

UC Irvine

UC Irvine Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

Transgressing Trans: The Genealogical Undoing of the Wrong Body Narrative

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9zv7t4cw>

Author

Lee, Meredith Cecilia

Publication Date

2018

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE

Transgressing Trans: The Genealogical Undoing of the Wrong Body Narrative

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Culture and Theory

by

Meredith Lee

Dissertation Committee:
Associate Professor Tiffany Willoughby-Herard, Co-Chair
Professor Judy Wu, Co-Chair
Associate Professor Susan Stryker
Associate Professor Jared Sexton

2018

DEDICATION

To

Judith

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF FIGURES	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
CURRICULUM VITAE	vi
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION	ix
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: Trans is Out of Joint: Specters of Pathology in the Transsexual Archive	6
CHAPTER 2: Into the Flesh: The Making of the Wrong Body	41
CHAPTER 3: Into the Spirit: Formations of Sexological Discourse	69
CHAPTER 4: Coding the Wrong Body Narrative	83
CHAPTER 5: Epilogue	103
REFERENCES	111

LIST OF FIGURES

		Page
Figure 1	Eve and her Tempter	53

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank, first and foremost, my co-chairs Tiffany Willoughby-Herard and Judy Wu, for their continual love, support, and brilliance. Without their guidance, this dissertation would not have been possible.

I would also like to thank my committee member Susan Stryker, whose mentorship was invaluable to this process. Jared Sexton, Gabriele Schwab, and Valerie Olsen provided awesome advice and support along the way as well.

In addition, Shannon Winnubst has always had my back with tons of love and support. Linda Mizejewski is my power of example within the academy. My academic career started with Cynthia Belmont and continued with Lynn Morgan. Thank you both for being amazing scholars and mentors.

I would like to thank the many folks inside and outside the academy who have helped me through this process: Mir, Aly Su, Dewar, Betsy, Vance, Amina, Ally Day, Cat, Christy, Dylan, Tracy, and Karina. Sometimes knowing you all exist was enough.

Finally, I thank Judith Rodriguez for always loving and supporting me. This dissertation is dedicated to you. Words cannot express my gratitude for you.

Financial support was provided by the University of California Presidential Dissertation Year.

CURRICULUM VITAE

EDUCATION

- Sept 2018 Ph.D., Culture and Theory, University of California, Irvine
Doctoral Dissertation: "Transgressing Trans: The Genealogical Undoing of the Wrong Body Narrative"
- June 2012 M.A., Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH
- May 2006 B.A., Critical Social Thought, Magna Cum Laude, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA

PUBLICATIONS

Refereed Journal Articles

- Sept 2017 "Generating Blackness: Unsettling the American Grammar of Trans Politics," *The Journal of Black Sexuality and Relationships*

Other Publications

- May 2015 "Conjuring *Ain't I a Woman*: an interview with bell hooks" in *Trans-Scripts V* as the introduction to the special issue

FELLOWSHIPS AND GRANTS

- 2017-2018 University of California Presidential Dissertation Year Fellow
2016 Humanities Commons Research Grant, University of California, Irvine
2012-2013 Regent's Fellowship, University of California, Irvine

CONFERENCES

Papers Presented

- 2018 "Blackness and the American Grammar of Trans Representation," American Political Science Association, August 30-September 2
2017 "Disentangling Cripistemologies," the National Women's Studies Association, November 16-19

- 2017 “Rethinking the Symbolic Order of Trans Politics,” Queer Places, Practices and Lives III, May 12-13
- 2017 “Anti-Blackness within Medico-Scientific Discourse,” the Comparative Literature Graduate Student Conference at UC Irvine, March 14-15
- 2016 “The Anthropology of Sexology,” the National Women’s Studies Association, November 10-13
- 2016 “Generating Blackness: Unsettling the American Grammar of Trans Politics,” Trans*studies: an International Transdisciplinary Conference on Gender, Embodiment, and Sexuality, September 7-10
- 2015 “Kraepelin’s Degeneration: the Pathologization of Trans Women of Color,” the National Women’s Studies Association, November 12-15
- 2015 “Decoding Anti-Blackness Within the Medico-Scientific Classification of Sexual Inversion,” Somatechnics Conference, April 15-18
- 2014 “Specters of Pathology: Transgenerational Memory in the Transsexual Archive,” the National Women’s Studies Association, November 13-16
- 2014 “The Transsexual Archive: The Spectral Materialization of Pathology,” Queer Places, Practices and Lives II, at May 16-17
- 2012 “Who’s Your Daddy? Queering Tattoo History Through the Life of Phil Sparrow,” Queer Places, Practices and Lives, May 18-19
- 2012 “Normalization and the Sexual Invert,” Multiple Perspectives on Access, Inclusion, and Disability Annual Conference, April 12-13
- 2011 “The Looping Effects of Transsexuality: Medical Science versus a Community,” the 36th Annual 4S Conference, November 2-5

Conferences Organized

- 2011-2012 Committee Member and Archival Subcommittee Chair, Queer Places, Practices and Lives: The Ohio State University’s First National Queer Studies Conference

Panels Organized

- 2015 “Trans Embodiment and Exclusion from the ‘National Body’: Race, Disability,

and Species as Categories of Biopolitical Control,” the National Women’s Studies Association, November 12-15

CAMPUS TALKS

May 2016 “Generating Blackness: Unsettling the American Grammar of Trans Politics” for the Cookies and Theory Workshop at University of California, Irvine.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Emerson College Honors Program

First Year Honors Seminar (Fall 2018-Spring 2018, co-instructor of record)

University of California, Irvine

Composition: Argument and Research (Fall 2015-Spring 2017, instructor of record)

Gender and Feminism (Fall 2013, Fall 2014)

Gender and Power (Winter 2014)

Gender and Popular Culture (Spring 2014, Spring 2015)

Asian American Cultures (Winter 2015)

The Ohio State University

Hollywood, Women and Film (Winter 2010-Spring 2012, instructor of record)

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

2018 Research Associate for Professor John Chirban, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

2013-2014 Research Assistant for Professor Janet Afary, University of California, Santa Barbara, Los Angeles, CA.

2009-2010 Research Assistant for Professor Janet Afary, University of California, Santa Barbara, Los Angeles, CA.

2006-2007 Research Assistant for Heresies Film Project. Northampton, MA.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Transgressing Trans: The Genealogical Undoing of the Wrong Body Narrative

By

Meredith Lee

Doctor of Philosophy in Culture and Theory

University of California, Irvine, 2018

Associate Professor Tiffany Willoughby-Herard
Professor Judy Wu, Co-Chairs

Transgressing Trans analyzes the formation of the wrong body narrative (a man trapped in a woman's body and vice versa) within sexological discourse. Drawing from sexological literature, anti-abolitionist texts, theology, black studies and transgender studies, this dissertation attempts to address the role (anti)blackness played in the creation of the wrong body narrative. How does the depoliticization of the wrong body narrative continue to inscribe trans politics and identity with anti-black racism?

Utilizing a Foucauldian genealogy, I reinterpret the history of sexology by showing how certain events were indeed historical processes caught in specific cultural, political, and economic times. Karl Ulrichs was the first person to construct a scientific theory of same-sex

desire (he coined the term “Urning,” who was a male-bodied individual with a female soul) in 1864, around the time that the trans-Atlantic slave trade was “abolished” (1859) and the publication of Darwin’s *The Origin of Species* (1859). I posit that these landmarks are not coincidental; the notion of being trapped in the “wrong body” became legible through the structures of slavery and the scientific racism that followed.

Organized around a series of case histories, the first chapters examine the historical, political, and cultural context of the formation of the “scientific” field of sexology, specifically through the early manifestations of the “wrong body” narrative within nineteenth century American and European biological science, psychiatry, theology, and anthropology. In the later chapters, I move to the 1950s when the term transsexual first became popular in both medicscience and the media in the United States, and then to the 1980s when transsexuality became an official mental disorder in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III (DSM-III)*. The discourses used to describe the transsexual continued to rely on the language of degeneration and pathology through reiterating not only the spirit/flesh duality, but also incorporating narratives of the primitive and the savage within the codification of transsexuality.

Introduction

With the medicalization of the abnormal and by dispensing with the ill and the therapeutic, psychiatry can claim for itself the simple function of protection and order. It claims a role of generalized social defense and, at the same time, through the notion of heredity, it claims the right to intervene in familial sexuality. It becomes the discipline of the scientific protection of society; it becomes the science of the biological protection of the species.

-Michel Foucault, *Abnormal*

Transgressing Trans addresses the construction of the wrong body narrative within medico-scientific discourses, beginning in the middle of the nineteenth-century. The wrong body narrative posits that either one is a woman born in a man's body or one is a man born in a woman's body. According to the inaugural issue of *TSQ*, Ulrica Engdahl writes, "The notion of 'wrong body' consists of a dichotomous explanation of the transgender experience as a state of 'being in the wrong body'. Wrongness is here understood in relation to how the body is gendered, connoting that the body is wrongly gendered in relation to a self-identified gender identity."¹ The wrong body narrative has become one of the main ways trans people express themselves within mainstream culture. This dissertation re-narrates the development of sexology by asking how the retelling of sexology through the lens of (anti)blackness changes our understanding of transgender politics today. What absent presence reproduces the narratological construction of the wrong body within medical discourse and culture? To

¹ Ulrica Engdahl, "Wrong Body" *TSQ* 1, nos. 1-2 (2014): 267.

paraphrase Rinaldo Walcott, how do discourses of psychiatry and sexology lend themselves to what is becoming an established field of transgender studies?²

Utilizing a Foucauldian genealogy, I follow Foucault to the degree that I am indeed re-interpreting history and showing how events are historical processes caught in a specific cultural, political, and economic time. In other words, genealogies undercut knowledge systems by shedding uncertainty to claims that declare themselves as entirely justified. For example, Foucault believes that our society insists on normality yet at the same time produces new types of abnormality in opposition to the normal. Through vigilant observations of deviant groups, scientists and other professionals create norms, and, in turn, these norms generate individuals as case studies who can be measured by varying degrees of deviation from the norm. Therefore, I am also examining the construction of the wrong normativity embedded within the wrong body narrative. A genealogy of the wrong body narrative inevitably leads to issues around the normal and the pathological.

I use genealogy as a methodology because of the multiple meanings of the word. As Walcott indexes, “Genealogy also drags along discourses of family which tend to produce moments of discipline, regulation and confinement, romance stories that do not hold up to scrutiny.”³ Discourses of the family play a significant role here, both through what Foucault discusses in *Abnormal* as a normalizing mechanism for the state, but also because psychiatrists

² Rinaldo Walcott, “Beyond the ‘nation thing’: Black Studies, Cultural Studies and Diaspora Discourse (or the Post-Black Studies Moment) in *Decolonizing the Academy: African Diaspora Studies*, eds. Carole Boyce Davies et al (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003).

³ Ibid, 108.

and sexologists employed family histories at the beginning of each case history as well as followed the theories of heredity and instinct from the turn of the twentieth-century.

A genealogy of transsexuality as a medicalized formation centers on the body and the determining factors of biology, whereas a transgender intervention in this process of medicalization works to disrupt cultural assumptions about sex, gender and sexuality. While I enthusiastically participate in the move away from the medico-scientific model of transsexuality to reconceptualize gender-variant identities, I argue that trans scholars and activists cannot completely disavow the medico-scientific model because its traumatic legacy still haunts trans-subjectivity today. Throughout this dissertation, I will use the terms “transsexual,” “transsexuality,” and “transsexualism” to discuss the medical model of nonnormative gender identity, wherein “transsexual” refers to the individual who desires to obtain medical procedures and live as the “opposite” sex. This is also the dominant category for individuals prior to the 1990s, when “transgender” entered the trans community’s vernacular. Contemporary notions of transgender politics (primarily in urban areas) have worked to include all kinds of gender nonnormativity and provide a site to build resistance against institutions of power that subjugate the trans community. I use transgender and trans interchangeably throughout.

Although I do not use an asterisk with trans, I do want to acknowledge Christina Sharpe’s discussion of trans*. She says:

The asterisk after a word functions as the wildcard, and I am thinking the trans* in that way; as a means to mark the ways the slave and the Black occupy what Saidiya Hartman calls ‘the position of the unthought’. The asterisk after the prefix ‘trans’ holds the place open for thinking (from and into that position). It speaks, as well, to a range of embodied experiences called gender and to Euro-Western gender’s

dismantling, its inability to hold in/on Black flesh.⁴

Trans* illuminates the position of the unthought for transgender studies and especially the history of transsexuality. I employ the notion of *angender* as an analytic to discuss ways we, as trans and queer scholars, can begin to deconstruct or perhaps even destroy contemporary notions of gender than depend on the Black flesh for intelligibility. Transgressing trans means centering the unthought and pushing thought beyond colonial and anti-black terms. In line with *TSQ's* special issue on *Decolonizing the Trans Imaginary*, I am calling for a reconfiguration of trans identity. This polemic pushes trans thought further, beyond the whitened and liberalized forms of trans representation within U.S. culture and politics. In sum, my dissertation constructs an opening to begin angendering transness.

According to Michel Foucault, “While the history of science is without doubt an important testing ground for the theory of knowledge, as well as for the analysis of meaningful systems, it is also fertile ground for studying the genealogy of the subject ... [O]ne of the main moral obligations for any subject is to know oneself, to tell the truth about oneself, and to constitute oneself as an object of knowledge both for other people and for oneself.⁵ Connecting scientific methodologies to the genealogy of the subject, Foucault inscribes scientific knowledge within the normative language of subject formation. The medical subject is not only produced through scientific knowledge and methods, but s/he must also become an object of knowledge to her/himself in return. Hegemonic norms thus reinforce the necessity for a trans individual to be consistently aware of her/his appearance, behaviors, and body presentation in

⁴ Christina Sharpe, *In the Wake: On Blackness and Being* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 30.

⁵ Michel Foucault, “About the beginning of the hermeneutics of the self” in *Religion and culture: Michel Foucault*, edited by Jeremy Carrette. New York: Routledge, 1999, 160.

relation to what is considered normal and in relation to an obligation to manifest coherence between the mind (spirit) and the body (flesh). Doctors worked to stabilize the connection between the normal and abnormal through utilizing terms such as “adjustment” and “conformity” as a means to regulate and subordinate those who did not “fit in.” Doctors were called upon to this both by transsexual persons themselves but also by a society determined to protect the hegemonic sex/gender binary. While many transsexuals resisted and continue to resist the medical model and the hegemonic sex/gender binary, I am focusing on the material effects of language within the symbolic order. Therefore, I believe transsexuals and trans people have autonomy over their own bodies. But my point is that the ideologies embedded within this binary through the historical construction of sex and gender cannot be ignored or disavowed without beginning to reconfigure our entire symbolic and structural system. Individuals who are resilient against hegemonic norms start to do this work but our understanding of sex and gender cannot change through individual rebellion alone. We are haunted by the legacies of slavery and colonialism within the ontologization of gender within a sexed body.

Into the Archive

In her introduction to *The Transgender Studies Reader*, Susan Stryker discusses the specialized medical literature on transsexuality and writes, “Transgender studies is now in a position to treat this immense body of clinical work as its archive.”⁶ (Stryker 2006, 14). In fact, I

⁶ Susan Stryker, “(De)Subjugated Knowledges: An Introduction to Transgender Studies.” *The Transgender Studies Reader*. Eds. Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle (New York: Routledge 2006), 14.

assert that the trans archive *is* a medical archive that ontologically and epistemologically continues to shape trans identity today; the medico-scientific model of transsexuality structures any trans archive. Transsexuality cannot escape the medical model because of the spectral “truth” embedded within it. When an individual reads an autobiography or a work of fiction by and/or about transsexuality, the medical model haunts that narrative – a constitutive haunting that in part unintentionally shapes the narrative. Granted that memory and history are forms of haunting, the transsexual archive houses the specters of such hauntings.

According to Achille Mbembe, the archive is a “montage of fragments” that creates an “illusion of totality and continuity.”⁷ No archive can be complete—order is constituted out of dis-order. The past constructed through the archive will never fully capture the “truth” of history. Moreover, archives always contain traces of the dead, either because archives catalog the work of someone deceased or through the archivist revitalizing the work of a dead scholar. Archives are constructed with the desire to restore the remnants of the dead rather than destroy them.⁸ The foundational structure of the archive is thus loss: loss of an other or loss of context. As K.J. Rawson states, “While transgender archives fight historical neglect, silences, and misrepresentations, the selection and discrimination involved in archiving creates a residual silencing of others.”⁹ Re-membering the archive means invoking traces of specters

⁷ Achille Mbembe, “The Power of the Archive and Its Limit,” In *Refiguring the Archive*, edited by Carolyn Hamilton et al. (Norwall, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers), 21.

⁸ Ibid, 22. Mbembe states, “It may be that historiography, and the very possibility of a political community, are only conceivable per condition of that spectre, which has been brought back to life in this way, should remain silent, should accept that from now on he may only speak through another, or be represented by some sign, or some object which, not belonging to any one in particular, now belongs to all” (25). Although archives strive to preserve the work of the dead, they also destroy them, as illuminated through Mbembe’s quote.

⁹ K.J. Rawson, “Archive,” *TSQ* 1, no. 1, May 2014: 24.

inscribed not only within the archival rituals but also in the documents themselves. The history collected within trans archives indexes the connection between medical science and regulation. In this sense, the archive constructs status: it secures the status of “proof.” Trans individuals look to the archive to “prove” that there have always been transsexuals, yet the historical, political, and economic circumstances are what become disavowed in order to maintain transsexuality as an identity disorder. Explain circumstances and how they differ.

For example, Jay Prosser claims that case histories provide proof of the presence of transsexuals prior to the naming of the transsexual as such in the 1940s and that these cases are “precious and indispensable as transsexual texts” because of “the fact that transsexuals must tell a transsexual autobiography to present-day psychiatrists and psychologists in order to become transsexual, the fact that transsexuality *is* a narrative.”¹⁰ Historian Vern Bullough writes, “Publicizing such cases and bringing them to the attention of others in the sex field is important because it serves to confirm that transsexualism existed before it was an accepted diagnosis. It also serves to emphasize that individuals of the past often expressed themselves in ways similar to today’s preoperative transsexuals.”¹¹ In contrast, I do not view these case histories of sexual inversion (and later transvestitism)¹² as confirmation of the existence of transsexuals before the construction of the medical diagnosis. However, I share some common ground with these scholars in paying attention to the narratological structure that reinforces a

¹⁰ Jay Prosser, “Transsexuals and Transsexologists: Inversion and the Emergence of Transsexual Subjectivity,” in *Sexology in Culture: Labelling Bodies and Desires*, edited by Lucy Bland and Laura Doan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998): 123.

¹¹ Vern Bullough, “A Nineteenth Century Transsexual,” *Archives of Sexual Behavior* 16, no. 1 (1987): 81.

¹² Magnus Hirschfeld coined the term “transvestite” in 1910 to describe sexual intermediaries – individuals who existed somewhere between the borders of male and female.

parallel set of regulatory mechanisms that are embedded within the racist and heteronormative structure of medico-science as well as all other forms of biopolitical control.

Conjuring the specter of Jacques Derrida, “Archive Fever” is the definitive model for theorizing the spectral nature of the archive. Significantly, Derrida argues that the two types of transgenerational memory—1) memory of an inherited event and 2) the “biologically” acquired character—are indeed analogous and that we cannot conceive of one without the other (Derrida 1995, 27). Derrida goes on to state:

Without the irrepressible, that is to say, only suppressible and repressible, force and authority of this transgenerational memory, the problems of which we speak would be dissolved and resolved in advance. There would no longer be any question of memory or of archive, of patriarchive or of matriarchive, and one would no longer even understand how an ancestor can speak within us, nor what sense there might be in us to speak *to* him or her, to speak in such an ‘*unheimlich*,’ ‘uncanny’ fashion, to his or her ghost. *With* it.¹³

Transgenerational memory acquires its authority through irrepressibility because of the analogous connection between history and materiality. Moreover, irrepressible events and memories are vital to the construction of history, memory, and archives as well as to the disentanglement of these distinct yet often conflated terms. The disconnect between history and memory is what haunts the transsexual archive because the disconnect constitutes the inherent anachronism inscribed in the medical model of transsexuality. For the transsexual, the medico-scientific discourse of pathology is what remains irrepressible and irreducible. The “uncanny fashion” that we speak to these specters would no longer be familiar, which means that we would no longer have those memories. While forgetting may in fact be an integral part of memory and thereby the archive, erasing specters moves beyond merely forgetting. The

¹³ Jacques Derrida, “Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression,” *Diacritics* 25, no. 2 (1995): 27.

specter is the sedimentation of history, and if one forgets, s/he is not erasing history but forgetting a part of her/his own transgenerational positionality. In other words, the structure of the archive is spectral because we need irrepressible memories to constitute any history. (Haunting of the medical archive crowding out space for nonnormative bodies. What is the medicalization trying to suppress and/or make known? Intermural conversation?)

Markedly, Derrida later draws further clarification between “memory of an inherited event” and the “biologically acquired character.” Although analogous, they are also quite distinct. He discusses “historical truth,” which is another way to say the “memory of an inherited event,” and “material truth,” which indexes the “biologically acquired character.” Historical truth, according to Derrida via Freud, is analogous to spectral truth because historical truth is repressed or suppressed. Derrida writes, “The truth is spectral, and this is its part of truth which is irreducible by explanation.”¹⁴ The historical “truth” of transsexuality has not been repressed as much as disavowed – there is a loss of context as well as a loss of citationality. For example, claims that the *DSM-V* diagnosis of *Gender Dysphoria* depathologizes transsexuality not only erases the complicated and often violent past of the diagnosis but also disconnects previous iterations of transsexuality with its newest incarnation.

The dominant scholarly narrative around sexology does not question the role of sexology *as* a medico-scientific endeavor.¹⁵ Although thinking about sexology as a science does not always mean that scholars are idealizing it or taking scientific objectivity for granted, I do argue that disavowing the violent, racist, and sexist history of sexology does damage to our

¹⁴ Ibid, 55.

¹⁵ Schaffner as exception

current understanding of sex, gender, and sexuality as well as excuses bad behavior. There has been much written on sexology but little has been written on racism and the role of anti-blackness specifically within sexology.¹⁶ And thus my dissertation works to create the space to discuss this contentious history in relation to the contemporary moment. Thinking with Kadji Amin, who discusses the role Genet plays within queer theory and queer culture, he writes: “Genet’s failures lay bare a methodological dilemma within queer scholarship as well as politicized criticism as a whole: how to counter the pathologization of denigrated groups without reacting by idealizing them.”¹⁷ This is a dilemma when discussing early sexologists, especially those like Magnus Hirschfeld and Havelock Ellis, as well as modernists like John Addington Symonds, Adolf Brand, and Edward Carpenter. Amin calls for unease—something between utopian hope and critique—when discussing such historical figures. I create unease when discussing the history of sexology in connection to (anti)blackness and colonialism.

Overview of Chapters

In Chapter One, I will turn to Hortense Spiller’s construction of an “American grammar” to re-examine the construction of the sex/gender system within sexology and psychiatry. I argue that it is vital for Transgender Studies to scrutinize the formation of the sex/gender system through the Trans-Atlantic slave trade as well as the plantation system because, as Spiller’s demonstrates, the American sex/gender system is constituted through the pornotroping of the black body into flesh. Next, I will turn to the 1860s and discuss the

¹⁶ Cite Meyerowitz, Bullough, etc then discuss Snorton and Bauer

¹⁷ Kadji Amin, 5-6

formation of the medico-scientific language of sexual inversion. Karl Ulrichs was the first person to construct a scientific theory of same-sex desire (he coined the term “Urning,” who was a male-bodied individual with a female soul) in 1864, around the time that the trans-Atlantic slave trade was “abolished” (1859) and the publication of Darwin’s *The Origin of Species* (1859). I posit that these landmarks are not coincidental; the notion of being trapped in the “wrong body” (male body with a female soul) became legible through the structures of slavery and the scientific racism that followed. In other words, when examining the formation of sexological discourse through Spiller’s critique of the sex/gender system, it becomes clear that sexology became a scientific field of inquiry through its connection to the language of (anti)blackness. Perhaps this becomes most obvious through the fact that most of the early sexologists were also Eugenicists. Yet I believe the deepest connection is through the notion of *degeneracy*.

According to the theory of degeneration, de-evolution (moral decay) results in the gradual weakening of certain groups of individuals, such as sexual inverts, “negros”, alcoholics, and criminals, through heredity from generation to generation. Put differently, sexual inverts, alcoholics, and other deviant types have atavistic (anachronistic) instincts that are inborn, thus their impulses continue to trouble the present. The “wrong body” narrative of sexual inversion and transsexuality modifies the notion of an atavistic instinct to one that is nonmaterial. I utilize Derrida’s notion that “time is out of joint” and Ernesto Laclau’s analysis of this notion in relation to spectrality to posit that the Cartesian dualism, which is indeed the hegemonic sex/gender binary (through the pornotroping of the black body) for transsexuality, is a “constitutive

anachronism” that establishes transsexuality as always-already pathologized.¹⁸ Trans is out of joint because anachronism, i.e., blackness, is inherent to the very structure of the medical model of transsexuality. The soul cannot chronologically align with the body because the soul exists outside of time, disconnected from any present; the soul is dis-jointed from the body.

Chapter Two focuses on the “degodding of the master code” (Wynter) where the “Redeemed Spirit/Fallen Flesh” master code becomes secondary to the “rational/irrational” master code. The employment of religio-secular discourse in Havelock Ellis’s writing reifies the rational/irrational master code because those who follow the path of the Spirit are redeemed while those who give into the sins of the flesh are pathological. But within rational/irrational master code, an individual does not repress her/his will/soul/spirit for redemption from the church but for the common good of society. Put differently, s/he no longer repents but modifies her/his behavior in order to fit within reproductive heteronormativity. In the terms of Ellis,¹⁹ to destroy the invert before he sins exceeds the demands of reason because children of the spirit can repress deviant behavior for the greater good.

For the rest of this chapter, I utilize the work of Sylvia Wynter to theoretically situate my “wrong body” argument. Although I discuss the “wrong body” narrative in Chapter One, here I will really flesh it out. I will primarily analyze sexological texts alongside theological and

¹⁸ Laclau states, “Time being ‘out of joint,’ dislocation corrupting the identity with itself of any present, we have a constitutive anachronism at the root of any identity.” Ernesto Laclau, “Time is Out of Joint,” *Diacritics* 25, no. 2 (1995), 88.

¹⁹ In perhaps the best-known study on sexual inversion, originally published in 1897, Havelock Ellis writes, “We are bound to protect the helpless members of society against the invert. If we go farther, and seek to destroy the invert himself before he has sinned against society, we exceed the warrant of reason, and in so doing we may perhaps destroy also those children of the spirit which possess a greater worth than the children of the flesh.” Here Ellis clearly articulates that Spirit possesses greater worth than flesh.”

scientific texts on the “negro” to illuminate the anti-black racism inscribed at the foundation of the “wrong body” narrative. For example, Charles Carroll quotes St. Paul, who says: “All flesh is not the same flesh; but there is one kind of flesh of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, and another of birds (See 1. Cor. xv. 39).”²⁰ Carroll employs this quote to “prove” that the “negro” is indeed the highest form of ape, thereby the “negro” belongs to the flesh of beasts (and therefore has no soul) rather than the flesh of men. Although Carroll does not consider the sexual invert, his discussion of the “negro” illustrates the foundation for the “wrong body” narrative of sexual inversion and later transsexuality. The “negro” is the first scientific classification of the rational/irrational master code by none other than Linnaeus, who places blackness in binary opposition to Europeaness. Therefore, within the medico-scientific realm, black flesh was not analogous but foundational to all other classifications of degeneracy and deviance.

Chapter Three centers on Denise Ferreira da Silva’s analysis of the transparent “I” to examine the role sexologists played in reproducing the dominant narratives of sex and gender in the last half of the 19th Century to the early 20th Century. da Silva provides a framework that outlines the emergence of rational man (Man2) through the universality and self-determination coterminous with post-Enlightenment thought (Hegel) and scientific reason (Kant). This theoretical framework emerges from what da Silva calls the *analytics of raciality*, which produces and reinforces the *transparent I/ affectable I* duality. Sexological literature at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century focused on a universal idea of inversion. Although

²⁰ Charles Carroll, “*The Negro a Beast*” ...or... “*In the Image of God*,” St. Louis: American Book and Bible House, 1900, 27.

sexology was not yet an official field of scientific inquiry, sexologists like Havelock Ellis, Iwan Bloch, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, and Magnus Hirschfeld worked to create a credible scientific field through collecting empirical data to bolster their universal theories (which mainly revolved around the nature/nurture question) and construct case histories. Sexologists utilized anthropological studies to prove their universal ideas of sex/uality. Therefore, sexologists examined customs from other countries without discussing the significance of location or race while simultaneously reinforcing the language of pathology and degeneration. Yet I argue that case histories obscure political, cultural, and economic issues by focusing on the personal rather than larger structural forces. Put differently, sexologists constructed “objective” taxonomies of deviance and degeneracy through case histories and racial science that conflated sex, sexuality, place, and time.

In the final section of chapter three, I discuss those individuals who opposed the pathologization of sexual inversion through medical science. The most outspoken, or at least the most privileged and therefore vocal, of these were literary scholars like John Addington Symonds (1840-1893), Oscar Wilde (1854-1900), John Henry Mackay (1864-1933), and Adolf Brand (1874-1945) who vehemently rejected sexology and turned to Ancient Greece and Rome to counter sexological pathologization. Significantly, these scholars were all involved and invested in pederasty (man-boy love) and romanticized “homosexual” relations in Graeco-Roman antiquity. As I will show, along with sexology, these scholars reified anti-black discourse through ignoring the interconnected relationship of boys and slaves in Graeco-Roman antiquity.

Chapter four focuses on the violence of the wrong body narrative within the symbolic order through the disavowal of the relationship of slavery and eugenics to biomedicine.

Further, this chapter addresses the Spirit/Flesh duality and Cartesian dualism embedded within the codification of the wrong body narrative that has become *the* narrative for the medico-scientific diagnosis of transsexuality. Indeed, these dualisms (re)materialize through the American Psychiatric Association's *DSM-III* in 1980. The foundational anti-black structure of the wrong body narrative, as discussed in Chapter One, was revitalized through the restructuring of the *DSM-III* to follow Emil Kraepelin's biological deterministic taxonomy from the turn of the 20th century. Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926) was a famous German psychiatrist who classified mental disorders in relation to physical diseases. He is often lauded as the father of modern scientific psychiatry and is best known for splitting the unitary concept of psychosis into two distinct disorders (manic depression and dementia, which is called the "Kraepelin dichotomy".) He was a staunch supporter of Social Darwinism and thus a Eugenicist and advocate of the theory of degeneration. In sum, Kraepelin's nosological system was built directly from the degeneration paradigm. I argue that transsexuality could not be included in the *DSM* without restructuring the methodology behind the manual itself. Examining the history of transsexuality as a medical diagnosis in the *DSM* exposes the economic, political, and (bio)cultural norms embedded within these so-called objective classifications by revealing a fundamental psychomedical gaze that has deliberately sought out human deviance with the objective of establishing institutionalized social control.²¹

After discussing the *DSM III* and its revisions, this chapter addresses the recent debate between transgender and transracial identity. Rachel Dolezal, who was the president of the

²¹ Arlene Istar Lev. "Disordering Gender Identity: Gender Identity Disorder in the *DSM-IV-TR*." *Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality* 17(3/4), 2005: 37-38.

Spokane NAACP and living as a black woman, was “outed” by her white parents. Ten days prior, Caitlyn Jenner’s *Vanity Fair* cover debuted, and thus created numerous comparisons between the two. Much has been written on the relationship of Jenner and Dolezal and in most, transgender is re-naturalized as something inherent. In other words, this recent debate supports the *DSM* diagnosis of gender dysphoria as a mental disorder that must be “fixed” for one to live an authentic life.

Chapter One

Trans is Out of Joint: Specters of Pathology in the Transsexual Archive

Under the binary phallographic founding myth by which Western bodies and subjects are authorized, only one body per gendered subject is ‘right’. All other bodies are wrong.
--Sandy Stone, “The Posttranssexual Manifesto”

This chapter examines the dominant narrative of sexual inversion, understood as the “wrong body” narrative, and analyzes the methods by which the “wrong body” narrative has become axiomatic, particularly for the medical model of transsexuality. This axiom insures that when an individual *feels* like s/he was born in the wrong body, medical and psychiatric institutions interpret this as meaning there is something *inherently wrong* with her/him rather than with larger socio-political and economic structural forces. I argue that the “wrong body” narrative was an ideological construct from the nineteenth century and continues to persist today within the medical realm as well as popular culture (the “wrong body” trope). Indeed, the psychiatric classification of *transsexuality* inherited the “wrong body” narrative from nineteenth century sexology. Foundational to this process of intelligibility is the early construction of the wrong body narrative. Sexological conceptualizations of sexual inversion utilized the Cartesian dualism of the wrong body narrative to explain the incongruences

between anatomy and psychological characteristics. For example, in *Sexual Inversion*, case history XXXVIII, Miss V. (aged 35) states, “I read a book where a girl was represented as saying she had a ‘boy’s soul in a girl’s body.’ The applicability of this to myself struck at once...”²² Miss V. recognizes her/his inversion through the “wrong body” narrative—s/he authenticates her/his “abnormal” instincts through articulating the fact that s/he is “always-already” male inside. Although the language of having the wrong body was used within many case histories around the turn of the twentieth century, it was by no means criteria to be recognized as an invert.

By the time transsexuality became a classification in the *DSM-III* in 1980, the notion that trans individuals are “trapped in the wrong body,” or that trans individuals are born with the right gender but the wrong sex, was the cornerstone of the medico-scientific diagnosis of transsexuality as well as one of the fundamental ways trans individuals have articulated their desire to transition to another sex. For a transsexual, the desire to transition is medically inscribed in the normative schema of a binary sex/gender system as well as the mind/body dualism originating from Descartes. The dominant understanding of the sex/gender system in the U.S. is a dualistic account of sex as biological and gender as socially constructed to “naturally” match sex in the normative system of sex/gender that regulates bodies in contemporary U.S. culture. While I recognize I am conjuring a violence that has ostensibly been eased by the performative and poststructural turns in the humanities,²³ I maintain that the binary sex/gender system continues to subjugate nonnormative bodies in the United States. Put differently, while trans politics and Transgender Studies have explicated the fallacy of the

²² Ellis, 232

²³ explain this

medico-scientific realm, we cannot escape the effects of the “trapped in the wrong body” narrative, especially because trans individuals are placed in a double bind: transsexuals are pathologized for transgressing social norms within the medico-scientific realm as well as within broader social forces that adhere to normative understandings of the binary sex/gender system. Yet at the same time, the surgical procedures necessary for many trans individuals to live a bearable life²⁴ also reinforce the biopolitical techniques of normalization that make a trans life unbearable in the first place. Moreover, someone cannot be “trapped” in the wrong body without a hegemonic understanding of what it means to inhabit a right body within normative interpretations of the dominant sex/gender binary, which is always already racialized.

I utilize Derrida’s notion of *hauntology*—“time is out of joint”—and Ernesto Laclau’s analysis of this notion in relation to spectrality²⁵ to posit that the Cartesian dualism, which is indeed the hegemonic sex/gender binary for transsexuality, is a “constitutive anachronism” that establishes transsexuality as always-already pathologized as opposed to the non-transsexual body whose mind and body (sex and gender) align. In affiliation with of other

²⁴ In *Undoing Gender* (New York: Routledge, 2006), Judith Butler utilizes the term “livable life” in relation to “certain normative terms that must be fulfilled for life to become life” (39). I am using “bearable life” in a similar manner, to emphasize the normative terms as well as the fact that surgical procedures make one’s life more tolerable. A bearable life not only involves feeling safe while walking down the street or finding permanent housing and job security, but becoming intelligible through the process of social recognition, which thereby makes an individual less vulnerable to violence, suicide, and discrimination.

²⁵ According to Srinivas Aravamudan, “The concept of spectrality, as Derrida puts it to use, is all about a historical accountability that is displaced or misplaced, anachronistic and anatopic, as suggested in the Shakespearean refrain ‘The time is out of joint.’ Where a practitioner of narrative historiography might want relative closure in regard to the meaning of a period or an event, a notion such as spectrality infects contemporaneity, as does the historical era, or the event one is looking at, with the condition of unfinalizability and the perspective of a missing hinge, perhaps even something like an anamorphosis” (“The Return of Anachronism,” *MLQ: Modern Language Quarterly* 62, no. 4 (2001): 347).

scholars like C. Riley Snorton and Matt Richardson, I argue that this constitutive anachronism is constructed on and through the black body/flesh and those genealogies of (anti)blackness that foreground black flesh as antagonistic to the human. Put differently, the medical model of transsexuality depends on the genealogies of slavery and colonialism inscribed in the center of medico-scientific discourse. And thus, consequently, in my account the very notion of transsexuality would not exist without (anti)blackness. After discussing the history of transsexuality in relation to (anti)blackness, I move to the (anti)black archive, which I argue cannot be separated from the medico-scientific realm, to contend that the specters of the transsexual archive are the historical pathologization and medicalization of the black body/flesh. In other words, I argue that that one cannot begin to dismantle the very structure that shapes gender as ahistorical and apolitical without returning to the archive and digging deeper. The specter of (anti)blackness embedded within the medical pathologization of transsexuality must be interrogated as a means to begin demystifying the role that science and medicine continues to play in reproducing the notion that gender is anchored in the body rather than socially and politically created. Thereby, I use the notion of *angender* as a political analytic to conceptualize gender outside the bounds of ontology and identity formation.

(Anti)black Specters

Foundational for my argument is Hortense Spillers discussion of the distinction within the symbolic order between the captive and liberated body. She maintains that the captive is reduced to flesh, i.e., a thing, that is not marked by gender difference: “The black female slave is the fundamental point of passage between the human and nonhuman world”—the “cultural

vestibular,” which she names *pornotroping*.²⁶ The term *porno* signifies prostitution while *trope* means both a figure of speech and a deviation from proper language.²⁷ The pornotroping of the black female (slave) body reduces her body to flesh, and thus reproduces blackness as nonhuman.

Spillers states that the ruling episteme that circulates the effects of naming and valuation continues to be conceptualized through the “originating metaphors of captivity and mutilation so that it is as if neither time nor history . . . shows movement, as the human subject is ‘murdered’ over and over again by the passions of a bloodless and anonymous archaism, showing itself in endless disguise.”²⁸ Time shows no movement within the symbolic order; both time and corporeality are literally de-generate. Within the symbolic order or what Spillers calls the American Grammar, signifiers are fixed for (trans) black women: A trans woman’s black body will always be marked by the history of genocide, slavery, and colonialism and the stereotypes constructed through the natural and social sciences as well as popular culture. Her trans body is marked by a history of pathologization and degeneration embedded in the medico-scientific discourses of scientific racism, sexology, and psychiatry.

The medical model of transsexuality depends on the distinctness of sex and gender. Significantly, these early sexologists sedimented gender as an inherent essence of the body. In other words, the idea that someone’s gender does not match her/his sex is medically constructed as ahistorical and apolitical—a notion that exists outside of time and space. Gender

²⁶ Hortense Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” *Diacritics* 17, no. 2 (1987): 67.

²⁷ Alexander Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 90.

²⁸ Spillers, 68.

was thus conceived as a distinct ontology that was immaterial and unchangeable, which must be realized to express one's "true" self. Mirroring Descartes, who argued that a nonmaterial mind (psyche/soul) expresses itself in a mechanistically controlled body, gender (mind) controls sex (body). Descartes's mind/body dualism has constituted much of contemporary western culture's inescapable sense of inwardness—the concern with one's inner self. Scripting the inner self as the Cartesian mind and the outer self as the Cartesian body, an individual's inner self holds the key to discovering her/his "true" self. Cartesian dualism was confirmed as *the* understanding of transsexuality within the medico-scientific realm, thereby sedimenting transsexuality as an identity disorder, i.e., a pathology anchored *in* the body, rather than an ideological construct with robust material consequences dependent on hegemonic structural forces.

By the middle of the 18th century, the Cartesian epistemology of certitude shaped scientific understanding of the human: scientists were positioned within the discourse of modern empirical science as uniquely objective observers while their objects of study—when it came to sexual science—embodied deviancy. In other words, scientists provided "objectively valid" claims while deviants were always already "merely subjective."²⁹ Susan Stryker writes, "In an epistemological regime structured by the subject-object split, the bodily situatedness of knowing becomes divorced from the status of formally legitimated objective knowledge; experiential knowledge of the material effects of one's own antinormative bodily difference on the production and reception of what one knows consequently becomes delegitimated as

²⁹ Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison discuss this distinction in Kant. For more information, see *Objectivity*. New York: Zone Books, 2010, especially pgs. 27-35.

merely subjective.”³⁰ Science was (and still is) conceptualized as a value-neutral realm—where observation leads to clear diagnostic and prescriptive solutions—i.e., the mind of the Cartesian split, of knowledge production untouched by cultural, economic, or political factors, thereby reducing the space for individuals (especially patients) to challenge the biological determinism increasingly embedded in scientific methodologies.

Within academia as well as the feminist and queer movements, scholars and activists have criticized transsexuals for reinforcing an essentialized understanding of sex and gender. In this case, trans is anachronistic because it claims essentialism—a throw-back to a time before the performative turn. Gayle Rubin famously defined the sex/gender system as “a set of arrangements by which a society transforms biological sexuality into products of human activity, and in which these transformed sexual needs are satisfied.”³¹ Rubin argues that biological differences are fixed but gender is socially constructed; and thus, sex/gender systems are not ahistorical but are a result of historical human interests. She famously utilizes the notion of the traffic in women, which Nell Irvin Painter states, “Although Rubin uses the concept of the traffic in women allegorically when she turns to American society, the notion of such a traffic is useful both literally and metaphorically with regard to American society during its nearly three centuries of slavery.”³² Painter indexes the influence slavery had on American family values as well as American culture as a whole.

Significantly, our contemporary Eurocentric hegemonic sex/gender system was

³⁰ Susan Stryker, “Transgender History, Homonormativity, and Disciplinarity,” *Radical History Review* 100 (2008): 154.

³¹ Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex,” in *The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory*, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1997): 28.

³²

manifested through the transatlantic slave trade. Black feminist theorists, such as Hortense Spillers and Saidiya Hartman, illuminate the relationship between our contemporary sex/gender system and the violence ontologized within the black body/flesh. For example, Saidiya Hartman writes, “The slave is the object or the ground that makes possible the existence of the bourgeois subject and, by negation or contradistinction, defines liberty, citizenship, and the enclosures of the social body.”³³ The enclosure of the trans body relies on the fundamental captivity of the black body. Put differently, although many queer bodies do not fit within the confines of hegemonic white masculinity and femininity, these hegemonic norms are constructed through anti-blackness. Our dominant sex/gender system depends on the black “object” to allow for this binary structure to emerge in the first place. The same is true for liberty and citizenship—the non-black subject gains liberty and citizenship through negating black subjectivity.

Black flesh is fundamental to scientific knowledge production because the black body is allegedly known. As Zakiyyah Jackson maintains, “Framed in essentialist terms, blackness marks a violation of gendered and sexual norms such that race—once ontologized—fixes blackness, regardless of ‘sex’, in the ‘feminine position’ as that passivity and stasis ascribed to objecthood and death, or objecthood as a form of living death.”³⁴ Black slaves (and thus black people) are constituted as “inherently” violent/ excessively violent. This was, indeed, reinforced through sexology and criminology—the “primitive savage” of Africa was always-already violent and in

³³ Saidiya Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997: 62.

³⁴ Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, “Sense of Things,” *Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience* 2, no. 2 (2016): 24.

“savage” societies, violence was the rule rather than the exception—violence done to the savage was not criminal because the savage body was the quintessential criminal body.³⁵ In sum, the pathologization of the transsexual is inscribed within the language of anti-blackness through the ways that sexologists and doctors naturalize violence as an inherent property of sexual deviance for the black subject. Sexologists observe black subject and naturalize the violence against these black subjects because they are inherently violent.

Contemporary feminist and queer theorists (myself included) often cite Judith Butler’s reconfiguration of the relationship between sex and gender as a way to disengage with a biological determinist understanding of sex.³⁶ In *Bodies that Matter*, Butler writes, “If gender is the social construction of sex, and if there is no access to this ‘sex’ except by means of its construction, then it appears not only that sex is absorbed by gender, but that ‘sex’ becomes something like a fiction, perhaps a fantasy, retroactively installed at a prelinguistic site to which there is no direct access.”³⁷ While sex may in fact be a fantasy for non-transsexuals, for a transsexual, the body is made exceptional through medical science’s insistence on the binary sex/gender system. In other words, sex cannot be absorbed by gender because there needs to be both to maintain the medical diagnosis of transsexuality. For example, playing off the wrong body narrative, Riki Anne Wilchins writes:

³⁵ David Horn, *The Criminal Body: Lombroso and the Anatomy of Deviance* (New York: Routledge, 2003). See Chapter 2 for more information.

³⁶ For more information, see the interview between Judith Butler and Gayle Rubin in *differences in feminism meets queer theory*, eds. Elizabeth Weed and Naomi Schor. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997, 68-108. In the interview, Rubin states, “In ‘Traffic,’ I simply absorbed the idioms and innocent universalism of the time. By the time I wrote ‘Thinking Sex,’ I wanted to make more modest claims. ... I had acquired some skepticism about the universality of those models” (95).

³⁷ Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’* (New York: Routledge, 1993): 5.

“How do you know you want rhinoplasty, a nose job?” he inquires, fixing me with a penetrating stare?

“Because,” I reply, suddenly unable to raise my eyes above his brown wing tips, “I’ve always felt like a small-nosed woman trapped in a large-nosed body.”

“And how long have you felt this way?” He leans forward, sounding as if he knows the answer and needs only to hear the words.

“Oh, since I was five or six, doctor, practically all my life.”

“Then you have rhino-identity disorder,” the shoetops state flatly. My body sags in relief. “But first,” he goes on, “we want you to get letters from two psychiatrists and live as a small-nosed woman for three years... just to be sure.”³⁸

Wilchins not only shows the ridiculousness of the surgical process (this antidote is quite dated but still holds some truth today) but also utilizes the language of being the wrong body (a small-nosed woman trapped in a large-nosed body). Wilchins takes a political stance here by illuminating how needing to live as the opposite sex for a certain amount of time and getting a note from a psychiatrist is ridiculous because both sex and gender are culturally constructed norms rather than inherent agential identities. Yet gender is constructed as the “prelinguistic site” within the medical model of transsexuality, not sex. Butler’s reconceptualization represents one main difference between the medical model of transsexuality and transgender theory. Transsexuality as a diagnosable category depends on earlier models like sexual inversion while transgender theory and studies works to dismantle this connection.

³⁸ Riki Anne Wilchins. *Read my Lips: Sexual Subversions and the End of Gender*. 63

Indeed, the medical model of sexual inversion haunts discourses of transsexuality today. In *Specters of Marx*, Jacques Derrida coins the term *hauntology*, a play on the word ontology that indexes the space between history and memory. Derrida writes, “To haunt does not mean to be present, and it is necessary to introduce haunting into the construction of a concept. Of every concept, beginning with the concept of being and time. That is what we would be calling here a hauntology. Ontology opposes it only in a movement of exorcism. Ontology is a conjuration.”³⁹ Transsexuality as an ontology hinges on the hauntology of medico-science and sexology. While there has also been a spectral turn within the humanities,⁴⁰ hauntology is significant for my argument because I believe ontology is only a conjuration of previous formations within the symbolic order. Put differently, sexology and medico-scientific constructions of sex, gender, and the body conjure the ontologies created through slavery and colonialism as a means to pathologize non-normative bodies.

Following Derrida, I maintain that the haunting of previous medico-sexological works on sexual deviancy, such as sexual inversion, transvestism, and intersexuality, construct not only the historical texts on transsexuality but also the contemporary texts that ostensibly work at disavowing this entanglement as well. The spectral legacies of sexological and medico-scientific discourse of transsexuality are embodied through the transsexual. This legacy is too extensive to discuss here in detail, but the consequences are felt through the psychic and epistemological violence that continues to structure the doctor and psychiatrist as “objectively valid” and the

³⁹ Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International* (New York: Routledge, 1994): 202.

⁴⁰ Discuss this

transsexual as “merely subjective.” When an individual enters the psychiatric or medical clinic, s/he is (unwittingly) reproducing the dominant narrative of the sex/gender system. I acknowledge and know first-hand that we—queers and trans folks—often play along with the medical script to receive hormones and/or surgical procedures. My point is not that trans people have no autonomy but that we must continue to play into dominant notions of sex and gender to receive the care we need rather than dismantle the very system, which is quite impossible. The first step in moving beyond our dominant sex/gender system is to begin thinking of gender outside of an ontological framework, as *angender* rather than non-binary or mutable.

Trans folks, including transsexuals, expose the fundamental myth of an originary sex/gender structure that has been inherent within our culture from a certain point of time. Nchamah Miller states, “Hauntologically, texts circumscribe ‘historical’ embodiments which are forever haunted by those spectres that informed the thinking of the writer, the spirit of the text which touches the embodied ghosts of its readers, and the legacy it creates.”⁴¹ As the next section discusses, early sexologists and other writers were indeed haunted by the political, cultural, and economic environment of their time.

The Wrong Body

⁴¹ Nchamah Miller, “Hauntology and History in Jacques Derrida’s *Spectres of Marx*” no publisher, no date, 11.

One critical originary moment for the wrong body narrative/trajectory, or feeling “trapped in the wrong body” was in 1864 when Karl Ulrichs (German lawyer and self-proclaimed Urning) constructed a scientific theory of same-sex desire by positing a male invert (*Urning*) as a male-bodied individual with a female soul. Significantly, this was around the same time as the “abolition” of the trans-Atlantic slave trade in the Americas (1850s-1890s), the publication of Darwin’s *The Origin of Species* (1859), and the European “scramble for Africa” (beginning in the late 1870s). I posit that these landmarks are not coincidental; the notion of being trapped in the “wrong body” became legible through the violence of racial slavery and scientific racism enacted on black bodies/flesh. Ulrichs’ notion of the third sex—the Urning—was constructed during heightened debates on slavery and abolition and what happens to black slaves once they are “free.”

Although Germany did not have slavery, slavery still shaped German thought. The ideologies around blackness effected the political, cultural, and economic climate of Germany. In Sander Gilman’s important work *On Blackness Without Blacks*, he claims that the museum and the colonial novel furnished a fixed stereotype of blackness but there was a “basic alteration” to this image because by the end of the 1880s Germany became a colonial power in Africa. He writes, “Dominating the German attitude was a neo-Hegelian concept of the Black, as primitive able only to be civilized through the application of brute force.”⁴² While I cannot “prove” Ulrichs was effected by the abolition of slavery and the discourses surrounding the impending colonization of Africa, the absence of any discussion is striking. Somerville writes,

⁴² Sander Gilman, *On Blackness Without Blacks: Essays on the Image of the Black in Germany* (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1982), 113.

“Yet the lack of explicit attention to race in these texts does not mean that it was irrelevant to sexologists' endeavors. Given the upheavals surrounding racial definition during this period, it is reasonable to imagine that these texts were as embedded within contemporary racial ideologies as they were within ideologies of gender.”¹² No doubt, sexologists did not interrogate race because they believed they were constructing a theory outside of the political and social sphere. But as Somerville states, this does not mean that race did not shape their theories. For example, Ulrichs writes, “My fight is a fight for freedom. The Roman slave bore a longing to be touched with the staff of freedom, with the vindicta.... We too long for this staff of freedom.”⁴³ Throughout Ulrichs work, he references Greek and Roman culture but neglects connecting the notion of slavery to the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, which was occurring at the same time as his theories of sexuality were being written. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

Because Ulrichs did not travel to the United States, the connection between his work and abolition can only be assumed on an unconscious level. Unlike Magnus Hirschfeld, who attended the 1893 Chicago World’s fair and said nothing on the race relations represented there. Heike Bauer states:

Given the popularity of the abolitionist movement in the United States, Hirschfeld’s silence on the debates about the Chicago World’s Fair is all the more noticeable. It indicates both his own detachment from the abolitionist and antiracism struggle and the more insidious privilege of whiteness, which normalized and made invisible to him the racism of the Chicago World’s Fair and American society more widely.⁴⁴

⁴³ Quoted in Hubert Kennedy, *Karl Heinrich Ulrichs: Pioneer of the Modern Gay Movement* (San Francisco: Peremptory Publications, 2002), 82.

⁴⁴ Heike Bauer, *The Hirschfeld Archives: Violence, Death, and Modern Queer Culture* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2017), 20.

As a eugenicist, Hirschfeld failed to address issues of racism. He did write a book titled *Racism*, which was published posthumously in 1938, but this text centers on anti-Semitism.

Ulrichs' theories were used to construct the medico-scientific classification of sexual inversion from sexologists, such as Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Magnus Hirschfeld and Havelock Ellis, and psychogenists such as Sigmund Freud. Many sexologists referenced the leading racial scientists of their time, such as Lamarck, Blumenbach, Broca, and Topinard. For example, Bauer writes, "Explaining that he was taught in school that humanity is divided according to Friedrich Blumenbach's color-coded taxonomy into five distinct "races"—black, white, yellow, red, and brown—Hirschfeld suggests that the teaching of this classification is partly how scientific speculation is vernacularized as a universal truth."⁴⁵ Significantly, Hirschfeld indexes the role of racial science in the reification of scientific speculation. With that said, Ernst Haeckel's recapitulation theory appears to be the most influential. Both Freud and Hirschfeld based their theories of inversion on Ernst Haeckel's recapitulation theory and his notion of Monism, which was based off of Darwinism.⁴⁶ Haeckel argued that ontogeny recapitulated phylogeny, which means that the origin and development of a species replicates the evolutionary history of a species. Stephen Jay Gould writes, "His evolutionary racism;... his belief that harsh, inexorable laws of evolution ruled human civilization and nature alike, conferring upon favored races the

⁴⁵ Ibid, 15.

⁴⁶ For more information on Magnus Hirschfeld's relationship to recapitulation theory, see Kevin Amidon, "Sex on the brain: The rise and fall of German sexual science," *Endeavour* 32, no. 2 (2008): 64-69 and Vern Bullough, "Magnus Hirschfeld, an often overlooked pioneer," *Sexuality and Culture* 7, no. 1 (2003): 62-72. For more information on Sigmund Freud's relationship to recapitulation theory, see Stephen Jay Gould, *Ontogeny and Phylogeny* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977), 155-166 and Lucille Ritvo, *Darwin's Influence on Freud: A Tale of Two Sciences* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 74-98.

right to dominate others;... contributed to the rise of Nazism.”⁴⁷ Haeckel supported his racist claims by consistently referring back to his recapitulation theory. Freud and Hirschfeld used Haeckel’s theory to argue for a biogenetic basis of sexual inversion and other perversions. They allegedly created “universal” notions of perversion based solely on the biological. In other words, they completely disavow the role of the political, cultural, and economic in the formation of sexual “perversions.” The medical model of sexual inversion and transsexuality are ontogenically possible through the biocentrism of the overrepresentation of Man2 (discussed in Chapter 2) and this narrative becomes a way to reinforce biology through notions of heredity and instinct, as discussed below.

The medical model ontologizes transsexuality as anachronistic,⁴⁸ thereby affirming its place as pathology. Ernesto Laclau writes, “Time being ‘out of joint,’ dislocation corrupting the identity with itself of any present, we have a constitutive anachronism at the root of any identity.”⁴⁹ To identify as a transsexual within the medical realm, one must feel that her/his gender is out of joint with her/his sex—one feels trapped in the wrong body. In other words, the sex/gender dualism is indeed a “constitutive anachronism” at the foundation of the medical model of transsexuality. The medicalized sex/gender system depends on the black body to legible as a mental disorder rather than a social issue. Trans is out of joint because anachronism is inherent to the very structure of the medical model of transsexuality. The mind (gender)

⁴⁷ Gould, 77-78.

⁴⁸ Anachronism comes from the Greek word *anakhronismos*—*ana* means backwards and *khronos* means time. According to the *OED*, anachronism is a “thing belonging or appropriate to a period other than that in which it exists, especially a thing that is conspicuously old-fashioned.”

<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/anachronism>

⁴⁹ Ernesto Laclau, “Time is Out of Joint,” *Diacritics* 25, no. 2 (1995): 88.

cannot chronologically align with the body (sex) because the mind exists outside of time, disconnected from any present; the mind is dis-jointed from the body. Put differently, one's body matures from childhood through puberty to adulthood while one's mind remains childish and primitive, which creates a violation of chronology, i.e., arrested development.

Sexologists and psychiatrists utilized the notion of degeneration to explain the sexual invert and later the transsexual's anachronistic heredity. The theory of degeneration was introduced by the French physician Bénédict Augustin Morel in 1857 and spread rapidly across Europe and the United States. For example, Richard von Krafft-Ebing began employing the term in the first edition of his *Psychopathia Sexualis*, first published in German in 1886, followed by seventeen revised editions between 1886 and 1924.⁵⁰ And as Peter Boag writes, "...Krafft-Ebing had a singular influence on his American counterparts; they had already begun citing Krafft-Ebing as early as 1881 and within a couple of years had generally emerged in American medical literature as the most important authority on the subject of sexual perversions."⁵¹ Until the last edition, Krafft-Ebing believed sexual inversion and other forms of sexual perversion were signs of degeneration that manifested as a neuropathic and psychopathic state that developed without external causes. The idea of degeneration as a form of devolution results in the gradual weakening of certain groups of individuals, such as "negroes," prostitutes, alcoholics, and criminals through heredity from generation to generation. Degeneracy indexed an anachronistic paradigm of identity that buttressed an atavistic model of biological inferiority

⁵⁰ Harry Oosterhuis, "Richard von Krafft-Ebing's 'Step-Children of Nature: Psychiatry and the Making of Homosexual Identity,'" In V. Rosario (Ed.), *Science and Homosexualities* (New York: Routledge, 1997): 67-88.

⁵¹ Peter Boag, *Re-Dressing America's Frontier Past* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 169.

through a lack of civilization, i.e., the “primitive savage” or the African. The black body/flesh was therefore not analogous but foundational to all other classifications of degeneracy and deviance.

Degeneration connects directly to the trans-Atlantic Middle Passage of African slavery and its concomitant grammar of black flesh. Matt Richardson states, “Slavery positioned people of African heritage as quasihuman in the great chain of being. There were many attempts to prove racial hierarchy through systematic investigation, many arguments resting on observations of the physical difference in biological sex that could then be used to explain imagined abnormal sexual degenerate behavior—all of which, of course, was fodder for anti-Black violence.”⁵² In sum, blackness is not only variant, but also “de-generate” and found its materiality within the mass biopolitical workings of the state. Our dominant sex/gender system depends on the black “object” to allow for this binary structure to emerge in the first place. The fundamental sex/gender system continues to define trans identity within popular culture as the transnormative subject, i.e., passing, white and heterosexual. The enclosure of the white trans body relies on the fundamental captivity of the black body. In fact, the notion of degeneracy⁵³

⁵² Paisley Currah, “Stepping Back, Looking Outward: Situating Transgender Activism and Transgender Studies—Kris Hayashi, Matt Richardson, and Susan Stryker Frame the Movement” *Sexuality Research and Social Policy* 5(1), 2008: 98.

⁵³ In *The History of Sexuality*, Michel Foucault writes, “The series composed of perversion-heredity-degenerescence formed the solid nucleus of the new technologies of sex. And let it not be imagined that this was nothing more than a medical theory which was scientifically lacking and improperly moralistic. Its application was widespread and its implication went deep. Psychiatry, to be sure, but also jurisprudence, legal medicine, agencies of social control, the surveillance of dangerous or endangered children, all functioned for a long time on the basis of ‘degenerescence’ and the heredity-perversion system. An entire social practice, which took the exasperated but coherent form of a state-directed racism, furnished this technology of sex with a formidable power and far-reaching consequences” (118-119). For more information on the theory of degeneracy in relation to scientific racism, see Stephen Jay Gould. *The Mismeasure of Man*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1981.

became *the* metaphor for constructing analogous classifications across deviant subjectivities. Analogies constituted the relations between the essential parts of a single abnormal classification as well as between a classified abnormality and an abnormality in need of classification.⁵⁴

Sexologists and psychiatrists utilized the “scientific” methods of comparative anatomy and heredity to define the normal and abnormal body. The ideologies embedded within the normal and the abnormal were created through the political and cultural climate, i.e., the institutions of slavery and colonialism.⁵⁵ As Seymour Drescher writes, “The rise of scientific racism induced not a radical shift in the characteristics ascribed to Africans or to blacks in general but a reworking of those characteristics in different frames of reference.”⁵⁶ Before the “abolition” of slavery, the dominant racial ideology was centered in religion—that God ordained inequality. During “abolition,” the dominant ideology shifted into the scientific realm, where scientists and doctors worked to “prove” the inferiority of abnormal individuals. In sum, the “religio-secular-race-making” discourse⁵⁷ shifted into the scientific realm where abnormality could be measured through comparative anatomy and other racialized methods of observation.

⁵⁴ Nancy Leys Stepan states, “[B]ecause a metaphor or analogy does not directly present a preexisting nature but instead helps ‘construct’ that nature, the metaphor generates data that conforms to it, and accommodates data that are in apparent contradiction to it, so that nature is seen via the metaphor and the metaphor becomes part of the logic of science itself.” Nancy Leys Stepan, “Race and Gender: The Role of Analogy in Science,” in *The “Racial” Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future*, ed. Sandra Harding (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993): 371.

⁵⁵ The histories of slavery and colonialism are discussed in detail in Chapter One.

⁵⁶ Seymour Drescher, “The Ending of the Slave Trade and the Evolution of European Scientific Racism,” *Social Science History* 14, no. 3 (1990): 419-420.

⁵⁷ See Chapter 2 for a discussion of this term.

Sexologists' use of comparative anatomy has been the focus of many studies⁵⁸, but not as much attention has been given to the theory of heredity. Through the lens of heredity, sexologists employed the notions of atavism and primitivism to show how inverts and other perverts are always-already trapped in the past—inverts degenerated to the level of the primitive. In *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, Freud argues that sexual inversion maintains “a predominance of archaic constitutions and primitive psychological mechanisms.”⁵⁹ Sexual inverts have supposed atavistic (anachronistic) instincts that are inborn, thus their impulses continue to trouble the present. Therefore, the invert's instincts are supposedly analogous to the “primitive” in medico-science. Magnus Hirschfeld believed that inversion was a “congenital impediment of evolution.”⁶⁰ Through the theorization of sexual inversion as an atavistic psychological disease, the notion of anachronism became internalized as one of the primary narratives for the diagnosis of inversion. Once again, time is out of joint; time is degenerate. Cartesian dualism is conjured through treating transsexuality as a medical disorder and consistently rewriting the diagnostic criteria within the medical model.

Although this “constitutive anachronism” ostensibly originated with the sexological classification of sexual inversion, the *DSM-III* solidified this anachronism through the nosology of transsexuality. Interestingly, in the *DSM-IV* (1994), the editors wrote the following: “The term *mental disorder* unfortunately implies a distinction between ‘mental’ disorders and ‘physical’

⁵⁸ Somerville, Snorton

⁵⁹ Sigmund Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, (SE 7, 1905), 146.

⁶⁰ Valerie Rohy, *Anachronism and Its Others: Sexuality, Race, Temporality* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2009), 6.

disorders that is a reductionistic anachronism of mind/body dualism.”⁶¹ To state that this dualism is anachronistic infers that the *DSM* disavows the history of psychiatry as well as the last three editions of the manual itself. In fact, the *DSM*’s classification of transsexuality (even *Gender Dysphoria*) naturalizes trans individuals’ relationship to Cartesian dualism (gender as anachronistic) rather than transcends it. Yet without this reductionistic anachronism, transsexuality would not be recognized as a *legitimate* disorder within medico-science. Put differently, if the medical diagnosis of transsexuality transcends the mind/body dualism, transsexuality will no longer be a medical or even political category because gender will no longer be out of joint with sex. Laclau writes:

If the specter inhabits the root of the social link in bourgeois society, the transcendence of the latter, the arrival at a time that is no longer ‘out of joint,’ the realization of a society fully reconciled with itself will open the way to the ‘end of ideology’—that is, to a purely ‘ontological’ society which, after the consummation of the proletarian millennium, will look to hauntology as its past. And since hauntology is inherent to politics, the transcendence of the split between being and appearance will mean the end of politics.⁶²

The transcendence of the split between the being and the appearance of race “eliminated” the political realm of race within medico-science. In other words, scientific methods disavowed the relationship of race to culture and politics and thus overlooked the history of slavery, genocide, and colonialism. This move also conflated time and space—sedimenting Africa as *the* place of primitivism and degeneration.

Additionally, transsexuality is not only haunted by the specters of Ellis, Krafft-Ebing, Freud, and Benjamin, but also by the “scientific” methods employed to collect data as a means

⁶¹ *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition*, Washington D.C.: The American Psychiatric Association, 1994: xxi.

⁶² Ernesto Laclau, “Time is Out of Joint,” *Diacritics* 25, no. 2 (1995): 88.

to discover the “truth” about transsexuality. The metaphor of degeneracy employed to construct analogous scientific taxonomies (re)iterates an anachronistic understanding of transsexuality, sexual inversion, criminality, et cetera, that buttresses an atavistic model of biological and physiological inferiority. Indeed, the medical model of transsexuality is constructed through a series of hauntings that will not disappear through resignifying or reclaiming transsexuality.

The Archival Specter

As discussed in the Introduction, the disconnect between history and memory is what haunts the transsexual archive because this disconnect constitutes the inherent anachronism inscribed in the medical model of transsexuality. I believe that the greatest disconnection between history and memory within the transsexual archive is the role (anti)blackness played in constructing the trans body in the first place. C. Riley Snorton argues that “captive flesh figures a critical genealogy for modern transness, as chattel persons gave rise to an understanding of gender as mutable and as an amendable form of being.”⁶³ The captive flesh became gender mutable by force and punishment and random gratuitous violence. What I want to focus on is how structures of power created and continue to create the notion of the wrong body that grounds our current understanding of transsexuality and even transgender politics. Put differently, Lindon Barrett states, “Racial blackness, the primary enabling point of exclusion for

⁶³ C. Riley Snorton

the development of Western modernity, complicates the legibility of modern subjectivity.”⁶⁴

Racial blackness complicates the legibility of trans subjectivity.

The ideologies inscribed within the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, abolition, and the colonization of Africa continue to shape all forms of subjectivity today. Saidiya Hartman famously states:

Slavery had established a measure of man and a ranking of life and worth that has yet to be undone. If slavery persists as an issue in the political life of black America, it is not because of an antiquarian obsession with bygone days or the burden of a too-long memory, but because black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago. This is the afterlife of slavery— skewed life chances, limited access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and impoverishment.⁶⁵

This seminal passage illuminates the effects of slavery today, or what Hartman terms as the afterlife of slavery. This afterlife also shapes current trans politics and culture because the violence against trans men and women is primarily targeted at trans women of color, specifically black trans women. And thus a genealogy of the wrong body narrative cannot be complete without discussing the role (anti)blackness plays in the formation of the wrong body.

Jennifer Morgan states:

The process by which ‘Africans’ became ‘blacks’ who became ‘slaves’ was initiated— on the European side at least—through a series of encounters made manifest in literary descriptions and only later expanded by the quotidian dimensions of slave ownership and settlement. The publication of images fueled the imaginations of settlers and would-be colonists alike and constituted an essential component of the ideological arsenal that European settlers brought to bear against African laborers.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Lindon Barrett

⁶⁵ Saidiya Hartman, *Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008: 6.

⁶⁶ Jennifer Morgan, *Laboring Women: Reproduction and Gender in New World Slavery*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004: 12-13.

These literary descriptions supplied the foundation for racist ideologies in support of slavery. For example, Morgan discusses Englishman Richard Ligon, who left London in 1647 to become a planter in the newly settled colony of Barbados. Over the course of his journey, he encountered black women for the first time. Ligon “wrote that their breasts ‘hang down below their Navels, so that when they stoop at their common work of weeding, they hang almost to the ground, that at a distance you would think they have six legs’.”⁶⁷ Morgan indexes the significance of black women’s utility as both producers and reproducers, which would come to define women’s experience of enslavement. In other words, black female slaves worth was primarily bound in their reproductive ability. The gratuitous violence against black women and men during slavery and its afterlife not only ontologized violence as inherent to blackness but also made violence necessary for regulating and controlling blackness.

In “No-Bodies: Law, Raciality, and Violence” Denise Ferreira da Silva examines social contract theory in relation to the state and law through interrogating key ideas in Locke, Hegel and Hobbe’s thinking on the state of nature and rationality in order to illuminate the analytics of raciality at the core of social contract theory. According to Locke, the neutral individual has property in his body, which can be utilized through labor to secure property outside the body. An individual leaves the state of nature to secure rights of ownership to said property, yet man can only leave “the state of nature” if he possesses reason. da Silva skillfully illuminates how not *every* body can disavow their body to gain enlightened reason; or as da Silva writes, “the displacement of exteriority,”⁶⁸ which is connected to self-determination—and therefore the

⁶⁷ Ibid, 14.

⁶⁸ Denise Ferreira da Silva, “No-Bodies: Law, Raciality and Violence,” *Griffith Law Review* 18, no. 2 (2009): 214.

property belonging to white, middle-to upper-classed, heteronormative men. In other words, hegemonic white masculinity (i.e., reason) becomes the sign and everyone else signifies difference from this symbolic hegemony.

Da Silva says, “Early and later writings of determination, of necessity as a signifier of power, assert the mind’s privilege of self-determination. Everywhere else in the stage of exteriority, the one occupied by the body and other external things, universal reason governs as *necessitas*; in the shapes of force and order, it constrains, regulates or limits.”⁶⁹ Both the law and state are situated within *necessitas*, thereby constituting the very nature of the law and the state as violent and regulatory. Yet both systems work to contain the founding original violence in “the state of nature,” the violence that social contract theorists like Locke and Rousseau signify through the figure of the savage. This figure will transfer into the medical/psychiatric realm through the evolution of scientific racism through the conceptualization of degeneration. This supposed savage cannot disavow the state of nature because s/he cannot possess reason, thereby never leaving the state of nature, which marks the supposed savage as always already violent.

I believe that the medico-scientific realm and its construction of degeneracy is situated as *necessitas* for trans women of color today. The disavowal of the violence enacted on black trans women and trans women of color is normalized through the transphobia and racism inscribed in the institutions and techniques of biopolitics (or necropolitics). These techniques and institutions serve as elements of segregation and social hierarchization thereby securing

⁶⁹ Ibid.

associations within domination and social control while simultaneously valorizing the body as the site of management and disciplinary normalization, all within the bounds of *necessitas*.

Chapter Two

Into the Flesh: The Making of the Wrong Body

We are bound to protect the helpless members of society against the invert. If we go farther, and seek to destroy the invert himself before he has sinned against society, we exceed the warrant of reason, and in so doing we may perhaps destroy also those children of the spirit which possess a greater worth than the children of the flesh.

—Havelock Ellis, *Sexual Inversion*

Therefore, brethren, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh. For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die: but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.

—Romans 8:12-14

This chapter centers on the historical effects of the spirit/flesh duality on the construction of the wrong body narrative in sexological discourse. I assert that the spirit/flesh duality within theology and scientific discourse provides a crucial method to transcode⁷⁰ both the overlay and the distinctness of race, specifically blackness, and sex within medico-science and sexology. The interconnected discourses on race and sex are exemplified through the anti-black language within early scientific theorizing, from evolutionary theory to psychiatric taxonomies. As such, this anti-black language shaped how sexologists from the turn of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries formulated taxonomies for sexual inversion and other perversions. According to Siobhan Somerville “the concurrent bifurcations of categories of race and sexuality were not only historically coincident but in fact structurally

⁷⁰ In *The Political Unconscious*, Fredric Jameson states that the process of transcoding is “the invention of a set of terms, the strategic choice of a particular code or language, such that the same terminology can be used to analyze and articulate two quite distinct types of objects or “texts,” or two very different structural levels of reality” (40).

interdependent and perhaps mutually productive.”⁷¹ In short, Somerville focuses on how racial ideologies connect the medico-scientific discourses on sexuality and race, and are thus “mutually productive.” Developing from Somerville’s claim, I argue that anti-black racism, both explicitly and implicitly, molded the medico-scientific language around what constitutes a “wrong body.” In doing so, the concept of blackness produced, and continues to produce, our contemporary understanding of the sex/gender binary. Operating from Sylvia Wynter’s analysis of the two master codes, I examine the “wrong body” narrative embedded in the medico-scientific classification of sexual inversion that laid the foundation for our current understanding of transsexuality within medico-science. To clarify, I am not claiming that sexual inverts were in fact transsexuals, but I do believe that the scientific methods employed to produce knowledge on the sexual invert are analogous to those of the transsexual.

The spirit/flesh duality was primarily constructed in the New Testament of the Bible. Throughout his letters in the New Testament, St. Paul draws antithetic parallels between a variety of concepts, but he discusses none as frequently as spirit and flesh.³ In the epigraph above, St. Paul indexes that the flesh is inherently weak because it renders humans mortal; if an individual rejects God, s/he lives an external life, one of the flesh, i.e., death (“For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die”). If s/he lives through the Spirit, s/he will be redeemed of sin and walk with God as a transcendent being: “For he that soweth to his flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the Spirit shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting.”⁷² St.

⁷¹ Siobhan Somerville, “Scientific Racism and the Invention of the Homosexual Body,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality*, 5, no. 2 (1994): 246.

⁷² William Dickson, *St. Paul’s use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit: The Baird Lecture for 1883* (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1883), 1. In *Flesh and Spirit*, William Barton states, “In the Bible the word flesh has its ordinary sense (Job x. 4), and also denotes mankind as a race (Gen. vi. 12);

Paul's notion of the spirit/flesh duality is reified in early scientific theorizing, especially within the work of Descartes. For example, Descartes famously tries to prove the existence of God, stating, "But if the mere fact that I can produce from my thought the idea of something entails that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really does belong to it, is not this a possible basis for another argument to prove the existence of God? Certainly, the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number."⁷³ Descartes employs innate knowledge as a means to prove the existence of a "supremely perfect being." Yet, this proof does not mirror a mathematical proof, but the mind of his Cartesian dualism; Descartes discovers this supreme being *within* himself. His formulation of the *cogito* reflects and reinforces the spirit/flesh duality of theology that began with the apostle Paul and was expanded significantly by Saint Augustine.

The language of the spirit/flesh duality from the bible and its material effects within the symbolic order⁷⁴ was conjured and sustained in the work of sexologists and

everything living (Gen. vi. 17); the body apart from the soul (Job. xiv. 22, Col. ii. 5); and human nature (John I. 14). In the New Testament it is used in an ethical sense, not merely in reference to the bodily appetites and passions, but the whole nature as alienated from God (John iii. 6), and its exact opposite, then, is spirit; i.e., either the Holy Ghost or the human soul as influenced by him" (4).

⁷³ John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and (for vol. 3) Anthony Kenny, eds. and trans., *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vols. 1–3, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 2:45.

⁷⁴ According to Lacan, the psyche can be divided into three orders: the Real, the Imaginary Order, and the Symbolic Order. The symbolic order is made possible through the acceptance of the "Name-of-the-Father," which are the laws and restrictions that control both desire and communication. Dino Felluga, "Modules on Lacan: On the Structure of the Psyche," *Introductory Guide to Critical Theory*. Purdue University, January 31st, 2011, <http://www.purdue.edu/guidetotheory/psychoanalysis/lacanstructure.html> (accessed August 20th, 2017).

psychiatrists, beginning in the late 1860s. Sylvia Wynter conceptualizes this move from religion to science a “the epochal degodding” of the master code.⁷⁵ Through the secularization of the human, the Redeemed Spirit/Fallen Flesh master code becomes secondary to the new rational/irrational master code, which she calls “hybridly religio-secular” because God continues to be avowed within science. Therefore, an individual is no longer redeemed through God, which Wynter calls Man1, but through possessing reason, which she calls Man2.

The employment of religio-secular discourse in Ellis’s quote above reifies the shift from the Spirit/Flesh master code to the rational/irrational master code. As he writes, if we “seek to destroy the invert himself before he has sinned against society, we exceed the warrant of reason.”⁷⁶ Put differently, those who follow the path of the Spirit are redeemed while those who give into the sins of the flesh are pathological. But within the rational/irrational master code, an individual does not repress her/his spirit for redemption from the church but for the common good of society. Yet s/he no longer repents but modifies her/his behavior in order to fit within the biopolitical apparatuses of civil society. Wynter explains that the “civic-humanist reformulation” of Man2 was “invented in its first form as the rational political subject of the state, as one who displayed his reason by primarily adhering to the laws of the state—rather than, as before, in seeking to redeem himself from enslavement to Original Sin by primarily adhering to the prohibitions of the Church.”⁷⁷ In the

⁷⁵ Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument,” *CR: The New Centennial Review*, 3, no. 3 (2003): 277.

⁷⁶ Havelock Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex Volume II: Sexual Inversion* (Philadelphia: F.A. Davis Company, 1901), 216.

⁷⁷ Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being,” 277.

terms of Ellis's "hybridly religio-secular" language, to destroy the invert before he sins exceeds the demands of reason because children of the spirit, i.e., those who transcend the flesh, can repress deviant behavior for the greater good. The "hybridly religio-secular" discourse in the work of sexology at the turn of the 20th Century is indeed a religio-secular-race-making discourse.⁷⁸

This religio-secular-race-making discourse shaped anti-abolitionists arguments in favor of maintaining racial slavery. For example, in *The Negro a Beast: Or in the Image of God; The Reasoner of the Age, the Revelator of the Century! The Bible as It Is! The Negro and His Relation to ... Negro Not the Son of Ham* (1900) Charles Carroll quotes St. Paul from 1st Corinthians 15 verse 39, who says: "All flesh is not the same flesh; but there is one kind of flesh of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, and another of birds."⁷⁹ Carroll employs this quote to "prove" that the "negro" is indeed the highest form of ape, and thereby demarcates the black body from the human. Although Carroll does not consider the sexual invert, his discussion of the "negro" provides one example of how the anti-blackness of 19th century scientific and religious scholarship became the foundation for the "wrong body" narrative of sexual inversion and later transsexuality. More examples will be discussed below. Throughout this chapter, I transcode the language used to describe blackness within anti-abolition and scientific racist literature into the language utilized by sexologists to discuss sexual inversion and other perversions to index how the political and cultural

⁷⁸ Thank you Tiffany Willoughby-Herard for illuminating this point.

⁷⁹ Charles Carroll, *The Negro a Beast: Or in the Image of God; The Reasoner of the Age, the Revelator of the Century! The Bible as It Is! The Negro and His Relation to ... Negro Not the Son of Ham* (St. Louis: American Book and Bible House, 1900), 27

unconscious at the end of the 19th century directly influenced our current understanding of transsexuality. I focus on the construction of the wrong body through the flesh and provide concrete examples within *The Tempest*, the Garden of Eden, and the anthropological turn in sexology.

The Work of the Flesh in *The Tempest* and the Garden

The religio-secular-race-making discourse of the master codes was often utilized in cultural production, specifically in theater and literature. In fact, much of the scientific and sexological texts being produced at the end of the 19th century employed literature as evidence for scientific theories of degeneration and perversion. Perhaps the most famous example is Richard von Krafft-Ebing's coining of the terms *sadism* and *masochism*, which he derived from the Marquis de Sade (1740-1814) and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch (1836-1895). Significantly, both authors' writings were influenced by racial slavery and their works often included black slaves as the submissive "partner." Sexological taxonomies were clearly affected by the entangled histories of slavery and flogging.

The Tempest (written somewhere between 1603-1613) by William Shakespeare was often utilized within sexological literature to analyze and describe taxonomies. For example, Wynter discusses the shift from Man1 to Man2 in connection to *The Tempest*. In "Beyond Miranda's Meanings," Wynter maintains that the shift from religion to science (Man1 to Man2) also redefined the central focus on the male/female gender division to the "cultural-physiognomic" variations between European and Non-European peoples. In other words, the primary code for Man1 was a model of *anatomical difference* while the primary code for

Man2 is the *physiognomic* model of race. According to Leila Lomax, “Physiognomy enables us to read the mind, character and temperament from the form of a man’s features, the expression of his face, and the form, attitudes and movements of his body.”⁸⁰ This shift from *anatomical* difference to a *physiognomic* model of race constructed one’s inner quality as revealed outwardly. Wynter writes:

Nowhere in this mutational shift from the primacy of the *anatomical* model of sexual difference as the referential model of *mimetic* ordering, to that of the *physiognomic* model of racial/cultural difference, more powerfully enacted than in Shakespeare’s play *The Tempest*, one of the foundational endowing texts both of Western Europe’s dazzling rise to global hegemony, and at the level of human “life”, in general, of the mutation from primarily religiously defined modes of human being to the first, partly secularizing ones.⁸¹

Caliban and Miranda represent this shift because within the play, Miranda, as a white woman, is capable of possessing rationality while Caliban, classified as nonhuman, can never be anything but irrational and savage. In summary, *The Tempest* follows Prospero, Duke of Milan, who is devoted to his intellectual pursuits, and thus turns the management of his state to his brother, Antonio. With the support of the King of Naples, he sends Prospero and his infant daughter, Miranda off on a leaky, unrigged boat, where they are then left to the mercy of the winds and waves. “The boat is borne to an island whose sole tenants are a creature named Caliban, half man, half monster, and a spirit named Ariel, who by Caliban's dead mother, Sycorax, has been pent up in a tree, from which Prospero liberates him.”⁸²

⁸⁰ Leila Lomax, *Physiognomy* (Philadelphia: The Penn Publishing Company, 1905), 4.

⁸¹ Sylvia Wynter, “Beyond Miranda’s Meaning: Un/silencing the ‘Demonic Ground’ of Caliban’s ‘Woman,’” in *Out of the Kumbia: Caribbean Women and Literature*, eds. Carole Boyce Davies and Elaine Savory Fido (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1990), 358.

⁸² K. Deighton, *The Tempest* (London: Macmillan and Co, 1889), ix-xi. This summary of *The Tempest* is paraphrased from Deighton.

Here Prospero and Miranda pass the years until the King of Naples, with his brother Sebastian, his son Ferdinand, Antonio, Prospero's brother, and others are returning from Tunis, when Prospero uses his magic to cause their ship to wreck on his island. By the end of the play, Prospero directs the King, his son, and the nobles to his cell, and prepares to sail to Naples to celebrate the marriage between Miranda and Ferdinand. Ariel is set free to wander at will in the free air when his task is done.

Significantly, near the end of the play, Caliban convinces Stephano, the drunken butler, that Prospero stole the island from him and proposes that they should murder him in his sleep. This does not happen and Prospero forgives Caliban for plotting against him. But Shakespeare left Caliban's fate ambiguous and it is not clear what will happen to Caliban at the end of the play. Within the schema of Man2, Caliban is represented as a monster, whose mother was an African witch who used black magic, while Prospero is the enlightened subject who uses white magic from scholarly books and knowledge for the advancement of Western society. Caliban's black flesh becomes *the* code of difference within *The Tempest*: *physiognomic* difference represents the coding role within the symbolic order such that *anatomical* difference creates a "mimetic parallel effect."⁸³ Put differently, sex and gender become legible through *physiognomic* difference because difference is conceptualized through the racialized body. Blackness is ungendered within the symbolic order, which in turn constructs normative gender identity for whiteness.⁸⁴

As for what Wynter deems "Western Europe's rise to global hegemony,"

⁸³ Wynter, "Beyond Miranda's Meanings," 358.

⁸⁴ The notion of ungendering within the symbolic order is discussed in detail in Chapter Four through Hortense Spiller's notion of an American Grammar.

Shakespearean scholars Alexander Chalmers (1759-1834) and Edmond Malone (1741-1812) believed that *The Tempest* was in fact inspired by Sir George Somers' voyage to the colony of Virginia in July of 1609.⁸⁵ Somers' ship, filled with colonists and supplies, was caught in a terrible storm and landed on the island of Bermuda. Rather than further contributing to the population of Virginia, Somers and his shipmates colonized Bermuda. An account of this event was published by one of its survivors, Silvester Jourdain, titled "A Discovery of the Bermudas, otherwise called the Isle of Devils."⁸⁶ As the title implies, natives of Bermuda were classified as "devils" by Western colonists, which reinforced the relationship between blackness and fallen flesh. In fact, throughout the literature on *The Tempest*, Caliban is referred to as "half brute, half demon" or as a monster, which in turn illuminates the social meaning attached to his temperament.⁸⁷ His physiognomic characteristics, such as his forehead, his nose, and the shape of his jaw, indicate that Caliban is meant to be Prospero's slave because his physical features mark his inferiority to Prospero.

The shift to the *physiognomic* model is connected to the rise of the biological sciences in the 19th century, and thus Man2 was redefined as a purely biological entity whose origin, like all species, was located in evolution. According to Wynter, the "negro" paid "the most total psycho- existential price for the West's epochal degodding of both its matrix Judeo-Christian identity and the latter's projection of Otherness."⁸⁸ Through this shift of master codes, blackness signifies both Fallen Flesh and the malediction of nature. This shift in Man2

⁸⁵ Daniel Wilson, *Caliban: The Missing Link* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1873), 48.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁸⁸ Wynter, 306.

also affected the model of *physiognomic* difference. Within the first schema, Man2's *physiognomic* difference was attached to "religio-cultural" difference so that Africans were understood as "pagans" and "cannibals." The second schema for Man2, which is a direct result of evolutionary biology, moved *physiognomic* difference from the "religio-cultural" to the biological such that Africans were now seen as "natives" along with the n-word.

During the reworking of racist ideologies from religion to the religio-secular in the middle of the 19th century, reference to *The Tempest* appeared in numerous pamphlets, books, and articles. For example, in *Caliban: The Missing Link* (1873), Daniel Wilson, Ethnologist and President of University College in Toronto, uses the figure of Caliban to examine the link between "spiritual essences and mere animal life."⁸⁹ Notably, Wilson discusses the shift from religion to science: "Infallibility has deserted the chair of St. Peter, and finds itself at home on a new throne. It is perilous to mediate in the inquires which now occupy a foremost place in deduction, induction, and scientific research."⁹⁰ Simply put, while God and the church were once thought of as infallible (Man1), science has taken the place of infallibility (Man2). Throughout his book, Wilson references *The Tempest* and Caliban to examine metaphysics, theology, and evolution, to name a few. Wilson discusses the relationship of literature to science as a means to further examine the "negro" as the missing link.

In his widely circulated pamphlet with the prolific title *The Negro: What is his Ethnological Status? Is he the Progeny of Ham? Is He a Descendant of Adam and Eve? Has*

⁸⁹ Wilson, 7.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 6-7.

He a Soul? Or Is He a Beast in God's Nomenclature? What Is His Status as Fixed by God in Creation? What Is His Relation to the White Race? (1867), "Ariel" (a pseudonym for Reverend Buckner Payne of Nashville) argues that God condemned the equality of the races. Ariel supported this claim with the hypothesis that the negro was created before Adam and Eve, and thus must be a beast. "Ariel" states that the negro "is a *beast* in God's nomenclature; and being a beast, was under Adam's rule and dominion, and, like all other beasts or animals, has no soul."⁹¹ In short, according to "Ariel," the negro was nonhuman and therefore needs to be enslaved to the white race.

In response to the criticism of his essay, "Ariel" chose the pseudonym "Prospero" and titled his essay "Caliban: A Response to Ariel" (1868). This choice of pseudonym clearly illustrates Payne's ideological beliefs. Although Ariel is a servant in *The Tempest*, he aligns himself with Prospero, his master, rather than Caliban, a slave.⁹² As a result, Ariel is set free at the end of the play while Caliban's fate remains precarious. In "Caliban: A Response to Ariel," "Prospero" argues that Genesis documents two accounts of primary creation—the first in Genesis 1 and the second in Genesis 2. "Prospero" employs "modern science" (Blumenbach, Prichard, and Cuvier) to state, "The preadamites were Mongols and Negroes, together with mixed progeny."⁹³ Arguing that the "serpent," which he calls the tempter, was

⁹¹ Ariel [Buckner Payne], *The Negro: What is his Ethnological Status? Is he the Progeny of Ham? Is He a Descendant of Adam and Eve? Has He a Soul? Or Is He a Beast in God's Nomenclature? What Is His Status as Fixed by God in Creation? What Is His Relation to the White Race?* (Cincinnati: Published for the Proprietor, 1867), 45.

⁹² Mason Stokes, "Someone's in the Garden with Eve: Race, Religion, and the American Fall," *American Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (1998): 739-740.

⁹³ Prospero [Buckner Payne], "Caliban: A Sequel to Ariel," in *Anti-Black Thought Volume Five: The "Ariel" Controversy, Religion and "The Negro Problem" Part I*, ed. John David Smith (New York: Garland Publishing, 1993), 217.

in fact “a preadamite, perhaps a negro,” “Prospero” situates the negro as aggressively sexual.⁹⁴ While “Prospero’s” tempter was a sexually aggressive “negro,” Charles Carroll, in his lesser known but no less racist *The Tempter of Eve; or, The Criminality of Man’s Social, Political, and Religious Equality with the Negro, and the Amalgamation to Which These Crimes Inevitably Lead*.

Discussed in the Light of the Scriptures, the Sciences, Profane History, Tradition, and the Testimony of the Monuments (1902), argues that the tempter was in fact a “negress.”

According to Carroll, the negress, who served as Eve’s maid servant, embeds into Eve’s mind “distrust of God, engendered in her heart discontent in her position, and aroused in her nature the unholy ambition that she and her husband ‘be as gods.’”⁹⁵ Yet Eve’s biggest transgression was treating the “negress” as socially equal, which leads to the worst sin of all—amalgamation, the “ultimate corruption of the flesh.”⁹⁶

While “Prospero’s” account provided an explicit portrayal of sexual intercourse, Carroll avoids any question of Eve’s chastity by replacing the aggressive black man for the scheming “negress.”⁹⁷ Mason Stokes argues that Carroll’s inclusion of an image (see figure 1) could be one reason he chose to depict the tempter as a woman. This illustration emphasizes the absolute difference between Eve and the “negress”: The figure of Eve shows modesty

⁹⁴ Ibid, 205. Here he is working off the racial ideology that if black slaves were freed, they would rape white women.

⁹⁵ Charles Carroll, *The Tempter of Eve; or, The Criminality of Man’s Social, Political, and Religious Equality with the Negro, and the Amalgamation to Which These Crimes Inevitably Lead. Discussed in the Light of the Scriptures, the Sciences, Profane History, Tradition, and the Testimony of the Monuments* (St Louis: The Adamic Publishing Company, 1902), 404.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 432.

⁹⁷ Stokes, 728.

because her hair covers her body for the viewer, but not for her servant. Conversely, the tempter's body is available for viewing because a "negress" supposedly lacked modesty. Furthermore, the tempter's ambiguous gender depicts the "negress" as a more masculinized figure because black femininity was unrepresentable—what Sylvia Wynter deems the "demonic ground." Within *The Tempest*, Wynter argues that the absence of Caliban's "physiognomically complementary mate" is an ontological absence because black femininity is unrepresentable.⁹⁸ In other words, whiteness is beautiful, i.e., good while blackness is "vile," i.e., evil.




Figure 1. Eve and her Tempter

⁹⁸ Wynter, "Beyond Miranda's Meanings," 360.

Stokes provides an excellent analysis of Carroll's work and the image of the tempter. In an extended footnote, he discusses the possibility of the negress as a lesbian. He cites Sander Gilman, who discusses a gynecological handbook that connects the "Hottentot Apron" with excesses of lesbian love.⁹⁹ A larger clitoris indexed the oversexualized nature of prostitutes, "negresses," and lesbians through mirroring the racial and sexual ideologies embedded in the "Cult of True Womanhood" that directly privileged white sexual purity over "degenerate" women's sexual availability.¹⁰⁰ Stokes maintains that pursuing the connection between the negress and lesbianism could be productive, but he is reluctant to do so because Carroll's tempter does not possess the Hottentot's physiology. He quotes Esther Newton's discussion of the "mannish" lesbian where she points out the link between "mannish" behavior, lesbianism, and the sexological literature of Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis. Although "mannish" behavior in white women was pathologized, black women were already marked as masculine because of the ontological absence of black femininity.

Yet the connection between the negress tempter and lesbianism is apparent in Carroll's image above. Stokes argues that none of these authors (Newton, Krafft-Ebing, Ellis) complicate their discussions on lesbianism with race, specifically blackness. While this may seem true, blackness *did* influence sexologists' conceptualization of sexual abnormalities. For example, in Havelock Ellis's *The New Spirit*, he writes, "If we English are certain to make little

⁹⁹ Stokes, footnote 37, 742.

¹⁰⁰ Somerville, 253.

progress where, as in Asia, the great task is conciliation, when it is a question of stamping out a lower race—then is our time! It has to be done; it is quite clear that the fragile Red men of America and the strange wild Blacks of Australia must perish at the touch of the White man.”¹⁰¹ Although Ellis wrote this years before he published *Sexual Inversion*, his views on nonwhite races shaped his understanding of sexual perversions. He was also a staunch Eugenicist and published numerous books on race regeneration and eugenically sound marriage. Even though he did not blatantly discuss blackness and race in his classification of sexual inversion, his unconscious, along with the cultural unconscious of the time, influenced his ideas of pathology and degeneration.

In a letter to John Addington Symonds, Ellis writes:

I suppose you would agree with me that in the liasions of sex-inversion there is usually, though not invariably, a kind of pseudo-sexual oppositeness of character, etc.—a sort of heterosexual polarization within the homosexual circle. (Ch. Dudley Warner told me that in American prisons, where great freedom is allowed, liasions are especially common between white women and negresses; and see e.g. the curious contrast between the straight-forward ‘Vernon Lee’—addressing a meeting, as I best remember seeing her, with her hand on her hip—and the ultra-feminine Kittenish little Mary).¹⁰²

In *Sexual Inversion*, Ellis cites Margaret Otis, who described the attraction that black girls exert on white girls at school. Somerville also discusses Otis and examines her article, “A Perversion Not Commonly Noted” (1913), where Otis describes the “love-making” between black and

¹⁰¹ Havelock Ellis, *The New Spirit* (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1890), 21.

¹⁰² Correspondence between John Addington Symonds and Havelock Ellis, February 9th, 1893. Photocopy of typescripts owned by Bristol University. Vernon Lee is a pseudonym for Violet Paget (1856-1935), whose lover’s name was Mary Robinson. According to Sally Newman, “Phyllis Grosskurth, in her biography of J. A. Symonds, drops the fascinating snippet of information about Mary Robinson and Vernon Lee that ‘Havelock Ellis later suggested to Symonds that die pair might serve as a possible case-history for the section on Lesbianism in *Sexual Inversion*.’” (“The Archival Traces of Desire: Vernon Lee’s Failed Sexuality and the Interpretation of Letters in Lesbian History,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 14(1/2), 2005: 58.

white girls and states, “One white girl...admitted that the colored girl she loved seemed the man, and though it was so in the case of the others.”⁴⁰ Within Otis’s discussion, blackness stands in for masculinity. Somerville argues that during the late 19th century and early 20th century, when Jim Crow segregation established a structure of taboos, race became a discernible marker for the sexual nature of interracial relationships.⁴¹ Given the political and cultural climate when Carroll wrote *The Tempter of Eve*, his image depicts an interracial relationship, whose deviance is marked primarily through race, not gender.

Carroll emphasizes Eve’s purity through the dialogue in figure 1. Because Eve has not yet eaten from the tree of knowledge, she does not know the difference between good and evil, which means that she does not know that her black servant is “evil” (in Carroll’s schema). This further illuminates Eve’s purity and naivety because the black temptress is depicted as urging Eve to eat the fruit, which in turn will cause the fall of mankind. As Wynter states, “[T]he ‘diabolical color’, black, had become the preferred color for the depiction of ‘demons’ and the signification of ‘sin’—the signifying actualization, therefore, of Judeo-Christianity’s behavior-programming postulate of “significant ill” to its limit degree.”¹⁰³ She goes on to claim that Black Africans were not only classified as apes, but also as the “degenerate descendants” of the White man. As the next section will discuss, sexologists utilized similar language to discuss sexual inverts and other perverts.

The Spirit of Case Histories

In former years I considered *contare sexual-empfindung* [contrary sexual feeling] as a result of neuro-psychical degeneration, and I believe that this view is warranted by more recent

¹⁰³ Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being,” 302-303.

investigations. As we study into the abnormal and diseased conditions from which this malady results, the ideas of horror and criminality connected with it disappear and there arises in our minds the sense of duty to investigate what at first sight seems so repulsive, and to distinguish, if may be, between a perversion of natural instincts which is the result of disease and the criminal offences of a perverted mind against the laws of morality and social decency. By so doing the investigations of science will become the means of rescuing the honor and re-establishing the social position of many an unfortunate whom unthinking prejudice and ignorance would class among depraved criminals. It would not be the first time in which science has rendered a service to justice and to society by teaching that what seem to be immoral conditions and actions are but the results of disease.

--Richard von Krafft-Ebing, "Perversion of the Sexual Instinct"

The disavowal of the cultural, economic, and political domain seen in the quote above occurs through the understanding of (medico) science as a neutral domain of knowledge that is apolitical, universal, and objective, thereby sedimenting the body as a legible text that could reveal what was hidden underneath, as explicated by Foucault. He discusses the "medicalization of the effects of confession," which means that the confession was "placed under the rule of the normal and pathological."¹⁰⁴ An analysis of the historical implications of the confession is a crucial method to illustrate the move from Man1 to Man2 in sexological literature. In *Abnormal*, Foucault argues that there was a metamorphosis of the obligatory confession around 1850, which in turn moved issues of sexuality into the realm of psychiatry.¹⁰⁵ He states:

If we go to the psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, or sexologist so frequently to consult them about our sexuality, and to confess the nature of our sexuality, it is precisely to the extent that all kinds of mechanisms everywhere—in advertising, books, novels, films, and widespread pornography—invite the individual to pass from this daily expression of sexuality to the institutional and expensive confession of his sexuality to the psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, or sexologist.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 67.

¹⁰⁵ Michel Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France 1974-1975* (New York: Picador, 2003).

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 170.

This widespread practice of confessing to a medical professional began with the first sexological texts at the end of the 19th century. As John Addington Symonds writes, “I am rather afraid that the diffusion of books by Ulrichs, Krafft-Ebing, and others, may tend to the formation of a kind of ‘fixed style’ in these confessions.”¹⁰⁷ The confession needed to expose the hidden truth which lives in one’s immediate consciousness, which was then transcribed into case histories for the general public as well as other medical professionals to read and analyze. In sum, through the confession, sexologists could construct uniform “objective” case histories to support their theories of sexual deviancy.

By placing the sexual invert (and later the transsexual) in a perverse confusion within the boundaries of the hegemonic sex/gender binary, medical discourse constructed sexual inversion as a site of transgression and then reinscription.¹⁰⁸ In other words, the invert transgresses the sex/gender binary by acknowledging that her/his gender does not properly match her/his sex, but symbolic hegemony is reinscribed through confessing this transgression to a medical professional who reiterates the narrative in medical language. Havelock Ellis argues that even if an invert is not telling the truth, the “expert” can differentiate between the truth and what he calls “the poetry.” Yet the patient’s story is necessary to discover what is objectively valid in relation to this mythical ideal invert (the model to base all other observations)—case histories are an intimate part of the medico-scientific construction of

¹⁰⁷ John Addington Symonds to Havelock Ellis, February 12th, 1893.

¹⁰⁸ In “A preface to transgression,” (*Religion and culture: Michel Foucault*. Ed. Jeremy Carrette. New York: Routledge, 1999), Michel Foucault discusses the relationship between transgression and limit. He writes, “The limit and transgression depend on each other for whatever density of being they possess: a limit could not exist if it were absolutely uncrossable and, reciprocally, transgression would be pointless if it merely crossed a limit composed of illusions and shadows” (60).

inversion. Ellis states, “More recently the psychoanalysts have made a more radical attack on all histories not obtained by their own methods as being quite unreliable” primarily because psychoanalysis can dig deeper into the unconscious, which is where “the most significant facts in his own sexual history are concealed.”¹⁰⁹ Indeed, an invert’s *true* feelings reside deep inside her soul where supposedly only an expert can uncover the truth. Ellis believes that psychoanalysts (and sexologists, although Ellis only says the former) can dig deeper into the unconscious where the most important facts of his/her sexual history are repressed. Yet Ellis goes on to state, “Sadger vigorously puts forward this view and asserts that autobiographies of inverts are worthless, although his assertions are somewhat discounted by the fact that they accompany an autobiography, written in the usual manner, to which he attributes much value.”¹¹⁰ Ironically, Ellis and his colleagues used fiction interchangeably with their own case histories. Both authors and their books are utilized as case studies. For example, Ellis discusses the function of homosexuality in the role and works of many famous men. Ellis argues that there was no solid evidence that Shakespeare was an invert (he spends a few paragraphs analyzing his sonnets) but that Francis Bacon was in fact a pederast. Ellis spends multiple pages discussing the evidence of Bacon’s pederasty.

Ivan Crozier argues that the use of case histories was what made sexology a credible scientific field.¹¹¹ Crozier writes, “The practice of making perversions “regular and understandable” was the central aim of sexologists in the late nineteenth century, and more

¹⁰⁹ Ellis, *Sexual Inversion*, 69.

¹¹⁰ Havelock Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Volume 2 – Sexual Inversion*. Lexington, KY: Filiquarian Publishing, 2011: 69.

¹¹¹ Ivan Crozier, “Pillow Talk: Credibility, Trust and the Sexological Case History,” *History of Science* 46.4, no. 154 (2008): 375-404.

recently whenever something new has appeared... It is the use of case histories in this way that makes sexology a medical discipline, rather than simply musing about sexuality.”¹¹² But as I show, these “objective” histories were anything but objective. Sexologists took on the role of the transparent I while the patients were seen as potential case histories, i.e., the affective I. Ellis says, “Where we differ from the savage, and in so differing also differ indeed from ourselves of yesterday, is that to-day we seek to contemplate sex objectively and impersonally...”¹¹³ The medical taxonomies of sexual inversion and transsexuality depend on patients’ autobiographical account of their past—the case history. Many of the case histories presented in Ellis’s book are letters from inverts hoping that Ellis will help them with their supposed pathologies. In fact, many of the famous sexologists, such as Krafft-Ebing, Ellis, and Hirschfeld collected their own case studies yet they also received letters from self-proclaimed inverts. Although these case histories constitute a space for inverts to construct a narrative ostensibly outside of medical discourse, sexologists believed that inverts could only confess their inner secrets without the help of a professional. The medical taxonomies of sexual inversion and transsexuality depend on patients’ autobiographical account of their past—the case history. Jay Prosser claims that case histories provide proof of the presence of transsexuals prior to the naming of the transsexual as such in the 1940s and that these cases are “precious and indispensable as transsexual texts” because of “the fact that transsexuals must tell a

¹¹² 376

¹¹³ Havelock Ellis, “Introduction,” in *Sex in Civilization*, eds. V.F. Calverton and S.D. Schmalhausen (Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing Company, 1929), 20.

transsexual autobiography to present-day psychiatrists and psychologists in order to become transsexual, the fact that transsexuality *is* a narrative.”¹¹⁴

Yet Dean Spade and LaMonda Stallings remind us that the clinician’s office is in fact a privileged and problematic site.¹¹⁵ LaMonda Horton-Stallings discusses Prosser’s claim that the autobiographical act of the transsexual begins in the clinician’s office and illuminates that this is in fact a privileged site. She writes:

[W]e should remember that literary genres have different histories, and these histories inform why and how autobiographical tropes of racialized subjects of an economically disenfranchised class might differ from white middle-class autobiographies. For even as we may accept that every transsexual, as an author, is originally an autobiographer, scholarship on slave narratives, oral histories, the dozens, and biomythographies in black literary tradition reminds anyone that autobiography, authorial control, and tropes are often strategic manipulations to take into account differences of gender, class, nation, and sexuality between authors and their audiences.¹¹⁶

Stallings quote indexes numerous significant points in relation to the “objective” case history. First, the autobiographies turned case histories in early sexological literature are primarily (if not entirely) from white, middle- to upper-class men and women, as one can glean from the beginning of each case. In other words, the normative sexual invert and then transsexual narrative excludes more than it includes. Second, the transsexuals’ autobiographies are often manipulated or strategically edited to highlight what the sexologist or psychiatrist would like the reader to focus on.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Jay Prosser, “Transsexuals and the Transsexologists: Inversion and the Emergence of Transsexual Subjectivity,” in *Sexology in Culture: Labelling Bodies and Desires*, eds. Lucy Bland and Laura Doan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 123.

¹¹⁵ Stallings...Spade

¹¹⁶ LaMonda Horton-Stallings, *Funk the Erotic: Transaesthetics and Black Sexual Cultures* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2015), Kindle Edition, 4802-4807.

¹¹⁷ Crozier, 380-387.

Dean Spade discusses the normalizing effects of medical discourse on the transgender community in “Mutilating Gender.” He maintains that “passing” becomes crucial the moment an individual enters a medical office because the medical professional decides whether one can present her/himself in a realistic way. Consequently, the doctor determines if the individual can live within the gender norms of the other sex while a trans individual’s desire to transition is policed through medicalized systems of power. In other words, the disciplinary techniques that generate properly sexed bodies become visible when a trans individual enters a medical office. A trans individual’s ability to gain recognition as a “true” transsexual within the medical framework depends on her/his ability to portray stereotypical behaviors of the opposite sex; stereotypical behavior is utilized to measure one’s mental health.

Through consciously refusing to reiterate the standard criteria around his (childhood) gender identity, Spade illuminates the constructedness of the language inscribed in the medical model around (childhood) origin narratives.¹¹⁸ Within the medical model, trans individuals who are approved for hormones and sex-reassignment surgery reiterate the standard “transsexual narrative,” which becomes *the* “transsexual trajectory.” Furthermore, this “transsexual trajectory” supports the diagnostic criteria that generate a naturalized account of gender,

¹¹⁸ The diagnostic criteria for Gender Dysphoria in Children reinforces the “wrong body” trope of transsexuality. Criteria A states: “A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender, of at least 6 months’ duration, as manifested by at least six of the following (one of which must be Criterion A1).” While all 8 sub-criteria index a version of the “wrong body” trope, the last two transparently illuminate this trope. They are stated as: “7. A strong dislike of one’s sexual anatomy; and 8. A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics that match one’s experienced gender.” Accessed at: <http://dsm.psychiatryonline.org/content.aspx?bookid=556§ionid=41101780>

which contends that non-transsexual individuals grow up without experiencing any gender confusion or experimentation. Spade states:

This story isn't believable, but because medicine produces it not through a description of the norm, but through a generalized account of the transgression, and instructs the doctor/parent/teacher to focus on the transgressive behavior, it establishes a surveillance and regulation effective for keeping both non-transsexuals and transsexuals in adherence to their roles.¹¹⁹

The medical discourse embedded in cultural understandings of transsexualism relies on preserving an ideal of two distinct gender categories that normally include everyone but occasionally get wrongly assigned and require correction to reinscribe the norm.

One of the most common narratological structures across all sexological case histories, either taken by the sexologist or provided by the individual relaying the information, is discussing heredity at the beginning of each case. The notion of heredity, which is commonly defined as the passing on of physical or mental characteristics genetically from one generation to another,¹²⁰ provides the conceptual and methodological framework to illuminate the role of degeneration and recapitulation within case histories. For example, in "Psychical Hermaphroditism," American sexologist William Lee Howard provides two case histories along with his own commentary.¹²¹ He states, "The medical man who has a clear understanding and

¹¹⁹ Dean Spade. "Mutilating Gender." *The Transgender Studies Reader*. Eds. Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle. New York: Routledge, 2006, 321.

¹²⁰ <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/heredity>

¹²¹ William Lee Howard, "Psychical Hermaphroditism: A Few Notes on Sexual Perversion, with Two Clinical Cases of Sexual Inversion," *The Alienist and Neurologist: A Quarterly Journal of Scientific, Clinical and Forensic Psychiatry and Neurology* XVIII, 1897: 111-118. A few years later, Howard published an article titled "The Negro as a distinct ethnic factor in civilization" where he argues that the Negro was returning to the state of savagery and sexual madness. He writes: "It is this sexual question that is the barrier which keeps the philanthropist and moralist from realizing that the phylogenies of the Caucasian and African races are divergent, almost antithetical, and that is gross folly to attempt to educate both on the same basis. When education will reduce the large size of the negro's penis as well as bring about the

conception of the psychological conditions governing the mental and physical attitudes of these perverts and inverts, who is known to understand their morbid desires, and appreciates their moral palsy, will be astonished at the number which will seek him for relief.”¹²² The psychological conditions almost always-centered on childhood and heredity. Many case histories also index a history of degeneration, either through addiction, disease, or perversion. Once again, a prevalence/preponderance of case histories reproduced within sexological literature focuses on the “unfortunate psychical pervert” rather than the vicious and banal one, as discussed in the epigraph.

The first case history that Howard provides begins with:

CASE 1. — H. W. F., I am thirty years old. Ever since I was a small boy of eight or nine I have practised the habit of self- abuse. For many years I had no idea that it was wrong or injurious; when my eyes were opened I loathed myself, and have had no self-respect. ... The object of my imagination is man. I suppose that men who practice this habit have as the idol of their imagination woman. But it is not so with me. I think that I have the same regard for men as a healthy man has for woman. I have loved men passionately. I idolize them. Any licentious thought in regard to such I regard as a sacrilege. That love is just as real to me as the love of a young man for a woman, though my better Self would tell me how preposterous it was; yet I seem incapable of any other.¹²³

The author of this case history, who I will call H, relates his inversion to his de-generate act of masturbating. Prior to the construction of sexual inversion, doctors and psychiatrists were consumed with regulating the perils of masturbation.¹²⁴ Because H is narrating his history at the

sensitiveness of the terminal fibers which exist in the Caucasian, then will it also be a le to prevent the African’s birthright to sexual madness and excess—from the Caucasian’s viewpoint.” Quoted in John Haller, “The Physician versus the Negro: Medical and Anthropological Concepts of Race in the Late Nineteenth Century” *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, March 1st, 1970: 163.

¹²² Ibid, 13.

¹²³ Howard, 115.

¹²⁴ For an in-depth overview of the history of masturbation in relation to the regulatory language of heterosexuality, see: Michel Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France 1974-1975*, New York: Picador, 2003.

end of the 19th century, his knowledge of sexual deviancy was bound to the discourses of social hygiene and procreative heterosexual relations.

What is perhaps most interesting about H's case history is that he writes:

My childhood was loveless, and I often used to reason that I longed for love and sympathy. When I first heard that twins were born I wondered if I had not lost my mate, such was that ever present longing. In my mother's family there were four girls and one boy. He was connected with many women; having three wives, all living. He was very erratic. Of the four girls, two never had children, though married young. The husband of one of them told me that his wife could never have children. I have two sisters and one brother; both sisters married over twenty years and childless. Their doctor told me that neither of them could have children. My mother died when I was six years old. My father was addicted to the morphine habit, and wished to be left alone.¹²⁵

While family history was included in most case histories, this one is striking for its history of degenerate heterosexuality. H is clearly an invert—and therefore degenerate—but his sisters are also degenerate because they cannot reproduce. This degeneracy, according to “H” and Howard, is quite understandable through given that H's father was a drug addict and his mother died when H was young. Yet as H states:

I can define my disposition no better than to say that I seem to be a female in a perfectly formed male body, for, so far; as I know, I am a well-formed man, capable of performing all of man's functions sexually. Yet as far back as I can remember, surely as young as five years, I seemed to have the strongest possible desire to be a girl, and used to wonder if by some peculiar magic I might not be transformed. I played with dolls; girls were my companions; their tastes were my tastes; music, flowers and millinery interested me and do.¹²⁶

H claims that he is perfectly formed, which is important in numerous ways. First, through, H shows that he is not physically abnormal. In other words, his physical condition cannot explain his inversion. Second, sexual inversion was intimately bound to “hermaphroditism” at this time, as shown in the title of this article. Sexologists and doctors believed that all sexual inverts were

¹²⁵ Howard, 116.

¹²⁶ Ibid, 115.

also “hermaphrodites,” [define for that period] either psychically and/or physically. In fact, prior to the 1950s, all transsexuals were considered intersexed as well. Expand analysis

H also uses the wrong body narrative in his case history. Here is where Prosser and Bullough would say that one can see the language of transsexuality in this case history because... Yet H does not construct his case history within our contemporary discourses of the sex/gender system or language of transsexuality. Rather, H is reproducing the same narrative of seen in all sexological texts. And this available language produced this narrative and provided the structure and language for transsexuals to voice their own case histories. Additionally, the narrative of degeneration was institutionalized through the addition of transsexuality into the *DSM-III* in 1980, as discussed in Chapter Four. But this does not mean that H was a transsexual.

Toward a Conclusion

Thinking back to the quote by Havelock Ellis at the beginning of the chapter, early sexological texts from the late 19th and early 20th century provide an “originary” account for the “wrong body” narrative through the discourses of the Spirit/Flesh and the rational/irrational master codes. For instance, in *The Homosexuality of Men and Women*, Magnus Hirschfeld says this about sexual inversion: “It is obvious that the ongoing attempts to conceal an inborn defect, whose existence people at first interpreted as sin and aberration, and later vice, crime, or mental disorder; the depressive torments of conscience, the eternal battle of the will against the weak flesh... must all strongly affect the mind and wear out the nerves...”¹²⁷ He concludes

¹²⁷ Magnus Hirschfeld, *The Homosexuality of Men and Women* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2000), 447.

that sexual inversion is fertile ground for the development of a nervous disposition, a fact that is continuously reproduced through the thousands of case histories in sexological literature. In short, Hirschfeld reinforces pathology as anchored in the flesh, thus indexing anti-blackness at its core. Likewise, Marc Andre Raffalovich (poet, sexologist, and life-long partner of the poet John Gray) says, "If he [the invert] were the superior being that he imagines himself and if he had any religion, he would shake off the bonds of the flesh and make himself useful to humanity."¹²⁸ These early examples from sexological literature illuminate the institutionalization of the two master codes, the Redeemed Spirit/Fallen flesh master code of Man1 and the rational/irrational master code of Man2 within the medico-scientific discourse on transsexuality, thereby setting the stage for the wrong body narrative.

¹²⁸ Marc Andre Raffalovich, "Uranism, Congenital Sexual Inversion: Observations and Recommendations," *Journal of Comparative Neurology* 5, no. 1 (1895): 42.

Chapter 3

Into the Spirit: Formations of Sexological Discourse

What distinguishes the modern notion of race from the notion of sex, then, is the fact that the former was articulated in fields of knowledge, *science of life* and the *science of man*, in which the strategies of intervention of the natural sciences were deployed in the cataloguing of human bodies. The strategies of intervention deployed in the initial moment of the *analytics of raciality* required the manipulation, measurement, and classification of bodies to produce the racial soul. In that, they produced the *racial subject* (*the raced consciousness*) as a fundamentally mediated, determined, spatial, condition.

–Denise Ferreira da Silva, “Towards a Critique of the Socio-logos of Justice”

This chapter centers on Denise Ferreira da Silva’s analysis of the transparent “I” to examine the role sexologists played in reproducing the dominant narratives of sex and gender in the last half of the 19th Century to the early 20th Century. In the epigraph above, da Silva states that race is distinguished from sex through the onto-epistemological methods of the sciences of life, like Biology, and the sciences of man, like Anthropology. da Silva provides a framework that outlines the emergence of rational man (Man2) through the universality and self-determination coterminous with post-Enlightenment thought (Hegel) and scientific reason (Kant). This theoretical framework emerges from what da Silva calls the *analytics of raciality*, which produces and reinforces the *transparent I/ affectable I* duality. As da Silva writes, the *analytics of raciality* is one particular strategy of power “that has produced race difference as a category connecting place (continent) of ‘origin’, bodies, and forms of consciousness.”¹²⁹ Thus the “transparent I” represents Man, i.e., white Europeans, while the “affectable I” marks all

¹²⁹ Denise Ferreira da Silva, “Towards a Critique of the Socio-logos of Justice: The Analytics of Raciality and the Production of Universality,” *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture*, 7, no. 3 (2001): 422-423.

non-European bodies and minds. Put differently, within da Silva's analytic, the spirit turned rational subject emerges as the transparent "I" while the irrational flesh stands for the exteriority of the marked body. I argue that sexologists utilized the methods of the "science of life" and the "science of man," specifically the *analytics of raciality*, to invent a diverse and disturbing array of deviant taxonomies. Arguing that through this framework (transparent I/affectable I), sexologists took on the role of the transparent I and became the "objective" scientific observers. Even though sexology is generally considered a pseudo-science today, sexologists at the turn of the 20th century were working to be taken seriously as a science through upholding social norms and policing boundaries.

This rendering of *transparent I/affectable I* was authenticated in Kant's reconfiguration of objectivity in his essay "Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will be Able to Come Forward as a Science" in 1783. Kant uses the terms "objectively valid" and "merely subjective" to illustrate the universal conditions of objectivity and the psychological and/or empirical status of subjectivity. Kant worked off the racial classifications of Linnaeus, but revised it to be transcendently grounded. As Emmanuel Eze states, "A transcendently grounded structure of feeling, for Kant, guarantees the objectivity of the scientific descriptions (distinction, classification, hierarchization, etc.) by conferring upon them the quality of permanence and universality."¹³⁰ One must transcend his white male body to be able to be objective. Science was (and still is) conceptualized as a value-neutral realm of knowledge production untouched

¹³⁰ Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, "The Color of Reason: The Idea of 'Race' in Kant's Anthropology," in *Anthropology and the German Enlightenment: Perspectives on Humanity*, ed. Katherine M. Faull (London: Bucknell University Press, 1995), 222.

by cultural, economic, or political factors. In short, scientific knowledge must possess the status of objectivity (ontologized whiteness) in order for it to *be* science.

Sexological literature at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century focused on a universal idea of inversion. Although sexology was not yet an official field of scientific inquiry, sexologists like Havelock Ellis, Iwan Bloch, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, and Magnus Hirschfeld worked to create a credible scientific field through collecting empirical data to bolster their universal theories (which mainly revolved around the nature/nurture question) and construct case histories. Sexologists utilized anthropological studies to prove their universal ideas of sex/uality. Therefore, sexologists examined customs from other countries without discussing the significance of location or race while simultaneously reinforcing the language of pathology and degeneration. Yet I argue that case histories obscure political, cultural, and economic issues by focusing on the personal rather than larger structural forces. Put differently, sexologists constructed “objective” taxonomies of deviance and degeneracy through case histories and racial science that conflated sex, sexuality, place, and time.

This conflation was used in sexological literature to justify the explosion of sexual taxonomies. The medical model’s wrong body narrative constructs the white trans subject as potentially gaining transparency through hormones and sex-reassignment surgery and eventually achieves the privileged positionality of “passing” (or disappearing into the transcendental I). Yet, “passing” is only available to those who are unmarked and able to transcend the flesh. Through symbolic whiteness, white trans men and women obtain access to rationality by transitioning to the “opposite” sex because they are becoming their spirit rather than remaining in their flesh. Further, to claim that gender is inherent not only negates the

historical construction of gender and the ungendering of black flesh through slavery and colonialism, as astutely argued by Hortense Spillers, but also perpetuates anti-black racism because whiteness is then associated with transparency and thereby rationality/reason. The medical discourse embedded in cultural understandings of transsexualism relies on preserving an ideal of two distinct gender categories that normally include everyone but occasionally get wrongly assigned and require correction to reinscribe the norm. Within the religio-secular schema of Modernity, Black individuals cannot transcend to spirit because s/he will never escape the confines of her/his flesh. Situating the spirit/flesh duality into terms of sexual inversion and transsexuality positions gender as spirit and sex as flesh. Within the medical model of transsexuality (gender identity disorder and/or gender dysphoria), one is born inherently gendered so either s/he has the right or wrong body to match her/his innate gendered self.

In the final section of this chapter I will discuss those individuals who opposed the pathologization of sexual inversion through medical science. The most outspoken, or at least the most privileged and therefore vocal, of these were literary scholars like John Addington Symonds (1840-1893), Oscar Wilde (1854-1900), John Henry Mackay (1864-1933), and Adolf Brand (1874-1945) who vehemently rejected sexology and turned to Ancient Greece and Rome to counter sexological pathologization. For example, in *Fenny Skaller*, John Henry Mackay relays that after reading Krafft-Ebing he discovered he was no longer alone but also felt outraged: “He [Krafft-Ebing] understood only so much: they had locked up his love in science’s wax-figure cabinet of monsters, deformities, and monstrosities of all kinds—there they had also classified him: among people he had nothing in common, and could and would have nothing in

common.”¹³¹ Significantly, these scholars were all involved and invested in pederasty (man-boy love) and romanticized “homosexual” relations in Graeco-Roman antiquity. As I will show, along with sexology, these scholars reified anti-black discourse through ignoring the interconnected relationship of boys and slaves in Graeco-Roman antiquity.

The Analytics of Raciality

The biopolitical arsenals of knowledge (like measurement and classification) embedded within the *analytics of raciality* opened the conceptual space for Enlightenment natural and social sciences to create new methods through consolidating the essence and the appearance of race, thereby conflating time and space. da Silva makes a compelling argument that this conflation could not occur without Hegel rewriting Kant’s transcendental reason into Spirit (*Geist*), which established Being and Knowing as the same thing. Although Kant’s objectively valid/merely subjective binary facilitated the natural and social sciences to expand its reach, Hegel’s reinterpretation enabled the coexistence of regulation and representation. In other words, he reclaimed universality and historicity as the “intrinsic difference” between the transparent I and the affectable I. da Silva writes that he conceived of exteriority as an expression of interiority where the scene of engulfment “institutes modern representation by resolving universality and historicity in transcendental and provisionally containing the threat introduced in the outlining of self-consciousness in a figure, the *homo historicus* [the transparent I], which is both the producer of science and a product of history, that is, the

¹³¹ Quoted in Hubert Kennedy, *Anarchist of Love: The Secret Life of John Henry Mackay* (San Francisco: Peremptory Publications, 2002), 8.

transparent I, the self-determined subject of universality.”¹³² Thus the resolution of regulation into representation does not abolish exteriority but encloses it into scientific concepts that explain, measure, and categorize difference and variation.

Hegel’s notion of *Geist* explicitly denies both blackness and Black individuals the right to universality and transcendence. Hegel claims, “But the Africans have not yet attained this recognition of the universal; their nature is as yet compressed within itself; and what we call religion, the state, that which exists in and for itself and possesses absolute validity – all this is not yet present to them.”¹³³ Because the “negro” lives in “savagery” outside of the law, s/he cannot transcend her/his body to become objectively universal. In other words, Africans cannot look outside themselves to *Geist* because Hegel argues that they have no moral laws, i.e., European consciousness. Significantly, da Silva states that Hegel’s revision of transcendental reason that replaces the divine ruler with “the self-determining and self-producing figure of ‘Spirit,’” produces “a social ontology in which transparency becomes the ‘end’, the final purpose, when the designs of the new author and ruler, are actualized in human institutions and products.”¹³⁴ Racial difference, i.e., the “negro,” as an object of knowledge was in fact a political signifier couched as scientific objectivity.

Spirit becomes the space of transparency while Flesh remains the space of Otherness.

Yet as Henri Lefebvre states:

Space is not a scientific object removed from ideology and politics, it has always been political and strategic. If space has an air of neutrality, and indifference with

¹³² Denise Ferreira da Silva, *Toward a Global Idea of Race* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 87-88.

¹³³ Georg Hegel, “Geographical Basis of World History,” in *Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader*, ed. Emmanuel Eze (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997), 127.

¹³⁴ da Silva, *Toward a Global Idea of Race*, 80.

regards to its contents and thus seems to be 'purely' formal, the epitome of rational abstraction, it is precisely because it has been occupied and used, and has already been the focus of past processes whose traces are not always evident on the landscape. Space has been shaped and molded from historical and natural elements, but this has been a political process. Space is political and ideological. It is a product literally filled with ideologies.¹³⁵

While medico-science, including sexology, attempts to neutralize spaces of study—from the laboratory to other countries—space is always politicized through the ideologies we attach to them. Sylvia Wynter argues that the geography of the earth is parallel to our understanding of Spirit/Flesh.¹³⁶ In terms of Lefebvre, space is always understood as neutral yet in reality is connected to the Spirit/Flesh duality where the Western world is Spirit and the rest is Flesh. Lefebvre breaks down the study of space into three parts, which he calls the “spatial triad.” The first is perceived space, which is space that can be empirically measured and described. Second, and most important here, is conceived space or representations. Lefebvre argues that “In these ‘dominating’ spaces of regulatory and ‘ruly’ discourse, these mental spaces are thus the representations of power and ideology, of control and surveillance.”¹³⁷ This is the space of anthropology, sexology, and psychiatry. The final space combines the first two into what he calls spaces of representation, where the real and imagined intertwine. This final space brings us to the next section on the role of anthropology within sexology.

The Anthropological Turn

Although sexologists believed they were creating universal taxonomies of deviancy,

¹³⁵ Henri Lefebvre quoted in Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 2011), 80.

¹³⁶ Wynter, 278.

¹³⁷ In Soja, 67.

they debated the origin of sexual inversion: was it an acquired or congenital disease? For example, Iwan Bloch believed sexual inversion was acquired (nurture) but Magnus Hirschfeld argued that inversion was in fact congenital (nature). Both sides utilized anthropological findings to support their own theories. Both depended on an understanding of the body as purely biological because the body needed to exist outside specific times and places as a means to construct a universal theory of inversion. Most, if not all, case histories were located within the Western hemisphere. Yet the regulation of the status quo through sexology expanded well beyond the Western world. Throughout the literature, “primitive” and “savage” men and women were measured through Westernized ideals of white heteronormativity as a means to prove the origin of inversion.

According to Iwan Bloch in *Anthropological Studies in the Strange Sexual Practices of All Races and All Ages*, “The anthropologic-ethnologic concepts of the facts of so-called ‘*psychopathia sexualis*’ ... proceeds from a conviction ... that neither the purely medical view of the sexual anomalies ... nor the historic studies of the sex life of different peoples, suffices for a fundamental explanation of the phenomena in this field.”¹³⁸ Thus, Bloch explains that he will investigate the universal causes of sexual aberrations that exist outside of “time, race, and culture” to ground his theory etiologically. Somewhat ironically, he spends the rest of his book describing various deviant rituals and acts throughout the world, especially in Africa and India. He examines the customs of barbarians, Satanic witch cults and sex matters, erotic relations with statues, and Hottentot Venuses (just to name a few) as a means to prove his theory that

¹³⁸ Iwan Bloch, *Anthropological Studies in the Strange Sexual Practices of All Races and All Ages*, (New York: Falstaff Press, 1933), 6.

sexual aberrations are not inborn. Bloch, who was trained as a dermatologist, is largely considered the first sexologist as well as the first person to move the study of sexuality from the “pathological” to an “anthropological” lens. Bloch believed that sexual inversion was indeed an acquired disease that needed to be controlled and his discussion of these various practices apparently confirmed his theory.

The historical and anthropological primitive/savage is foundational to the history of sex and sexuality. Centering the primitive within sexological discourses highlights the anthropological drive for a universal (read white) idea of sex and sexuality. In *The Sexual Demon of Colonial Power*, Greg Thomas writes:

The shape and substance of sexuality is surely contingent upon time and space, or history and culture. The history of sexuality canonized by Europe and North America claims to make this point in theory. However, the concept of historicity employed normalizes the time-space of Europe as the only imaginable mode of socio-cultural existence. The white world is always renaturalized as a universal standard of human civilization and its erotic practice; and the mechanics of race that inscribe it are erased from the category of sexuality itself.¹³⁹

Thomas critiques contemporary constructions of the history of sexuality that claim to denaturalize erotic identity and sexuality but instead center on white cultural hegemony. His critique illuminates the Eurocentricism at the heart of sexological studies in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Throughout Bloch’s text, he naturalizes the white world’s standards as well normalizes the “time space” of Europe. The larger anthropological turn within sexology reinforced Western standards and ideologies of perversions couched in the ideals of universal objectivity.

¹³⁹ Greg Thomas, *The Sexual Demon of Colonial Power: Pan-African Embodiment and Erotic Schemes of Empire* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007), 22-23.

Many sexologists turned to “other” cultures to reinforce their own theories on sexual inversion and other perversions. In *Transvestites*, Magnus Hirschfeld begins his section on the history and ethnology of transvestitism with a discussion of religion and primitive folk. Here he describes various cult rituals, which was one of his obsessions, and then turns to Ferdinand Karsch-Haack’s influential work “Uranism or Pederasty and Tribadism in Primitive Folk.” Karsch argues that individuals inclined toward acting like the other sex are common among Negros, the people of Malay, Indians, and people of the Arctic. While Iwan Bloch criticized him for only providing descriptive narratives of inversion rather than looking for the genesis of it, Hirschfeld lauded his work, primarily because Karsch-Haack believed that inversion was both inborn and acquired.

But Hirschfeld is concerned that Karsch-Haack and other ethnologists fail to question whether their informants had homosexual feelings or were in fact transvestites, a term he coined in 1910. He says, “Since effeminate homosexuals occasionally dress in women’s clothing, many people conclude that those who have the tendency to cross-dress in this manner always have to be homosexual. This conclusion, however, has turned out to be a false one: just as not all homosexuals are effeminate, not all effeminate men are homosexuals.”¹⁴⁰ While this is an important insight for the disentanglement of homosexuality and transsexuality in the West, Hirschfeld critiques Karsch-Haack and other anthropologists through a Eurocentric lens— Hirschfeld employs various anthropological studies to show that transvestitism is a “human peculiarity” found among primitive folk and

¹⁴⁰ Magnus Hirschfeld, *Transvestites: The Erotic Drive to Cross-Dress* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991), 248.

civilized people alike. No doubt Hirschfeld constructs his argument through the language available to him at the time (degeneration) yet his propensity toward applying a Westernized notion of sex and sexuality was continuously duplicated throughout sexological literature.

Another example comes from Bloch, who writes, "The anthropologic-ethnologic concepts of the facts of so-called '*psychopathia sexualis*' which will be advanced in these pages proceeds from a conviction... that neither the purely medical view of the sexual anomalies ... nor the historic studies of the sex life of different peoples, suffices for a fundamental explanation of the phenomena in this field."⁴⁷ Thus, Bloch explains that he will investigate the universal causes of sexual aberrations that exist outside of "time, race, and culture" to ground his theory etiologically. Ironically, he spends the rest of his book describing various deviant rituals and acts throughout the world, especially in Africa and India. Therefore, throughout his book, he examines the customs of barbarians, Satanic witch cults and sex matters, erotic relations with statues, and Hottentot Venuses (just to name a few) as a means to prove that sexual aberrations are not inborn. Bloch believed that sexual inversion was indeed an acquired disease that needed to be controlled and his discussion of these various practices confirmed his theory.

Sexological literature at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century primarily focused on a universal idea of inversion. Therefore, sexologists examined customs from other countries without discussing the significance of location or race while simultaneously reinforcing the language of pathology and degeneration. Although sexology was not yet an official field of scientific inquiry, sexologists like Havelock Ellis, Iwan Bloch, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, etc, worked to create a credible scientific field through collecting empirical data to

bolster their universal theories (which mainly revolved around the nature/nurture question) and construct case histories. Sexologists utilized anthropological studies to prove their universal ideas of sex/uality. Put differently, sexologists constructed “objective” taxonomies of deviance and degeneracy through case histories and racial science.

Because sexological literature at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century focused on a universal idea of inversion, the racial and the cultural became *the* signifiers of human difference outside the realm of self-determination, i.e. universality. Although Bloch argues that he is constructing the universal origin of sexual aberrations, his work utilizes the notions of the racial and the cultural, not only because he is focusing on India and Africa, but because he consistently calls non-Europeans primitive and savage. In *Toward a Global Idea of Race*, Denise Ferreira da Silva argues that even though the cultural was consolidated as *the* signifier of human difference, it would not eradicate the political-symbolic force of the racial. She writes, “[W]ithout the science of man’s notion of racial difference, which here becomes the “empirical” basis for distinguishing between Europeans and their “others,” the very delimitation of the exclusive object of anthropological investigation, the “primitive” mental and social configurations, would be impossible.”⁴⁸ In other words, without the racial, Bloch and Hirschfeld could not turn to “other” cultures to bolster their theories of inversion and perversion. Indeed, their reiteration of empirical knowledge of non-Western countries within sexological literature ontologized the primitive and the savage as the origin of inversion. While sexologists turned to Africa, those opposed to medico-science—John Addington Symonds, Oscar Wilde, John Henry Mackay, and Adolf Brand—look to Ancient Greece.

A Turn to Greece

Modernists like Oscar Wilde and John Addington Symonds were adamantly against Christian morality (which they saw linked to sexology) and turned to Hellenism to counter this morality. Didier Eribon writes, “Their adversary was Christian morality, the idea of the ‘vice which cannot be named among Christians’, of the ‘sin against nature’. In opposition to this, they offered the pagan freedom of the Greeks, the Greek cult of beauty, and the greatness of Greek artistic accomplishments.”¹⁴¹ Indeed, Symonds, Wilde and others were against any form of pathologization. In a letter to Havelock Ellis, Symonds states:

The so-called scientific “psychiatrists” are ludicrously in error, by diagnosing as necessarily morbid what was the leading emotion of the best and noblest men in Hellas. The ignorance of men like Casper-Liman, Tardieu, Carlier, Taxil, Moreau, Tarnowsky, Krafft-Ebing, Richard Burton is incalculable, and is only equaled to their presumption. They not only do not know Ancient Greece, but they do not know their own cousins and club-mates.¹⁴²

Symonds worked with Ellis on revising Ellis’s well-known *Sexual Inversion*. Their edition was published in English in 1897 and includes sections on both scientific thought and Ancient Greece. Although most sexologists simply recognized the importance of Ancient Greece on the formation of homosexual identity, Karl Ulrichs’ creation of the *Urning* depended on it.

Ulrichs derives his terminology from Pausania’s speech in *Plato’s Symposium* and the notion of the *Urning* comes directly from Urania. Ulrichs writes:

There are two Aphrodites, one the motherless daughter of Uranus, whom we call Urania. The other is the daughter of Zeus and Dione, who we call Dandemos, or ‘common’. ... Those who belong to the common Venus, love women... (On the other hand, Urania took no part in the female, but only in the male.) For that

¹⁴¹ Didier Eribon, *Insult and the Making of the Gay Self* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 119.

¹⁴² John Addington Symonds to Havelock Ellis, June 20th, 1892.

reason, Urania's Eros is the love of young men. Those who are intoxicated by this god will be attracted to those who are male.¹⁴³

Here we see the foundation of sexological taxonomies are from Ancient Greece. Yet sexologists worked to connect inversion to pathology rather than anything historical.

¹⁴³ Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, *The Riddle of 'Man-Manly' Love, Volume II* (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1994), 542.

Chapter 4

The *DSM* and the Codification of the Wrong Body Narrative

Representation at its most magical, the transsexual body is perfected memory, inscribed with the 'true' story of Adam and Eve as the ontological account of irreducible difference, an essential biography which is part of nature. A story which culture tells itself, the transsexual body is a tactile politics of reproduction constituted through textual violence. The clinic is a technology of inscription.

-Sandy Stone, "The Empire Strikes Back"

The Clinical Case on Gender Reassignment in the American Psychological Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual V (DSM-V, 2013)* employs the case study of Jody Rohmer, a 52-year-old salesperson, for the revised diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria.¹⁴⁴ Ms. Rohmer grew up viewed by her peers as a "sissy" (her term) preferring the company of girls to boys. By around age 20, in 1982, she was no longer content with presenting as male and felt her male genitals were a "mistake of nature." She received sex-reassignment surgery at age 24, six years after "transsexuality" was added to the *DSM-III*, followed by a legal sex change and spent the next fifteen years as a woman. Nevertheless, she was rarely publicly recognized as a woman (she is "tall and muscular") and therefore felt exhausted by "the continual public scrutiny." In 2001, at age 42, she removed her breast implants and resumed living as a man. At this time, the *DSM-IV-TR* (text revision) had been published the previous year and "transsexuality" was now diagnosed as "Gender Identity Disorder." She became "curious and excited about the prospect of integrating 'male personality traits,' which she saw as increased assertiveness and

¹⁴⁴ *DSM-V Clinical Cases*, Chapter 14, no page numbers. Accessed at: <https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.books.9781585624836.jb14>

dominance.”¹⁴⁵ In the end, she decided that she could not be a man without her male genitalia, and at age 51, she received new breast implants and legally applied to be a woman once again.

In the discussion that follows Ms. Rohmer’s case history, psychiatrists John Barnhill and Friedemann Pfäfflin employ the updated language of the *DSM-V*’s “Gender Dysphoria.” This new diagnosis has been lauded as the “depathologization” of transsexuality because of the emphasis on emotional distress, i.e., the response an individual has to subjugating social structures of recognition, rather than disorder, i.e., illness residing *in* the body. Thus, they maintain that gender identity is a social construct, rather than a physiological one. Yet as this chapter will argue, the depathologization of transsexuality cannot occur concomitantly with an updated diagnosis in the *DSM* because the latter is *the* psychiatric guide to mental disorders. In other words, transsexuals may no longer be classified as “disordered,” but they are in fact still classified as mentally ill within the *DSM*, which means transsexuality is still pathologized. In the introduction to this case history, Barnhill and Pfäfflin state, “It also seems unlikely that DSM-5 intends the term gender dysphoria to refer primarily to psychological reactions to societal prejudice; discrimination comes in many forms, and no other triggers for discrimination are privileged with their own diagnosis. DSM-5 also clarifies that the diagnosis does not refer simply to gender nonconformity or transvestism.” Clearly, they are reading Jody Rohmer’s case as a conflict between her body and her sense of self rather than conflict with social reality and acceptance. Rohmer “felt exhausted by public scrutiny” and thus tried to live as a man to find some acceptance and recognition. What Barnhill and Pfäfflin fail to mention is that discrimination was in fact Rohmer’s primary issue. She had “psychological reactions to societal

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

prejudice”—that shaped the incongruence between body and sense of self. While I am not arguing that Ms. Rohmer does not struggle with this incongruence or that she should not receive the necessary medical intervention, I am claiming that the *DSM* and its long history depoliticizes gender and gender identity. Within the medico-scientific realm, gender was thus conceived as a distinct ontology that was immaterial and unchangeable, which must be realized to express one’s “true” self. Even if gender is socially constructed, the *DSM* still conceptualizes it as inherent. Cartesian dualism was confirmed as *the* understanding of transsexuality, thereby sedimenting transsexuality as an identity disorder, i.e., mental disorder, rather than a dilemma with the hegemonic notion of the binary sex/gender system.

This chapter addresses the Spirit/Flesh duality and Cartesian dualism embedded within the codification of the wrong body narrative that has become *the* narrative for the medico-scientific diagnosis of transsexuality. Indeed, these dualisms (re)materialize through the American Psychiatric Association’s *DSM-III* in 1980. The foundational anti-black structure of the wrong body narrative, as discussed in Chapter One, was revitalized through the restructuring of the *DSM-III* to follow Emil Kraepelin’s biological deterministic taxonomy from the turn of the 20th century. Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926) was a famous German psychiatrist who classified mental disorders in relation to physical diseases. He is often lauded as the father of modern scientific psychiatry and is best known for splitting the unitary concept of psychosis into two distinct disorders (manic depression and dementia, which is called the “Kraepelin dichotomy”). He was a staunch supporter of Social Darwinism and thus a Eugenicist and advocate of the theory of degeneration. In sum, Kraepelin’s nosological system was built directly from the degeneration paradigm. I argue that transsexuality could not be included in the *DSM* without

restructuring the methodology behind the manual itself. Examining the history of transsexuality as a medical diagnosis in the *DSM* exposes the economic, political, and (bio)cultural norms embedded within these so-called objective classifications by revealing a fundamental psychomedical gaze that has deliberately sought out human deviance with the objective of establishing institutionalized social control.¹⁴⁶

After discussing the *DSM III* and its revisions, this chapter addresses the recent debate between transgender and transracial identity. Rachel Dolezal, who was the president of the Spokane NAACP and living as a black woman, was “outed” by her white parents. Ten days prior, Caitlyn Jenner’s *Vanity Fair* cover debuted, and thus created numerous comparisons between the two. Much has been written on the relationship of Jenner and Dolezal and in most, transgender is re-naturalized as something inherent. In other words, this recent debate supports the *DSM* diagnosis of gender dysphoria as a mental disorder that must be “fixed” for one to live an authentic life.

Revisiting Spillers

I center my analysis within the symbolic order of Hortense Spiller’s concept of the “American Grammar” in order to generate a conceptual space to interrogate the relationship of (anti)blackness to contemporary medico-scientific discourse, specifically the wrong body narrative. Spillers makes an important distinction within the symbolic order between the captive and liberated body and illuminates that the captive is reduced to flesh, i.e., a thing, that

¹⁴⁶ Arlene Istar Lev, “Disordering Gender Identity: Gender Identity Disorder in the *DSM-IV-TR*,” *Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality* 17(3/4), 2005: 37-38.

is not marked by gender difference. The “black female slave is the fundamental point of passage between the human and nonhuman world”—the “cultural vestibular,” which she names *pornotroping*.¹⁴⁷ Our dominant sex/gender system depends on the black “object” to allow for this binary structure to emerge in the first place. As discussed in Chapter Two, physiognomic difference represents the main code of difference within the symbolic order such that sex and gender become legible through physiognomic difference. Blackness is ungendered within the symbolic order because blackness is the cultural vestibular for constructing normative gender identity for whiteness. The fundamental sex/gender system continues to define trans identity within medico-scientific discourse as the transnormative subject, i.e., passing, white and heterosexual.

Spillers’ examination of black female vestibularity in relation to Roland Barthes’ notion of myth exemplifies further how blackness and the black flesh are always already wrong within the contemporary medico-scientific system. Barthes identifies two orders of signification, and myth belongs to the second. Within the second order of signification, or what he calls the “semiological system,” the sign becomes the signifier. Barthes says, “That which is a sign (namely the associative total of a concept and an image) in the first system, becomes a mere signifier in the second. We must here recall that the materials of mythical speech (the language itself, photography, painting, posters, rituals, objects, etc.), however different at the start, are reduced to a pure signifying function as soon as they are caught by myth.”¹⁴⁸ Within the first

¹⁴⁷ Hortense Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” *Diacritics* 17, no. 2 (1987): 67.

¹⁴⁸ Roland Barthes, “Myth Today,” 413.

order of signification, signifier + signified = sign¹⁴⁹; but within the second order of myth, the sign of the first order becomes the signifier of the second. Spillers begins here article with: “Let's face it. I am a marked woman, but not everybody knows my name. ‘Peaches’ and ‘Brown Sugar’, ‘Sapphire’ and ‘Earth Mother’, ‘Aunty’, ‘Granny’, God's ‘Holy Fool’, a ‘Miss Ebony First’, or ‘Black Woman at the Podium’: I describe a locus of confounded identities, a meeting ground of investments and privations in the national treasury of rhetorical wealth.” Thus, the sign within the second order not only sediments concepts already accepted as true in culture, but also makes these concepts into a metalanguage, meaning that these concepts need no explanation through the first order, that of linguistics.

Transsexuality—as a sign of the second order—equals pathology, i.e., the wrong body. As Sandy Stone states in the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, the clinic is the technology of inscription and the transsexual body reproduces the origin story of Adam and Eve through psychic and textual violence. Throughout the rest of this chapter, I discuss how the language of transsexuality prior to the *DSM* and then after continue to shape our knowledge of trans identity within the symbolic order. While the *DSM* creates material effects and consequences, these are constituted within the symbolic order.

The Making of the *DSM* Diagnosis of Transsexuality

When medico-scientific literature on transsexuality officially developed in the late 1950s, both doctors and psychiatrists implemented the fundamental wrong body framework

¹⁴⁹ According to Barthes in *Elements of Semiology*, the signifier is the “mental representation of the ‘thing,’” and the signified is the materiality of the signifier. In other words, the signified must be made of matter, whether it be an image, object, or person.

and created plausible criteria that could be applied “objectively” and easily repeated from case to case. Prior to the “official” classification of transsexuality in the *DSM-III*, Harry Benjamin and Christine Jorgenson are acknowledged as the individuals to popularize the use of the term “transsexuality” in the 1950s. In 1952, Christine Jorgensen gained recognition in the U.S. media as the first out male-to-female transsexual when she returned from Denmark after obtaining a successful sex change operation. While she was not the first to obtain medical intervention, the spectacle of her media coverage brought about a growing awareness of non-normative gender identities and began popularizing the use of the term transsexual.

Significantly, after the media frenzy around Christine Jorgensen’s story in the early 1950s, sexologists, psychiatrists, and doctors began to focus almost exclusively on male-to-female (MTF) transsexuals. Susan Stryker discusses the fact that Jorgensen’s popularity resulted not only from her beauty, poise, and youth, but also because she was a G.I. in World War II.¹⁵⁰ Stryker says, “There had been a great deal of attention to male homosexuality in the military during World War II, and maybe, some thought, gender transformation represented a solution to that perceived problem.”¹⁵¹ During the 1950s, nationwide defamation and scapegoating of homosexuals cultivated anxieties over homosexuality and homosexual sex crimes, most often linked or even standing in for post-Cold War anti-communist phobias. This fear of effeminate men, what Eve Sedgwick called “effeminophobia,”¹⁵² led to an increase in medical and media attention around transsexuality, and its relationship to homosexuality.

¹⁵⁰ Susan Stryker, *Transgender History*, 47-48.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, 48.

¹⁵² Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “How to Bring Your Kids up Gay,” 20.

The focus on MTF transsexuals was also shaped by the Cartesian dualism influencing medico-science's perception of transsexuality. The female body had always been more closely scrutinized, measured, and cataloged than the male body. Therefore, the incongruence between the mind and body for a man who desired to be a woman was more regulated than the woman who desired to be a man. Judith Butler states, "The classical association of femininity with materiality can be traced to a set of etymologies which link matter with *mater* and *matrix* (or the womb) and, hence, with the problematic of reproduction."¹⁵³ Women always had been tied to the body through reproduction and menstruation, whereas (white) men could disavow their bodies to focus on the mind. The media not only focused on MTF transsexuals, but also eroticized them by printing stories about trans burlesque dancers. These stories represented trans women as normatively white and feminine in appearance.

By the late 1960s, Harry Benjamin's *The Transsexual Phenomenon* became the guideline for diagnostic criteria for transsexualism. Benjamin made use of Karl Ulrich's "Urning" but modified it to discuss correcting one's body to match the gender of one's mind (inner self). Gender was thus conceived as immaterial and therefore unchangeable, which must be realized to express one's "true" self. Benjamin reinscribed Cartesian dualism at the core of the medical understanding of transsexuality. He argued that transsexualism was a somatic condition that could not be cured through psychotherapy alone. He advocated for surgical intervention at a time when doctors and psychiatrists opposed such procedures.

Preoperative transsexuals read Benjamin's book and used the language to gain acceptance for medical intervention. Their behavior mirrored the standards of the book almost

¹⁵³ Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter*, 31.

exactly and it took doctors many years (and numerous journal articles later) to realize that their patients had read the book as well.¹⁵⁴ Additionally, the patients helped one another rehearse and prepare for the interviewing process to appear as conventional feminine women. But doctors did not want transsexuals to create a community and often advised and even required their patients to say they would not socialize with other transsexuals.¹⁵⁵ They wanted their patients to become “normal” members of society—i.e., disappear—and only accepted candidates who would conform to the dominant norms of gender and sexuality.¹⁵⁶

Doctors worked to stabilize the connection between the normal and abnormal through utilizing terms such as “adjustment” and “conformity” as a means to regulate and subordinate those who did not “fit in.” Doctors worried that ideals of gender transgression would enter into transsexuals’ consciousness and thereby disrupt norms constructed by the binary sex/gender system. Those who did not or would not conform to the normative understanding of the sex/gender system were refused medical intervention.¹⁵⁷ In 1966, John Hopkins opened the first gender clinic that performed sex-change operations in the United States. Although John Hopkins’s clinic was the impetus for other universities to open gender clinics, John Hopkins’ clinic rarely actually accepted any patients for surgery.¹⁵⁸ University of Minnesota, University of California, Los Angeles, University of Washington and Stanford opened gender clinics within years of John Hopkins, which provided more opportunities for trans individuals to gain access to

¹⁵⁴ Sandy Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto.” Page 228.

¹⁵⁵ Dallas Denny, “Transgender Communities in the United States in the Late Twentieth Century,” 177. Denny further states, “After surgery, the clinic doctors told them that they were now normal men and women and should blend into society; most did” (177).

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Denny, 177.

¹⁵⁸ Meyerowitz, 221.

surgery in the United States. Stanford took it a step further and opened a grooming school inside the clinic to teach MTF transsexuals how to talk and act like proper ladies. As Sandy Stone states, “The origin of the gender dysphoria clinics is a microcosmic look at the construction of criteria for gender. The foundational idea for the gender dysphoria clinics was first, to study an interesting and potentially fundable human aberration; second, to provide help, as they understood the term, for a ‘correctable problem’.”¹⁵⁹ University gender clinics in the 1960s and 1970s were not set up to necessarily help individuals achieve a more bearable life but to collect data to create better criteria for diagnosis. Doctors understood transsexualism as an identity disorder that can be cured through hormones and surgery, thereby reinforcing transsexuals’ relationship to Cartesian dualism. In short, a transsexual can be cured of her/his identity disorder by normalizing the body to match cultural paradigms of masculinity and femininity.

Constructing accurate criteria for the process of diagnosis was justified through ensuring successful gender transitions, which meant anyone who could realistically “pass” as a “normal” woman or man. Surgical procedures associated with transsexuality thereby construct a paradox for trans individuals. Hormones and surgery are a means to normalize binary gender regulations and conform trans individuals to the Cartesian dualism by altering one’s body to match her/his mind; yet at the same time, many trans individuals cannot live a bearable life without such procedures and face extreme violence, poverty, and suicide without medical

¹⁵⁹ Sandy Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back,” 227. Arlene Istar Lev discusses the medical model’s role in constructing a “true” transsexual in “Disordering Gender Identity.” She states, “According to this model, only ‘true’ or ‘primary’ transsexuals should be eligible for medical and surgical treatments and distinguishing between ‘true’ transsexuals and all other gender variant and gender dysphoric people became the focal point of much of the research as well clinical evaluation” (43).

intervention. The criteria for diagnosing an individual with gender identity disorder reflect this paradox: it eases one's agony, but at the same time, it strengthens one's agony by pathologizing her/his desire to alter her/his body.¹⁶⁰ In other words, the diagnosis actually acts as its own social force, causing suffering, setting up desire as pathological, and strengthening the regulation of individuals who communicate these desires in institutional situations.

Once diagnostic criteria were established for transsexuality through Benjamin's *The Transsexual Phenomenon*, psychiatrists and doctors assessed candidates for surgery based on their ability to realistically and successfully perform their gender choice. Yet many doctors had ethical concerns about removing healthy body parts¹⁶¹ and, as a result, most trans identified individuals were not receiving the surgical procedures necessary to gain social recognition as the sex of their choice. The institutions of normalization embedded in the immense network of biopolitical machinery needed to recognize transsexuality as a serious illness that required surgical intervention for doctors to intervene and begin accepting patients.

By the end of the 1970s, psychiatrists enforced a neo-Kraepelin framework as the dominant model for the *DSM III*. The new emphasis on careful classification of mental disorders created a space to include transsexualism as a nosology while John Money, Robert Stoller, and Harry Benjamin's research and clinical work influenced the decision to include transsexuality in the *DSM-III*.¹⁶² Additionally, in 1955, Money coined the notion of "gender role" to discuss "all those things that a person says or does to disclose himself or herself as having the status of boy

¹⁶⁰ Judith Butler, *Undoing Gender*, 100.

¹⁶¹ Joanne Meyerowitz, *How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the United States*. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, 121.

¹⁶² Jack Drescher, "Conference Proceedings 'In or Out'?: A Discussion about Gender Identity Diagnoses and the DSM," *Journal of Gay and Lesbian Mental Health* 14(2), 2010, 113.

or man, girl or woman,” and ‘gender’ to describe “outlook, demeanor, and orientation.”¹⁶³

Robert Stoller was a professor of Psychiatry at UCLA as well as a researcher at UCLA’s Gender Identity Clinic. Significantly, in 1964, Stoller and his colleague Ralph Greenson refined the notion of gender with the term “gender identity,” which eventually became the standard in the literature on transsexualism. Stoller and Greenson defined gender identity as “one’s sense of being a member of a particular sex.”¹⁶⁴ The adoption of the term “gender identity” in place of “gender role” created a clearer distinction between the personal sense of self and the behaviors connected to masculinity and femininity. Yet doctors and psychiatrists needed an official diagnosis to provide “gender confirming healthcare”¹⁶⁵ to trans men and women.

The American Psychological Association’s *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)* provided just that. The first two editions of the *DSM* (1952, 1968) did not include transsexualism as a diagnosable mental disorder. Rick Mayes and Allan Horwitz write, “These manuals conceived of symptoms as reflections of broad underlying dynamic conditions or as reactions to difficult life problems.”¹⁶⁶ Therefore, the first two editions of the *DSM* did not

¹⁶³ Meyerowitz, *How Sex Changed*, 114. The notion of gender, as a way to classify individuals within the binary sex/gender system, had not entered the medical realm prior to this. Therefore, doctors used the term “psychological sex” to define the mental sense of self that was separate from the body.

¹⁶⁴ Denny, “Transgender Communities,” 115.

¹⁶⁵ Dean Spade, *Normal Life* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2011), 45n11. Spade uses the term “gender-confirming health care for trans people” throughout his book and states two main reasons. He says, “First, the same programs that exclude coverage of this care or deny this care for trans people often cover it for non-trans people, so the distinction is not about certain kinds of procedures or medications; it is about who is seeking them” (45n11). Second, he says he wants to avoid terms like “sex reassignment surgery” because they concentrate on a small part of the trans community. Much of the trans community request (and denied) mental health care, hormones, and/or other surgical procedures, but this varies from individual to individual. I have used terms like “sex reassignment surgery” through this paper because I am discussing specific requirements for the *DSM* diagnosis.

¹⁶⁶ Rick Mayes and Allan Horwitz, “DSM-III and the Revolution in the Classification of Mental Illness.” *Journal of the History of Behavioral Sciences* 41(3), 2005: 249.

include transsexuality as a diagnosable condition because medically speaking, transsexuality was understood not as a reaction to difficult life problems but as an inherent (biological) disorder. As Mayes and Horwitz explain, 1980 marks a turning point for psychiatry—the *DSM-III* centralized the significance of diagnosis over analysis. And thus, transsexuality was added while homosexuality was removed from the *DSM-III* (or at least symbolically –ego dystonic homosexuality remained until 1987).

The *DSM*

Emil Kraepelin's methodological approach was revived in the Department of Psychiatry at Washington University in St. Louis in the 1970s. This department is where Robert Spitzer, the *DSM-III* editor and chair of the task force compiled to edit the *DSM-II*, discovered his intellectual roots. Spitzer structured the *DSM-III* around a neo-Kraepelin framework that focused on diagnostic criteria rather than clinical practice. He gave priority to epistemological clarity rather than clinical experience through constructing criteria that could be repeated across a variety of cases. Put differently, Spitzer decided to take psychiatric diagnosis in another direction completely, making the diagnoses as exact as possible in order to correspond to what were presumably natural disease entities. According to Spitzer, the best way to do research would be to construct operational criteria for determining exactly what symptoms must be present before a physician could make a given diagnosis.

Shortly after its release in 1980, the *DSM-III* acquired the status of *the* authoritative text within psychiatry, thereby reinforcing as well as institutionalizing its classifications as scientific

truth. The diagnostic criteria for transsexualism in the *DSM-III*¹⁶⁷ was revised to “Gender Identity Disorder” (GID) in the fourth edition, first published in 1994 and then revised in 2000. In May of 2013, the *DSM-V* was published and further revised GID to “Gender Dysphoria.”¹⁶⁸ The announcement of this new diagnosis was lauded by many people as the “depathologization” of transsexuality¹⁶⁹ because of the emphasis on emotional distress, i.e., the response an individual has to subjugating social structures of recognition, rather than disorder, i.e., illness residing *in* the body. Thus, they maintain that gender identity is a social construct, rather than a physiological one. Transsexuals may no longer be classified as “disordered,” but they are in fact still classified as mentally ill within the *DSM*. Put differently, one cannot depathologize transsexuality through the very object used to institutionalize this classification

¹⁶⁷ “A. Sense of discomfort and inappropriateness about one's anatomic sex; B. Wish to be rid of one's own genitals and to live as a member of the other sex; C. The disturbance has been continuous (not limited to periods of stress) for at least two years; D. Absence of physical intersex or genetic abnormality; E. Not due to another mental disorder, such as Schizophrenia.” *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition*, Washington D.C.: The American Psychiatric Association, 1980: 263-264.

¹⁶⁸ The revised criteria states: “A. A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender, of at least 6 months’ duration, as manifested by at least two of the following: 1. A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and primary and/or secondary sex characteristics (or in young adolescents, the anticipated secondary sex characteristics); 2. A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics because of a marked incongruence with one’s experienced/expressed gender (or in young adolescents, a desire to prevent the development of the anticipated secondary sex characteristics); 3. A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the other gender; 4. A strong desire to be of the other gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender); 5. A strong desire to be treated as the other gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender); 6. A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the other gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender). B. The condition is associated with clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning.” *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition*, Arlington, VA: The American Psychiatric Association, 2013: 452-453.

¹⁶⁹ For example, see Lowder, J. Bryan, “Being Transgender is No Longer a Disorder: The American Psychiatric Association Salutes the T in LGBT,” http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2012/12/dsm_revision_and_sexual_identity_gender_identity_disorder_replaced_by_gender.html (December 3rd, 2012).

and to secure gender confirming health care covered by medical insurance as a pathology in the first place. Although this new diagnosis does not depathologize transsexuality because it must still be medicalized to justify receiving the care of a medical professional—and arguably it cannot given the need for insurance companies to cover surgery and hormones—it opens up the conceptual space to include the possibility of a political understanding of transgender.

Yet with that said, the manual still reinforces a hegemonic understanding of the sex/gender system. Under the title “Nonconformity to gender roles, the *DSM-V* states:

Gender dysphoria should be distinguished from simple nonconformity to stereotypical gender role behavior by the strong desire to be of another gender than the assigned one and by the extent and pervasiveness of gender-variant activities and interests. The diagnosis is not meant to merely describe nonconformity to stereotypical gender role behavior (e.g., "tomboyism" in girls, "girly-boy" behavior in boys, occasional cross-dressing in adult men). Given the increased openness of atypical gender expressions by individuals across the entire range of the transgender spectrum, it is important that the clinical diagnosis be limited to those individuals whose distress and impairment meet the specified criteria.¹⁷⁰

The use of the terms “tomboyism” and “girly-boy” are certainly enough to raise a red flag. But the *DSM* believes that all clinicians have the ability to determine the proper amount of distress and impairment that one needs to affect to gain access to life-changing procedures. Put differently, the *DSM* assumes that all clinicians can be “objective” and make a reasonable decision, not based on one’s own transphobia, racism, and/or prejudice. And these same clinicians can also determine the extent and pervasiveness of gender-variant activities that make an individual distressed enough to determine who can gain access to “gender-confirming health care.” So the *DSM* recognizes “some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender” (Criteria 4-6), yet these alternative genders must fit within criteria of Gender

¹⁷⁰ *DSM-V*, 458.

Dysphoria. Moreover, those who desire “gender-confirming health care” must police their own desires and expressions of such desires for treatment to show enough distress to necessitate help but not so much as to appear unreasonable or dangerous. A trans individual’s desires are thus already foreclosed through the structures of normalization embedded in the medico-scientific understanding of transsexuality and Gender Dysphoria. In sum, the new criteria for Gender Dysphoria remains rooted within the binary framework of Enlightenment science, thereby disavowing movement towards the depathologization of transsexuality.

Even further, to claim the *DSM* depathologizes trans identity erases the violent history of psychiatry and sexology in direct correlation to the codification of transsexuality in the *DSM*. In other words, the classifications found in the *DSM* are not constructed in a bubble. Clearly the current *DSM* diagnosis is haunted not only by the dominant construction of the sex/gender system but also by the clinicians and psychiatrists who have written and revised the criteria. The revised criteria for Gender Dysphoria was constructed through “The Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders Work Group,” chaired by Kenneth J. Zucker. Kenneth Zucker, psychologist and head of the child and adolescent Gender Identity Clinic at Toronto’s Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, was originally selected as a member of the American Psychiatric Association’s Task Force on Gender Identity, Gender Variance, and Intersex Conditions in 2007 and then as chair of the workgroup in 2008 for the 2012 (which was published in 2013) edition of the *DSM-V*. Zucker is infamous for his use of “reparative therapy:” he “helps” children accept their natal sex and associated gender, which he put not-so-subtly when stating that

young boys must “drop the Barbie.”¹⁷¹ In short, Zucker “cures” children of their gender variant behavior through teaching boys how to be masculine and girls how to be feminine.

Ray Blanchard, also a part of the workgroup, coined the term “autogynephilia” in 1989, which means that a man is sexually aroused by the thought or image of himself as a woman.¹⁷² He also divided MTF transsexuals into two categories: 1) homosexual transsexuals who have sex-reassignment surgery to attract heterosexual men and 2) autogynephilic transsexuals who are sexually aroused by her female body. His controversial concept was expanded by J. Michael Bailey in *The Man who would be Queen*. Bailey’s book incited significant backlash in the transgender community.¹⁷³ Blanchard, and then Alice Dreger in his defense, accuse trans women of “over reacting” to the point of discouraging future research. Alice Dreger writes:

What of the supposed evidence against Blanchard’s theory? Many transwomen have complained that, in their work, Blanchard and Bailey have ignored their life narratives, narratives that these women say fly in the face of the simple two-type model of MTF transsexualism that sees eroticism as a fundamental motivation for MTF sex reassignment. But what many of these critics have failed to realize is that Bailey and Blanchard aren’t interested in whether people’s narratives fit Blanchard’s theory; they are interested in whether people do. And Bailey and Blanchard see plenty of evidence that, self- representation to the contrary, transwomen’s histories—including their gendered and erotic histories—and the data drawn from them in lab-based and clinical studies support rather than weaken Blanchard’s typology.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Lynn Conway. “Drop the Barbie: Kenneth Zucker’s Reparative Treatment of Gender-Variant Children.” <http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/conway/TS/News/Drop%20the%20Barbie.htm>. Kenneth Zucker attempted to sue Lynn Conway for a link she posted on her website to another site, Intersex International. Zucker used this lawsuit as an attempt to discredit Conway, who has publicly vocalized her concern with Zucker’s inclusion on the *DSM-V* Task Force. For more information, see “Dr. Kenneth Zucker’s War on Transgenders” at <http://www.queerty.com/dr-kenneth-zuckers-war-on-transgenders-20090206/>.

¹⁷² For more information, see Ray Blanchard. “Early History of the Concept of Autogynephilia,” *Archives of Sexual Behavior* 34(4), 2005: 439-446.

¹⁷³ The majority of *Archives of Sexual Behavior* 37(3), 2008 is dedicated to this controversy. See pages 365-510.

¹⁷⁴ Alice Dreger. “The Controversy Surrounding The Man Who Would Be Queen: A Case History of the Politics of Science, Identity, and Sex in the Internet Age.” *Archives of Sexual Behavior* 37(3), 2008, 415.

Dreger clearly states that the fact that trans women are offended by Blanchard and Bailey's theory of transsexuality does not matter because clinical studies "prove" its relevance. This reinforces the neo-Kraepelin methodology employed in the *DSM-III* because narratives (clinical reality) are secondary to history (reliable diagnoses). What Blanchard, Dreger, and other sexologists do not appear to understand is that transsexual men and women are not *merely* objects of study in the first place—transsexuals are not specimens to be coded and hypothesized to further sexologists' careers.¹⁷⁵ For the *DSM* to employ Blanchard and Zucker to revamp *Gender Identity Disorder* to *Gender Dysphoria* indexes the fact that the new diagnosis was not created through scientific evidence of mental illness but through cultural and political bias couched as science.

Transgender vs Transracial

Although Transgender Studies has turned away from the medical model, specifically the wrong body narrative, this model continues to shape contemporary trans politics and representation. For example, in 2015 Caitlyn Jenner's *Vanity Fair* cover debuted ten days before Rachel Dolezal was "outed" as a white woman passing as a black woman. Significantly, the language used in the liberal media reinforces the Cartesian dualism at the heart of the medical

¹⁷⁵ Blanchard said, "The population of people who were actively doing research on transgender was already pretty small [...] If anything, [the attack on Bailey] has had a discouraging effect about getting into the area of study. It's not hard for a student to see, if they have a choice of topics, "Why should I pick one where the subjects are likely to get litigious or make a fuss, or suspect everything I do?" In Dreger, 413. For the definitive model on writing about transsexuality, see "Suggested Rules for Non-Transsexuals Writing about Transsexuals, Transsexuality, Transsexualism, or Trans _____," written by Jacob Hale. Accessed at: <http://sandystone.com/hale.rules.html>.

model of the wrong body narrative. Further, this debate indexes how blackness is viewed as additive or analogous to the originary model of gender. In *The Guardian*, Meredith Talusan argues as “a person of color who is, by and large, perceived by strangers as white” that “[t]rans people transition in order to be the gender we feel inside...”¹⁷⁶ And thus she concludes, “I don’t need to pass as a woman the way Dolezal needs to pass as black, for the simple reason that I am a woman.”¹⁷⁷ In another article, “A black trans woman explains changing gender vs. changing race,” Kat Blaque explains:

People draw this comparison between Rachel and Caitlyn because they believe that at the end of the day, trans people are deceptive. ... [Rachel Dolezal] lied about who she was and she’s continuing to lie about who she is. As a trans woman, I do not like being compared to someone who is a liar. I am not being dishonest by being who I am today. Who I am today is the most truthful incarnation of myself. Transitioning took honesty. Transitioning took accepting myself for who I was and not pretending to be something that I wasn’t. I am living my truth. Rachel is living a lie.¹⁷⁸

Both Talusan and Blaque are conjuring the Spirit of the wrong body narrative by reinscribing Cartesian dualism at the center of trans politics. They are also analogizing race and gender in problematic ways.

Foucault writes, “[A]nalogy is no longer a more or less close kinship that vanishes as one moves away from the essential identity; it is an isomorphism of relations between elements: it concerns a system of relations and reciprocal actions, a functioning or a dysfunctioning.”¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Meredith Talusan, “There is no comparison between transgender people and Rachel Dolezal,” *The Guardian* June 12th, 2015. Accessed at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/12/comparison-transgender-people-rachel-dolezal>

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Kat Blaque quoted in Franchesca Ramsey, “A black trans woman explains changing gender vs. changing race,” *Upworthy* June 15th, 2015. Accessed at <https://www.upworthy.com/a-black-trans-woman-explains-changing-gender-vs-changing-race>

¹⁷⁹ Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), 100.

Analogies constitute the relations between the essential parts of a single abnormal classification as well as between a classified abnormality and an abnormality in need of classification. For example, the metaphor “trapped in the wrong body” reinforces the notion that the body needs to be altered to authenticate (and tell the truth about) one’s true self hidden inside. Through the medicalization of transsexuality, the “wrong body” narrative was systemized around surgical intervention as a way to make one’s body match one’s mind.

Yet at issue here is the relationship between race, specifically blackness, and gender. Blackness and gender are not analogous. Gender would not exist or be legible without (anti)blackness. Put differently, (anti)blackness is foundational to gender identity. As Susan Stryker states, “Analogy’s rhetorical strength is to be found precisely in its ability to condense complicated forms of similarity into singularly powerful linguistic gestures and acts of speech, while its analytical weakness lies precisely in the non-identity of the things being compared.”¹⁸⁰ With Jenner and Dolezal, trans and cis individuals are singling out their ability to move from one sex or race to another rather than question this connection in the first place.

¹⁸⁰ Susan Stryker, “Caitlyn Jenner and Rachel Dolezal: Identification, Embodiment, and Bodily Transformation, *AHA Today*, July 13th, 2015. Accessed at: <https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/summer-2015/caitlyn-jenner-and-rachel-dolezal-identification-embodiment-and-bodily-transformation>

Epilogue

We might concede, at the very least, that sticks and bricks *might* break our bones, but words will most certainly *kill* us.

-Hortense Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe"

Season Two, Episode Six ("Two Birds, One Millstone," October 2015) of *How to Get Away with Murder* paradigmatically displays the codification of racial violence within trans subjectivity. Alexandra Billings plays Jill Hartford, a white trans woman who teaches at the same prestigious university as the main character, Annalise Keating (played by Viola Davis), a black defense lawyer. After years of living with domestic violence, Jill murders her husband, an act that does not stray too far away from Annalise's own traumatic experience with her white husband. While discussing the case with Annalise, Jill references CeCe McDonald (a black transwoman who was brutally attacked and sentenced to a men's prison after accidentally killing one of her attackers in self-defense)¹⁸¹ to illustrate how she is always-already guilty because she is trans. She states, "CeCe McDonald. She killed a man for attacking her because she is trans."¹⁸² Significantly, the writers of this series, through the character of Jill, overlook McDonald's experience of violence as not only anti-trans, but anti-black. Jill's statement indexes an idea of the universal trans subject (read white trans subject) as always criminal within juridical discourse, a statement that disavows the ways that (anti)blackness underpins the historical construction of criminality through the figure of the racial slave and her codification within the law. In this episode of *HTGAWM*, the white victim is set free because the judge is

¹⁸¹ For more information on CeCe McDonald, see Cowan, 2016.

¹⁸² Peter Norwalk, Michael Foley (Writers), & Mike Listo (Director). (2015). Two Birds, One Millstone [Television series episode]. In S. Rhimes (Producer), *How to Get Away with Murder*. New York: American Broadcasting Company.

coerced using extrajudicial means by her black lawyer while in real life, there is no credibility or legal remedy in a black (trans) woman's story; the only credibility exists in her story's utility for constructing a shared multicultural experience of domestic violence.¹⁸³ In sum, Annalise and McDonald are doing all the work for the liberation of the white trans subject.

I use the "trans" storyline of *How to Get Away with Murder (HTGAWM)* throughout this article as a means to analyze the relationship of (anti)blackness to popular (as in commercial television) trans representation and anti-trans violence. As Jill's statement indexes above, an idea of the universal trans subject as always degenerate within juridical discourse disavows the ways that (anti)blackness underpins the sexological emergence of degeneracy and its codification within the law in the first place. In sum, blackness is not only variant, but also "degenerate" and found its materiality within the mass biopolitical workings of the state. While the atavistic temporal domain of degeneration is portrayed through the juridical and police investigation of Jill's husband's murder in this episode of *HTGAWM*, the portrayal is neutralized by Jill's positionality as a white transnormative subject,¹⁸⁴ which is constructed through and against CeCe McDonald, or that of the figure of the black trans woman. This trans storyline is one of numerous examples of the performance of the black trans woman's vestibularity within contemporary popular culture. Therefore, the question here must revolve around CeCe McDonald's experience of anti-black/trans violence and her doubled inability to transcend this

¹⁸³ Nikol Alexander-Floyd, "But I Voted for Obama: Melodrama and Post Civil Rights, Post-Feminist Ideology in *Grey's Anatomy*, *Crash*, and Barack Obama's 2008 Presidential Campaign," *National Political Science Review*, 13 (2012): 23-39.

¹⁸⁴ C. Riley Snorton and Jin Haritaworn, "Trans Necropolitics," in *The Transgender Studies Reader 2*, edited by Aren Aizura and Susan Stryker (New York: Routledge, 2013).

violence because of the marking of her flesh. Perhaps it is time to take these “originating metaphors of captivity and mutilation” as the foundation for interrogating all trans violence.

Trans scholars remain confounded by the galvanizing magnitude of violence against trans women of color and black trans women in particular. While trans scholar and activist Eric Stanley’s vital critique of trans/queer overkill begins to do the work of analyzing the marked and pathological body, the trans historical psychic life of the symbolic order that continues to shape civil society remains undertheorized. Stanley is able to examine queer violence and queer death because of the “demonic ground”¹⁸⁵ through which the African body was made flesh for the emergence of liberal discourses to develop in the first place. He employs Fanon’s phenomenological understanding of black life under colonization and states that for Fanon, “the white imago holds captive the ontology of the colonized,”¹⁸⁶ which in turn leaves the colonized with an embodied feeling of “nonexistence.” He proceeds to use this nonexistence to comprehend a phenomenology of anti-queer violence that could escape generality. Stanley moves the term “queer” away from the “universal queer subject” and resignifies it as a means to name “a nonidentity where force is made to live.”¹⁸⁷ It would seem that this “nonidentity where force is made to live” provokes a relationality to the pornotroping techniques performed on black bodies throughout the history of the United States since racial slavery. If we are to adhere to Fanon’s psychoanalytic theorization as well as Spillers’s *American Grammar*, such relationality collapses at the site of the “blood stained gates”¹⁸⁸ of black slavery and its afterlife

¹⁸⁵ Wynter, “Beyond Miranda’s Meanings”

¹⁸⁶ Eric Stanley, “Near Life, Queer Death: Overkill and Ontological Capture,” *Social Text* 107, no. 29: 14.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁸⁸ Fredrick Douglass, *Narrative of the Life of Fredrick Douglass, An American Slave* (Boston: The Anti-Slavery Office, 1845), 16.

of anti-blackness. As Spillers indexes, black (trans) women are marked by the gratuitous violence of black slavery and its afterlife because the captive body gathers both social realities and a metaphor for value that are so intertwined that a distinction between the figurative and the literal are useless. Yet I argue that Stanley's article provides the ground from which a conceptualization of racial violence within transgender studies could emerge. He opens up one of the many possibilities for cutting through the relational paradigms of anti-black and anti-trans violence.

This relational paradigm is illustrated through the triangular representation of violence experienced and performed by Jill, Annalise, and CeCe McDonald in the trans episode of *HTGAWM*. Jill represents the liberated white trans subject, but her liberation pivots on the work of black women, that of Annalise (legal vocation which enables her body to stand in for Jill's in the court room and to speak for Jill's actions) and CeCe McDonald (semiotic value/fungible black (trans) body that is an endless metaphor of harm that Jill can leap into and out of at will). The writers of this episode attempt to impose a multicultural critique of domestic violence through the shared experience of Jill and Annalise's struggle with their husbands that reduces the state-sanctioned violence experienced by CeCe McDonald. As quoted earlier, Jill says, "CeCe McDonald. She killed a man for attacking her because she is trans."¹⁸⁹ Jill then continues, "It was self-defense but she had to take a deal and she ended up in a men's prison because she knew no one would believe her. I needed them to believe me."¹⁹⁰ McDonald's violent attack occurred in front of a bar, on a public street with witnesses. McDonald fatally

¹⁸⁹ Norwalk, Foley, & Listo, 2015.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

stabs one of her attackers, Dean Schmitz, in an act of obvious self-defense, yet the court and McDonald's attackers perceive themselves as victims, even though Schmitz had a swastika tattoo and three prior assault charges. Furthermore, McDonald was severely injured during the attack but was handcuffed and placed in the back of a police car while Jill, who killed her husband in her home with no witnesses, is never even charged.

One only needs to go to a radical, or even liberal news website to read about the violence galvanizing black trans women and trans women of color. Yet within (mainstream) cultural production, trans identities are usually formed around the transnormative subject.

Journalist Sabrina Erdely writes:

Given the swift political advances of the transgender movement, paired with its new pop-culture visibility, you'd be forgiven for believing that to be gender-nonconforming today is to be accepted, celebrated, even trendy... But the appearance of tolerance belies the most basic day-to-day reality: No community living in America today is as openly terrorized as transgender women, especially trans women of color."¹⁹¹

The "especially trans women of color" mentioned above is crucial here. Trans women of color and black trans women become additive rather than foundational when discussing violence against the trans community. Yet year after year, statistics show that trans women of color and black trans women are the most terrorized in the United States.¹⁹² The fact that Jill (or the writers of *HTGAWM*) failed to mention that CeCe McDonald is a black trans woman indexes this contradiction between the appearance of tolerance and the excessive violence used against

¹⁹¹ Sabrina Erdely, "The Transgender Crucible," *Rolling Stone* July 30th, 2014.

¹⁹² For example, see "Hate Violence against Transgender Community." Retrieved at http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/ncavp_transhvfactsheet.pdf

black transwomen. The unthought factor of McDonald's blackness within this episode signals the writer's desire for a transnormative subject to provide their (neo)liberal audiences with commonsense imagery.

At the end of this episode, Annalise informs Jill that she is free of all charges and they bond over their shared relief that both of their (white) husbands are dead. This story line ends with Annalise telling Jill, "It's okay. You're free. You finally get to be the woman you really are."¹⁹³ Annalise then places her hand on Jill's hand as the camera pans back and forth on their relieved expressions. Through juxtaposing Jill to Annalise, Jill can maintain her normative subjectivity because her violence is indeed illustrated as liberating while Annalise's violence is represented as prepossessed because she is portrayed as the stereotypical "Sapphire."¹⁹⁴ Put differently, Jill's violence is represented as an exception whereas Annalise is consistently represented as cold, manipulative, aggressive, and even physically violent within the series itself. In sum, the American Grammar constructs material effects, especially through its ungendering of black women within civil society's borders as illustrated by Annalise's representation as well as a reference or "nod" to McDonald.

Jill's transnormative subjectivity in *HTGAWM* allows for her trans embodiment to be cloaked by social and cultural norms until a police officer outs her as trans by asking her who the man is on a driver's license discovered while searching her house. Jill replies that it used to be her. The show implies that Jill had been fully passing prior to the killing of her husband,

¹⁹³ Norwalk, Foley, and Listo, 2015.

¹⁹⁴ Kimberly Springer, "Waiting to Set It Off: African-American Women and the Sapphire Fixation," In M. McCaughey and N. King (Eds.), *Reel Knockouts: Violent Women in Film* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001).

thereby reproducing the transnormative subject within popular representation. Yet, the detective pathologizes Jill for being trans. The detective says, “You lied to your husband about what you are.” Jill replies, “How dare you... My husband attacked me.” The detective then says, “Only because he found out what you hid from him so you killed him.” Jill then states, “No, I killed him because he was going to kill me first. Don’t you dare use him [Jill’s previous life presenting as male] against me or you’ll be next.”¹⁹⁵ Here we can fully observe the absurdity of referencing McDonald’s experience with violence and the law as analogous to Jill’s storyline. Jill threatens a detective and is not physically or verbally assaulted or imprisoned. For CeCe McDonald, the group of white men and women who verbally and physically assaulted McDonald and her friends for walking down the street insinuated that McDonald was dressed as a woman to rape one of the white men in the group.¹⁹⁶ As Saidiya Hartman explains, the gratuitous use of violence against the black body is ontologized as genetic inheritance, thereby marking McDonald as inheritantly “criminal” and “violent.”

This ontologization of violence is reinforced within the very medico-scientific discourses of sexology and criminology that haunt the historical construction of the transsexual. In other words, the pathologization of the transsexual is inscribed within the language of criminalization through the ways that violence becomes an inherent property of sexual deviance for the black subject. Annalise and McDonald’s positionalities intersect within this cognitive mapping of the demonic ground and we can, thus, see the ways that criminal and anti-black discourses continue to reinforce the popular cultural imagination of the transnormative subject. By

¹⁹⁵ Norwalk, Foley, & Listo, 2015.

¹⁹⁶ Soloman, “CeCe McDonald: Attacked for Her Identity, Incarcerated for Surviving,” *Ebony*, May 4th, 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.ebony.com/news-views/cece-mcdonald-bias-attack#axzz20CoiAkyi>

lingering in the anti-black/trans violence inscribed with “bloodless and anonymous archaism,” transgender studies can continue to grow as a field in contention with the medico-scientific classification of transsexuality as pathological and degenerate. The future of trans studies pivots on the theorization of the tearing of the flesh, the trans historical violence performed on/through black trans bodies and trans bodies of color. This materialized analysis of racial violence within trans representation, its (un)doing of relationality, provokes a theory and a practice to build on as well as unsettle the critical ground of the American Grammar for transgender studies.

References

- Alexander-Floyd, Nikol. "But I Voted for Obama: Melodrama and Post Civil Rights, Post-Feminist Ideology in *Grey's Anatomy*, *Crash*, and Barack Obama's 2008 Presidential Campaign," *National Political Science Review*, 13 (2012): 23-39.
- Amidon, Kevin. "Sex on the brain: The rise and fall of German sexual science." *Endeavour* 32, no. 2 (2008): 64-69.
- Amin, Kadji. *Disturbing Attachments: Genet, Modern Pederasty, and Queer History*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2017.
- Aravamudan, Srinivas. "The Return of Anachronism." *MLQ: Modern Language Quarterly* 62, no. 4 (2001):
- Ariel [Buckner Payne]. *The Negro: What is his Ethnological Status? Is he the Progeny of Ham? Is He a Descendant of Adam and Eve? Has He a Soul? Or Is He a Beast in God's Nomenclature? What Is His Status as Fixed by God in Creation? What Is His Relation to the White Race?* Cincinnati: Published for the Proprietor, 1867.
- Barrett, Lindon. *Racial Blackness and the Discontinuity of Western Modernity*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2013.
- Barton, William. *Flesh and Spirit: A Sermon by Rev. William Barton*. Boston: Frank Wood, 1895.
- Bauer, Heike. *The Hirschfeld Archives: Violence, Death, and Modern Queer Culture*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2017.
- Bloch, Iwan. *Anthropological Studies in the Strange Sexual Practices of All Races and All Ages*. New York: Falstaff Press, 1933.
- Boag, Peter. *Re-Dressing America's Frontier Past*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.
- Brantlinger, Patrick. "Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent." *Critical Inquiry* 12, no. 1 (1985): 166-203.
- Bullough, Vern. "Magnus Hirschfeld, an often overlooked pioneer," *Sexuality and Culture* 7, no. 1 (2003): 62-72.
- . 1987. "A Nineteenth-Century Transsexual." *Archives of Sexual Behavior* 16, no. 1: 81-84.
- Butler, Judith. 1993. *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'*. New York: Routledge.
- . 2006. *Undoing Gender*. New York: Routledge.

- Carroll, Charles. *The Negro a Beast: Or in the Image of God; The Reasoner of the Age, the Revelator of the Century! The Bible as It Is! The Negro and His Relation to ... Negro Not the Son of Ham*. St. Louis: American Book and Bible House, 1900.
- . *The Tempter of Eve; or, The Criminality of Man's Social, Political, and Religious Equality with the Negro, and the Amalgamation to Which These Crimes Inevitably Lead. Discussed in the Light of the Scriptures, the Sciences, Profane History, Tradition, and the Testimony of the Monuments*. St. Louis: The Adamic Publishing Company, 1902.
- Crozier, Ivan. "Pillow Talk: Credibility, Trust and the Sexological Case History." *History of Science* 46.4, no. 154 (2008): 375-404.
- da Silva, Denise Ferreira. "Towards a Critique of the Socio-logos of Justice: The Analytics of Raciality and the Production of Universality." *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture*, 7, no. 3 (2001): 138-148.
- . *Toward a Global Idea of Race* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007.
- . "No-Bodies: Law, Raciality and Violence." *Griffith Law Review* 18, no. 2 (2009): 212-236.
- Daston, Lorraine and Peter Galison. *Objectivity*. New York: Zone Books, 2010.
- Derrida, Jacques. 1994. *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*. New York: Routledge.
- . 1995. "Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression." *Diacritics* 25, no. 2: 9-63.
- Descartes, Rene. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vols. 1–3, edited by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Dickson, William. *St. Paul's use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit: The Baird Lecture for 1883*. Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1883.
- Douglass, Fredrick. *Narrative of the Life of Fredrick Douglass, An American Slave*. Boston: The Anti-Slavery Office, 1845.
- Drescher, Jack. "Conference Proceedings 'In or Out'?: A Discussion about Gender Identity Diagnoses and the DSM." *Journal of Gay and Lesbian Mental Health* 14(2), 2010.
- Drescher, Seymour. "The Ending of the Slave Trade and the Evolution of European Scientific Racism." *Social Science History* 14, no. 3 (1990): 415-450.
- Ellis, Havelock. *The New Spirit*. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1890.

- 1915. *Studies in the Psychology of Sex Volume II-Sexual Inversion*. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis Company.
- "Introduction." In *Sex in Civilization*, edited by V.F. Calverton and S.D. Schmalhausen, 15-28. Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing Company, 1929.
- Felluga, Dino. "Modules on Lacan: On the Structure of the Psyche." *Introductory Guide to Critical Theory*. Purdue University, January 31st, 2011, <http://www.purdue.edu/guidetotheory/psychoanalysis/lacanstructure.html> (accessed August 20th, 2017).
- Engdahl, Ulrica. "Wrong Body." *TSQ* 1, nos. 1-2 (2014): 267-269.
- Erdelyi, Sabrina. "The Transgender Crucible." *Rolling Stone*, July 30th, 2014.
- Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi. "The Color of Reason: The Idea of 'Race' in Kant's Anthropology." In *Anthropology and the German Enlightenment: Perspectives on Humanity*, edited by Katherine M. Faull, 200-241. London: Bucknell University Press, 1995.
- Foucault, Michel. *The Birth of the Clinic*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1973.
- 1990. *The History of Sexuality Volume One: An Introduction*. New York: Vintage Books.
- "A Preface to Transgression." 1999. *Religion and culture: Michel Foucault*. Ed. Jeremy Carrette. New York: Routledge: 57-71.
- 2003. *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975*. New York: Picador.
- Freud, Sigmund. 1905. *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*. SE 7, 125-245.
- Gilman, Sander. *On Blackness Without Blacks: Essays on the Image of the Black in Germany*. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1982.
- Gould, Stephen Jay. 1981. *The Mismeasure of Man*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
- Haller, John. "The Physician versus the Negro: Medical and Anthropological Concepts of Race in the Late Nineteenth Century." *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, March 1st, 1970: 154-167.
- Hartman, Saidiya. *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- *Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route*. New York: Farrar, Straus and

- Giroux, 2008.
- Hegel, Georg. "Geographical Basis of World History." In *Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader*, edited by Emmanuel Eze, 110-149. Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1997.
- Hirschfeld, Magnus. *Transvestites: The Erotic Drive to Cross-Dress*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991.
- . *The Homosexuality of Men and Women*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2000.
- Horn, David. *The Criminal Body: Lombroso and the Anatomy of Deviance*. New York: Routledge, 2003.
- Horton-Stallings, LaMonda. *Funk the Erotic: Transaesthetics and Black Sexual Cultures*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2015, Kindle Edition.
- Jackson, Zakiyyah Iman. "Sense of Things." *Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience* 2, no. 2 (2016): 1-48.
- Jameson, Fredric. *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982.
- Kennedy, Hubert. *Karl Heinrich Ulrichs: Pioneer of the Modern Gay Movement*. San Francisco: Peremptory Publications, 2002.
- Krafft-Ebing, Richard von. "Perversion of the Sexual Instinct-Report of Cases," *The Alienist and Neurologist* 9(4), 1888:
- Laclau, Ernesto. 1995. "Time is Out of Joint." *Diacritics* 25, no. 2: 85-96.
- Lev, Arlene Istar. "Disordering Gender Identity: Gender Identity Disorder in the *DSM-IV-TR*." *Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality* 17(3/4), 2005:
- Lomax, Leila. *Physiognomy*. Philadelphia: The Penn Publishing Company, 1905.
- Mayes, Rick and Allan Horwitz. 2005. "DSM-III and the Revolution in the Classification of Mental Illness." *Journal of the History of Behavioral Sciences* 41, no. 3: 249-267.
- Mbembe, Achille. 2002. "The Power of the Archive and its Limits." In *Refiguring the Archive*, edited by Carolyn Hamilton et al. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002: 19-28.
- Meyerowitz, Joanne. 2002. *How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the United States*. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Miller, Nchamah. "Hauntology and History in Jacques Derrida's *Spectres of Marx*" no publisher, no date.
- Morgan, Jennifer. *Laboring Women: Gender and Reproduction in the Making of New World Slavery*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
- Norwalk, Peter Michael Foley (Writers), & Mike Listo (Director). (2015). Two Birds, One Millstone [Television series episode]. In S. Rhimes (Producer), *How to Get Away with Murder*. New York: American Broadcasting Company.
- Oosterhuis, Harry. (1997). "Richard von Krafft-Ebing's 'Step-Children of Nature: Psychiatry and the Making of Homosexual Identity.'" In V. Rosario (Ed.), *Science and Homosexualities*. New York: Routledge, 1997, 67-88.
- Painter, Nell Irvin. *Southern History Across the Color Line*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.
- Prospero [Buckner Payne]. "Caliban: A Sequel to Ariel." In *Anti-Black Thought Volume Five: The "Ariel" Controversy, Religion and "The Negro Problem" Part I*, edited by John David Smith, 193-222. New York: Garland Publishing, 1993.
- Prosser, Jay. 1998. "Transsexuals and the Transsexologists: Inversion and the Emergence of Transsexual Subjectivity." *Sexology in Culture: Labelling Bodies and Desires*. Eds. Lucy Bland and Laura Doan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Raffalovich, Marc Andre. "Uranism, Congenital Sexual Inversion: Observations and Recommendations." *Journal of Comparative Neurology* 5, no. 1 (1895): 33-65.
- Ritvo, Lucille. *Darwin's Influence on Freud: A Tale of Two Sciences*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.
- Rohy, Valerie. 2009. *Anachronism and Its Others: Sexuality, Race, Temporality*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Rubin, Gayle. 1997. "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex." *The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory*. Ed. Linda Nicholson. New York: Routledge, 27-62.
- Rubin, Gayle with Judith Butler. 1997. "Sexual Traffic. Interview." *feminism meets queer theory*. Eds. Elizabeth Weed and Naomi Schor. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press: 68-108.
- Shakespeare, William. *The Tempest: with an introduction and notes* by K. Deighton. London:

- Macmillan and Co., 1889.
- Sharpe, Christina. *In the Wake: On Blackness and Being*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2016.
- Snorton, C. Riley. *Black on Both Sides: A Racial History of Trans Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017.
- Snorton, C. Riley and Jin Haritaworn. "Trans Necropolitics." In *The Transgender Studies Reader 2*, edited by Aren Aizura and Susan Stryker. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 66-76.
- Soloman, Akiba. CeCe McDonald: Attacked for Her Identity, Incarcerated for Surviving. *Ebony*, May 4th, 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.ebony.com/news-views/cece-mcdonald-bias-attack#axzz2OCoiAkyi>
- Somerville, Siobhan. "Scientific Racism and the Invention of the Homosexual Body." *Journal of the History of Sexuality*, 5, no. 2 (1994): 243-266.
- Spillers, Hortense. (1987). Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book. *Diacritics* 17(2), 64-81.
- Springer, Kimberly. Waiting to Set It Off: African-American Women and the Sapphire Fixation. In M. McCaughey and N. King (Eds.), *Reel Knockouts: Violent Women in Film*. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), 172-199.
- Stanley, Eric. "Near Life, Queer Death: Overkill and Ontological Capture." *Social Text* 107, no. 29 (2011): 1-19.
- Stokes, Mason. "Someone's in the Garden with Eve: Race, Religion, and the American Fall." *American Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (1998): 718-744.
- Stryker, Susan. 2006. "(De)Subjugated Knowledges: An Introduction to Transgender Studies." *The Transgender Studies Reader*. Eds. Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle. New York: Routledge: 1-17.
- "Transgender History, Homonormativity, and Disciplinarity." *Radical History Review* 100 (2008):
- Thomas, Greg. *The Sexual Demon of Colonial Power: Pan-African Embodiment and Erotic Schemes of Empire*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007.
- Ulrichs, Karl Heinrich. *The Riddle of 'Man-Manly' Love, Volume II*. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1994.
- Walcott, Rinaldo. "Beyond the 'nation thing': Black Studies, Cultural Studies and Diaspora

Discourse (or the Post-Black Studies Moment) in *Decolonizing the Academy: African Diaspora Studies*, eds. Carole Boyce Davies et al. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003.

Weheliye, Alexander. (2014). *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Wilchins, Riki Anne. *Read my Lips: Sexual Subversions and the End of Gender*. Ann Arbor: Firebrand Books, 1997.

Wilson, Daniel. *Caliban: The Missing Link*. London: Macmillan and Co., 1873.

Wynter, Sylvia. "Beyond Miranda's Meaning: Un/silencing the 'Demonic Ground' of Caliban's 'Woman.'" In *Out of the Kumbla: Caribbean Women and Literature*, edited by Carole Boyce Davies and Elaine Savory Fido, 355-372. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1990.

---. "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation--An Argument" *CR: The New Centennial Review*, 3, no. 3 (2003): 257-337.

Young, Allan. 1995. *The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.