyana gives this example of a standard inferential argument:

- | | |
|--------------------|---|
| 1. Proposition | Sound is impermanent |
| 2. Reason | because it is subject to origination; |
| 3. Exemplification | a substance that is subject to origination, like a dish, is impermanent; |
| 4. Application | and, in this way (<i>tathā</i>), sound is subject to origination. |
| 5. Conclusion | Therefore, because it is subject to origination, sound is impermanent. ⁵²⁹ |

Bhāvivikta's final fragment in the *Pañjikā*, Bh12, concerns the fourth component, the application (*upanaya*).

Nyāyasūtra 1.1.38 gives this definition:

The application is the drawing together (*upasaṃhāra*) of the subject of the argument (*sādhyā*) 'in this way' (*tathā*) or 'not in this way' (*na tathā*) in relation to the exemplification.⁵³⁰

The syntax is a little wonky but the point is fairly clear. While the exemplification demonstrates that the reason proves the property to be proven, the application indicates that the reason is a property of the subject—and this leads to the conclusion. Vātsyāyana clarifies that the word *sādhyā*, “to be established,” which often refers to the property that is being proven, here refers to sound, the locus of the argument. (We could say that impermanence is “to be established,” but also that sound is “to be established” *as* being impermanent.) He also explains that the term “in this way” (*tathā*) concerns arguments made on the basis of similarity (*sādharmyeṇa*), such as the example above, whereas the phrase “not in this way” concerns arguments made from dissimilarity (*vaidharmyeṇa*), such as the argument that sound, *unlike* the self, is subject to origination (“sound is *not in this way* not subject to origination”).⁵³¹

Kamalaśīla first frames Śāntarakṣita's discussion of the application with an inference he credits to Dignāga: “The statement of the application is not effective because it illuminates the meaning of the reason that has been stated, like a second statement of the reason.”⁵³² In other words, the application

⁵²⁹ anityaḥ śabda iti pratijñā. utpattidharmakatvād iti hetuḥ. utpattidharmakaṃ sthālyādi dravyam anityam ity udāharaṇam. tathā cotpattidharmakaḥ śabda ity upanayaḥ. tasmād utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ śabda iti nigamanam (NBh 34.13).

⁵³⁰ udāharaṇāpekṣas tathety upasaṃhāro na tatheti vā sādhyasyopanayaḥ ||1.1.38|| (NS 33.16)

⁵³¹ ātmādidravyam anutpattidharmakaṃ nityaṃ dṛṣṭam, na ca tathānutpattidharmakaḥ śabda iti (NBh 34.4).

In his comments on the following sutra, 1.1.39, Vātsyāyana lists a series of rhetorical questions and contrapositives demonstrating the need for each of the five components. Just before his defense of the conclusion, he says the following about the application, he says: “Without the application, the proving property (*sādhaka dharmā*) [i.e., the reason], not having been drawn together (*anupasaṃhṛta*) to the subject (*sādhyā*), could not prove the point (*artha*)” (*upanayaṃ cāntareṇa sādhye 'nupasaṃhṛtaḥ sādhalako dharmo nārtham sādhyet* [NBh 35.9]).

⁵³² tatropanayavacanam na sādhanam, uktahetvarthaprakāśakatvāt, dvitīyahetuvacanavad ity ācāryadignāgapādaiḥ pramāṇite... (TSP 514.2, J166v.7). (Bh12 follows immediately upon this *sati saptamī*.) There are several ways of

is not epistemically meaningful; it does not actually serve to produce knowledge.

Then, Kamalaśīla cites Bh12 as the Nyāya response:

bhāviviktādayo hetvasiddhyartham āhuḥ na khalu pakṣadharmatvaṃ pratijñānantarabhāvinā hetuvacanena prakāśyate kāraṇamātrābhīdhanāt. anityaḥ śabda bhavati kṛtakatvāt, tat punaḥ kṛtakatvaṃ kiṃ śabde 'sti nāstīti ceti, tasyāstītvam upanayāt pratiyate.

athavā pratibimbanārtham upanayanaṃ, pūrvaṃ hi hetuvacanena nirviśeṣaṃ kṛtakatvaṃ śabde nirdiṣṭaṃ, tena dṛṣṭānte pradārśitasādhyāvinābhāvitvasya kṛtakatvasyopanayena pratibimbanam cumṣanam[?]^a ādarśyate tathā ca kṛtakaḥ śabda iti. tasmād viśeṣadyotanān na punaruktateti. (1437–1438)⁵³³

Bhāvivikta et al, in order [to demonstrate] that the reason [of Dignāga's argument] is unestablished, say: Actually, [the reason's] being a property of the locus (*pakṣadharmatva*) is not illuminated by the statement of the reason (*hetu*), which appears right after the proposition, because it denotes the reason (*kāraṇa*) alone. Sound is impermanent because of producedness, but does this producedness pertain to sound or not? One learns that it does from the application.

Alternatively, the purpose of the application is mirroring (*pratibimbana*). Indeed, the statement of the reason first indicates, without distinction (*nirviśeṣa*), that producedness pertains to sound; then

interpreting the example, *dvitīya-hetu-vacana-vad*. For one thing, the term “second” (*dvitīya*) could either qualify *hetu* or *vacana*, i.e., “like a second statement of the reason” or “like the statement of a second reason.” The main reason for taking the second reading is simply that Dignāga (or Kamalaśīla) could have used a more common term for redundancy, i.e., *hetu-punarvacana-vad*, “like a restatement of the reason.” If we take it the second way, “like the statement of a second reason,” it may serve as a kind of ironic dissimilar case, rather than a straightforward similar case: “Because, unlike the statement of a second reason, it only illuminates the fact of the reason that has already been stated.” That is to say, though a genuine “second reason” could create additional problems, at least it would offer more than merely highlighting something already stated. Nevertheless, the simplest reading, which most simply sets up the attempted rebuttal in the impending fragment, is that Dignāga is arguing that the application is like a simple restatement of the reason. This is more poignant in light of the Buddhist critique of the fifth component, the conclusion. The Buddhists are keen to point out that the conclusion really is a restatement of the proposition (or, we might say, a second statement of the proposition).

⁵³³ TSP 514.3, 166r.8.

^a TSP *upanayād*. J (167r.1) and P (125r.2) both read *cumṣanamādarśyate*, or something along those lines. Krishnamacharya (1928, 420) prints *usanasā*, eliding *c* and *m*, and proposes *upanayāt* in brackets; Shastri more or less follows suit, listing °*nam cuṣanamād*° in a footnote.

The Tibetan is inconclusive. The key excerpt is *dpe la bstan pa'i byas pa de bsgrub bya med na mi 'byung ba nyid ni nye bar sbyor bas bzlas pa yin nol de bzhin du sgra la yang byas pa nyid yin no zhes bya bas 'dra bar bstan pa yin nol de lta bas na khyad par bsal bar bya ba'i phyir zlos pa ma yin no zhes zer ro*. Does *bzlas pa* (recited, repeated) correspond in some way to the corrupted term in the Sanskrit? In the final sentence, *zlos pa* renders *punaruktatā*, so *bzlas pa* presumably means something similar. This would work fairly well if *bzlas pa* was meant to render *pratibimbanam* together with the mystery word, in the sense “the mirroring [read: reflection, i.e., reiteration] is stated/brought about by the application.”

If the syllables in the manuscripts had actually been *usanamāddarśyate*, rather than *cumṣanamādarśyate*, I would find Krishnamacharya's emendation more compelling. In addition, adding *upanayāt* would require reading *pratibimbanam* as the end of a clause (perhaps supplying *nirdiṣṭam* from the previous line), and *upanayād darśyate* as the beginning of a new one. But then Sanskrit would have a slightly odd redundancy. Eliding this strange collection of syllables altogether, we can then read *pratibimbanam* as the patient of *darśyate* or *ādarśyate*, and *upanayena* as the agent. I think this makes the construction beginning with *tena* more satisfyingly ornate, and I have tentatively taken this approach in my translation. Alas, this does not at all solve the problem of *cumṣanam*. Derivations of verbs like *śams* (recite, repeat) and *kumś* (speak) could fit quite close syllabically and semantically, but would be rare, and especially surprising in such a prosaic context.

producedness is shown in the example to have an invariable relation (*avinābhāva*) with the property to be proven; the application presents the mirroring of producedness: “And, in this way, sound is produced.” Therefore, because it illuminates a distinction (*viśeṣa*), it is not redundant.

Bhāvivikta et al present two possible defenses of the function of the application.

The first is to clarify the relation between the reason and the locus of the argument. The reason, “producedness,” or “being subject to origination,” may or may not be a property of the locus of the argument, so this relationship bears being stated.⁵³⁴

Śāntarakṣita refutes the first alternative in Bh12 on the basis of his earlier rejection of the proposition. Bh12 specifically says that the statement of the reason immediately follows the proposition, but, because this is so, once the proposition has been rejected, the entire sequence is lost along with it. “There can be no statement of the reason (*kāraṇa*) if there is no statement of the proposition,” Śāntarakṣita says, “so the statement of the application cannot be brought about to prove the real existence” of the reason in the locus.⁵³⁵

“How,” Kamalaśīla adds, “is the reason [in Dignāga’s argument] unestablished?”⁵³⁶ That is to say, Dignāga argued that the application was redundant, and the first option in Bh12 does nothing to disprove this.

The second alternative in Bh12 points more directly to the main point of NS 1.1.38, namely, the significance of the manner—*tathā*—in which the reason pertains to the locus. It may already be accepted that producedness pertains to sound, but the bearing this has on whether sound is permanent or impermanent has to be illustrated. The statement of the reason may say that sound is produced, but it does so “without distinction.” The “distinction” in question is, I think, the relation between producedness and impermanence. The exemplification demonstrates the relation between producedness and impermanence, but the application illustrates the fact that *sound’s* producedness is distinguished “in this manner.” For Bhāvivikta et al, implication is insufficient. The direct statement of the application is what makes the conclusion available.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s response raises the question of the relation between *trairūpya* and *vyāpti* in pre-Dharmakīrti thinkers, which we will discuss further in §14 and §15. As Kamalaśīla puts it:

Mirroring (*pratibimbana*) is entirely pointless, too. The statement of the reason has already conveyed the mere fact of its being a property of the locus (*pakṣadharmamātra*), and its pervasion with the property to be proven has already been related; this being so, stating [such mirroring] for the establishment of the intended point quite clearly incurs redundancy.

⁵³⁴ This, it should be noted, is strikingly different than Aviddhakarṇa’s skeptical argument in Av4, which Śāntarakṣita cites in the *Vipañcitārthā* (cf. Appendix A). In Av4, Aviddhakarṇa argues that merely stating that sound is produced “does not bring about [such knowledge] for someone who has yet to learn about producedness.” Aviddhakarṇa, at least in his Cārvāka posture, would seem to reject the first defense of the application in Bh12.

⁵³⁵ *pratijñānabhīdhāne ca kāraṇānabhīdhānataḥ |kartavyopānāyasyoktir na sadbhāvaprasiddhaye || 1437 ||* (TS 514, J72v.4). Kamalaśīla adds: *sadbhāvaprasiddhaya iti hetor dharmiṇīti śeṣaḥ* (514.11, J167r.1).

⁵³⁶ *kuto 'siddhatā hetoḥ* (TSP 514.19, J167r.4).

In this case, too, how is the reason unestablished?⁵³⁷

Clearly the Buddhists understand it to be the proponent's burden to establish pervasion, and they take it that the exemplification—the statement of concomitance—serves this purpose. It may be anachronistic on their part to presume that Bhāvivikta et al understood a valid reason in these terms (cf. §15), but in either case, the underlying point is compelling. Practically, there may be value in separating out each element of the argument and clarifying their relationships the way Naiyāyikas do—especially in the case of arguments that are more elaborate or technical than “sound is impermanent because produced.” But Naiyāyikas argue that the five components are necessary rather than merely practical.

If the standard is epistemic necessity, theirs is an uphill battle.

§ § §

After NS 1.1.38, sutra 39 defines the conclusion as “the restatement (*punar-vacana*) of the proposition after the indication of the reason.”⁵³⁸ The charge of redundancy is not very surprising. But Vātsyāyana asserts the need for each of the five components. First, he explains the sequence they follow, including that the conclusion “demonstrates the capacity of all of these to communicate a single matter (*eka-artha*).”⁵³⁹ He then explains that there is not just a logical and rhetorical sequence to the five components, but an overarching relationship of mutuality (*itaretarābhisambandho*) between them. Without the proposition, for example, from what would the reason proceed? If there were no reason, how would the exemplification bear on the proposition? And so on. “If there were no conclusion,” he asks, “then what would explain (*pratipādana*) that, ‘in this way’ (*tathā*), the proposition and the like, whose connection (*sambandha*) is not yet manifest, advance with a single aim (*ekārtha*)?”⁵⁴⁰

In Av15, Aviddhakarṇa restates the need for a separate conclusion—seemingly against the Buddhist attack. As we know, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita argue not only that the proposition and the conclusion are redundant, but that neither statement serves any epistemological function. The statement of pervasion and the statement of *pakṣadharmatā* suffice to bring about the knowledge that sound is impermanent, so even the statement of only one or the other, proposition or conclusion, would be epistemically worthless—let alone both. Aviddhakarṇa, we can presume, has already defended the statement of the proposition earlier in the *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*, and is now implicitly arguing that both are necessary. (And of course, if he and Bhāvivikta are identical, Bh12 is his defense of the application.) Av15 reads as follows:

aviddhakarṇas tv āha viprakīrṇaiś ca vacanair nekārthaḥ pratipādyate. tena sambandhasiddhyarthaṃ

⁵³⁷ pratibimbanam api vyartham eva, yatas tasmin pakṣadharmamātre hetuvacanena prāgukte sati sādhyadharmeṇa ca tasya vyāptau kathitāyāṃ vivakṣitārthasamsiddher ucyamānaṃ sphuṭataram eva punaruktatām^a āvāhatīti kuto 'trāpy asiddhatā hetoḥ (TSP 515.1, J167r.4)

^a TSP wrongly prints *purukta*°.

⁵³⁸ hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanaṃ nigamanaṃ ||1.1.39|| (NS 34.9).

⁵³⁹ sarveṣāṃ ekārthapratipattau sāmartyapradarśanaṃ nigamanaṃ iti (NBh 35.4).

⁵⁴⁰ nigamanābhāve cānabhivyaktasambandhānāṃ pratijñādīnāṃ ekārthena pravartanaṃ tatheti pratipādanaṃ kasyet (NBh 35.10).

vācyaṃ nigamaṇaṃ pṛthak *iti*. (1440)⁵⁴¹

Aviddhakarṇa, for his part, says: A single aim (*ekārtha*) cannot be explained (*pratipādyate*) with scattered statements. Therefore, a separate conclusion must be stated in order to establish the connection (*sambandha*).

Av15, it is quite clear, reformulates, in almost the same terms, Vātsyāyana's closing rhetorical question—"If there were no conclusion..."—as a declaration. Vātsyāyana says the connection between the components is manifest before the statement of the conclusion, and asks how, without the conclusion, one would demonstrate the manner in which all of the components share a single aim. Aviddhakarṇa flatly states that this is not possible, and asserts the need to state the conclusion separately.

In the *Pañjikā*, in moments such as this, Kamalaśīla concludes with a punchy remark we have seen before: "The rest (*śeṣa*) is easy to understand (*subodham*)." In other words, nothing more need be said. I cannot always agree that "the rest," i.e., whatever Kamalaśīla chooses not to gloss or explain, is, in fact, easy to understand. The challenge, in these cases, is to figure out what I am missing—or whether, in rare instances, Kamalaśīla might be dodging a tricky issue. But, at any rate, in the present case I can happily agree.

Subodham.

⁵⁴¹ TSP 516.1, J167v.1. As Shastri indicates in his edition, this fragment is in *śloka* meter and may, therefore, preserve a verse composed by Aviddhakarṇa.

§14. AV16: AVIDDHAKARṆA'S SWORD

The bulk of the “Examination of Inference” concerns the definition and scope of inference. First, Śāntarakṣita fends off Pātrasvāmin’s notion that a valid argument must only fulfill a single characteristic, “being otherwise-impossible,” rather than the three characteristics (*trirūpa*) of Buddhist logic.⁵⁴² This notion, according to Śāntarakṣita, is only valid insofar as it is a shorthand for the three characteristics. Then, as we just saw in §13, he dismisses the five components of Nyāya theory. Nyāya fails, in his view, to isolate the statements that have the real epistemic function of teaching the other party about something. After this, he briefly considers Kumārila’s description of two varieties of inference, those based on what is “observed in specificity” (*viśeṣatodṛṣṭa*) and what is “observed through generality” (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*). The Buddhists have several problems with this dichotomy, but they focus especially on the fact that momentariness renders inferences based on particularity impossible. Kumārila conflates perceptible things, i.e., momentary unique particulars, with inferable things, conceptual universals.

After refuting Kumārila, Śāntarakṣita turns to his discussion with anti-inference skeptics, in which he posits a provisional alliance between Cārvāka and the grammarian-theorist Bhartṛhari (5th c.). The first words of this passage put everything that precedes them in a new light:

But there are some shortsighted folks (*kudṛṣṭi*) who say, “inference is not a means of knowledge,” while conveying their intention with these very words.⁵⁴³ (1455)

Pātrasvāmin, Kumārila, and the Naiyāyikas may wrongly define inference because of their mistaken views about the nature of existence, perception, and language, but at least they can see well enough to recognize the necessity and authority of inference itself. Some folks—Cārvākas and Bhartṛhari—have such bad vision (*kudṛṣṭi*) they cannot see the contradiction in saying “inference is not a means of knowledge.”

According to Śāntarakṣita, communication entails inferential reasoning. When I say something, I have a particular intention (*vivakṣā*, “desire to speak”) that I am trying to convey. You hear my words and infer my intention on their basis. Śāntarakṣita substantiates this idea in the following chapter, the “Examination of Other Means of Knowledge.” When an opponent points out that people’s words do not always match their intentions, Śāntarakṣita explains that

The utter distinction between words used by someone befuddled and those used by someone lucid is very clear. Clever people can discern it on the basis of the topic of conversation and such things.⁵⁴⁴ (1516)

Simply saying—and meaning—that inference is not a means of knowledge entails relying on inference as a means of knowledge. One’s interlocutor can only understand the claim, and the intention one wishes to convey with it, because they are capable of drawing that fundamental

⁵⁴² Cf. “Setting the Terms” in the Introduction.

⁵⁴³ na pramāṇam iti prāhur anumānam tu kecana | vivakṣām arpayanto^a ‘pi vāgbhir ābhiḥ kudṛṣṭayaḥ ||1455|| (TS 520, J73v.3).

^a Ś arth°

⁵⁴⁴ bhrāntābhrāntaprayuktānām vailakṣaṇyaṃ parisphuṭam | vidagdhaḥ prakṛtādibhyo niścinvanti girām alam ||1516|| (TS 540, J76v.5).

inference.

After verse 1455, the next eleven verses comprise the skeptical *pūrvapakṣa*, which has three distinct voices: (i) anonymous arguments against “for-oneself” inferences and the three characteristics (*trirūpa*); (ii) Bhartṛhari’s skeptical verses; and (iii) anonymous arguments against “for-others” inferences:

Pūrvapakṣa: Shortsighted folks claim inference is not a means of knowledge [1455]

- I. Anonymous Cārvāka(s) [1456–1458]
 - a. A valid reason can generate a false cognition
 - b. An inferential mark can fulfill the three characteristics even if there is no inference, ergo it is not the cause of inference
 - c. Inferences can be invalidated by further inferences and by the opposite inference
- II. Bhartṛhari [1459–1461]
 - a. Time, place, and context can alter or impede a thing’s capacity; inference is unreliable
 - b. More skillful disputants can always come up with an alternate explanation
- III. Anonymous [1462–1466]
 - a. The speaker does not learn from a “for-others” inference
 - b. What occurs for the listener is “for-oneself”

The first set of arguments is not entirely anonymous. For one thing, Kamalaśīla explicitly attributes these arguments to Cārvākas. But more specifically, Kamalaśīla links one claim—that inferences can always be invalidated by the opposite inference (*viruddha-avyabhicārin*), i.e., by an equally valid reason that nevertheless “does not deviate from (*avyabhicārin*) what is contrary (*viruddha*)” to the point of the proponent’s argument—with the *Tattvaṭīkā*, referring most likely to Aviddhakarṇa’s Cārvāka commentary:

sarvatra ca viruddhāvyabhicārī sambhavati. tad yathā, anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti kṛte kaścid viruddhāvyabhicāriṇam āha nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāc chabdatvavad iti. evamādis tattvaṭīkāyām^a udāharaṇaprapaṅco draṣṭavyaḥ. (1456–1458)⁵⁴⁵

And in every case, the opposite inference (*viruddha-avyabhicāra*) is possible. So, for example, if what has been put forth is, “Sound is impermanent because it is produced, like a pot,” someone may state the opposite inference, “Sound is permanent because it is audible, like [the universal] soundness (*śabdatva*).” A proliferation (*prapaṅca*) of examples such as this can be seen in the *Tattvaṭīkā*.

There are two important uncertainties to note about this brief passage. First, it is not clear whether, strictly speaking, this is a fragment from the *Tattvaṭīkā* or merely Kamalaśīla’s report about it. The example is relatively generic,⁵⁴⁶ and Kamalaśīla does not present or frame this as a direct citation.

⁵⁴⁵ TSP 521.4, J168v.5.

^a J evamādi tattva°.

⁵⁴⁶ Cf. the *Nyāyapraveśa*, a primer on logic attributed to a Buddhist thinker named Śaṅkarasvāmin, who seems most likely to have lived between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (Tachikawa 1970). This same pair of arguments is raised in the *Nyāyapraveśa*. Tachikawa describes their relation very clearly: “The Vaiśeṣikas admit the existence of permanent universal which resides in each individual. For example, they hold that the universal ‘sound-ness’ resides in every individual sound. According to them, if a thing is cognized through a sense-organ, the universal of that thing can also be cognized through that same sense-organ. Sound is cognized through the ear. Therefore, soundness or sound-universal can also be perceived through the ear. [...] The combination of these two marks, however, furnishes occasion for a fault. That is to say, it leads to a set of contradictory results – Sound is permanent and impermanent. Dharmakīrti does not consider this to be a

Second, it is not clear whether he is referring to the same *Tattvatīkā* that he attributes to Aviddhakarṇa later in the “Examination of Inference,” though that is surely the likeliest possibility.

In the theoretical debate in this passage, the first disputant argues that sound is impermanent “because it is produced, like a pot.” To counter this, the opponent simply states an argument for the opposite claim: “Sound is permanent because it is audible, like soundness.” Now, for Vaiśeṣika, the universal soundness is (i) permanent, (ii) distinct from individual sounds, (iii) inherent in individual sounds, and (iv) perceptible. As with the blueness of a blue cloth, when we hear a sound, we also hear the universal soundness that inheres in it. But Buddhists do not accept that soundness is a real thing, let alone that it is distinct from individual sounds. The similar case (soundness) must be distinct from the subject of the argument (sound) in order to demonstrate the invariable relation between the reason (audibility) and the property to be proven (permanence). The mountain cannot be the example used to demonstrate the principle that smoke over the mountain proves there is fire there. Audibility, Buddhists would argue, is unique to sound, ergo it cannot be employed as a reason for sound’s permanence or impermanence, because nothing else can serve as the similar case. For the Buddhists, then, this dispute demonstrates the need for each proponent to respect their opponent’s views in formulating arguments. Each element in an argument must be accepted by both parties (*ubhaya-siddha*). The author of the *Tattvatīkā*, on the other hand, seems to be arguing that such arbitrary rules for debate cannot rescue the authority of abstract inferential reasoning.

The passage Kamalaśīla is describing most likely stems from the portion of the *Tattvatīkā* on the epistemological aphorisms of the *Cārvākasūtra*: “perception alone is a means of knowledge” (*pratyakṣam eva pramāṇam*), and, even likelier, “because a means of knowledge is not secondary, it is difficult to obtain certainty about something on the basis of inference” (*pramāṇasyāgaunṛatvād anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ*). These aphorisms have been interpreted, both in medieval India and by modern scholars,⁵⁴⁷ as an unqualified denial of inference and every other means of knowledge apart from perception; but, as Ramkrishna Bhattacharya argues at length, taking the extant evidence seriously, the point seems to be to emphasize the unique intrinsic authority of perception rather than to deny inferential reasoning entirely.⁵⁴⁸ The authority of an inference is, according to these aphorisms, derivative of perceptual knowledge; it is not possible to learn anything from an abstract inference about things that cannot be perceived. That does not mean that we do not know there is fire on a smoky mountain. If being a means of knowledge strictly entails intrinsic authority, then perception is the only means of knowledge. But inferential reasoning that ultimately rests on basic perceptual knowledge may still be authoritative in a derivative sense.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s response to the claim that every inference can be invalidated by its inverse highlights Dharmakīrti’s distinction between inferences based on an intrinsic relationship (*svabhāva-hetu*) and inferences based on a causal relationship (*kārya-hetu*). This distinction is meant to resolve the problem of induction, i.e., that inferences based solely on prior observation (e.g., never seeing a black swan and inferring there are no black swans) may be falsified by a later observation to the contrary (later seeing a black swan). The intrinsic relationship between being-a-redwood and

logical fallacy because it cannot occur in the process of natural inference. (*NB*, 3.111.)” (Tachikawa 1970, 135 n 40).

⁵⁴⁷ See, for example, Franco 1991 and Franco and Preisendanz 1998. Namai (1976b) does not accept the latter as a genuine *Cārvākasūtra* aphorism, but I am afraid I am not yet able to read the original Japanese of his full analysis.

⁵⁴⁸ Bhattacharya 2011.

being-a-tree, for example, cannot be invalidated by a later observation, nor can it be contradicted by some kind of contrary inference, because of the principle of non-contradiction. Significantly, in this context Śāntarakṣita invokes an important standard of epistemic authority:

Isn't being preceded by a mark that fulfills the three characteristics indicative of agreement (*saṃvādin*) [i.e., being “not inconsistent” (*avisamvādaka*) with reality], and isn't the indication of that what it is to be a means of knowledge? What, then, is denied through this [argument]? (1467)

We saw in the Introduction that the *Nyāyasūtra* uses the term *saṃvāda* to refer to friendly debates between like-minded truth-seekers. Dharmakīrti uses the same term together with a double negation, *a-vi-saṃvāda*, to describe the relationship between a means of knowledge and reality, it is not (*a-*) in dis- (*vi-*) agreement (*saṃvāda*). Thus, even though inferences concern universals, which are fundamentally conceptual and, so, at a remove from unique particulars, they can still grant genuine knowledge insofar as they are *avisamvādaka*.

In effect, Śāntarakṣita's response to the claim that the opposite inference is always possible is that this is only salient if an argument is not grounded in a necessary relationship; intrinsic and causal inferences, along with the triple-characterization of the reason, serve precisely to isolate such necessary relationships (*avinābhāva*, *vyāpti*). A valid inference is “not inconsistent” with reality and so has genuine epistemic authority.

Apart from this, all of the arguments surrounding the verses from Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* are without attribution. Kamalaśīla refers to “Cārvākas” and to “someone else” (*anya*), but, apart from Bhartṛhari and the *Tattvaṭīkā*, does not mention any other thinker or text in the *pūrvapakṣa*. While these arguments may originate in texts like the *Tattvaṭīkā*, it seems at least as likely to me that Śāntarakṣita is essentially making them up on the basis of earlier discussions in works like Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, like the discussion of reasons that “refute what is intended” (*iṣṭa-ghāta-kṛt*).

The most concrete claim in all of the anonymous skeptical arguments is the first critique of “for-oneself” inferences:

[What you call] ‘for-oneself’ [inference] cannot be a means of knowledge, because it is preceded by a mark that fulfills the three characteristics, like a false cognition, which, as is known, can be generated by a reason that refutes what is intended (*iṣṭaghātakṛt*).⁵⁴⁹ (1456)

“A reason that refutes what is intended” is a technical term that Dignāga describes as a species of contrary reason. Kamalaśīla offers the same example that Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti discuss in this context, namely, a Sāṃkhya thinker proposing that “the eyes, etc., are for the sake of another because they are composite, like the components of a bed.”⁵⁵⁰ As Tom Tillemans demonstrates, in a discussion of Dharmakīrti's remarks on Dignāga's use of the term *iṣṭa* (intended),⁵⁵¹ the Sāṃkhya's point cannot merely be that composite things do not exist for their own

⁵⁴⁹ trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvāt svārthaṃ mānaṃ na yujyate | iṣṭaghātakṛtā^a janyaṃ mithyājñānaṃ yathā kila ||1456|| (TS 520, J73v.4).

^a Ś °kṛtāj

⁵⁵⁰ parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātatvāc chayanāsanādyaṅgavat (TSP 520.11).

⁵⁵¹ Tillemans 2000, 50–57.

sake, as the Buddhists already accept that to be the case. The implication of the argument is that the “other” for whom the eyes exist is the self and that the self is non-composite. “The reason, ‘being a composite’ (*saṃghātatva*),” Tillemans explains, then becomes contradictory in that it does not prove the *parārthatva* [for-other-ness] qualified in this way: instead, it proves the opposite, viz., that the eyes and other faculties are for the benefit of another who is composed.”⁵⁵² Not only does the reason fail to prove what the proponent intends, but it in fact proves the opposite.

Śāntarakṣita’s skeptical *pūrvapakṣa* seems to imply that with this example the Buddhists are claiming that the reason, “because of being composite,” fulfills the three characteristics and is valid and yet, because it “refutes what is intended,” also generates a “false cognition.” A mark that fulfills the three characteristics can thus generate a false cognition, and so it does not warrant knowledge. It is not a particularly strong argument, but it does offer Śāntarakṣita the opportunity to explain that there is a difference between the way that one’s argument bears on one’s own view and the way the argument relates to reality. The reliability, or non-inconsistency, of the cognition is absolute; it is “false” in the sense that it cuts against the proponent’s desired view, but that is a mark against the proponent’s view, not against the argument itself or inferences as such. Śāntarakṣita is clearly responding in this discussion to a topic found in the major sources of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*.

There is little evidence of any real specificity in the remaining anonymous arguments. The arguments against “for-others” inferences essentially boil down to the idea that a “for-others” inference cannot really be for others *and* an inference. If the statement generates an inferential cognition, it is really a “for-oneself” inference in the listener: hearing it is no different than seeing smoke over the mountain. But this is already the Buddhist position. In response, Śāntarakṣita only has to clarify that a “for-others” inference, the formal statement of an inferential argument, is just called an inference conventionally. The statement itself does not warrant or generate knowledge, but it does instigate an inferential cognition in the listener, and, so, is figuratively called an inference. As the opponent suggested, the statement is an inference “for-others” in the sense that it impels the other party to experience the “for-oneself” inference that it communicates.

At the end of the *uttarapakṣa*, Śāntarakṣita reiterates his opening claim against skepticism:

If you say inference is not a means of knowledge, your declaration (*vyāhṛti*) is fruitless (*viphalā*), for no one could learn your intention from the statement.⁵⁵³ (1480)

The claim is essentially that Cārvākas and Bhartṛhari declare inference not to be a means of knowledge—with no further context or qualification. For the Buddhists, inference either is or is not a means of knowledge, and if you do not accept its authority, you contradict yourself when you try to convey such an attitude.

After this, at the very end of the chapter, we finally hear from specific Cārvāka commentators, Purandara and Aviddhakarṇa, who appear to be trying to rescue the validity of the declaration (*vyāhṛti*). In order to think most fruitfully about Aviddhakarṇa’s fragment from this brief passage, we

⁵⁵² Tillemans 2000, 53.

⁵⁵³ nānumānaṃ pramāṇaṃ ced viphalā vyāhatis tava | na kaścid api vāco^a hi vivakṣāṃ pratipadyate ||1480|| (TS 527, J75r.1).

^a KŚ vādo, T tshig gang gis kyang

should first consider what a few others have said about the authority of inferential reasoning, specifically (i) Vātsyāyana, (ii) the *Cārvākasūtra*, (iii) Bhartṛhari, and (iv) Aviddhakarṇa himself.

I. Vātsyāyana on Inference

To begin with, Vātsyāyana makes an important comment at the beginning of the *Bhāṣya* about the relative value of perception, testimony, and inference. NS 1.1.1 names all sixteen of the principles (*tattva*) defined and examined in the *Nyāyasūtra*. Early on in his comments on that sutra, Vātsyāyana entertains the objection that the last fourteen principles need not be mentioned separately because they can all be subsumed within the first two, the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the objects of knowledge (*prameya*).⁵⁵⁴ Vātsyāyana concedes the basic point but argues that the last fourteen principles have to be mentioned separately because they are the special subjects under the purview of Nyāya. After commenting on the third principle, doubt (*saṁśaya*), he turns to the principle called “purpose” (*prayojana*), and says this:

Purpose is that by which someone who engages in a course of action has been urged, i.e., the object that one desires to obtain or to abandon in undertaking an action. Therefore, all beings, all actions, and all sciences (*vidyā*) are accompanied by it, and *nyāya* proceeds with it as its basis.

But what is this *nyāya*?

Examining (*parīkṣana*) things with the means of knowledge, and inference relying on perception and testimony—that is analysis (*anvikṣā*). Analyzing (*anvikṣana*) an object observed (*ikṣita*) through perception and testimony is analysis, and what proceeds by means of that is analytics (*anvikṣikī*), i.e., the science of *nyāya*, the *nyāya-sāstra*. Whereas an inference contradicted by perception or testimony is pseudo-*nyāya*.⁵⁵⁵

In this passage, as quite a few scholars have noted,⁵⁵⁶ Vātsyāyana identifies Nyāya with the science of *anvikṣikī*, positioning it as one of the four royal sciences identified in the *Arthasāstra*. The emphasis on testimony further solidifies Nyāya as an authoritative Brahmanical science. The word for testimony, *āgama*, means “arrival” and commonly refers to tradition. In the context of the *Nyāyasūtra*, it refers to the testimony of a reliable person, received knowledge, and scripture—knowledge that “has come down to us.” In this specific passage, Vātsyāyana seems to have the latter two most firmly in mind. Perceptual experience is more fundamentally authoritative than inferential reasoning: if the two conflict, the inference cannot stand. But the same is true for tradition, the knowledge derived from scripture and received wisdom. The scope of inferential reasoning is quite extensive for Vātsyāyana, as we have seen throughout the present study. But the distinction between

⁵⁵⁴ “Concerning these, the separate mention of doubt, etc., is senseless; seeing as doubt, etc., are included within the means of knowledge and objects of knowledge, as suitable, they are not separate” (*tatra saṁśayādīnāṃ pṛthagvacanam anarthakam, saṁśayādayo hi yathāsambhavam pramāṇeṣu prameyeṣu cāntarbhavanto na vyatiricyanta iti* [NBh 2.17]).

⁵⁵⁵ yena prayuktaḥ pravartate tat prayojanam. yam artham abhīpsan jihāsan vā karmārabhate. tenānena sarve prāṇinaḥ sarvaṇi karmāṇi sarvāś ca vidyā vyāptāḥ. tadāśrayaś ca nyāyaḥ pravartate. kaḥ punar ayaṃ nyāyaḥ. pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇam. pratyakṣāgamāśritaṃ cānumānam. sānvikṣā. pratyakṣāgamābhyām ikṣitasayārthāsānvikṣaṇam anvikṣā. tayā pravartata ity ānvikṣikī nyāyavidyā nyāyaśāstram. yat punar anumānam pratyakṣāgamaviruddham nyāyābhāṣaḥ sa iti. (NBh 3.9)

⁵⁵⁶ Preisendanz 2000, for example, includes not only Preisendanz’s own insights on this passage, but also a concise and excellent run-down of work on this passage by Hermann Jacobi, Surendranath Dasgupta, Paul Hacker, and Wilhelm Halbfass. Vātsyāyana’s passage has been remarked upon many more times.

genuine *nyāya*, which proceeds from and relies on perception and *āgama*, and pseudo-*nyāya*, which conflicts with either or both of them, is key.

II. Cārvāka on Inference

The *Cārvākasūtra* says something not entirely dissimilar, albeit without any deference to scriptural authority and with sharply divergent implications for the science of reasoning. The two best attested epistemological aphorisms⁵⁵⁷ of the *Cārvākasūtra* are:

- i. Perception is the only means of knowledge.
- ii. Because a means of knowledge is not secondary, it is difficult to obtain (*durlabha*) certainty (*nīścaya*) about something on the basis of inference.⁵⁵⁸

There are several ways of interpreting this pair of statements. The first, of course, is that they deny the authority of inference altogether. The second aphorism defines a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as *non-derivative*, implying that perception is its own foundation but inference is derivative. If authority (*prāmāṇya*) is by definition intrinsic, and inferences require perceptual knowledge, then inference is not a *pramāṇa*. This seems simple enough.

But this is only an outright denial of the validity and value of all inferences if we think we only learn from what are strictly *pramāṇas*. I see no reason to presume that Cārvāka thinkers were *pramāṇa-vādins* (proponents of *pramāṇa*) rather than what we might call *vyavahāra-vādins* (proponents of common practice). Inferences that proceed from scripturally-derived knowledge are quite clearly out the window. And even inferences derivative of perception are unlikely to warrant certainty. But does this mean we should stop inferring things? The worldly orientation of Cārvāka suggests a different interpretation: we should stop debating abstract principles and imperceptible things altogether—i.e., ideas received through *āgama*—and be wary of overconfidence in our more earthly deductions, but continue to make use of common and commonly accepted practices like “inferring” fire on the mountain. If perception alone is intrinsically authoritative, the question is not whether all inferences should be avoided, but what sorts of inferences are legitimately derivative of perception and what sorts of inferences are warranted.

This is how Purandara and Aviddhakarṇa appear to have interpreted these aphorisms. Franco and Preisendanz have regarded Purandara as an innovator,⁵⁵⁹ but as far as I know, there is no concrete evidence, apart from a smattering of hostile comments from rivals, that there was anything for him

⁵⁵⁷ Different collectors of Cārvāka fragments have given the aphorisms different schemes of lettering and numbering, so I am simply referring to these as (i) and (ii). The numbers do not indicate anything about their “original” placement in the *Cārvākasūtra*.

⁵⁵⁸ *pratyakṣam eva pramāṇam; pramāṇasyāgaunatvād anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ* (Bhattacharya 2011, 80). Namai 1976b (39) gives instead *pratyakṣam evaikam pramāṇam; anumānam apramāṇam*.

⁵⁵⁹ Franco and Preisendanz 1998. They describe Cārvāka thinkers after around the 5th century as “embarrassed over the justification of their single means of valid cognition.” Purandara, according to them, gave one of four distinct responses to this problem: “A philosopher called Purandara claimed that the Cārvākas also admit inferences, but only those that are well-known in everyday practice, such as the one from smoke to fire. Inferences meant to establish nonperceptible entities like God or a soul are rejected. To justify only limited use of inference, Purandara emphasized that inference is not an independent means, but depends on perception and therefore cannot transgress the scope of perception.” If the *Cārvākasūtra* aphorisms are authentic, this sounds like little more than a characterization of them.

to innovate. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla seem to suggest that some Cārvākas were entirely against inferential reasoning, but this comes across more as a theoretical or hypothetical position than anything else. As Ramkrishna Bhattacharya highlights, when thinkers like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla invoke strict anti-inference claims, the only actual thinker they cite is Bhartṛhari, who is not a Cārvāka at all, and whose actual position on inferential reasoning is more complex than Śāntarakṣita suggests.

III. Bhartṛhari on Inference

In a verse that Śāntarakṣita lifts from the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari says,

Given that capacities differ according to differences in state, place, and time, proof (*prasiddhi*) of the nature of things is extremely difficult to obtain (*atidurlabha*) via inference.⁵⁶⁰ (TSP 1459; VP 1.32)

The resonance with the second *Cārvākasūtra* aphorism is clear enough. Śāntarakṣita also cites the preceding two verses from the *Vākyapadīya*, which substantiate Bhartṛhari’s skeptical stance:

Even if the capacity of something with respect to a certain purposeful action is already known, that capacity can be impeded when there is contact with specific substances. Even if folks who are skilled in inferential reasoning carefully infer something, others who are more well versed may explain it entirely otherwise.⁵⁶¹ (TSP 1460–1461; VP 1.33–34.)

This is reminiscent of some of the stories highlighted by Phillis Granoff⁵⁶² that present rational debate with great suspicion. The view Granoff describes is that “a good debater should be able to argue successfully even for a wrong doctrine. How then [...] is a bystander to know who was really right?”⁵⁶³ As Kamalaśīla points out in his introductory comments in the *Pañjikā*, we cannot know whether some obstacle or impediment will get in the way of a particular course of action.⁵⁶⁴ For Bhartṛhari, this means that we cannot always derive certainty through inferential reasoning. Accordingly, the Buddhists use his words to articulate the skeptical position they otherwise attribute to Cārvāka.

But Bhartṛhari’s epistemological views are not quite so simple. For one thing, Bhartṛhari is not an epistemologist. He is not interested in systematic analyses of the means of knowledge. He does not define perception, inference, or *āgama*. As we have seen, he regards inference with suspicion, and he regards perception with some skepticism, as well:

The sky looks like a surface, the firefly like a fire; but there is no surface in the sky, no fire in the firefly.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶⁰ avasthādeśakālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu | bhāvānam anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā ||1459|| (TS, 521, J73v.5).

⁵⁶¹ vijñātaśakter^a apy asya^b tām tām arthakriyām prati | viśiṣṭadravyasambandhe sā śaktiḥ pratibadhyate ||1460|| yatnenānumito ‘py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātr̥bhiḥ | abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathavopapādyate ||1461|| (TS 521, J74r.1).

^a VP nirjñāta°

^b VP dravyasya

⁵⁶² Cf. “Playfighting” in the Introduction.

⁵⁶³ Granoff 1985, 465.

⁵⁶⁴ Cf. “The Fruits of Our Labor” in the Introduction.

⁵⁶⁵ talavad dṛṣyate vyoma khadyoto havyaṅvād iva | naiva cāsti talaṃ vyomni na khadyote hutāśanaḥ ||2.140|| (VP 72).

Things are not always as they appear. Nevertheless, as Ashok Aklujkar has shown,⁵⁶⁶ Bhartṛhari does not entirely dismiss the authority of either perception or inference. In fact, his skepticism about perception and inference seems predicated on his accepting their relative authority. Bhartṛhari “nowhere declares *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* to be unacceptable or always unreliable,” Aklujkar rightly notes.⁵⁶⁷ Even more importantly, Bhartṛhari clearly regards *āgama* as a means of knowledge. In fact, he clearly treats it as the highest means of knowledge, at least when it comes to knowledge about dharma, which is his chief concern. Alberto Todeschini puts a fine point on the significance of Bhartṛhari’s skepticism to his overarching project: “*āgama* is a *sine qua non* for determining Dharma, that is, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* are not sufficient with regard to Dharma.”⁵⁶⁸ Expressing skepticism about the foundations of inferential reasoning seems, for the Buddhists, to be as good as saying that all inferences are invalid. But the words the Buddhists use to present Bhartṛhari as a crusader against inference are, in fact, only words of caution.

Bhartṛhari’s emphasis on *āgama* is the single most important element in his provisional alliance with Cārvāka. Without making systematic claims, Bhartṛhari nevertheless clearly elevates *āgama*. The alliance can only extend so far.

In response to Bhartṛhari, Śāntarakṣita revises two of the verses he quoted from the *Vākyapadīya*:

Though capacities differ according to differences in state, place, and time, proof of the nature of things is not so difficult to obtain via inference. Also, if folks who are skilled in inferential reasoning carefully infer something, others cannot prove otherwise, even if they are more well versed.⁵⁶⁹ (1475–1476)

He substantiates these revisions in two ways. First, he differentiates between proper and improper inferences:

We say that inferences about things whose characteristics are known through repeated experience (*abhyasta*) proceed when an accurate (*samyak*) mark is ascertained; other practices are not inferences.⁵⁷⁰ (1474)

Drawing an inference requires thorough practical knowledge and the ascertainment of a legitimate inferential mark. Otherwise, it is not a proper inference. But what distinguishes a legitimate mark? The answer by now should be familiar:

For there is no intrinsic condition (*svabhāva*) without an intrinsic condition and no effect without a cause—otherwise difference or causlessness would obtain, respectively—and there is no inference without these two.⁵⁷¹ (1477)

⁵⁶⁶ Aklujkar 1989.

⁵⁶⁷ Aklujkar 1989, 153. Aklujkar also notes (*ibid.*) that “the author of the Yogasūtra, to whose thought B[hartṛhari] seems close, acknowledges precisely the same three pramāṇas.”

⁵⁶⁸ Todeschini 2010, 104.

⁵⁶⁹ avasthādeśakālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu | bhāvānām anumānena nātaḥ siddhiḥ sudurlabhā ||1475||
yatnenānumito ‘py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātr̥bhiḥ | nānyathā sādhyate so ‘nyair abhiyuktatarair api ||1476|| (TS 526, J74v.3)

⁵⁷⁰ abhyastalakṣaṇānām ca samyaglingavinīścaye | anumāvṛttir^a anyā tu nānumety abhidhīyate ||1474|| (TS 525, J74v.3)

^a J anumānavṛttir

⁵⁷¹ na hi svabhāvaḥ kāryam vā svabhāvāt kāraṇād ṛte | bhedānimittatāprāptes te vināsti na cānumā ||1477|| (TS 526,

In other words, relations of identity and causality warrant inferences and guard against the concerns of Bhartṛhari and his ilk. A farmer may not know for sure that planting a seed will lead to a sprout, but when he walks past a neighboring farm and sees a field of sprouts, he knows that seeds were planted (causality). If he recognizes the sprouts as those of rice plants, he also knows it to be a field of grain (identity). This has little to do with the whims of state, place, and time, and nothing to do with the skill of a disputant.

IV. *Aviddhakarṇa* on Inference

One last thinker whose thoughts on the authority of inference we should consider before turning to the concluding verses of the “Examination of Inference” is *Aviddhakarṇa* himself. The Buddhist commentator Karṇakagomin (c. 800), in his commentary (*ṭīkā*) on Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, includes several citations of *Aviddhakarṇa* (cf. Appendices A and B). Two of these, Av19 and Av20, are of particular importance for this discussion. In Av20, *Aviddhakarṇa* seems to make the clear, categorical statement that Śāntarakṣita attributes to Cārvākas:

*yad ucyate ‘viddhakarṇena*⁵⁷² *anadhigatārthaparicchitṭiḥ pramāṇam ato nānumānam pramāṇam arthaparicchadakavābhāvād iti. (PVSVT 25.5)*

Aviddhakarṇa says: A means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) delimits a matter that has not yet been understood, ergo inference is not a means of knowledge, because it does not have the condition of delimiting an object.

Inference, *Aviddhakarṇa* claims, does not qualify for this fairly common definition of *pramāṇa*. Therefore: “Inference is not a means of knowledge.” This is the precise declaration Śāntarakṣita criticizes. Kamalaśīla perhaps could have used this same citation to instantiate Śāntarakṣita’s initial charge against the skeptics. And yet, earlier in Karṇakagomin’s *Ṭīkā*, Av19 appears:

*yad ucyate ‘viddhakarṇena*⁵⁷³ *satyam anumānam iṣyata evāsmābhiḥ pramāṇam lokapratītatvāt kevalam liṅgalakṣaṇam ayuktam iti. (PVSVT 19.3)*

Aviddhakarṇa says: True, we actually accept that inference is a means of knowledge, but only insofar as it is commonly accepted in the world (*loka-pratīta*); the definition of the mark (*liṅga-lakṣaṇa*) is untenable.

As we will see, this is nearly identical to Purandara’s description of Cārvāka epistemology. But how can this statement stand alongside the straightforward negation found in Av20? In all likelihood, the word “inference” in Av20 stands for something more specific, something like “[a technical] definition of the mark,” “the Buddhist concept of inferential reasoning,” or even “the verbal formulation of an argument.” If, in the *Tattvaṭīkā*, Av20 followed shortly after Av19, the

J74v.4).

⁵⁷² The full sentence begins *tena yad ucyate...* and ends *iti tad apāstam*, “What *Aviddhakarṇa* says [...] is refuted by this (*tena*) [passage].” In the passage in question, Dharmakīrti explains that causal and identity relations generate knowledge, and concludes, “thus [reasons based on causal and identity relations are] means of knowledge like perception” (*iti pramāṇam pratyakṣavat*). This, according to Karṇakagomin, serves in part to disprove Av20.

⁵⁷³ The formulation is the same as in the previous note. In this case it is Dharmakīrti’s analysis of the three characteristics that, according to Karṇakagomin, disproves Av19. Karṇakagomin says the three characteristics are commonly accepted.

implication would be, “Inference *as you define it* is not a means of knowledge.”

Karṇakagomin argues that Dharmakīrti’s definition of the three characteristics disproves Av19, “because fulfillment of the three characteristics (*trairūpya*), i.e., the definition of the mark (*liṅga-lakṣaṇa*), is also commonly accepted in the world (*loka-pratīta*), as in the case of smoke, etc.”⁵⁷⁴ According to Karṇakagomin, Av20 is disproven by Dharmakīrti’s analysis of the two kinds of inference-warranting relation, causality and identity:

Though these two cognitions of inferable objects do not have the appearance of that [inferable thing] because they do not arise directly from it, they nevertheless do not deviate from it because they arise from it [indirectly], thus [they are both] means of knowledge, like perception.⁵⁷⁵

A thoughtful person, as Karṇakagomin explains, acts on the basis of their certainty (*niścaya*) that invariable relations they have already come to understand (*pūrva-pratīpanna*) will hold good in the future, even though the future efficacy of their activities (*anāgatam pravṛtti-sādhya-arthakriyā-sāmarthyam*) is not perceptible.⁵⁷⁶ Curiously, with this explanation, Karṇakagomin seems to describe an inductive process, whereas Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla focus more on the deductive necessity of causal and identity relations. In any case, both Av19 and Av20 are, for Karṇakagomin, refuted by Dharmakīrti’s analysis of reasons that are valid and genuinely inference-warranting—whether Aviddhakarṇa is denying the authority of inferential reasoning as such or only a certain class of technical, abstract inferences.

Straying from the Common Course

This brings us, finally, back to the conclusion of the chapter. In verse 1480, at the very end of the *uttarapakṣa*, Śāntarakṣita reiterates his initial charge that the declaration (*vyāhṛti*), “Inference is not a means of knowledge, is fruitless—communication requires that the listener infers the speaker’s intention on the basis of their words, so the declaration undoes itself.

In response, two voices chime in to try and save the Cārvāka declaration. Here are the final five verses of the chapter (in bold) together with Kamalaśīla’s commentary:⁵⁷⁷

CONCLUSION OF “EXAMINATION OF INFERENCE” SANSKRIT TEXT

purandaras tv āha lokaprasiddham anumānam cārvākair apīṣyata eva, yat tu kaiścil laukikam
mārgam atikramyānumānam ucyate tan niṣidhyata iti. etad āśaṅkya dūsayann āha laukikam ityādi.
laukikam liṅgam iṣṭam cen na tv anyaiḥ parikalpitam |
nanu loko ‘pi kāryāder hetvādīn avagacchati || 1481||

⁵⁷⁴ trairūpyasyāpi liṅgalakṣaṇasya lokapratītatvāt dhūmādāv iva (PVSVT 19.4).

⁵⁷⁵ tau dvāv anumeyapratyayau sāksād anutpatter atatpratibhāsitve ‘pi tadutpattes tadavyabhicāriṇāv iti pramāṇam pratyakṣavat (PVSV 3.5)

⁵⁷⁶ yataḥ sarva eva prekṣāvān pravṛttikāmaḥ pramāṇam anveṣate pravṛttiviṣayārthopadarśakatvena pravṛttiviṣayaś cārtho ‘rthakriyāsamartha eva. na cānāgataṃ pravṛttisādhyaarthakriyāsāmarthyam vastunaḥ pratyakṣam paricchinitity uktam ataḥ katham asyārthaparichedamātrāt prāmāṇyam. tasmāt svaviṣaye tadutpattiyā pratyakṣam yan mayā pūrvapratīpannam prabandhenārthakriyākāri tad evedam iti niścayam kurvan pravartakatvāt pramāṇam tathānumānam api (PVSVT 25.6)

⁵⁷⁷ Two small excerpts are left out of the translation, but included in footnotes. They are not insignificant, but relatively pedantic. The reader is encouraged to read them, but I have chosen to streamline the passage for ease and clarity.

tattvatas tu tad evoktaṃ nyāyavādibhir apy alam |
tal laukikābhyanujñāte kiṃ tyaktaṃ bhavati tvayā ||1482||

tattvata iti⁵⁷⁸ hetvādīn avagacchatīti sambandhaḥ. kāryāder ityādiśabdāt svabhāvagrahaṇam. evaṃ hetvādīn⁵⁷⁹ atrāpi svabhāvagrahaṇam eva. bahuvacanaṃ tu vyaktibhedāt. yata⁵⁸⁰ eva liṅgāt⁵⁸¹ tādātmyatadutpattipratibaddhāl loko ‘rthaṃ⁵⁸² pratipadyate, tad evoktaṃ liṅgam asmābhiḥ. tadabhyanujñāne kiṃ tyaktaṃ syād, yasyānumānatvaniṣedho bhavet.

athāpi syān naivāsmākaṃ kiṃcid anumānam iṣṭam, kiṃ tu pareṇa tat pramāṇam iṣṭam, tadabhyupagamān mama viphalā vyāhṛtir na bhavatīti. atrāhāpramāṇenetyādi.

apramāṇena caitena paraḥ kiṃ pratipadyate |

kutaś cāyaṃ niścayo jātaḥ pareṇa tat pramāṇam abhyupagatam iti, na hi parābhyupagamaḥ pratyakṣaḥ, na cānyat tava pramāṇam asti, yena niścayaḥ syāt. bhavatu nāma niścayaḥ, tathāpi⁵⁸³ tenāpramāṇena parābhyupagatena kimiti paraḥ pratipādyate,⁵⁸⁴ na vai vyasanam etat.

athāpi syād yathā ripuhastād ācchidya khaḍgaṃ tenaiva sa eva ripur nipātyate, evaṃ pareṇa yat pramāṇatvenābhyupagatam, tad eva gṛhītvā paro nirākriyata ity āśaṅkyāhāpramāṇakṛta iti.

apramāṇakṛtaś cāsau pratyayaḥ kīdrśo bhavet ||1483||

etat uktaṃ bhavati yadi mohāt pareṇāpramāṇam eva pramāṇam iti kṛtvā saṃgṛhītam, kathaṃ tenāpramāṇena parasya samyagjñānotpādanaṃ śakyate kartum, samyagjñānaphalatvāt pramāṇasya. na hi mohāt khaḍga iti kṛtvā gṛhītena yena kenacit chedakena paraś cchettuṃ śakyata iti na samāno drṣṭāntaḥ.

aviddhakarṇas tattvaṭīkāyām āha nanu cāpramāṇena⁵⁸⁵ kimiti paraḥ pratipādyate, ubhayaśiddham hi pratipādakaṃ bhavatīti. tad etad ayuktam. yasmād vacanātmakam anumānam na ca vaktuḥ pramāṇam atha ca vaktā tena paraṃ pratipādayati parapratipādanārthatvāt prayāsasya. nāvaśyam ubha[J171r]yasiddhena prayojanam iti. tad āśaṅkate ‘numānam ityādinā:

anumānam pramāṇam cet vaktur na vacanātmakam |

prakāśayati tenāyaṃ yathā tadvad idam bhavet ||1484||

ayaṃ iti vaktā. teneti vacanātmakena.

ajñātetyādinā dūṣaṇam āha.

ajñātārthāprakāśatvād apramāṇam tad iṣyate |

nāśaktasūcakatvena tāvakīnam tathā nanu ||1485||

na hi vacanasya vaktrapekṣayāsamsūcanād aprāmāṇyam iṣṭam, kiṃ tarhi.

ajñātārthāprakāśanāt. śaktasūcakatvam⁵⁸⁶ asyāsty eva, tvadīyaṃ [P128v] tv anumānam na śaktasamsūcakam⁵⁸⁷ ity asamānam etat. anyathā hy ubhayaśiddham eva bhavet. tasmān nyāyād anapetaṃ tat⁵⁸⁸ pramāṇam sarveṣāṃ yuktaṃ pratyakṣavad iti nyāyayam.⁵⁸⁹

⁵⁷⁸ K nanu loko ‘pīti, J na tv anyata iti (J marginalia indicates alternate reading [“pā”] *tattvataḥ*; P identical [except “pāṭhaḥ” for “pā”]), T gzhan ma yin zhes bya ba; cf. n 591.

⁵⁷⁹ KŚ hetvādīn ity

⁵⁸⁰ K yad

⁵⁸¹ J ligāt

⁵⁸² KŚ lokārthaṃ

⁵⁸³ J °yaḥ sta°

⁵⁸⁴ KŚ pratipad°

⁵⁸⁵ KŚ nanu vā, T ‘on te

⁵⁸⁶ KŚ sakta° (J prints *s* for *ś* here, as is often the case; P *śakta*°)

⁵⁸⁷ KŚ sakta°

⁵⁸⁸ KŚ om., JP marginalia indicates *tat* as an alternate reading

⁵⁸⁹ J nāyayam

But Purandara says, “Even Cārvākas accept inference as it is generally accepted in the world, but deny what those straying from the common (*laukika*) course call inference.” Śāntarākṣita raises this objection (*āśaṅkya*), then censures it:

**You may say, “We accept a commonplace (*laukika*) mark, not what is imagined by others.”
But doesn’t a common man also understand a cause from its effect, and so on? And in truth,⁵⁹⁰ proponents of logic say that alone suffices. So if you admit the commonplace, what is it you set aside? (1481–1482)**

[...] ⁵⁹¹ The common man learns something on the basis of a mark that is invariably connected to it through identity or causality. That alone is what we call an inferential mark. If you admit this, then what is it you set aside, whose inferentiality you would deny?

Yet you may say, “In fact, we do not admit inference at all. Rather, the other party claims it to be a means of knowledge, and, because they accept it to be so, our declaration (*vyāhṛti*) is not in vain.” To this, he says:

And how does the other party learn with this non-means-of-knowledge?

How is your certainty that the other party accepts it to be a means of knowledge brought about? Another person’s acceptance is not perceptible, and you have no other means of knowledge with which to ascertain it. Still, let there be such certainty. Even so, how would the one be instructed with the non-means-of-knowledge accepted by the other? Surely it’s not just bad luck (*vyasana*).

Yet you may say, “Just as one might strike down an enemy with his own sword after wresting it from his hands, so we refute the other party after seizing what they have taken to be a means of knowledge.” With this objection in mind (*āśaṅkya*), he says:

And what sort of cognition would be produced by a non-means-of-knowledge? (1483)

This conveys the following: If out of delusion someone mistakes what is in fact not a means of knowledge for a means of knowledge, how can they generate a correct cognition for someone else using that non-means-of-knowledge? After all, it is [only] a means of knowledge that has a correct cognition as its result. Indeed, it is not possible to cut someone with whatever weapon was mistaken out of delusion for a sword, so the example is not commensurate.

Aviddhakarṇa, in the *Tattvāṅkī*, says:

Objection: “How can the other party be taught by a non-means-of-knowledge? Actually, only what is established for both is instructive.”

⁵⁹⁰ For the phrasing of this verse, cf. n 524–526.

⁵⁹¹ Skipped passage: “The phrase ‘in truth’ [is in verse 1482, but it] construes with ‘recognizes causes, etc.’ [in verse 1481]. The term ‘etc.’ in the phrase ‘an effect, etc.’ imparts ‘intrinsic condition’ (*svabhāva*) [on the basis of which one can infer a more general intrinsic condition, as when inferring being-a-tree on the basis of being-a-redwood]. In the same way, in the phrase ‘causes, etc.’ it just imparts ‘intrinsic condition,’ as well, but the plural number is used because there are different instances.”

I.e., in general, one can deduce causes *or* intrinsic conditions, but each from *its* effect or from *an* intrinsic condition, hence, “causes, etc., from *an* effect, etc.” One can infer tree-ness from something’s being-an-oak, both of which can be said to be the “intrinsic condition” (*svabhāva*) of the thing. For the debate about Dharmakīrti’s use of the terms *bhāva* and *svabhāva* in different texts, see, e.g., Hayes 1987 and Steinkellner 1996.

The manuscripts read *na tv anyata iti* (“but not from others”) but insert *tattvataḥ* (in truth) as an alternate reading (*pāṭhaḥ*). (The Tibetan reads *gzhan ma yin zhes bya ba*.) It is hard to make sense of *na tv anyata*. A similar phrase, *na tv anyaiḥ*, appears in the second *pāda* of verse 1481, but there is little reason to think that Kamalaśīla would want this to construe syntactically (*iti sambandha*) with “recognizes causes, etc.” Śāstrī appears to take this marginalia to mean that *tattvataḥ* is an alternate reading for *na tv anyaiḥ* in the verse itself, but this makes little sense in the verse. I provisionally read *tattvataḥ*, and take it as a reference to the first *pāda* of verse 1482, though I am not as inclined as Kamalaśīla to syntactically connect this term with “recognizes causes” in the preceding verse.

[*Response:*] This is untenable. An inference consists in a statement and is not a means of knowledge for the speaker, and the speaker teaches the other party with that [statement], since the point of the effort is teaching the other party. Hence, there is no need for what is established for both.

With the next verse, Śāntarākṣita raises [Aviddhakarṇa's] objection (*āśāṅkate*):

You may say, “Inference, which consists in a statement, is not a means of knowledge for the speaker. Just as he reveals something with that, so [our declaration] could be the same.” (1484)

[...] ⁵⁹² With the following, he censures this:

We accept it to be a non-means-of-knowledge because it does not ⁵⁹³ illuminate something as yet unknown, not because it does not point to something capable. But isn't yours like that? (1485)

Indeed, we do not claim that a statement is a non-means-of-knowledge on account of not pointing to something with respect to the speaker. Why, then? Because it does not illuminate something as yet unknown. It [i.e., a valid inferential statement] actually does point to something capable [of instigating an inferential cognition]. Your inferential argument, on the other hand, does not point to something capable, so it not comparable. Indeed, otherwise [i.e., if it did point to something capable] it would be established for both parties.

It is proper that this means of knowledge, which does not deviate from logic, is tenable for all, like perception.

The passage begins with Purandara's clarification, quite like Aviddhakarṇa's in Av20, about Cārvāka epistemology: Cārvākas accept inferences that are *laukika*—common, mundane, worldly. In response, the Buddhists say relations of identity and causality are well within the scope of common sense. “If you admit this,” Kamalaśīla says, “then what is it you set aside, whose inferentiality you would deny?”

The implication is that Purandara has no response, but his use of the term *laukika* is significant.

The *Cārvākasūtra* includes at least a few aphorisms denying the existence of “the other world (*paraloka*),” i.e., heaven and hell realms and/or the transmigration of the self to another body in the next life. One of the relatively well-attested aphorisms of the *Cārvākasūtra* says, “Because there is no otherworldly being (*paralokin*), there is no other world (*paraloka*).”⁵⁹⁴ It is easy to see why this follows: if the only fundamental means of knowledge is perception, but none of us lives in “the other world,” there is no one whose perceptions can warrant knowledge about it. There is no way to prove that the other world exists, ergo there is no reason to believe it does.

Purandara and Aviddhakarṇa refer to inferences that are *loka-pratīta* or *loka-prasiddha*, commonly accepted or well established *in the world* (*loka*). That is, they are referring not only to common sense and common practice, but more precisely to knowledge that pertains to this world (*loka*) rather than the other world (*paraloka*). Definitions of inference that “stray from the common (*laukika*) course” are also definitions concerning supramundane (*alaukika*) phenomena. The fact that relations of identity and causality are generally known to common sense says nothing about a philosopher using

⁵⁹² Skipped passage: “He' is the speaker. 'With that' means with that which consists in a statement.”

⁵⁹³ The J manuscript does not include the negation of illumination (*aparakāśa*), but both editions print it, as Kamalaśīla's gloss, and, by consequence, the verse, makes more sense if the negation is there. Cf. n 528.

⁵⁹⁴ paralokino 'bhāvāt paralokābhāvaḥ (Namai 1976b, 39; Bhattacharya 2011, 80).

specific claims about identity and causality to prove otherworldly phenomena. Śāntarakṣita is concerned with definitions, whereas Purandara is concerned with applications. And yet, Purandara and Aviddhakarṇa both comment on the way that other thinkers describe (*ucyate*) or define (*lakṣaṇa*) inferences, setting themselves up for Śāntarakṣita's counterpoint. If the problem for the Cārvākas is a definition of inference that goes beyond the scope of the everyday world, then Buddhist epistemology has nothing to answer for.

After dealing with Purandara, Kamalaśīla imagines an interlocutor chiming in with the stronger view that scholars have attributed to pre-Purandara Cārvāka: "In fact, we do not admit inference at all. Rather, the other party claims it to be a means of knowledge, and, because they accept it to be so, our declaration is not in vain." This, Kamalaśīla says, is what Śāntarakṣita is responding to when he asks, "And how does the other party learn with this non-means-of-knowledge?"

Kamalaśīla's characterization of this exchange is striking:

How is your certainty that the other party accepts it to be a means of knowledge brought about? Another person's acceptance is not perceptible, and you have no other means of knowledge with which to ascertain it. Still, let there be such certainty. Even so, how would the one be instructed with the non-means-of-knowledge accepted by the other? Surely it's not just bad luck (*vyasana*).

The statement that "inference is not a means of knowledge" only conveys the Cārvākas' intention, Śāntarakṣita argues, if the other party is able to infer their intention on its basis. Kamalaśīla inverts the direction of the inference to point out another chink in the Cārvākas' defense: without inferring it, how can the Cārvākas discover the Buddhists' belief in the authority of inference? "Another person's acceptance is not perceptible," he explains, but Cārvākas claim that perception alone has epistemic authority. This would be a major hurdle for a strict anti-inference Cārvāka. Nevertheless, following Śāntarakṣita's impulses toward comprehensiveness and systematicity, Kamalaśīla grants this first point: "Let there be such certainty." Though the strict anti-inference Cārvāka has no way of discovering his rivals' commitment to the authority of inference, there is a deeper problem. Kamalaśīla's imaginary interlocutor says that the declaration, "inference is not a means of knowledge," is not made in vain because others accept the authority of inference. But if the Cārvākas intend to convince their rivals that inference is not a means of knowledge, they have to explain how an argument can actually instruct anyone of anything. With a bit of rhetorical flair, Kamalaśīla insists that there must be some epistemic mechanism at play here: "Surely," he says, "it's not just bad luck" (*na vai vyasanam etat*).

Tenable for All

To try to solve this riddle, Kamalaśīla's imaginary interlocutor raises the analogy of the sword:

Just as one might strike down an enemy with his own sword after wresting it from his hands, so we refute the other party after seizing what they have taken to be a means of knowledge.

Kamalaśīla says that Śāntarakṣita has this objection in mind (*ity āśankya*) when he asks his next rhetorical question: "And what sort of cognition would be produced by a non-means-of-knowledge?" If a delusional enemy were to swing a sunflower as if it were a sword, one could wrest it from his hands and even strike him with it without being able to pierce his skin. If inferential reasoning is

nothing but idle prattle that Buddhists deludedly take to be a means of knowledge, Cārvākas can babble in a similar fashion, but they are not likely to generate knowledge in the Buddhist by such a means.

There is no glint of an imaginary sword in the root text, but Kamalaśīla is very good at conjuring the words of others that seem to be anticipated in Śāntarakṣita's responses. In Kamalaśīla's reading, even when Śāntarakṣita does not directly invoke the words of his rivals, as he does when he paraphrases Purandara in verse 1481 or Aviddhakarṇa in 1484, his words are always already immersed in dialogue.

This inexorably dialogic character extends to the words of others, as well. We do not encounter Purandara's or Aviddhakarṇa's words in a vacuum or as an absolute statement, but always as a response. In fact, Śāntarakṣita not only speaks in response to an anticipated objection, but also speaks in order to generate such an anticipation. "How does the other party learn with this non-means-of-knowledge," he asks in verse 1483. In verse 1484 he paraphrases Av16, which, as we know from the *Pañjikā*, begins with an opponent asking, "How can the other party be taught by a non-means-of-knowledge?" In order to refute Aviddhakarṇa, Śāntarakṣita first plays the part of Aviddhakarṇa's interlocutor, using nearly the exact words to which Aviddhakarṇa's argument responds.

But here again the response leaves a little bit to be desired. In Śāntarakṣita's paraphrase, Aviddhakarṇa hardly seems to respond to the initial question. Even if the statement is not a means of knowledge *for the speaker*, it still remains to be said how it manages to impart knowledge *to the listener*. Śāntarakṣita, like Aviddhakarṇa's imaginary interlocutor, asks how the other party can be taught by a non-means-of-knowledge, but in Śāntarakṣita's paraphrase, Aviddhakarṇa's response amounts to: "The statement is not a means of knowledge, anyway." His actual point, in Av16, is different. Aviddhakarṇa's interlocutor not only asks how someone can be taught by a non-means of knowledge, but also asserts: "Actually, only what is established for both is instructive." The concern, then, is Dignāga's requirement that all of the components of an argument be "established for both parties" (*ubhaya-siddha*). In other words, a real debate requires a certain amount of shared ground. If Cārvākas do not even accept that inferences are authoritative—to use Franco's words—what right do they have to participate in the philosophical scene?

Aviddhakarṇa's response, Av16, requires careful attention:

aviddhakarṇas tattvaṭīkāyām āha nanu cāpramāṇena^a kimiti paraḥ pratipādyate, ubhayaśiddham hi pratipādakam bhavatīti. tad etad ayuktam. yasmād vacanātmakam anumānam na ca vaktuḥ pramāṇam atha ca vaktā tena paraṃ pratipādayati parapatipādanārthatvāt prayāsasya. nāvaśyam ubhayaśiddhena prayojanam iti. (1484–1485)⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹⁵ TSP 529.6, J170v.6.

^a Shastri and Krishnamacharya both print *nanu vāpramāṇena*. I am not familiar with the phrase *nanu vā*, whereas *nanu ca* is ubiquitous. More importantly, *vāpramāṇena* can be broken up in two ways, with a negation of *pramāṇa* or without it, i.e., *vā + apramāṇena* or *vā pramāṇena*. Jha, for example, translates the latter. The characters for *v* and *c* are sometimes hard to distinguish in J, but *v* always tends towards roundness, whereas *c* often has a telltale indentation similar to the horizontal line that marks it in Devanāgarī. This indentation is present here, obviating the need to interpret the phrase *nanu vā*, and, more significantly, making the negation in *apramāṇena* certain. (Tib. 'on te tsad ma ma yin pas ci'i phyir

Aviddhakarṇa, in the Tattvaṭīkā, says:

Objection: “How can the other party be taught by a non-means of knowledge (*apramāṇa*)? Actually, only what is established for both (*ubhaya-siddha*) is instructive.”

[*Response:*] This is untenable. An inference consists in a statement and is not a means of knowledge for the speaker, and the speaker teaches the other party with that [statement], since the point of the effort is teaching the other party. Hence, there is no need⁵⁹⁶ for what is established for both.

Why does the fact that an inferential statement is not a means of knowledge for the speaker bear on the requirement that the argument itself be established for both? Ordinarily, when we think about this requirement, we think about the speaker’s opponent. A Naiyāyika cannot rely on concepts like the self or god to draw an inference against a Buddhist. The Buddhist could simply say, “You have yet to prove that the self exists.” But Aviddhakarṇa flips this requirement on its head. To convince someone, you may have to rely on terms and concepts that they already accept, but why should that mean you have to accept them yourself?

The implied practice should be familiar to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla and any other followers of Nāgārjuna: manipulating interlocutors’ beliefs and statements to force unwanted consequences on them. For Aviddhakarṇa, this not only means that he can make successful arguments in bad faith by using his opponents’ beliefs and statements against them, but, more fundamentally, that he can use inferential reasoning, and even abstract inferential reasoning, in a debate with Buddhist rivals even though he does not accept the authority of such reasoning. They have made the rules—he seems to imply—and they are committed to playing by them.

But as is so often the case, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are more inclined to interpret such arguments in categorical and definitive terms. Rather than reply to the implicit critique—and taunt—in Aviddhakarṇa’s claim, Śāntarakṣita instead takes it as an opportunity to reiterate his stance on the epistemic function of inferential statements, and to mock, one last time, the Cārvākas’ declaration that “inference is not a means of knowledge:”

We accept [an inferential statement] to be a non-means-of-knowledge because it does not illuminate something as yet unknown, not because it does not point to something capable [of instigating an inferential cognition]. But isn’t yours like that?

“For-others” inferences are not, strictly speaking, means of knowledge. But this is only because they do not “illuminate (*prakāśayati*) something as yet unknown.” As Śāntarakṣita says in verse 1479, a “for-others” inference “is figurative and conventional with respect to its inferentiality insofar as it points to something capable.” A valid inferential argument “points to (*sūcaka*) something capable (*śakta*),” just as the finger pointing toward the smoke billowing up over the mountain does not itself illuminate or reveal the existence of the fire on the mountain, but points someone else towards what is “capable” of instigating such an inferential cognition, i.e., to the smoke itself. There is a difference

gzhan rtogs par byed de.)

⁵⁹⁶ The Sanskrit reads *nāvaśyam ... prayojana*. I understand Aviddhakarṇa to be using *prayojana* with the instrumental (*ubhaya-siddhena*) in the sense of “need for” or “use of.” In total, then, the sentence means something like “There is no necessity for the use of what is established for both.” The rhetorical effect is to emphasize the needlessness of *ubhaya-siddha*, but this is conveyed more clearly in English by collapsing the senses of *avaśya* and *prayojana*. (Tib. *gdon mis za bar gnyis la grub par dogs pa med do.*)

between the smoke and the statement, “There is smoke over the mountain,” but there is also a difference between the statement, “There is smoke over the mountain,” and the statement, “Inference is not a means of knowledge.” The former points to something that is capable of instigating an inferential cognition, whereas the latter fails even on that count.

Kamalaśīla brings the discussion back to the terms of Aviddhakarṇa’s actual comment. “Your inferential argument,” he explains, “does not point to something capable, so it not comparable. Indeed, otherwise it would be established for both parties.” Aviddhakarṇa denies the need for an argument to be established for both, but even so, if his argument were valid, Kamalaśīla suggests, it would be anyway.

Is that so? If Aviddhakarṇa were to craft his argument in such a manner that the Buddhists were obliged to accept, would it be “established for both” even if he intended only to throw a wrench in the Buddhists’ system rather than to establish something about the nature of reality? Kamalaśīla’s conclusion is that it would have to be:

It is proper that this means of knowledge, which does not deviate from logic (*nyāya*), is tenable for all, like perception.

This is a far cry from the *Cārvākasūtra*’s epistemological aphorisms, but it also seems somewhat removed even from Vātsyāyana’s description of inference’s reliance on perception and testimony. Though Kamalaśīla would grant that many inferences involve perceptual knowledge, here in his final remark in the “Examination of Inference,” he posits *nyāya* as its own foundation. If Cārvākas or anyone thinks that they can deny the authority of inference, they are, Kamalaśīla’s conclusion suggests, kidding themselves.

But the question remains whether Aviddhakarṇa intended Av16 to prove a specific conclusion or to make something like a rhetorical point.

The manner in which Kamalaśīla frames his earlier reference to the *Tattvaṭīkā* is significant in this regard: “A proliferation of this and other examples can be seen in the *Tattvaṭīkā*.” Most of Aviddhakarṇa’s Cārvāka fragments⁵⁹⁷ concern the authority of inference, so it would not be surprising to hear that his comments on the epistemological aphorisms contain “a proliferation of examples” for doubting inference’s intrinsic authority. In several cases, the Buddhists regard Aviddhakarṇa’s skeptical arguments as sincere arguments, and therefore (i) self-contradictory (in the sense that Aviddhakarṇa is making an inferential argument against the possibility of inferential arguments), and (ii) inimical to his commitment, as a Naiyāyika, to the validity of inference. (Cf. §15 below.) This may be true, but there are a few other possibilities. First of all, Aviddhakarṇa may have “converted” from Nyāya to materialism (or vice versa), eliminating the contradiction between denying inference and upholding Nyāya. This, however, still raises the question of self-contradiction. Whether he converted or not, we should not presume that he intended his skeptical arguments sincerely. Instead, he may have raised these arguments against inference in order to mock or undermine—and so to expose weaknesses of—Buddhist epistemology. In fact, he may have done so not after a conversation to Cārvāka, but as a committed Naiyāyika weaponizing the Cārvāka view

⁵⁹⁷ Appendix A, sections V and VII. Appendix B includes several additional fragments from Karṇakagomin’s *Pramāṇavārttikasavṛttiṭīkā* that derive most likely from the *Tattvaṭīkā*.

against Buddhists.⁵⁹⁸

One of Aviddhakarṇa's arguments from the *Vipañcitārthā*, Av4 (Appendix A, section V), concerns the statement of concomitance: where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen. In Av4, he argues that the statement of concomitance “only generates a memory” (*smṛti-mātraka*) because it only functions if the person hearing the statement is already aware of the relationship between smoke and fire; the mere statement does not generate genuinely new information. If we link Av16 with Av4, we can see a faint glimpse of the arguments surrounding the “proliferation of examples” Kamalaśīla mentions. Aviddhakarṇa emphasizes the Buddhist demand that the terms and ideas underlying one's argument must be acceptable to both parties; but if both parties already accept the elements of the argument, then the argument is needless, or, if the other party does not yet accept them, the argument is fruitless (Av4); and since the idea is to convince the other person of something, it does not actually matter whether the speaker believes it or not (Av16); it is possible to make something up on the basis of the other party's beliefs.

In response to skeptical arguments against inference, the Buddhists argue that their inferences stand on the firm ground of intrinsic and causal relationships. If Av16 is meant more as something like an intentional sophism than a sincere argument for the nature of inferential reasoning, the underlying point becomes a poignant counterpunch: the ground of argumentation is not certain at all; it is arbitrary, because it is possible to convince someone of something by manipulating their own beliefs without believing them oneself. It is not hard to imagine our Buddhist authors making a similar point about the Buddha's ability (*upāya-kauśalya*) to leverage someone's afflictions and attachments to guide them towards the way. In fact, considering the notion of a “sliding scale of analysis” that scholars⁵⁹⁹ often use to characterize the Buddhist epistemological school, we can easily imagine Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla putting a slightly different spin on the same basic idea: One must adjust the “level” of analysis in accordance with the needs and limitations of one's interlocutor. All swords, ultimately speaking, are imaginary; practically speaking, however, some imaginary swords can cut.⁶⁰⁰

Aviddhakarṇa's larger point is not that inferences never work, nor that knowledge is impossible, but simply that argumentation is a game. At some point, we have to rely on things like testimony and scripture—and dogma—to get the game going.

⁵⁹⁸ Consider Av5, which Kamalaśīla cites in PPS; cf. Appendix A.

⁵⁹⁹ E.g., in Dunne 2004, Blumenthal 2004, McClintock 2010.

⁶⁰⁰ Cf. n 260 on Kumārila's attack on the purportedly Buddhist “dream argument” for idealism.

PRAMĀṆĀNTARA

In chapter nineteen, the “Examination of Other Means of Knowledge (*pramāṇa-antara*),” Śāntarakṣita argues against the epistemological authority or independence of testimony, analogy, and several other cognitive processes believed by others to be *pramāṇas*.⁶⁰¹

Śāntarakṣita begins by refuting Śabara and Kumārila’s analyses of verbal testimony as a distinct means of knowledge. The Mīmāṃsakas argue that testimony (*śabda*, “word”) consists in the statements of the Veda as well as those of a trustworthy person. Śāntarakṣita does not, of course, accept the intrinsic validity of the Vedas, nor that a person is reliable merely on account of their word having been good on some occasions.⁶⁰² In any case, he says, words do not inform us about the nature of things, but only about the speaker’s intention (*vivakṣā*), which we infer from their statements.

An unnamed opponent interjects to point out that befuddled people sometimes say one thing when they mean to say another; we cannot infer the one on the basis of the other. We have already seen (cf. §14) Śāntarakṣita’s retort:

The utter distinction between words used by a befuddled person and those used by a lucid person is very clear. Clever people can discern it on the basis of the topic of conversation and such things. (1516)⁶⁰³

When a person’s words accord with their intentions, clever people can tell. (One can only hope to be up to the task.)

Śāntarakṣita does not consider any other arguments for testimony apart from those of Mīmāṃsā. After this, he considers analogy (*upamāna*), beginning with the Mīmāṃsā view, then turning to

⁶⁰¹ Namely, implication (*arthāpatti*), absence (*abhāva*), and, very briefly, logic (*yukti*), non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*), probability (*sambhava*), tradition (*aitihya*), and intuition (*pratibhā*).

⁶⁰² A (selective) objection, perhaps, to what we would call inductive rather than deductive reasoning.

⁶⁰³ bhrāntābhrāntaprayuktānām vailakṣaṇyaṃ parisphuṭam | vidagdhaḥ prakṛtādibhyo niścinvanti girām alam ||1516|| (TS 540, J76v.5).

Nyāya.

The Nyāya theory of analogy is distinctive. As we will see in more detail below, Nyāya holds a statement of similarity to be a genuine means of knowledge when it teaches the person who hears it the connection between the name of a thing and the thing itself (or, at least, a member of that particular class of things). Av17 appears as an objection to Śāntarakṣita's first line of argument against analogy. At the end of the chapter, Av18, a rather odd-seeming argument, appears as a last-ditch effort by the Naiyāyikas to rescue analogy, though I am not at all sure that is what it originally was.

CHAPTER NINETEEN EXAMINATION OF OTHER MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

[...]

Analogy, according to Nyāya

Some hold that analogy is the understanding of the connection with a designation that arises when someone who has heard an analogical statement perceives the similar object.⁶⁰⁴ (1562)

Preliminary response

If a lucid and clear apprehension of the connection with a name has already been generated when one hears the analogical statement, then, because of grasping something already grasped, it is not a means of knowledge. This is because, like memory, analogy would not have the purpose of bringing something about.⁶⁰⁵ (1563–1564)

If it has not yet been generated, then how does one learn that “this is that whose name I heard”? Indeed, in this way, someone who has not yet heard the name cannot, upon apprehending [e.g.] a gayal,⁶⁰⁶ know that they have heard its name. (1565–1566)

Nyāya argument for analogy

Objection: “One who applies an analogy understands the connection to have a specific referent when grasping the similar object. For, one knows the connection to a general extent through received knowledge, but understands the specific referent on the basis of analogy.”⁶⁰⁷ (1567–1568)

Refutation

It is not tenable that one understands the connection to a name with respect to one thing after coming to understand it in relation to another, as this would strain logic. When someone has grasped a particular name with respect to a man with a beautiful armlet, he does not, at another time, understand the same word with respect to a man with a lovely diadem. Therefore, when someone already knows a name with respect to a conceptual image, i.e., with what we call “a universal,”⁶⁰⁸ through a cognition of external things, then, even when apprehending a gayal, it is that

⁶⁰⁴ Uddyotakara puts it this way in his *Nyāyavārttika*: “The meaning of the [Nyāya] sutra [defining analogy] is that one learns the connection between designation and designated after learning the gayal’s resemblance to a cow” (*gavā gavayasārūpyapratipattes tu samjñāsamjñūsambandham pratipadyata iti sūtrārthah* (ND2, 54.12)). In other words, with analogy, one is taught that a gayal (*gavaya*) is similar to a cow (*gauḥ*), and then, upon seeing a gayal, learns that this is the thing called “gayal.”

⁶⁰⁵ Kamalaśīla says, “The purpose (*artha*) of bringing something about (*karana*) means being most effective insofar as engaging (*pravṛtti*) in an action (*karman*) that has not yet been done (*anispādita*)” (*karanaṅrthah sādhatamatvam anispādite karmani pravṛtṭyā*).

⁶⁰⁶ A gayal is a bovine native to South and Southeast Asia; it is similar to but distinct from the *gauḥ* (which I render “cow” throughout the present study).

⁶⁰⁷ Here Kamalaśīla cites an argument by Aviddhakarṇa (§15).

⁶⁰⁸ According to Dignāga’s division, the object of perception is a unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), the object of inference is a universal (*sāmānya*), and all conceptions and linguistic conventions refer to the latter. “Gayal” is a useful conventional

[“universal”] with respect to which he learns [the name]. He who does not understand the division between the perceptible and the conceptual believes it to be “external.”⁶⁰⁹ (1569–1572)

Furthermore, it must be understood that we have already refuted, at length,⁶¹⁰ words and concepts referring to unique particulars. (1573)

Yet, even if they had those as their referents, it would only be an inference that would arise. We clearly apprehend that this is produced by a mark fulfilling the three characteristics, as follows: “This thing that is similar to a cow is the referent of the expression ‘ox,’ just like the ox that was present in mind on the occasion⁶¹¹ of grasping the convention.” (1574–1575)

If it was not even present in mind on that occasion, then with respect to what was the convention “this is similar to a cow” made? We have already proven⁶¹² that there is no connection apart from the things connected. Earlier, at the time of the convention,⁶¹³ one heard the sound with an auditory perception; then one sees with the eyes the animal standing before one. It is not tenable that combining these two things that have already been cognized separately is a means of knowledge, because it only joins together what has already been grasped, as in the case of the fragrant and the sweet, and so on.⁶¹⁴ A cognition of the connection with a name does not go beyond the status of memory. (1576–1579)

In addition, there are limitless means for producing cognitions of the connection with a name. They are even produced without respect to similarity, as in the case of kings and such. Suppose someone has been told, “Among those people, the king is he for whom the rays of the sun are concealed by a white umbrella.” Later, when he sees that man, on account of that particular teaching, he has the thought, “That is the name of this one.” For you, it must obtain that this is a distinct means of knowledge, because it does not rely on similarity, etc. (1580–1582)

Conclusion

Others seek to prove the existence of another means of knowledge on the force of inference: “Perception is connected with another means of knowledge apart from inference because it is a means of knowledge, like inference; and the same with inference, too.”⁶¹⁵

fiction superimposed onto fluctuating unique particulars, and this fiction is called a “universal.”

⁶⁰⁹ Kamalaśīla explains that “even when apprehending a *gayal*, one learns that name with respect to that itself, rather than with an external unique particular called ‘*gayal*.’ And that itself, the conceptual image, which we conventionally denote ‘universal,’ is only imagined by the other party, as we have already refuted it” (*gavayopalambhe ‘pi tatraiva tannāma pratipadyate, na tu bāhye svalakṣaṇe gavayākhye. tad eva ca vikalpapratibimbakam sāmānyam iti vyavahriyate, tat paraparikalpitam, tasya nirākṛtatvāt*).

⁶¹⁰ “In,” as Kamalaśīla explains, “the examination of the meaning of words,” i.e., chapter 16 (*śabdārthaparīkṣāyām*).

⁶¹¹ The grammar of this term puzzles me, but Kamalaśīla glosses it with the very clear “at the time of grasping the convention” (*saṃketagrahaṇakāle*), which is what one would expect this to amount to, especially considering the following verse.

⁶¹² “In the examination of the category of quality,” says Kamalaśīla (*guṇapadārthaparīkṣāyām*), i.e., in chapter 11.

⁶¹³ Kamalaśīla glosses *samaye* (convention, in the locative case) with the more explicit “at the time of the convention” (*samayakāle*), and I follow his lead.

⁶¹⁴ Taking a bite out of a ripe mango and thinking about how sweet it is may link together the notion of sweetness, which one learned about earlier in life, and the present sensation of the mango on one’s tongue, but this is not a means of knowledge—it does not warrant any new information.

⁶¹⁵ This is the last fragment of Aviddhakarṇa that Kamalaśīla cites; it is not clear whether this attack on Buddhist epistemological theory is really leveled from a Nyāya perspective or if it comes from Aviddhakarṇa’s skeptical Cārvāka writings (§15).

This reason is not invariably related to those, because nothing demonstrates the annulment [of the reason in the dissimilar case].⁶¹⁶ (1583–1584)

Also, in this very manner, you would obstruct your own view that there are four means of knowledge. Your objection to that will work against this.⁶¹⁷ (1585)

⁶¹⁶ Kamalaśīla: “Because nothing illuminates the annulment of the reason in the dissimilar case, it is demonstrated that there cannot be an invariable relation between the proving property and the property to be proven” (*sādhyavipakṣe hetor bādhakasyāprakāśanān na sādhyasādbhanayoḥ pratibandha upadarśitaḥ*).

⁶¹⁷ If Aviddhakarṇa makes this argument in order to prove that there are four, rather than two, means of knowledge, someone else could wield the same argument against him to prove that there are five or more, rather than four; Śāntarakṣita suggests he apply whatever counterargument he would use in that case against his own argument, as well.

§15. AV17 AND AV18: ANALOGY

Av17, like Av15, is a concise and fairly straightforward gloss on a basic term of Nyāya epistemology, in this case analogy (*upamāna*).

NS 1.1.6 defines analogy as “proving what is to be proven through homogeneity (*sādharmyāt*) with something well-known.”⁶¹⁸ In his comments, Vātsyāyana, without explicitly mentioning testimony, describes a process of learning that appears to hinge on a combination of testimony and perception. The entirety of his comments are as follows:

Analogy is the making known of something to be made known on the basis of similarity (*sāmānyāt*) with something that is already known (*prasiddha*), e.g., “a gayal (*gavaya*) is like a cow (*gauḥ*).” But what does analogy bring about in this case? When one learns (*pratipadyate*) that something has a similar quality (*samāna-dharma*) to a cow, one then learns about the thing itself through perception. The purpose of the analogy is learning (*pratipatti*) the connection with a name (*samākhyā*). For example, when the analogy “a gayal is like a cow” has been uttered, then, while perceiving an object that has a common quality with a cow through contact between the object and the sense faculties, one learns the connection between the designation and the designated (*saṃjñā-saṃjñi-sambandha*): “The word ‘gayal’ is the designation of this.” When the analogy that has been uttered is, “the *mudgaparṇi* is like the *mudga*,” or, “the *māṣaparṇi* is like the *māṣa*,”⁶¹⁹ one who learns the connection between designation and designated through the analogy then fetches the one herb or the other for medicine. The same goes for other objects of analogy in the world that one may want to know about.⁶²⁰

Commenting on this, Uddyotakara entertains an objection he attributes to Buddhists (*bhadanta*): What makes analogy a distinct means of knowledge from perception and testimony? One learns, presumably from a trustworthy source, that there is such a thing as a gayal and that it is similar to a cow. This only describes a case of testimony. Similarly, when one sees a gayal and recognizes its similarity to a cow, this is nothing but an act of perception.⁶²¹ In response, deriding what he considers his Buddhist opponent’s simplistic view of cognition, Uddyotakara reiterates Vātsyāyana’s main point about the connection between designation and designated:

“He learns either the gayal’s resemblance to the cow or the gayal’s existence.”

⁶¹⁸ prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasāadhanam upamānam ||1.1.6|| (NS 13.10).

⁶¹⁹ These are, it would seem, different but similar plants, rather than different parts of the same plant (such as the bean of the *māṣa* plant vs. the leaves (*parṇi*) of the same plant).

⁶²⁰ prajñātena sāmānyāt prajñāpanīyasya prajñāpanam upamānam iti. yathā gaur evaṃ gavaya iti. kiṃ punar atropamānena kriyate? yadā khalv ayaṃ gavā samānadharmam pratipadyate, tadā pratyakṣatas tam artham pratipadyata iti. samākhyāsambandhapratipattir upamānārtham ity āha. yathā gaur evaṃ gavaya ity upamāne prayukte gavā samānadharmāṇam artham indriyārthasannikarṣād upalabhamāno 'sya gavayaśabdaḥ saṃjñeti saṃjñāsāñjisambandham pratipadyata iti. yathā mudgas tathā mūdgaparṇi, yathā māṣas tathā māṣaparṇi ity upamāne prayukte upamānāt saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandham pratipadyamānas tām tām oṣadhīm bhaiṣajyāya āharati. evam anyo 'py upamānasya loke viṣayo bubhutsitavya iti (NBh 13.11)

⁶²¹ pratyakṣāgamābhyāṃ nopamānam bhidyate. katham iti. yadā tāv ubhau gogavayau pratyakṣeṇa paśyati, tadāyam anena sarūpa ity upamānam bhidyate. yadāpi śṛṇoti yathā gaur evaṃ gavaya ity tadāsyā śṛṇvata eva buddhir upajāyate. kecid godharmā gavaye 'nvayina upalabhyante, kecid vyatirekeṇa iti. anyathā hi yathā tathety etan na syāt. bhūyas tu sārūpyam gavā gavayasya ity evaṃ pratipadyate. tasmāt nopamānam pratyakṣāgamābhyāṃ bhidyata iti (NV 54.6).

Behold, the Buddhist’s faculty for *pramāṇa*!

Actually, the meaning of the sutra is that one learns the connection between designation and designated (*saṃjñā-saṃjñi-sambandha*) after learning the gayal’s resemblance to a cow. Therefore, he has just said something without having understood the sutra’s meaning.⁶²²

In the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntarakṣita emphasizes the “connection with a designation” in verse 1562, which characterizes the Nyāya position:

Some hold that analogy is the understanding (*viññāna*) of the connection with a designation (*saṃjñā-sambandha*) that arises when someone who has heard an analogical statement (*atideśa-vākya*) perceives the similar object (*samāna-artha*).⁶²³

The discussion that follows centers on the relation between the statement comparing gayals to cows, the perception of a gayal, and the understanding that a gayal is what is called “a gayal.” Has one learned, once and for all, the connection with the designation when one hears the statement? If so, the cognition that follows later on, when one sees a gayal, is not a means of knowledge (*na pramāṇatā*), but something more like a memory. If, at the later moment, when one sees the gayal, one has not yet learned the connection with the designation, then how, at that point, would one come to see that this is the thing called a gayal?

In the next two verses (1567–1568), Śāntarakṣita paraphrases the argument in Av17, which Kamalaśīla cites as follows:

avidbhakarṇas tv āha āgamāt sāmānyena pratipadyate viśeṣapratipattis tūpamānād iti (1567–1568).⁶²⁴

Avidbhakarṇa, for his part, says: One learns [the connection] in a general way (*sāmānyā*)⁶²⁵ through received knowledge (*āgama*), whereas learning of the particular (*viśeṣa-pratipatti*) follows from analogy.

Unto itself, the fragment does not announce its bearing on the connection between designation and designated, but Śāntarakṣita’s version—in verse, as always—does:

Objection: One who applies (*upayukta*) an analogy understands the connection (*sambandha*) to have a specific referent (*viśiṣṭa-viśaya*) when grasping the similar object. For one knows the connection to a

⁶²² gavā gavayasārūpyaṃ pratipadyate gavayasattāṃ vety aho pramāṇābhijñā bhadantasya. gavā gavayasārūpyapratipattes tu saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhaṃ pratipadyata iti sūtrārthaḥ. tasmād aparijñāya sūtrārthaṃ yat kiñcid ucyate (NV 54.12).

⁶²³ śrutātideśavākyaṣya samānārthopalambhane | saṃjñāsambandhavijñānam upamā kaiścid iṣyate ||1562|| (TS 551, J78v.6).

⁶²⁴ TSP 553.1, J176v.1.

⁶²⁵ There is a minor ambiguity in the juxtaposition between *sāmānyā* and *viśeṣa* in Av17. These terms are often juxtaposed in the adverbial senses “in general” and “in particular,” respectively, especially in the ablative or instrumental cases (*sāmānyena*) or at the beginning of a compound (*viśeṣa-pratipatti*). So it would seem in Av17. But Vātsyāyana uses the same term, *sāmānyā*, in the ablative, to gloss the term “homogeneity” (*sādharmya*, “having the same property”) in the sutra. In the *Bhāṣya*, *sāmānyāt*, construed with the instrumental *prasiddhena*, “with something known,” means “on the basis of similarity” rather than the adverbial “in general.” Is Avidbhakarṇa commenting on this passage in the *Bhāṣya* while using a term from the *Bhāṣya* in a semantically distinct manner? It seems so. Otherwise, the fragment would mean that one learns by means of similarity *through testimony*. This ambiguity is a little odd, but Av17’s use of *sāmānyā* and *viśeṣa* is common, their juxtaposition in the fragment is clear, and Śāntarakṣita’s paraphrase (cf. next note) is unambiguous, so we are on safe ground.

general extent (*sāmānya-gocara*) through received knowledge (*āgama*), but understands (*vijānāti*) the specific referent (*viśiṣṭa-viṣaya*) on the basis of analogy. (1567–1568)⁶²⁶

Although Av17 itself does not mention the connection between designation and designated, the overall discussion in which Śāntarakṣita places it, his paraphrase of the argument in verse, and, even more importantly, the content of the passage in the *Bhāṣya* that Aviddhakarṇa was most likely commenting on, makes the argument in Av17 fairly clear: The actual analogical cognition is neither the statement, “a gayal is like a cow,” nor the ensuing perception of the ox itself, but rather the application of the designation learned in the statement to the object seen in the perception, and thus constitutes a unique means of knowledge.

Śāntarakṣita spends the next fifteen verses refuting this. He argues that the entire notion is built on a misunderstanding about the relationship between words and things, between conceptions and perceptions—and in this light he points back to the “Examination of the Meaning of Words.” If one genuinely learns anything about the concept of a gayal through the kind of process the Naiyāyikas describe, it is simply as an inference. Aviddhakarṇa’s argument implies that words can have both a general aspect and a particular aspect—“gayal” refers generally to an animal that is similar to a cow, but also truly refers, when one is standing before a gayal, to that particular animal. As Śāntarakṣita has already explained at length in his discussion of *apoha*, this cannot be so. The general (universals, *sāmānya*) is essentially disconnected from the particular (*viśeṣa*, *svalakṣaṇa*). For Śāntarakṣita, as for Dignāga and Dharmakīrti before him, we learn about the former through inference, the latter through perception—and never the twain shall meet.

§ § §

Finally, to conclude the section on analogy in the “Examination of Other Means of Knowledge,” Śāntarakṣita considers one last argument of Aviddhakarṇa’s, Av18, which Kamalaśīla cites as follows:

*aviddhakarṇas tu dve eva pramāṇe svalakṣaṇasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ cānyatprameyam nāstīty
etadvighātanārthaṃ pramāṇayati* pratyakṣam anumānavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṃ pramāṇatvāt
anumānavat. anumānaṃ vā pratyakṣavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṃ pramāṇatvāt, pratyakṣavat.
tathā svalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇavyatiriktaprameyārthāntarasadvitīyaṃ prameyatvāt,
sāmānyalakṣaṇavat. sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ vā svalakṣaṇavyatiriktaprameyāntarasadvitīyaṃ prameyatvāt,
svalakṣaṇavad *iti*. (1583–1584)⁶²⁷

*But Aviddhakarṇa makes this argument in order to demolish the idea that there are only two means of knowledge, and that there is no object of knowledge apart from unique particulars and universals: Perception is accompanied (*sadvitīya*) by another means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), apart from inference, because it is a means of knowledge, like inference; or inference is accompanied (*sadvitīya*) by another means of knowledge, apart from perception, because it is a means of knowledge; like perception. In the same way, unique particulars are accompanied (*sadvitīya*) by another [class of] object of knowledge (*prameya*), apart from universals, because they are objects of knowledge, like universals; or universals are accompanied (*sadvitīya*) by another [class of] object of knowledge, apart from unique particulars, because they are objects of knowledge, like unique particulars.*

⁶²⁶ upayuktopamānaś cet tulyārthagrahaṇe sati | viśiṣṭaviṣayatvena sambandham avagacchati ||1567|| āgamād dhi sa sambandhaṃ vetti sāmānyagocaram | viśiṣṭaviṣayaṃ taṃ tu vijānāty upamāśrayāt ||1568|| (TS 553, J79r.4).

⁶²⁷ TSP 556.14, J177r.5.

Dignāga is the clear target of this argument—specifically, Dignāga’s claim that there are precisely two means of knowledge, perception and inference, which are restricted, respectively, to the precisely two kinds of object of knowledge, unique particulars and universals. On its face, the overall argument, or quartet of arguments, entails that there are *more* than two of each. Yet, as we should now expect with Aviddhakarṇa, there may be more here than meets the eye.

Śāntarakṣita, for his part, also performs the way we have come to expect: he reads the argument entirely sincerely. He makes two points: First, the reason does not have a necessary connection (*apratibandha*), because Aviddhakarṇa has not demonstrated what blocks the reason from applying in a dissimilar case.⁶²⁸ Second, this argument conflicts with the Nyāya commitment to four means of knowledge. If the argument holds, then it holds just as well to prove that there are more than just four means of knowledge as that there are more than two. Śāntarakṣita concludes wryly: “Your objection to that will work against this.”⁶²⁹ In other words, Aviddhakarṇa has put himself in a bind. Whatever he may say to try to salvage the Nyāya doctrine that there are exactly four means of knowledge will, Śāntarakṣita insists, undermine the reasoning in Av18.

Śāntarakṣita’s response only makes sense if Av18 is a simple and sincere argument from the Nyāya perspective meant to prove that there are more than two means of knowledge and more than two kinds of object of knowledge. Yet here again we have to wonder whether this argument might have come originally from the *Tattvaṭīkā*. Is Av18 meant, in other words, to positively establish something inferentially or to cast doubt on inferential argumentation as such?

The most striking term in the argument is “accompanied,” or, more coarsely, “with a second” (*sadvitīya*). It is hard to look at Av18 without thinking of the so-called *sadvitīya-prayoga* (i.e., the argument based on “accompanied”), especially considering Aviddhakarṇa’s occasional Cārvāka sympathies.

The *sadvitīya-prayoga* is a fascinating argument countered by Dharmakīrti. In Eli Franco’s rendering:

abhivyaktacaitanyaśarīralakṣaṇapurusaḡhaṭānyatarasadvitīyo ghaṭaḥ, anutpalatvāt, kuḍyavat.

The pot is accompanied (*sadvitīya*) either (*anyatara*) by a man who is characterized as a body where consciousness is manifested, or by a pot, because it is not a lotus, just like a wall.⁶³⁰

As Franco says, this “reads like nonsense.” What could possibly be the point of this hodgepodge of random nouns? Franco makes a compelling case for three important features of the argument: historical, logical, and rhetorical. First, Franco suggests that Tillemans and Iwata, in their earlier accounts of the *sadvitīya-prayoga*,⁶³¹ both regard the argument through post-Dharmakīrtian lenses. Both scholars attempt to characterize the argument in terms of pervasion (*vyāpti*), but Franco points out that there is no reason to presume that Cārvāka thinkers prior to Dharmakīrti would have

⁶²⁸ teṣāṃ apratibandho ‘yaṃ hetur bādḥāprakāśanāt ||1584|| (TS 557, J80r.4).

⁶²⁹ yas tatra parihāras te sa evātra bhaviṣyati ||1585|| (TS 557, J80r.4).

⁶³⁰ Franco 2012, 219–220.

⁶³¹ Tom J.F. Tillemans, “Dharmakīrti on some sophisms,” in Steinkellner 1991, 403–418; Takashi Iwata, “An analysis of examples for the interpretation of the word *iṣṭaḥ* in Dharmakīrti’s definition of the thesis,” in Kellner et al 2007, 315–344.

understood an equivalence between fulfillment of the three characteristics and pervasion.⁶³² As we have already seen, for Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, the triple characterization (*trairūpya*) of the reason is inextricably bound up with pervasion (*vyāpti*) or an invariable connection (*pratibandha*)—but, of course, they follow Dharmakīrti, too.

It is important to note that Dharmakīrti did not come up with the requirement that pervasion entails fulfillment of the three characteristics and vice versa. Nor did Dignāga. We find this concept at least implied as early as Vasubandhu's *Vādaśāstra*. And we know Naiyāyikas were familiar with Vasubandhu's work on logic, as Uddyotakara cites him in his definition of *vāda*. But in Uddyotakara we see a defense of arguments that are *kevalānvayin* and *kevalavyatirekin*, i.e., those based either entirely on positive concomitance, or entirely on negative concomitance. It is not so much that Dharmakīrti established the equivalence between *trairūpya* and pervasion as that its equivalence may only have become widely accepted in his wake.

Considering the idea that a pre-Dharmakīrti Cārvāka may not have understood triple characterization in terms of pervasion, Franco turns to the logical function of the *sadvitīya-prayoga*. In short, though this argument fails to establish pervasion, it does fulfill the three characteristics: the reason is a property of the subject (because a pot is not a lotus), it is a property of a similar case (because neither is a wall), and it is not a property of a dissimilar case (because, imagining the dissimilar case to be non-existent things, what is not existent cannot be qualified as *being* a non-lotus). (Franco notes that the Cārvāka may have intended this as a *kevalānvayin* inference, which suggests looking at this from a slightly different vantage point than Franco does. Rather than establishing *trairūpya* without establishing pervasion, the Cārvāka can claim to fulfill Vasubandhu's requirement, i.e., an invariable relation (*avinābhāva*), through positive concomitance with a *kevalānvayin* inference.) The term *sadvitīya* implies difference; a pot cannot be “accompanied by” itself (or, we might say, *pots* cannot have *pots* as their second). Proving that “the pot is accompanied *either* by a man who is characterized as a body where consciousness is manifested *or* by a pot,” serves actually to prove the former, which is what Cārvāka theory entails.

Importantly, Franco does not leave it here. This argument, he explains, was probably not intended to conclusively prove the Cārvāka position,

for his inference can easily be countered with the opposite inference (cf. *viruddhāvvyabhicāri-hetu*), but [its purpose was, rather, probably] to show a serious deficiency in the structure of inference that allows any odd thesis to be established, and consequently that inference should not be considered a reliable means of knowledge, especially not for establishing metaphysical entities such as God and Soul.⁶³³

Though the rhetorical force of the argument hinges on its validity, the point is not really to positively prove something, but rather to undermine others' epistemological theories. Franco briefly considers another argument countered by Dharmakīrti that similarly (a) uses a disjunction (*anyatara*) to cleverly fulfill the three characteristics, (b) does not attempt to establish pervasion, and (c) seems likely to have been intended to demonstrate the unreliability of inferences. But in this case, rather

⁶³² Specifically, “I would rather argue that it is anachronistic to consider the establishment of *trairūpya* at the time prior to Dharmakīrti as equivalent to establishment of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā*” (221).

⁶³³ Franco 2012, 223.

than a Cārvāka, Franco thinks the author of the argument may have been a Mīmāṃsaka. “One can well imagine,” Franco concludes, “a Mīmāṃsaka and a Cārvāka joining forces in such an endeavor, each for his own purpose.”⁶³⁴ We can imagine such a provisional alliance between a Cārvāka and a Naiyāyika, as well.

To return to Av18, the most obvious difference between Aviddhakarṇa’s argument and the *sadvitīya-prayoga* is that Av18 does not have a disjunction. The key feature of the *sadvitīya-prayoga* is the “either *x* or *y*” structure in the property to be proven—that is the mechanism by which the point about consciousness is proven, but also the trick that reveals the trouble with inferences in general. Lacking that, Av18 cannot exactly be described as a version of the *sadvitīya-prayoga*. But it is not just the word *sadvitīya* that resonates. Here, too, we can point to roughly the same historical, logical, and rhetorical features of the argument.

First, consider Śāntarakṣita’s response: there is no invariable connection (*apratibandha*). In other words, Aviddhakarṇa has failed to establish pervasion. But, to use Franco’s formulation, it may be anachronistic to think Aviddhakarṇa, presuming he precedes Dharmakīrti, considered the three characteristics equivalent to pervasion. Just as some post-Dharmakīrti scholars, both traditional and modern, criticize the *sadvitīya-prayoga*’s failure to establish pervasion without recognizing that its author was not attempting to do so, Śāntarakṣita may be looking for pervasion where none was intended.

Instead, then, we should look for mere fulfillment of the three characteristics (or to the features of a *kevalānvayin* inference).

Perception is accompanied (*sadvitīya*) by another means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), apart from inference, because it is a means of knowledge, like inference.

(i) The reason, being a means of knowledge, is, in fact, a property of the subject, perception. (ii) It is also a property of the similar case, inference. (iii) The dissimilar case is whatever is not accompanied by another means of knowledge apart from inference. Here, again, we can imagine the dissimilar case being whatever is non-existent, and the third characteristic is fulfilled. (And here, too, we might instead think of this as a *kevalānvayin* inference and leave off (iii) entirely.)

Finally, we must consider the rhetorical force of the argument. Perhaps Aviddhakarṇa was not attempting to establish pervasion. Nevertheless, Śāntarakṣita’s other point would seem to hold. If we accept Aviddhakarṇa’s argument as fulfilling the three characteristics, the same argument could be extended beyond the four means of knowledge accepted by Nyāya. The success of Av18 would undermine Aviddhakarṇa’s own doctrine. Did he simply make a poor argument? Or, as with the *sadvitīya-prayoga*, was the real point to criticize a certain epistemology rather than to establish a particular claim? The *sadvitīya-prayoga*, as Franco argues, is most forceful as a sophism intended to undermine triple characterization in particular and abstract inferences in general. The same, I would argue, holds for Av18.

Perhaps Aviddhakarṇa intentionally re-tailored a Cārvāka argument to prove that there are four means of knowledge; perhaps the resonance with the *sadvitīya-prayoga* is adventitious. In any case, if

⁶³⁴ Franco 2012, 223.

Aviddhakarṇa intended Av18 as an earnest argument from the Nyāya perspective, then he would seem to have devised a fairly poor argument, even without the requirement of pervasion. The argument surely works better as a sophism meant to unsteady the foundations of Dignāgan epistemology. The point, in this case, would not be that there are four means of knowledge, nor merely that inference does not have epistemic authority, but rather that the rigidity of Dignāga's epistemology undoes itself—the two means of knowledge prove that there are more than two means of knowledge; triple characterization proves that triple characterization is invalid. Buddhist epistemology yields ultimately to skepticism, rather than yielding certainty.

If Śāntarakṣita were primarily an intellectual historian rather than a scholastic philosopher, he might instead have replied to Aviddhakarṇa by saying that argument might have worked against Dignāga, but that Dharmakīrti solved this particular problem. Instead, he treats pervasion resting on the relations of causality and identity as a timeless fact of epistemological authority and of the superiority of Buddhist epistemology.

One question that remains is whether this skeptical argument comes from Aviddhakarṇa's Naiyāyika or Cārvāka work, and what that tells us about these two phases of his career. Surely if he intended Av18 to prove four means of knowledge, that would imply that he was, or was still, a Naiyāyika when he composed it. It is possible to imagine this argument appearing somewhere in his defense of analogy, as its location in the *Pañjikā* implies. But given that it works best as a skeptical argument, and as a sophism meant to reveal the inadequacy of Dignāgan epistemology, I find it easier to imagine Av18 stemming from the *Tattvaṭīkā*. If Av18 is one of Aviddhakarṇa's "proliferation of examples" against inference, then Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla would seem to have misunderstood and/or misrepresented it.

Up until this point, I have regarded Aviddhakarṇa's possible conversion with modest skepticism. "Conversion" from Nyāya to Cārvāka (or vice versa) should not be considered a prerequisite for writing both Nyāya and Cārvāka commentaries. (It is not even clear that such a concept even makes much sense.) Still, whenever we consider one of Aviddhakarṇa's fragments as a potential remnant of the *Tattvaṭīkā*, we must bear in mind the possibility that he did, in fact, undergo a real change of mind. Reading Av18 as the argument of a fully converted Cārvāka presents us with the most ironic of possibilities: Śāntarakṣita is interpreting Aviddhakarṇa's Cārvāka materials as arguments for Nyāya positions. This would mean the proponent of no-self mistaking the author of a Cārvāka treatise for an earlier author of a Nyāya treatise simply because, conventionally speaking, he is the same man.

EPILOGUE: EARS PIERCED

His entire material unfolds before him as a series of human orientations. His path leads not from idea to idea, but from orientation to orientation. To think, for him, means to question and to listen, to try out orientations, to combine some and expose others. For it must be emphasized that in Dostoevsky's world even *agreement* maintains its *dialogic* character, that is, it never leads to a *merging* of voices and truths in a single *impersonal* truth, as occurs in the monologic world.

—Mikhail Bakhtin, “Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics”

Speaking, *vāda*, does not necessarily imply listening, *śrāva*. We can speak *out*, speak *for*, speak *to*, speak *about*—and we can do all of these things in the form of a monologue. We can also speak *with*: *saṃvāda*. Having a conversation would seem to imply listening well. And yet, good conversation is not necessarily good communication. It’s like good writing. It excites, it invites, it unsettles, it moves. And it works sometimes despite—sometimes even *because of*—our failures to listen.

In the present study, I have attempted to amplify the voices of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta and, in so doing, to shed light on the way Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla employ their arguments. I have done my best to guide my own reader through an enormous swath of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. I hope to have made a compelling case that the style and structure of the treatise, especially concerning its incessant movement between many different voices, are as important for reading and interpreting it as the reasoning behind its arguments. I wish I could say I have *a reading* of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* to offer. I am afraid such a goal is still somewhat far off. I am still learning how best to listen to it and speak with it. For now, I hope to have shown that such a goal is worthwhile.

§ § §

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do not riff on Aviddhakarṇa’s name, “Unpierced-ears.”⁶³⁵ They may not

⁶³⁵ Kamalaśīla may riff on his Chinese rival Moheyan’s (=Mahāyāna) name in the third *Bhāvanākrama*, when he

have found it unusual or surprising, or at any rate they may have understood it more concretely than we do. As we saw in the Introduction (cf. “Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta”), Esther Solomon suggests Aviddhakarṇa was a “self-made man” in the sense that his ears were never “pierced” by a guru’s mantra. However striking, such an idea is at best uncertain, and I am unaware of any other interpretation. It may simply be that, for whatever reason, Aviddhakarṇa missed the *kārṇa-vedha* (ear-piercing) ritual⁶³⁶ when he was a child; if his family or caste did not participate in that particular *samskāra*, it may have been distinctive for a thinker in his milieu. On the other hand, thinking both metaphorically and concretely, his ears would never have been “pierced” by a guru’s words or anyone else’s if he were deaf. We also saw in the Introduction that Isabelle Ratié uses the term “dialogue of the deaf” to describe Katsumi Mimaki’s characterization of bad-faith Indian philosophy. There is, of course, nothing oxymoronic about deaf people having a dialogue unless we presume that dialogue entails audibility.⁶³⁷ But if we move further along the metaphorical path, we find perhaps the least likely yet also perhaps the most potent—and the most fun—valence of Aviddhakarṇa’s name. If his faculty of hearing functioned well enough yet the words of gurus and others never quite “pierced” his ears, we might simply call Aviddhakarṇa “the stubborn one.” He could hear—but could he listen?

In the course of the present study, we have trained our ears on Aviddhakarṇa’s and Bhāvivikta’s voices, listening for the faint traces preserved in the *Pañjikā*. We have done so in part to learn about these two nearly-forgotten thinkers, their commitments and concerns, their sources, reasoning, and style, as well as the potential light they shed on early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. But we have also done so in order to learn to listen well to the *Tattvasamgraha* itself.

When I first conceived of this project, at the very outset of my doctoral program, I thought it would be a close study of the first section of the “Examination of the Self,” the section on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. I always intended to read the entire treatise and to try to understand the way the chapter on the self fits within the whole, but I imagined that as a peripheral concern, a pet project to keep in the back of my mind. The focus would be the “Examination of the Self.” As soon as I encountered Aviddhakarṇa’s proof of the self (Av8), I stumbled. I simply could not make heads or tails of it. I kept reading in the hopes that the rest of the chapter would help clear things up. Instead, as I reached the end of the chapter’s *pūrvapakṣa*, I came upon two more of Aviddhakarṇa’s argument (Av9 and Av10), and my confusion—and curiosity—only grew. I read and reread Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s responses to these arguments, and I was left disappointed. They hardly said a word about Av9 and Av10, and somehow their take on Av8 failed to clarify the original argument for me. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are clear, often eloquent, writers. Aviddhakarṇa’s obscurity felt like an intrusion, a dissonant sound I could not get out of my head—as if the Buddhists’ voices were momentarily drowned out.

describes something resembling Moheyan’s view and says, “But he who believes [...] would reject the entire Mahāyāna” (yas tu manyate [...] tena sakalamahāyānāṃ pratikṣiptaṃ bhavet [Tucci 1971, 13]). Śāntarakṣita riffs on Vasubandhu’s name in his gloss of Dharmakīrti’s concluding verse in the *Vādanyāya* when he refers to him as *sakalalokānibandhanabandhunā*, “unfettered (*anibandhana*) kinsman (*bandhu*) of all the world” (cf. n 118).

⁶³⁶ Gonda 1977 discusses some of the ritual sutras that deal with *kārṇa-vedha*, particularly *gṛhyasūtras*.

⁶³⁷ The idiom “dialogue of the deaf” is typically used to refer to a discussion whose participants are talking past one another or failing to hear or listen to one another. In effect, it means “dialogue of the stubborn.” But I prefer to interpret the phrase more literally in order to highlight its ableist undercurrents—and, hopefully, to counteract them.

I looked for help in scholarship and in other primary texts, but I found very few references to Aviddhakarṇa in either. But there were many more references in the *Pañjikā*. I turned back to the second chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, the “Examination of Īśvara,” to see if Aviddhakarṇa’s arguments there could shed any light on Av8. As it turned out, his first theistic argument, Av6, was even more obscure than his proof of the self!

All I originally wanted was to understand Aviddhakarṇa well enough to be able to translate and characterize his arguments for the self with precision—that, I thought, would put me in a better position to understand the “Examination of the Self” on its own terms. Aviddhakarṇa’s theistic arguments had two effects on my vision for the project. First, I was now thoroughly frustrated by my failed efforts to understand even one of Aviddhakarṇa’s arguments with any real clarity. I was determined to become better acquainted with his work. Second, after studying the chapters on Īśvara and the self, my interest in the structure of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* as a whole grew. Simple questions arose: Why is Īśvara the second topic examined in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*? Why was the first section of the “Examination of the Self” concerned with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory? I already knew, from prior scholarship, that Śāntarākṣita’s methodical *maṅgala* verses lay out the entire sequence of the treatise, but I did not know whether there was any particular logic to the sequence. I did not know how the *Tattvasaṃgraha* moves, let alone how it moves the reader. Now I wanted to know.

Eventually I encountered several of Bhāvivikta’s fragments, and I noticed the striking similarity between some of his and Aviddhakarṇa’s idiosyncrasies. After I found out that Śāntarākṣita cites both thinkers in the *Vipañcitārthā*, his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s *Vādanyāya* (cf. Appendix A), I discovered a nearly-identical argument attributed to both Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta (Av1 and Bh8—cf. §8), and began to wonder about the relationship between these two thinkers. My curiosity spiked again when I found out both thinkers are credited with Cārvāka commentaries. Their voices began to inform my engagement with the *Tattvasaṃgraha*.

When I finally began writing the present study, I had become thoroughly preoccupied with the fragments of Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta. I could not understand either of them without an exhaustive, almost obsessive examination of their fragments and their potential sources, conversation partners, and targets—my own version of *abhyāsa* or *bhūta-pratyavekṣā* (cf. “Why Uncertainty” in the Introduction). Proceeding through the *Tattvasaṃgraha* in search of fragments put me in direct contact with a host of other voices. The “Examination of Īśvara” came more fully into focus after a close reading of the “Examination of *Prakṛti*,” which precedes it. The “Examination of the Self” took on a new character when I considered it partly as a prelude to the “Examination of Permanence,” which follows it. The better acquainted I became with Vātsyāyana’s and Uddyotakara’s voices, the more clearly I could hear Aviddhakarṇa’s and Bhāvivikta’s. And the same was true for the voices of Kumārila, Pātrasvāmin, Bhartṛhari, and so many of the other real and imaginary interlocutors of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Pañjikā*.

This then altered the way I thought about the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Rather than a collection of discrete examinations with an unknown structure, I began to see the *Tattvasaṃgraha* as a coherent whole. I began outlining its discrete chapters, looking and listening for poignant transitions, recurring arguments, rhyming action, and any other signs of the work’s overall movement. And then, trying to amplify Aviddhakarṇa’s voice meant listening ever more closely for the other voices that intrude into the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, the other orientations Śāntarākṣita tries on, the other speakers he mimics or

mocks, the sources he combines, and those that he exposes, in his collection of truths.

From Idea To Idea

Even after the years I have spent with Aviddhakarṇa, I do not feel I can say whether he is a good listener. His fragments tell us a lot about his concerns, his sources, his reasoning, and his style, but not nearly enough about Aviddhakarṇa the conversation partner (*samvādin*), Aviddhakarṇa the listener (*śrotr*), Aviddhakarṇa the reader (*śrotr*). But what about the Buddhists whose words preserve for us the faint traces of Aviddhakarṇa's voice? Can we describe Śāntarakṣita or Kamalaśīla as a good listener?

Kamalaśīla favors the well-known division of three kinds of wisdom: that derived from listening to (*śruta*), from reflecting on (*cintā*), and from meditating on or cultivating (*bhāvanā*) the Buddha's teaching. In the introduction of the *Pañjikā*, he says that "the understanding that people and phenomena are selfless, which is the cause of the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*), arises through the stages (*krama*) of listening (*śruta*), reflecting (*cintā*), and cultivating (*bhāvanā*)." ⁶³⁸ He relies on the same set in his three *Bhāvanākramas* (Stages of Cultivation), the very title of which hearkens to the progressive movement through all three practices.

We might describe the whole process as dialogic. Many tales of the Buddha's prowess as a teacher involve his ability to formulate the teaching in whatever words his student can—*must*—hear. If the Buddha himself were not a profoundly accomplished listener, could his teaching have been heard with such resounding force? In a similar vein, the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, the *Bhāvanākramas*, and so many other similar texts, exemplify a kind of writing *qua* reading *qua* dialogue. In the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntarakṣita compiles and orchestrates a vast array of overlapping discussions with other texts, thinkers, and traditions. In the *Bhāvanākramas*, Kamalaśīla weaves together practical meditation instruction, scriptural citations, and philosophical analysis. In both cases, the text itself is a dialogue—and evinces dialogues within Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla themselves, as well as between them and their teachers and sources—but also initiates a dialogue with its reader. The *Pañjikā* is Kamalaśīla's discussion with his own teacher, Śāntarakṣita, and also *as* the teacher of his students and readers.

At least, we can describe these texts and practices in such a way. But we can just as well describe the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Bhāvanākramas*, the stages of wisdom, and even the Buddha's teaching as a series of monologues. The point of much of Buddhist philosophy, in that sense, would not be to teach one how to listen to one's interlocutors and conversation partners, but to help one discover—or confirm—that the Buddha is the one to whom one should listen, that dependent origination is the instruction on which one should reflect, that selflessness is the insight one should cultivate, and so on. To ask whether Kamalaśīla is a good listener accords with his vision for the task of a practitioner, but to ask whether he is any good at listening to Aviddhakarṇa may be a misunderstanding of his philosophical-spiritual project.

Throughout the present study we have repeatedly had to consider the possibility that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's ears have failed to be pierced by Aviddhakarṇa's words. If they misunderstand or misconstrue his actual intent, the context of an argument, or the force of his reasoning, we can say

⁶³⁸ pudgaladharmanairātmyāvabodhaś ca niḥśreyasahetuḥ śrutacintābhāvanākrameṇotpadyate (TSP 13.5).

they are listening poorly whether or not they considered it important to listen well. Such would not be evidence of “a dialogue of the deaf,” but, much more precisely, a dialogue of the stubborn—a “dialogue” between monologists.

To reframe the question, then, we can ask: Is the *Tattvasamgraha*, with its proliferation of voices and discussions and debates, ultimately a dialogue or a monologue? In other words, does Śāntarakṣita, and/or his readers, hear all of the voices that constitute the text and allow them to speak on their own, or are they purely instrumental in the formulation of his singular statement? Does Aviddhakarṇa speak in the *Tattvasamgraha* or is he merely ventriloquized?

To Question And To Listen

At the outset of the present study, we considered the possible audience of the *Tattvasamgraha*. Throughout the study, we have considered the possible audience of Aviddhakarṇa’s and Bhāvivikta’s arguments, as well. When we ask after a work’s intended audience, we often concern ourselves with the motivations behind it. Did Śāntarakṣita write the *Tattvasamgraha* to combat his non-Buddhist rivals? Was he trying to educate scholar-monks in the art of debate? If the latter, does that make the former an implicit or indirect aim?

Vincent Eltschinger has recently shown that we can understand a complex set of motivations behind works like these if we consider them in terms of apologetics.⁶³⁹ Attacking rivals is positive apologetics; neutralizing their critiques is negative apologetics.⁶⁴⁰ When we think about such a work as an apologetic, it pushes us to consider broader social, political, and institutional contexts.⁶⁴¹ Rather than examining Śāntarakṣita’s and other Buddhist epistemological works as *either* analytic (and, so, only incidentally “religious”) *or* proselytic (and, so, perhaps less rigorously “philosophical”), regarding them in terms of apologetics collapses such distinctions. Analysis is an integral component of Śāntarakṣita’s project, and we also know that spreading the faith was important to him (cf. his time in Tibet). Bolstering the faith and its institutions is a coherent aim for the *Tattvasamgraha*, perhaps more so than inspiring conversion. Such an aim is as soteriologically oriented as proselytism, and yet does not cut against the pursuit of well-reasoned arguments for Buddhist ideas.

But if we consider the audience of the *Tattvasamgraha* to be readers and conversation partners, we are left with additional questions.

It is, of course, important to inquire into the motivations behind the text’s composition. Without worrying about Śāntarakṣita’s intentions, we can still discuss things like the work’s socio-political

⁶³⁹ Eltschinger 2014.

⁶⁴⁰ Eltschinger 2014, 4–5.

⁶⁴¹ Eltschinger notes that the collapse of the Gupta empire, in the middle of the sixth century, coincides with the rise of the Buddhist epistemological school, which he interprets as “a Buddhist answer to the sociopolitical, institutional, religious and philosophical challenges of that much troubled period” (Eltchinger 2014, 94). By the end of the eighth century, the rise of the Pāla empire brought with it increased patronage for Buddhist institutions like Nālandā. The *Tattvasamgraha* may well have been part of Śāntarakṣita’s efforts to bolster such support for his monastic institution.

As we briefly considered in the Introduction, the *Tattvasamgraha* works well as an apologetic on Dharmakīrti’s behalf. Dharmakīrti clearly commanded interest and respect from many eighth-century Buddhist commentators. But the sorts of attitudes that inspired Dharmakīrti’s bitter lament at the beginning of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (cf. n 75) may have lingered into Śāntarakṣita’s time.

context, textual history, and so on. But once written, what was the *Tattvasamgraha*'s reception? What was it like to read it? Without knowing exactly what Śāntarakṣita hoped it would do, we can still inquire into what it actually did.

Here, too, we lack evidence. The *Tattvasamgraha* features rarely in later texts. It was entirely eclipsed in Tibet by Śāntarakṣita's much more concise and focused *Madhyamakāloka*, which he may well have written while he was living there. Manuscripts of the *Tattvasamgraha* and *Pañjikā* have been preserved until today in Jain temples, and Vācaspati Miśra (c. 10th c.), at least, responds directly to one of Śāntarakṣita's arguments, so we know the root text must have had some cachet. In addition, the *Pañjikā* clearly provided source material for the Jain thinker Abhayadevasūri (c. 11th c.), who, for example, not only cites Aviddhakarṇa's first theistic argument (Av6), but copies much of Kamalaśīla's explanatory gloss of it, as well. Otherwise, if we are concerned chiefly with concrete historical facts, it is not surprising that scholars have typically only given the *Tattvasamgraha* passing attention. But readers are usually not writers; they rarely leave evidence of their encounters with texts. Apart from Kamalaśīla, the only readers of the *Tattvasamgraha* we can really engage with in any remote depth are ourselves. The question then might not be what the text *did* in a historicist sense, but what the text actually *does*.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla seem at times to claim they are engaged in a purely rational enterprise. They examine the nature of things—including, pivotally, the concept of knowledge and the very means by which we secure it—and arrive at a truer understanding of it based on nondoctrinal, nonpartisan rational inquiry. They do not deny that some truths cannot be arrived at through logic nor that logic can be misused or misunderstood. But a clever, well-trained mind constrained by sound principles of rationality and the attentive focus of fair-minded interlocutors can arrive at genuine knowledge and even generate—or at least instigate—such knowledge in others. That is the basic underlying premise of the Buddhist epistemological lineage to which the *Tattvasamgraha* is largely indebted.

Yet as Eltschinger's insight about apologetics reminds us, thinkers like Śāntarakṣita begin with the truth—Buddhist thought, as they understand it—and go about defending it by rational and rhetorical means.⁶⁴² When Kamalaśīla describes the exhaustive examination of all things (*bhūta-prayavekṣā*) that the meditative practitioner must undertake (cf. "Why Uncertainty" in the Introduction), he is not describing a process of starting from scratch and building back up from there. Rather, the practitioner begins right where she is, fully and infinitely immersed in the beginningless streams of consciousness, conventional construction, and karmic complexity; from there, the practitioner carefully, comprehensively examines the constituents of reality in order to

⁶⁴² This certainly does not mean Śāntarakṣita et al are not engaged in philosophy. I do not see much need to try and prove that Śāntarakṣita is a philosopher. It should be obvious to anyone who encounters his work. But, as Eltschinger (2014) lays out at the beginning of his book on apologetics, scholars have often seemed at pains over the last several decades to demonstrate that Buddhist philosophy is philosophy. Perhaps this is not because of anything unfamiliar or unphilosophical about the Buddhist material, but simply because we often think about philosophy strangely. What would it mean to start a philosophical project from scratch? We all know that Descartes claimed to have done exactly that; but we also know he was wrong to think he succeeded. (Do we not?) Philosophy is a bit more like Īśvara's creation of the world—using all the material available to him—than Puruṣa constructing the web of the universe by himself, of himself. But it is even more like the Buddhist alternative to theories of creation, which also happens to be the focal point of the *Tattvasamgraha*: dependent origination.

cultivate an intimate encounter with the basic state of things. It is not enough merely to hear the Buddha's teaching (*śruta*), nor even merely to reflect on it (*cintā*); one must inculcate it (*bhāvanā*).

In order to know what one is inculcating, why and how one must do so, it can be useful to mimic the Buddha's journey, inquiring into the highest teachings of other traditions and discovering their unsatisfactoriness. Even if one has accepted the doctrine of dependent origination, with careful observation one is likely to find oneself quietly committed to artificial and delusive constructs. We are not singular, fixed beings. Listening to ourselves well is itself a dialogic encounter. Śāntarakṣita treats some of the rival voices that populate the *Tattvasaṃgraha* with sensitivity and respect; others, he mocks. Perhaps he is modeling the way his readers should engage with the various thoughts and beliefs they may encounter in themselves as they proceed in their persistent study of truth.

When we reach the end of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, an exhaustive and at times exhausting work filled with a multitude of voices, ideas, and arguments, there is no grand conclusion, no epitomizing statement, no instruction for what comes next. The final *pūrvapakṣa* is answered with the final *uttarapakṣa*, and we are left with the resounding echoes of Śāntarakṣita's many discussions.

We are left with ourselves—only, somehow, different from before.

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APPENDIX A
“BEYOND STUPID AND TOO CUTE:”
AVIDDHAKARṆA AND BHĀVIVIKTA IN VA AND PPS

VIPAÑCITĀRTHĀ

The *Vipañcitārthā Tīkā* (Commentary in which the Meaning is Elaborated) is Śāntarakṣita’s commentary on the *Vāda-nyāya* (VN) by Dharmakīrti. As its multivalent title suggests,⁶⁴³ VN is both a polemic against the Nyāya tradition and an analysis of the rules (*nyāya*) of debate (*vāda*). Dharmakīrti introduces the treatise by complaining that cheaters—i.e., Naiyāyikas—are winning debates by implementing corrupt rules. Adding insult to injury, he refers to fair-minded practitioners of debate—i.e., Buddhists—as “proponents of *nyāya*,” which is to say, proponents of logic, rather than proponents of (capital-n) Nyāya.⁶⁴⁴ Naiyāyikas are, in other words, undermining *nyāya* to steal victory on behalf of Nyāya.

In VN’s first chapter (of two), Dharmakīrti presents his own streamlined rules for determining the victor and the vanquished in debate, and discusses several related epistemological issues.⁶⁴⁵ In the first verse, he distinguishes between two broad categories of “grounds for defeat” (*nigraha-sthāna*), those committed by the proponent and those committed by the opponent. Unsurprisingly, should one party commit such “grounds for defeat,” and should the other party recognize this and point it out, the guilty party is defeated. In two short but dense compounds, *a-sādhanāṅga-vacana* and *a-doṣa-udbhāvana*, Dharmakīrti describes every genuine ground for defeat, analyzing each compound in a variety of ways to draw out eleven distinct cases.⁶⁴⁶ The compounds could be understood simply as “non-proof-stating” (*a-sādhanāṅga-vacana*) and “non-error-demonstrating” (*a-doṣa-udbhāvana*), i.e., failure on the part of the proponent or the opponent, respectively, to accomplish their designated task in the debate. But both compounds can be broken apart in several ways. In both cases, the negation can be read with different members of the compound. The negation in “non-error-demonstrating” may refer to the demonstration or to the error: the opponent may fail to demonstrate an error in the proponent’s argument (“non-demonstrating of error”), or they may fail to point out a genuine error on the proponent’s part (“demonstrating of non-error”). Similarly, “non-proof-stating” indicates the failure to state a proof *or* a statement of what is not actually a proof. This compound is particularly multivalent, because each member of the compound can be understood in slightly different ways. There are various ways in which the content of one’s statement can be *a-sādhanāṅga*, depending on the particular kind of argument or the particular component of

⁶⁴³ The word *nyāya* refers to the text tradition rooted in the *Nyāyasūtra*, to logic or logical arguments in general, as well as to any technical rule, maxim, or standard.

⁶⁴⁴ *nyāyavādinam api vādeṣu asadvyavasthopyāsaṅgā śaṭhā nigṛhṇanti, tanniṣedhārtham idam ārabhyate* (VN 1.2).

⁶⁴⁵ Cf. Much 1991 for an edition, German translation, and introduction to VN. Gokhale 1993 contains an English translation and a brief introduction.

⁶⁴⁶ “Da sich die Negation in den Komposita *asādhanāṅgavacana* und *adoṣodbhāvana* sowohl auf *anga* bzw. *doṣa* beziehen kann, als auch auf *vacana* oder *udbhāvana*, und da *sādhanā*, *anga* und *vacana* in verschiedenen Bedeutungen verstanden werden können, sind indiesen Versen die Definitionen von insgesamt elf Gründen einer Niederlage enthalten,” Much 1991, vol. 2, viii. Cf. viii-xii for a breakdown of all eleven readings.

reasoning in question. Dharmakīrti fits all of the grounds for defeat into these two terms by boiling reasoning and debate down to its essential features.

In the second chapter, he then turns his attention to the Nyāya analysis of grounds for defeat, based on Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara's comments on the final chapter of the *Nyāyasūtra* (book five, lesson two). NS 5.2 lists and defines twenty-two varieties of ground for defeat, each with its own distinctive technical term. Dharmakīrti refutes each of these in turn, often quoting verbatim and directly responding to both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. Generally speaking, he finds their analysis of grounds for defeat (as he often finds Nyāya analysis of all sorts of things) overwrought, redundant, and self-contradictory. In some cases he finds the term in question completely needless, and discards it outright, whereas in other cases he partly accepts the idea, but reduces it to one of the three basic categories of fallacious reason laid out by Vasubandhu and Dignāga.⁶⁴⁷ If Naiyāyikas are cheaters, the task of VN is to level the playing field.

Most of the *Vipañcitārthā*'s fragments come from this chapter. (The structure of the second chapter of VN tracks NS 5.2, cf. Appendix C.) The fragments here are enmeshed in a dense discussion of grounds for defeat. More commonly in interreligious polemics, if a Buddhist quotes an argument by a Naiyāyika, the dispute is about the validity or soundness of the argument itself. In this case, the Naiyāyikas are intentionally crafting defective arguments in order to demonstrate the need for their preferred taxonomy of fallacies. Dharmakīrti's critique does not concern the validity of these arguments, but whether they demonstrate the legitimacy of a certain category of ground for defeat. It is essential to keep this in mind when reading and thinking about this material.

The *Vipañcitārthā* is reminiscent of the exhaustiveness and scholarly acumen of Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*.⁶⁴⁸ In the *Vipañcitārthā*, Śāntarakṣita gives us important information about Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta beyond the fragments themselves, e.g., crediting both with writing a *Bhāsyatikā*, indicating that Bhāvivikta was a direct target of Dharmakīrti's *Pramānaviniścaya* (confirming that Bhāvivikta predates Dharmakīrti), and citing a fragment from Aviddhakarṇa's apparent Cārvāka guise. Several of the fragments of both Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are clear comments on specific portions of the *Bhāsyā*, both because of the focus of the second chapter of VN and because of terminological marks in the fragments themselves.

Av1, the first fragment in the *Vipañcitārthā*, is nearly identical to Bh8, one of the fragments of Bhāvivikta from the *Pañjikā*. We have already examined this fragment in §8, so we will skip straight to Av2 and the second chapter of VN.

I. AV2: GLOSS OF NBH 5.2.3

After Av1 in the first chapter, we do not find another fragment—of Aviddhakarṇa or Bhāvivikta—in

⁶⁴⁷ It is unclear whether Vasubandhu and/or Dignāga refuted the list of *nigrahasthānas* in NS 5.2 directly, or simply noted that the list could be collapsed into their streamlined categories of fallacious reasons. Cf. n 118 regarding Dharmakīrti's motive in composing VN.

⁶⁴⁸ Of course, it is perhaps more precise to say this the other way around, but since the *Pañjikā* is relatively well-known, and the *Vipañcitārthā* has yet to receive due scholarly attention—for example, it has not even received a preliminary translation, like Jha's translation of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Pañjikā*—from my vantage point the *Pañjikā* is more of a standard-bearer.

the *Vipañcitārthā* until we reach the second chapter. As noted earlier, in the second chapter of VN, Dharmakīrti goes through each of the grounds for defeat (*nigraha-sthāna*) listed and defined in NS 5.2, often discussing both the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārttika* on each sutra. Typically, Dharmakīrti first presents the sutra itself, then cites the corresponding gloss from NBh and/or NV, and then proceeds to pick apart their analysis.

NS 5.2.1 lists all twenty-two varieties of ground for defeat; sutra 5.2.2 defines the first of these, “harm to the proposition” (*pratijñā-hāni*); sutra 3 defines the next, “another proposition” (*pratijñāntara*), and so on for the remainder of NS 5.2.⁶⁴⁹

Śāntarakṣita cites Av2, the second fragment of Aviddhakarṇa, in his comments on Dharmakīrti’s response to Vātsyāyana on the topic of NS 5.2.3, “another proposition” (*pratijñāntara*). As its name suggests, an instance of this ground for defeat is when the proponent, realizing his proposition has been refuted, introduces a new proposition in order to bolster it. Vātsyāyana’s example is this: the proponent realizes that his proposition, “sound is impermanent because it is sensuous (*āindriyakatva*),” has been refuted; he then argues that sound is not omnipresent (*asarvagata*), and that, just as a pot is both sensuous and non-omnipresent, so, too, does this prove sound’s impermanence. This is grounds for defeat because one cannot prove a proposition with another proposition, but only with a reason and an example.⁶⁵⁰

Dharmakīrti discounts Vātsyāyana’s example altogether, arguing that, in this case, rather than introducing another proposition, the proponent is actually qualifying the reason: sound is impermanent because it is sensuous *while not being omnipresent*. It is permissible to add a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) to a reason to specify its scope. Dharmakīrti also says that “it is already established that sound is non-omnipresent, and a proposition is defined by indicating something to be proven.”⁶⁵¹ In other words, Vātsyāyana’s specific example does not qualify as genuinely involving an additional proposition. But Dharmakīrti finds the underlying concept unacceptable, anyway. A proposition, he argues, that is stated in order to establish another proposition would not actually be a proposition at all, but rather a reason, or one of the other members of a syllogism.⁶⁵²

Śāntarakṣita introduces Av2 as if as a direct response to this criticism:

aviddhakarṇas tu bhāṣyaṭīkāyām idam āśankya parijihīṣati nanu cāsarvagatatve satīti hetuviśeṣaṇam uktam, saviśeṣaṇas ca hetur vipakṣe nāstīti na pratijñāntaram nigrahassthānam. naitad⁶⁵³ evam asarvagataḥ śabda iti pratijñāntaropādānāt. hetuviśeṣaṇopādāne hetvantaram nigrahassthānam iti. (VA 76.1)

But Aviddhakarṇa, in his Bhāṣyaṭīkā, considers this and then tries to avoid it:

[Objection:] But “while not being omnipresent” (*asarvagatatve satī*) conveys a qualification of the reason (*hetuviśeṣaṇa*), and the reason with this qualification is not present in the dissimilar case,

⁶⁴⁹ NS 5.2.15 clarifies the definition, in sutra 14, of “redundancy” (*punarukta*). Otherwise each sutra in 5.2.2–24 defines a separate *nigrahassthāna*.

⁶⁵⁰ na pratijñāyāḥ sādhanam pratijñāntaram. kiṃ tārī. hetuḍṣṭāntau sādhanam pratijñāyāḥ. (NBh 310.14)

⁶⁵¹ na punaḥ pratijñāntaram āha, asarvagatatvasya śabde siddhatvāt pratijñāyās ca sādhyānirdeśalakṣaṇatvāt. (VN 27.14)

⁶⁵² na hi pratijñā pratijñāsādhanāyocyamānā pratijñāntaram bhavati, kiṃ tarhi hetvāder anyatamaḥ. (VN 27.18)

⁶⁵³ Steinkellner (34) na hi tad r : naitad ms.

therefore this is not the ground for defeat “another proposition.”

No, because “sound is not omnipresent” is the employment of another proposition. When employing a qualification of the reason, the ground for defeat is “another reason.”

This is the first reference to Aviddhakarṇa’s *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*. Even without such a remark, this is quite clearly a comment on “another proposition,” the technical term defined in NS 5.2.3 and discussed nowhere else in the *Bhāṣya* but here. Unlike Av1, Av2’s source material could not be much clearer.⁶⁵⁴ The source of Av2 also helps to contextualize its content somewhat. The reference to the phrase “insofar as it is not omnipresent” is a particular reference to Vātsyāyana’s example of “another proposition,” rather than Aviddhakarṇa’s own example.

Immediately responding to Av2, Śāntarakṣita again denigrates Aviddhakarṇa’s intelligence, referring to the entire passage as *atisthūla*, “excessively coarse” (or, better, beyond stupid) and the particular comment about “another thesis” as almost the polar opposite, *atipelava*, “excessively soft” (or, rather, too cute).

Nevertheless, this *atisthūla* fragment suits Śāntarakṣita’s purposes rather perfectly. Dharmakīrti argues that “while not being omnipresent” is a qualification of the reason; on cue, Aviddhakarṇa refutes precisely that point. Was Aviddhakarṇa responding directly to VN? Dharmakīrti seems quite clearly to respond to Aviddhakarṇa’s first theistic argument in PV 2.10ff (cf. Krasser 2002), making it rather unlikely that Aviddhakarṇa responded to him. In VN, Dharmakīrti explicitly invokes and quotes Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, often referring to them as, respectively, the “author of the *Bhāṣya*” (*bhāṣya-kāra*) and the “author of the *Vārttika*” (*vārttika-kāra*); perhaps he does not refer to the *ṭīkā-kāra* because he was not particularly concerned in VN with any of his arguments. (As we will see in section VI below, Śāntarakṣita states quite clearly in the *Vipaṅcitārthā* that Bhāvivikta predates Dharmakīrti.)

The fragment itself somewhat supports dating Aviddhakarṇa before Dharmakīrti. Av2 may suit Śāntarakṣita’s needs well, but it does not add anything to the discussion. Aviddhakarṇa simply states that the purported “qualification” is in fact another proposition. He does not seem to contend with Dharmakīrti’s claim that this, by definition, cannot be a new proposition because its content is already established. Nor does he comment—at least, not in the excerpt Śāntarakṣita provides—on whether a proposition stated to prove another proposition can actually be a proposition at all. Despite the fact that Śāntarakṣita describes Aviddhakarṇa as considering and responding to “this” (*idam āśaṅkyā*), i.e., Dharmakīrti’s argument, the fragment itself does not suggest direct engagement with Dharmakīrti himself.

II. BH1: GLOSS OF NBH 5.2.4

After NS 5.2.3, sutra 4 discusses the ground for defeat called “proposition contradiction” (*pratijñāvirodha*). The sutra defines the term as “contradiction of the proposition and the reason” (*pratijñāhetvor virodhah*)—seemingly meaning *between* the two. Vātsyāyana, following the sutra

⁶⁵⁴ The fragment mentions “another reason” (*hetvantara*), a ground for defeat defined in 5.2.6, but clearly in order to refer forward to that concept, rather than to define or defend it here.

closely, gives only one interpretation and example of “proposition contradiction,” namely, “Substance is distinct from quality, because of the nonapprehension of anything other than color, etc.” This example, roughly speaking, affixes a Buddhist reason to a Nyāya proposition. If qualities like color are all that we perceive, then substance is not distinct from quality, hence the reason contradicts the proposition.⁶⁵⁵

Uddyotakara adds significantly more nuance to the term by analyzing the compound *pratijñā-virodha* in several ways, thereby incorporating cases when the proposition contradicts itself (*svavacanena virudhyate*), when the proposition contradicts the example (*pratijñāyā dṛṣṭāntavirodha*), and so on.⁶⁵⁶ He calls Vātsyāyana’s example an instance of “the reason contradicting the proposition” (*pratijñā hetunā virudhyate*). Śāntarakṣita’s first mention of Bhāvivikta, Bh1, appears in this context. Bh1 is only a single word, but it suggests similarity between Bhāvivikta’s comments and Uddyotakara’s.

Before considering the fragment, we must turn back to an important backdrop of Bh1, Vātsyāyana’s comments on NS 4.1.36. The passage from NS 4.1.34–36 concerns the (roughly) Buddhist claim that “everything is separate,” which is to say that there are no singular, substantial entities. This is the sixth in the sequence of eight causal theories raised and refuted in NS 4.1.14–43.⁶⁵⁷ The three sutras are as follows:

[Claim:] All is separate, because of the separateness of the mark (*lakṣaṇa*) of an entity. (4.1.34)

[Response:] No, because a single entity has its completion by means of more than one mark (*lakṣaṇa*). (4.1.35)

[Continued:] There is no refutation [of unities] because of the differential establishment (*vyavasthāna*) of the mark (*lakṣaṇa*). (4.1.36)⁶⁵⁸

The pseudo-Buddhist argues, depending on one’s interpretation, either that the definition (*lakṣaṇa*), or the characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*), of purported entities are separate: a pot is comprised of different portions, colors, scents, materials, functions, etc., and it is only the conceptual construction of the identity of “the pot” that makes it seem that as if these are all unified. In response, Nyāya argues first that entities do, in fact, have many characteristics. As Vātsyāyana says, “A single entity [such as a pot] comes forth connected with qualities, such as scent, and parts, such as a base.”⁶⁵⁹ It is only insofar as there is a pot that there can be a base of the pot. The base is a real part of a real whole. Then, in sutra 36, the Naiyāyika continues by arguing that unities cannot be denied because the names (*lakṣaṇa*) for things are restricted. “It is not a heap of atoms,” Vātsyāyana says, “that is grasped [when we say], ‘I am touching the jar that I saw,’ or, ‘I am seeing the jar that I touched,’”⁶⁶⁰ it is an

⁶⁵⁵ This recalls the polemical context of Av1, and highlights the centrality of mereology to the division between Buddhism and Nyāya.

⁶⁵⁶ NV 522.2.

⁶⁵⁷ Cf. n 326 (§5) and n 400 (§8).

⁶⁵⁸ sarvaṃ pṛthag bhāvalakṣaṇapṛthaktvāt ||4.1.34|| (NS 234.12); nānekalakṣaṇair ekabhāvaniṣpatteḥ ||4.1.35|| (234.18); lakṣaṇavyavasthānād evāpratiśedhaḥ ||4.1.36|| (235.6).

⁶⁵⁹ gandhādibhiḥ ca guṇair budhnādibhiḥ cāvayavaiḥ sambaddha eko bhāvo niṣpadyate (NBh 235.1).

⁶⁶⁰ yaṃ kumbham adrākṣaṃ taṃ spr̥śāmi yaṃ cāsprākṣaṃ taṃ pasyāmīti nāṇusamūho gṛhyata iti (NBh 235.8).

actual jar.

Vātsyāyana's interlocutor disagrees. Everything is indeed separate, he says, "because of the application of the word *entity* to heaps" (*samūhe bhāvaśabdaprayogāt*). In other words, it is precisely a heap of atoms that we call "a pot," rather than a real, substantial whole. In response, Vātsyāyana says that a heap, e.g., a heap of atoms, is comprised of the individuals heaped together, i.e., the atoms, each of which is its own singular thing. The reason actually proves that there must be unities, and this contradicts the proposition, "everything is separate," which is meant to deny exactly that. The interlocutor's argument here in NBh 4.1.36, therefore, qualifies as a "proposition contradiction."

Nevertheless, Vātsyāyana does not use this as his example of "proposition contradiction" in his comments on NS 5.2.4. Instead, he creates an absurd hybrid argument by affixing a Buddhist reason to a Nyāya proposition. But Uddyotakara does. He interprets the phrase "proposition contradiction" variously, and presents the interlocutor's argument from NBh 4.1.36 as one example of this kind of ground for defeat.

Dharmakīrti comments at length on "proposition contradiction," primarily in response to Uddyotakara's layered unpacking of the term. He does not accept that "because of the application of the word *entity* to heaps" is a genuine case of "proposition contradiction." Instead, he explains, its defect is non-coreferentiality (*vyadhikaraṇatva*) between the topic and the reason. The reason, "because of the application of the word...", is not a property of the topic, "everything."⁶⁶¹ Śāntarakṣita clarifies the point with an example: in the fallacious argument "molasses is sweet because of the blackness of crows,"⁶⁶² the blackness of crows does not apply to molasses and, so, cannot prove anything about it. The application of the word *entity* is a property of the word, not of "everything." This change in subject renders the reason unestablished (*asiddha*). And, as Dharmakīrti points out elsewhere, if the reason is unestablished, the proponent has already lost and need not be defeated again.

At this point, Śāntarakṣita cites Bh1:

*syād buddhiḥ samūhavācakaśabdavācyatvād ity evaṃ bhāvivikṭena bhāṣyaṭīkāyāṃ prayogād
vyadhikaraṇatvaṃ nāsti.* (VA 85.3)

One might think that in Bhāvivikṭa's formulation in the Bhāṣyaṭīkā, i.e., "Because of being expressible by a word expressive of a heap," non-coreferentiality does not occur...

The entirety of the fragment is, strictly speaking, a single compound, the reason, *samūha-vācakaśabda-vācyatvāt*, "because of being expressible by a word expressive of a heap." The distinction between this and the reason in Uddyotakara's example is that "being expressible" directly characterizes "everything," and so does not entail any grammatical inconsistency. The implication is that Bhāvivikṭa's formulation of the (defective) argument presents a (genuine) case of "proposition contradiction," undercutting Dharmakīrti's counterargument.

We can see that Bhāvivikṭa gives a similar example of "proposition contradiction" as the

⁶⁶¹ *api cāyam viruddho 'viruddho vā sati hetuprayoge vyadhikaraṇatvād asiddha ity asiddhatā hetor nigrāhasthānam* (VN 33.12).

⁶⁶² *guḍo madhuraḥ, kākasya kārṣṇyād iti yathā* (VA 65.1).

interlocutor’s argument in NBh 4.1.36, and in Uddyotakara’s comments on NS 5.2.4. But Bhāvivikta formulates the example differently, and in such a manner that maintains coreferentiality between the topic and the reason. As we will see when we turn to Bh3 (section VI), we know that Bhāvivikta most likely predated Dharmakīrti, so he must not have been responding to Dharmakīrti’s critique in the *Vāda-nyāya*. Nevertheless, it is possible that he formulated his example of “proposition contradiction” in order to avoid the problem of non-coreferentiality. In that case, Bh1 would support dating Bhāvivikta after Uddyotakara, though this is far from conclusive. In any case, we do not know how exactly Bhāvivikta used this argument to establish or define “proposition contradiction,” or anything else about his comments on NBh 5.2.4, including its potential audience or target.

Śāntarakṣita’s response is, essentially, that it does not matter whether Bhāvivikta’s example skirts the shift in subject. Dharmakīrti only mentions this flaw as a kind of thought experiment. Even accepting that a contradiction between the proposition and the reason constitutes a distinct ground for defeat, Uddyotakara’s example fails to instantiate it. But Dharmakīrti had only provisionally accepted this to be so. In fact, following Śāntarakṣita’s reading of the passage, purported cases of “proposition contradiction” fall under the fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsa*), and so are contained by the final sūtra in NS, 5.2.24, which lists the fallacious reasons as grounds for defeat.⁶⁶³

III. AV3: GLOSS OF NBH 5.2.4

Av3 appears shortly after Bh1, also in the context of Dharmakīrti’s rejection of “proposition contradiction.” Concerning the interpretation that “proposition contradiction” involves a “contradiction of the reason by the proposition,”⁶⁶⁴ Dharmakīrti imagines an interlocutor raising this objection: perhaps a fallacious reason (*hetvābhāsa*) and a proposition contradiction both mar the same argument at once. This, Dharmakīrti argues, should be especially unacceptable for a Naiyāyika, who is committed to a strict sequence in argumentation and debate. Once the first possible defect has been pointed out, it is irrelevant whether there be some other defect. Defeat is defeat.⁶⁶⁵ The reason, in such a case, may be contrary (*viruddha*) or uncommon (*asādhāraṇa*, a species of inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) reason), but in any case, as Śāntarakṣita puts it, a contradiction with the

⁶⁶³ pratijñāhetvor virodhasya ca nigrahasthānāntaratvam aṅgikṛtya mayedam abhyadhāyi, na tv asya tad yuktaṃ, hetvābhāsās ca nigrahasthānānīty anenaiva saṃgrhītavād ity etad bibhaṅṣur āhāpi cetyādi (“I stated [the defect of shift in grammatical subject] after [provisionally] accepting that a contradiction between proposition and reason is a distinct ground for defeat, but this is not [actually] tenable for that, because it is contained in [NS 5.2.24], ‘And fallacious reasons are grounds for defeat.’” Desiring to say this, he says: “Moreover...” [VA 85.8]) Śāntarakṣita seems to misquote NS 5.2.24, which actually reads, “and fallacious reasons as stated” (*hetvābhāsās ca yathoktāḥ*).

⁶⁶⁴ Uddyotakara refers to situations “in which the proposition is contradicted by the reason, and the reason by the proposition” (*yatra pratijñā hetunā virudhyate hetuś ca pratijñayā* [NV 522.2]), as well as several other valences of the term “proposition contradiction.”

⁶⁶⁵ This is one of many significant comments in VN regarding the relationship between *śāstra* and *vāda*, i.e., between philosophical treatises and formal debate. If Śāntarakṣita accepts the idea that a single point of defeat suffices in the context of *vāda* (debate) surely he does not feel at all constrained in pointing out myriad defects when composing *śāstra*. Some scholars have proposed that the *Tattvasaṃgraha* may have been written to train students in *vāda*. Comments like these must be kept in mind when we consider such matters.

example must touch upon a defect in the reason.⁶⁶⁶

At this point, Śāntarakṣita raises Av3. This fragment, like Bh1, is only a sentence fragment, a short phrase of Aviddhakarṇa's commentary on—apparently—NS 5.2.4:

yat punar udāhṛtam aviddhakarṇena bhāṣyaṭīkāyām vyaktam ekaprakṛtikam, parimitatvāt, śarāvādivad iti, tatrāpi viruddho hetuḥ. (VA 89.10)

But what Aviddhakarṇa gave as an example in the Bhāṣyaṭīkā, “The manifest has a single thing as its source because it is limited, like a clay dish (śarāva), etc.,” is also an example of a contrary (viruddha) reason.

Here, as an example of “proposition contradiction,” Aviddhakarṇa raises a Sāṃkhya-style argument for identifying the manifest world with *prakṛti*. Śāntarakṣita cites this in terms of cases of “contradiction of the example by the proposition,” and that seems to be what Aviddhakarṇa considers the defect in this argument. In any case, according to Śāntarakṣita, Dharmakīrti's response to Uddyotakara works just as well against Aviddhakarṇa: this is not a genuine case of “proposition contradiction,” but just a contrary reason. The reason, he explains, “is present in the dissimilar case, i.e., that which does not has many things as its source, because clay is divided into separate moments and components.”⁶⁶⁷ Perhaps this fragment reflects something about the community or communities of early Nyāya subcommentators, but, as far as I can see, Av3 reveals fairly little.⁶⁶⁸

The more interesting detail is that Śāntarakṣita again refers to Aviddhakarṇa's *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*, very shortly after mentioning Bhāvivikta's. This marginally supports the idea that Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are different thinkers, however similar their biographies and bibliographies. Now, the fact that both authored a *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*, unto itself, tells us little. The term *bhāṣya-ṭīkā* simply describes a subcommentary on the (*Nyāya-*)*Bhāṣya*, and may not have been a proper title. Any number of authors may have written *bhāṣya-ṭīkā*s. Nor is the fact that Śāntarakṣita refers to both names dispositive. Śāntarakṣita refers to Uddyotakara by that name, but also by the name Bhāradvāja (a patronymic or surname?), with which Uddyotakara refers to himself in the closing verse of the *Vārttika*. Is “Aviddhakarṇa” some kind of epithet for Bhāvivikta (or Bhāvivikta something like a consecration name for a thinker commonly called Aviddhakarṇa)? Perhaps. Yet the proximity of Av3 and Bh1 is striking. Av3 and Bh1 both fall within the section on “proposition contradiction,” and are only separated by about four pages in the editions and around five folio sides in the manuscript (each of which is a mere 29.3 x 6.4 cm.) There may be a specific point in Śāntarakṣita's mentioning Aviddhakarṇa's name *and* his authorship of a *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* so shortly after citing Bhāvivikta's *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*, namely, to clarify that these are distinct thinkers. Steinkellner points out that, when Kamalaśīla says “Aviddhakarṇa, in the *Tattvaṭīkā*...” it serves to clarify that we are dealing with a different work by the same author. In a similar vein, Śāntarakṣita may here be clarifying that we are

⁶⁶⁶ na tu dṛṣṭāntavirodho hetvābhāsarūpāsaṃsparśy asti (VA 89.7).

⁶⁶⁷ parimitatvasya hetoḥ sapakṣe 'bhāve vāvṛtteḥ, vipakṣe cānekaprakṛtike śarāvādaḥ vṛtteḥ, mṛdaḥ pratikṣaṇam pratyavayavaṃ ca bhidyamānatvāt. (VA 89.11)

⁶⁶⁸ It is noteworthy that Śāntarakṣita mentions the *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* again here. He does not attribute Av4, Aviddhakarṇa's last fragment in the *Vipaṅcitārthā*, to any particular text, but, as we will now see, it is quite likely from the *Tattvaṭīkā*, Aviddhakarṇa's Cārvāka commentary. Though the two-Aviddhakarṇa theory was perhaps never very compelling, the movement from Av3 to Av4 helps to strengthen Steinkellner's argument against it.

dealing with a different text by a different author on the same material.⁶⁶⁹

IV. BH2: GLOSS OF NBH 5.2.5

NS 5.2.5 defines the ground for defeat called “rescinding the proposition” (*pratijñāsannyāsaḥ*), which is, naturally, when the proponent rescinds his proposition in light of its refutation. Vātsyāyana explains:

When [the proponent] has said, “Sound is impermanent because it is sensuous, like a pot,” the other party might say, “Universals are sensuous and yet not impermanent, so sound, too, is sensuous and yet not impermanent.” If, when the proposition is thus refuted, [the proponent] were to say, “But who says sound is impermanent?” this would be a case of concealment of the matter proposed, i.e., “rescinding the proposition.”⁶⁷⁰

Dharmakīrti considers this entirely superfluous. If the argument has already been refuted, what does it matter whether the proponent tries to take it back? He has already been defeated. Further, if we admit this as a distinct ground for defeat, we will have to include every conceivable situation when someone is unable to defend their claims, such as remaining silent or running away in the face of counter-argument.⁶⁷¹ Dharmakīrti calls this absurd (*asambaddha*).

Śāntarakṣita, adding things like fainting and sweating to the list, says that Dharmakīrti’s intention is to say that this is absurd “because such a manner is coarse (*sthūla*) in an assembly of learned men.”⁶⁷² The implication seems to be that a learned practitioner of debate would not behave so foolishly, and/or that a learned audience would recognize when an argument has successfully been refuted. Vātsyāyana’s example leaves something to be desired. There is no need for the superfluous technicality that rescinding an already-refuted proposition is yet further grounds for defeat.

At this point, Śāntarakṣita introduces Bh2, demonstrating why he chose the term *sthūla*:

tad atra bhāviviktaḥ svayam āśānkya kila pratividhatte sthūlatvān^a nedaṃ nigrahassthānam iti cet. prāśnikaprativādisannidhau pratijñātārthāpahnavaṃ karotīti. asambaddham ucyate tatrābhīprāyāparijñānāt. na brūmo dhvaṃsī śabda iti, kiṃ tu saṃyogavibhāgābhyāṃ na vyajyata^b iti ayaṃ pratijñātārtha ity āha sāmānyasya ca svāśrayavyaṅgyatvāt vyabhicārābhāva^c iti. nigrahassthānam

⁶⁶⁹ Of course, it may serve the opposite purpose—to demonstrate that Bhāvivikta and Aviddhakarṇa are both *the* author of *the* *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*. That would certainly have been helpful for our purposes, but how would it have benefited, for example, Śāntarakṣita’s students? If he felt the need to make this point, he surely could have been clearer about it. If Bhāvivikta is Aviddhakarṇa, it seems more likely that, as in the case of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara, he would have treated it as a known fact.

⁶⁷⁰ anityaḥ śabda aindriyakatvād ghaṭavad ity ukte paro brūyāt sāmānyam aindriyakaṃ na cānityam, evaṃ śabdo 'py aindriyako na cānitya iti. evaṃ pratiśiddhe pakṣe yadi brūyāt—kaḥ punar āha anityaḥ śabda iti. so 'yaṃ pratijñātārthanīnavaḥ pratijñāsannyāsa iti. (NBh 311.10)

⁶⁷¹ pakṣapratīṣedhe tūṣṇīmḥbhavatas tūṣṇīmḥbhāvo nāma nigrahassthānam, prapalāyamānasya prapalāyitvaṃ nāma nigrahassthānam ityevamādy api vācyam syāt. (VN, 38.17)

⁶⁷² mūrcchāvepathutrasasvedādīnām^a ādīśabdenāvarodhaḥ. tasmād etad apy^b asambaddham, vidvatsadasy evamprakārasya sthūlatvād ity abhiprāyaḥ^c (VA 93.5).

^a Steinkellner (41) °trasattvādī° r : °trasasvedādī° ms.

^b VA *aty*°

^c Steinkellner corrects the edition’s *ābhiprāyaḥ*.

tu pūrvam apratijñātārthatvāt,^d anaikāntikadoṣeṇa pratiṣedhe hetau pratijñātārthāpahnavaṃ karotīti niḡrhyate *iti*. (VA 93.7)⁶⁷³

With regard to this, Bhāvivikta, as he says, states the objection himself and then responds:

You may say, “This is not grounds for defeat because of its coarseness (*sthūlatvāt*). It is in the presence of the examiner, the opponent, and so on, that he performs the concealment of the matter proposed.”

We say this is absurd (*asambaddha*), because in such a case there is no discernment of the intention.

“We do not say, ‘Sound is perishable.’ Rather, we say the matter proposed is ‘not manifested by conjunction or disjunction,’ and there is no deviation because universals are manifested in their respective substrata.”

But this is already grounds for defeat, because this is not the matter proposed. When the reason is refuted by the defect of inconclusiveness, he denies the matter proposed, and, so, is defeated.

Dharmakīrti takes NBh 5.2.5 at face value. The argument is refuted, so the proponent is defeated. Bhāvivikta insists there is more to the story. In Vātsyāyana’s characterization, the proponent simply denies saying what he had just proposed—an unsatisfying and improbable example, especially in a learned assembly. In Bh2, on the other hand, the proponent tries to dodge the attack by claiming that, with the word “impermanent,” what he really meant was not “perishable,” but “not manifested by conjunction or disjunction.” This undercuts the refutation, but still includes a denial of the original proposition, rather than a legitimate clarification of intent. In fact, this is an especially egregious case from the Nyāya perspective because the proponent would have won the argument if he had played his cards right.

To explain requires another detour through an earlier portion of the *Bhāṣya*.

Vātsyāyana’s example of “rescinding the proposition,” on which Bhāvivikta is expounding, actually calls back to an earlier discussion of the impermanence of sound, NS 2.2.13–17, where this argument is made successfully. The passage begins with a group of three reasons that sound is impermanent, followed by an objection to each reason in turn:

Because it has a beginning, because it is sensuous, because we refer to it (*upacāra*) as something produced. (2.2.13)

[*Objection:*] No, because of the permanence of the absence of a pot [after it perishes] and the permanence of universals, and because we also refer to (*upacāra*) permanent things as impermanent. (2.2.14)

[*Response:*] There is no deviation because there is a division according to the difference between the true state (*tattva*) and the secondary usage (*bhākta*) [of notions like “permanent”]. (2.2.15)

⁶⁷³ Steinkellner (41) provides several corrections based on the manuscript:

^a sthūlatvenedaṃ r: sthūlatvā nedam ms > sthūlatvā(n) nedam em.

^b na vyakta r: na vyajyata ms.

^c vivādābhāva r: vicārābhāva ms > v(yabh)icārābhāva em.

^d °ārthatvāt re: °ārthātvāt ms [this, presumably, was an error in the ms]

Because this is a qualification of the inference of the series. (2.2.16)

Because the term *portion* (*pradeśa*) denotes a causal substance. (2.2.17)⁶⁷⁴

Sutra 13 argues that sound is impermanent (i) because it possesses a beginning, (ii) because it is sensuous, and (iii) because it is referred to as a product. The opponent in sutra 14 denies each in turn: (i) after a pot perishes, its absence, though caused, is eternal; (ii) universals are permanent, yet they are also sensuous; and (iii) we refer—following Vātsyāyana’s gloss, and anticipating sutra 17—to things like “portions” (*pradeśa*) of ether (*ākāśa*). Sutras 15,⁶⁷⁵ 16,⁶⁷⁶ and 17⁶⁷⁷ are the orthodox responses from the Nyāya perspective.

It is, of course, the second of these three reasons, “because it is sensuous,” that is important for our present purpose. In his comments on NS 5.2.5, Vātsyāyana imagines someone arguing that sound is impermanent “because it is sensuous,” and being presented with precisely the same counterargument as in sutra 2.2.14, “no, because of the permanence of universals.” In Vātsyāyana’s example in NBh 5.2.5, the proponent immediately backs down, and Vātsyāyana says nothing else about the situation. The example could stand perfectly well on its own as an example of a proponent rescinding his proposition at the first sign of trouble. But Bhāvivikta’s mention of “manifestation by conjunction and disjunction” highlights a deeper point in Vātsyāyana’s call-back to this earlier discussion of sound’s impermanence.

In his comments on the first reason in sutra 13, “because it has a beginning,” Vātsyāyana asserts that sound is produced by conjunction and/or disjunction; ergo it has a cause; ergo it is impermanent. The second reason, “because it is sensuous,” is brought in, Vātsyāyana says, to confirm that the conjunction or disjunction causes the *origination* of an individual sound, rather than its manifestation. This is a pivotal distinction. Causing something to appear does not mean bringing it into existence, but only creating the conditions for its apprehension. If conjunction and disjunction *manifest* sound, the apparent origin of any particular sound may be but a momentary appearance of a permanent substance. “Because it is sensuous,” Vātsyāyana says, resolves this debate:

When someone is cutting wood, after the conjunction between the wood and the axe has ceased, the sound is grasped by someone who stands at a distance. But there is no grasping of something manifested in the absence of that which manifests it. Conjunction, therefore, does not manifest

⁶⁷⁴ ādimattvād aindriyakatvāt kṛtakavad upacārāc ca ||2.2.13|| (NS 105.4);
na ghaṭābhāvasāmānyanīyatvān nityeṣv apy anītyavad upacārāc ca ||2.2.14|| (106.18);
tattvabhāktayor nānātvasya vibhāgād avyabhicārah ||2.2.15.|| (107.8);
santānānumānaviśeṣaṇāt ||2.2.16|| (107.16);
kāraṇadravyasya pradeśaśabdenābhīdhānāt ||2.2.17|| (108.5).

⁶⁷⁵ An atom is permanent in the true sense (*tattva*) that it has no beginning and no end, and exists for all time; the absence of a thing after it perishes is permanent only in the figurative sense (*bhākta*) that it never ceases to be. The former is a real thing (*vastu*, *bhāva*) that is really permanent; the latter is a non-entity (*avastu*, *abhāva*) that is only permanent in a manner of speaking.

⁶⁷⁶ See the ensuing discussion.

⁶⁷⁷ The permanent substances are either atomic (atoms, mind) or all-pervading (self, time, space, ether); but being divisible into “a portion” would seem to cut against the permanence of the latter. Vaiśeṣika describes hearing as sound reaching the “portion” of ether within the ear canal. This does not actually refer to a “portion of ether” in the literal sense, but rather, since the cavity of the ear does not extend over the entirety of ether, it is as if the space of the cavity is a “portion” of ether.

sound.

On the other hand, if the conjunction produces it, it is tenable that a sound can be grasped when the conjunction has ceased: a series of sounds follows from the sound produced by the conjunction, and in light of this, the sound proximate to the ear [of the person at a distance] is grasped.⁶⁷⁸

That sound is sensuous means, Vātsyāyana explains, that it can only be grasped in proximity to the sense faculty. It is not the mere fact that sound relates to the senses that proves its impermanence. Rather, the manner, and the condition, in which it is sensibly perceived demands that we infer a series of sounds emanating from the first sound caused by, e.g., the conjunction of an axe and a piece of wood.⁶⁷⁹ The second reason, “because it is sensuous,” functions almost like a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the first, “because it has a beginning.”

In NBh 5.2.5, the proponent is caught off guard by the objection. Rather than explain the sequence of reasoning, he bashfully abandons his argument, leading to his defeat. In Bh2, on the other hand, the proponent tries to subvert the objection, implying, when he says that he really meant to say sound is “not manifested,” that it is, instead, *produced*. But instead of clarifying his position, he winds up denying his actual proposition, i.e., that sound is impermanent. After all, the upshot of the fact that sound is produced rather than manifested is that it is impermanent. We know this, and, by extension, that the proponent of Bh2 has a winning hand, from the earlier section of the *Bhāṣya*—but he misplays it. “Rescinding the proposition” must be accepted as a distinct ground for defeat in just such a situation.

Śāntarakṣita, it should go without saying, does not accept Bhāvivikta’s argument. But his gloss of “absurd” as “coarse” is artful. Dharmakīrti says “rescinding the proposition” is absurd; Bhāvivikta offers Bh2 in response to the argument that it is “coarse.” In turn, Bhāvivikta calls this objection itself “absurd” (*asambaddha*). It almost seems, reading Śāntarakṣita’s framing of Bh2, that when Dharmakīrti calls “rescinding the proposition” absurd, he has in mind Bhāvivikta’s use of the same term. Unto itself, Dharmakīrti’s attack on “rescinding the proposition” does not seem to address Bhāvivikta’s point, but Śāntarakṣita constructs a kind of back-and-forth between the two passages.

He offers two readings of the situation raised by Bhāvivikta:

To this, it should be said: (i) If the proponent’s argument is incomplete,⁶⁸⁰ and, in the meantime, he is criticized for the defect of inconclusiveness by someone wrongheaded, but he reveals his intention by clarifying the matter proposed, then there is no further defect. Why rescind the proposition? (ii) If his argument is complete and, criticized at last, he qualifies the proposition, this, too, will be defeated for the defect of inconclusiveness, so then, [as Dharmakīrti says,] “What’s the point in looking for the

⁶⁷⁸ dāruvraścane dāruparaśusaṃyoganivṛttau dūrasthena śabdo gṛhyate. na ca vyañjakābhāve vyañgyasya grahaṇam bhavati. tasmān na vyañjakaḥ saṃyogaḥ. utpādake tu saṃyoge saṃyogajāc chabdāc chabdasantāne sati śrotrapratyāsannasya grahaṇam iti yuktaṃ saṃyoganivṛttau śabdasya grahaṇam iti. (NBh 105.13)

⁶⁷⁹ In PDhS, Praśastapāda says sound is “produced by conjunction, disjunction, or sound” (*saṃyoga-vibhāga-śabda-ja*). This contains Vātsyāyana’s first point, that some conjunction or disjunction of two things must serve as the origin for a particular sound, as well as his second point, that that initial sound itself impels a series of sounds that persist beyond the conjunction that gave rise to it.

⁶⁸⁰ In the first case, the proponent is *sākāñkṣā*. Rather than desire, Śāntarakṣita must here be referring to *ākāñkṣā* in its grammatical valence, i.e., the proponent, or his argument, still requires an additional word or phrase to complete its meaning. In the second case, the proponent is *nirākāñkṣā*, without this need; his argument has been conveyed.

later rescinding of the proposition?” Nothing is repelled. Moreover, this is clearly contained in regard to [Dharmakīrti’s criticism of] “another proposition.” Nothing need be stated separately.⁶⁸¹

Śāntarakṣita uncovers—or, rather, plants—a direct rejection of Bhāvivikta’s reasoning in two places: Dharmakīrti’s rhetorical question attacking “rescinding the proposition” *and* his earlier critique of “another proposition,” which was the topic of NS 5.2.3 (section I). A clever piece of commentary.

V. AV4: THE STATEMENT OF CONCOMITANCE ONLY GENERATES A MEMORY

Av4, the last of Aviddhakarṇa’s fragments in the *Vipañcitārthā*, appears some time later, in the context of Dharmakīrti’s discussion of NS 5.2.12. This sutra defines the ground for defeat called “defective” (*nyūna*), in which one of the five components of the argument is lacking.

According to Nyāya, a proper argument requires the statement of (i) the proposition (*pratijñā*), (ii) the reason (*hetu*), (iii) the exemplification (*udāharana*), (iv) the application (*upanaya*), and (v) the conclusion (*nigamana*). For example: sound is impermanent (*proposition*) because it is produced (*reason*); whatever is produced is impermanent, like a pot (*exemplification*), and sound is produced in this way (*application*); therefore, sound is impermanent (*conclusion*).

Dharmakīrti uses the “defective” ground for defeat as an opportunity to revisit his case against the proposition, application, and conclusion. He argues that they are inessential to communicating an argument, as well as redundant. “Someone who employs a pointless statement whose meaning is already present in our awareness,” he explains, “would be deserving of defeat.”⁶⁸²

By way of example, Śāntarakṣita points out that two steps are sufficient to communicate the impermanence of sound: “(i) What is produced is impermanent; (ii) and sound is produced.” Here again Śāntarakṣita introduces the fragment as a direct response from Aviddhakarṇa:

*tad atrāviddhakarṇaḥ pratibandhakanyāyena pratyavatiṣṭhate yady evaṃ kṛtakaś ca śabda ity etad api na vaktavyam, kiṃ kāraṇam?*⁶⁸³ anityatvam ity etenaiva śabde ‘pi kṛtakatvam anityatvam cobhayaṃ pratipadyate. yasmāt pūrvam api śabde kṛtakatvam pareṇa pratipannam eva, kāraṇāc chabdo ‘pi buddhau vyavasthitaḥ. ato ‘nvayavākyena smṛtimātrakam utpādyate. apratipannakṛtakatvasya punaḥ kṛtakaś ca śabda ity etasmād api naiva bhavati.

yadvā kṛtakaḥ śabda ity etāvad vaktavyam. kṛtakatvasya tv anityatvenāvinābhāvitvam parasya

⁶⁸¹ tatra vācyam—yadi vādī sākāṃkṣa evāntarāle kenacid durvidagdhenaikāntikadoṣeṇa^a coditaḥ san pratijñātārthaphalīkāraṇena svābhiprāyam āviṣkaroti, tadānyo ‘pi na kaścid doṣaḥ, kim aṅga punaḥ pratijñāsamnyāsaḥ. atha nirākāṃkṣaḥ san paścāc coditaḥ pratijñāṃ viśīnaṣṭi, tad^b apy anaikāntikadoṣeṇaiva nigṛhyata iti kim uttarapratijñāsamnyāsaṃpekṣayeti na kiṃcit parihr̥tam. kiṃ ca sphuṭam idaṃ pratijñāntare ‘ntarbhavati na pṛthag vācyam iti (VA 93.13).

^a ms. durvividghena^o (Steinkellner 2014, 41).

^b VA reads *tadā*^o.

⁶⁸² yaḥ pratiyamānārtham anarthakaṃ śabdaṃ prayuñkte, sa nigraham arhet (VN 49.11).

⁶⁸³ Steinkellner (46) kiṃkāraṇam re : kiṃkāraṇa ms / (nimitta)m re : nīm ms.

In other words, the ms reads *kiṃkāraṇanīm*, and Sāṅkṛtyāyana proposed emending to ^onimittam, but *kāraṇa-nimitta* would be an odd construction. (*Nimitta-kāraṇa*, meaning instrumental cause, is far commoner.) *Kiṃ kāraṇam* (what’s the reason?) is a perfectly sensible phrase here.

prasiddham iti śabde 'py anityatvaṃ pratipadyata iti. (VA 105.1)

Aviddhakarṇa resists this by means of an impediment (pratibandhaka): If that is so, nor should one say, “And sound is produced.” The word “impermanence” alone makes it known that both producedness and impermanence pertain to sound. Sound is also fixed in the other party’s mind on the basis of the action (*karāṇa*) through which (*yasmāt*) he was earlier instructed that producedness pertains to sound. As a result, the statement of concomitance only generates a memory (*smṛti-mātraka*). But the phrase, “And sound is produced,” surely does not bring this about for someone who has yet to learn about producedness.

Or else, one should say so much as, “Sound is produced.” But the invariable relation between impermanence and producedness is well-known to the other party, so this communicates that impermanence pertains to sound, too.

Aviddhakarṇa appears to be using the Buddhist epistemological tendency toward reduction *against* the Buddhists. Once you have reduced the five components to two, what is to stop us from using the same reasoning to reduce your two to one? If the other party does not already agree that sound is produced, a separate argument will have to prove it first; merely stating it will not do. Presuming the other party does agree, “what is produced is impermanent” communicates every essential bit of information. “And sound is produced,” by Dharmakīrti’s own criteria, is pointless.

Śāntarakṣita’s response? “What he has done is actually agreeable” (*tenānukūlam evācaritam*). He cites a stanza from Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* explaining that mere statement of the reason is sufficient for the wise (*viduṣāṃ vācyo hetur eva hi kevalaḥ*), but that one must state the example for the ignorant (*dr̥ṣṭānte tadavedinaḥ khyāpyete*). In other words, Dharmakīrti’s theory of debate is essentially practical, not axiomatic. Whatever it takes to make the other party draw the correct conclusion is what is needed. By endorsing the gist of Aviddhakarṇa’s objection, Śāntarakṣita takes the teeth out of it.

Śāntarakṣita refers to Aviddhakarṇa’s argument as a *pratibandhaka* (impediment), suggesting not the logical invalidation of a *bādhaka* (invalidation), but rather an appeal to the psychology of doctrinal commitments.⁶⁸⁴ Yet he does not comment any further on the tone of Aviddhakarṇa’s argument. Taken seriously, Aviddhakarṇa is not merely arguing that the Buddhists’ two components are liable to further reduction. Rather, he is mocking the kind of reasoning Buddhists use to, among other things, attack Nyāya inferential theory. Among the two statements, (i) “what is produced is impermanent” and (ii) “and sound is produced,” if you accept the need for the first, the second becomes pointless; if you take off the word “and,” you can state the second and render the first pointless. Why? Because, if the argument works at all, in both cases the second statement would serve only to remind the other party of something they already know and accept. But this reasoning has an obvious next step: whether you state both components or only one, the argument really only works if the other party already knows and accepts both things to be true. If I do not already accept that “what is produced is impermanent,” you will not convince me by merely saying it; nor will you convince me that “sound is produced” if I am committed to the opposite view. It follows that *both* statements are equally “pointless” insofar as they only work if they generate “simply a memory”

⁶⁸⁴ It is not clear to me whether Śāntarakṣita considers a *pratibandhaka* as intrinsically less forceful an objection than a *bādhaka*, more of a sophism than a serious argument, as the dichotomy somewhat suggests in Dharmakīrti’s work. Cf. Tillemans 2000, 133–135, 138–142.

rather than a genuine insight. This suggests that Aviddhakarṇa’s argument works best when it is read sarcastically. The end result is not a definite position (“therefore, only one component is essential”), but scorn: “Have it your way, arguments are useless.”

Though it is possible, of course, that Aviddhakarṇa included this critique of Buddhist argumentation somewhere in his commentary on the *Bhāṣya*, the language and the tone of Av4 recall the arguments that are attributed to, or at least more likely to derive from, his *Tattvaṭīkā*.⁶⁸⁵ In his apparent Cārvāka guise, Aviddhakarṇa likes to throw wrenches into the very concept of inferential argumentation. Rather than explicate something about the “defective” (*nyūna*) ground for defeat, or defend the necessity of the proposition (*pratijñā*) or application (*upanaya*), as we might expect the author of the *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* to do, in Av4 Aviddhakarṇa simply takes aim at the Buddhist analysis of argumentation and what, it appears, he sees as its pretension to authority.⁶⁸⁶

The question, then, is *why*? What, for Aviddhakarṇa, is the upside to putting a crack in the foundation of inference? It is less surprising if we interpret this as a fragment from his *Tattvaṭīkā*. Cārvākas seem to have accepted some inferences to some extent, but questioned its primary authority as a means of knowledge.⁶⁸⁷ But if so, it is quite striking that Śāntarakṣita cites it here in his commentary on a text exclusively concerned with Nyāya.⁶⁸⁸ This suggests that Aviddhakarṇa’s Cārvāka commentary is relevant to Buddhist-Nyāya polemics. We will return to this question shortly. For now, suffice it to say that Aviddhakarṇa seems to have wielded Cārvāka or Cārvāka-style arguments against Buddhist ideas.

VI. BH3: "THIS SAME CLATTER OF HOOVES"

The final sutra of the *Nyāyasūtra*, 5.2.24, is an interesting case: “And fallacious reasons as stated” (*hetvābhāsās ca yathoktāḥ*).

The treatment of the fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsa*) is one of the many quirks of the *Nyāyasūtra* (and also, more generally, of interreligious *pramāṇa* theory). According to the very first sutra, NS 1.1.1,

⁶⁸⁵ Cf. section VII below, and §14.

⁶⁸⁶ Following something like the sort of reasoning Steinkellner applies to Kamalaśīla’s mention of the *Tattvaṭīkā*, we can say that Av4 may be the reason Śāntarakṣita mentioned the *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* by name in Av2 and Av3. Cf. “Surveying the Fragments” in the Introduction.

⁶⁸⁷ Cf. §14 and §15 for a continuation of this discussion. The two surviving sutras from the *Cārvākasūtra* that concern *pramāṇa* theory are as follows: Perception alone is a means of knowledge (*pratyakṣam (ekam) eva pramāṇam*). Because a means of knowledge is not secondary, certainty about things is difficult to obtain through inference (*pramāṇasyāgauṇatvād anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ*). Bhattacharya makes a compelling case that Cārvākas (or at least some Cārvākas) did not entirely dismiss inference, but rather emphasized its secondariness. They accept basis worldly inferences—the fire on the mountain—but rather than concluding that inference is authoritative, they point out that valid inferences are entirely derivative of perception, and do not generate knowledge on their own (Bhattacharya 2011, 80). Cf. Namai 1976b.

⁶⁸⁸ It is very unlikely that there were two Aviddhakarṇas. Such an idea seems to stem more from an overreliance on rigid categories of “Nyāya” and “Cārvāka” than any textual evidence. In any case, the fact that Śāntarakṣita may here be citing Aviddhakarṇa’s Cārvāka commentary supports presuming a single Aviddhakarṇa. Steinkellner’s argument that when Kamalaśīla refers to the *Tattvaṭīkā*, he could have instead, with a simple characterization, clarified that he was talking about a thinker with the same name but a different affiliation, rather than a different text by the same author. See “Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta” in the Introduction.

reaching the highest spiritual aim requires knowledge of sixteen principles (*tattva*). The last of these—and hence the last topic discussed in the Sūtras—are the grounds for defeat. As 5.2.24 makes clear, fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsa*) are species of grounds for defeat; but they seem to have special status, as they are also listed as the thirteenth of the sixteen principles (*tattva*). Accordingly, they receive their own treatment earlier in the Sūtras. NS 1.2.4–9 lists and defines the five kinds of fallacious reason: inconclusive (*avyabhicāra* or *anaikāntika*), contrary (*viruddha*), neutral to the dialectic (*prakaraṇasama*), similar to what is to be proven (*sādhyasama*), and past time (*kālātīta*). In sūtra 5.2.24, the phrase “as stated” refers back to this earlier passage.

Dharmakīrti expresses reservations about the phrase “as stated.” “It is still to be examined,” he says, “whether the fallacious reasons are, in fact, like the varieties defined earlier, or otherwise. But this would take us too far if we examined it here, so it is not extended.”⁶⁸⁹ Though Dharmakīrti indeed leaves the discussion here,⁶⁹⁰ Śāntarakṣita follows his suggestion and examines the varieties of fallacious reason “as stated” earlier in NS. Śāntarakṣita, like Dharmakīrti before him, admits “inconclusive” and “contrary” as categories of fallacious reason, adding also unestablished (*asiddha*)—which is rather close to “similar to what is to be proven”—and various species of each of these three. The Buddhists⁶⁹¹ do not accept that the other three—“neutral to the dialectic,” “similar to what is to be proven,” and “past time”—characterize distinct fallacies. Śāntarakṣita attacks all three at some length and in an intricate sequence.

First, Śāntarakṣita pairs Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, treating the latter as essentially finishing the former’s sentences, regarding reasons that are “past time”⁶⁹² and “neutral to the dialectic.” Then he turns to an anonymous “other” (*anya*) Naiyāyika’s interpretations of the same two fallacies.⁶⁹³ In his comment on “neutral to the dialectic,” the “other” sidesteps the *Bhāṣya* and comments directly on the sūtra. After refuting these groups of arguments in turn, Śāntarakṣita introduces Bh3 as yet another defense of fallacious reasons that are “neutral to the dialectic.”

The overall passage in the *Vipaṅcitārthā* looks like this:

- ❖ Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara’s comments on “past time” [VA 130.20]⁶⁹⁴
 - Śāntarakṣita’s refutation [131.5]

⁶⁸⁹ tat tu cintyamānam ihātiprasajyata iti na pratanyate (VN 68.7).

⁶⁹⁰ He adds one additional comment: “And fallacious reasons are only accepted to be grounds for defeat to an extent that accords with reason.” *hetvābhāsās ca yathānyāyaṃ nigrahasthānam ity etāvanmātram iṣṭam iti* (VN 68.8).

⁶⁹¹ In PPS, Kamalaśīla cites NS 1.2.4–9 as the first example of *pūrvapakṣas* on the topic of the fallacious reasons.

⁶⁹² According to them, a reason is “past time” if there is a temporal lapse within the concept of the reason itself, e.g., “sound is permanent because it is manifested by conjunction.” This is an odd idea, and the Buddhists fairly convincingly show that in most cases such a reason could be described as unestablished (*asiddha*). It is not particularly surprising that different commentators came to their own conclusions about the sūtra rather than substantiating Vātsyāyana’s interpretation.

⁶⁹³ The “other” first argues that a reason is “past time” if it is valid but contradicted by perception or scripture. In an early section of the *Bhāṣya*, Vātsyāyana suggests that one should only resort to inference after consulting perception and scripture. A valid argument that does not accord with perception or scripture evinces an improper sequence of reasoning. This is called “past time.” Then the “other” offers two readings of “neutral to the dialectic.” First, that an argument that entails an infinite regress may be valid, but fails to resolve the underlying question. Second, on the basis of *nirukti*, *prakaraṇa-sama* means a reason that is neutral (*sama*) because of establishing (*karaṇa*) the property to be proven in only a portion (*pra-deśa*) of the locus.

⁶⁹⁴ Line/page numbers follow my interpretation of the passage, which seems to differ at times from Shastri’s.

- ❖ Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara on *prakaraṇa-sama* [131.22]
 - Śāntarakṣita’s refutation [132.4]
- ❖ Anonymous “other” on “past time” [132.20]
 - Refutation [132.32]
- ❖ Anonymous “other” on *prakaraṇa-sama* [133.6]
 - Refutation [133.21]
- ❖ Bhāvivikta on *prakaraṇa-sama* [134.1]
 - Refutation [134.8]

According to sutra 1.2.7, a reason that is “neutral to the dialectic” is intended to bring about a resolution, but only serves to perpetuate uncertainty about the matter at hand. Later commentators noticed that this is fairly similar to the idea of an “inconclusive” reason (or a reason that “deviates” (*savyabhicāra*)) and either subsumed it within that category, or else rationalized its distinctness.⁶⁹⁵ Bhāvivikta belongs to the latter group.⁶⁹⁶

Vātsyāyana defines *prakaraṇa* as a dichotomy of positions raised in order to resolve a particular case of uncertainty (*saṁśaya*), hence, “dialectic.” A reason that is “neutral to the dialectic” fails to distinguish the two positions. Without resolving the dialectic, the motivating uncertainty remains. This is different from a reason that is inconclusive, according to Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, because the latter concerns the internal reasoning of a single argument rather than the relationship between the pair of arguments comprising the dialectic.

Bhāvivikta’s interpretation is slightly different. Like the “other,” he first glosses the sutra itself, apparently circumventing the *Bhāṣya*’s reading and seemingly offering a different take on the term *prakaraṇa*. (Though he also presents *prakaraṇa-sama* as straddling a pair of arguments, Bhāvivikta appears to equate *prakaraṇa* with *sādhyā*.) Then he offers an example in order to prove that such a reason is distinct from one that is inconclusive. First, the sutra itself, with the word *prakaraṇa* untranslated:

yasmāt prakaraṇacintā sa nirṇayārtham apadiṣṭaḥ prakaraṇasamaḥ.⁶⁹⁷

From which there is anxiety about the *prakaraṇa*, that, adduced for the sake of ascertainment, is *prakaraṇasama*.

And Bh3, with terms lifted directly from the sutra in bold:

bhāvivikto ‘py *atraiva khurarave*^a *patitaḥ prakaraṇasamam anyathā samarthayati yasmād dhetoḥ*^b **prakaraṇacintā** vipakṣasyāpi vicāraḥ paścād bhavati, **sa** evaṁlakṣaṇo hetur^c **nirṇayāya** yo ‘**padiśyamānaḥ prakaraṇasamo** bhavati, prakaraṇe sādhye samo tulyaḥ sattve ‘sattve vā. yathā sat

⁶⁹⁵ Gokhale (1992, 22) describes *savyabhicāra* as “related irregularly or with uncertainty.”

⁶⁹⁶ Caraka also mentions *prakaraṇasama*. Gokhale renders the sutra, “*Prakaraṇasama* is one from which the investigation of the problem begins and still which is applied as a *hetu* for reaching the conclusion,” and says the meaning has not changed from Caraka’s use (Gokhale, 25). He also favors Randle’s definition of *prakaraṇasama* as begging the question, over Matilal’s objection.

In addition, there is a *jāti* called *prakaraṇasama* in NS. Gokhale defines this *jāti* as “a wrong claim that the disputant has committed the fallacy of infinite regress.” In other words, an improper *reductio ad absurdum* by asserting that the proving property has to be proven on the basis of yet another property, and so on.

⁶⁹⁷ NS 44.4.

sarvajñatvam,^d itaradviparītavinirmuktatvād,^e rūpādivat iti. yasmād ayaṃ hetur ubhayatra samānaḥ, yo 'py asattvaṃ sādhyati tasyāpi samānaḥ. katham? asat sarvajñatvam, itaradviparītavinirmuktatvāt, kharaviṣṇavat iti. na cāyaṃ kilobhayadharmatve 'py anaikāntikaḥ, vipakṣavṛttivaikalāyāt. (VA 134.1)⁶⁹⁸

Bhāvivikta, too, reduced (patita) to this same clatter of hooves (khararava), construes “neutral to the dialectic” in another manner.

Say there is a reason **from which** there arises **anxiety about the prakaraṇa**, i.e., hesitation (*vicāra*) even after [statement of] the dissimilar case;⁶⁹⁹ **that**, a reason characterized in that way, being **adduced for ascertainment**, would be *prakaraṇasama*, neutral (*sama*) to the *prakaraṇa*, i.e., comparable (*tulya*) to what is to be proven (*sādhyā*), existence or non-existence.

For example, “Omniscience exists because it is free from what is contrary to that, as is color, etc.” Since this reason is the same in both cases, it is the same as that which proves non-existence, too. How so? “Omniscience does not exist because it is free from what is contrary to that, as is a donkey’s horn.” And this indeed is not inconclusive, even if it is a property of both (*ubhaya-dharma*), because it lacks presence in the dissimilar case (*vipakṣa-vṛtti-vaikalāya*).

There is a considerable amount to unpack here, even before turning to the content of the fragment itself.

To begin with, Śāntarakṣita refers to a “clatter of hooves” (*khararava*). Steinkellner points out, in a footnote, that this term does not appear as a name in Demoto’s register of auxiliary hell regions (*Nebenhöllen*).⁷⁰⁰ Presumably, Śāntarakṣita’s reference to Bhāvivikta “falling” (*patita*) to *khararava* led him rightly to consider whether it refers to a particular region or state that serves as a metaphor for Bhāvivikta’s intellectual or mental fall from grace. From what I can tell, rather, it appears to be a rhetorical expression for some kind of overhasty argumentative or interpretive move.

A comparable example can be found in a small moment in Vācaspati’s commentary (*Bhāmātī*) on Śāṅkara’s *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* (3.3.18), in which Vācaspati uses roughly the same term. Better still, in the subcommentary (*Vedānta-kalpataru*), Amalānanda offers an explanation of the expression.

⁶⁹⁸ Steinkellner (60) provides two corrections:

^a khararave r : khararave ms.

^b heto(h) re : heto ms.

^c My emendation. The editions read *hetu*°, and Steinkellner does not comment, but *saḥ* must construe with *hetuḥ*. Otherwise the sentence would read, “That [...] which is being adduced for the ascertainment of the reason...” but it is the reason that is being adduced for ascertainment the fact of the matter.

^d My emendation. The editions read *sarvajñam*; no comment from Steinkellner. The phrasing in the second example is more precise, and the passage makes little sense if the two arguments do not have the same subject.

^e My emendation. Ed. *itaratadviparītavinirmuktatvād*, no comment from Steinkellner. As in the previous note, the passage hardly works without parallelism. °ta° introduces a redundant pronoun, and *vi+nir√muc* is better attested than *vi+ni√muc*.

⁶⁹⁹ The dissimilar case is often the last thing mentioned in an argument (e.g., the mountain is fiery because it is smoky, like a kitchen, *unlike a lake*), so “after the dissimilar case” may well mean after the statement of the dissimilar case, i.e., after the argument has been fully formulated. Alternatively, perhaps *paścāt* is meant only to clarify the force of the ablative *yasmāt* in the sutra, in which case *vipakṣasyāpi vicāraḥ* would be Bhāvivikta’s gloss of *prakaraṇacintā*, meaning, “anxiety about the *prakaraṇa*, i.e., hesitation even about the dissimilar case.”

⁷⁰⁰ “Auch in der reichen Nebenhöllenliste von Demoto 2009 sind diese Namen nicht zu finden” (Steinkeller 2014, 60).

First, Śāṅkara poses a question about the purport of the sutra. The sutra refers to two different practices; but what does it enjoin? He asks, in this sequence, whether the sutra (i) entails both practices, (ii) entails only the first of the two, or (iii) entails only the second.⁷⁰¹ Śāṅkara entertains the first two possibilities before settling on the third. Vācaspati describes the sequence as follows:

Suddenly (*āpātatas*),⁷⁰² by the mere clatter of hooves (*khura-rava-mātreṇa*), after the position that both are enjoined has been taken up, the *pūrvapakṣin* seizes on the middle position.⁷⁰³

Amalānanda then explains this idiom:

For, just as it is said that a horse, without being led (*anirṇīya*), runs by the mere sound of hooves (*khura-śabda-mātreṇa*), so this, too. That's the meaning.⁷⁰⁴

A horse follows the sound of another horses's hoofbeats without having to be led. Śāṅkara poses the question, and the *pūrvapakṣin* follows after it in the same sequence, down the same path. The implication seems to be that such a practice is reflexive, almost unthinking—instinctual.⁷⁰⁵

In the *Vipaṅcitārthā*, the “clatter of hooves” may refer to the sutra itself. Again, it is only after first considering Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara's comments on NS 1.2.7, and then those of the anonymous “other,” that Śāntarakṣita cites Bh3. Like the “other,” Bhāvivikta seems to circumvent rather than gloss the *Bhāṣya*, focusing instead on the sutra itself. Perhaps, in saying that Bhāvivikta has “fallen” or “been reduced” to the same clatter of hooves, Śāntarakṣita is saying that he is failing to think for himself, instead just following after the hoofbeats of the sutra.

Śāntarakṣita's initial response to Bh3 is noteworthy, as well. Here he shows that Bhāvivikta predates, and was a direct target of, Dharmakīrti:

The teacher refuted this himself in his *Pramānaviniścaya*, beginning with, “But to which dissimilar case, which lacks the property to be proven, do you resort here? How, now, is the reason absent in the dissimilar case and [at the same time] a property of both (*ubhaya-dharma*)?”⁷⁰⁶

⁷⁰¹ tat kim ubhayam api vidhīyata utācamānam evotānagnatācintanam eveti vicāryate (BBh 775.1).

⁷⁰² Bhāvivikta has “fallen” (*patita*) to, or at, the clatter of hooves, whereas, in Vācaspati's reading of Śāṅkara, the position is taken up “suddenly” (*āpātatas*). It may be significant that both of these terms derive from the same verbal root, √*pat*, to fall or to fly, but I am not sure how.

⁷⁰³ khuraravamātreṇāpātata ubhayavidhānaṃ pakṣaṃ grhītvā madhyamaṃ pakṣaṃ ālambate pūrvapakṣy athavācamānam eveti (Bhā 775.1).

⁷⁰⁴ khuraravamātreṇeti yathā hy anirṇīyaiva khuraśabdāmātreṇāśvo dhāvātīty ucyate evam idam apīty arthaḥ. siddhāntabījam āśāṅkya pariharati yady apīti (VK 775.1).

⁷⁰⁵ I am not very familiar with the traditions of horsemanship in India, though horses obviously have a long and storied history in South Asia. Nor have I come across similar idioms or ideas in English. But my friend Hannah Beresford, who has considerable experience training and riding horses, has explained the situation to me like this: Horses' eyes are set on the sides of their head, giving them a considerable blind spot directly in front of them, but their ears can rotate so as to give them a 360 degree range of hearing; trail horses are specifically trained to keep track, by sound, of the horses in front and behind them, and wild horses moving in single file on mountainous terrain would likely do the same. Whether these biological features are part of the reasoning behind the idiom of doing something “by the mere clatter of hooves,” I cannot say.

⁷⁰⁶ tad idam ācāryeṇa svayaṃ pramānaviniścaye pratiśiddham—kaṃ punar atra bhavān vipakṣaṃ pratyeti sādhyābhāvam. katham idānīm hetur^a avipakṣavṛttir^b ubhayadharmāś cetyādīnā^c (VA 134.8).

^a VA *hetum*, PVin (78.2) *hetur*.

Dharmakīrti focuses on the final sentence of the fragment. The phrase “a property of both” (*ubhaya-dharma*) suggests, in Dharmakīrti’s interpretation, that the reason is a property of both the similar case and the dissimilar case. For example, in the classic example, “There is fire on the mountain because it is smoky,” being smoky is a property of similar cases like kitchens, but never of dissimilar cases like lakes. “There is fire on the mountain because it is visible,” on the other hand, is inconclusive because “being visible” is both a property of similar cases, and of dissimilar cases. “Being a property of both” precisely entails presence in the dissimilar case. In Dharmakīrti’s reading, Bhāvivikta’s claim that the argument is “a property of both” and yet “lacks presence in the dissimilar case” is incoherent.

Śāntarakṣita goes on to examine the Nyāya standard for establishing negative concomitance. According to him, Nyāya accepts mere non-observation (*adarśanamātra*) as a sufficient basis for negative concomitance. Without establishing some kind of necessary connection, however, mere non-observation would lead to arguments that may be valid, but stand on doubtful ground, e.g., “Perception is conceptual because it is a means of knowledge like inference.”⁷⁰⁷ For this reason, Śāntarakṣita calls Naiyāyikas “those for whom doubt is remote” (*apagata-sāṅka*), i.e., the insufficiently skeptical. (This is an especially striking comment, considering Aviddhakarṇa’s Cārvāka fragments.)

As for the content of the fragment itself. Rather than describe *prakaraṇa* as the pair of arguments raised to resolve a particular doubt, here Bhāvivikta equates *prakaraṇa* with *sādhya*, the property to be proven (i.e., the fire on the mountain that we cannot see but must infer). This is a somewhat surprising gloss, given that *prakaraṇa-sama* would then resemble *sādhya-sama*, a distinct fallacy in NS. But the distinction is clear. A reason that is *sādhya-sama* is similar (*sama*) to the property to be proven (*sādhya*) in the sense that it, too, has yet to be established. A reason is *prakaraṇa-sama*, on the other hand, if it is the same (*sama*) whether the *sādhya* is the existence or non-existence of the topic. This is not entirely dissimilar to Vātsyāyana’s interpretation, but it is even more restricted. Here again the fallacy only appears in the navigation between two positions, rather than the internal functioning of a single argument. Yet Bhāvivikta takes the syntax of the sutra very seriously. In his interpretation, the fact that the reason leads to further anxiety about the *prakaraṇa* is logically prior to the formulation of the argument; it is the use of such a reason in an argument that constitutes the fallacy.

The example Bhāvivikta uses demonstrates just how restrictive his interpretation is. The phrase “because of being free from what is contrary to that” is ambiguous. When “being free from the contrary of that (*itarad*)”⁷⁰⁸ is used to prove the existence of omniscience, the pronoun “that” refers to existence, and the reason precisely excludes everything that is contrary to existence alone. But when the argument proves that omniscience does not exist, “that” refers to non-existence, and the reason precisely excludes what is contrary to non-existence.

It seems that Dharmakīrti’s response actually misrepresents Bhāvivikta’s position. Rather than both

^b VA *vīpakṣa*°, PVin *avīpakṣa*°.

^c VA °*dharmenāivety*°, ms. *dharmas...tyādīnā* (Steinkellner 2014, 60), PVin *dharmas ca*.

⁷⁰⁷ *savikalpaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇatvād anumānavad* (VA 134.15).

⁷⁰⁸ The pronoun “that” (*itara*) implies a pair. If “that” refers to existence, here it implies that while existence is “the one” (*itara*), non-existence is “the other” (*itara*).

the similar and dissimilar cases, the reason in Bhāvivikta’s example is a property of both *arguments*. As in Vātsyāyana’s reading, the need for a distinct technical term, *prakaraṇa-sama*, stems from situations where the reason may work well in one argument, but equally well in that argument’s inverse. (Here again we cannot help but think of the claim in the *Tattvaṭīkā* that in every case an argument can be rebutted with the opposite inference, cf. §14.) It is precisely the deictic, or indexical, openness of the term “that” (*itarad*) in the reason, and the specificity of the *sādhya*, that leads to this situation.

One can imagine different scenarios where a similar issue could arise. When Richard Hayes, following Richard Robinson, points out the equivocation in Nāgārjuna’s use of the term *svabhāva*, he demonstrates an instance of something fairly similar to *prakaraṇa-sama*, only in this case the neutrality is intentionally employed to create an irresolvable dialectic.⁷⁰⁹ Of course, the Buddhists would still be unlikely to accept the term. They may well consider it needless, and, so, harmful conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*),⁷¹⁰ and, in any case, the logical standard for negative concomitance remains an important locus of debate. But it is important to note here again, as with several of Aviddhakarṇa’s fragments, that the Buddhists sometimes interpret an argument in their own terms, rather than seeking to understand the terms of the intellectual community of their Naiyāyika opponents, and in so doing misjudge—or at least appear to misjudge—the actual point.

⁷⁰⁹ Hayes 1994. I am indebted to Nir Feinberg for this striking observation.

⁷¹⁰ I am grateful to Max Brandstadt for emphasizing the Buddhist concern for *prapañca* when we discussed this passage.

PŪRVAPAKṢASAMKṢIPTA

Kamalaśīla's *Pūrvapakṣasamkṣipta* (Prima facie views in brief, PPS), which is only extant in Tibetan (D 4232, Tshad ma Vol. 16, we, 92a2–99b5, as *rigs pa'i thigs pa'i phyogs snga ma mdor bsdus pa*), is a studious and creative take on Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*. The title describes the contents quite well: Kamalaśīla abbreviates (*sam-√kṣip*) opposing viewpoints from various traditions of Indian philosophy and stitches them in between the stanzas of the root text as prima facie views to be refuted (*pūrvapakṣa*). Before Dharmakīrti's definition of a particular kind of perception, for example, Kamalaśīla inserts the adverse opinion of Aviddhakarṇa—without any comment but the words of the *Nyāyabindu* that follow and set the record straight.

Like Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla turns his source material into a conversation, albeit in a very different manner. Quite unlike Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla does nothing but collect and organize the opposing views. To what end, exactly? Was PPS an assignment given to a close disciple, a young teacher's lecture notes, the work of an overeager student, or perhaps even preliminary research toward the *Pañjikā*? How we read this interesting little book determines a lot about its affect.

For the most part, Kamalaśīla only cites general groups as *pūrvapakṣas*. He mentions Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, for example, throughout the text, and he mentions Lokāyatikas once. He names Vasubandhu a couple of times, but otherwise only mentions three thinkers by name: Caraka, Pātrasvāmin, and Aviddhakarṇa. This raises a clear question: Is there something distinctive about any or all of these three thinkers that distinguishes them from the authors who Kamalaśīla otherwise collapses into generic philosophical affiliations?

In PPS, he mentions Caraka in the context of the number of means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Buddhist epistemologists accept only two, perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*), on the basis of the sharp distinction Dignāga draws between the two kinds of object of knowledge (*prameya*), unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), which are perceivable, and universals (*sāmānya*), which are inferable. Kamalaśīla lists four traditions with different views: “Followers of Bṛhaspati” (Cārvākas) accept only perception (cf. §14); Sāṃkhya accepts three, adding verbal testimony (*śabda*) to the list; Naiyāyikas add analogy (*upamāna*) to make it four; and Mīmāṃsakas (“followers of Jaimini”) accept six, including presumption (*arthāpatti*) and absence (*abhāva*). Finally, as a catch-all for any additional means of knowledge people may admit, he mentions “Caraka et al,” who accept reasoning (*yukti*), non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*), and/or probability (*sambhava*). Caraka, who accepts *yukti*, stands in for any other such thinkers who accept means of knowledge beyond the six of Mīmāṃsā.

Pātrasvāmin also shows up later in the *Pañjikā*, and the passage Kamalaśīla attributes to him in PPS is roughly the same as the passage in the *Pañjikā*. In the first two verses of the “Examination of Inference” (1361–1362), Śāntarakṣita defines the two kinds of inference, for-oneself (*svārtha*) and for-others (*parārtha*), specifying the necessity, in both cases, of a reason with three characteristics (*trirūpalīṅga*, *trairūpya*, etc.), i.e., a reason that is a property of the locus of the argument (*anumeye sattvam eva*), that exists in a similar case (*sapakṣa eva sattva*), and that does not exist in any dissimilar case (*asapakṣe ca asattvam eva*).⁷¹¹ An inference “for-oneself” is a cognition, e.g., inferring that there is

⁷¹¹ The three features are here cited as found in *Nyāyabindu*, though they are phrased slightly differently in different

fire on a mountain after seeing smoke rising from it; whereas an inference “for-others” is a statement, e.g., instructing someone that there is fire there. (The latter is, in effect, an effort to instigate the former in one’s opponent.) In both cases the smoke is the reason (*hetu*), or the mark (*liṅga*), and in both cases it fulfills the three characteristics: it is a property of the locus of the argument, the mountain; it is a property of a “similar case” (*sapakṣa*), i.e., something that is the locus of the property-to-be-proven (*sādhya*), fire, such as a kitchen that is in use; and it is not a property of any “dissimilar case” (*asapakṣa*, *vipakṣa*), i.e., something that is never the locus of the property-to-be-proven, such as a lake.

Śāntarakṣita devotes the next several verses (1363–1378) to the opposing view that the reason only requires a single characteristic, namely, “being otherwise impossible” (*anyathānupapannatva*). In short, if the reason (smoke) cannot arise in the locus (the mountain) without the property to be proven (fire), the reason fulfills the condition of “being otherwise impossible.” (Śāntarakṣita has a number of things to say to this idea, but his main point is that it is only valid insofar as it entails fulfillment of the three characteristics, making it nothing but an abbreviation of *trairūpya*.) In the *Pañjikā*, Kamalaśīla, unpacking these verses in his usual fashion, attributes the view to Pātrasvāmin and cites (or paraphrases) his argument.

It is unsurprising to find Kamalaśīla citing roughly the same passage, again directly credited to Pātrasvāmin (*snod kyī rje*), at the beginning of the second chapter of PPS, in response to Dharmakīrti’s definition of inference for-oneself, which is the first reference in the *Nyāyabindu* to the three characteristics of the reason. The *Nyāyabindu* is clearly Śāntarakṣita’s most immediate source for his definition of the two kinds of inference,⁷¹² and it is surely no coincidence that he and Kamalaśīla both immediately think of Pātrasvāmin when the issue arises.⁷¹³ Though Kamalaśīla attributes several arguments to Digambaras in general, Pātrasvāmin’s theory appears to have been novel in Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s time, or at least in their view.

Otherwise, apart from Vasubandhu, the only thinker Kamalaśīla names in PPS is Aviddhakarṇa, who he cites once. According to the Tibetan, he refers to “Aviddhakarṇa et al” (*rna ma phug la sogs pa*), suggesting that, like Caraka, Aviddhakarṇa is not quite alone in this argument, and yet that he could not be reduced to a more widespread affiliation. Aviddhakarṇa, too, must have occupied a distinctive position in Kamalaśīla’s pantheon of rivals. He is only cited once in PPS, and yet, because he is cited by name, he comes across as occupying a singular place in Kamalaśīla’s view. Perhaps—judging by Av5—it is because of his curious connection with Cārvāka.

texts. Cf. Oetke 1994 for an in-depth, rigorous study of the reasoning of the three characteristics. Cf. comments on Dignāga’s *hetucakra* in “Debates about debate.”

⁷¹² Specifically: svārthaṃ parārthaṃ ca ||2.2|| (NB 88); tatra svārthaṃ trirūpāl liṅgād yad anumeyo jñānaṃ tad anumānaṃ ||2.3|| (89); trirūpaliṅgākhyānaṃ parārthaṃ anumānaṃ ||3.1|| (150); evaṃ eṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ rūpāṇāṃ ekaikasya dvayor dvayor vā rūpayor asiddhau sandehe vā yathāyogam asiddhviruddhānaikāntikās trayo hetvābhāsāḥ ||3.109|| (224).

⁷¹³ Perhaps this suggests a common feature in Buddhist philosophical education during their time, or specifically suggests something about Kamalaśīla’s education under Śāntarakṣita.

VII. AV5: MENTAL PERCEPTION IS NOT A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

Towards the beginning of the *Nyāyabindu*, Dharmakīrti lists four kinds of perception, the second being mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*), which he defines in a fairly intricate but purposeful manner: “Mental cognition is that [perception] which is produced by the sensory cognition, its immediately preceding condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*), that is concurrent with the object immediately preceding the object of [the mental cognition] itself.”⁷¹⁴ This is very precisely put together, and solves two particular problems with Dignāga’s earlier formulation, as Masaaki Hattori points out. First, in order to qualify as a genuine means of knowledge (*pramāna*), mental cognition must perceive an object that has not yet been grasped (*anadhigata-artha-gantr*). Second, if there is no difference in the object between the sensory cognition that comes first and the proceeding mental cognition, nothing should stop a deaf or a blind person from mentally perceiving sound or color. As Hattori puts it, Dharmakīrti’s definition resolves both matters: “(1) What is perceived by means of mental perception is the object in the moment that immediately follows the moment of sense-perception. Therefore mental perception is held to be *anadhigatārtha-gantr*. (2) Mental perception is conditioned by the immediately preceding sense-perception as its *samanantara-pratyaya*. Accordingly, blind and deaf persons who have no sense-perception are unable to have mental perception.”⁷¹⁵

Kamalaśīla offers Av5 as the *pūrvapakṣa* to Dharmakīrti’s definition of mental cognition. It reads as follows:

de bzhin du rna ma phug la sogs pa ni yid kyi zhes bya ba’i mngon sum tsad mar rigs pa ma yin te. sngar mngon sum gyis gzung ba las yul gzhan ma yin na de bzung zin pa ‘dzin pa’i phyir tsad ma ma yin pa kho na’o. yul don gzhan nyid yin na ni. ‘di rang dbang du ‘jug pa’i phyir dang. don thams cad yul yin pa’i phyir. ‘ga’ yang long ba la sogs pa’i dngos por mi ‘gyur ro zhes zer ro. (PPS 92b2)

In this way, Aviddhakarṇa et al say: It is not tenable that so-called⁷¹⁶ mental perception is a means of knowledge. If its object is nothing but what was grasped by perception, then it is not a means of knowledge, because it grasps what has already been grasped. If its object is something else, then [it is not a means of knowledge] because it would function independently [of perception] and because it would have every object in its scope; but nothing comes to be an entity for the blind, etc.⁷¹⁷

Aviddhakarṇa argues that mental perception cannot be a means of knowledge because it either grasps what has already been grasped by sense perception, and so does not give us anything new, or because, if it is independent of perception, it would render the world visible to the blind. Clearly this is the

⁷¹⁴ svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena samanantarapratyayena janitaṃ tan manovijñānam (NB 57).

⁷¹⁵ Hattori 1968, 93 n 1.46.

⁷¹⁶ yid kyi zhes bya ba = mānasa iti—?

⁷¹⁷ This final sentence is tricky to interpret. If there is no implicit repetition of “*tshad ma ma yin pa kho na*,” the negation in the final clause (*mi ‘gyur*) renders the whole argument rather incoherent. If we do not read an implicit repetition of the conclusion (i.e., it is *apramāṇa*), we would have to read, “If its object is something else, then it functions independently, so it has every object in its scope, and so nothing comes to be an entity for the blind, etc.” If instead we interpret the repetition as implicit (taking the topic marker *ni* as emphasizing the fact that the if-clause expects a conclusion), the two *phyir* (*-tvāt?*) clauses explain that implicit conclusion (it is *apramāṇa*), and the final negative (*mi ‘gyur*) clause underscores the absurdity of the notion. Even without anticipating Dharmakīrti’s response, the text as is does not make much sense without either reading it this way or removing the negation from the final clause.

very two-fold problem Dharmakīrti's definition seems designed to resolve.

Like Av4, there is a chance that this appears somewhere in Aviddhakarṇa's *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*, most likely in his comments on NS 1.1.4, the definition of perception:

Perception is a cognition that is generated by contact between a sense faculty and an object; it is non-linguistic (*avyapadeśya*),⁷¹⁸ non-deviating, and consists in determination.⁷¹⁹

Uddyotakara, for example, at one point entertains the objection that the sutra should mention contact between a sense faculty and the mind, since that is a peculiarity of every perception. His first response is that there is simply no need, as the sutra is not intended to exhaust every single aspect of perception. But then he says, "Or the term *contact between a sense faculty and an object* is used because it is distinctive." Perceptual cognition, he explains, is always designated (*vi+apa+√dis*) with a sense faculty or an object: "color cognition" or "visual cognition." "For it is not the case," he says, "that there is 'mental cognition' (*mano-vijñāna*) when there is a cognition with color as its objective support."⁷²⁰ But Uddyotakara simply states as a fact that we do not speak of "mental cognition" in such cases, rather than arguing against such a notion. Uddyotakara's interlocutor in this passage is a fellow Naiyāyika, rather than a rival Buddhist. In fact, in the very next line, Uddyotakara brings up perceptions of the self: "But when mental perceptions (*mānasa-buddhi*) arise on the basis of the conjunction of the self and the mind, then these are designated by the self or the mind."⁷²¹ This may be the interlocutor's voice rather than Uddyotakara's own (only the disjunctive particle *tu*, "but," serves to indicate this), but if so, he does not disagree. He just goes on to explain that things are named after their most distinctive cause, as a plant is named for the seed from which it sprouts, rather than the myriad other causal factors of its sprouting. It is not hard to imagine Uddyotakara disagreeing with the Buddhist notion of "mental perception," but he does not engage that particular issue.

Av5 may, then, have been part of Aviddhakarṇa's commentary on NS 1.1.4. Uddyotakara considers at length whether the sutra should mention the mind. Perhaps in doing the same, Aviddhakarṇa saw fit to raise the Buddhist notion of mental perception. But Av5 is also rather similar to one of Aviddhakarṇa's fragments in Karṇakagomin's⁷²² commentary (*ṭīkā*) on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārttika-svavṛtti*. The fragment that Karṇakagomin cites probably derives from Aviddhakarṇa's Cārvāka commentary, the *Tattvaṭīkā*: "A means of knowledge delimits a matter that has not yet been understood, ergo inference is not a means of knowledge, because it does not have the condition of delimiting an object."⁷²³ The underlying reasoning—purported means of knowledge are disqualified

⁷¹⁸ Cf. §10 for a discussion of the term *avyapadeśya*.

⁷¹⁹ *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam ||1.1.4|| (NS 10.3).*

⁷²⁰ *indriyārthasannikarṣagrahaṇam vā viśeṣakatvāt. yadindriyārthasannikarṣād upajāyate vijñānam tasyānyatarad viśeṣakam bhavati. indriyam artho vā tadviśeṣakam, tena vyapadeśāt. yasmād idam vijñānam indriyeṇa vā vyapadiśyate arthena vā, rūpavijñānam iti vā cakṣurvijñānam iti vā. na punar indriyamaṅṅsaṃyogena vyapadiśyate. na hi bhavati rūpālambane vijñāne manovijñānam iti (NV 30.9).*

⁷²¹ *yadā tv ātmamaṅṅsaṃyogān mānasyo buddhayaḥ saṃpravartante tadātmanā vyapadiśyante manasā vā (NV 30.14).*

⁷²² Karṇakagomin cites Aviddhakarṇa three times. See Appendix B.

⁷²³ *yad ucyate 'viddhakarṇenānadhigatārthaparicchittih pramāṇam ato nānumānam pramāṇam arthaparicchedakatvābhāvād (PVSVT 25.5).* Specifically, this would be a comment on the second epistemological aphorism in the *Cārvākasūtra*, *pramāṇasyāgaunatvād anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ* (Certainty about an object is difficult to obtain through inference, because its authority is derivative). Cf. §14. This is "Av20," the second fragment of

if their objects are already known—is quite similar to what we found in Av5, as well as in Av4. Any or all of these three fragments may derive from the *Tattvaṭīkā*.⁷²⁴ What might this tell us about Aviddhakarṇa-the-Cārvāka?

The PPS, like the *Vipaṅcitārthā*, deserves closer scrutiny than I can give it here. What I have been trying to emphasize is Kamalaśīla’s focus on Aviddhakarṇa as a singular voice. Perhaps it is incidental that Kamalaśīla only mentions Caraka, Pātrasvāmin and Aviddhakarṇa by name. His consistency and diligence throughout the rest of the PPS, however, puts this into question. In addition, whatever his intention, the effect of the rarity of these citations is to draw our attention to them, so we might as well give them our attention.

Kamalaśīla mentions Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas repeatedly, but could not rightly attribute an argument from the *Tattvaṭīkā* to them. He also mentions “Followers of Bṛhaspati” and “Lokāyatikas” once each (both terms can be used to describe the *Cārvākasūtra* and/or its proponents), but does not attribute this view to either of them, only to “Aviddhakarṇa et al.” Perhaps he could not rightly attribute to Lokāyatikas an argument by a prominent Naiyāyika, or vice versa?

We are left with the Naiyāyika-Cārvāka conundrum.⁷²⁵ If Aviddhakarṇa was a Naiyāyika *and* a Cārvāka, we must at least ask about the transition between these two phases of his career. Av5 suggests, however faintly, that this may have been a slight conundrum, or at least a point of distinction, for Kamalaśīla, as well. He could not reduce Aviddhakarṇa to one affiliation or the other.

Albrecht Wezler⁷²⁶ argues that thinkers like Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta—though these are his only concrete examples—may have had economic or political motivations for exploring various traditions. But we need not venture outside the arguments themselves, and the responses they generated, to imagine another reason a Naiyāyika might entertain Cārvāka theory.⁷²⁷ Specifically, Av4 and Av5 raise a clear possibility: to spar with Buddhists. Eli Franco notes that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas sometimes “criticized the Buddhists with arguments that bear a baffling resemblance to those of the Carvaka.”⁷²⁸ With some amazement, he concludes that “it seems that the most orthodox and the most heterodox schools have joined forces to criticize the Buddhists.”⁷²⁹ Perhaps Aviddhakarṇa embodies the occasional borrowing between these traditions. Whether before, during, or after his stint as a Naiyāyika, Aviddhakarṇa may well have written a Cārvāka commentary as a way of weaponizing the incisive and playful reasoning of Bṛhaspati against Buddhist epistemology. At the very least, it is clear that a number of later Buddhists jumped—on cue.

Aviddhakarṇa in PVSVTĪ (cf. Appendix B).

⁷²⁴ Cārvākas are typically understood

⁷²⁵ See previous note.

⁷²⁶ Wezler 1975, esp. 144–145; see also “Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta” in the introduction of the present study.

⁷²⁷ And indeed, if Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are separate people, perhaps “et al” refers to the latter!

⁷²⁸ Franco 1997, 99.

⁷²⁹ Franco 1997, 100.

APPENDIX B

THE FRAGMENTS OF AVIDDHAKARṆA AND BHĀVIVIKTA

AVIDDHAKARṆA

Av1 rūpādyagrahe 'pi dravyagrahaṇam asty eva, yato mandamandaprakāṣe 'nupalabhyamānarūpādikaṃ dravyam upalabhyate 'niścitarūpam, gauḥ aśvo veti. nanu ca tatrāpi saṃsthānamātram upalabhyate. satyam upalabhyate na tu tadrūpādyātmakam. rūpādyātmakatve vā nilapītādiviśeṣagrahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ. tathāyaskañcukāntargate puruṣe puruṣarūpādyagrahe 'pi puruṣapratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ. rātrau ca balākānāṃ śuklarūpādyagrahe⁷³⁰ 'pi pakṣipratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ. tathā nilādyupadhānabhedānuvidhāyinaḥ sphaṭikamaṇeḥ sphaṭikarūpādyagrahe 'pi sphaṭikapratyayaḥ. tathā kaṣāyarūpeṇa paṭarūpābhībhive paṭarūpādyagrahe 'pi paṭapratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ. (VA 34.15; Av)⁷³¹

We do in fact grasp a substance even when we do not grasp color, etc. For, in dim light, a substance, without its color, etc., being perceived, is perceived in an uncertain form, e.g., as a cow or a horse.

But even in this case, isn't it that the shape alone is perceived?

True, it is perceived, yet does not consist in its color, etc. After all, if it consisted of color, etc., [then, perceiving it,] we would have to grasp its particular color, blue, yellow, or the like. In this way, we have observed that when a person is cloaked in iron armor, even though we do not grasp his complexion, we perceive a person; or, at night, even though we do not grasp the color covering a crane, we perceive a bird. Similarly, when a jewel that is crystalline conforms to a distinct support, like something blue, even though we do not grasp the crystal color, etc., we perceive the jewel. Likewise, we have observed that when we see the color of a [dyed] cloth as the reddish tint [of its dye], even though we are not seeing the color of the cloth itself, we perceive the cloth.

Av2 nanu cāsarvagatatve satīti hetuviśeṣaṇam uktam, saviśeṣaṇaś ca hetur vipakṣe nāstīti na pratijñāntaraṃ nigrahassthānam. naitad⁷³² evam asarvagataḥ śabda iti pratijñāntaropādānāt. hetuviśeṣaṇopādāne hetvantaraṃ nigrahassthānam. (VA 76.1; Av; BhṬ)

But “while not being omnipresent” conveys a qualification of the reason, and the reason with this qualification is not present in the dissimilar case, therefore this is not the ground for defeat “another proposition.”

No, because “sound is not omnipresent” is the employment of another proposition. When employing a qualification of the reason, the ground for defeat is “another reason.”

⁷³⁰ Steinkellner (16) valākāvyaṃmukta rūpādyagraha R : valākāmāṃ suklarūpādyagrahe Ms > balākānāṃ śuklarūpādyagrahe em. (Cf. n 391 regarding Steinkellner 2014.)

⁷³¹ Three pieces of information are indicated, when applicable, after the Sanskrit text of each fragment: (i) the source in which the fragment is preserved; (ii) the author(s) to whom the fragment is attributed; (iii) the text from which the fragment is cited. Abbreviations: Av = Aviddhakarṇa; Adh = Adhyayana;^a Bh = Bhāvivikta; U = Uddyotakara; & = et al; BhṬ = *Bhāṣyaṭīkā*; TṬ = *Tattvaṭīkā*. If (ii) and/or (iii) are not included, the source text lacks any such attribution.

^a Adhyayana is the name of another lost Naiyāyika. There are only a handful of known references to this thinker.

⁷³² Steinkellner (34) na hi tad R : naitad Ms.

Av3 vyaktam ekaprakṛtikam, parimitatvāt, śarāvādivad (VA 89.10; Av; BhṬ)

The manifest has a single thing as its source because it is limited, like a plate.

Av4 yady evaṃ kṛtakaś ca śabda ity etad api na vaktavyam, kiṃ kāraṇam?⁷³³ anityatvam ity etenaiva śabde ‘pi kṛtakatvam anityatvaṃ cobhayaṃ pratipadyate. yasmāt pūrvam api śabde kṛtakatvaṃ pareṇa pratipannam eva, karaṇāc chabdo ‘pi buddhau vyavasthitaḥ. ato ‘nvayavākyaena smṛtimātrakam utpādyate. apratipannakṛtakatvasya punaḥ kṛtakaś ca śabda ity etasmād api naiva bhavati.

yadvā kṛtakaḥ śabda ity etāvad vaktavyam. kṛtakatvasya tv anityatvenāvinābhāvitvaṃ parasya prasiddham iti śabde ‘py anityatvaṃ pratipadyata. (VA 105.1; Av)

If that is so, nor should “and sound is produced” be stated. What’s the reason? The word “impermanence” alone makes known that both being-produced and impermanence pertain to sound. If the other party has already learned that being produced pertains to sound, on that basis sound is also established in cognition, so that what the statement of concomitance generates is simply a memory. But for one who has yet to learn about being-produced, it certainly does not come about even on the basis of the phrase, “And sound is produced.”

Or else, to the same extent, what should be said is, “Sound is produced,” because the invariable connection between impermanence and being-produced is well-known to the other party, so it is already communicated that impermanence pertains to sound, too.

Av5 yid kyi zhes bya ba’i mngon sum tsad mar rigs pa ma yin te. sngar mngon sum gyis gzung ba las yul gzhan ma yin na de bzung zin pa ‘dzin pa’i phyir tsad ma ma yin pa kho na’o. yul don gzhan nyid yin na ni. ‘di rang dbang du ‘jug pa’i phyir dang. don thams cad yul yin pa’i phyir. ‘ga’ yang long ba la sogs pa’i dngos por mi ‘gyur ro. (PPS 92b2; Av& (*rna ma phug la sogs pa*))

It is not tenable that so-called mental perception is a means of knowledge. If its object is nothing but what was grasped by perception, then it is not a means of knowledge, because it grasps what has already been grasped. If its object is something else, then [it is not a means of knowledge] because it would function independently [of perception] and because it would have every object in its scope; but nothing comes to be an entity for the blind, etc.

Av6 dvīndriyagrāhyāgrāhyaṃ vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannaṃ buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakam svārambhakāvayavasamṇniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt, ghaṭādivat, vaidharmyeṇa paramāṇava iti.⁷³⁴ (TSP 52.13; Av)

What is perceptible and what is imperceptible to the two sense faculties that has come to be the topic of disagreement is preceded by an intelligent cause because of being distinguished by an arrangement of parts that generate [effects] in themselves, like a pot, atoms dissimilarly.

Av7 tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāni cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitāni svakāryam ārabhanta iti pratijānīmahe, rūpādīmatvāt tantvādivad.⁷³⁵ (TSP 54.1; Av)

⁷³³ Steinkellner (46) kiṃkāraṇam Re : kiṃkāraṇa Ms / (nimitta)m Re : nīm Ms.

⁷³⁴ Abhayadevasūri cites this verbatim, and Kumāriḷa seems to refer to it. See Av6_a and Av6_b below.

⁷³⁵ Abhayadevasūri cites this in a slightly more expansive form. See Av7_a below.

We know that the material causes of bodies, worlds, and instruments generate their respective effects presided over by something sentient, because of possessing color, etc., like threads, etc.

- Av8 sadādyaviśeṣaviśayāviśayajñeyaviśayā madīyā pratyakṣānumānopamānaśābdasmṛtipratyabhijñāna-siddhadarśanārṣārekaviparyayānadhyavasāyavapnavapnāntikāḥ⁷³⁶ prajñānaviśeṣā madīyaśarīrādivyতিরিক্তসাংবেদকাসাংবেদ্যাহ্ স্বাকারোঁয়ত্তাজানমবত্তবাসামঁয়বিশেষবত্তবদহঁতমকাতবঁসুতরা-বিনঁসিতবাসমঁকারঁদহঁয়াকতবপ্রত্যয়তবেহ্যাহ্ পুরুঁসঁন্তারপ্রত্যয়বত বৈদহঁরম্যেঁণা গহঁতঁদায়া. (TSP 103.7; Av)

Particular cognitions of mine—whether perception, inference, analogy, testimony, memory, recognition, established teaching, sagely wisdom, doubt, error, indefinite cognition, dream, or end of dream, whose objects are the knowable things that fall within the scope and those that do not fall within the scope of the indeterminate, existent and so forth—can only be known by a knower distinct from my body and the like, because of possessing an origin relying on its cause, possessing particular universals, consisting in awareness, perishing quickly, bestowing impressions, and being cognitions, like the cognitions of other people, unlike pots and such.

- Av9 mātur udaraniṣkramaṇottarakālam madīyādyaprajñānasamvedakasamvedyāny atakālāni madīyāni prajñānāni madīyaprajñānatvāt āyamadīyaprajñānavat.⁷³⁷ (TSP 106.1; Av)

After emerging from my mother's womb, my cognitions across time can only be known by the knower of my first cognition because they are my cognitions, like my first cognition.

- Av10 avanijalānilamanāmsi vipratipativīśayabhāvāpannāni dūrataravarttīni madīyenātmanā saha sambadhyante mūrtatvavegavattvaparativāparatvamithaḥsaṃyogavibhāgavattvebhyo, madīyaśarīrādivad. (TSP 106.7; Av)

What have come to be the objects of disagreement, earth, water, wind, and mind, which occur far apart, are connected with my self, because they have a fixed shape, they possess momentum, they have proximity and posteriority, and they possess conjunction and disjunction to each other, like my body, etc.

- Av11 sahetuko vināśaḥ kādācitkatvāt vastūtpattyanantarabhāvitvena bauddhair abhyupagamyamānatvāt prāg abhūtvātmalābhāc ca kṣaṇāntaravat, vaidharmyeṇa śaśaviśāṇādaya. (TSP 172.13; Av)

Destruction has a cause because it is incidental, because it is accepted by Buddhists as coming into its own immediately after the arising of the entity, and because it comes into its own after not previously existing, like another moment, and unlike hare's horns, etc.

- Av12 paramāṇūnām utpādakābhimatam saddharmopagatam na bhavati sattvapratipādakapramāṇāviśayatvāt kharaviśāṇavad. (TSP 233.5; Av)

What is imagined to be the generator of atoms does not actually exist because it does not fall within

⁷³⁶ Shastri prints °prabhijñānasiddhātidarśanārṣārekaviparyayāḥ and omits °nadhyavasāya°.

⁷³⁷ Jayarāśi Bhāṭṭa refers to an argument that is fairly similar to Av9, but without the distinctive phrasing of the fragment in the *Pañjikā*. See Av9_a below.

the scope of any means of knowledge that can prove existence, as in the case of donkey's horns.

- Av13 senāpratyayo⁷³⁸ gajaturaṅgasyandanādivyatiriktanibandhano gajādipratyayavilakṣaṇatvān nilapaṭapratyayavad.⁷³⁹ (TSP 265.6; Av)

The perception of number has a basis distinct from such things as elephants, horses, and chariots, because it has a different character than the perceptions of those things, as in the case of the perception of blue and a cloth.

- Av14 samūhasantānāvasthāviśeṣās tattvānyatvābhyām avacanīyā na bhavanti pratiniyatadharmayogitvād rūparasādivad. (TSP 279.14; Av)

It is not the case that specific heaps, streams, or states are inexpressible in terms of identity or difference, because they are endowed with properties restricted in each case, as in the case of color, taste, and so on.

- Av15 viprakīrṇaiś ca vacanair nekārthaḥ pratipādyate. tena sambandhasiddhyarthaṃ vācyaṃ nigamanam pṛthak. (TSP 516.1; Av)

A single aim cannot be explained with scattered statements. Therefore, a separate conclusion must be stated in order to establish the connection.

- Av16 nanu cāpramāṇena⁷⁴⁰ kimiti paraḥ pratipādyate, ubhayasiddham hi pratipādam bhavātīti. tad etad ayuktam. yasmād vacanātmakam anumānam na ca vaktuḥ pramāṇam atha ca vaktā tena param pratipādayati parapatipādanārthatvāt prayāsasya. nāvaśyam ubhayasiddhena prayojanam. (TSP 529.6; Av; TṬ)

Objection: “How can the other party be taught by a non-means of knowledge? Actually, only what is established for both is instructive.”

This is untenable. An inference consists in a statement, and is not a means of knowledge for the speaker. The speaker teaches the other party with that, since the point of the effort is teaching the other party. Hence, there is no need for what is established for both.

- Av17 āgamāt sāmānyena pratipadyate viśeṣapratipattis tūpamānād. (TSP 553.1; Av)

One learns in a general way through received knowledge, whereas learning of the particular follows from analogy.

- Av18 pratyakṣam anumānavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṃ pramāṇatvāt anumānavat. anumānam vā pratyakṣavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṃ pramāṇatvāt, pratyakṣavat. tathā svalakṣaṇam sāmānyalakṣaṇavyatiriktaprameyārthāntarasadvitīyaṃ prameyatvāt, sāmānyalakṣaṇavat. sāmānyalakṣaṇam vā svalakṣaṇavyatiriktaprameyāntarasadvitīyaṃ prameyatvāt, svalakṣaṇavad. (TSP

⁷³⁸ Shastri prints saṅkhyā° instead of senā°.

⁷³⁹ Abhayadevasūri cites this argument in a slightly different form; see Av13_a below.

⁷⁴⁰ Shastri and Krishnamacharya both print *nanu vāpramāṇena*. Tib. *‘on te tsad ma ma yin pas ci’i phyir gzhan rtogs par byed de*.

556.14; Av)

Perception is accompanied by another means of knowledge, apart from inference, because it is a means of knowledge, like inference; or inference is accompanied by another means of knowledge, apart from perception, because it is a means of knowledge; like perception. In the same way, unique particulars are accompanied by another object of knowledge, apart from universals, because they are objects of knowledge, like universals; or universals are accompanied by another object of knowledge, apart from unique particulars, because they are objects of knowledge, like unique particulars.

Av19 satyam anumānam iṣyata evāsmābhiḥ pramāṇam lokapratītatvāt kevalam liṅgalakṣaṇam ayuktam. (PVSVT 19.3; Av)

True, we actually accept that inference is a means of knowledge, but only insofar as it is commonly accepted in the world; the definition of the mark is untenable.

Av20 anadhigatārthaparicchittiḥ pramāṇam ato nānumānam pramāṇam arthaparicchadakatvābhāvād. (PVSVT 25.5; Av)

A means of knowledge delimits a matter that has not yet been understood, ergo inference is not a means of knowledge, because it does not have the condition of delimiting an object.

Av21 yadi tulāntayor nāmonnāmavat kāryotpattikāla eva kāraṇavināśaḥ, tarhi⁷⁴¹ kāryakāraṇabhāvo na syād yataḥ kāraṇasya vināśaḥ kāraṇotpādaḥ.⁷⁴² evaṃ bhāva eva nāśa iti vacanād evaṃ ca kāraṇena saha kāryam utpannam iti prāptam. yadi ca bhāva eva nāśaḥ prathame 'pi kṣaṇe bhāvasya na sattā syāt vināśād. bhāvanivṛttis ca vināśo lokapratīto na bhāva eva. sarvakālam ca nāśasadbhāvād bhāvasya sattvaṃ syāt. atha kāraṇotpādāt kāraṇavināśo bhinnas tadā kṛtakasvabhāvatvam anityatvasya na syāt. vyatirikte ca nāśe jāte tasya kṣaṇasya na nivṛttir iti katham kṣaṇikatvam. (PVSVT 90.26; AdhAvU&)

If the destruction of the cause occurs at the very moment of the origination of the effect, like the rising and falling of the two sides of a scale, this would not be a causal relation, since the destruction of the cause is the origination of the cause, which follows from the statement, “Existence itself is destruction.” And in the same way it would obtain that the effect arises together with the cause.

Further, if existence itself is destruction, then existence would have no being even at the first moment, because there would be destruction. And destruction is commonly understood as the cessation of existence, not existence itself. Also, because destruction would really exist for all time, existence would exist for all time.

If the destruction of the cause were distinct from the origination of the cause, then impermanence would not be the intrinsic condition of objects that are produced. But if destruction were produced as something distinct, there would be no cessation of this moment; how would it have momentariness?

⁷⁴¹ The manuscript reads *yadi*, but Sāṃkṛtyāyana proposes *tadā*, which fits the context better; I am modifying his emendation to *tarhi*, in line with the repetition of *yadi... tarhi* in the surrounding context of the *Ṭīkā*.

⁷⁴² Sāṃkṛtyāyana adds the *visarga*. If the absence of the *visarga* is not accidental, *kāraṇotpāda evaṃ* suggests the locative form *kāraṇotpāde* before sandhi, giving the sense, “the destruction of the cause occurs *at* the origination of the cause.”

Av22 avinābhāvitvaṃ ekaṃ dr̥ṣṭvā dvitīyādīdarśane sati siddhyati. na ca kṣaṇikavādino draṣṭur avasthānam⁷⁴³ asti. na cānyenānubhūte 'rthe 'nyasyāvinābhāvitvasmaraṇam asty atiprasaṅgāt. (PVSVT 98.10; Av)

The fact of an invariable relation is proven when, after seeing it once, one sees it for a second time, and so on. Yet, for the proponent of momentariness, the seer does not endure, and one person does not recall the invariable relation upon another person perceiving something, as that strains logic.

VARIANTS

Av6_a sanniveśaviśiṣṭānām utpattim yo gr̥hādivat | sādhyec cetanādhiṣṭhāṃ dehānāṃ tasya cottaram. (ŚV (Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 74) 467.21)

The [proceeding verses give the] response to someone who would argue that the origination of bodies, with their particular arrangements, is overseen by something sentient.

Av6_b dvīndriyagrāhyāgrāhyaṃ vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannam buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakam svārambhakāvayavasamniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt, ghaṭādivat, vaidharmyeṇa paramāṇava iti. (TBV⁷⁴⁴ 100.34; Av)

What is perceptible and what is imperceptible to the two sense faculties that has come to be the topic of disagreement is preceded by an intelligent cause because of being distinguished by an arrangement of parts that generate [effects] in themselves, like a pot, atoms dissimilarly.

Av7_a tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāni cetanācetanāni cetanādhiṣṭhitāni svakāryam arabhanta iti pratijānīmahe, rūpādīmatvāt, yad yad rūpādīmat tat tat cetanādhiṣṭhitam svakāryam ārabhate, yathā tantvādi, rūpādīmac ca tanubhuvanakaraṇādīkaraṇam, tasmāc cetanādhiṣṭhitam svakāryam ārabhate. yo 'sau cetanas tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāder adhiṣṭatā sa bhagavān īśvara. (TBV 101.12; Av)

We know that the material causes of bodies, worlds, and instruments, both sentient and insentient, generate their respective effects presided over by something sentient, because of possessing color, etc.. Whatever possesses color, etc., generates its effects presided over by something sentient, like threads, etc., and the cause of bodies, worlds, and instruments possesses color, etc., therefore it generates its effects presided over by something sentient. This sentient thing that presides over such things as the material causes of bodies and worlds is the lord Īśvara.

Av9_a mātur udarāniṣkramaṇānantaram yad ādyaṃ jñānam taj jñānāntarapūrvakam jñānatvād dvitīyajñānavat.⁷⁴⁵ (TUS 57.3)

⁷⁴³ The edition reads *draṣṭur ara(?)vasthānam*.

⁷⁴⁴ The *Pañjikā* is one of the direct sources, if not the direct source, for the citations of Aviddhakarṇa (and others) in the *Tattvabodhavidhānī*. For example, Abhayadevasūri copies Kamalaśīla's explanatory comments on Av6 verbatim and only slightly reworks his refutation of Av13.

⁷⁴⁵ Esther Solomon (1971, 22) describes this as "almost the same words" as Av9, but the wording, and reasoning, is actually rather different. This argument more directly fits with NS 3.1.18–26, which seeks to prove the permanence and rebirth of the self on the basis of an infant's innate knowledge. In addition, Solomon also says that Jayarāśī cites this

The first cognition immediately after emerging from the womb is preceded by another cognition, because it is a cognition, like the second cognition.

Av13_a gajaturagasyandanādivyatiriktanimittaprabhavaḥ senāpratyayaḥ, gajādipratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt, vastracarmakambaleṣu nilapratyayavad. (TBV 674.17; Av)

The perception of number has as its source a basis distinct from such things as elephants, horses, and chariots, because it has a different character than the perceptions of those things, as in the case of the perception of blue in cloths, hides, and blankets.

Av21_a yadi tulāntayor nāmonnāmavat kāryotpattikāla eva kāraṇavināśas tadā kāryakāraṇabhāvo na bhavet yataḥ [?? kāraṇasya vināśaḥ kāraṇotpāda eva nāśaḥ??]⁷⁴⁶ iti vacanāt evaṃ ca kāraṇena saha kāryam utpannam iti prāptam. yadi ca sa eva nāśaḥ prathame ‘pi kṣaṇe na sattā bhāvasya syāt vināśāt tadaiva loke ca bhāvanivṛttir vināśaḥ pratītaḥ na bhāva eva, sarvakālaṃ ca vināśasambhavāt sarvadā bhāvasya sattvaṃ syāt. vyatirikte ca nāśe samutpanne na bhāvasya nivṛttir iti kathaṃ kṣaṇikatvam. (TBV 332.15; AdhAvU&)

If the destruction of the cause occurs at the very moment of the origination of the effect, like the rising and falling of the two sides of a scale, this would not be a causal relation, since [it is the destruction of the cause], which follows from the statement, “[The arising of the cause is itself destruction.]” And in the same way it would obtain that the effect arises together with the cause.

Further, if it itself is destruction, then existence would have no being even at the first moment, because there would be destruction. And in the world, destruction is understood as the cessation of existence, not existence itself. Also, because destruction would be possible exist for all time, existence would exist for all time. But if destruction were produced as something distinct, there would be no cessation of existence; how would there be momentariness?

REPORTS

1. itarasyācetanasya vā bhūmyādeḥ mūrtasya, anenāviddhakarṇasya samayo darśitaḥ. (SVṬ 306.22)

Of the other or of the insentient, earth and the like, that which has a fixed shape—this presents the tenet of Aviddhakarṇa.

2. sarvatra ca viruddhāvyabhicārī sambhavati. tad yathā, anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti kṛte kaścid viruddhāvyabhicāriṇam āha nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāc chabdatvavad iti. evamādis tattvaṭīkāyām^a udāharaṇaprapaṅco draṣṭavyaḥ. (TSP 521.4; TṬ)

And in every case, the opposite inference is possible. So, for example, when the argument “Sound is impermanent because it is produced, like a pot,” has been made, someone may state the opposite the opposite inference, “Sound is permanent because it is audible, like soundness.” A proliferation of examples such as this can be seen in the *Tattvaṭīkā*.

“with a specific reference to Aviddhakarṇa,” but he only characterizes this argument as *anyaduktam*, “stated by another.”

⁷⁴⁶ As printed in the edition.

3. tathā ca kāryakāraṇayor buddhikāyayoḥ madhye tasya kāraṇasya nivṛttito vinipātāt nāsti saṃsāraḥ kāyāntarasamcāraḥ. kuto nāsti? buddher avasthānāt tasyā eva tadupagamād iti cet. na, kāryasya buddheḥ abhāvagateḥ abhāvaprāpter abhāvanirṇayād vā. na hi kāraṇanivṛtttau kāryasyāvasthānam atatkāryatvāpatteḥ. ity evam kaścana cārvākaviśeṣo 'viddhakarṇaḥ. (NViV [v.2] 101.23; Av)

“And in this way, concerning the body and the intellect, which are cause and effect, because of the cessation, the death, of the cause, there is no samsara, no transition to another both. Why not? You may say, ‘Because of the stability of the intellect, because it itself is what reaches there.’ Not so, because the effect, the intellect, goes to non-existence, i.e., because it comes not to exist or because its non-existence is ascertained. For it is not the case that the effect remains in the cessation of the cause, because this would incur that it is not the effect of that.” Thus said⁷⁴⁷ someone, i.e., a particular Cārvāka, Aviddhakarṇa.

⁷⁴⁷ This may appear to be a fragment, but Vādirājasūri is clearly just glossing the terms in Akalaṅkadeva’s root text: kāryakāraṇayor buddhikāyayos tannivṛttitaḥ || 70 || kāryābhāvagater nāsi saṃsāra iti kaścana (NViV 101.2).

BHĀVIVIKTA

Bh1 samūhavācakaśabdavācyatvād. (VA 85.3; Bh; BhT)

Because of being expressible by a word expressive of a heap

Bh2 sthūlatvān nedaṃ⁷⁴⁸ nigrahassthānam iti cet. prāśnikaprativādisannidhau pratijñātārthāpahnavaṃ karotīti. asambaddham ucyate tatrābhīprāyāparijñānāt. na brūmo dhvaṃsī śabda iti, kiṃ tu saṃyogavibhāgābhyāṃ na vyajyata⁷⁴⁹ iti ayaṃ pratijñātārtha ity āha sāmānyasya ca svāśrayavyaṅgyatvāt vyabhicārābhāva⁷⁵⁰ iti. nigrahassthānaṃ tu pūrvam apratijñātārthatvāt,⁷⁵¹ anaikāntikadoṣeṇa pratiṣedhe hetau pratijñātārthāpahnavaṃ karotīti nigṛhyate. (VA 93.7; Bh)

You may say, “This is not grounds for defeat because of its coarseness. It is in the presence of the examiner, the opponent, and so on, that he performs the concealment of the matter proposed.”

We say this is absurd, because in such a case there is no discernment of the intention.

“We do not say, ‘Sound is perishable.’ Rather, we say the matter proposed is ‘not manifested by conjunction or disjunction,’ and there is no deviation because universals are manifested in their respective substrata.”

But this is already grounds for defeat, because this is not the matter proposed. When the reason is refuted by the defect of inconclusiveness, he denies the matter proposed, and, so, is defeated.

Bh3 yasmād dhetoḥ⁷⁵² prakaraṇacintā vipakṣasyāpi vicāraḥ paścād bhavati, sa evaṃlakṣaṇo hetur⁷⁵³ nirṇayāya yo ‘padiśyamānaḥ prakaraṇasamo bhavati, prakaraṇe sādhye samo tulyaḥ sattve ‘sattve vā. yathā sat sarvajñatvam,⁷⁵⁴ itaradviparītavinirmuktatvād,⁷⁵⁵ rūpādivat iti. yasmād ayaṃ hetur ubhayatra samānaḥ, yo ‘py asattvam sādhyati tasyāpi samānaḥ. katham? asat sarvajñatvam, itaradviparītavinirmuktatvāt, kharaviṣṇavat iti. na cāyaṃ kilobhayadharmatve ‘py anaikāntikaḥ, vipakṣavṛttivaikalyāt. (VA 134.1; Bh)

Say there is a reason from which there arises anxiety about the *prakaraṇa*, i.e., hesitation even after the dissimilar case; that, a reason characterized in that way, being adduced for ascertainment, would be *prakaraṇasama*, neutral to the *prakaraṇa*, i.e., comparable to what is to be proven, existence or non-existence.

For example, “Omniscience exists because it is free from what is contrary to that, as is color, etc.” Since this reason is the same in both cases, it is the same as that which proves non-existence, too. How so? “Omniscience does not exist because it is free from what is contrary to that, as is a donkey’s horn.” And this indeed is not inconclusive, even if it is a property of both, because it lacks presence in the dissimilar case.

⁷⁴⁸ Steinkellner (41) sthūlatvenedaṃ R: sthūlatvā nedaṃ Ms > sthūlatvā(n) nedaṃ em.

⁷⁴⁹ Steinkellner (41) na vyakta R : na vyajyata Ms.

⁷⁵⁰ Steinkellner (41) vivādābhāva R : vicārābhāva Ms > v(yabh)icārābhāva em.

⁷⁵¹ Steinkellner (41) °ārthatvāt Re : °ārthātāt Ms. [This, presumably, was an error in the ms.]

⁷⁵² Steinkellner (60) heto(h) Re : heto Ms.

⁷⁵³ My emendation. The editions read *hetu*°, and Steinkellner does not comment, but *saḥ* must construe with *hetuḥ*.

⁷⁵⁴ My emendation. Ed. read *sarvajñam*; no comment from Steinkellner.

⁷⁵⁵ My emendation. Ed. *itaratadviparītavinirmuktatvād*, no comment from Steinkellner.

Bh4 aviśeṣāspadapadārthāntarbhūtajñeyaviṣayatve sati. (TSP 113.14; Bh)

Under the condition that its referent is a knowable thing included in the categories that are the seat of the indeterminate.

Bh5 pratyakṣata evātmā siddhaḥ. tathā hi liṅgaliṅgisambandhasmrtyanapekṣam aham iti jñānaṃ rūpādijñānavat pratyakṣam. asya ca na rūpādir viṣayas tadvijñānabhinnaḥ pratyakṣatvāt. tasmād anya eva viṣaya. (TSP 115.11; UBh&)

The self is actually established through perception. To explain: Without requiring a recollection of the connection between mark and marked, the cognition “I” is a perception, like the cognition of color, etc. But its object is not color, etc., because it has a different appearance than that. Therefore, its object is something else.

Bh6 vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannāni candrārkaḥ grahaṇakṣatradijñānāni vivakṣitacandrārkaḥ grahaṇakṣatratāraḥ kādiviṣayaṃ yad devadattādivijñānaṃ tatkalāvaccinnacandrārkaḥ grahaṇakṣatratāraḥ kādiviṣayaṃ eva, pṛthvīsambandhitvenānupalabhyamānavat sati candrārkaḥ grahaṇakṣatratāraḥ kādiviṣayaḥ śabdavācyatvāt, prathamakālabhāvidevattatāraḥ kādiviṣayaḥ. (TSP 202.8; Bh)

The cognitions of things like the moon, the sun, planets, asterisms, and so on, that have come to be the topic of disagreement, must have as their objects the moon, sun, planets, asterisms, stars, and so on, that were singled out at the time of a cognition, e.g., of Devadatta’s that had as its object the moon, sun, planet, asterism, star, or the like, in question. This is because, given that they are not being perceived as having a connection with the earth, they are expressible by the words for cognitions of the moon, the sun, planets, asterisms, stars, and so on, like, Devadatta’s cognition of stars, etc., that arose in the first instance.

Bh7 ye rūpatvādisāmānyāśrayāḥ, ye ca tadāśrayāḥ, tadviṣayās ca ye pratyakṣānumānopamānaśābdasmṛti-pratyabhijñānārśasiddhadarśanārekaviparyayānadhyaśāyasvapnasvapnāntikāḥ⁷⁵⁶ prajñānaviśeṣāḥ te sarve svātmalābhānantaraprādhvaṃsino na bhavanti jñeyatvaprameyatvābhidheyatvasadasad-anyataratvasadasadvyatiriktajñeyaviṣayajñānānavacchedyatvāgrāhyaviṣayagrahaṇāgrāhyatvānabhidheyābhidhāyākānabhidheyatvasamānāsamānājātīyadravyasaṃyogavibhāgajanitaśabdakāryaśabdābhidheyatvebhyāḥ prāgabhāvādivad. (TSP 203.1; Bh)

The substrata of universals like color-ness, their substrata, and the particular cognitions—whether perception, inference, analogy, testimony, memory, recognition, sagely wisdom, established teaching, doubt, error, indefinite cognition, dream, or end of dream—that have those as their objects are all not subject to destruction immediately after coming into their own. This is because they are cognizable; because knowable; because denotable; because either existent or non-existent; because of not being delimitable by a cognition of cognizable objects apart from what is existent or non-existent; because of not being graspable by the grasping of an ungraspable object; because of not being denotable by what denotes the undenotable; and because of being denotable by a sound that is the effect of a sound produced by the conjunction and disjunction of homogeneous and heterogeneous samāna substances; like prior non-existence, etc.

Bh8 guṇavyatirikto guṇī samupalabhyata eva, tadrūpādiguṇāgrahaṇe 'pi tasya grahaṇāt. tathā hi

⁷⁵⁶ Shastri prints °ārtha° instead of °ārṣa°, and °ānuvyavasāya° instead of °ānadhyaśāya°, but J confirms that the list is the same as in Av8.

sphaṭīkopalāḥ sannihitopadhānāvasthāyāṃ svagataśuklaguṇānupalambhe 'pi dṛśyata eva. balākādiś ca rātrau mandamandaprakāśāyāṃ tadgatasitādirūpādarśane 'pi gṛhyata eva. tathāprapadīna-kañcukāvachannaśarīre puṃśi tadiyaśyāmādirūpādyagrahaṇe 'pi pumān pumān iti pratyayaḥ prasūyata eva. kaśyakuṅkumādirakte vāsasi tadrūpasya saṃsarpirūpeṇābhībhūtasūyānupalambhe 'pi vastradhīr bhavaty eva.⁷⁵⁷ (TSP 234.12; UBh&)

The quality-possessor is actually perceived apart from its qualities, because it is grasped even when its qualities, color etc., are not grasped. To explain: We see a rock that is crystalline when it is situated on an adjacent surface even if the quality of clearness that pertains to it is not perceived; and a crane, or the like, is grasped even at night, in dim light, when the color pertaining to it, white or the like, is not grasped. Similarly, when a man's body is covered in armor from head to toe, even though we do not see the color of, e.g., his dark complexion, the cognition, "man," does in fact arise. When a cloth is dyed reddish yellow, saffron, or the like, even though we do not perceive its color, which has been overcome by the permeating color, there is in fact a cognition of a cloth.

Bh9 gavāśvamahiṣavarāhamātaṅgādiṣu gavādyabhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣāḥ samayākr̥tipiṇḍādivyatirikta-svarūpānurūpasamārginimittāntaranibandhanā ity avaghoṣaṇā. gavādiviṣayatve sati piṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānavyatiriktābhidhānajñānavat, teṣv eva gavādiṣu savatsā gaur bhārākrānto mahiṣaḥ saśalyo varāhaḥ sāṅkuśo mātaṅga ityādyabhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣavat, vaidharmyena piṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣāḥ. yāni ca tāni nimittāntarāṇi tāni gotvādīnīti siddham. (TSP 294.16; Bh)

With regard to cows, horses, buffalo, boar, elephants, and so on, particular terms and cognitions, such as "cow," have as their basis other causes that are distinct from conventions, forms, bodies, etc., and that are merged with what conforms to their character—that is the proclamation. This is because, under the condition that cows, etc., are their objects, they are terms and cognitions distinct from the terms and cognitions of the nature of bodies, etc. It is like the particular terms and cognitions, "cow with calf," "overloaded buffalo," "wounded boar," "goaded elephant," and so on, with regard to the same cows, etc., and unlike the particular terms and cognitions of the nature of bodies, etc. And these other causes are cowness—so it is established.

Bh10 na hi sarvatra nimittānurūpaḥ pratyaya iṣyate. tathā hi gajaturagadhavakhadirādisamavāyini bahutvasaṅkhyā senāvanādibuddhīnāṃ nimittam, pānakakāñjikādibuddhīnāṃ vijātiyadravyasaṃyogo nimittam, anyathā hi bahavaḥ saṃyuktā iti ca pratyayaḥ syād. (TSP 309.13; Bh)

In fact, it is not the case that a cognition conforms to its basis in every case—that is the meaning. To explain: The number plurality, which inheres in elephants and horses, axewoods and acacias, etc., is the basis of cognitions of an army or a forest, etc.; the conjunction of heterogeneous substances is the basis of cognitions of a potion or a soup, etc. For otherwise the cognition would be "many" or "conjoined."

Bh11 nendriyavijñānaṃ savikalpakamanovijñānakāraṇaṃ bhinnaviṣayatvād rūpasparśādijñānavat, nirvikalpakatvāc ca cakṣurādivad. (TSP 478.12; Bh&)

Sensory cognition is not the cause of conceptual mental cognition because of having a different

⁷⁵⁷ J reads °āpradīpana° for °āprapadīna° and appears to read °sargni° for °sarpi°.

object, like cognitions of color, touch, etc., and because it is non-conceptual, like the eye, etc.

Bh12 na khalu pakṣadharmatvaṃ pratijñānantarabhāvinā hetuvacanena prakāśyate kāraṇamātrābhīdhānāt. anityaḥ śabda bhavati kṛtakatvāt, tat punaḥ kṛtakatvaṃ kiṃ śabde 'sti nāstīti ceti, tasyāstītvam upanayāt pratiyate.

athavā pratibimbanārtham upanayanaṃ, pūrvam hi hetuvacanena nirviśeṣaṃ kṛtakatvaṃ śabde nirdiṣṭam, tena dṛṣṭānte pradarśitasādhyāvinābhāvitvasya kṛtakatvasyopanayena pratibimbanam cumṣanam[?]⁷⁵⁸ ādarśyate tathā ca kṛtakaḥ śabda iti. tasmād viśeṣadyotanān na punaruktatā. (TSP 514.3; Bh&ç)

Actually, being a property of the locus is not illuminated by the statement of the reason, which appears right after the proposition, because it denotes the reason alone. Sound is impermanent because of producedness, but does this producedness pertain to sound or not? One learns that it does after the application.

Alternatively, the purpose of the application is representation. Indeed, the statement of the reason first indicates, without distinction, that producedness pertains to sound; then producedness is shown in the example to have an invariable relation with the property to be proven; the representation of producedness is indicated by the application. Through the application, it is shown: “And, in this way, sound is produced.” Therefore, because it illuminates a distinction, it is not redundant.

REPORTS

1. cirantanaçārvākair hi bhāviviktaprabhṛtibhir bhūtebhyaś caitanyam iti sūtram bhūtebhya iti pañcamyantapadayojanayā vyākhyātāṃ bhūtebhya utpadyate caitanyam iti. (NMGBh 197.4)

Indeed, the ancient Çārvākas, beginning with Bhāvivikta, glossed the sutra *bhūtebhyaś caitanyam* in terms of the ablative construction, i.e., “consciousness (*caitanya*) is produced (*utpadyate*) from the elements (*bhūtebhyah*).

⁷⁵⁸ TSP *upanayād*. J (167r.1) and P (125r.2) both read *cumṣanamādarśyate*, or something along those lines.

Krishnamacharya (1928, 420) prints *usanasā*, eliding *c* and *m*, and proposes *upanayāt* in brackets; Shastri more or less follows suit, listing °*nam cuṣanamād*° in a footnote.

The Tibetan is inconclusive. The key excerpt is *dpe la bstan pa'i byas pa de bsgrub bya med na mi 'byung ba nyid ni nye bar sbyor bas bzlas pa yin nol de bzhin du sgra la yang byas pa nyid yin no zhes bya bas 'dra bar bstan pa yin nol de lta bas na khyad par bsal bar bya ba'i phyir zlos pa ma yin no zhes zer ro*. Does *bzlas pa* (recited, repeated) correspond in some way to the corrupted term in the Sanskrit? In the final sentence, *zlos pa* renders *punaruktatā*, so *bzlas pa* presumably means something similar. This would work fairly well if *bzlas pa* was meant to render *pratibimbanam* together with the mystery word, in the sense “the mirroring [read: reflection, i.e., reiteration] is stated/brought about by the application.”

If the syllables had actually been *usanamāddarśyate*, rather than *cumṣanamādarśyate*, I would find Krishnamacharya's emendation more compelling. In addition, adding *upanayāt* would require reading *pratibimbanam* as the end of a clause (perhaps with *nirdiṣṭam* carried over from the previous line), and *upanayād darśyate* as the beginning of a new one. But then the Sanskrit would have a slightly odd redundancy. Eliding this strange collection of syllables altogether, we can then read *pratibimbanam* as the patient of *darśyate* or *ādarśyate*, and *upanayena* as the agent. I think this makes the construction beginning with *tena* more satisfyingly ornate, and I have tentatively taken this approach in my translation. Alas, this does not at all solve the problem of *cumṣanam*. Derivations of verbs like *śams* (recite, repeat) and *kumś* (speak) could fit quite close syllabically and semantically but would be rare and especially surprising in such a prosaic context.

APPENDIX C

NYĀYASŪTRA

OUTLINE

N.B. This is not intended as a robust or definitive statement on the structure of the *Nyāyasūtra*, but rather as a condensed (*saṃkṣipta*) point of entry for the reader—my intention is to provide a sense of the context of the various passages in the present study that are lifted from this intricate text. The *Nyāyasūtra* is divided into five books (*adhyāya*) with two daily lessons (*āhnikā*) each; a lesson contains anywhere from twenty to over seventy sutras. I indicate the demarcations between the books and lessons; but topics are not necessarily confined to a single book or lesson, so the levels of the outline do not conform to these, but rather follow the sequence of topics. Sutras or groups of sutras are numbered according to Thakur 1996a. “[1.1.1]” means “book one, lesson one, sutra one.” “[5]” means “sutra five (within the book and lesson under discussion).” Sutras directly discussed in the present study are indicated in **bold**.

BOOK ONE, LESSON ONE

■ Introduction

- [1.1.1] The highest good (*niḥśreyasa*) is acquired through knowledge of the sixteen principles (*tattva-jñāna*): (i) means of knowledge; (ii) objects of knowledge; (iii) doubt; (iv) purpose; (v) examples; (vi) doctrines; (vii) components; (viii) reasoning; (ix) ascertainment; (x) debates; (xi) quarrels; (xii) attacks; (xiii) fallacious reasons; (xiv) equivocation; (xv) futile rejoinders; (xvi) grounds for defeat
- [1.1.2] Emancipation (*apavarga*) follows upon the successive destruction of pain, birth, activity, defects, and false knowledge

■ Definition of the sixteen principles

- [1.1.3] Means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), four
 - [1.1.4] Perception (*pratyakṣa*): **a cognition generated by contact between a sense faculty and an object that is non-linguistic, non-deviating, and determinate**
 - [5] Inference (*anumāna*)
 - [1.1.6] Analogy (*upamāna*): **proving something through similarity with something familiar**
 - [7–8] Testimony (*śabda*)
- [1.1.9] Objects of knowledge (*prameya*), twelve
 - [1.1.10] **Self (*ātman*): indicated by desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain, and cognition**
 - [11–13] Body (*śarīra*); sense faculties (*indriya*)
 - [1.1.14] **Objects: odor, taste, color, touch, sound; qualities of/and⁷⁵⁹ earth, etc.**
 - [1.1.15] Cognition (*buddhi*): synonymous with *jñāna* and *upalabdhi*
 - [16–22] Mind (*manas*); activity (*pravṛtti*); defects (*doṣa*); rebirth (*pratyabhāva*); results (*phala*); pain (*duḥkha*); emancipation (*apavarga*)
- [23–25] Doubt (*saṃśaya*); purpose (*prayojana*); examples (*dṛṣṭānta*)
- [26–31] Doctrines (*siddhānta*), five
- [1.1.32] Components (*avayava*), five
 - [33] Proposition (*pratijñā*): indicating what is to be proven
 - [34] Reason (*hetu*): proving what is to be proven
 - through similarity
 - [35] or through dissimilarity

⁷⁵⁹ Vātsyāyana: *of*; Uddyotakara: *and*. Cf. §9.

- [36] Exemplification (*udāharana*)
 - similar
 - [37] or dissimilar
- [1.1.38] Application (*upanaya*): relating the subject to the example
- [1.1.39] Conclusion (*nigamana*): restating the proposition after indicating the reason
- [40] Reasoning (*tarka*)
- [41] Ascertainment (*niścaya*)

BOOK ONE, LESSON TWO

- Definition of the sixteen principles, continued
 - [1.2.1–3] Debate (*vāda*); quarrel (*jalpa*); attack (*viṭandā*)
 - [1.2.4] Fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsa*), five
 - [5] Inconclusive (*avyabhicāra*)
 - [6] Contrary (*viruddha*)
 - [1.2.7] Neutral to the dialectic (*prakaraṇa-sama*): putting forth as the reason a fact that only perpetuates the question at hand.
 - [8] Similar to what is to be proven (*sādhyā-sama*)
 - [9] Past time (*kālātīta*)
 - [10–17] Equivocation (*chala*)
 - [18–20] Futile rejoinders (*jāti*); grounds for defeat (*nigrahasthāna*)

BOOK TWO, LESSON ONE

- Examination of (iii) doubt (*saṃśaya*)
 - [2.1.1–5] Objection to the definition in 1.1.23
 - [6–7] Clarification of the definition of doubt
- Examination of (i) the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*)
 - Introduction
 - [2.1.8–11] *Objection*: There are no means of knowledge
 - [12–15] *Response*: Then by what means do you prove that there is no means of knowledge?
 - [16–] A means of knowledge is also an object of knowledge, depending on the circumstances
 - [17–18] *Objection*: This implies that there are additional means of knowledge by which the means of knowledge are themselves known
 - [19–20] *Response*: Not so, it is like the light of a lamp
 - Perception
 - Defense
 - [21–23] Objection to the definition in 1.1.4
 - [24–30] Defense of the definition of perception
 - [2.1.31–36] Auxiliary: Mereology
 - [2.1.31] *Opponent*: Perception is actually inference, because we apprehend something after grasping only one part
 - [2.1.32] *Response*: No; to the extent we apprehend it, it is through perception
 - [2.1.33] *Objection*: You have yet to prove that wholes exist
 - [2.1.34–5] *Response*: If there were no wholes, we would not grasp anything, and holding and pulling would be impossible
 - [2.1.36] It is not like grasping an army or a forest because atoms, the components of a whole, are beyond the senses
 - Inference

- Defense
 - [2.1.37] *Opponent*: Inference is a non-means of knowledge (*apramāṇa*) because examples of each species of inference can be shown to deviate
 - [2.1.38] *Response*: The examples offered are fallacious arguments, undergirding the authority of a valid inference
- Auxiliary: Time
 - [2.1.39] *Objection*: What is falling can only occur in the temporality of what has fallen or is going to fall; there is no present moment
 - [2.1.40] *Response*: Past and future rely on the present; neither can exist without it
 - [2.1.41] It has not been proven that past and future are mutually dependent
 - [2.1.42] Without the present, perception is impossible; we would not grasp anything
 - [2.1.43] Our notions of past and future entail the existence of the present
- Analogy
 - [2.1.44–45] Defense of the tenability of analogical cognition
 - [46–48] Distinction from inference
- Testimony
 - [49–56] The statement of a trustworthy source
 - [57–68] Veda

BOOK TWO, LESSON TWO

- [2.2.1–12] The number of means of knowledge
 - [1–2] Other means of knowledge can be reduced to the four
 - [3–6] Presumption (*arthāpatti*)
 - [7–12] Absence (*abhāva*)
- [2.2.13–69] Theory of language
 - The impermanence of sound
 - [2.2.13–17] Proof of the impermanence of sound
 - [2.2.13] **Three reasons: it has a beginning; it is sensuous; we refer to it as something produced**
 - [2.2.14] *Objection*: No, for three reasons: the permanence of the absence of a pot after it perishes; the permanence of universals; we refer to permanent things as impermanent
 - [2.2.15] *Response*: There is a distinction between primary and secondary uses of notions like “permanent”
 - [2.2.16] “Because it is sensuous” is not its own reason, but a qualification of the inference of the series, i.e., sound is produced because someone hears a sound from afar after the conjunction that creates it has ceased, like the sound of chopping wood
 - [2.2.17] When describing the movement of sound through ether, we refer to a “portion” of ether, but only in the sense that ether is a causal substance
 - [18–39] Refutation of the permanence of sound
 - Syllables
 - [40–57] Contra Sāṃkhya, the diversity in letters and syllables cannot be the result of the transformation of permanent sound
 - Words
 - [58–65] Do words refer to an individual, a form, or a class?
 - [2.2.66] A word can refer to all three
 - [2.2.67] An individual (*vyakti*) is a material body with particular qualities
 - [2.2.68] “Form” (*ākṛti*) is the name for the marks of a class (*jāti*)
 - [2.2.69] Class (*jāti*) is what generates generality

BOOK THREE, LESSON ONE

- Examination of (ii) the objects of knowledge (*prameya*)
 - [3.1.1–26] Self
 - Existence
 - [3.1.1] **Because a single thing can be both seen and touched**
 - [3.1.2] *Objection:* This is not so, because objects are restricted to particular sense faculties
 - [3.1.3] *Response:* In fact, the differentiation of the senses entails that there must be a single agent binding together the different sense modalities
 - Difference from body
 - [4] Killing would not accrue demerit if there is no self apart from the body
 - [5] *Objection:* If the self is eternal, there is nothing to kill
 - [6] *Response:* “Killing” is the destruction of the body and sense faculties that belong to the self
 - Difference from sense faculties
 - [7–11] The fact that there are two eyes
 - [3.1.12] **An object perceived by one sense can spark the recollection of another**
 - [3.1.13] *Objection:* This cannot be so, as we only recall what is recallable
 - [3.1.14] *Response:* In fact, memory is a property of the self.
 - Difference from mind
 - [15–17] The mind is an instrument of the self like the sense faculties
 - Eternality
 - [3.1.18] A newborn experiences fear, joy, and sorrow based on recollection of past experience
 - [3.1.19] *Objection:* These are just modifications of a transient soul
 - [3.1.20] *Response:* What causes such a modification?
 - [3.1.21] After death, upon rebirth, there is desire for milk
 - [3.1.22] *Objection:* This is like iron moving towards a magnet
 - [3.1.23] *Response:* Neither example is fortuitous; both have specific causes
 - [3.1.24] We never observe a newborn free from desire
 - [3.1.25] *Objection:* Birth is like the birth of a new substance with its qualities
 - [3.1.26] *Response:* Not so, because desire, etc., are caused by volition
 - [3.1.27–31] Body
 - Composed of earth, or some combination of elements?
 - [3.1.32–61] Sense faculties
 - Evolved of *prakṛti*?
 - [32–36] Discussion with Sāṃkhya
 - [37–50] Perceptual theory
 - [3.1.51] **How many are there?**
 - [3.1.52] *Opponent:* **There is only touch**
 - [3.1.53–54] *Response:* No, because we do not perceive objects simultaneously (*yugapad*); it would be contradictory for there to be touch alone
 - [3.1.55] **There are five sense faculties because there are five objects**
 - [3.1.56] *Objection:* No, there are many of them
 - [3.1.57] *Response:* They are rightly grouped into five
 - [3.1.58] *Objection:* Then all five can be grouped into one
 - [3.1.59] *Response:* **No, the five have significant distinctions**
 - [60] The sense faculties and their objects correspond to their respective elements
 - [3.1.61–72] Objects
 - Composed of the elements

BOOK THREE, LESSON TWO

- [3.2.1–55] Cognition (*buddhi*)
 - [3.2.1] Is *buddhi* transient and limited or eternal and all-pervading?
 - [2] *Sāṃkhya*: The latter, because otherwise recognition would be impossible.
 - [3–8] Response
 - [3.2.9] *Sāṃkhya*: We only imagine there are different *buddhis*, just as we imagine there to be a different crystal when it is placed on something of a different color
 - [3.2.10] *Buddhist*: Momentariness proves that even the crystal is different
 - [3.2.11] *Nyāya*: There is no basis for accepting momentariness as a fixed rule
 - [3.2.12] We would apprehend the causes of the origination and destruction of the successive crystals if this were true
 - [3.2.13] *Buddhist*: We do not apprehend the cause of the destruction of milk or the origination of curd, and the same is true in the case of the crystal
 - [3.2.14] *Nyāya*: Actually, we infer the cause of the destruction of milk, etc.
 - [15] *Sāṃkhya*: The diversity of our cognitions is but the sequential manifestation of transformations of *prakṛti*
 - [16–17] Response
 - [18–41] A property of the self, sense faculties, or objects?
 - [42–45] Comes to an end quickly
 - [46–55] Not a property of the body
- [3.2.56–72] Mind
 - [56–58] Singular
 - [59] Atomic
 - [60–72] Karmically produced

BOOK FOUR, LESSON ONE

- [4.1.1] Activity
- [2–9] Defects
 - [3–5] Three kinds: desire, aversion, delusion
 - [6–9] Delusion is the worst
- [4.1.10–43] Rebirth
 - [11–13] Possible because of the permanence of the self
 - [4.1.14–43] Auxiliary: Causal theory
 - [14–18] Absence is the cause of things
 - [4.1.19–21] God is the cause of things
 - [4.1.19] *Claim*: Īśvara is the cause because we observe human action to be fruitless
 - [4.1.20] *Objection*: Not so, human action is essential for obtaining desired results
 - [4.1.21] *Response*: Yet this is effected by Īśvara
 - [22–24] Things arise without cause
 - [25–28] All is impermanent
 - [29–33] All is permanent
 - [34–36] All is separate
 - [4.1.34] *Opponent*: All is separate because the marks of a purportedly single entity are themselves separate; a unity, like a “jar,” is but a conceptual imposition
 - [4.1.35] *Response*: Entities have more than one mark; it is only insofar as there is a pot that there can be such a thing as the base or lid of the jar
 - [4.1.36] When we refer to “the jar,” we are not referring to mere heaps of atoms

- [37–40] All is non-existent
- [41–43] Indexing
- [44–54] Results
 - Immediate or delayed?
- [55–58] Pain
 - Not a denial of pleasure, but a clarification
- [59–68] Emancipation
 - Is possible

BOOK FOUR, LESSON TWO

- Interlude on knowledge of the principles (*tattva-jñāna*)
 - [4.2.1–3] Knowledge and defects
 - Mereology revisited
 - [4.2.4–17] The existence of wholes
 - [4–5] Wholes have already been proven
 - [6–10] *Objection*: There is no tenable relation between a whole and its parts
 - [11–12] *Response*: None of the objections are logically sound
 - [13] *Objection*: We see masses of atoms just as someone with partial blindness can still make out a mass of hair
 - [14–17] *Response*: The atoms are beyond the senses; they are permanent and without parts
 - [4.2.18–25] Auxiliary: Atomic theory
 - [4.2.18] *Opponent*: Atoms must have parts because ether penetrates them
 - [4.2.19] *Continued*: Otherwise ether would not be all-pervading
 - [4.2.20] *Response*: Atoms are not effects, ergo they cannot have an “inside” or “outside,” which denote causes
 - [21–22] The qualities of ether
 - [23–24] *Objection*: Atoms have parts because they have shape, and form conjunctions
 - [25] *Response*: This would lead to an infinite regress
 - [4.2.26–37] The external world
 - [26] *Objection*: On close inspection, we do not apprehend the external world
 - [27–30] *Response*: This is self-contradictory; means of knowledge prove the existence of the external world, otherwise you could not prove your own point
 - [31–32] *Objection*: It is like the objects in a dream, mirages, etc.
 - [33–35] *Response*: There is no evidence for this claim; the objects of dreams are like those of memories and desires; *tattva-jñāna* like waking from a dream
 - [36–37] The erroneous cognition itself cannot be denied; it is duplicitous because of the difference between the real object (e.g., the pillar) and the paradigm for the error (e.g., the man)
 - [4.2.38–51] Cultivating knowledge of the principles
 - [38] *Tattva-jñāna* arises on the basis of the repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) of a particular form of meditative concentration (*samādhi*)
 - [39–40] *Objection*: Forceful objects like thunder and states like hunger make this impossible
 - [41–42] *Response*: Such concentration arises as a result of previous actions; it should be practiced in forests, caves, and river-banks
 - [43] *Objection*: The intrusion of forceful objects, etc., follows even upon emancipation
 - [44–45] *Response*: Not so, as the requisites for such cognition are absent upon emancipation
 - [46–47] For the sake of *tattva-jñāna*, one should engage in internal and external yogic practices, persistent study of Nyāya, and friendly debates (*samvāda*)

- [48–49] The latter should be carried out, without counterargument, with well-wishing peers and teachers
- [50–51] Quarrels, attacks, and hostile conversations are for protecting the truth against unfriendly interlocutors

BOOK FIVE, LESSON ONE

- Examination of (xv) the futile rejoinders (*jāti*)
 - [5.1.1] There are 24 varieties
 - [2–38] Definitions of the 24 varieties, together with the proper responses to each
 - [39–43] The six-sided (*ṣaṭ-pakṣin*) argument: the proponent cannot bring the discussion to a resolution by answering a *jāti* with another *jāti*

BOOK FIVE, LESSON TWO

- Examination of (xvi) the grounds for defeat (*nigraha-sthāna*)
 - [5.2.1–24] There are 22 varieties
 - [2–3] Harm to the proposition (*pratijñā-hāni*); another proposition (*pratijñā-antara*)
 - [5.2.4] **Proposition contradiction (*pratijñā-virodha*): a contradiction with or by the proposition**
 - [5.2.5] **Rescinding the proposition (*pratijñā-sannyāsa*): concealing or denying the proposition when it has been refuted**
 - [6–11] Another reason (*hetv-antara*); another matter (*arthāntara*); senseless (*nirarthaka*); unintelligible (*avijñātārtha*); useless (*apārthaka*); not accomplished in time (*aprāpta-kāla*)
 - [5.2.12] **Defective (*nyūna*): deficient in one of the components**
 - [13–23] superfluous (*adhika*); redundant (*punarukta*; distinguished from *anuvāda*); non-reformulating (*ananubhāṣaṇa*); non-undersanding (*ajñāna*); timidity (*apratibhā*); distraction (*vikṣepa*); accepting what is believed (*mata-anujñā*); overlooking what should be urged (*paryanuyojya-upakṣana*); employing what should not be urged (*niranuyojya-anuyoga*); opposed to doctrine (*apasiddhānta*)
 - [5.2.24] **Fallacious reasons (*hetv-ābhāsa*) are also grounds for defeat**

APPENDIX D
SANSKRIT TEXT

MAṄGALA

- prakṛtīśobhayātmādivyāpārarahitaṃ calaṃ |
karmatatphalasambandhavyavasthādisamāśrayaṃ || 1 ||
guṇadravyakriyājātisamavāyādyupādhibhiḥ |
śūnyam āropitākāraśabdapratyayagocaraṃ || 2 ||
5 spaṣṭalākṣaṇasaṃyuktapramādvitayaniścitaṃ |
aṅīyasāpi nāṃśena mīśrībhūtāparātmakaṃ || 3 ||
asaṃkrāntim anādyantaṃ pratibimbādisannibhaṃ |
sarvaprapañcasandohanirmuktaṃ agataṃ paraiḥ || 4 ||
svatantraśrutiniḥsaṅgo jagaddhitavidhitsayā |
10 analpakalpāsaṅkhyeyasātmībhūtamahādayaḥ || 5 ||
yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ jagada gadatāṃ varaḥ |
taṃ sarvajñaṃ praṇamyāyaṃ kriyate tattvasaṃgrahaḥ || 6 ||

J1v, P1v

CHAPTER TWO
ĪŚVARAPARĪKṢĀ

- sarvotpattimatām īśam anye hetuṃ pracakṣate |
nācetanam svakāryāṇi kila prārabhate svayam || 46 ||
yat svārambhakāvayavasamṇiveśaviśeṣavat |
buddhimaddhetugamyam tat tad yathā kalaśādikam || 47 || P2v
5 dvīndriyagrāhyam⁷⁶⁰ agrāhyam vivādapadam īdṛśam |
buddhimatpūrvakam tena vaidharmyeṇāṇavo matāḥ || 48 ||
tanvādīnām⁷⁶¹ upādānam cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitam |
rūpādīmatvāt tantvādi yathā dṛṣṭam svakāryakṛt || 49 ||
dharmādharmaṇavas sarve cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitāḥ |
10 svakāryārambhakāḥ sthitvā pravṛttes turitantuvat || 50 ||
sargādaḥ vyavahāraś ca puṃsām anyopadeśajāḥ |
niyatatvāt prabuddhānām⁷⁶² kumāravyavahāravat || 51 ||
mahābhūtādīkam vyaktam buddhimaddhetvadhiṣṭhitam |
yāti sarvasya lokasya sukhaduḥkhanimittatām || 52 ||
15 acetanatvakāryatavināśītvādihetutaḥ |
vāsyādivad atas spaṣṭam tasya sattvam⁷⁶³ pratīyate || 53 ||
sarvakartṛtvasiddhau ca sarvajñatvam ayatnataḥ |
siddham asya yataḥ kartā kāryarūpādivedakāḥ || 54 ||
vimater āspadam vastu pratyakṣam kasyacit sphuṭam |
20 vastusattvādihetubhyaḥ sukhaduḥkhādibhedavat || 55 ||
tadatrāsiddhatā hetoḥ prathame sādhanē yataḥ |
samṇiveśo na yogākhyāḥ siddho nāvayavī tathā || 56 ||
dṛṣyatvenābhyupetasya dvayasyānupalambhanāt |
sādhanānanvītam cedam udāharānam apy atāḥ || 57 ||
25 cakṣuḥsparśanavijñānam bhinnābham upajāyate |
ekālabhanatā nāsti tayor gandhādivittivat || 58 ||
tatsāmarthyasamudbhūtakaḥ kalpanānugātātmakam |
pratisandhānavijñānam samudāyam vyavasyati || 59 ||
jalānalādi naivedam dvīndriyagrāhyam asty atāḥ |
30 āśrayāsiddhatāsiddher⁷⁶⁴ yathābhīhitadharmināḥ || 60 ||
samṇiveśaviśiṣṭatvam yādṛg devakulādiṣu |
kartary anupalabdhe ‘pi yaddṛṣṭau buddhimadgatiḥ || 61 ||
tādṛg eva yadīkṣyeta tanvagādiṣu dharmiṣu |
yuktaṃ tatsādhanād asmād yathābhīṣṭasya sādhanam || 62 ||
35 anvayavyatirekābhyām yat kāryam yasya niścitam |
niścayas tasya taddṛṣṭāv iti nyāyo vyavasthitaḥ || 63 ||
samṇiveśaviśeṣas tu naivāmīṣu tathāvidhaḥ |
tanutarvādibhedeṣu śabda eva tu kevalaḥ || 64 ||
tādṛśaḥ procyamānas tu sandīghavyatirekatām |
40 āśādayati valmīke kumbhakārakṛtāv iva⁷⁶⁵ || 65 ||

⁷⁶⁰ P buddhī°

⁷⁶¹ K tattv°

⁷⁶² PK pravṛddh°

⁷⁶³ KŚ sarvam, JP satvam

⁷⁶⁴ P °āsiddhe

⁷⁶⁵ KŚ °kṛtādiṣu, T rdza mkhan gyis ni byas pa bzhin

nanu⁷⁶⁶ jātyuttaram idaṃ dharmabhedavikalpanāt |
 sāmānyam eva kāryādi sādhanam pratipāditam || 66 ||
 atadrūpaparāvṛtṭam vastumātram anityatām |
 tādātmyāt sādhayaty eṣa na nyāyo ‘stīha sādhanē || 67 ||
 45 dhūmātmā dhavalo dṛṣṭaḥ pāvākāvabhicāravān |
 sitābhidheyatāmātrān na himād api tadgatiḥ || 68 ||
 sāmānyapratibandhe tu viśeṣāśrayaṇī yadā |
 codanā kriyate tatra jātyuttaram udāhṛtam || 69 ||
 gośabdavācyatāmātrād vajrādīnām⁷⁶⁷ viśāṇitā |
 50 saṃsiddhyed anyathā hy eṣa nyāyo nāśrīyate yadi || 70 ||
 yadi tu pratibandho ‘smin pramāṇe nopapadyate |
 tad atra yuktitaḥ siddhe na⁷⁶⁸ vivādo ‘sti kasyacit || 71 ||
 kiṃ tu nityaikasarvajñanīyabuddhisamāśrayaḥ |
 sādhyavaikalayato ‘vyāpter na siddhim upagacchati || 72 ||
 55 tathā hi saudhasopānagopurāṭṭālakādayaḥ |
 anekānīyavijñānapūrvakatvena niścitāḥ || 73 ||
 ata evāyam iṣṭasya vighātakṛd apīṣyate⁷⁶⁹ |
 anekānīyavijñānapūrvakatvapasādhanāt || 74 ||
 buddhimaddhetumātre hi pratibandhas tvayoditaḥ |
 60 dvitīye punar asmābhir viśpaṣṭam abhidhīyate || 75 ||
 kramākramavirodhena nityā no ‘kāryakāriṇaḥ |
 viśayānām kramitvena tajjñāneṣv api ca kramaḥ || 76 ||
 kramabhāviśvarajñānam kramivijñeyasaṅgateḥ |
 devadattādivijñānam yathā jvālādigocaram || 77 ||
 65 aṇusaṃhatimātram ca ghaṭādy asmābhir iṣyate |
 tatkāraḥ kulālādir aṇūnām eva kāraḥ || 78 ||
 na vyāvṛttas tato dharmāḥ sādhyatvenābhivāñchitaḥ⁷⁷⁰ |
 aṇūdāharaṇād asmād vaidharṃyeṇa prakāśitāt || 79 ||
 buddhimatpūrvakatvam ca sāmānyena yadīṣyate |
 70 tatra naiva vivādo no vaiśvarūpyam hi karmajam || 80 ||
 nityaikabuddhipūrvatvasādhanē⁷⁷¹ sādhyasūnyatā |
 vyabhicāraś ca saudhāder bahubhiḥ karaṇekṣaṇāt || 81 ||
 etad eva yathāyogam⁷⁷² avaśiṣṭeṣu hetuṣu |
 yojyam dūṣaṇam anyac ca kiṃcin mātram prakāśyate || 82 ||
 75 sthitvā pravṛttir aṇvāder na siddhā kṣaṇabhaṅgataḥ |
 vyabhicāraś ca tenaiva tasyāpi kramavṛttitaḥ⁷⁷³ || 83 ||
 pralaye luṭtavijñānasṃtayaḥ puruṣā na naḥ |
 ābhāsvarādisambhūtes tata eveha sambhavāt || 84 ||
 vimukhasyopadeṣṭṛtvam śraddhāgamyam param yadi |
 80 vaimukhyam vitanutvena dharmādharmavivekataḥ || 85 ||
 anumānavirodhaś ca vyāpteḥ sarvatra sādhanē |
 na viruddhena dharmeṇa vyāptir hetoḥ prakalpate || 86 ||
 neśvaro janminām hetur utpattivikalatvataḥ |
 gaganāmbhojavat sarvam anyathā yugapad bhavet || 87 ||

J4v
P3r

J5r

⁷⁶⁶ P tanu

⁷⁶⁷ K digādi°

⁷⁶⁸ J °r na, T grub ‘di la

⁷⁶⁹ K apīcyā(ṣya?)te, P apīṣyate.

⁷⁷⁰ P sām̐dhya°

⁷⁷¹ P nityeka°

⁷⁷² K °yogyam

⁷⁷³ K °vṛttitā

85 ye vā krameṇa jāyante te naiveśvarahetukāḥ⁷⁷⁴ |
yathoktasādhanodbhūtā jaḍānāṃ pratyayā iva || 88 ||
teṣāṃ api tadudbhūtau viphalā sādhanābhidhā |
nityatvād acikitsyasya naiva sā sahakāriṇī || 89 ||
yeṣu⁷⁷⁵ satsu bhavaddṛṣṭam asatsu na kadācana |
90 tasyānyaheturākṣiptāv anavasthā katham na te || 90 ||
kartṛtvapraṭiṣedhāc ca sarvajñatvaṃ nirākṛtam |
boddhavyaṃ tadbaleṇaiva sarvajñatvopapādanāt || 91 ||
yathoktadoṣaduṣṭāni mā bhūvan sādhanāni vā |
tathāpi kartur naikatvaṃ vyabhicāropadarśanāt || 92 ||
95 ekakartur asiddhau ca sarvajñatvaṃ kim āśrayam |
tatsiddhau sādhanam proktaṃ jaiminīyeṣu rājate || 93 ||

J5v

⁷⁷⁴ Ś naiśvara°

⁷⁷⁵ K ye tu (P has *yetuṣu*, but *tu* is cancelled)

CHAPTER SEVEN (A)
NYĀYAVAIŚEṢIKAPARIKALPITA-ĀTMAPARĪKṢĀ

- anye punar ihātmānam icchādīnāṃ samāśrayaṃ⁷⁷⁶ |
svato 'cidrūpaṃ icchanti nityaṃ sarvagataṃ tathā || 171 ||
śubhāśubhānāṃ kartāraṃ karmaṇāṃ tatphalasya ca |
bhoktāraṃ cetanāyogāc cetanaṃ na svarūpataḥ || 172 ||
5 jñānayatnādisambandhaḥ kartṛtvaṃ tasya bhāṇyate |
sukhaduḥkhādīsaṃvittisamavāyas tu bhokṛtā || 173 ||
nikāyena viśiṣṭābhir apūrvābhiś ca saṃgatiḥ | J9v
buddhibhir vedanābhiś ca janma tasyābhidhīyate || 174 ||
prāgāttābhir⁷⁷⁷ viyogas tu maraṇaṃ jīvaṇaṃ punaḥ |
10 sadēhasya manoyogo dharmādharmābhisamskṛtaḥ⁷⁷⁸ || 175 ||
śārīracakṣurādīnāṃ vadhād dhīmsāsya kalpyate |
itthaṃ nitye 'pi puṃsy eṣā prakriyā vimalekṣyate || 176 ||
jñānāni ca madīyāni tanvādivyatiṛeḱiṇā |
saṃvedakena vedyāni pratyayatvāt tadanyavat || 177 ||
15 icchādāyaś ca sarve 'pi kvacid ete samāśritāḥ |
vastutve sati kāryatvād rūpavat sa ca naḥ⁷⁷⁹ pumān || 178 ||
vastutvagrahaṇād eṣa na nāśe vyabhicāravān |
hetumattve 'pi nāśasya yasmān naivāsti vastutā || 179 ||
rūpādipratyayāḥ sarve 'py ekānekanimittakāḥ |
20 mayeti pratyayenaīśāṃ pratisandhānabhāvataḥ || 180 ||
nartakībhrūlatābhaṅge bahūnāṃ pratyayā iva | P5r
anyathā pratisandhānaṃ na jāyetānibandhanam || 181 ||
buddhīndriyādisaṃghātavyatiriktābhidhāyakam |
ātmeti vacanaṃ yasmād idam ekapadaṃ mataṃ || 182 ||
25 siddhaparyāyabhinnatve yac caivaṃ pariniścītaṃ |
yathānirdiṣṭadharmeṇa tad yuktaṃ ghaṭaśabdavat⁷⁸⁰ || 183 ||
prāṇādibhir viyuktaś ca jīvaddeho bhāved ayaṃ |
nairātmyād ghaṭavat tasmān naivāsty asya nirātmatā || 184 ||
sadyojātādyavijñānavedakenaiva vedyate | J10r
30 sarvam uttaravijñānaṃ majjñānatvāt tadādyavat || 185 ||
madīyenātmanā yuktaṃ dūradeśavivartty⁷⁸¹ api |
kṣityādīmūrttimattvāder⁷⁸² asmadīyaśārīravat || 186 ||
evaṃ ca sattvanityatvavibhutvānāṃ viniścāye |
ātmano na nirātmanāḥ sarvadharmā iti sthitaṃ || 187 ||
35 tadatra prathame tāvat sādhanē siddhasādhyatā |
sarvajñādīpravedyatvaṃ tvajñānasyeṣyate yataḥ || 188 ||
prakāśakānapekṣaṃ ca svacidrūpaṃ prajāyate |
anyavijñānaṃ apy evaṃ sādhyāśūnyaṃ nidarśanam || 189 ||
40 tadākāroparaktena yad anyena pravedyate |
tasyodāharaṇatve 'pi bhaved anyena saṃśayaḥ || 190 ||

⁷⁷⁶ Ś notes a *visarga* in J that is actually a “bengali”

anusvāra (ঐঐ)

⁷⁷⁷ Ś prag°

⁷⁷⁸ KŚ °satkṛtaḥ, T ‘dus byas pa

⁷⁷⁹ JP om. *visarga*, T nyid kyī skyes bu

⁷⁸⁰ K paṭa°

⁷⁸¹ K nivartty

⁷⁸² Ś °ādirmūtti°

kvacit samāśritatvaṃ ca yadicchādeḥ prasādhyate |
 tatra kāraṇamātraṃ ced āśrayaḥ parikalpyate || 191 ||
 iṣṭasiddhis tadādhāras tv āśrayaś cen matas tava |
 tadāpi⁷⁸³ gatisūnyasya niṣphalādhāraḥkalpanā || 192 ||
 45 āśrayo badarādīnāṃ kuṇḍādir⁷⁸⁴ upapadyate |
 gater vibandhakaraṇād viśeṣotpādanena vā || 193 ||
 nīrūpasya ca nāśasya kāryatvaṃ naiva yuktimat |
 ato viśeṣaṇam vyartham hetāv uktaṃ parair iha || 194 ||
 mayeti pratisandhānam avidyopaplavād idam |
 50 kṣaṇikeṣv api bhāveṣu kartrekatvābhimānataḥ || 195 ||
 mithyāvikalpataś cāsmān na yuktā tattvasaṃsthiṭiḥ |
 sāmartyabhedād bhinno ‘pi bhavaty ekanibandhanam || 196 || J10v
 ekānugāmikāryatve paurvāparyaṃ virudhyate |
 rūpaśabdādicittānāṃ śaktakāraṇasannidheḥ⁷⁸⁵ || 197 ||
 55 ekānantaravijñānāt ṣaḍvijñānasamudbhavaḥ |
 yugapad vedyate vyaktam ata iṣṭaprasādhanam || 198 ||
 kramiṇāṃ tv ekahetutvaṃ naivety uktam anantaram |
 ato ‘numānabādhāsmiṇ vyāpter vyaktaṃ samikṣyate || 199 ||
 nartakībhūrūlatābhaṅgo naivaikaḥ⁷⁸⁶ paramārthataḥ |
 60 anekāṅgusamūhatvād ekatvaṃ tasya kalpitam || 200 ||
 ekakāryopayogitvād ekaśabdasya gocaraḥ |
 sādhyo ‘py evaṃvidho ‘bhīṣṭo yadi siddhaprasādhanam || 201 ||
 buddhicittādiśabdānāṃ vyatirikṭābhīdhāyitā |
 naivaikapadabhāve ‘pi paryāyānāṃ samastī naḥ || 202 ||
 65 ato ‘naikāntiko hetur nanūktaṃ tadviśeṣaṇam |
 ucyate naiva siddham taccetaḥparyāyatāsthiteḥ || 203 ||
 ahaṃkāraśrayatvena cittam ātmeti gīyate |
 saṃvṛṭtyā vastuvṛṭtyā tu viśayo ‘sya na vidyate || 204 ||
 nabhastalāravindādau yad ekaṃ viniveśyate |
 70 kārakādīpadam tena vyabhicāro ‘pi dr̥śyate || 205 ||
 saṅketamātrabhāvinyo vācaḥ kutra na saṅgatāḥ |
 naivātmādivipadānāṃ ca prakṛtyārthaprakāśanam || 206 ||
 prāṇādīnāṃ ca sambandho yadi siddhaḥ sahātmanā |
 bhavet tadā prasaṅgo ‘yaṃ yujyetāsaṅgato⁷⁸⁷ ‘nyathā || 207 || J11r
 75 na vandhyāśūnyatve jīvaddehaḥ prasajyate |
 prāṇādivirahī⁷⁸⁸ hy evaṃ tavāpy⁷⁸⁹ etat prasaṅjanam || 208 ||
 na tāvad iha tādātmyaṃ bhedaṅgikaraṇāt tayoh |
 kāryakāraṇatā nāpi yaugapadyaprasaṅgataḥ || 209 ||
 tadātmano nivṛṭtau hi tatsambandhavivarjitāḥ |
 80 kim amī vinivartante prāṇāpānādayas tanoḥ || 210 ||
 evaṃ ca sādhanaiḥ sarvair ātmasattvāprasiddhitāḥ |
 nityavyāpītvayor uktaṃ sādhyahīnaṃ nidarśanam ||211||
 pratyakṣasiddhatvam ātmanaḥ parikalpitam |

⁷⁸³ K tathā ‘pi

⁷⁸⁴ JP kuṇḍādi°

⁷⁸⁵ Ś reads °sannidhiḥ in J, but the line distinguishing
dhi from *dhe* seems to be erased; P preserves °sannidhiḥ;
 T nye phyir

⁷⁸⁶ JP naive°

⁷⁸⁷ P yujyetasa°, KŚ yujyate ‘sa°

⁷⁸⁸ KŚ °virahe

⁷⁸⁹ KŚ tadā°

85 svasaṃvedyo hy ahaṃkāras tasyātmā viṣayo mataḥ || 212 ||
 tad ayuktam ahaṃkāre tadrūpānavabhāsanāt |
 na hi nityavibhutvādinirbhāsas tatra lakṣyate || 213 ||
 gauravarṇādinirbhāso vyaktaṃ tatra tu vedyate⁷⁹⁰ |
 tatsvabhāvo na cātmeṣṭo nāyaṃ tadviṣayas tataḥ || 214 ||
 yadi pratyakṣagamyaś ca satyataḥ puruṣo bhavet |
 90 tat kimarthaṃ vivādo 'yaṃ tatsattvādau pravartate || 215 ||
 tathā hi niścayātmāyam ahaṃkāraḥ pravartate |
 niścayāropabuddhyoś ca bādhyabādhakatā sthitā || 216 ||
 tasmād icchādayaḥ sarve⁷⁹¹ naivātmasamavāyinaḥ |
 krameṇotpadyamānatvād bījānkuralatādivat || 217 ||
 95 atha vādhyātmikāḥ sarve nairātmyākrāntamūrtayaḥ |
 vastusattvādihetubhyo yathā bāhyā ghaṭādayaḥ || 218 ||
 sātmakatve hi nityatvaṃ taddhetūnāṃ prasajyate |
 nityāś cārthakriyāśaktā nātaḥ sattvādisambhavaḥ || 219 ||
 ghaṭādiṣu samānaṃ ca yan nairātmyaṃ⁷⁹² niṣidhyate |
 100 parair jīvaccharīre 'smiṃs tad asmābhiḥ prasādhyate || 220 ||
 ittham⁷⁹³ ātmāprasiddhau ca prakriyā tatra yā kṛtā |
 nirāspadaiva sā sarvā vandhyāputra iva sthitā || 221 ||

J11v

⁷⁹⁰ PKŚ vidyate, T rig 'gyur

⁷⁹¹ Ś sarvai

⁷⁹² P yavairātmā

⁷⁹³ JP icchām°, T de ltar

CHAPTER EIGHT
STHIRABHĀVAPARĪKṢĀ

EXCERPTS

- atha vā 'sthāna evāyam āyāsaḥ kriyate yataḥ |
kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasiddhyaiva prakṛtyādi nirākṛtam || 350 ||
uktasya vakṣyamānasya jātyādeś cāvīśeṣataḥ |
niṣedhāya tataḥ spaṣṭaṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ prasādhyate || 351 || P8r
- 5 kṛtakākṛtakatvena dvairāśyaṃ kaiścid iṣyate |
kṣaṇikākṣaṇikatvena bhāvānām aparair matam || 352 ||
tatra ye kṛtakā bhāvās te sarve kṣaṇabhaṅginaḥ |
vināśaṃ prati sarveṣāṃ anapekṣatayā sthiteḥ || 353 ||
yadbhāvaṃ prati yan⁷⁹⁴ naiva hetvantaram apekṣate |
10 tat tatra niyataṃ⁷⁹⁵ jñeyaṃ svahetubhyas tathodayāt⁷⁹⁶ || 354 ||
nirvibandhā⁷⁹⁷ hi sāmagrī svakāryotpādane yathā |
vināśaṃ prati sarve 'pi nirapekṣās ca janminaḥ || 355 ||
anapekṣo 'pi yady eṣa deśakālāntare bhavet |
15 tadapekṣatayā naiṣa nirapekṣaḥ prasajyate || 356 || J18r
sarvatraivānapekṣās ca vināśe janmino 'khillāḥ |
sarvathā nāśahetūnāṃ tatrākīṃcitkaratvataḥ || 357 ||
tathā hi nāśako hetur na bhāvāvyatirekiṇaḥ |
nāśasya kāraṅka yuktaḥ svahetor bhāvajanmataḥ || 358 ||
na cānaṃśe samudbhūte bhāvātmany⁷⁹⁸ ātmahetutaḥ |
20 tadātmaiva vināśo 'nyair ādhātuṃ pāryate punaḥ || 359 ||
padārthavyatirikte tu nāśānāmni kṛte sati |
bhāve hetvantarais tasya na kiṃcid upajāyate || 360 ||
tenopalambhakāryādi prāgvad evānuśajyate |
tādavasthyāc ca naivāsya yuktam āvaraṇādy api⁷⁹⁹ || 361 ||
25 nāśānāmnā padārthena bhāvo nāśyata ity asat |
anyatvādivikalpānāṃ tatrāpy avinivṛttitaḥ⁸⁰⁰ || 362 ||
bhāvābhāvātmake nāśaḥ pradhvaṃsāparasamjñakaḥ |
kriyate cen na tasyāpi karaṇaṃ yuktisaṅgatam || 363 ||
abhāvasya ca kāryatve vastutaivāṅkurādivat |
30 prasaktājanyarūpasya hetuśaktyā samudbhavāt || 364 ||
vidhinaivam abhāvaś ca paryudāsāśrayāt kṛtaḥ | J18v
yas tatra vyatirekādīkālpo vartate punaḥ || 365 ||
atha kriyāniṣedho 'yaṃ bhāvaṃ naiva karoti hi |
tathāpy ahetutā siddhā kartur hetutvahānitaḥ || 366 ||
35 nanu naiva vināśo 'yaṃ sattākāle 'sti vastunaḥ |
na pūrvaṃ na cirāt paścād vastuno 'nantaraṃ tv asau || 367 ||
evaṃ ca hetumān eṣa yukto niyatakalataḥ |
kāḍācitkatvayogo hi nirapekṣe nirākṛtaḥ || 368 ||

⁷⁹⁴ P pra°

⁷⁹⁵ P om. *anusvāra*

⁷⁹⁶ P tato°

⁷⁹⁷ KŚ nirvibandh°

⁷⁹⁸ K bhavā°

⁷⁹⁹ K °nād api

⁸⁰⁰ KŚ arthānuvṛt°

- 40 vastvanantarabhāvāc ca hetumān eva⁸⁰¹ yujyate |
 abhūtvā bhāvataś cāpi yathavānyāḥ kṣaṇo mataḥ || 369 ||
 ahetukatvāt kiṃ cāyam asan vandhyāsutādivat |
 atha vākāśavan nityo na prakārāntaram yataḥ || 370 ||
 asattve sarvabhāvānāṃ nityatvaṃ syād anāśataḥ |
 sarvasaṃskāranāśitvapratyayaś cānimittakaḥ || 371 ||
 45 nityatve ‘pi saha sthānaṃ vināśenāvirodhataḥ⁸⁰² |
 ajātasya ca nāśoktir naiva yuktyanupātini || 372 ||
 tad atra katamaṃ nāśaṃ pare paryanuyuñjate |
 kiṃ kṣaṇasthitidharmāṇaṃ bhāvam eva tathoditam || 373 ||
 atha bhāvasvarūpasya nivṛttiṃ dhvaṃsasamjñitām |
 50 pūrvaparyanuyoge hi naiva kiṃcid virudhyate || 374 ||
 yo hi bhāvaḥ kṣaṇasthāyī vināśa iti gīyate |
 taṃ hetum antam icchāmaḥ parābhāvāt tv ahetukam || 375 ||
 vastvanantarabhāvitvaṃ na tatra tv asti tādrśī |
 calabhāvasvarūpasya bhāvenaiva sahodayāt || 376 ||
 55 ato vināśasadbhāvān na nityāḥ sarvasaṃskṛtāḥ |
 na vināśīti buddhiś ca nirmittā prasajyate || 377 ||
 pradhvaṃsasya tu nairātmyān nāsty anantarabhāvitā |
 nābhūtvā bhāvayogaś ca⁸⁰³ gaganendīvarādivat || 378 ||
 pradhvaṃso bhavatīty eva na bhāvo bhavatīty ayam |
 60 arthaḥ pratyāyyate tv atra na vidhiḥ kasyacin mataḥ || 379 ||
 na hi bāleya ity evaṃ nāmamātre kṛte kvacit |
 sarvo rāsabhadharṃ ‘smin prasaktiṃ labhate nare || 380 ||
 dhvaṃsanāmaṇaḥ padārthasya vidhāne punar asya na |
 vastuno jāyate kiṃcid ity etat kiṃ nivartate || 381 ||
 65 bhāvadhvaṃsātmanaś caivaṃ nāśasyāsattvaṃ iṣyate |
 vasturūpaviyogena na bhāvābhāvarūpataḥ || 382 ||
 nivṛttirūpatāpy asmin vidhinā nābhidhiyate |
 vasturūpānuvṛttiś ca kṣaṇād ūrdhvaṃ niśidhyate || 383 ||
 70 ato vyavasthitaṃ rūpaṃ vihitam nāsyā kiṃcana |
 iti nityavikalpo ‘smin kriyamāṇo nirāspadaḥ || 384 ||
- [...]
- 75 nanv anenānumānena bādhyate sarvahetuṣu |
 vyāptiḥ sarvopasaṃhārā pratijñārthasya vā kṣatiḥ || 461 ||
 vivakṣitārkaśādrādiviṣayaṃ yat pravartate |
 jñānaṃ tatkalāsambaddhasūryādiviṣayaṃ param || 462 ||
 pārthivāviṣayatve hi tajjñānatvābhidhānataḥ⁸⁰⁴ |
 tadyathā prathamam jñānaṃ svakālārkaśādigocaram⁸⁰⁵ || 463 ||
 80 rūpatvādyāśrayāḥ sarve ye ca teṣāṃ samāśrayāḥ |
 ye ca tadviṣayaḥ kecij jāyante pratyayās tathā || 464 ||
 utpādānantaradhvaṃsabhājo⁸⁰⁶ naiva bhavanti te |

⁸⁰¹ P eṣa

⁸⁰² P vināśai°

⁸⁰³ KŚ °yogasya; Kamalaśīla’s *pratīka* is °yogaś ca, and he specifically comments on “the particle ‘and’” (*caḥāra*)

⁸⁰⁴ P dittography *tata*°

⁸⁰⁵ KŚ tatkalā°

⁸⁰⁶ KŚ °ntaram dhva°

- prameyatvābhidheyatvahetutaḥ khāravindavat || 465 ||
 vivādaviṣayā ye ca pratyayāḥ kramabhāvinaḥ |
 85 ekārthaviṣayās te ‘pi sarva ity avaghoṣaṇā || 466 ||
 abādhaikāśrayatve hi samānoktiniveśanāt |
 vartamāne yathaikasmin kṣaṇe⁸⁰⁷ naikavidhā⁸⁰⁸ dhiyaḥ || 467 ||
 sādhyena vikalamaṁ tāvad ādye hetau nidarśanam |
 hetutvād viṣayaḥ sarvo na hi svajñānakālikaḥ || 468 ||
 90 yadā sūryādisabdās ca vivakṣāmātrabhāvinaḥ |
 dipādaḥ viniveśyante tajjñānair⁸⁰⁹ vyabhicāritā || 469 ||
 jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvān naiveṣṭā kṣaṇabhaṅgitā |
 tadabhāvaprasiddhyartham nirdiṣṭam sādhanam vṛthā || 470 ||
 samānaśabdavācyatvam dipādipratyayeṣv api |
 95 vartate vyabhicāry eṣa hetus tena bhavaty ataḥ || 471 ||
 sāmānādhikarānyam ced bādhitam teṣu kalpyate |
 vivakṣite ‘pi vispaṣṭā bādhaiṣā kiṁ na vīkṣyate || 472 ||
 vivādapadam ārūḍhā naikārthaviṣayā dhiyaḥ |
 krameṇotpadyamānatvād vidyuddīpādibuddhivat || 473 ||
 100 kramabhāvavirodho hi jñāneṣv ekārthabhāviṣu |
 anyair akāryabhedasya tadapekṣāvirodhataḥ || 474 ||
 sandīghavyatirekitvam sarveṣv eteṣu hetuṣu |
 vipakṣe vartamānānām⁸¹⁰ bādhakānupadarśanāt || 475 ||

⁸⁰⁷ J kṣeṇe

⁸⁰⁸ J neka°

⁸⁰⁹ J tajñā°

⁸¹⁰ P om. *anusvāra*

CHAPTER TEN
DRAVYAPARĪKṢĀ

EXCERPT

- jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvam ayuktaṃ prāk prakāśitam |
dravyādayaḥ ṣaḍarthā ye vidyante pāramārthikāḥ || 546 ||
ity ākṣapādakāṇādāḥ prāhur āgamamātrikāḥ⁸¹¹ |
dravyādipratīṣedho 'yaṃ saṃkṣepeṇa tad ucyate || 547 ||
5 kṣityādibhedato bhinnaṃ navadhā dravyam iṣyate |
catuḥsaṅkhyam pṛthivyādi nityānityatayā dvidhā || 548 ||
pṛthivyādyātmakās tāvad ya iṣṭāḥ paramāṇavaḥ |
te 'nityā⁸¹² ye tadādyais tu prārabdhas te vināśinaḥ || 549 ||
tatra nityānurūpāṇām asattvam upapāditam |
10 niḥśeṣavastuviśayaakṣaṇabhaṅgaprasādhanāt || 550 ||
nityatve sakalāḥ sthūlā jāyeran sakṛd eva hi | J28r
saṃyogādi na cāpekṣyaṃ teṣāṃ asty aviśeṣataḥ || 551 ||
saddharmopagataṃ no ced aṅūtpādakam iṣyate |
vidyamānopalambhārthapramāṇāviśayatvataḥ || 552 ||
15 nāsiddher⁸¹³ dṛśyate yena kuvindādyaṅukāraṇam |
paramāṇvātmakā eva yena sarve paṭādayaḥ || 553 ||
sadgrāhakaḥ pramāṇbhāvān na cāsattā⁸¹⁴ prasiddhyati |
pramāṇavinivṛttau hi nārthābhāve 'sti niścayaḥ || 554 ||
tadārabdhas tv avayavī guṇāvayavabhedavān |
20 naivopalabhyate tena na siddhyaty apramāṇakaḥ || 555 ||
nanūpadhānasamparke dṛśyate sphaṭikopalāḥ |
tadrūpāgrahaṇe 'py evaṃ balākādiś ca dṛśyate || 556 ||
kañcukāntargate⁸¹⁵ puṃsi tadrūpādyagatāv api |
puruṣapratyayo dṛṣṭo rakte vāsasi vastradhīḥ || 557 ||
25 rūpādīndīvarādibhya ekāntena vibhidhyate |
tena tasya vyavacchedāc caitrād iva⁸¹⁶ turaṅgamaḥ || 558 ||
kṣityādirūpagandhāder atyantam vā vibhidhyate |
ekānekavacobhedāc candranakṣatrabhedavat || 559 ||
vibhinnakarṭṛśaktyāder bhinnau tantupaṭau tathā |
30 viruddhadharmayogena stambhakumbhādibhedavat || 560 ||
sthūlārthāsambhave tu syān naiva vṛkṣādīdarśanam |
atīndriyatayāṅūnām na cāṅuvacanaṃ bhavet || 561 ||
sthūlavastuvyapekṣo hi susūkṣmo 'rthas tathocyate |
sthūlaikavastvabhāve tu kim apekṣāsya sūkṣmatā || 562 ||
35 nanu raktādirūpeṇa gr̥hyante sphaṭikādayaḥ |
na ca tadrūpatā teṣāṃ svapakṣakṣayasāṅgateḥ || 563 || J28v
tadrūpavyatiriktaś ca nāparātmopalabhyate |
na cānyākāradhīvedyā yuktās te 'tiprasaṅgataḥ || 564 ||
śūklādayas tathā vedyā ity evaṃ cāpi sambhavet |

⁸¹¹ KŚ mātrakāḥ

⁸¹² K om. *te*

⁸¹³ P °ddhir

⁸¹⁴ KŚ vā°

⁸¹⁵ ŚK °ntarite

⁸¹⁶ K caitrādeś ca

- 40 tasmād bhrāntam idaṃ jñānaṃ kambupītādibuddhivat || 565 ||
kañcukāntargate puṃsi taj jñānaṃ⁸¹⁷ tv ānumānikam |
taddhetusanniveśasya kañcukasyopalambhanāt || 566 ||
kaṣāyakuṅkumādibhyo vastre rūpāntarodayaḥ |
pūrvarūpavināśe hi vāsasaḥ kṣaṇikatvataḥ || 567 ||
- 45 punar jalādisāpekṣāt tasmād evopajāyate |
rūpād rūpāntaraṃ śuklaṃ lohādeḥ śyāmatādivat || 568 ||
tādavasthye tu rūpasya nānyenābhībhavo bhavet |
prāktanānābhībhūtasya svarūpasyānuvartanāt || 569 ||
ṣaṣṭhīvacanābhedādir⁸¹⁸ vivakṣāmātrasambhavi⁸¹⁹ |
- 50 tato na yuktā vastūnām tattvarūpavyavasthitih⁸²⁰ || 570 ||
tathā hi bhinnaṃ naivānyaiḥ ṣaṇṇām astitvam iṣyate |
teṣāṃ vargaś ca naivaikaḥ kaścīd artho ‘bhyupeyate || 571 ||
saṃjñāpakapramāṇasya viṣaye tattvam iṣyate |
ṣaṇṇām astitvam iti cet ṣaḍbhyo ‘nyas te prasajyate || 572 ||
- 55 ṣaḍ ete dharmaṇaḥ proktā dharmās tebhyo ‘tīrekiṇaḥ |
iṣṭā eveti cet ko ‘yaṃ sambandhas tasya tair mataḥ || 573 ||
dravyeṣu niyamād yuktā na saṃyogo na cāparaḥ |
samavāyo ‘sti nānyaś ca sambandho ‘ṅikṛtaḥ⁸²¹ paraiḥ || 574 ||
sambandhānupapattau ca teṣāṃ dharmo bhavet katham |
- 60 tadutpādanamātrāc ced anye ‘pi syus tathāvidhāḥ || 575 ||
tasyāpy astitvam ity evaṃ vartate vyatirekiṇī |
vibhaktis tasya cānyasya bhāve ‘niṣṭhā prasajyate || 576 ||
anyadharmasamāveśe prāptā tatra ca dharmitā |
dravyāder api dharmitvam asmād eva ca saṃmatam || 577 ||
- 65 prathamebhyāś ca tantubhyaḥ⁸²² paṭasya yadi sādhyate |
bhedaḥ sādhanavaiphalyaṃ durnivāraṃ⁸²³ tadā bhavet || 578 ||
prāptāvasthāviśeṣā hi ye jātās tantavo⁸²⁴ ‘pare |
viśiṣṭārthakriyāsaktāḥ prathamebhyo ‘vilakṣaṇāḥ || 579 ||
ekakāryopayogitvajñāpanāya pṛthak śrutau |
- 70 gauravāśaktivaiphalyadoṣatyāgābhivāñchayā || 580 ||
sākalyenābhīdhānena vyavahārasya lāghavam |
manyamānaiḥ kṛtā yeṣu vāg ekā vyavahartṛbhiḥ || 581 ||
tebhyaḥ samānakālas tu paṭo naiva prasiddhyati |
vibhinnakartṛsāmarthyaparimāṇādīdharmavān || 582 ||
- 75 anyonyābhisarāś caivaṃ ye jātāḥ paramāṇavaḥ |
naivātīndriyatā teṣāṃ akṣānām⁸²⁵ gocaratvataḥ || 583 ||
nīlādīḥ paramāṇūnām ākāraḥ kalpito nijāḥ |
nīlādīpratibhāsā ca vedyate cakṣurādīdhīḥ || 584 ||
- 80 paurvāparyavivekena yady apy eṣāṃ alakṣaṇam |
tathāpy adhyakṣatābādḥā pānakādāv iva sthitā || 585 ||
sarveṣāṃ eva vastūnām⁸²⁶ sarvavyāvṛttirūpiṇām |
dṛṣṭāv api tathāiveti na sarvākāraṇiścaṃyaḥ || 586 ||

P12r

J29r

J29v

⁸¹⁷ JP tajñānaṃ, K na jñānaṃ, T shes pa de rjes dpag pa

⁸¹⁸ KŚ °ādi

⁸¹⁹ KŚ °bhavi

⁸²⁰ K tat svarūp°

⁸²¹ P °ndho ‘gī°

⁸²² P om. *visarga*

⁸²³ P dittography *durnivāraṃ*

⁸²⁴ P tantato

⁸²⁵ K anyānām

⁸²⁶ P om. *anusvāra*

- akalpanākṣagamyē ‘pi niraṃśe ‘rthasvalakṣaṇe⁸²⁷ |
yadbhedavyavasāye ‘sti kāraṇaṃ sa pratīyate || 587 ||
- 85 samānajvālāsambhūter yathā dīpaikavibhramaḥ⁸²⁸ |
nairantaryasthitānekasūksmavittau⁸²⁹ tathaikadhā⁸³⁰ || 588 ||
vivekālakṣaṇāt teṣāṃ no cet pratyakṣatesyate |
dīpādaṃ sā kathaṃ dṛṣṭā kiṃ veṣṭo ‘vayavī tathā || 589 ||
etāvāt tu bhaved atra kathaṃ eṣāṃ anīścaye⁸³¹ |
- 90 nīlādīparamāṇūnām ākāra iti gamyate || 590 ||
tad apy akāraṇaṃ yasmān naitaj⁸³² jñānaṃ agocaram |
na caikasthūlavīṣayaṃ sthāulyaikatvavirodhataḥ⁸³³ || 591 ||
sthūlasyaikasvabhāvatve makṣikāpadamātrataḥ |
- 95 pidhāne pihitaṃ sarvaṃ āsajyetāvibhāgataḥ || 592 ||
rakte ca bhāga ekasmin sarvaṃ rajyeta raktavat | J30r
viruddhadharmabhāve vā nānātvam anuśajyate || 593 ||
nanu caikasvabhāvatvāt sarvaśabdo ‘tra kiṃ kṛtaḥ |
sa hy anekārthaviśayo nānātmāvayavī na ca || 594 ||
- 100 nanu ye lokataḥ siddhā vāsodehanagādayaḥ |
ta evāvayavitvena bhavadbhir upavarṇitaḥ || 595 ||
raktaṃ vāso ‘khilaṃ sarvaṃ niḥśeṣaṃ nikhilaṃ tathā |
tatrecchāmātrasambhūtam iti sarve prayuñjate || 596 ||
tathāvidhavivakṣāyām asmābhir api varṇyate |
- 105 sarvaṃ syād raktam ity ādi nirvibandhā⁸³⁴ hi vācakāḥ || 597 ||
bhāktaṃ tad abhidhānaṃ ced vacobhedāḥ prasajyate |
na ca buddher vibhedo ‘sti gaṇamukhyatayeṣṭayoḥ || 598 ||
nanu cāvīṣyavṛttitvāt saṃyogasya na raktatā |
sarvasyāśajyate nāpi sarvaṃ āvṛtam īkṣyate || 599 ||
- 110 nanu cānaṃśake dravye kim avyāptaṃ vyavasthitaṃ | P12v
svarūpaṃ tadavasthāne bhedaḥ⁸³⁵ siddho ‘ta eva vā || 600 ||
bahudeśasthitis tena naivaikasmin kṛtāspadā |
tataḥ siddhā paṭādīnām aṇuśo⁸³⁶ ‘nekarūpatā || 601 ||
avijñātārthatattvas tu piṇḍam ekaṃ ca manyate |
- 115 lokas tatkalpitāpekṣaḥ paramāṇur ihocyate || 602 || J30v
nimittanirapekṣā vā saṃjñeyaṃ tādrīṣi sthitā |
saṃketānvayinī yadvan nirvitte ‘pīśvaraśrutiḥ || 603 ||

⁸²⁷ K °rthasya lakṣ°

⁸²⁸ K dīpena vi°

⁸²⁹ P °cittau

⁸³⁰ J °dhāḥ

⁸³¹ K na niścaye, P eṣān anīścaye

⁸³² Conj. JP naita°, KŚ naiva, T shes pa de ni

⁸³³ P sthāulyekaś ca vi°

⁸³⁴ KŚ nirni°

⁸³⁵ P bhidaḥ

⁸³⁶ KŚ aṇubhyo

CHAPTER ELEVEN
GUNAPARIKṢĀ

EXCERPTS

- dravyāṅgāṃ pratiṣedhena sarva eva tadāśritāḥ | J32r, P13r.4
 guṇakarmādayo ‘pāstā bhavanty eva tathā matāḥ || 633 ||
 kva kasya samavāyaś ca sambandhiny apahastite |
 viśeṣapraṭiṣedho ‘yaṃ tathāpi punar ucyate || 634 ||
 5 dravye mahati nīlādir eka eva yadīṣyate |
 randhrālokena tadvyaktau vyaktir dṛṣṭiś ca nāśya kim || 635 ||
 na ca deśavitānena⁸³⁷ sthito nīlādir⁸³⁸ iṅṣyate⁸³⁹ |
 vyajyate vā⁸⁴⁰ tadā tena tasya bhedo ‘ṅuśas tataḥ || 636 ||
 atadrūpaparāvṛttagajādivyatirekiṇī |
 10 na saṅkhyā bhāṣate jñāne dṛṣyeṣṭā naiva sāsti tat || 637 ||
 icchāracitasāṅketamanaskārānvayaṃ tv idam |
 ghaṭādyekādivijñānaṃ⁸⁴¹ jñānādāv iva vartate || 638 ||
 adravyatvān na saṅkhyā ‘sti teṣu kācid vibhedinī⁸⁴² |
 tajjñānaṃ naiva yuktaṃ ca⁸⁴³ bhāktam askhalitatvataḥ || 639 ||
 15 taddravyasamavetāc ced ekatvāt parikalpyate |
 guṇādiṣv ekavijñānam ekārthasamavāyataḥ || 640 ||
 astu nāmaivam ekatra jñāne dvyādimitis⁸⁴⁴ tu kam |
 eteṣv apekṣate hetuṃ ṣaṭpadārthādikeṣu vā || 641 ||
 ekārthasamavāyāder gauṇo ‘yaṃ pratyayo bhavet⁸⁴⁵ |
 20 tathā ca skhalito yasmān māṅave ‘nalabuddhivat || 642 ||
 gajādipratrayebhyaś ca vailakṣaṇyāt prasādhyate |
 senābuddhis⁸⁴⁶ tadanyotthā nilavastrādibuddhivat || 643 || J32v
 icchāracitasāṅketamanaskārādyupāyataḥ |
 tatteṣṭasiddhir buddhyātau saṅkhyaitenaiva vā bhavet || 644 ||
 25 buddhyapekṣā ca saṅkhyāyā niṣpattir yadi varṇyate |
 saṅketābhogamātreṇa tadbuddhiḥ kiṃ na saṃmatā || 645 ||
- [...]
- 30 saṅkhyāyogādayaḥ sarve na dravyāvyatirekiṇaḥ⁸⁴⁷ | J34r.2, P13v.13
 tadvyavacchedakatvena daṇḍādir iva cen matam || 676 ||
 teṣāṃ saṃvṛttisattvena varṇanād iṣṭasādhanam |
 tattvānyatvena nirvācyam naiva saṃvṛtisad yataḥ || 677 ||
 athānirvacanīyatvaṃ samūhāder niṣidhyate |
 35 yasmān niyatadharmatvaṃ rūpaśabdarasādivat || 678 ||
 niḥsvabhāvatayā tasya tattvato ‘mbarapadmavat |
 na siddhā niyatā dharmāḥ kalpanāropitās tu te || 679 ||

⁸³⁷ KŚ deśavibhāḡ°, T yangs pa’i phyogs

⁸³⁸ P nītā°

⁸³⁹ K iṣyate, T mthong ba

⁸⁴⁰ K yas

⁸⁴¹ K ghaṭeṣy°, T bum sogs gcig sogs

⁸⁴² P vebhedinī

⁸⁴³ K tu

⁸⁴⁴ K vyāpti(dvyādi)°, P vyādhi°, T gnyis sogs blo

⁸⁴⁵ K bhavan

⁸⁴⁶ K saṅkhyā°

⁸⁴⁷ P dravyā ‘vyati°

40 tathavoktāvan ekānto vyatpadmādibhir yataḥ |
abhedo vyatirekaś ca vastuṇy eva vyavasthitaḥ || 680 ||
saṅkhyāder dravyato 'nyatvam evaṃ cet pratipādyate |
āśrayāsiddhatā hetoḥ saṅkhyādinām asiddhitaḥ || 681 ||
samuccayādibhinnaṃ tu dravyam eva tathocyate |
svarūpād eva bhedaś ca vyāhataḥ sādhitō bhavet || 682 ||

CHAPTER THIRTEEN
SĀMĀNYAPARĪKṢĀ

EXCERPTS

- dravyādiṣu niṣiddheṣu jātayo 'pi nirākṛtāḥ |
padārthatrayavṛttā hi sarvās⁸⁴⁸ tāḥ parikalpitāḥ || 707 ||
tatreyaṃ dvividhā jātiḥ parair abhyupagamyate |
sāmānyam eva sattākhyam samasteṣv anuvṛttitāḥ || 708 ||
5 dravyatvādi tu sāmānyam sadviśeṣo 'bhidhīyate |
svāśrayeṣv anuvṛttasya cetaso hetubhāvataḥ || 709 ||
vijātibhyaś ca sarvebhyaḥ svāśrayasya viśeṣaṇāt | P14v
vyāvṛttibuddhihetutvaṃ teṣāṃ eva tataḥ sthitam || 710 ||
viśeṣā eva kecit tu vyāvṛtter eva hetavaḥ |
10 nityadravyasthitā ye 'ntyā viśeṣā iti varṇitāḥ || 711 ||
yadbalāt paramāṇvādaḥ jāyante yogināṃ dhiyaḥ |
vilakṣaṇo 'yam etasmād iti pratyekam āśritāḥ || 712 || J36r
pratyakṣataḥ prasiddhās tu sattvagotvādi jātayaḥ |
akṣavyāpārasadbhāve sadādipratyayodayāt || 713 ||
15 anumānabalenāpi sattvam āsāṃ pratīyate |
viśeṣapratyayo yena nimittāntarabhāvikaḥ || 714 ||
gavādīśabdaprajñānaviśeṣā gogajādiṣu |
samayākṛtipiṇḍādivyātiriktārthahetavaḥ || 715 ||
gavādiviśayatve hi sati tacchabdabuddhitāḥ |
20 anyatvāt tad yathaiṣv eva savatsāṅkuśadhīdhvanī || 716 ||
śaśaśṅgādivijñānair vyabhicārād viśeṣaṇam |
tat svarūpābhīdhānaṃ ca vaidharmyeṇa nidarśanam || 717 ||
gavādiṣv anuvṛttaṃ ca vijñānaṃ piṇḍato 'nyataḥ |
viśeṣakatvān nilādivijñānam iva jāyate || 718 ||
25 gotattvārthāntaram⁸⁴⁹ gotvaṃ bhinnadhīviśayatvataḥ |
rūpasparśādivat tasyety ukteś caitraturaṅgavat⁸⁵⁰ || 719 ||
asāram tad idaṃ sarvaṃ⁸⁵¹ prakriyāmātravarṇanam |
na tu tajjñāpakam kiṃcit pramāṇam iha vidyate || 720 ||
akṣavyāpārasadbhāvān na hy anantarabhāvinaḥ |
30 sadādipratyayaḥ siddhāḥ saṅketābhogatas tu te || 721 ||
yathā dhātryabhayādīnāṃ nānārogaṇivartane |
pratyekam saha vā śaktir nānātve 'py upalabhyate || 722 ||
na teṣu vidyate kiṃcit sāmānyam tatra śaktimat | J36v
cirakṣiprādibhedena rogaśāntyupalambhataḥ || 723 ||
35 sāmānye 'tiśayaḥ kaścin na hi kṣetrādibhedataḥ |
ekarūpatayā nityam dhātryādes tu sa vidyate || 724 ||
evam atyantabhede 'pi kecin niyataśaktitāḥ |
tulyapratyavamarśāder hetutvaṃ yānti nāpare || 725 ||
kāryamātropayogitvavivakṣāyāṃ ca sacchruteḥ |

⁸⁴⁸ P sarvas

⁸⁴⁹ J gotāsvā°, P gotāsva°, T ba lang las don gzhan

⁸⁵⁰ K caiva°

⁸⁵¹ KŚ kāryam

- 40 samayaḥ kriyate teṣu⁸⁵² yad vānyasyā yathāru⁸⁵³ || 726 ||
vāhadohādirūpeṇa kāryabhedopayogini |
gavādiśrutisaṅketāḥ kriyate vyavaharṭṛbhiḥ || 727 ||
tat saṅketamanaskārāt sadādipratyayā ime |
jāyamānās tu⁸⁵⁴ lakṣyante nākṣavyāpṛṭyanantaram⁸⁵⁵ || 728 ||
- 45 ajalpākāram evādau vijñānaṃ tu prajāyate |
tatas tu samayābhogas tasmāt smārtaṃ tato ‘pi te || 729 ||
anyatra gatacittasya vastumātropalambhanam |
sarvopādhivivekena tata eva pravartate || 730 ||
hetāv ādye ‘pi vaiphalyaṃ samayābhogabhāvitā |
- 50 teṣām iṣṭaiva saṃsargī so ‘nvayavyatirekavān || 731 ||
tasya pakṣābahirbhāve sādhyasūnyaṃ nidarśanam |
naiva⁸⁵⁶ taddhetavaḥ sāksād bāhyavatsāṅkuśādayaḥ || 732 ||
nābhīdhānavikalpānāṃ vṛttir asti svalakṣaṇe |
sarvaṃ vāggocarātītamūrtir⁸⁵⁷ yena svalakṣaṇam || 733 ||
- 55 antarmātrāsamarūḍhaṃ sāmvrtaṃ tv avalambya te | J37r
bahirūpādhyavasitaṃ pravartante ‘nkuśādikam || 734 ||
kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvo hetuś ca varṇyate |
abhāvapratyayasyeti viśeṣaṇam anarthakam || 735 ||
tad apy ayuktaṃ hetutve vastutā śaktito ‘pi ca |
- 60 abhāvapratyayaḥ prāptaḥ sattādiṣv aviśeṣataḥ || 736 ||
vailakṣaṇyam asiddhaṃ ca piṇḍākṛtyādibuddhitaḥ |
tajjñānānām asiddho ‘pi hetur eṣa bhavaty ataḥ || 737 || P15r
anvayī pratyayo yasmāc chabdavyaktyavabhāsavān |
varṇākṛtyakṣarākārasūnyā jātis tu varṇyate || 738 ||
- 65 sāmānyasyāpi nīlādirūpatve guṇato ‘sya kaḥ |
bhedo nānugataś caiko nīlādir upalakṣyate || 739 ||
bhāsamāno ‘pi ced eṣa na vivekena lakṣyate |
tat kathaṃ dhīdhvanī vyaktau vartete tadbaleṇa tau || 740 ||
nīścayātmaka evāyaṃ sāmānyapratyayaḥ paraiḥ |
- 70 iṣṭaś cāgrahaṇaṃ prāpter⁸⁵⁸ yuktaṃ nānupalakṣaṇam⁸⁵⁹ || 741 ||
siddhe ‘py anyanimittatve na sāmānyaṃ prasiddhyati |
anugāmy ekam adhrauvyaviviktaṃ ca kramodayāt || 742 ||
padārthaśabdaḥ kaṃ hetum aparaṃ ṣaṭsv apekṣate |
astīti pratyayo yaś ca sattādiṣv anuvartate || 743 ||
- 75 anyadharmanimittaś cet tatrāpy asty astitāmatīḥ | J37v
tadanyadharmanimittatve ‘niṣṭhāsaktā ca⁸⁶⁰ dharmitā || 744 ||
vyabhicārī tato hetur amībhīr ayam īkṣyate⁸⁶¹ |
na ca sarvopasaṃhārād vyāptir asya prasādhitā || 745 ||
- 80 [...]

⁸⁵² P yeṣu

⁸⁵³ P ruciḥ

⁸⁵⁴ P °nās ca

⁸⁵⁵ Ś nākṣād vy°, T dbang po'i bya ba'i rjes thogs min

⁸⁵⁶ K naivaṃ

⁸⁵⁷ J sarvavāg°...°mūrtti, P sarvaṃ rvāg°...°mūrtti

⁸⁵⁸ K °ne prāpte, P °ṇaprāpte

⁸⁵⁹ P nanupa°

⁸⁶⁰ KŚ °sakter a°

⁸⁶¹ K iṣyate

ghaṭasya prāgabhāvo 'yaṃ ghaṭasya dhvaṃsa⁸⁶² ity ayam |
 tadvastūpādhikān eva⁸⁶³ dhīr abhāvān prapadyate || 766 ||
 upādhigatasāmānyavaśād evānuvṛttatā |
 85 tasyāḥ sarvatra cen naivaṃ vailakṣaṇyātadāśrayāt || 767 ||
 ghaṭa ity ādikā buddhis tebhyo yuktānugāminī |
 nābhāvo bhāva ity eṣā tanmatis tu vilakṣaṇā || 768 ||
 na hi sattāvaśād buddhir gaur aśva iti ceṣyate |
 ekam evānyathā kalpyaṃ sāmānyam sarvasādhanam || 769 ||
 90 na nimittānurūpā cet sarvasmin buddhir iṣyate |
 yatas senādibuddhīnāṃ saṅkhyādīṣṭam nibandhanam || 770 ||
 yady evam iyam⁸⁶⁴ eṣv eva bhedeṣv iṣṭā na kiṃ matiḥ |
 icchāracitasāṅketabhedābhogānusārīṇī || 771 ||
 bhedajñāne satīcchā hi saṅketakaraṇe tataḥ |
 95 tatkr̥tis tacchrutiś cāsyā ābhogas tanmatis tataḥ || 772 ||
 anvayavyatirekābhyām iyad⁸⁶⁵ eva viniścitam |
 samartham kāraṇam tasyām⁸⁶⁶ anyeṣām⁸⁶⁷ anvasthitiḥ || 773 ||

⁸⁶² KŚ ghatapra°, P corrupt

⁸⁶³ P °ānaiva

⁸⁶⁴ P °va niyam°

⁸⁶⁵ PK idam

⁸⁶⁶ Ś yasyām

⁸⁶⁷ JP anyeṣṭāv

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
PRATYAKṢALAKṢANAPARĪKṢĀ

EXCERPT

	avikalpam ⁸⁶⁸ api jñānaṃ vikalpotpattisaktimat	J66r
	niḥśeṣavyavahārāṅgaṃ ⁸⁶⁹ taddvāreṇa bhavaty ataḥ 1305	
	nāvikalpaṃ vikalpe cec chaktaṃ ⁸⁷⁰ viṣayabhedataḥ	P25r
5	akalpatvāc ca rūpādijñānavac cakṣurādivat ⁸⁷¹ 1306	
	tad atra na virodho 'sti vikalpena sahānayoḥ	
	na cāpi viṣayo bhinnas tadarthādhyavasāyataḥ 1307	
	vastutas ⁸⁷² tu nirālambo vikalpaḥ saṃpravarttate	
	tasyāsti viṣayo naiva yo vibhidyeta kaścana 1308	
10	rūpaśabdādibuddhīnām asty evānyonyahetutā	
	tato 'prasiddhasādhyo 'yaṃ drṣṭāntaḥ samudīritaḥ 1309	
	agnidhūmādibuddhīnām kāryakāraṇabhāvataḥ	
	vyabhicāro 'pi viśpaṣṭam etasminn upalabhyate 1310	

⁸⁶⁸ JP vikalpakam, T rtog pa med pa'i shes pa yang.
Kamalaśīla's *pratīka* is *avikalpam apīty ādi*.

⁸⁶⁹ Ś °vyahāra°

⁸⁷⁰ K proposes *ca śaktaṃ*

⁸⁷¹ Ś °vaj jakṣur°

⁸⁷² Ś vastus

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN ANUMĀNAPARĪKṢĀ

EXCERPTS

- svaparārthavibhāgena tv anumānaṃ dvidheṣyate | J69r, P25v.-3
svārthaṃ trirūpato⁸⁷³ liṅgād anumeyārthadarśanam || 1361 ||
trirūpaliṅgavacanāṃ⁸⁷⁴ parārthaṃ punar ucyate |
ekaikavidvirūpo ‘rtho liṅgābhāsas tato mataḥ || 1362 ||
- 5
[...]
- asambandhān na sākṣād dhi sā yuktārthopapādikā | P27r.4
aśaktasūcanān⁸⁷⁵ nāpi pāramparyeṇa yujyate || 1430 || J72v
sādhyasādhanadharmasya viśayasyopadarśanāt |
10 drṣṭāntapadavattveṣa sādhanāṅgaṃ yadiśyate || 1431 ||
abhyanujñādivākyena nanv atra vyabhicāritā |
niṣphalaṃ ca tad apy atra⁸⁷⁶ viśayasyopadarśanam || 1432 ||
sapakṣādivyavasthā cet kathaṃ pakṣāprayogataḥ |
15 nātas trairūpyam apy asti tadapekṣānibandhanam⁸⁷⁷ || 1433 ||
na sādhanābhidhāne ‘sti sapakṣādivikalpanā |
śāstre tu pravibhajyante vyavahārāya te tathā || 1434 ||
prakṛtārthāśrayā sā ‘pi yadi vā na virudhyate |
na vādyakāṇḍa evāha parasyāpi hi sādhanam || 1435 ||
20 jijñāsitaviśeṣe hi vartanāt pakṣadharmatā |
sapakṣas tatsamānatvād vipakṣas tadabhāvataḥ || 1436 ||
pratijñānābhidhāne ca kāraṇānābhidhānataḥ |
kartavyopanayasyoktir na sadbhāvaprasiddhaye || 1437 ||
prāgukte bhāvamātre ca paścād vyāpṭeḥ prakāśanāt |
25 vivakṣītārthasaṃsiddher viphalam pratibimbakam || 1438 ||
trirūpyahetunirdeśasāmarthyād eva siddhitaḥ |
na viparyayaśaṅkāsti vyarthaṃ nigamanam tataḥ⁸⁷⁸ || 1439 ||
sambaddhair eva vacanair eko ‘rthaḥ pratipādyate |
nātaḥ sambandhasiddhyarthaṃ vācyam nigamanam pṛthak || 1440 ||
30
[...]
- na pramānam iti prāhur anumānaṃ tu kecana | P27v.2
vivakṣām arpayanto⁸⁷⁹ ‘pi vāgbhir ābhiḥ kudrṣṭayaḥ || 1455 ||
35 trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvāt svārthaṃ mānaṃ na yujyate |
iṣṭaghātakṛtā⁸⁸⁰ janyaṃ mithyājñānaṃ yathā kila || 1456 ||
bhāvād ananumāne ‘pi na cānumitikāraṇam |
dvairūpyam iva liṅgasya trairūpyam nāstyato ‘numā || 1457 ||
anumānavirodhasya viruddhānām ca sādhanē |

⁸⁷³ JP sva°, T tshul gsum pa'i

⁸⁷⁴ Ś °vadanam

⁸⁷⁵ KŚ sakta°

⁸⁷⁶ K tadā yatra

⁸⁷⁷ P tadāpekṣ°

⁸⁷⁸ J dittography *tatataḥ*

⁸⁷⁹ Ś arth°

⁸⁸⁰ Ś °kṛtāj

- 40 sarvatra sambhavāt kiṃ ca viruddhāvyaabhicāriṇaḥ || 1458 ||
avasthādeśakālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu | J74r
bhāvānam anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā || 1459 [Vākyapadīya 1.32] ||
vijñātaśakter⁸⁸¹ apy asya⁸⁸² tām tām arthakriyām prati |
viśiṣṭadravyasambandhe sā śaktiḥ pratibadhyate || 1460 [Vākyapadīya 1.33] ||
45 yatnenānumito ‘py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātr̥bhīḥ |
abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathavopapādyate || 1461 [Vākyapadīya 1.34] ||
parārtham anumānaṃ tu na mānaṃ vaktrapekṣayā |
anuvādān na tenāsau svayam arthaṃ prapadyate || 1462 ||
śrotṛvyapekṣayā ‘py etat svārtham evopapadyate |
50 śrotadarśanamūlāyāḥ ko viśeṣo hi saṃvidāḥ || 1463 ||
na parārthānumānatvaṃ vacasaḥ śrotapekṣayā |
śrotṛsantānavijñānahetutvajñāpakatvataḥ || 1464 ||
yathendriyasya sāksāc ca nānumeyaprakāśanam |
tasmād asyāvinābhāvasambandhajñānavan na tat || 1465 ||
55 athocyate parārthatvaṃ paravyāpṛtyapekṣayā⁸⁸³ |
tad apy ayuktaṃ svārthe ‘pi parārthatvaprasaṅgataḥ || 1466 ||
trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvaṃ nanu saṃvādīlakṣaṇam |
tallakṣaṇam ca mānatvaṃ tat kiṃ tasmān niśidhyate || 1467 ||
mithyājñānaṃ samānaṃ ca pūrvapakṣavyapekṣayā |
60 iṣṭaghātakṛtā⁸⁸⁴ janyaṃ jñānam uktaṃ na vastutaḥ || 1468 ||
vastusthityā hi taj jñānam avisamvādi niścitam |
vādīṣṭaviparītasya pramāṇam ata eva tat || 1469 ||
ato viruddhatā⁸⁸⁵ hetor dīṣṭānte cāpy asiddhatā⁸⁸⁶ | J74v
etenaiva prakāreṇa dviṭīye hetvasiddhatā || 1470 ||
65 yat tādātmyatadutpattiyā sambandhaṃ pariniścitam |
tad eva sādhanam prāhuḥ siddhaye nyāyavādināḥ || 1471 ||
anumānavirodhādīr idṛśy asti⁸⁸⁷ na sādhanē |
naiva tad dhy ātmahetubhyaṃ vinā sambhavati kvacit || 1472 ||
parasparaviruddhau ca dharmāu naikatra vastuni |
70 yujyete sambhavo nāto viruddhāvyaabhicāriṇaḥ || 1473 ||
abhyastalakṣaṇānām ca samyagliṅgaviniścaye |
anumāvṛttir⁸⁸⁸ anyā tu nānumety abhidhīyate || 1474 ||
avasthādeśakālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu |
bhāvānam anumānena nātaḥ siddhiḥ sudurlabhā || 1475 ||
75 yatnenānumito ‘py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātr̥bhīḥ |
nānyathā sādhyate so ‘nyair abhiyuktatarair api || 1476 ||
na hi svabhāvaḥ kāryaṃ vā svabhāvāt kāraṇād ṛte |
bhedānimittatāprāptes te vināsti na cānumā || 1477 ||
trirūpaliṅgavacasaḥ śaktasamsūcakatvataḥ⁸⁸⁹ |
80 yat parārthānumānatvam uktaṃ tac chrotapekṣayā || 1478 ||
gauṇam sāṅketikaṃ caivam anumānatvam āśritam | J75r

⁸⁸¹ Ś nirjñāta°, JP vijñāna°, Vākyapadīya nirjñāta°

⁸⁸² Vākyapadīya dravyasya

⁸⁸³ K °vyāvṛtty°

⁸⁸⁴ Ś °kṛtāj

⁸⁸⁵ P viruddhā

⁸⁸⁶ KŚ asādhyatā

⁸⁸⁷ P idṛśasti, KŚ idṛśe ‘sti

⁸⁸⁸ J anumānavṛttir

⁸⁸⁹ KŚ sakta°

śaktasamśūcakatvena⁸⁹⁰ tena⁸⁹¹ nātiprasajyate || 1479 ||
 nānumānaṃ pramāṇaṃ ced viphalā vyāhatis tava |
 na kaścid api vāco⁸⁹² hi vivakṣāṃ pratipadyate || 1480 ||
 85 laukikaṃ liṅgaṃ iṣṭaṃ cen na tv anyaiḥ⁸⁹³ parikalpitam⁸⁹⁴ |
 nanu loko 'pi kāryāder hetvādīn avagacchati || 1481 ||
 tattvatas⁸⁹⁵ tu tad evoktaṃ nyāyavādibhir apy alam |
 tallaukikābhyanujñāte kiṃ tyaktaṃ bhavati tvayā⁸⁹⁶ || 1482 ||
 apramāṇena caitena paraḥ kiṃ pratipadyate |
 90 apramāṇakṛtaś cāsau pratyayaḥ kīdrśo bhavet || 1483 ||
 anumānaṃ pramāṇaṃ ced vaktur⁸⁹⁷ na vacanātmakam |
 prakāśayati tenāyaṃ yathā tadvad idaṃ bhavet || 1484 ||
 ajñātārthāprakāśatvād⁸⁹⁸ apramāṇaṃ tad iṣyate |
 nāśaktasamśūcakatvena tāvakīnaṃ tathā nanu || 1485 ||

P28r

⁸⁹⁰ KŚ sakta°

⁸⁹¹ P tana

⁸⁹² KŚ vādo, T tshig gang gis kyang

⁸⁹³ Ś cet tattvataḥ

⁸⁹⁴ P parikalpitaḥ (in J the bottom dot of the *visarga* is cancelled, leaving an *anusvāra*; P retains the *visarga*), T

gzhan ni brtag nus min zhe na

⁸⁹⁵ P dittography *tattattvatas*

⁸⁹⁶ K svayam, T khyed la

⁸⁹⁷ K cakrur, T sgra ba po yi

⁸⁹⁸ J °rthaparakāś°

CHAPTER NINETEEN
PRAMĀNĀNTARAPARĪKṢĀ

EXCERPT

	śrutātideśavākyasya samānārthopalambhane	J79r
	saṃjñāsambandhavijñānam upamā kaiścīd iṣyate 1562	
	tatrāpi saṃjñāsambandhapratipattir ⁸⁹⁹ anākulā	
	tasyātideśavākyasya jātaiva ⁹⁰⁰ śravaṇe yadi 1563	
5	tathā pariḡhītārthagrahaṇān na pramāṇatā	
	smṛter ivopamānasya karaṇārthaviyogataḥ 1564	
	atha sā naiva saṃjātā tathāpi pratipadyate	
	so 'yaṃ yasya mayā saṃjñā saṃśruteti kathaṃ tadā 1565	
	tathā hy aśrutatasaṃjño gavayasyopalambhane	
10	tan nāma śrutam asyeti na jñātum kaścana prabhuḥ 1566	
	upayuktopamānaś cet tulyārthagrahaṇe ⁹⁰¹ sati	
	viśiṣṭaviṣayatvena sambandham avagacchati 1567	
	āgamād dhi sa sambandham vetti sāmānyagocaram	P29v
	viśiṣṭaviṣayaṃ taṃ tu vijānāty upamāśrayāt 1568	
15	nanv anyatra na saṃjñāyāḥ sambandhasyāvabodhane	
	tasyā arthāntare ⁹⁰² bodho yujyate ⁹⁰³ 'tiprasaṅgataḥ 1569	
	na hi citrāṅgade kaścit tannāmagrahaṇe sati	
	kālāntareṇa taṃ śabdaṃ vetti cārūkirīṭini 1570	J79v
	tasmāt prāḡ yatra tenedaṃ vikalpapratibimbake	
20	jñātaṃ nāma bahirbuddhyā sāmānyam iti saṃjñite 1571	
	gavayasyopalambhe 'pi tatraiva pratipadyate	
	dr̥ṣyakalpāvibhāgaṅjño bāhya ity abhimanyate 1572	
	evaṃ ca pratipattavyaṃ yat svalakṣaṇagocarāḥ	
	vikalpā dhvanayaś cāpi vistareṇa nirākṛtāḥ 1573	
25	teṣāṃ tadgocaratve 'pi bhavaty evānumaiva ⁹⁰⁴ vā	
	trirūpaṅgajanyatvam asyā evaṃ ⁹⁰⁵ pratīyate 1574	
	yo gavā sadṛṣo 'sau hi gavayaśrutigocaraḥ	
	saṅketagrahaṇāvastho buddhisto gavayo yathā 1575	
	buddhisto 'pi na cet tasyām avasthāyāṃ bhaved asau	
30	kriyate samayaḥ kasminn ayaṃ ca sadṛṣo gavā 1576	
	na sambandhyatiriktaś ca sambandho 'stīti sādhitam	
	prāḡ eva samaye śabdo ḡhītaḥ śrotracetasā 1577	
	cakṣuṣā dr̥ṣyate cāsāv agrato 'vasthitaḥ ⁹⁰⁶ paśuḥ	
	pr̥thagvijñātayor eṣā yuktā na ghaṭanā pramā 1578	J80r
35	ḡhītapratīsandhānāt sugandhimadhurādivat ⁹⁰⁷	
	tannāmayogasamvittīḥ smārtatāṃ nātivartate 1579	
	anantopāyajanyāś ca samākhyāyogasamvidāḥ	

⁸⁹⁹ P °pratirūpattir

⁹⁰⁰ K tadaiva, P dātaiva, T skyes pa nyid

⁹⁰¹ K tulyatva°, T mtshungs don 'dzin pa

⁹⁰² Ś tasyā hy arth°

⁹⁰³ Ś yujyete

⁹⁰⁴ J eṣā°, P corrupt

⁹⁰⁵ K asya caivaṃ

⁹⁰⁶ Ś avagrato 'sthi°

⁹⁰⁷ K °madhurtva°

sādharmyam anapekṣyāpi jāyante narapādiṣu || 1580 ||
 sitātapatrapihitabradhnapādo⁹⁰⁸ narādhipaḥ |
 40 teṣāṃ⁹⁰⁹ madhya iti prokta upadeśaviśeṣataḥ || 1581 ||
 kālāntareṇa taddṛṣṭau tan nāmāsyeti yā matiḥ |
 sā tavānyā⁹¹⁰ pramā prāptā sādharmyādyanapekṣaṇāt || 1582 ||
 anye⁹¹¹ pramāntarāstitvam sādhayanty anumābalāt |
 pratyakṣam anumābhinnapramāṇāntarasaṅgatam || 1583 ||
 45 anumāvat⁹¹² pramāṇatvād anumāpy evam eva ca |
 teṣāṃ⁹¹³ apratibandho 'yaṃ hetur bādhāprakāśanāt || 1584 ||
 catuṣṭvam⁹¹⁴ ca pramāṇānām vyāhanyetaivam eva⁹¹⁵ te |
 yat tatra parihāras te sa evātra bhaviṣyati || 1585 ||

⁹⁰⁸ KŚ °patrāpi°

⁹⁰⁹ J om. *anusvāra*

⁹¹⁰ KŚ tadā°, T khyed la

⁹¹¹ K anyaḥ

⁹¹² JP anumānavat

⁹¹³ K (naiva)m

⁹¹⁴ P unclear but additional *akṣara* in *catuṣṣṭvam*

⁹¹⁵ P eṣa