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The Bounded Community:
Turning Foreigners into Americans in 21st Century L.A.*

by

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Abstract

The Bounded Community:

Turning Foreigners into Americans in 21st Century L.A.

Contrary to the forecasts of the scholarship on immigrant transnationalism, foreigners continue to get transformed into nationals. Engaging in the necessary adjustments is often acceptable to the people earlier willing to abandon home in search of the good life; the everyday demands of fitting in, as well as the attenuation of home country loyalties and ties, make the foreigners and their descendants increasingly similar to the nationals whose community they have joined. But the ex-foreigners also respond to the message conveyed by nationals and state institutions, all of which signal that acceptance is contingent on demonstrating a commitment to belonging. In this respect, the assimilation literature, emphasizing the decline of an ethnic difference, largely misleads: the ex-foreigners do not abandon particularism; rather, they replace an old particularism for one that is new. Using survey data, this demonstrates, in at least one key immigrant metropolis, the power and prevalence of the forces transforming foreigners into Americans. The paper analyzes immigrants' views of national attachment, immigration control, language policies, and cultural pluralism, underscoring the convergence in the beliefs of immigrants and natives.

**The Bounded Community:
Turning Foreigners into Americans in 21st Century L.A.**

At the turn of the 21st century, “globalization” is the order of the day. With international migration bringing the alien “other” from third world to first, and worldwide trade and communications amplifying the feedbacks traveling in the opposite direction, the view that nation-state and society normally converge has waned. Instead, social scientists are looking for new ways to think about the connections between “here” and “there,” as evidenced by the interest in the many things called “transnational”. Those studying international migration evince particular excitement. Observing that migration produces a plethora of connections spanning “home” and “host” societies, these scholars proclaim the emergence of “transnational communities” (see Glick Schiller, et. al., 1992; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998, Portes et. al., 1999, Dewind and Levitt, 2003, and accompanying articles in *International Migration Review*, V. 37, 3).

Evidence of ties that the scholars call “transnational” abounds. To begin with, the reality of “immigration” diverges from the definition employed by dictionaries and social scientists alike, namely, migration for settlement. While some migrants do move to settle and others settle despite initial plans to the contrary, today’s mass international migrations entail movements of other type, including return migration, repeat migration, and circular migration, as well as migration for settlement. Such flows leave large numbers of persons moving back and forth, not certain where to settle, let alone how much importance to place on the connections “here” versus “there”. The passage of so many people moving across borders generates a huge, subsequent flow of information,

goods, and money. Though the simple letter did a remarkably good job of knitting together distant trans-oceanic contacts during the migrations of the last turn of the century, today's migrants can communicate with the stay-at-homes in any number of ways, doing so with a speed and immediacy that, in the view of many experts, keeps migrants and stayers firmly connected. As the scholars of immigrant transnationalism contend, changes in receiving societies also facilitate the expression of home-place attachments. For much of the twentieth century, ties to home and host country were often seen as mutually exclusive, such that immigrants who mobilized on behalf of the place left behind ran the risk of falling into the "dual loyalty" trap. Today's, however, is a more relaxed political and ideological environment: in particular, the shift from melting pot to multiculturalism has legitimated the expression of and organization around home country loyalties. In the views of some scholars, moreover, immigrants are free to mobilize around home country concerns in a way that was not true before: the advent of a new international human rights regime (labeled "post-nationalism") has diminished the difference between "nationals" and "foreigners" by circumscribing the power of receiving states.

If some scholars look at today's immigration and see home-place connectedness as its distinguishing feature, others examine the same reality and find that old country ties inevitably give way to new, just as in the past. As Richard Alba and Victor Nee (2003) have argued in their recent, eloquent defense of assimilation, *Remaking the American Mainstream*, the U.S. of the turn of the 21st century is again demonstrating its extraordinary capacity to dissolve ethnic ties. As Alba and Nee explain, the attenuation of home place connections derives from the dynamics of the migration process itself.

Immigration is motivated by the search for the better life, a quest that usually has no inherent relationship to assimilation. Only in some instances is assimilation self-consciously embraced; often, it is precisely the end that the immigrants wish to *avoid*. Nonetheless, the effort to secure a better future – find a better job, a safer neighborhood, a higher quality school – confronts immigrants with the need to choose between strategies of an “ethnic” or “mainstream” sort. Insofar as the better future is found in a place where out-group contacts are more plentiful than in the neighborhoods or workplaces where the newcomers begin, the new Americans are likely to select “mainstream strategies” – and thereby progress toward assimilation, whether wanted or not.

No less important are institutional responses to the immigrants’ arrival, which given current circumstances, promote acceptance and thereby encourage immigrants and their descendants to enter social structures of progressively greater ethnic diversity. In Alba and Nee’s view, change in the latter mechanisms distinguishes today’s immigrant world from yesterday’s: on the one hand, racism, and its associated ways of thinking and feeling, has lost legitimacy; on the other hand, discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origins has been prohibited, to very significant effect. Most significant is the change in the “*formal rules of state organizations* (53; italics in the original):” the “institutional mechanisms extending civil rights to minorities and women have increased the cost of discrimination...in non-trivial ways (57).” While today’s immigrants don’t come from the same places as yesterday’s, the impact of national or ethnic origins is contingent and variable, which is why they don’t determine destinies.

Thus, if the search for the better life succeeds, it inevitably pulls the immigrants and their descendants away from others of their own kind. Home place ties are likely to wither even faster: socially significant connectedness to the place of origin is hard to maintain without extensive exposure and it is precisely exposure that immigrant offspring are likely to lack. Moreover, other assimilatory pressures, most notably, the rapid loss of mother tongue proficiency, make it likely that only the immigrants, and perhaps only those among them who migrated as adults, will continue to feel at ease in the interchange with the kin and friends left behind.

Although the relevant literature (in anthropology, history, political science, and sociology) has largely embraced one of these two competing perspectives, there is a third, thus far undeveloped alternative: in this view, migrants' ties to home places get severed as the foreigners undergo, not so much "assimilation", but rather a transformation into nationals. From this perspective, the simplistic dichotomy of assimilation versus transnationalism misleads, as these are not theories but rather social processes, inextricably intertwined (as argued in Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004). Conventional social science overlaps with folk understandings: both assume that nation-states normally contain societies (as implied by the concept of "American society"), which is why the appearance of foreigners and their foreign attachments are perceived as anomalies expected to disappear. What conventional perspectives see as normal, however, the alternative sees as contingent: while society and state generally overlapped during the mid-20th century, conditions at the turns of the 20th and the 21st century took a different form, making it hard for nation-state societies to wall themselves off from the world (as argued in Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002). As social relations regularly span state

boundaries, international migrants, those people from beyond the nation-state's boundaries, persistently re-appear.

For this reason, connections between “here” and “there” are an inherent and enduring component of the long-distance migrations of the modern world, as the students of “immigrant transnationalism” insist. What escapes from the latter's field of vision are the reactions generated by the advent of international migration, and which aim at forcing society back into the state container. States seek to bound the societies they enclose: they strive to regulate membership in the national collectivity as well as movement across territorial borders, often using illiberal means to fulfill liberal ends. Nationals, believing in the idea of the national community, endeavor to implement it, making sure that membership is only available to some, and signaling to the newcomers that acceptance is contingent on conformity.

In large measure, the effort is successful, as foreigners get transformed into nationals. Contrary to the claims of the scholarly transnationals, engaging in the necessary adjustments is often acceptable to the people earlier willing to abandon home in search of the good life; the everyday demands of fitting in, as well as the attenuation of home country loyalties and ties, make the foreigners and their descendants increasingly similar to the nationals whose community they have joined. But the ex-foreigners also respond to the message conveyed by nationals and state institutions.¹ In this respect, the assimilation literature, emphasizing the decline of an ethnic difference, and organized around the distinction between mainstreamers and sidestreamers largely misleads (for further elaboration, see Waldinger, 2003). Whether accepted into the mainstream or not, the foreigners clearly get transformed into Americans, another, particularistic, we-they,

contrastive social identity, and one that can only be understood by reference to the un-Americans. Moreover, the new Americans find appeal in the idea of a national community, so much so that they think their new national community should be bounded, agreeing that the gates through which future foreigners enter ought to be controlled.

In the pages that follow, I first develop this argument and then, using survey data, demonstrate, in at least one key immigrant metropolis, the power and prevalence of the forces transforming foreigners into Americans. I will first quickly develop the “nationalization” perspective outlined below. Then, I will discuss the dataset to be employed and last move on to an analysis of immigrants’ views of national attachment, immigration control, language policies, and cultural pluralism, underscoring the convergence in the beliefs of immigrants and natives.

Nationalizing Foreigners

In the United States, the continued nationalization of the foreigner is largely unseen – in part, because the democratization of the American people has transformed the meaning of Americanization. The key lies in the distinction between the internal and external aspects of national identity, the former distinguishing among the various peoples of the United States, the latter between the Americans at home and the foreigners abroad.

Historically, the Americans constructed nationhood in terms that have been both *externally* and *internally* contrastive, excluding not just aliens but also the outsiders – most notably, African Americans -- found within the territory of the state. The mass migration of the turn of the 20th century provoked reactions that heightened the importance of both *internal* and *external* distinctions, eventuating in Jim Crows laws, immigration restriction, and a narrow, ethnocentric conception of American identity.

Descendants of the founding immigrant groups dominated during the last era of mass migration and its aftermath; since, as the dominants saw it, *they* were the Americans, the demands for cultural change were intense: acceptance was to be granted only if the immigrants and their descendants shed all foreign habits, tastes, and attachments.

During the current era of mass migration, by contrast, sharply ethnicized conceptions of American identity have been abandoned; the cultural boundaries of the American “we” have also been enlarged to include all the citizens of the state. In postethnic America, as the historian David Hollinger (1993) has termed it, ethnicity is respected, but not frozen in place. New ethnic groups get formed as part of the normal functioning of a democratic society, and are so accepted; as sociologists Richard Alba and Victor Nee correctly note, the newest Americans are freer, as compared to the past, to choose strategies of the “mainstream” as well as the “ethnic” type. Likewise, the unitary political culture of the last era of mass migration, when founding groups dominated the state and defined political identity, has given way to pluralism, in which ethnic succession at the highest levels of the polity is admired as confirmation of the American creed.

If the America encountered by the “immigrants” of the turn of the 21st century tends to be *internally* post-ethnic, or at least evolving in that direction, it remains *externally* exclusive. National identity continues to serve as a source of primary affiliation; as of this writing, the political, external component of American identity – the national “us” v. the alien “them” beyond the borders of the U.S. -- is very much alive and well. According to the pundits (see Kagan, 2002), Americans come from Mars (loving war) and Europeans from Venus (loving love). That view might be too strong, but poll data do

indicate that Americans are more nationalistic than are members of the other rich democracies (Smith and Jarko, 1998). Liberal nationalists readily concede the point. As Hollinger points out, postethnic Americans are *not* citizens of the world, as their territorially-bounded, collective attachments keep cosmopolitan sympathies in check (Hollinger, 1997). Put somewhat differently, the national community is an *ideal* in which almost all Americans, the occasional libertarian excepted, strongly believe.

Consequently, contemporary liberal nationalism takes a double-edged form, at once internally inclusive, yet externally exclusive. Internal inclusion emphasizes the acceptability of ethnic differences *within* national boundaries, such as continued ethnic group or language loyalties. External exclusivity refers to the bounded character of the broader national collectivity. While internal inclusivity allows for a range of ethnic attachments at the sub-national level, external exclusivity implies an ordering, in which a national “we,” understood in familistic terms, takes priority over attachments to other places and peoples (e.g. Walzer, 1997, on acceptance of internal differences *within* the national community v. Walzer, 1983, in defense of immigration restriction in order to maintain a national community different *from* the rest of the world;; for a sociological discussion, see Joppke, 2005) By the same token, boundaries and bounding are seen as legitimate, which is why immigration restriction is widely supported.

Moreover, the advent of international migration turns the tension between the principles of internal inclusion and external exclusion into a social dilemma, and one that takes a novel form. The foreigners seeking to cross national borders are just implementing the program that assimilationists, whether folk or scholarly, so clearly endorse: forsaking ties to home and hearth in search of the better life. But since a

national community couldn't be maintained if foreigners were able to come and go as they pleased, nationals are willing to abandon liberalism in order to keep borders controlled – endorsing illiberal means in order to keep foreigners, only looking to better their condition, from crashing the gates. Moreover, once foreign-born numbers burgeon, a gap emerges between the people of the state and the people in the state. Believing in the *idea* of the national community, the nationals are also reluctant to provide membership to any and all who might happen to have moved here from “el otro lado” or have managed to cross the water’s edge. Since immigration restriction in liberal societies inherently produces “illegal” immigration, the commitment to external exclusion yields support for policies designed to exclude the least acceptable foreigners from the privileges enjoyed by the people both in *and* of the state.

The framework developed above contrasts with much, if not most, of the research on Americans’ views and beliefs regarding ethnic and racial differences. That research is focused on the “American Dilemma”: the contradiction between official creed and informal beliefs and practices, which has Americans publicly proclaiming their indifference to ascriptive differences among the peoples of the United States, and yet organizing so much of national life around precisely those differences. Liberal nationalism, by contrast, embraces the American creed, bringing all members of the American people into the fold. For that reason, it is the point of view most likely to appeal to those ethnic outsiders, whether of long-established or recent vintage, who want to be full Americans, without ever having to worry about being harassed for driving when not white, or being pressed to sever all attachments to other peoples or places. Put somewhat differently, it is the perspective of the World War II ethnics in the foxholes, of

a Colin Powell writing that "My blackness has been a source of pride, strength and inspiration, and so has my being an American (Powell with Persico, 1995: 534-5)," or for that matter, a W.E.B. Dubois describing the "two unreconciled strivings" associated with being "a Negro, an American.(DuBois, 1999: 17)"² As the political perspective most accepting of differences among Americans and shorn of the usual atavisms (that is, racism of the Jim Crow, symbolic, laissez-faire types [e.g. Bobo and Smith, 1998]), liberal nationalism is the exclusionary doctrine best suited to the normal, multicultural American of the early 21st century, and therefore the view most likely to be internalized by the new and candidate Americans of our times.

In the end, what the literature calls "acculturation" is actually a form of political re-socialization in which, as the ex-foreigners nationalize, they accept and internalize the social models prevailing among the nationals, replacing old country with new country solidarities. The ex-foreigners retain ethnic ties and are more likely than nationals to adhere to an internally inclusionary point of view. While home country attachments constrain the shift to an externally exclusive view, the ex-foreigners demonstrate significant levels of commitment, both to the new national collectivity and to the prevailing, hierarchical ordering of national and sub-national, ethnic affiliations.

Data, Indicators, Analysis

How Americans view immigration and the broader questions of belonging that emerge in immigration's wake is the subject of a small, but growing literature (e.g. Espenshade and Hempel, 1996; Citrin, et. al., 1997) Much less attention has been paid to the view of the ex-foreigners themselves (for an exception, see Citrin, et. al., 2003). Although more than ten percent of the U.S. population is foreign-born, the immigrants

remain concentrated in a small number of places, with the result that national sample surveys generate relatively small foreign-born Ns. Small Ns also preclude the disaggregations that any meaningful analysis would require: the foreigners are far from one of a kind; and even those who happen to come from a single place tend to change as time spent in the United States lengthens. As many immigrants can't adequately understand or express themselves in English, surveys lacking a foreign-language component end up sampling on the dependent variable. Consequently, a standard public opinion workhorse doesn't suffice for the purpose at hand. The General Social Survey, for example, contains many questions that are useful for understanding nationals and their views of the foreigners in their midst; but the foreign-born N is too small, and too heavily skewed toward English-speakers and non-Latino respondents as to be truly useful.

There are now a handful of national surveys with large foreign-born Ns, most notably, the Pew Hispanic Surveys; the alternative used in this paper, however, is to fall back on the Los Angeles County Social Survey, a random-digit-dial telephone survey conducted annually during February through April from 1994 to 2000.³ As a sample survey in an immigrant region where foreign-born densities, the foreign-born (and foreign parentage) share of the sample is naturally high. Moreover, the relevance of immigration to the region is such that the survey consistently asked respondents about their views on immigration and its sequels. As shown in Table 1, pooling annual results from 1994 to 2000 yields a total sample of 4,866 respondents, aged 18 and over, of whom 35 percent are foreign-born and 14 percent are children of the foreign-born. The size of

the Hispanic respondent pool is also large (1,564); as interviews were conducted in Spanish, meaningful internal comparisons are possible.

On the other hand, use of the LACSS involves some downsides, starting with the most obvious: that Los Angeles offers a distinctive, not necessarily typical, cross section of the U.S.'s foreign-born population. In addition, each year's survey is relatively small, averaging roughly 700 per year. More problematically, topical questions change from year. Thus, whereas close to 100 questions related to immigration or multiculturalism were asked during the 1994-2000 period, many fewer questions were asked more than once. While some topics warranted repetition, questions were worded in such different ways that merging responses was inappropriate. Notwithstanding, there remains ample material relevant to the issue, with relevant repeated questions offering a very large N, and the characteristics of the region's population ensuring that the foreign-born sample is of adequate size, even for those questions asked on a one-time basis, as shown in Table 1.

Following the framework developed above, the paper is organized around a two-by-two contrast, cross-classifying political boundaries with formality, as displayed in Table 1, which also lists the relevant questions, along with sample sizes and survey years in which the questions were asked. The external dimension invokes the we-they contrast between Americans and foreigners, with the latter either outside the territory or possibly within it. The internal dimension invokes a different we-they contrast, namely between Americans (or possibly, candidate Americans) of different types. The formal dimension refers to policies, whether oriented externally (regulating international migration or access to public goods by foreigners resident on the territory) or internally (policies regarding language use). The informal dimension refers to views and beliefs regarding

the importance and appropriateness of attachments to national or sub-national collectivities.

Table 1 about here

Given the inherent tension between liberalism's internal and external aspects, I hypothesize that opinion among the nationals in the sample is likely to crystallize with varying degrees of consensus around the two dimensions. Internally, liberal nationalism is contested: the usual ideological and class (as measured by school) factors will generate variance in the degree to which internal ethnic differences are accepted. Externally, however, liberal nationalism is far more broadly embraced, as it can be endorsed by conservatives adhering to more organic or ethnocentric understandings of the nations, as well as liberals who, while insisting that the "we" include Americans of all types, bound the collectivity at the water's edge. While I expect that the usual factors producing acceptance on the internal dimension, namely liberal political beliefs and higher levels of education, will influence views regarding the external dimension, the variance will be distributed at exclusionary ends of the spectrum.

Likewise, whereas the internalist preoccupation of the literature emphasizes the differences between ethnic mainstreamers and sidestreamers, expanding the focus to include the relevant external social contrasts underscores common allegiance to and belief in the national collectivity. Consequently, ethnic and racial differences are expected to affect opinion regarding *internal* dimensions of inclusion, but are likely to be

of reduced importance in shaping views on the *external* dimension, whether having to do with sentiments of national attachment, beliefs regarding immigration control, or views regarding membership in the people and access to the privileges that membership creates. Specifically, I expect African-Americans or native-born Hispanics to take pluralistic positions on issues linked to the internal dimension, but reveal little difference from white natives when the focus shifts to the external dimension. As noted above, I anticipate that foreign-born respondents will differ from nationals on all four dimensions, at least to some extent. However, I also expect that differences will be greatest among the most recently arrived, with the views of more settled immigrants increasingly similar to those of natives, and dissimilar from the recent arrivals.

The analysis is constructed to focus attention on inter-group differences in ways that maintain a meaningful reference to the specific questions that respondents were asked. Consequently, I emphasize ethnic differences in the mean value of responses, prior to and then after, application of controls. Thus, when inquiring about views towards desired levels of immigration, the survey asked respondents to pick among five categories, ranging from “increased a lot” (coded as 1) to “decreased a lot” (coded as 5). As one might expect, recent immigrants or Hispanics were, on average, likely to take a less restrictionist view of whites. On the other hand, the mean value for the *least* restrictionist group, foreign-born respondents living in the United States, was just under 3, corresponding to the response, “stay the same.” A little over half of the questions examined in this paper asked respondents to pick among a variety of outcomes; in the remaining cases, respondents were presented with dichotomous possibilities. Where the question involved a dichotomy, the mean value appearing in a table represents the

proportion answering affirmatively (coded 1). Significance levels for descriptive statistics come from a series of regressions (binomial or ordered logistic), in which dummies were simultaneously entered for three immigrant cohorts (less than 10 years residence; 10-20 years residence; more than 20 years residence); four ethnic groups (blacks; Hispanics; Asians; others); persons with at least one foreign born parents (second generation); and respondents interviewed in Spanish. Whites were the omitted category. Consequently, significance levels reflect the significance of the difference relative to native born whites of native parentage (third generation).

As with any multivariate analysis, our interest is in the unique effect of ethnic or immigrant characteristics on the outcome of interests. The multivariate analysis is based on a series of regressions (either binomial or ordered logistic), in which I regressed the dependent variables on a series of standard controls: four dummy variables for education (less than high school; high school; some college; graduate school, with college as the omitted category); two dummy variables for political ideology (liberal and conservative, with all others [moderates, not categorizable, don't know] as the omitted category); two dummy variables for religion (catholic and protestant, with all others as the omitted category); four dummy variables for age cohorts (twenties, forties, fifties, sixties and over, with thirties as the omitted category); a dummy variable for whether or not the interview had been conducted in Spanish; and a dummy variable for the survey year(s) in which any particular item appeared (with the most recent year as the omitted category).

In the regressions, significance tests illuminate the two-way contrast between whites and each of the ethnic or generational categories; as I argue that, with years of settlement in the United States, immigrants' views converge with those of natives, each

regression was followed by separate significance tests, comparing the three immigrant cohorts with one another.

As my interest does not so much focus on the size of the coefficients, as on the size of the difference in the mean value, I also use the results of the multivariate regressions to predict mean values for each group, controlling for background factors.⁴ The predictions are tantamount to a thought experiment, in which I ask how a group would have responded to any question of interest if: (a) everyone in the sample had been a member of that group; and (b) everyone possessed the mean value of the entire sample on all of the control factors. Put somewhat differently, by standardizing for the relevant characteristics, which at once vary greatly within the sample, but also affect the outcomes of interest, the predictions remove all effects except for those associated with membership in the category. Taking the concrete case of recent immigrants asked whether the government should spend more money to deport illegal immigrants, the prediction shows that if these respondents possessed the age, education, political ideology, and religion of all other respondents, the proportion supporting such a policy would be lower than among native whites, but would nonetheless be well in excess of 50 percent (see Table 3).

Findings

External-informal: The first dimension refers to views regarding those we-they identities distinguishing the Americans from the other peoples of the world. In general, theories of globalization or transnationalism predict diminished attachment to the particularistic communities linked to and organized the nation-state. Specifically, the literature on immigrant transnationalism contends that international migration will

generate the presence of persons from beyond state boundaries with loyalties that extend to their home states; moreover, those loyalties are expected to be maintained by the foreign-born even as they put down roots, and also passed on to children and possibly even grandchildren. Whether indeed today's immigrant "transnationals" (or is it "transmigrants"?) are expected to follow the cosmopolitan model of the labor migrant internationalists of the turn of the last century is not clear. Given the stronger, more encompassing states found in host and home states, it may be more realistic to anticipate the development of dual attachments to both places. Nonetheless, the development of patriotic attachments to the host society would be an outcome difficult to reconcile with the core transnationalist claims, and all the more so given the historic caging (or integrating) power of the United States.

The LACSS asked respondents four questions, bearing on the intensity of their feelings for the United States. Three of the questions – regarding love for the USA, feeling for the American flag, and pride in the U.S. – tap in to the strictly affective dimension of attachment. A fourth question, asking respondents about their willingness to leave the United States for another country to improve their lives, allows one to assess whether national attachment is based on a calculation of costs and benefits, rather than affect. A more calculative view toward national attachment might be expected among international migrants, as many move for strictly instrumental purposes, exploiting the opportunity to work in the wealthy countries in order to bring some of those riches back home. Note that agreement with the question implies greater willingness to leave, and therefore lower levels of attachment to the United States.

As shown in Table 2, responses to the questions regarding national attachment are consistent with a nationalization, not transnationalism perspective. Recent immigrants, with ten years or less in the United States, are likely to produce responses reflecting levels of attachment that are significantly lower than the responses produced by native whites of native parentage (hereafter “third generation whites”); this response pattern can be observed both before and after controls. A similar pattern can be observed among respondents interviewed in Spanish and likewise among immigrants with somewhat deeper roots (ten to twenty years in the United States), though neither responds with the consistency seen for the most recent immigrants, and consistency is weaker among the latter than among the former. Difference greatly diminishes, however, when the focus turns to the most settled immigrants, to the children of immigrants, or to Hispanics generally: with the occasional exception, these groups reveal levels of attachment that resemble, when not being virtually, to those of native whites. Tests for differences in the coefficients among the three immigrant cohorts further highlight the impact of time spent in the United States. Prior to controls, all but 1 of the 12 contrasts shows stronger levels of attachment among the more settled pair in comparison (e.g. less than 10 years v. ten to twenty years). With controls, the differences generally fall below standard significance levels, though the least settled group still emerges as distinctively less attached than the rest.

Table 2 about here

External-formal: For the most part, American social science views “immigrants” and their descendants as social outsiders. As this characteristic provides their distinguishing trait, the people from abroad and their descendants can be compared with social outsiders that are native to this land; likewise, attitudes toward immigration control, whether focused on the border or on those aliens within the territory of the United States, are thought of in strictly socio-cultural terms.

However, population movement across state boundaries is an inherently *political* matter, as it threatens to sever the alignment of territory, political institutions, and society that states try to create and in which nationals so fervently believe. *States* make migrations international: implementing controls at internal as well as external levels, they regulate both movement across territorial borders and membership in the national collectivity. Consequently, the internal boundaries among persons living in the contemporary United States aren’t simply defined by “social and cultural differences” of purely local provenance. Instead, the crucial categorical memberships derive from the political organization of the contemporary migration regime. After all, the categories of “asylee”, “refugee,” “non-immigrant resident,” and “naturalized citizen,” refer to traits that are administrative, can only be understood within the contexts of the state system, and are more or less interchangeable from one state to another. They are transparently *not* properties of persons – no one is a born a refugee – and therefore bear no relationship to either “race” or “ethnicity” as conventionally defined.

Moreover, in seeking to restrict immigration, the United States has created the “illegal immigrant. (as argued by Ngai, 2004)” As the effort to restrict illegal immigration is inherently unsuccessful, and all the more so in the United States, where

policy aims to produce smoke and mirrors but no real results (e.g. Massey, et. al), the failure to successfully restrict illegal immigration has made for ever greater efforts at hardening the boundaries between bona fide members and excluded persons, who nonetheless live on the national soil. Likewise, the growing presence of illegal immigrants has fostered intensified efforts to deny them access to public goods. As a significant portion of the foreigners living on American soil are neither “new Americans” nor even “candidate” Americans, views toward immigration policies, whether focused internally or externally, are more likely to draw on those we-they identities distinguishing the Americans from the other peoples of the world than on the we-they distinctions among Americans of different type, which has been the literature’s principal concern.

When asked about their views regarding levels of *legal* immigration, foreign-born Angelenos expressed views that were distinctly different from third generation whites, who supported further restriction. However, as shown in Table 3, the group most supportive of immigration -- the most recently arrived immigrants – were at best supportive of expansion of a most modest sort: their mean score of 2.9 fell just below the value indicating support for the view that levels of immigration should remain the same. Better settled immigrants, moreover, took a more restrictionist view, with the adult offspring of immigrants voicing support for yet deeper cuts, though not at the level of whites. Controlling for group membership, but *no* other characteristics, indicates that Hispanics and respondents interviewed in Spanish were less restrictionist than whites, without expressing support for expansion. Controls for other characteristics left the inter-group pattern unchanged, though the adjusted scores pushed the foreign-born respondents towards slightly more restrictionist views.

Table 3 about here

When asked whether the government should spend more money to deport illegal immigrants, 62 percent of whites responded “yes”. Not surprisingly, less than one quarter of recently arrived immigrants, one fifth of those interviewed in Spanish, and just under three tenths of Hispanics gave the same answer. Better settled immigrants and immigrant offspring were also less likely than whites to endorse greater funding for deportation, but support levels were nonetheless higher than among the recently arrived: almost half of the second generation respondents supported greater spending for deportation. After controls for background characteristics, more recent immigrants, Hispanics, respondents interviewed in Spanish, and immigrant offspring remained less likely, than whites, to support enhanced spending on deportation; the adjusted means show only modest convergence toward the more restrictionist views held by whites.

Although the U.S. constitution guarantees citizenship to all persons born in the United States, regardless of the nativity or legal status of the parent, less than half of whites voiced continued support for this principle. By contrast, support for the status quo was strongly endorsed by all foreign-born respondents (the coefficient for the most settled group of immigrants falling just above conventional levels of statistical significance), and likewise by Hispanics, and respondents interviewed in Spanish. These differences persisted after applications of controls, though support for birthright citizenship weakened among immigrant offspring.

Whereas the first three items focus on foreigners either outside the territory of the United States, or present on the territory but in an unauthorized status, the last item asks about attitudes toward candidate Americans – that is to say, legal, permanent immigrants. Whites again reveal strong support for greater internal exclusion: only a minority, 38 percent, thought that *legal* immigrants should be eligible for services immediately upon arrival in the United States. Recent arrivals took a very different view, with almost three quarters voicing support for immediate eligibility; respondents interviewed in Spanish were also significantly more likely, than whites, to support immediate eligibility. However, opinion among all other groups converged with that of whites. Controls left the inter-group pattern unaltered; however, the adjusted scores for recent immigrants and for respondents speaking in Spanish show that, after controls, just over a half continued to voice support for immediate eligibility.

The tests for significance of the differences among immigrant cohorts provide further evidence that time in the United States leads settlers to espouse a more restrictionist view. The contrast emerges most distinctively when the focus gets trained on issues regarding the admission or acceptance of foreigners: the most recent arrivals, in particular, have views that clearly diverge from the other cohorts. Disagreement regarding policies for candidate Americans is less clear cut; on the other hand, understanding the finer points of citizenship policy may itself be the result of time spent in the United States, which is why differences between the intermediate and the most settled cohort are close to conventional levels of significance.

Internal-informal: This dimension focuses on differences among *Americans* of different types, referring to ethnocultural views regarding the relationship between

membership in the American people and in an American minority. Historically, as argued above, dominant groups held a unitary view; consequently, Americanization required the immigrants and their descendants to shed all foreign habits, tastes, and attachments. At the turn of the 21st century, however, the options for belonging appear to take a different form. The civil rights revolution transformed the terms of membership, so that all of its citizens were included – not just those with origins in Europe. It also ushered in a different understanding of the cultural differences between Americans of different national or ethnic types, effectively validating the perspective long espoused by immigrants and domestic outsiders alike (see Conzen, et. al, 1992) – namely that membership in both the minority and the American people are fully compatible with one another. Consequently, ethnic diversity among Americans is likely to now be a mainstream value.

Unfortunately, only two of the available questions in the LACSS provide germane information. The first employed a widely used item, asking respondents whether they think that racial and ethnic groups should blend into the melting pot or maintain distinct cultures. As indicated in Table 4, white respondents selected an intermediate response, as the mean score of 4.49 on the 7 point scale represents a very slight tilt toward the blending option. For all practical purposes, this appears to be the general consensus: only immigrant offspring answered differently, though the mean score also reflects endorsement of an intermediate position. Application of background controls had no effect on inter-group differences.

Table 4 about here

Whereas the question about the melting pot refers to views of ethnocultural membership in the American people, a second item on the impact of the variety of ethnic groups on the quality of life in Los Angeles inquires into views of the desirability of ethnic diversity. A majority of whites thought that ethnic variety helped the quality of life in Los Angeles, a view espoused by very similar proportions in virtually every other category; as with the question concerning opinion of the melting pot, controls left inter-group differences unaltered. Only respondents interviewed in Spanish thought that ethnic variety had a negative effect on the quality of life in Los Angeles, a pattern that persisted after controls. Just why Spanish-speaking respondents should take such a view is not clear; perhaps diversity at the bottom of the totem pole implies heightened ethnic competition.

Internal-formal: The “American ethnic pattern,” to borrow from Nathan Glazer (1975), accepts ethnic difference as long as it is voluntary and confined to private spheres of family and community. As opinion seems to have moved far away from the unitary view prevailing at the time of the last mass migration, it seems unlikely that state institutions will be used as instruments of coercive Americanization, as was true at the turn of the 20th century. If anything, the view that membership in the American people *and* in the minority are compatible probably entails a somewhat expanded role for the state in maintaining or supporting ethnic differences, cultures, or languages. On the other hand, just how expansive that state role should be is a matter of considerable debate. There appears to be little support for the stronger form of multiculturalism prevailing

north of the U.S. border. More common in the United States have been policies oriented at native language maintenance and the provision of either bilingual information or instruction. However, given the role of language as a symbol of national unity, these policies have not surprisingly been the source of much controversy. Consequently, the gamut of options run from state efforts at maintaining non-English languages to policies that would endorse English as the official language of the United States, significantly curbing the use of non-English languages in the public domain. Somewhere in between these two poles can be found policies designed to facilitate transition from a foreign language to English, with controversy swirling around the speed of that transition.

As shown in Table 5, whites tend to oppose state policies aimed at foreign language maintenance, as exemplified by bilingual education. By contrast, opinion among recent immigrants, Hispanics, and respondents interviewed in Spanish leans in favor of bilingual education. Among the longest settled immigrants, as well as among immigrant offspring, views toward bilingual education differ little from those of whites. Opinion toward bilingual education shifts from support to modest opposition, after controlling for background characteristics, though the coefficients for the foreign-born show that the differences, relative to whites, are all significant. While the adjusted scores show a softening of support among Hispanics and Spanish speaking respondents, a large difference, relative to whites, persists, suggesting that views toward bilingual education are affected more by ethnicity than by foreign-birth or settlement status.

Table 5 about here

By contrast, policies of an intermediate sort, allowing for continued native language use while aiming for transition to English, receive broader support, across the board; even among whites, only a minority endorses the view that non-English speaking students should have all classes taught in English only. While overwhelming majorities among recent immigrants, Hispanics, and respondents interviewed in Spanish opposed an English only policy, support rose among successively more settled immigrant cohorts. A very different pattern, however, emerged after application of controls: all immigrant cohorts surpassed whites in support for classes taught in English only, with more than half of the most settled cohort endorsing this policy. By contrast, Hispanics and respondents interviewed in Spanish remained strongly opposed to English only classes for foreign language students.

While strongly opposed to state policies that would maintain foreign languages, whites strongly supported policies that would reinforce English language dominance: 76 percent favored a law that would make English the official language of the United States, obliging governments to use English only for official purposes. Immigrants, regardless of cohort, as well as immigrant offspring, were less likely than whites to support this policy, but the differences were not significant. Only among Hispanics and respondents interviewed in Spanish did large majorities oppose a law that would make English the U.S.'s official language. While application of controls left the pattern of intergroup differences unchanged, opposition to an official English law also declined. However, as shown by the adjusted scores, only among respondents interviewed in Spanish did a majority remain opposed to an official English law.

African-Americans and liberals: International migration raises a set of political and policy questions, many of which stand in contrast to the traditional civil rights issues that have galvanized African-Americans as well as liberals. Civil rights issues involved differences among Americans of varying ethnic or racial type, and the proper role of the state in responding to those differences. Insofar as the immigrants are either candidate or full-fledged Americans who are not fully accepted for reasons having to do with their ascriptive characteristics, standard ideological commitments can provide guidance. But as noted earlier, many of the policy issues raised by immigration pertain, not to the relationships among Americans of different type, but rather to the we/they relationship distinguishing the Americans from the non-Americans, whether outside or within the territory of the United States. As neither liberals nor African-Americans are one worlders, one expects that they will be committed to the community of the Americans; furthermore, these same commitments may lead them to endorse exclusion of the foreigners who aren't properly members of the American community.

As shown in Table 6, the views of African-American and white respondents converge in many, though not all, respects. Answers to the questions regarding attachment to the national community are not fully consistent: while African-Americans and whites converge on two items, the former are less likely than the latter to endorse the strongest sentiments of national attachment (e.g., great love for the United States and finding the American flag very moving). More importantly perhaps, are the divergences produced by those items involving differences among Americans of different types and which therefore relate most closely to the traditional civil rights agenda: on the questions having to do with bilingualism, enrolling foreign language students in English only

classes, and birthright citizenship, African-Americans espouse pluralistic views, consistent with those espoused by the foreign-born.

On issues having to do with the external boundary separating Americans and foreigners, however, support for inclusion substantially weakens. Not only do most African-American respondents prefer reduced levels of Americans; relative to whites, they are actually more likely to favor greater restriction, a distinction that persists after controlling for background characteristics. Likewise, large majorities endorse coercive measures directed at immigrants, whether to step up deportation efforts, bar legal immigrants from immediate eligibility for benefits, or require that official government business be conducted in English only. And though African-Americans are less likely than whites to support the elimination of birthright citizenship for the U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants, a large minority (46 percent) is nonetheless prepared to endorse this position.

Table 6 about here

By contrast, the answers provided by liberal respondents almost always prove distinctive. As with African-Americans, the items related to national attachment produce inconsistent responses, suggesting that love for country and for flag are keyed to a different dimension of national sentiment than pride in country or a willingness to leave in order to improve one's life. On all other matters, however, ideology counts: whether the issues have to do with ethnocultural matters or state policies, whether the focus extends to the external or the internal dimension, liberals espouse a more inclusionary

view than most other Angelenos, whether before or after controls. That being said, an important qualifier must be added: namely, that inclusionary can be applied only when speaking in relative terms, as liberal opinion is split roughly in two on such matters as increased spending on deportation or declaring English the U.S.'s official language. And when it comes to levels of immigration, liberals show no predilection for expansion; indeed, the mean score reflects a slight preference for greater restriction.

Latino exceptionalism? Thus far, the analysis suggests that immigrants may enter the United States with strong home country attachments, but that commitments to the bounded community of the Americans increasingly come to the fore, as the foreign-born put down roots, and as one generation succeeds the next. While the data may warrant such a conclusion, it is possible that the peculiarities of the survey are at cause. Although LACSS contains a large foreign-born sample, only Latino respondents are offered the chance to be interviewed in their native-language. The survey, therefore, is biased towards those non-Latino immigrants with greater English language proficiency. As English-language proficiency is certainly correlated with “acculturation,” of which one component is political re-socialization, the survey may have selected for those respondents already most exposed to the political models of the Americas, in which case the findings reported above would be suspect.

One test for this possibility is to remove the possibly confounding effect of interview language, and restrict the analysis to Latino. This procedure is not ideal in all cases, as sample size limitations might impede meaningful disaggregations by generation and immigrant cohort. But as most questions were asked in multiple survey years, and a large proportion of respondents were consistently of Latino background, sample size is a

very limited constraint. The Latino N never falls below 400 and is above 600 for 11 of the 15 dependent variables.

To avoid redundancy, I have simply graphed the raw means for all Latino respondents, disaggregating by immigrant cohort (less than 10 years; ten to twenty years; more than twenty years) and generation (second and third). Figure 1 presents four graphs, corresponding to each of the each of the cross-tabulated dimensions (internal/formal; internal/informal; external/formal; external/informal) displayed in Table 1. The graphs demonstrate that the patterns among Latinos are consistent with those found when analyzing the entire sample: opinion shifts as one moves from the least to the most established members of the group; change is consistent from one dimension to another; and the more established the category, the greater the attachment to the national attachment, and the greater the support for policies that would sharpen controls on immigration, restrict immigrants' rights and access to public goods, weaken state support of languages other than English.

Figure 1 about here

Conclusion

To the students of immigrant transnationalism goes the great credit of seeing that connections between “here” and “there” are an inherent and enduring component of the long-distance migrations of the modern world. While implicitly rejecting the view that

social relations should be contained within the boundaries of a state, however, the students of immigrant transnationalism have unfortunately forgotten about the processes that produce a container society – whether driven by states’ efforts to bound the societies they enclose, or more informal, ethnocultural membership practices that aspire to the same goal.

Thus, contrary to the forecasts of the scholarship on immigrant transnationalism, foreigners continue to get transformed into nationals. Engaging in the necessary adjustments is often acceptable to the people earlier willing to abandon home in search of the good life; the everyday demands of fitting in, as well as the attenuation of home country loyalties and ties, make the foreigners and their descendants increasingly similar to the nationals whose community they have joined. But the ex-foreigners also respond to the message conveyed by nationals and state institutions, all of which signal that acceptance is contingent on demonstrating a commitment to belonging. In this respect, the assimilation literature, emphasizing the decline of an ethnic difference, largely misleads: the ex-foreigners do not abandon particularism; rather, as shown in this paper, they replace an old particularism for one that is new. Finding appeal in the idea of a national community, they also think their new national community should be bounded, agreeing that the gates through which future foreigners enter ought to be controlled, as we have seen.

Of course, one could argue that the results reported above are somehow artifactual, influenced by the research method employed or the particular place studied. To be sure, Los Angeles is *not* the United States. On the other hand, it is a critical case for the issues at hand. As a blue metropolis in one of America’s bluest states, it is a place

where liberal attitudes, inclusive of Americans as well as of foreigners, are most likely to prevail. As we have seen, Angelenos, whether foreign or native, turn out to be reluctant to further open the gates or provide a warmer welcome to the unauthorized foreigners living in our midst. Is there any reason to think Iowans or Mississippians will harbor more inclusive views?

As for transnationalism, where else, but in Los Angeles, is it likely to be alive and well? As the capital of 21st century immigrant America, Los Angeles makes it easy to maintain connections between “here” and “there,” with all the infrastructure needed to quickly and cheaply communicate and travel across the border, not to speak of home country and hometown leaders coming to America in search of the dollars and influence that the emigrants can provide. If immigrant Angelenos are becoming American, it seems reasonable to assume that immigrants living elsewhere in the United States will be following a similar course.

Of course, it goes without say that survey research has its limitations: one wants to know, not just what people say, but what they do, though one would have to endorse a very strong view of the mind/body split to insist that what people say is of no value at all. To be sure, what people say to survey researchers may differ quite greatly from what they say to friends, intimates, or even the ethnographer. On the other hand, the LACSS is hardly the first survey to report that immigrants have become nationals, and in shifting their allegiance to the community of the Americans have also seen virtues in keeping that community closed. And the historical and ethnographic literature on immigrant politics recounts a rather similar story.

Moreover, that literature tells us that nowhere is the shift from foreigner to national more readily perceived, nor more easily produced, than in the United States. Some foreigners “naturalize” for purely pragmatic reasons, and the old country flag or anthem stirs many an immigrant heart; nonetheless, the imprint of adoptive country nationalization is hard to miss, as noted in this paper. Those who retain affection for or connections to the old country often find that there is nothing more American than coming together around homeland ties. Accommodations to earlier homeland loyalties ensure that the political system can easily incorporate the old country attachments of the latest Americans: having long attended to the importance of the “three I’s” of Italy, Israel, and Ireland, New York political figures, for example, have not waited for prompts from social scientists to extend their political antennae to Santo Domingo or Port-au-Prince. Moreover, in a world where the United States remains the unquestioned hegemon, anything that will increase influence in Washington needs to be pursued – which is why the home country governments of today’s immigrants eagerly ask their expatriates to transform themselves into the next “Jewish lobby”. Beyond these incentives to operate on native grounds are the unintended results of the quest to exercise influence on “homeland” issues. As mobilizing to support the home country yields instruction in that most American of public activities, namely, interest group politics, playing the transnational card ultimately produces integration, albeit in a contested, conflictual way.

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¹ As even noted by Alba and Nee, who in their effort to emphasize the transient nature of immigrant home state attachments, effectively concede the point, writing that "the second generation has often been zealous in its expression of American patriotism, partly out of a need to compensate for uncertainties about its acceptance in American society (151)." Likewise, since questions about dual loyalty can be activated by relatively minor tensions between home and host states, they portray homeland ties as a source of potential threat

and reason for immigrants to emphasize their commitment to the adopted home – an acute observation, but one that highlights the nationalization of the immigrants, *not* the disappearance of an ethnic identity.

² Colin Powell (with Joseph Persico), *My American Journey*, New York : Random House, 1995, pp. 534-35.

³ The complete LACSS run extends from 1992 through 2002. No survey was conducted in 1996; the 2001 and 2002 surveys are not yet available for public use; the 1999 and 2000 surveys were made available to me by Professor David Sears, Director of the Institute of Social Science Research, UCLA. Although the 1992 and 1993 surveys contained numerous items of relevance to this paper, differences in question wording are such as to preclude inclusion in our analysis.

⁴ For ease of presentation, predictions for ordinal dependent variables are made using ordinary least squares; predictions for each value of the dependent variable, using ordered logit, are presented in an appendix.

Table 1: We/they distinctions cross-classified by political boundary and formality

<p><u>Informal:</u> ethno-cultural beliefs</p>	<p><u>External:</u> Americans versus foreigners</p> <p>Concept: <i>Attachment to country</i> Survey questions: have great love for usa (1998, 1999 ; N=1479) leave U.S. to improve life (1994, 97-8; N=2177) proud to be an American, (1998-2000; N=2059) find American flag very moving (1998-2000; N=2053)</p>	<p><u>Internal:</u> Americans of different types</p> <p>Concept: <i>Cultural pluralism (scope for hyphenated identities)</i> Survey questions: ethnic groups should be distinct or blend (1994-5; N=1422) variety of ethnic groups in LA--help/hurt life (1994-2000; N=3559)</p>
<p><u>Formal:</u> views on govt policies</p>	<p>Concept: <i>Membership/migration control</i> Survey questions: increase/decrease number of immigrants (1994-2000; N=5553) u.s. citizenship for children of illegal immigrants (1994; 97-8; N=2,118) gov't should spend more to deport illegal immigrants (1994-8, 2000; 3,191) legal immigrants immediately eligible for services (1994-5; 1,423)</p>	<p>Concept: <i>Language policy</i> Survey questions: favor or oppose bilingual education (1994, 98-99; N=2,032) english as official language (1997-8; N=1309) how to teach english to nonenglish speaker (1995, 97-98; 2000 N=2532)</p>

Table 2: External-informal -- Attachment to Country

		Generation						Interview in Spanish			
		First generation: years in U.S.		Second Generation		Ethnicity:					
		< 10 yrs	10 to 20 > 20	1.44	1.56	whites	blacks				
loveusa	5 item	1=strongly agree	raw	1.95	1.67	1.44	1.56	1.39	1.60	1.68	1.75
			adjusted	1.69	1.54	1.49	1.54		1.31	1.69	1.66
leaveusa	4 item	1=very willing	raw	2.35	2.40	2.73	2.73	2.83	2.50	2.92	2.34
			adjusted	<u>2.66</u>	2.64	2.75	<u>2.74</u>		2.90	2.90	2.55
proud	5 item	1=strongly agree	raw	2.21	1.86	1.55	1.41	1.31	1.74	1.44	2.00
			adjusted	1.92	1.64	1.49	1.38		1.24	1.45	1.81
usflag	5 item	1=strongly agree	raw	2.33	2.06	1.90	<u>2.03</u>	1.84	1.96	2.24	2.03
			adjusted	2.16	2.02	2.05	2.04		1.77	2.50	2.11

Note: Bold = $p < .01$; italic $p < .05$; underline $p < .1$

Significance of difference: immigrant cohorts compared

	loveusa	leaveusa	proud	US flag
Less than 10 years v. Ten to twenty years: raw	0.02	0.87	0.00	0.00
controls	0.34	0.79	0.02	0.36
Less than 10 years v. More than twenty raw	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
controls	0.11	0.60	0.00	0.83
Ten to twenty v. More than twenty raw	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.11
controls	0.36	0.38	0.39	0.46

Table 3: External-Informal - Membership/migration Control

	<i>Generation</i>						Interview in Spanish			
	Foreign-born: years in U.S.			Second Generation		Ethnicity:				
	< 10 yrs	10 to 20	> 20	whites	blacks	hispanics				
immtotal	5 item	raw	2.90	3.09	3.12	3.40	3.60	3.80	3.12	3.00
kidsaits2	2 item	raw	2.98	3.16	3.17	3.40		3.67	3.38	3.45
	1=qualify as citizens	adjusted	<i>0.85</i>	0.85	<i>0.73</i>	<i>0.62</i>	0.47	0.54	0.90	0.98
deport2	2 item	raw	0.64	0.67	<i>0.59</i>	<i>0.56</i>		0.57	0.76	0.88
	1=spend more deport	adjusted	0.23	0.32	0.43	0.48	0.62	0.61	0.27	0.20
imservcs2	2 item	raw	0.36	<i>0.47</i>	0.52	0.46		0.51	0.36	0.34
	1=eligible	adjusted	0.72	0.54	0.41	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.54	0.63
			0.56	0.41	0.35	0.35		0.41	0.39	0.53

Note: Bold = p < .01; italic p < .05; underline p < .1; immtotal - 3=stay same; 5=decreased a lot

Immigrant cohorts compared: significance of differences

	Immtotal	Deport2	Imservcs2	Kidsaits2
Less than 10 years v. Ten to twenty years raw	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.80
controls	0.02	0.02	0.10	0.69
Less than 10 years v. More than twenty raw	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.26
controls	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.48
Ten to twenty v. More than twenty raw	0.92	0.06	0.10	0.10
controls	0.90	0.22	0.30	0.18

Table 4: Internal-informal - Cultural pluralism

		<i>Generation</i>						
		Foreign-born: years in U.S.			Second Generation		Ethnicity:	
		< 10 yrs	10 to 20	> 20	whites	blacks	hispanics	Interview in Spanish
meltpot	7 item	4.49	4.63	4.62	4.21	4.49	4.54	4.60
	1=eth gps shd be distinct							
	raw	4.33	4.54	4.50	4.20	4.35	4.43	4.50
	adjusted	0.64	0.65	0.59	0.64	0.60	0.61	0.54
ethgrp1	2 item	0.64	0.65	0.61	0.55	0.58	0.63	0.37
	1=variety helped							
	raw							
	adjusted							

Note: Bold = $p < .01$; italic $p < .05$; underline $p < .1$; Meltpot - 7=blend

Immigrant cohorts compared: significance of differences

	meltpot	ethgrp1a2
Less than 10 years v. Ten to twenty years:	0.46	0.82
	0.32	0.58
Less than 10 years v. More than twenty	0.49	0.02
	0.51	0.45
Ten to twenty v. More than twenty	0.95	0.01
	0.85	0.15

Table 5: Internal-formal - Language policies

		Generation				Ethnicity:			Interview in Spanish
		First generation: years in U.S.				whites	blacks	hispanics	
		< 10 yrs	10 to 20	> 20	Gen				
biling2	4 item 1=strongly favor	raw 1.56	1.67	2.33	2.63	2.20	1.70	1.56	
teachng2	2 item 1=all classes in english	raw 2.23	2.42	2.40	0.41	2.16	2.15	2.30	
offcleng2	2 item 1=favor	raw 0.34	0.31	0.39	0.76	0.33	0.28	0.23	
		adjusted 0.54	0.56	0.63		0.38	0.32	0.22	
		raw 0.39	0.38	0.59		0.71	0.32	0.17	
		adjusted 0.74	0.71	0.67		0.67	0.52	0.28	

Note: Bold = $p < .01$; italic $p < .05$; underline $p < .1$

Significance of difference: immigrant cohorts compared


	Bilingual	teachng2	offcleng2
Less than 10 years v. Ten to twenty years:	raw 0.02	0.59	0.87
	controls 0.09	0.27	0.55
Less than 10 years v. More than twenty	raw 0.00	0.73	0.69
	controls 0.11	0.50	0.20
Ten to twenty v. More than twenty	raw 0.05	0.32	0.77
	controls 0.93	0.70	0.37

Table 6: African-Americans and Liberals

		all res-		blacks		liberals		Raw scores compared	
		pondents	whites	raw	adjusted	raw	adjusted	blacks/ whites	liberals/ all resp.
External-informal: modified 6/13; shaded=modified									
loveusa	5 item	1.52	1.39	1.68	1.69	1.67	1.65	1.21	1.10
leaveusa	4 item	2.72	2.83	2.93	2.90	2.67	2.70	1.03	0.98
proud	5 item	1.51	1.31	1.44	1.45	1.60	1.57	1.10	1.06
usflag1	5 item	1.99	1.84	2.24	2.50	2.18	2.17	1.22	1.10
External-formal									
immtotal	5 item	3.43	3.57	3.80	3.67	3.34	3.28	1.06	0.97
kidscits2	2 item	0.63	0.47	0.54	0.57	0.70	0.81	1.16	1.12
deport2	2 item	0.50	0.62	0.61	0.51	0.45	0.37	0.98	0.91
imservcs2	2 item	0.44	0.38	0.38	0.41	0.50	0.51	0.99	1.14
Internal-informal									
melpot	7 item	4.51	4.49	4.54	4.54	4.23	4.32	1.01	0.94
ethrpla2	2 item	0.62	0.60	0.62	0.58	0.70	0.89	1.03	1.13
Internal-formal									
bilinged	4 item	2.22	2.64	2.20	2.16	2.02	2.10	0.83	0.91
teachng2	2 item	0.36	0.41	0.33	<u>0.38</u>	0.30	0.34	0.81	0.84
offcleng2	2 item	0.59	0.76	<u>0.71</u>	<u>0.67</u>	0.52	0.48	0.93	0.88

Note: Bold = $p < .01$; italic $p < .05$; underline $p < .1$;
 comparisons for significance tests: blacks v. whites; liberals v. moderates/not classifiable

Figure 1: Latino responses, cross-classified by years of residence and generation



Appendix 1: Ordinal variables - unadjusted and adjusted frequencies

Loveusa

	Foreign-born: years in U.S.			Blacks	Hispanics	Interview in Spanish	Second Generation
	< 10 yrs	10 to 20	> 20				
<i>Unadjusted</i>							
Strongly agree	39%	48%	67%	62%	56%	47%	60%
Somewhat agree	41%	42%	26%	23%	35%	41%	31%
Neither agree nor disagree	10%	6%	3%	5%	5%	7%	4%
Somewhat disagree	6%	3%	2%	5%	3%	3%	4%
Strongly disagree	4%	1%	1%	5%	2%	3%	1%
<i>Adjusted</i>							
Strongly agree	58%	53%	58%	50%	77%	56%	54%
Somewhat agree	33%	29%	25%	31%	19%	34%	29%
Neither agree nor disagree	4%	4%	3%	4%	2%	5%	4%
Somewhat disagree	3%	3%	2%	3%	1%	3%	3%
Strongly disagree	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%

Proud

	Foreign-born: years in U.S.			Blacks	Hispanics	Interview in Spanish	Second Generation
	< 10 yrs	10 to 20	> 20				
<i>Unadjusted</i>							
Strongly agree	35%	49%	64%	76%	56%	43%	72%
Somewhat agree	34%	33%	24%	14%	27%	34%	19%
Neither agree nor disagree	15%	6%	6%	3%	8%	10%	5%
Somewhat disagree	7%	5%	2%	5%	4%	5%	2%
Strongly disagree	9%	6%	3%	2%	5%	8%	1%
<i>Adjusted</i>							
Strongly agree	56%	55%	60%	75%	82%	57%	76%
Somewhat agree	29%	23%	21%	16%	13%	28%	16%
Neither agree nor disagree	7%	5%	5%	3%	2%	7%	3%
Somewhat disagree	4%	3%	2%	2%	1%	4%	2%
Strongly disagree	4%	2%	2%	1%	1%	4%	1%

Usflag

	Foreign-born: years in U.S.			Blacks	Hispanics	Interview in Spanish	Second Generation
	< 10 yrs	10 to 20	> 20				
<i>Unadjusted</i>							
Strongly agree	31%	37%	46%	41%	44%	39%	45%
Somewhat agree	32%	40%	31%	25%	34%	36%	30%
Neither agree nor disagree	20%	10%	15%	13%	11%	13%	10%
Somewhat disagree	9%	6%	6%	9%	6%	5%	7%
Strongly disagree	9%	7%	3%	11%	6%	6%	8%
<i>Adjusted</i>							
Strongly agree	41%	45%	42%	35%	57%	35%	45%
Somewhat agree	34%	33%	33%	34%	28%	34%	33%
Neither agree nor disagree	13%	12%	13%	15%	8%	15%	12%
Somewhat disagree	6%	6%	5%	8%	4%	8%	6%
Strongly disagree	6%	5%	6%	6%	3%	6%	5%

Appendix 1: cont'd

Leaveusa

	Foreign-born: years in U.S.			Blacks	Hispanics	Interview in Spanish	Second Generation
	< 10 yrs	10 to 20	> 20				
<i>Unadjusted</i>							
Very willing	24%	26%	17%	16%	24%	28%	19%
Fairly willing	35%	31%	28%	22%	29%	31%	24%
Fairly unwilling	23%	20%	20%	16%	21%	22%	21%
Very unwilling	18%	23%	35%	46%	27%	20%	35%
<i>Adjusted</i>							
Very willing	17%	18%	16%	12%	12%	21%	15%
Fairly willing	29%	29%	28%	24%	25%	31%	28%
Fairly unwilling	23%	23%	24%	24%	24%	22%	24%
Very unwilling	31%	30%	33%	40%	39%	26%	33%

Meltpot

	Foreign-born: years in U.S.			Blacks	Hispanics	Interview in Spanish	Second Generation
	< 10 yrs	10 to 20	> 20				
<i>Unadjusted</i>							
Ethnic groups should be distinct	17%	16%	12%	11%	18%	20%	14%
2	3%	5%	4%	5%	4%	4%	6%
3	11%	9%	7%	13%	9%	7%	12%
4	14%	13%	25%	21%	11%	10%	20%
5	20%	16%	18%	15%	21%	18%	26%
6	10%	9%	9%	9%	8%	8%	7%
Ethnic groups should blend	26%	31%	25%	26%	29%	33%	15%
<i>Adjusted</i>							
Ethnic groups should be distinct	13%	11%	11%	12%	11%	10%	14%
2	5%	5%	5%	5%	4%	4%	6%
3	14%	12%	13%	13%	12%	12%	15%
4	21%	20%	20%	20%	20%	19%	21%
5	21%	22%	22%	22%	22%	22%	20%
6	7%	8%	8%	8%	8%	9%	6%
Ethnic groups should blend	19%	22%	22%	21%	23%	24%	17%

Immtotal

	Foreign-born: years in U.S.			Blacks	Hispanics	Interview in Spanish	Second Generation
	< 10 yrs	10 to 20	> 20				
<i>Unadjusted</i>							
Increased a lot	11%	8%	10%	4%	9%	8%	6%
Increased a little	19%	15%	14%	7%	15%	17%	9%
Left the same	45%	47%	42%	30%	41%	46%	42%
Decreased a little	21%	21%	22%	24%	23%	22%	24%
Decreased a lot	4%	10%	12%	35%	11%	7%	20%
<i>Adjusted</i>							
Increased a lot	11%	8%	8%	3%	6%	5%	6%
Increased a little	16%	13%	13%	5%	10%	9%	10%
Left the same	47%	46%	46%	35%	43%	43%	43%
Decreased a little	16%	19%	19%	27%	23%	24%	24%
Decreased a lot	10%	13%	13%	26%	18%	19%	18%

Appendix 1: cont'd

Bilingual

	Foreign-born: years in U.S.			Blacks	Hispanics	Interview in Spanish	Second Generation
	< 10 yrs	10 to 20	> 20				
<i>Unadjusted</i>							
Strongly favor	61%	54%	43%	34%	57%	62%	32%
Somewhat favor	28%	23%	24%	30%	25%	26%	25%
Somewhat oppose	5%	10%	13%	17%	9%	5%	20%
Strongly oppose	6%	12%	19%	19%	9%	7%	23%
<i>Adjusted</i>							
Strongly favor	35%	28%	28%	36%	38%	31%	21%
Somewhat favor	32%	31%	31%	32%	32%	32%	29%
Somewhat oppose	16%	19%	19%	16%	16%	18%	22%
Strongly oppose	17%	21%	21%	16%	15%	19%	28%