# UCLA UCLA Previously Published Works

### Title

White-faced capuchin monkeys use both rank and relationship quality to recruit allies

# Permalink

https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9z51s81k

# Authors

Kajokaite, Kotrina Whalen, Andrew Panchanathan, Karthik <u>et al.</u>

# **Publication Date**

2019-08-01

### DOI

10.1016/j.anbehav.2019.06.008

Peer reviewed

1	
2	
3	
4	White-faced capuchin monkeys use both rank and relationship quality to recruit allies
5	
6	Kotrina Kajokaite <sup>*a,d</sup> , Andrew Whalen <sup>b</sup> , Karthik Panchanathan <sup>c</sup> , and Susan Perry <sup>a,d</sup>
7	
8	
9	a. Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
10	b. The Roslin Institute and Royal (Dick) School of Veterinary Studies, The University of
11	Edinburgh, Midlothian, Scotland, UK
12	c. Department of Anthropology, University of Missouri, Columbia, USA
13	d. Behavior, Evolution and Culture Program, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
14	
15	
16	* Corresponding author:
17	Kotrina Kajokaite
18	kotrina@ucla.edu
19	+1 805 889 9533
20	UCLA Department of Anthropology
21	375 Portola Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90095
22	

23 Coalitionary recruitment offers a window into animal social cognition. However, naturally 24 observed coalitionary conflicts are challenging to analyze because the researcher has no control 25 over the context in which they occurred, and observed behavior patterns are typically consistent 26 with multiple explanations. In this paper we analyze observational data of coalitionary 27 solicitations during conflicts in wild capuchin monkeys, Cebus capucinus. We build upon 28 previous work that focuses on identifying the cues that animals use to solicit allies in agonistic 29 encounters. In contrast to previous studies, we applied a statistical technique that allows us to 30 simultaneously compare different hypotheses regarding which cues animals use and how these 31 cues interact. Our analysis shows that capuchin monkeys use information about both relationship 32 quality and dominance when recruiting allies during conflicts. Monkeys primarily use rank when 33 recruiting an ally, but will also use relationship quality, particularly when the potential ally has 34 low rank. This study provides evidence that nonhuman primates are able to classify other group 35 members using multiple criteria simultaneously. In addition, this paper presents a statistical 36 technique that animal researchers can use to infer decision rules from observational data. 37 38 **Keywords** 39 Cebus capucinus, coalitions, decision making, conditional logistic regression, observational data 40 41

43

42

44

46	Many animals, including humans, use social information to navigate the world around
47	them. The cognitive demands of social living may well have shaped the minds of social species
48	(Whiten and Byrne 1997). If so, studying social abilities may offer insights into the link between
49	sociality and intelligence (Jolly 1966; Humphrey 1976; Whiten and Byrne 1997; Byrne 2018). A
50	key question is how animals use information about their social environment to negotiate
51	relationships. Coalitionary behavior offers particularly good insights into how individuals use
52	social information. Participants in conflicts must decide whom to solicit for help, while
53	onlookers must decide whether to join a conflict if solicited. This requires that individuals both
54	know their own relationships with others and relatioships among others.
55	Coalitions typically occur in an aggressive context in which two animals join together
56	against a third party or one individual intervenes in an ongoing dyadic conflict in support of one
57	of the parties (Harcourt and De Waal 1992). Though extensively documented in primates
58	(reviewed in Bissonnette et al. 2015), coalitionary behavior occurs in other taxa as well
59	(reviewed in Smith et al. 2010). Third-party intervention in dyadic conflicts and coalition
60	formation have been reported in a variety of mammals (e.g. Hyenas, Crocuta crocuta: Engh et
61	al. 2005; bottlenose dolphins, Tursiops sp.: Parsons et al. 2003; African wild dogs, Lycaon
62	pictus: de Villiers et al. 2003;) and birds (Graylag geese, Anser anser: Scheiber et al. 2005;
63	Jackdaws, Corvus monedula: Wechsler 1988; rooks, Corvus frugilegus: Emery et al. 2007, Seed
64	et al. 2007).
65	Coalitionary behavior represents a continuum (Olson and Blumstein 2009), ranging from

66 mutual tolerance (e.g. refraining from fighting in raccoons, *Proycyon lotor*: Gehrt and Fox 2004)

67 to the recruitment of coalition partners using evolved and formal recruitment signals (e.g. white-

68 faced capuchin monkeys, *Cebus capucinus*; Perry 2012), with many intermediate forms

69 including the active collaboration between two or more individuals (e.g. males collaborate when 70 taking over groups with reproductive females in banded mongoose, *Mungos mungo*: Waser et al. 71 1994). Animals soliciting help often have a choice between multiple bystanders present in the 72 vicinity. This offers an opportunity to investigate what animals know about their fellow group 73 members and whether they strategically use that information.

74 Research on soliciting behavior mostly comes from primate studies. Silk's (1999) 75 pioneering study examined observational data to assess whether bonnet macaques, Macaca 76 radiata, use information about third-party relationships while recruiting allies. She showed that 77 male macaques consistently choose allies that outrank both themselves and their opponents. 78 Similar patterns have been observed in juvenile sooty mangabeys (Range and Noë, 2005) and 79 white-faced capuchin monkeys (Perry et al. 2004). Some evidence suggests that animals classify 80 others using more than one individual attribute or relationship (e.g. combining rank and kinship 81 information). For example, Bergman et al. (2003) experimentally demonstrated that baboons 82 responded more strongly to call sequences that indicate rank reversal between families than 83 within families, showing that baboons recognize that the dominance hierarchy is subdivided into 84 family groups.

Though informative regarding how primates use social knowledge, observational data present inferential challenges. We cannot directly study social cognition. Instead, we must observe which individuals are recruited as allies and which are not, and from these observations make inferences about social cognition. The task is made even more difficult because the pattern of choices animals make when recruiting allies are typically consistent with multiple explanations (Kummer et al. 1990; Silk 1999). As we will discuss, previous statistical approaches forced the research to test each possible explanation against a null hypothesis, not

92 against each other. With observational data, our goal should be to compare models against each93 other and assign relative plausibilities to them.

94 Some previous studies (Silk 1999; Perry et al. 2004; but see Schino et al. 2006) have been 95 able to evaluate whether a single facet of social cognition is used for determining coalitionary 96 behavior (e.g. "Solicit the highest-ranking individual" or "Solicit someone with whom you have 97 the highest relationship quality"), but could not address hypotheses that combine two types of 98 information (e.g. "Solicit someone who has high rank and good relationship quality with you"). 99 The exception is one captive observational study (Schino et al. 2006) that investigated whether 100 animals combine cues in a coalitionary recruitment context. They provided evidence that that 101 Japanese macaques prefer allies who outrank their opponents but will avoid recruiting such 102 individuals when they are the opponent's kin. Although the rule in which macaques combine 103 information about rank and kin was plausible when tested against the null model, the methods employed in the analyses were not sufficient to decide whether such a rule is more likely than 104 105 rules employing a single facet of social cognition.

106 Wild white-faced capuchins engage in exceptionally high rates of coalitionary aggression 107 (Perry 2012). The rate of lethal coalitionary aggression in this species is comparable to rates in 108 eastern chimpanzees (Gros-Louis et al. 2003). The frequent formation of coalitions means that 109 monkeys have to decide whom to recruit as allies on a daily basis. Coalitionary behavior 110 provides a window into how capuchin monkeys use and integrate social cues (e.g. whether or not 111 capuchins use information about third-party relationships). Perry et al. (2004) investigated 112 whether capuchins understand rank relationships and relationship quality among other group 113 members and whether they use this knowledge in the solicitation of coalitionary partners. The 114 authors used a Monte Carlo simulation to produce a distribution of coalitionary partner choices

115 assuming monkeys choose at random. Each hypothesized decision rule's plausibility was 116 assessed by comparing it against the null distribution. A rule was considered plausible if the 117 observed patterns are not likely to have arisen by chance. This kind of statistical approach does 118 not allow for the direct comparison of different hypothesized decision rules against each other. 119 All the analyst can do is state whether the choices predicted by any particular decision rule 120 would have been likely given the null model (Mangel and Hillborn, 2005). In Perry et al. (2004), 121 four different decision rules were found to be plausible. However, their methods did not allow 122 them to determine which particular decision rule, if any, was most plausible. 123 Here, we reanalyze the dataset on capuchin coalitionary behavior published in Perry et al. 124 (2014) using a conditional logistic regression model. Our goal is to pit the different decision rules 125 identified by Perry et al. (2004) against each other. Some of these rules use a single cue, while 126 others combine cues. Based on previous findings about coalitionary recruitment patterns in 127 capuchins (Perry 1996; Perry 1997; Perry 1998a; Perry 2003; Perry et al. 2004), we focus on 128 rank relationships and the quality of social relationships among the individuals present during the 129 conflicts as predictors of solicitation decisions.

130 METHODS

131 The dataset

132 The records on capuchin solicitation during conflicts were collected between May 1991

133 and May 1993 at Lomas Barbudal Biological Reserve and surrounding private lands in

134 Guanacaste, Costa Rica (Perry, 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998a,b). The conflict data set, identical to the

135 data presented in Perry et al. (2004), was recorded in a single capuchin group, Abby's group,

136 which consisted of 21 individuals: four adult males, six adult females and eleven immatures.

137 The data include observations from 10-minute focal follows and *ad libitum* observations. To

138 identify the audience members for each conflict, a scan sample was taken every 2.5 minutes in 139 which the identities of all individuals in the view of the focal animal were recorded. Monkeys 140 within a 10-20 m radius were considered to be available for solicitation. In order to be included 141 in the data set, the conflict had to include a response from the target of the initial aggressive 142 action, and the recruitment signals from either the aggressor or the target had to be obviously 143 directed toward a particular individual. Recruitment signals include the headflag (the head is 144 jerked quickly towards the solicitee and then back toward the opponent), the aggressive embrace, 145 cheek-to-cheek posture (the monkeys in coalition touch their cheeks together while threatening a 146 common opponent), and the overlord posture (the monkeys align themselves on top of one 147 another, with heads stacked like a totem pole while jointly threatening their opponent; Perry et 148 al. 2004).

Of the 21 group members, 18 were decision makers who solicited help from the audience members and 17 were opponents of the decision makers. The four individuals who never participated as either decision makers and/or opponents were young juveniles (age 1-2 years). Of the 21 group members, 14 individuals from the group were solicited as audience members.

154 Rank

White-faced capuchin societies are characterized by an alpha male at the top of the dominance hierarchy (Fragaszy et al. 2004; Jack 2010; Perry 2012). The linear ranks of adult subordinate males are hard to distinguish because interactions are rare and often interrupted by the alpha male, whose decisions about whom to support in male-male conflicts are inconsistent (Perry 1998a). Female capuchins rank below adult males (Perry 1997). In contrast to adult males, female-female dominance relationships tend to be linear (Perry 1996; Bergstrom and Fedigan

2010). A female's position in the dominance hierarchy is not only a function of her kin ties
within the group, but also dependent on her individual competitive ability (Perry and Manson
2008; Perry 2012). Females are usually able to change their dominance rank upon reaching
physical maturation by frequently fighting and winning against other females (Perry 2012).
Female dominance ranks are stable later in life (Manson et al. 1999; Bergstrom and Fedigan
2010).

167 Dominance ranks were determined using individuals' submissive behaviors (avoidance 168 and cowering) in dyadic interactions (Perry et al. 2004). Ranks were assigned on a scale ranging 169 from 0 (the lowest ranked individual) to 1 (the highest rank). There were six dyads for which we 170 assigned tied ranks, because it was impossible to determine their relative ranks. Additionally, 171 there was an alpha male rank reversal during the data collection period (Perry 1998b), which 172 resulted in a change in the dominance hierarchy. Following Perry et al. (2004), we used two 173 dominance hierarchies: one for the conflicts that occurred prior to the rank reversal and the other 174 for conflicts that occurred after the rank reversal.

175 Relationship quality index

The relationship quality index was constructed based on the interaction history for each dyad (Perry et al. 2004). All interactions between two individuals for each 10-minute focal follow were coded as being either affiliative (e.g. grooming, resting in contact), cooperative (e.g. supporting each other in a conflict), agonistic (e.g. aggressive or submissive behaviors), or neutral. The relationship quality index between the decision maker and an audience member,  $Q_{i}$ .

182 
$$Q_{i-a} = \frac{I_{+i}}{I_{+i+I_{-i}i}\dot{i}}\dot{i}$$
(1)

183 where  $I_{\pm}$  is the number of 10-minute samples with affiliative/cooperative interactions, and  $I_{\pm}$  is 184 the numbers of 10-minute samples with agonistic interactions. A 10-minute sample could have 185 been coded as both having affiliative/cooperative behaviors and agonistic interactions. The 186 relationship quality index could range from 0 (indicating that a dyad relationship quality is 187 completely characterized by agonistic interactions) to 1 (indicating only affiliative/cooperative 188 interactions within a dyad). In the dataset, the majority of the relationship quality indices were 189 above 0.5 (84%), with the range between 0.2 and 1.0. Following Perry et al. (2004), separate 190 relationship quality indices were calculated for the periods before the alpha male rank reversal and after. 191

#### 192 Statistical approach

193 We modeled each decision rule using a multi-level conditional logistic regression model. 194 The goal of this model was to consider the attributes of each audience member when predicting 195 the likelihood that a specific individual was solicited. The dependence on other individuals is natural: If we consider a group with the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 5<sup>th</sup> top ranking individuals, we expect the 196 probability of soliciting the 5<sup>th</sup> ranking individual to be low. In contrast if we consider a group 197 with the 5<sup>th</sup>, 15<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> ranking individuals, we expect the probability of soliciting the 5<sup>th</sup> 198 199 ranking individual to be high. Thus, the likelihood of soliciting an audience member should 200 depend not only on the audience member's own rank, but also on the ranks of other audience 201 members. More traditional modeling frameworks, such as a binomial generalized linear model, 202 fail to capture the dependence on a solicitation choice with the other audience members, particularly if the size of the audience is not constant. Conditional logistic regression is a natural 203 204 extension of logistic regression that allows selecting a choice based on the other choices 205 available.

Conditional logistic regression is a two-step process. First the model uses a function (Equation 2) to score each audience member based on their rank and their relationship quality. Then the model uses a choice function (Equation 4) that takes the scores of all audience members into account to determine the likelihood of soliciting a particular audience member. This model is linear in that we assume that the scoring function will be a linear function of the audience member's rank, relationship quality, and potentially the product of those two values (i.e. an interaction term).

More formally, we assume that each decision maker (*i*) assigns a score ( $S_a$ ) to each audience member (*a*), which is a linear combination of the potential coalition partner's rank (R), relationship quality to the decision maker ( $Q_i$ ), and the sum of rank and relationship quality ( $R * Q_i$ ):

217 
$$S_a = \beta_{R,i} R + \beta_{Q,i} Q_i + \beta_{RQ,i} R * Q_i$$
(2)

The model coefficients,  $\beta_{R,i}$ ,  $\beta_{Q,i}$ , and  $\beta_{RQ,i}$  determine the impact dominance rank, relationship quality index, and the interaction between the two variables have on the audience member's score. The subscript, *i*, for each of the model coefficients denotes the fact that these coefficients might be different for each decision maker. We model individual differences using a random effect model assuming that the coefficient for each individual is the product of a fixed effect term (shared between all individuals in the population) and an individual deviation term, e.g.,

$$\beta_{R,i} = \beta_R + \beta'_{R,i}.$$
(3)

225 If rank, relationship quality, or the interaction term is not included in the model, then the 226 respective parameter may be set to zero.

To convert the audience members' scores to choice probabilities, we constructed a choice function based on the softmax decision rule, a widely used model of animal and human behavior (Luce 1963; Racey et al. 2011),

230 
$$P(a) = \frac{e^{S_a}}{\sum_{a'} e^{S_a'}} .$$
 (4)

231 In Equation 4, the exponential of the particular audience member's score is divided by the sum 232 of the exponentials of all audience members' scores. This ensures that each audience member is assigned a probability ranging from 0 to 1 that is based on his or her score relative to the scores 233 of other audience members, and that the probabilities of all audience members sum to 1. The 234 235 exponential link function ensures that the scores are evaluated relative to each other. For example, the probability that each audience member is solicited is the same for a group in which 236 237 the scores are 1, 20, and 100 as for a group in which the scores are 101, 120, and 200. 238 Under this choice function, individuals with the highest score will be chosen more often

than those with a lowest score. However, the highest-scoring audience member will not always
be chosen, only more likely to be chosen. If the scores among audience members are fairly close,
we expect that individuals will be chosen with roughly equal probability.

242 Before fitting the model, we standardized all predictor variables by subtracting the mean 243 and dividing by the standard deviation.

244 *Model fitting* 

We used a Bayesian approach to fit the conditional logistic regression model. We included uninformative Normal(0,100) priors on each of the fixed effects,  $\beta_R$ ,  $\beta_Q$ , and  $\beta_{RQ}$ , and Normal(0, $\sigma^2$ ) priors on each of the individual level random effects. We used three different approaches to model the variance of the random effects,  $\sigma^2$ : (1) fitting the model without random

249 effects; (2) setting the value of  $\sigma^2$  to 1 and using a Normal(0,1) prior for each of the random effects; (3) inferring the value of  $\sigma^2$  as another model parameter by using an InvGamma(0.001, 250 0.001) prior and allowing the value of  $\sigma^2$  to differ between fixed effects (i.e. between rank, 251 252 relationship, or the interaction). The choice of a wide inverse gamma distributed prior for a 253 variance term is thought to be relatively uninformative (Lunn et al. 2012; but see Gelman 2006). 254 All three approaches for modeling the variance of the random effects produced similar results. 255 We present the results from approaches (1) and (2) in the supplementary material, and focus on 256 the results of approach (3) in the main text.

257 To perform a model comparison, we evaluated the WAIC values for each model 258 (Watanabe 2010). WAIC is an estimate of out-of-sample predictive validity taking into account 259 the number of parameters (McElreath 2016). Unlike AIC which includes a fixed penalty for the 260 number of parameters in the model (Akaike 1973), in WAIC the effective number of parameters 261 is based on the diversity of the posterior distribution. This produces estimates for the effective 262 number of parameters that tend to be much smaller than the total number of parameters if many 263 of the parameters have small effects, or only contribute to fitting a subset of the data. This is 264 particularly important for evaluating models where there are a large number of random effects 265 (one for each fixed effect per individual), but where each parameter may only influence a small number of observations. We present the WAIC for each model, the standard error of the WAIC, 266 267 the difference between the WAIC of each model and the top model, and the standard error of that difference. 268

In addition to reporting the WAIC statistics, we also report the median posterior estimate for each fixed effect term and its 95% Highest Posterior Density Interval (HPDI), representing the narrowest interval containing the 95% probability mass (McElreath 2016).

272	We fit the models using Stan v.2.18.0 via its R-interface, RStan v.2.18.2. We used R
273	v.3.5.2, and used the packages loo v.2.0.0 to calculate WAIC values and rethinking v.2.18.2 to
274	calculate model comparison statistics. An example R script using simulated data and the Stan
275	model files are available in the Supplementary Materials.
276	Relative, absolute, or threshold rules
277	We assume that rank, $R$ , and relationship quality index, $Q$ , can be measured in one of
278	three ways. The decision to investigate each rule was based on Perry et al. (2004), who suggest
279	capuchin monkeys might be paying attention to either absolute or to relative criteria of
280	relationship quality and rank relationships.
281	Absolute rules
282	For absolute rules, the values of <i>R</i> and <i>Q</i> are equal to the audience member's rank ( $R_a$ ) and the
283	relationship between the individual and the audience member $(Q_{i-a})$ .
284	$R_{absolute} = R_{a}$
285	$Q_{absolute} = Q_{i-a}$
286	Relative rules
287	For relative rules, $R$ (or $Q$ ) is based on the difference between the solicited target's rank (or
288	relationship quality index) and the opponent's rank (or relationship quality index). If the rank of
289	the opponent is $R_o$ and the rank of the target audience member is $R_a$ , then
290	$R_{relative} = R_a - R_o$
291	Since the rank of the opponent is constant and the model depends only on the relative score of
292	individuals, $R_{relative}$ and $R_{absolute}$ are identical.

293 In the case of relationship quality index, the relationship depends on the difference between the

294 relationship of the individual with the audience member,  $Q_{i-a}$ , and the relationship of the

- 295 opponent and the audience member,  $Q_{o-a}$ :
- 296  $Q_{relative} = Q_{i-a} Q_{o-a}$

297 Threshold rules

For threshold rules, R and Q are assigned a value of 0 or 1, based on whether the opponent has a higher rank than the audience member, or if the decision maker has a higher relationship quality

- 300 index with the audience member compared to their opponent.
- 301  $R_{threshold} = 1$  if  $R_a > R_o$  and 0 otherwise.
- 302  $Q_{threshold} = 1$  if  $Q_{i-a} > Q_{o-a}$  and 0 otherwise.

303 Full model set

304 We evaluated 12 models. First, we fitted a model with just an intercept and no predictor 305 variables, which represents a null model in which choices are determined at random. Then we 306 fitted five models with a single predictor each (3 relationship quality models and 2 rank models; 307 as we discussed, absolute and relative ranks are equivalent). We followed this with three models 308 containing both rank and relationship quality predictors from each rule (absolute, relative, 309 threshold). We also assumed that either the influence of rank or relationship quality might 310 depend on the other, particularly when deciding between low ranking individuals. If one has a 311 strong preference for high-ranking individuals, then maybe she is less concerned with her relationship quality with those individuals. On the other hand, if someone is deciding between 312 313 low-ranking individuals, then relationship quality might play a larger role in the decision. We 314 modeled this assumption including an interaction term and fitted the three models with both predictors and an interaction term between them. All of the models used the same type of rule, 315 316 i.e. both rank and relationship quality predictors were operationalized using either absolute, 317 relative, or threshold rule.

318 The single variable models are similar to the decision rules tested in Perry et al. (2004).

319 The two-predictor models allow us to evaluate whether models that combine rank and

320 relationship quality explain the data better than any of the decision rules that are based on just

321 one variable.

322 Ethical note

323 This was a strictly observational study of wild animals, involving no manipulation on the 324 part of the observers, aside from the application of a small amount dye to a few of the small 325 juveniles to assist in recognizing individuals during quick action. These individuals were squirted with Clairol Born Blonde hair dye, dispensed from a 100-cc syringe from which the 326 327 needle had been removed. The dye was squirted onto their backs from a 1-2 meter distance and never produced noticeable distress. The protocols for this study were approved by the University 328 329 of Michigan Committee on Use and Care of Animals, IUCUC #3081, and permission was 330 obtained from the Servicio de Parques Naciónales de Costa Rica and the regional division (Area 331 de Conservacion Tempisque).

332 RESULTS

333 We find that an interaction model using both absolute rank and absolute relationship 334 quality (Absolute Interaction Model) provides the best fit to the data. Table 1 presents model comparison statistics for the twelve models. The Absolute Interaction model garnered 63% of the 335 336 WAIC weight and the majority of the remaining weight (24%) was placed on the absolute rank 337 and relationship quality model without an interaction (Absolute Additive model). The two relative criteria models received much of the remaining weight (11%). The threshold models, the 338 339 single-variable models (except absolute rank model which received 2% of the weight), and the 340 random choice model received almost no weight and had low ranking WAIC scores. Table 2

- 341 presents the posterior mean estimates and 95% HPDI of the parameters across twelve models
- 342 presented in Table 1.

343 Table 1. Model comparison. The table reports the effective number of parameters (pWAIC), the 344 information criterion WAIC, standard error of the WAIC estimate (SE), the difference between 345 each WAIC the smallest WAIC (dWAIC), and standard error of the difference in WAIC between 346 each model and the top-ranked model (dSE), and the approximate WAIC weight. Additive 347 models are indicated with +, interaction models are indicated with x.

Model	pWAIC	WAIC	SE	dWAIC	dSE	weight
Absolute rank x relationship quality (Absolute Interaction Model)	9.2	174.96	17.27	0.00	NA	0.63
Absolute rank + relationship quality (Absolute Additive Model)	9.7	176.87	17.59	1.90	2.86	0.24
Relative rank + relationship quality	10.9	179.15	17.26	4.18	4.63	0.08
Relative rank x relationship quality	12.5	181.16	17.46	6.20	4.83	0.03
Absolute rank	7.1	181.93	16.63	6.97	6.09	0.02
Threshold rank + relationship quality	10.9	198.65	15.89	23.68	11.32	0.00
Threshold rank x relationship quality	13.4	199.46	16.38	24.49	12.06	0.00
Threshold rank	5.0	204.52	15.94	29.55	11.75	0.00
Threshold relationship quality	6.2	224.25	12.98	49.28	16.42	0.00
Relative relationship quality	3.8	232.71	12.98	57.75	15.99	0.00
Random choice	0.0	236.60	12.10	61.64	16.05	0.00
Absolute relationship quality	2.6	238.98	12.21	64.02	15.88	0.00

### 350 **Table 2. Parameter estimates**. The table reports fixed effect parameter estimates including the median and 95% HDPI (in brackets)

351 for each model, and the variance for random effects. Additive models are indicated with +, interaction models are indicated with x.

		Fixed Effects		Random Effects				
Model	Rank Rel. quality		Interaction $\sigma^2_{Rank}$		$\sigma^2_{Rel. quality}$	$\sigma^2_{Interaction}$		
Absolute rank x relationship quality (Absolute Interaction Model)	1.74 [1.15, 2.44]	0.90 [0.32, 1.52]	-0.57 [-1.29, 0.14]	0.05 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 0.59]	0.02 [1×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 0.22]	0.04 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 0.59]		
Absolute rank + relationship quality (Absolute Additive Model)	1.53 [0.96, 2.25]	0.58 [0.12, 1.07]	-	0.22 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 1.35]	0.02 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 0.25]	-		
Relative rank + relationship quality	1.39 [0.81, 2.15]	0.42 [-0.01, 0.88]	-	0.28 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 1.45]	0.06 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 0.48]	-		
Relative rank x relationship quality	1.41 [0.83, 2.21]	0.45 [0.01, 0.93]	-0.05 [-0.33, 0.28]	0.30 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 1.59]	0.07 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 0.50]	0.01 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 0.11]		
Absolute rank	1.33 [0.77, 2.05]	-	-	0.22 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 1.27]	-	-		
Threshold rank + relationship quality	1.81 [0.87, 2.76]	0.74 [-0.69, 2.21]	-	0.19 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 3.66]	1.74 [3×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 6.89]	-		
Threshold rank x relationship quality	2.79 [1.18, 4.71]	1.75 [-0.08, 4.26]	-1.45 [-3.51, 0.36]	0.13 [3×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 2.98]	2.51 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 9.72]	0.07 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 1.39]		
Threshold rank	1.83 [0.95, 2.71]	-	-	0.11 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 2.41]	-	-		
Threshold relationship quality	-	0.93 [-0.45, 2.57]	-	-	2.34 [4×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 8.77]	-		
Relative relationship quality	-	0.35 [-0.04, 0.77]	-	-	0.07 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 0.48]	-		
Random choice	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Absolute relationship quality	-	0.03 [-0.34, 0.40]	-	-	0.02 [2×10 <sup>-4</sup> , 0.24]	-		

### 352 Best-Fitting model

353 Figure 1 illustrates how the best-fitting model, the Absolute Interaction model, predicts 354 the interaction between the dominance rank and relationship quality by marginalizing over the 355 model parameters for all of the samples in the posterior distribution. This model predicts that the 356 audience member's score, a linear combination of their rank, relationship quality and their 357 product, will be highest for an audience member who has the top rank and greatest relationship 358 quality index with the decision maker. However, Figure 1 shows that if the audience member is 359 at the top of the hierarchy, the predicted effect of the relationship quality on their score is very 360 small. As the rank of the audience member decreases, the influence of relationship quality on the 361 value of the audience member becomes increasingly important.

1.2	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.4
0.8	-0.4	-0.2	0.1	0.4	0.7	1	1.2	1.5	1.8	2.1
() 0.5	-2	-1.5	-1.1	-0.7	-0.3	0.1	0.5	0.9	1.4	1.8
JIZ 0.1	-3.5	-2.9	-2.4	-1.8	-1.3	-0.7	-0.2	0.4	0.9	1.5
daro	-5	-4.3	-3.6	-2.9	-2.3	-1.6	-0.9	-0.2	0.5	1.1
(standardized) 9.0- 9.0- 9.0-	-6.5	-5.7	-4.9	-4	-3.2	-2.4	-1.6	-0.8	0	0.8
s) Y -1	-8	-7	-6.1	-5.1	-4.2	-3.3	-2.3	-1.4	-0.4	0.5
-1 -1.3	-9.5	-8.4	-7.3	-6.2	-5.2	-4.1	-3	-1.9	-0.9	0.2
-1.7	-11	-9.8	-8.6	-7.3	-6.1	-4.9	-3.7	-2.5	-1.3	-0.1
-2	-12.5	-11.1	-9.8	-8.5	-7.1	-5.8	-4.4	-3.1	-1.7	-0.4
-2	-4.3	-3.7	-3	-2.4	-1.7	-0.0	-0.4	0.2	0.9	1.5

Relationship Quality Index (standardized)


363 Figure 1. A heat map of audience member scores for the Absolute Interaction model. The

364 values in the heat map represent audience member scores ( $S_a$ , Equation 2) computed using the

365 estimated parameters of the Absolute Interaction model (Table 1).

366 Observed choices

367 One of the main objectives of our statistical approach was to evaluate the likelihood of 368 an audience member being solicited while considering the other available options. Below we 369 present the observed audience members in each conflict and highlight which individual was 370 solicited. Figure 2 illustrates all of the audience members available in the 38 conflicts where a single audience member was both highest ranking and had the highest relationship quality with 371 372 the decision maker. Figure 3 illustrates the remaining of the 72 conflicts in which the decision maker had a choice between the highest-ranking member and another member with the highest 373 374 relationship quality.



376 Figure 2. The choice of allies in conflicts when there is a single audience member who is both highest ranking and has the highest relationship quality with the decision maker. Each 377 square represents the audience available in a particular conflict. The blue dots represent the 378 audience member who was solicited, while the orange dots represent all of the other audience 379 380 members who were available during that conflict. The x-axis represents the audience member's relationship quality with the decision maker (ranges 0-1, where the highest relationship quality is 381 382 1) and the y-axis represents the audience member's rank (ranges from 0-1, where the highest 383 rank is 1). In 32 of 38 conflicts (84%) in which the decision maker could choose an audience 384 member who had the highest value on both dimensions, he or she did so (Panel A). Panel B 385 depicts the remaining 6 conflicts (16%) in which the decision maker chose to recruit someone else. 386






Figure 4. The choice of allies in conflicts in which one audience member is highest ranking 389 390 and another has the highest relationship quality with the decision maker. Each square 391 represents the audience available in a particular conflict. The blue dots represent the audience member who was solicited, while the orange dots represent all the other audience members who 392 393 were available during that conflict. In 42 of 72 conflicts (58%), the decision maker chose the 394 highest-ranking individual, not the one with the highest relationship quality (Panel A). The plots 395 in Panel A are arranged (starting at the top left and going down) from the lowest relationship quality of the solicited member to the highest. In 14 of 72 conflicts (19%), the decision maker 396 solicited the audience member with whom he had the highest relationship quality, not the one 397 398 with the highest rank (Panel B). The plots in Panel B are arranged (starting at the top left and 399 going down) from the lowest rank of the solicited audience member to the highest. And in the remaining 17 of 72 conflicts (24%), the decision maker chose an audience member was neither 400 401 highest ranking nor had the greatest relationship quality with the decision maker (Panel C).

402 DISCUSSION

403 In this paper we reanalyzed the dataset on capuchin coalitionary behavior published in 404 Perry et al. (2004) using a conditional logistic regression model. We find that both high rank and having a high relationship quality with the focal individual increased the probability that an 405 406 audience member was solicited. This is consistent with findings that primates classify their group members using multiple criteria simultaneously (Bergman et al. 2003) and that they use this 407 408 information in making decisions during conflicts (Silk 1999; Perry et al. 2004; Schino et al. 409 2006). Unlike the original analysis of these data (Perry et al. 2004), we do not find that triadic 410 awareness is required to explain the solicitation behaviors of the capuchin monkeys. Here we

411 discuss the methodological contribution of our study and the substantive contribution regarding

412 coalitionary behavior and cognition.

#### 413 Conditional logistic regression as a general framework for studying partner choice

414 The use of conditional logistic regression to model solicitation behavior in conflicts 415 represents a methodological advance compared to previous studies (Silk 1999; Perry et al. 2004; 416 Schino et al. 2006). Conditional logistic regression was used for two reasons. First, previous 417 analyses were limited in that they could not simultaneously consider multiple competing hypotheses and determine which, if any, are most plausible given the data. In addition, previous 418 419 analyses could not model decision rules in which individuals combine different kinds of social information. Conditional logistic regression solves these limitations by allowing multiple cues to 420 421 be combined in an additive model. In addition, using conditional logistic regression instead of 422 simulation techniques allows the comparison of different decision rules using an information 423 theoretic approach. The richer modeling framework used here allows us to learn more with the 424 same data, providing more nuanced insights into the capuchins' behaviors.

425 Second, conditional logistic regression was also chosen to solve the problem of how to 426 model solicitation decisions when individuals have to choose from a subset of possible audience 427 members. The problem of partner choice features prominently in the literature on biological 428 markets (Noë and Hammerstein, 1994). Previous analyses that relied on simple binomial regression models (or GLMMs) are insufficient because they do not consider which animals are 429 430 available to choose from. In contrast, conditional logistic regression explicitly takes into account which audience members are available, and allows inferences to be made that more closely 431 432 resemble the individual's actual decision making. We believe this modeling framework—using 433 conditional logistic regression in combination with an information theoretic approach—

434 represents a powerful approach for similarly structured coalitionary behavior data (and could be applied in, e.g. olive baboons, Papio anubis: Packer 1977; brown capuchin monkeys, Sapajus 435 436 apella: Ferreira et al. 2006; African wild dogs, Lycaon pictus: de Villiers et al. 2003; spotted hyenas, Crocuta crocuta: Smith et al. 2010). More broadly, it can be applied to decision-making 437 438 problems in which individuals choose from multiple potential partners, such as grooming (e.g. 439 sooty mangabeys, Cercocebus atys atys: Mielke et al. 2018; chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes verus: 440 Mielke et al. 2018), food sharing (e.g. chimpanzees, Pan trogolodytes verus : Samuni 2018; 441 humans: Koster and Leckie 2014), group foraging (e.g. bluegill sunfish, *Lepomis macrichirus*: 442 Dugatkin and Wilson 1992), antipredator inspection (e.g. guppies, *Poecilia reticulata*: Dugatkin 443 and Alfieri 1991), and mate choice (e.g. sage grouse, Centrocercus urophasian: Gibson et al. 1991). 444

445 The importance of relationship quality and rank in partner solicitation in capuchins

Our findings are consistent with previous findings on joining ongoing conflicts in 446 447 capuchins. When intervening in a conflict, capuchins tend to join with either higher-ranking 448 individuals or individuals with whom they have better social relationship (Perry 1996; 1997; 449 1998a,b; 2003). In other species, rank and relationship quality have also been shown to be 450 important in soliciting help (bonnet macaques, Macaca radiata: Silk 1999; sooty mangabeys, Cercocebus torquatus atys: Range and Noë 2005; Japanese macaques, Macaca fuscata: Schino 451 et al. 2006), joining a conflict (hyenas, Crocuta crocuta: Engh et al. 2005; sooty mangabeys, 452 453 Cercocebus torquatus atys: Range and Noë 2005), or predicting competitor's supporter 454 (chimpanzees: Wittig et al. 2014). In addition, our analyses show that, in capuchins, rank is more 455 important than relationship quality when soliciting allies. The importance of rank in capuchin 456 monkeys is not surprising given that high-ranking individuals are more likely to participate in

457 coalitions (Perry 1996), high-ranking individuals are almost never challenged in a conflict (Perry
458 2012), and that the alpha male enjoys a central position with other group members seeking his
459 help and readily offering their own support (Perry 1996; Perry 1998; Perry 2012). Taken
460 together, this suggests that capuchins form coalitions primarily to reinforce existing hierarchy
461 rather than challenge it ("all-down" coalitions in Bissonnette et al. 2015).

#### 462 Do capuchin monkeys exhibit triadic awareness?

Triadic awareness is the ability to have some knowledge of the relationships between other individuals (De Waal 1982; Tomasello and Call 1997). Being able to know something about third-party relationships might be very useful in soliciting help during conflicts, because a decision maker might prefer a potential ally who has better relationship with him or her than with the opponent. Perry et al. (2004) reported that such decision rule is plausible for these data.

468 Our analyses included twelve hypotheses about possible decision rules that ranged from 469 the assumption that monkeys are making random choices, to hypotheses in which monkeys take 470 into account multiple types of information simultaneously when assessing a potential ally. Each 471 of these rules assumes a certain level of cognitive ability. To use relative and threshold decision 472 rules, the monkeys must have knowledge of third-party relationships: The decision maker must 473 assess the difference between his relationship quality to the audience member and the opponent's relationship quality to the audience member. Absolute decision rules do not require triadic 474 475 awareness, because the decision maker only uses information about the audience member's rank or his relationship quality with the audience member. Our model comparison shows that the rules 476 477 which do not require triadic awareness have the best model fit, suggesting that triadic awareness 478 is not required to explain the solicitation patterns in this dataset.

The differences between the results of Perry et al. (2004) and our results come down to differences in the analytical approach. Consistent with previous findings, we found that decision rules that requiring triadic awareness are more plausible than the random choice model. However, we showed that these rules are far less plausible than the rules that do not require triadic awareness. Although we do not find strong support for triadic awareness, this does not rule out the possibility that capuchins may have this ability. Experimental studies may be a better way to establish whether species have a particular cognitive ability.

In addition, we aimed to make inferences based on the entire set of models rather than selecting the best model (Burnham and Anderson 2004; McElreath 2016). This enabled us to infer that the decision rules in which animals assess only one attribute of a potential ally are far less plausible than decision rules where the decision maker combines information about rank and relationship quality. This provided more evidence that monkeys evaluate potential allies by combining multiple types of information about them.

492 ANIMAL WELFARE NOTE

493 This was a strictly observational study of wild animals, involving no manipulation on the part of 494 the observers, aside from the application of a small amount dye to a few of the small juveniles to 495 assist in recognizing individuals during quick action. These individuals were squirted with Clairol Born Blonde hair dye, dispensed from a 100-cc syringe from which the needle had been 496 497 removed. The dye was squirted onto their backs from a 1-2 meter distance and never produced 498 noticeable distress. The protocols for this study were approved by the University of Michigan 499 Committee on Use and Care of Animals, IUCUC #3081, and permission was obtained from the 500 Servicio de Parques Naciónales de Costa Rica and the regional division (Area de Conservacion 501 Tempisque).

### 502 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We thank J. Manson, J. Gros-Louis and L. Sirot for their invaluable assistance in data collection.
L. Sirot, M. Tomaszycki, M. Landys and S. Newman assisted in data processing. This paper has
benefited from helpful discussions with H. C. Barrett, J. Manson, T. Scott-Phillips, B. Scelza, E.
S. Gillen, members of UCLA's Biological Anthropology subfield, the Behavior, Evolution and
Culture group, members of the Healey Lab who provided valuable feedback; the editor J.
Higham and an anonymous reviewer who suggested individual level analysis. We thank the

509 Costa Rican Servicio de Parques Naciónales and the Area de Conservación Tempisque for

510 permission to work in Lomas Barbudal Biological Reserve, and the community of San Ramón de

511 Bagaces and Rancho Jojoba for permission to work on private lands near the reserve. G. Frankie

and J. Frankie, the Rosales family and M. Cedillos provided logistical assistance in the field.

513 K.K. was supported by NSF Graduate Research Fellowship Grant DGE-1650604. S.E.P. was

514 supported by the L.S.B. Leakey Foundation (two grants), the National Science Foundation

515 (graduate fellowship to S.E.P., and grants to B. Smuts and J. Mitani), the National Geographic

516 Society, Sigma Xi, the Rackham Graduate School, the Evolution and Human Behavior Program

517 and the University of Michigan Alumnae Society.

518 REFERENCES

519 Akaike, H. (1973). Information theory and an extension of the maximum likelihood principle. In

520 B. N. Petrov & F. Caski (Eds.), Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on

521 Information Theory (pp. 267-281). Budapest: Akademiai Kiado.

522 Bachmann, C., & Kummer, H. (1980). Male assessment of female choice in hamadryas

523 baboons. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 4, 315–21.

- 524 Bergman, T. J., Beehner, J. C., Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (2003). Hierarchical
- 525 classification by rank and kinship in baboons. Science, 302(5648), 1234-1236.
- 526 Bergstrom, M.L., Fedigan, L.M. (2010). Dominance among female white-faced capuchin
- 527 monkeys (Cebus capucinus): hierarchical linearity, nepotism, strength and stability. Behaviour,
- 528 147, 899–931.
- 529
- 530 Bissonnette, A., Perry, S., Barrett, L., Mitani, J. C., Flinn, M., Gavrilets, S., & de Waal, F. B.
- 531 (2015). Coalitions in theory and reality: a review of pertinent variables and processes. Behaviour,
  532 152(1), 1-56.
- 533 Burnham, K. P., & Anderson, D. R. (2004). Multimodel inference: understanding AIC and BIC
- in model selection. Sociological methods & research, 33(2), 261-304.
- 535 Byrne, R. W. (2018). Machiavellian intelligence retrospective. *Journal of Comparative*
- 536 *Psychology*, *132*(4), 432.
- 537 Byrne, R. W., & Bates, L. A. (2011). Cognition in the wild: exploring animal minds with
- 538 observational evidence. *Biology Letters* 7, 619-622.
- 539 Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1980). Vocal recognition in free-ranging vervet
- 540 monkeys. Animal Behaviour, 2, 362–67.
- 541 Cheney, D. L., Seyfarth, R. M., & Silk, J. B. (1995). The responses of female baboons (Papio
- 542 cynocephalus ursinus) to anomalous social interactions: evidence for causal reasoning?. Journal
- 543 of Comparative Psychology, 109(2), 134.
- 544 Dasser, V. (1988). A social concept in Java monkeys. Animal Behaviour, 36(1), 225-230.

- 545 De Villiers, M. S., Richardson, P. R., & Van Jaarsveld, A. S. (2003). Patterns of coalition
- 546 formation and spatial association in a social carnivore, the African wild dog (Lycaon pictus).
- 547 Journal of Zoology, 260(4), 377-389.
- 548 De Waal, F. B. (1991). Complementary methods and convergent evidence in the study of primate
- 549 social cognition. Behaviour, 118(3), 297-320.
- 550 De Waal, F. (1982). Chimpanzee politics: Power and sex among apes. Harvard University Press.
- 551 Dugatkin, L. A., & Alfieri, M. (1991). Guppies and the TIT FOR TAT strategy: preference based
- on past interaction. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 28(4), 243-246.
- 553 Dugatkin, L. A., & Wilson, D. S. (1992). The prerequisites for strategic behaviour in bluegill
- sunfish, Lepomis macrochirus. Animal Behaviour, 44, 223-230.
- 555 Emery, N. J., Seed, A. M., Von Bayern, A. M., & Clayton, N. S. (2007). Cognitive adaptations
- 556 of social bonding in birds. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological
- 557 Sciences, 362(1480), 489-505.
- 558 Engh, A. L., Siebert, E. R., Greenberg, D. A., & Holekamp, K. E. (2005). Patterns of alliance
- 559 formation and postconflict aggression indicate spotted hyaenas recognize third-party
- 560 relationships. Animal behaviour, 69(1), 209-217.
- 561 Feh, C. (1999). Alliances and reproductive success in Camargue stallions. Animal Behavior,
- 562 57(3), 705-713.
- 563 Ferreira, R. G., Izar, P., & Lee, P. C. (2006). Exchange, affiliation, and protective interventions
- 564 in semifree-ranging brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). American Journal of Primatology:
- 565 Official Journal of the American Society of Primatologists, 68(8), 765-776.
- 566 Fragaszy, D. M., Visalberghi, E., & Fedigan, L. M. (2004). The complete capuchin: the biology
- 567 of the genus Cebus. Cambridge University Press.

- 568 Gehrt, S. D., & Fox, L. B. (2004). Spatial patterns and dynamic interactions among raccoons in
- 569 eastern Kansas. The Southwestern Naturalist, 49(1), 116-121.
- 570 Gelman, A. (2006). Prior distributions for variance parameters in hierarchical models (comment
- 571 on article by Browne and Draper). Bayesian analysis, 1(3), 515-534.
- 572 Gibson, R. M., Bradbury, J. W., & Vehrencamp, S. L. (1991). Mate choice in lekking sage
- 573 grouse revisited: the roles of vocal display, female site fidelity, and copying. Behavioral
- 574 Ecology, 2(2), 165-180.
- 575 Gompper, M. E., Gittleman, J. L., & Wayne, R. K. (1997). Genetic relatedness, coalitions and
- 576 social behaviour of white-nosed coatis, Nasua narica. Animal Behaviour, 53(4), 781-797.
- 577 Gros-Louis, J., Perry, S., & Manson, J. H. (2003). Violent coalitionary attacks and intraspecific
- 578 killing in wild white-faced capuchin monkeys (Cebus capucinus). Primates, 44(4), 341-346.
- 579 Harcourt, A. H., & de Waal, F. B. (Eds.). (1992). Coalitions and alliances in humans and other
- 580 animals (pp. 445-471). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 581 Hilborn, R., & Mangel, M. (1997). The ecological detective: confronting models with data (Vol.
  582 28). Princeton University Press.
- 583 Hirsch, B. T. (2007). Spoiled Brats: Is Extreme Juvenile Agonism in Ring-Tailed Coatis (Nasua
- nasua) Dominance or Tolerated Aggression?. Ethology, 113(5), 446-456.
- 585 Humphrey, N. K. (1976). The social function of intellect. In Growing points in ethology. edited
- 586 by B. Bertram, P. Bateson, and R. Hinde (pp. 303-317). Cambridge University Press.
- 587 Jack KM. 2010. The cebines: Toward an explanation of variable social structure. In: Campbell
- 588 CJ, Fuentes A, MacKinnon KC, Bearder SK and Stumpf RM. Primates in perspective. New
- 589 York: Oxford University Press.

- 590 Jennings, D. J., Carlin, C. M., & Gammell, M. P. (2009). A winner effect supports third-party
- intervention behaviour during fallow deer, Dama dama, fights. Animal Behaviour, 77(2), 343-348.
- Jolly, A. (1966). Lemur social behavior and primate intelligence. Science, 153(3735), 501-506.
- 594 Koster, J. M., & Leckie, G. (2014). Food sharing networks in lowland Nicaragua: an application
- of the social relations model to count data. Social Networks, 38, 100-110.
- 596 Kummer, H., Dasser, V., & Hoyningen-Huene, P. (1990). Exploring Primate Social Cognition:
- 597 Some Critical Remarks1. Behaviour, 112(1), 84-98.
- 598
- 599 Luce, R. D. (1963). Detection and Recognition. In R. D. Luce, R. R. Bush, & E. Galanter (Eds.),
- 600 Handbook of Mathematical Psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 103–189). New York: Wiley.
- 601 Lunn, D., Jackson, C., Best, N., Spiegelhalter, D., & Thomas, A. (2012). The BUGS book: A
- 602 practical introduction to Bayesian analysis. Chapman and Hall/CRC.
- 603 Manson, J.H., L.M. Rose, S. Perry & J. Gros-Louis. (1999). Dynamics of female-female
- 604 relationships in wild Cebus capucinus: data from two Costa Rican sites. International Journal of
- 605 Primatology 20: 679-706.
- 606 Mielke, A., Preis, A., Samuni, L., Gogarten, J. F., Wittig, R. M., & Crockford, C. (2018).
- 607 Flexible decision-making in grooming partner choice in sooty mangabeys and chimpanzees.
- 608 Royal Society open science, 5(7), 172143.
- 609 McElreath, R. (2016). Statistical Rethinking: a Bayesian Course with Examples in R and
- 610 Stan. Chapman and Hall/CRC, New York.
- 611 McElreath R. (2019). rethinking: Statistical Rethinking book package. R package version 1.82.

- 612 Mitani, J. C., Merriwether, D. A., & Zhang, C. (2000). Male affiliation, cooperation and kinship
- 613 in wild chimpanzees. Animal behaviour, 59(4), 885-893.
- 614 Noë, R., & Hammerstein, P. (1994). Biological markets: supply and demand determine the effect
- of partner choice in cooperation, mutualism and mating. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology,
- 616 35(1), 1-11.
- 617 Noë, R., & Sluijter, A. A. (1995). Which adult male savanna baboons form coalitions?.
- 618 International Journal of Primatology, 16(1), 77-105.
- 619 Navarrete, A. F., Reader, S. M., Street, S. E., Whalen, A., & Laland, K. N. (2016). The
- 620 coevolution of innovation and technical intelligence in primates. Philosophical Transactions of
- 621 the Royal Society B, 371(1690), 20150186.
- 622 Olson, L. E., & Blumstein, D. T. (2009). A trait-based approach to understand the evolution of
- 623 complex coalitions in male mammals. Behavioral Ecology, 20(3), 624-632.
- 624 Packer, C. (1977). Reciprocal altruism in Papio anubis. Nature, 265(5593), 441.
- 625 Parsons, K. M., Durban, J. W., Claridge, D. E., Balcomb, K. C., Noble, L. R., & Thompson, P.
- 626 M. (2003). Kinship as a basis for alliance formation between male bottlenose dolphins, Tursiops
- 627 truncatus, in the Bahamas. Animal Behaviour, 66(1), 185-194.
- 628 Perry, S. (1995). Social Relationships in Wild White-Faced Capuchin Monkeys, Cebus
- 629 capucinus. Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan.
- 630 Perry, S. (1996). Female-Female Social Relationships in Wild White-Faced Capuchin
- 631 Monkeys, Cebus capucinus. American Journal of Primatology, 40(2), 167–82.
- 632 Perry, S. (1997). Male-female social relationships in wild white-faced capuchins (Cebus
- 633 capucinus). Behaviour, 134(7), 477-510.
- 634 Perry, S. (1998a). Male-male social relationships in wild white-faced capuchins, Cebus

- 635 capucinus. Behaviour, 135(2), 139–72.
- 636 Perry, S. (1998b). A case report of a male rank reversal in a group of wild white-
- 637 faced capuchins (Cebus capucinus). Primates, 39(1), 51–70.
- 638 Perry, S. (2003). Coalitionary aggression in white-faced capuchins. In F. B. M.
- 639 de Waal, & P. L. Tyack (Eds.), Animal Social Complexity. Intelligence, Culture and
- 640 Individualized Societies. London, England.
- 641 Perry, S. (2012). The behavior of wild white-faced capuchins: demography, life history, social
- relationships, and communication. In Advances in the study of behavior (Vol. 44, pp. 135-181).
- 643 Academic Press.
- 644 Perry, S., & J. H. Manson. (2008). Manipulative Monkeys: The Capuchins of Lomas
- 645 Barbudal. Harvard University Press.
- 646 Perry, S., Barrett, H. C., & Manson, J. H. (2004). White-faced capuchin monkeys show triadic
- 647 awareness in their choice of allies. Animal Behaviour, 67(1), 165-170.
- 648 R Core Team (2018). R: a language and environment for statistical computing. Vienna, Austria:
- 649 R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
- 650 Racey, D., Young, M. E., Garlick, D., Pham, J. N. M., & Blaisdell, A. P. (2011). Pigeon and
- human performance in a multi-armed bandit task in response to changes in variable interval
- 652 schedules. Learning & behavior, 39(3), 245-258.
- 653 Range, F., & Noë, R. (2005). Can simple rules account for the pattern of triadic interactions in
- 654 juvenile and adult female sooty mangabeys?. Animal Behaviour, 69(2), 445-452.
- 655 Rowell, T. E., & Rowell, C. A. (1993). The Social Organization of Feral Ovis aries Ram Groups
- 656 in the Pre-rut Period. Ethology, 95(3), 213-232.

- 657 Samuni, L., Preis, A., Mielke, A., Deschner, T., Wittig, R. M., & Crockford, C. (2018). Social
- bonds facilitate cooperative resource sharing in wild chimpanzees. *Proceedings of the RoyalSociety B.*
- 660 Scheiber, I. B., Weiß, B. M., Frigerio, D., & Kotrschal, K. (2005). Active and passive social
- support in families of greylag geese (Anser anser). Behaviour, 142(11-12), 1535-1557.
- 662 Schino, G., Tiddi, B., & Di Sorrentino, E. P. (2006). Simultaneous classification by rank and
- kinship in Japanese macaques. Animal Behaviour, 71(5), 1069-1074.
- 664 Scott, D. K. (1980). Functional aspects of prolonged parental care in Bewick's swans. Animal
- 665 Behaviour, 28(3), 938-952.
- 666 Seed, A. M., Clayton, N. S., & Emery, N. J. (2007). Postconflict third-party affiliation in rooks,
- 667 Corvus frugilegus. Current Biology, 17(2), 152-158.
- 668 Silk, J. B. (1999). Male bonnet macaques use information about third-party rank relationships to
- 669 recruit allies. Animal Behaviour, 58(1), 45-51.
- 670 Slocombe, K. E., & Zuberbühler, K. (2007). Chimpanzees modify recruitment screams as a
- 671 function of audience composition. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(43),
- 672 17228-17233.
- 673 Smith, J. E., Memenis, S. K., & Holekamp, K. E. (2007). Rank-related partner choice in the
- 674 fission-fusion society of the spotted hyena (Crocuta crocuta). Behavioral Ecology and
- 675 Sociobiology, 61(5), 753-765.
- 676 Smith, J. E., Van Horn, R. C., Powning, K. S., Cole, A. R., Graham, K. E., Memenis, S. K., &
- 677 Holekamp, K. E. (2010). Evolutionary forces favoring intragroup coalitions among spotted
- hyenas and other animals. Behavioral Ecology, 21(2), 284-303.

- 679 Stan Development Team (2018). RStan: the R interface to Stan., v. 2.18.0. See http://mc-
- 680 stan.org/ rstan.html.
- 681 Stephan, H., Barbon, G., Frahm, H. D. 1988. Comparative Size of Brains and Brain Components.
- In H. D. Steklis, & J. Erwin (Eds.), Comparative Primate Biology (pp. 1-39). New York:
- 683 WileyeLiss.
- 684 Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (1997). Primate cognition. Oxford University Press, USA.
- 685 Vaida, F., & Blanchard, S. (2005). Conditional Akaike information for mixed-effects models.
- 686 Biometrika, 92(2), 351-370.
- 687 Vehtari A, Gabry J, Yao Y, Gelman A (2018). "loo: Efficient leave-one-out cross-validation and
- 688 WAIC for Bayesian models." R package version 2.0.0, https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=loo
- 689 Ward, C., Trisko, R., & Smuts, B. B. (2009). Third-party interventions in dyadic play between
- 690 littermates of domestic dogs, Canis lupus familiaris. Animal Behaviour, 78(5), 1153-1160.
- 691 Waser, P. M., Keane, B., Creel, S. R., Elliott, L. F., & Minchella, D. J. (1994). Possible male
- 692 coalitions in a solitary mongoose. Animal Behaviour, 47(2), 289-294.
- 693 Watanabe, S. (2010). Asymptotic Equivalence of Bayes Cross Validation and Widely Applicable
- 694 Information Criterion in Singular Learning Theory. Journal of Machine Learning Research 11.
- **695** 3571–3594.
- 696 Wechsler, B. (1988). Dominance relationships in jackdaws (Corvus monedula). Behaviour,
- 697 106(3), 252-264.
- 698 Whiten, A., & Byrne, R. W. (Eds.). (1997). Machiavellian intelligence II: Extensions and
- 699 evaluations (Vol. 2). Cambridge University Press.

- 700 Wittig, R. M., Crockford, C., Deschner, T., Langergraber, K. E., Ziegler, T. E., & Zuberbühler,
- 701 K. (2014). Food sharing is linked to urinary oxytocin levels and bonding in related and unrelated
- 702 wild chimpanzees. Proc. R. Soc. B, 281(1778), 20133096.