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    <title>Recent uclalaw_plltwps items</title>
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    <description>Recent eScholarship items from UCLA Public Law &amp; Legal Theory Series</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 8 Sep 2026 12:16:33 +0000</pubDate>
    <item>
      <title>Competition and Congestion in Trademark Law</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/98s5w5qf</link>
      <description>Trademark law exists to promote competition. If consumers know which companies make which products, they can more easily find the products they actually want to purchase. Trademark law has long treated “source significance”—the fact that a particular trademark is identified with a particular producer—as both necessary and sufficient for establishing a valid trademark. That is, trademark law has traditionally viewed source significance as the only necessary precondition for a trademark being pro-competitive. In this paper, we argue that this equation of source significance and pro-competitiveness is misguided. Some marks use words that are so closely connected with the product being branded that giving just one firm a monopoly over those words provides that firm with a meaningful competitive advantage—an artificial advantage granted by the state. This problem becomes worse as the number of firms producing (and branding) a type of product increases.The more words cordoned off by...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Buccafusco, Christopher</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Masur, Jonathan S.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/96d194h2</link>
      <description>In the early 1980s, Fred Korematsu, Minoru Yasui, and Gordon Hirabayashi marched back into the federal courts that convicted them during World War II for defying the internment of persons of Japanese descent. Relying on suppressed exculpatory evidence discovered in the national archives, they filed writs of error coram nobis to overturn their convictions. Remarkably, this litigation was successful and fueled the extraordinary redress movement, which culminated in federal reparations for surviving internees. Yet, a dark side to this victory has never been discussed, until now. In granting the petitions, the Judiciary absolved the one branch of government that has never been held accountable for the internment: itself. Specifically, the lower federal courts adopted an official legal history that insulated the wartime Supreme Court from any fault. According to that account, the Supreme Court was simply duped by conniving officials in the Departments of War and Justice, who suppressed...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kang, Jerry</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Fixing Functionality in Design Patent Law</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/93v1n2qw</link>
      <description>This contribution to the Berkeley Technology Law Journal's spring 2021 symposium, Navigating and Rectifying the Design Patent Muddle, responds to Peter Menell and Ella Corren's important article, Design Patent Law's Identity Crisis. It agrees with Menell and Corren that design patent law's ornamentality requirement should get more attention because that requirement is supposed to differentiate design patent from utility patent. It also agrees that current law does not exclude functional design features aggressively enough. It suggests, however, that there really are two distinct but related problems with ornamentality doctrine.The first problem is that the Federal Circuit has reduced the concept of ornamentality to nonfunctionality: The only question courts and the Patent Office ask in considering whether a design meets the statutory requirement of ornamentality is whether the design features are nonfunctional. The second problem is that the Federal Circuit defines functionality...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Design Problems</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/89x19932</link>
      <description>This Essay draws on our empirical research into designers and their work to investigate the limits of intellectual property law for achieving its goal of progress in the design context. We focus on two related aspects of our research and also address a pressing doctrinal question in design patent law. The two research questions we discuss are: (1) how do designers conceive of and solve design problems through innovative design practice?; and (2) how do designers incorporate human values of coherence, inclusivity, and sustainability in their process, imbuing their practice with a kind of politics? The related doctrinal question concerns patent law's obviousness doctrine, which recently has been restored in the design patent context, but in ways we consider incomplete and to which we offer several improvements. Specifically, we emphasize the role of constraints under which designers work, and how those constraints can guide evaluation of the problems designers seek to solve.</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Silbey, Jessica</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Progressive Politics and the Courts: Lessons from the United States</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8821c46p</link>
      <description>In recent years, contested political issues in the US have been subject to strategic judicial challenges that attempt to reopen political debates on a more favorable battleground. For example, twice in the four years after Congress and President Obama enacted health reform, legal challenges subjected this progressive achievement to a final veto point: the consent of an ideologically fractured Supreme Court. Conservatives attempted to achieve through the courts — citing novel legal doctrines — a policy goal of enormous consequence, which they could not achieve through the legislature. Party actors used the judiciary as an institutional veto for the political process; a final means to block a policy change that American progressives had for generations fought to secure. Conservatives made similar legal challenges to nearly all of President Obama’s major initiatives, in policy areas including oversight of the financial system, environmental regulation, and immigration.Further, recent...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Highsmith, Brian</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Huang, Chye-Ching</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Partisan Constitutionalism: Reconsidering the Role of Political Parties in Popular Constitutional Change</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/86v8c3xm</link>
      <description>Scholars have long understood that political parties play an important role in shaping constitutional culture over time. This occurs most obviously through judicial appointments but also by participating in the shaping of public opinion and passing legislation affecting the scope of our fundamental commitments. But recent legal challenges to the healthcare law highlight the ability of political parties to use courts to shift the scope and meaning of our policy and constitutional commitments also in the very short run, through their strategic support for high-stakes public litigation.In both the NFIB and King challenges, some number of political opponents of the healthcare law recognized in the developing legal case an opportunity to extend a fight that had been waged in the political branches (at both the state and federal level), to a new and potentially more favorable battleground. This paper seeks to identify, for the first time, the mechanisms that allow political parties...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Highsmith, Brian</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Crimsumerism: Combating Consumer Abuses in the Criminal Legal System</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7z79s8wh</link>
      <description>Crimsumerism: Combating Consumer Abuses in the Criminal Legal System</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Highsmith, Brian</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Kornya, Alex</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Rodarmel, Danica</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Gonzalez, Mel</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Mermin, Ted</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability of Dworkin's Defense of Affirmative Action</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7b24g0s8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ronald Dworkin has forcefully argued that because affirmative action does not violate the constitutional rights of Whites, it must be allowed to do the work of promoting racial equality. But the sword he forges to justify affirmative action has a double-edge that cuts unexpectedly against the liberal orthoýdoxy. In particular, Dworkin's theory justifying affirmaýtive action for certain minority groups, consistently applied under plausible empirical conditions, can authorize what I call negative action against Asian Americans.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;By negative action, I mean unfavorable treatment based on race, using the treatment of Whites for comparison: Negative action against Asian Americans is in force if a university denies admission to an Asian Ameriýcan who would have been admitted had that person been White. The fact that Dworkin's theory justifies both affirmative action for racial minorities and negative action against Asian Americans suggests an internal instability within his theory....</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kang, Jerry</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 'Affirmative Action'</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6wx3m7q9</link>
      <description>New facts recently discovered in the mind and behavioral sciences have the potential to transform both lay and expert conceptions of affirmative action. Drawing on recent findings in implicit social cognition (ISC) and applying a legal methodology called behavioral realism, the authors advance four arguments. First, evidence of pervasive implicit bias allows us to avoid problematic backward- and forward-looking justifications for affirmative action and instead focus on addressing discrimination here and now. Second, evidence of biased interpretation and stereotype threat suggests that merit is currently being mismeasured, and that more accurate measurement processes should be adopted. Third, evidence of the malleability of implicit bias suggests interventions different from the traditional social contact hypothesis, such as deploying debiasing agents. Finally, instead of an arbitrary deadline, a better terminus for various affirmative action programs is when our society reaches...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kang, Jerry</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Banaji, Mahzarin R.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Regulating Location Incentives</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/66x1f015</link>
      <description>In recent years, a growing share of state and local budgetary resources has been diverted to a small number of firms through multi-billion-dollar location incentive megadeals, as represented by Amazon’s HQ2 search and Wisconsin’s Foxconn boondoggle. These companies have become adept at devising new mechanisms for extracting the public resources of local communities to secure a competition advantage over their market rivals. But legal scholarship has not considered the possibility that dominant firms’ incentive demands might implicate the statutory protections enacted to protect against unfair methods of competition and corporate dominance more broadly. This Article develops a historical, economic, and institutional case for using latent authority under the FTC Act to study the market consequences of inefficient incentive megadeals—and regulate certain anticompetitive practices that cause cognizable harms.This Article uses location incentive megadeals to explore how federal regulation...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Highsmith, Brian</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Taking Scale Seriously in Technology Law</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5w10f3j2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Issues of scale—the relationship between the amount of an activity and its associated costs and benefits—permeate discussions around law and technologies. Indeed, it’s not much of an exaggeration to say that scale is the reason for most technology regulation.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But it’s not always clear how lawmakers and judges conceptualize “scale” when approaching questions around automated technologies. Scale is often used intuitively, just to mean “more.” But scale is not always just about more—scale can introduce new harms and benefits along different dimensions, not simply costs or efficiencies of greater magnitude.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In this Article, we argue for a more sustained interrogation of the role of scale in law, one that is more sensitive to the distinction between what we describe as “scale is more” and “scale is different.” When lawmakers and judges fail to properly categorize the role of scale in a particular context, they risk ignoring or misidentifying harms, misdiagnosing the...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Hartzog, Woodrow</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Investigating Design</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5938g1xv</link>
      <description>Design is ascendant. Steve Jobs’s legendary obsession with design was widely regarded as Apple’s comparative advantage, and that lesson has not been lost on its competitors. Design thinking is a growth industry, in business and at universities, and design professionals continue to take on increasingly significant roles within firms. The increasing economic significance of design has been reflected in an explosion of design patent applications and increasing amount of design litigation.Despite design’s growing economic and legal importance, relatively little is known by legal scholars and policymakers about designers or the design process. This paper addresses that gap and is drawn from original data collected over several years interviewing and observing designers where they work. Our interviews provide a rich background on the design field(s), the nature and value of design, and designers’ goals and values.Studying designers and the practice of design is not only economically...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Silbey, Jessica</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Trademark Spaces and Trademark Law's Secret Step Zero</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5909g17r</link>
      <description>When is a design just a design, and when is it a trademark? Over the last several decades, courts have developed a clear framework for evaluating the distinctiveness of certain unconventional marks, especially those typically conceived of as “trade dress.” The Supreme Court has drawn a line between product packaging, on the one hand, and product design, on the other. Packaging features are treated just like any other potential trademark in the sense that we protect them automatically if they are inherently distinctive, and we require evidence of secondary meaning if they aren’t. Product design, by contrast, is different: like color, it is incapable of being inherently distinctive and can be protected only when it has acquired secondary meaning.There’s just one problem with this fundamental rule: it isn’t true. Or at least, it isn’t the whole truth. As we show in this article, sometimes courts and the Trademark Office don’t recognize features like logos as being part of a product’s...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Lemley, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Welfare Reform at Twenty: The Consequences of Making Work Status a Proxy for Deservingness</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/54h885qp</link>
      <description>Twenty years ago, President Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), the culmination of what had started as his campaign promise five years prior to “end welfare as we know it.” The law ended the country’s only cash entitlement program for poor families with children, replacing it with a fixed-budget, state-administered program that offers lifetime-limited cash assistance to some but not all needy families and requires recipients to participate in work activity as a condition of receipt. The reform significantly altered our safety net’s protections, not to mention our national politics, and its effects are still debated today. In $2.00 a Day: Living on Almost Nothing in America, leading poverty researchers Kathryn J. Edin and H. Luke Shaefer add a new urgency to this debate by documenting the survival stories of families who have fallen into the gaps that PRWORA created — which, researchers increasingly agree, are much...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Highsmith, Brian</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Trade Mark Protection for Digital Goods</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5061p93z</link>
      <description>A number of recent US cases involve attempts by authors or publishers of creative works to use trade mark or unfair competition law to control the reproduction or use of those works. For example, consider a movie the copyright protection for which has lapsed. Can the creator of the movie claim that copiers of the film commit trade mark infringement by including in their copies some content that appears in the original movie – perhaps the movie studio’s logo, or a famous scene? Or consider a website that allows artists to upload and offer for sale digital models of various goods where the models include recognisable designs and/or logos. Does the website operator commit trade mark infringement simply by distributing the digital files, from which someone might print a physical good that bears the trade mark?These sorts of claims raise important questions about the boundaries of different forms of intellectual property, particularly the distinctions between trade mark, copyright,...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Mckenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Osborn, Lucas</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Asian Americans: Engaging Online</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4828q84s</link>
      <description>The Internet has rapidly become a familiar communications medium at the workplace, at home, and on the streets. Fortunately, this trend has not passed Asian Americans by. Notwithstanding substantial variance among subpopulations, it is fair to say that Asian Americans as a racial group are on average well-connected to the Internet. What then are the implications for Asian American civic engagement? This Chapter addresses that question, first, by examining how Asian Americans are currently using online communities, with special focus on ethnic-specific forms of Internet-mediated engagements. Next, it analyzes a specific aspect of political engagement - voting - which may soon be strongly influenced by the Internet. Finally, it explores how the increasing significance of computer-mediated communications might alter or disrupt how race operates both online and off, and what that might mean for Asian America.</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kang, Jerry</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Design Patents Aren't Patents (And It's a Good Thing Too)</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/45p2j1b0</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In design patent law we have created a monster—a chimera, a hybrid that sometimes looks and acts like a patent regime and then, unexpectedly, doesn’t. Courts in design patent cases sometimes apply the rules as they would in utility patent cases, sometimes modify those rules for the design context, and sometimes ignore the utility patent rules altogether. The consequences of that incomplete adoption of utility patent rules are grossly underappreciated. Among other things, it has wreaked havoc on the law of novelty and nonobviouness— doctrines that are supposed to ensure that we grant design patent protection only to new and meaningfully different designs. And it has too often resulted in rules that ignore how designers actually work. In this Article, we suggest that the problem stems from trying to fit design into a framework that was intended for the very different context of inventions. There are good reasons not to use the utility patent infringement rules for design, even...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Lemley, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Qualitative Method for Investigating Design</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/40q5z5hj</link>
      <description>This chapter describes our qualitative study of designers and design practice. It situates the study in the broader field of empirical studies of intellectual property, and it describes in detail the methodology and benefits of a qualitative interview study of designers and design practice to shed light on some of the persistent puzzles in design law. The chapter focuses on four lines of inquiry: defining “design” and “design practice” from within the profession; exploring the various inputs to design practice and the process of “problem solving” designers pursue; understanding what “integrated” form and function mean to designers; and explaining the features of “successful” or “excellent” design as a professional standard.</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Mckenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Silbey, Jessica</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>E-Racing E-Lections</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3zb5q9q7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Electronic voting is inevitable. It will significantly affect the process of electing and governing, with important consequences on race, race relations, and social justice. This paper argues that on matters of electing, we should not let short term concerns about digital divide blind us to long term possibilities. Specifically, we should pay close attention to how cyberspace can be specifically designed to alter preferences and attitudes, political as well as social, of its inhabitants in particular ways.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On matters of governing, the spread of the Internet may encourage more instantaneous forms of direct democracy. This is bad news for racial minorities because they are numerical minorities and people vote more in their self-interest than in the public interest. To respond to the possibility of a digital tyranny of an electronically mediated majority, this paper urges racial minorities to prepare to play smart, to leverage technology to counter numerical disadvantages....</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kang, Jerry</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Privacy in Atlantis</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3wk3q15b</link>
      <description>This Socratic Dialogue is set in the nation state of Atlantis. The Queen has charged the Counselor to consult learned stakeholders to forge a course of action on the matter of privacy. Accordingly, the Counselor has called forth the Philosopher, Economist, Merchant, and Technologist to the great Hall of Discussion. Through a hard-nosed, pragmatic dialogue, the Counselor comes to believe that form has been privileged over substance in the privacy debate. Regardless of whether privacy is viewed as property or dignity, one must confront similar core problems in establishing privacy policy. And regardless of the framing, quite similar solutions may be adopted.</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kang, Jerry</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Buchner, Benedikt</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Fees, Fines, and the Funding of Public Services: A Curriculum for Reform</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3ng568j8</link>
      <description>Since 2018, the Liman Center at Yale Law School and Harvard Law School’s Criminal Justice Policy Program (CJPP), in partnership with the Fines &amp;amp; Fees Justice Center and the Berkeley Law Policy Advocacy Clinic, have collaborated to mitigate the problems faced by people of limited means and resources who interact with criminal punishment systems around the United States. Through a series of workshops and materials, we have examined how law has enabled and, on occasion, limited these harms, experienced disproportionately by communities of color.Budget pressures are part of what drives state and local governments to rely on monetary sanctions. Reform efforts have, at times, been stymied by arguments that governments “need” the money generated by regressive fines and fees. In 2008, during and after the Great Recession, state and local governments responded to sudden budget pressures by searching for new streams of revenues—including from a host of legal assessments. Given that...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Highsmith, Brian</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3m12k6jm</link>
      <description>Cyberspace is the rapidly growing network of computing and communication technologies that have profoundly altered our lives. We already carry out myriad social, economic, and political transactions through cyberspace, and, as the technology improves, so will their quality and quantity. But the very technology that enables these transactions also makes detailed, cumulative, invisible observation of our selves possible. The potential for wide-ranging surveillance of all our cyber-activities presents a serious threat to information privacy. To help readers grasp the nature of this threat, Professor Jerry Kang starts with a general primer on cyberspace privacy. He provides a clarifying structure of philosophical and technological terms, descriptions, and concepts that will help analyze any problem at the nexus of privacy and computing-communication technologies. In the second half of the article, he focuses sharply on the specific problem of personal data generated in cyberspace...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kang, Jerry</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Externalizing Trademark's Limits</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3dh7d0hd</link>
      <description>Courts and scholars alike conventionally describe trademark rights as inherently limited. By “inherently limited,” they mean that the boundaries of trademark rights can be derived from the justifications for those rights, without resort to other competing values. That description is important to both trademark maximalists and minimalists. For the former, appeals to the inherent limits are meant to downplay concerns about broad rights; for the latter, they are meant to reinvigorate the limits.The claim that trademark rights are inherently limited is undeniably correct in important ways. Nothing is more foundational to trademark law than the notion that trademark rights are not rights in gross—the rights arise out of use in connection with particular goods or services, and they exist only in relation to those goods or services. For that reason, eligibility for trademark protection depends on a claimed mark’s relationship to the goods and services. We determine whether one has a...</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Amazon's Quiet Overhaul of the Trademark System</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2vb3q2zg</link>
      <description>Amazon’s dominance as a platform is widely documented. But one aspect of that dominance has not received sufficient attention—the Amazon Brand Registry’s sweeping influence on firm behavior, particularly in relation to the formal trademark system. Amazon’s Brand Registry serves as a shadow trademark system that dramatically affects businesses’ incentives to seek legal registration of their marks. The result has been a surge in the number of applications to register, which has swamped the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and created delays for all applicants, even those that previously would have registered their marks. And the increased value of federal registration has drawn in bad actors who fraudulently register marks that are in use by others on the Amazon platform and use those registrations to extort the true owners.Amazon’s policies also create incentives for businesses to adopt different kinds of marks. Specifically, businesses are more likely to claim descriptive...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2vb3q2zg</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Fromer, Jeanne</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Registration and Federalization: 75 Years of the Lanham Act</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2bf8p7v3</link>
      <description>This contribution to the Cardozo Arts &amp;amp; Entertainment Law Journal's symposium celebrating 75 years of the Lanham Act evaluates the statute in light of two of the drafters' most significant goals: improving the quality of notice provided by the federal register and maintaining the substantive uniformity of trademark and unfair competition law.In our view, the statute has only been a partial success in terms of notice. Federal law has come to dominate the field, but not primarily because registration became more significant, as the drafters expected. Instead, federal law displaced common law trademark and unfair competition law because courts interpreted the Lanham Act to provide a federal cause of action for infringement of unregistered marks. That interpretation assured continued substantive uniformity, but it undermined the statute’s incentives to register and therefore probably came at the expense of better notice.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2bf8p7v3</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Von Rueden, Brittany</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Watching the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the Internment's Shadow</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1zm5t4nt</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial (2004), I tried to further a careful remembering of the internment as precedent and parable by holding the judiciary to account. The accounting was for what it did not only in the 1940s internment cases decided by the Supreme Court, but also the less well-known 1980s coram nobis cases decided in the Ninth Circuit. My objective was to unmask the sophistic ways that the judiciary avoided accountability for the racist civil rights disaster. Using techniques often praised as minimalist, the judiciary in the 1940s avoided accountability on the part of the President and the Congress. With a straight face, the Court held that the internment camps were never authorized by the political branches; rather, they were an ultra vires frolic committed by a civilian agency called the War Relocation Authority.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I also showed how, in the 1980s, again using minimalist tactics, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals quietly whitewashed history...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1zm5t4nt</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kang, Jerry</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Cyber-Race</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1zb353pg</link>
      <description>To date, most inquiries into race and cyberspace have focused on the "digital divide" - whether racial minorities have access to advanced computing-communication technologies. This paper asks a more fundamental question: Can cyberspace change the way that race functions in American society? Professor Jerry Kang starts his analysis with a social-cognitive account of American racial mechanics that centers the role of racial schemas. These schemas consist of racial categories, rules of racial mapping that place individuals into these categories, and racial meanings associated with each category. He argues that cyberspace can disrupt racial schemas because it alters the architecture of both identity presentation (enabling racial anonymity and pseudonymity) and social interaction (enabling increased interracial interactions). Thus, cyberspace presents society with three design options: abolition, which challenges racial mapping by promoting racial anonymity; integration, which reforms...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1zb353pg</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kang, Jerry</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Race.Net Neutrality</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0vs7s4kq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The "net neutrality" debate is undergoing a theoretical transition. Since the late 1990s, we have moved from "open access," to "end to end," to "net neutrality," and by 2007, the question seems to have transformed into "anti-discrimination." To the extent that net discrimination frames the question, our history and experience with race discrimination should be cognitively salient. Although patently different subjects, these two forms of discrimination share some similarities which have been noted by various commentators but never systematically explored. This Essay begins that study, with the goal of gleaning lessons for telecommunications policy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A comparison and contrast between race discrimination and net discrimination teaches us, first, to particularize the discrimination at issue, and to be wary of what I call normative carve-outs in defining discrimination. Second, the comparison sensitizes us to the clash between welfarist and deontological concerns that have...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0vs7s4kq</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kang, Jerry</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Urban Sensing: Out of the Woods</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0m95s839</link>
      <description>A fundamental shift is underway in pervasive computing. Within academic research, pervasive computing in the form of embedded networked sensing has leapt from the laboratory to the natural environment. Simultaneously, in the domain of personal communication and corporate marketing, pervasive computing has entered the backpack, purse, and coat pocket in the form of mobile phones, laying the groundwork for Mark Weiser's vision of ubiquitous computing. We characterize this contextual shift as urban sensing, which augurs a fundamental transition from science and engineering into the realms of politics, aesthetics, interpretation, and motivation. More than a change in degree, this is a change in kind that warrants careful, transdisciplinary study. In this paper, three authors representing the fields of architecture and urban planning, statistics and visual arts, and the law explore how urban sensing can help produce a data commons with public sphere benefits. But the construction of...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0m95s839</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kang, Jerry</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Cuff, Dana</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Hasen, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Brief of Trademark Scholars As Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/03d6z9hk</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Amici take no position on whether BOOKING.COM is generic, but write to encourage the Court to be cautious in resolving this case, which involves a generic term combined with a common top-level domain name identifier (.com). Trademark applications raise almost infinitely varied scenarios, including generic terms combined with other elements, and the top-level domain name identifier has some specific features that make it analogous to functional matter. Whatever rule the Court adopts should be highly attentive to the risks to competition of overassertion of registered marks that are largely or entirely comprised of generic elements.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Because courts deciding infringement cases are often unfamiliar with the context of a trademark registration, they may miss limitations on the scope of the registered mark that the Trademark Office believed existed and, as a result, enforce broader rights than the registrants should actually have. Ordinary businesses receiving cease and desist...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/03d6z9hk</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Tushnet, Rebecca</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? Legal Standards vs. Fundamental Determinants</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9xw2177x</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;William Baude and Stephen Sachs argue for the importance of the “law of interpretation” – legal standards that govern how statutes, constitutional provisions, and other legal materials are to be interpreted. Their article begins by following and developing a cluster of arguments I have elaborated in recent work – arguments that emphasize the importance of distinguishing between, on the one hand, the linguistic meaning of legal texts and, on the other, the content of the law. But Baude and Sachs’s view about the most important implication of these arguments is very different from mine. Their central message is a practical, lawyerly one: we can avoid the abstract and theoretical complexities and normative and linguistic disputes that have typified central debates over legal interpretation by instead looking to law for the answers. Baude and Sachs’s goal here is not to take a position on what the law of interpretation requires with respect to the relevant issues, but to argue...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9xw2177x</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Explaining the Asymmetry between Mistakes of Law and Mistakes of Fact</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9w58224d</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Gideon Yaffe’s "Excusing Mistakes of Law" seeks to explain "the asymmetry between the excusing force of mistakes of fact and law." In this paper, I offer a competing explanation of the asymmetry and criticize Gideon's explanation. Behind some of the specific issues concerning mistake of fact and mistake of law lie more fundamental questions about the nature of law and about the relation between law and morality. Underlying Gideon's proposal seems to be an assumption that the legal domain has an internal structure parallel to that of the moral domain: legal reasons, legal obligations, legal excuses, and so on bear the same relations to each other that, within the moral domain, moral reasons, moral obligations, moral excuses, and so on bear to each other. In particular, Gideon relies on the assumption that just as, absent special circumstances, one who acts on morally wrong principles is, for that reason, morally blameworthy or morally deserving of reproach or punishment, so...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9w58224d</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Thoughts Without Masters: Incomplete Understanding and the Content of Mind</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9hr0r04z</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;When we explain Bruno’s taking the train by attributing to him the belief that safety is more important than price, we attribute to him a thought involving the concept of safety, as opposed to (say) the concept of comfort. Most leading theories of mental content presuppose what I call&amp;nbsp;the achievement view&amp;nbsp;– that for a thought to involve a given concept is, roughly speaking, for the thinker to have a disposition to satisfy a condition associated with the concept, such as a disposition to make certain inferences. I show that it follows from the achievement view that a thinker must&amp;nbsp;fully grasp&amp;nbsp;(in a sense I make precise) a concept in order to have attitudes involving it (though most theorists would allow an exception for cases in which the thinker defers to others). I claim, to the contrary, that thinkers can have attitudes involving concepts no one fully grasps. Further, I argue that this phenomenon, which I call incomplete understanding, is the key to otherwise...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9hr0r04z</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Structure of a Free Speech Right</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/93p8g4r4</link>
      <description>What do you have by virtue of being the holder of a free speech right? This chapter in the forthcoming Oxford Handbook on Freedom of Speech provides an overview of the underlying structure of free speech as a legal right by analyzing and illustrating its component parts. It shows that the answer to this question can vary considerably depending on how these parts are addressed and combined. The six components, or structural elements, of a free speech right are: (1) its legal force or status (2) who are the subjects or rights-holders; (3) the scope of the right; (4) whether it includes not only negative prohibitions but also positive obligations to protect against third-party threats; (5) the object of the right, or who is bound by it; and (6) permissible limits on the right. The chapter gives examples of significant variation in the approach to these elements among legal systems around the world and demonstrates how, by collectively constituting the general structure of the right...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/93p8g4r4</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Gardbaum, Stephen</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Probabilistic Knowledge of Third-Party Trademark Infringement</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8t87c1p4</link>
      <description>This essay views secondary trademark liability in light of tort law’s treatment of parties whose actions expose a plaintiff to third party-wrongdoing. Broadly speaking, tort law imposes liability on a party for contributing to the tortious activity of another in two different ways. In vicarious and accomplice liability cases, courts impose the same liability on the defendant as they would have on the direct tortfeasors, had they been defendants: if the third-party wrongdoer is a batterer, the defendant is liable for battery. Another line of cases imposes liability for unreasonably putting a defendant at risk of third-party wrongdoing, and these cases are often based on knowledge of probabilistic harm. But crucially, these are negligence cases: even if the third party wrongdoer is a batterer, the defendant’s liability in these cases is for negligence and not for battery. The Supreme Court's Inwood decision preserves this important distinction between secondary liability for third-party...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8t87c1p4</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How Law Affects Behavior</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8qw7g4cq</link>
      <description>Fred Schauer’s&amp;nbsp;&lt;em&gt;The Force of Law&lt;/em&gt;&amp;nbsp;neglects an important way in which the law can motivate people. It shapes our moral reasons. Schauer’s response to my original essay that he is concerned with empirical motivations, not normative reasons, misses the point. His empirical argument depends crucially on his assumptions that, when people act for moral reasons, the law has not made a difference to their behavior and that the use of coercion is the only alternative to getting people to obey the law simply because it is the law. Once we see that the law regularly molds our ordinary moral reasons, not by creating content independent reasons, but by changing the morally relevant circumstances, we see that much morally motivated behavior is in fact behavior that is importantly influenced by the law. Regardless of the empirical frequency of “puzzled people,” because people respond to moral reasons, law has an important alternative to the use of coercion.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8qw7g4cq</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>(Dys)Functionality</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8b66j10m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The functionality doctrine serves a unique role in trademark law: unlike virtually every other doctrine, functionality can trump consumer confusion (or so it seems, at least in mechanical-functionality cases). In this sense, functionality may be the only doctrine in trademark law that can truly be considered a defense. But despite its potential power, the functionality doctrine is quite inconsistently applied. This is true of mechanical functionality cases because courts differ over the extent to which the doctrine focuses on competitors’ right to copy unpatented features as opposed to their need to copy. And aesthetic functionality cases are even more scattered: some courts refuse to recognize the aesthetic-functionality doctrine at all, and courts that do recognize it are often reluctant to actually find the features at issue functional, even when exclusive use of those features seems very likely to put competitors at a significant, non-reputation-related disadvantage.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8b66j10m</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Moral Impact Theory of Law</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/89p9k3v7</link>
      <description>I develop an alternative to the two main views of law that have dominated legal thought. My view offers a novel account of how the actions of legal institutions make the law what it is, and a correspondingly novel account of how to interpret legal texts. According to my view, legal obligations are a certain subset of moral obligations. Legal institutions – legislatures, courts, administrative agencies – take actions that change our moral obligations. They do so by changing the morally relevant facts and circumstances, for example by changing people’s expectations, providing new options, or bestowing the blessing of the people’s representatives on particular schemes. My theory holds, very roughly, that the resulting moral obligations are legal obligations. I call this view the Moral Impact Theory because it holds that the law is the moral impact of the relevant actions of legal institutions. In this Essay, I elaborate and refine the theory and then illustrate and clarify its implications...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/89p9k3v7</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How Mistakes Excuse: Genuine Desert, Moral Desert, and Legal Desert</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7g59p4cn</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Gideon Yaffe’s "Excusing Mistakes of Law" seeks to explain "the asymmetry between the excusing force of mistakes of fact and law." In this paper, I offer a competing explanation of the asymmetry and criticize Gideon's explanation. Behind some of the specific issues concerning mistake of fact and mistake of law lie more fundamental questions about the nature of law and about the relation between law and morality. Underlying Gideon's proposal seems to be an assumption that the legal domain has an internal structure parallel to that of the moral domain: legal reasons, legal obligations, legal excuses, and so on bear the same relations to each other that, within the moral domain, moral reasons, moral obligations, moral excuses, and so on bear to each other. In particular, Gideon relies on the assumption that just as, absent special circumstances, one who acts on morally wrong principles is, for that reason, morally blameworthy or morally deserving of reproach or punishment, so...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7g59p4cn</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Teaching Trademark Theory through the Lens of Distinctiveness</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7cw1z0z0</link>
      <description>Teaching Trademark Theory through the Lens of Distinctiveness</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7cw1z0z0</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Implications of Inequality for Fiscal Federalism (or Why the Federal Government Should Pay for Local Public Schools)</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/79g237wr</link>
      <description>In designing public policy, a question of first principle is the degree to which government services—and the mechanisms of collecting revenue to finance those services—should be centralized within and across political systems. To inform their assessments of where redistribution properly should occur, public finance researchers have to date worked backwards from different assumptions about the mobility of residents within the political community. Scholars have disagreed about the viability of local governments’ efforts to redistribute wealth—with traditionalists arguing that these efforts are made impossible by residential mobility, and recent reformists countering that limitations on mobility indeed allow for limited redistribution at the local level.But these theoretical arguments have largely sidestepped questions about what level of centralization is optimal for redistributive programs. And by focusing on the empirical question of residential mobility, they have ignored a variable...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/79g237wr</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Highsmith, Brian</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Democratic Design and the Twin Contemporary Challenges of Fragmented and Unduly Concentrated Political Power</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/78g80396</link>
      <description>This chapter is an exercise in democratic design that explores one potential way to achieve and better balance the four key values of democratic governance – effective, stable, accountable, and representative government -- and also to address some current pathologies of political party systems, especially polarization and fragmentation. This way is to adapt a newly conceptualized democratic regime type, semi-parliamentarism, for more general use.Although political parties are essential to modern democracy, they create certain problems for achieving its central governance values. The general and longstanding problem is that because parties compete to occupy state executive and legislative institutions, they can concentrate power when a single party occupies both and also disperse it when it does not, regardless of the formal or constitutional relationship between these institutions. Such concentration or dispersal threatens to undermine various of the values. This general problem...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/78g80396</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Gardbaum, Stephen</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Life's a Game (Reviewing Robert Wright, Nonzero)</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6wt1k6qf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the theory of games, a non-zero-sum game is a situation in which one participant’s gain is not necessarily another’s loss – in which the gains and losses do not sum to zero. Trade is a non-zero-sum game since seller and buyer can both improve their positions. In zero-sum games, by contrast, there is a fixed total of prizes, with the consequence that any person’s advantage must be at the expense of someone else. Poker is a zero-sum game; so is competition between suitors for the same mate. There is nothing to be gained from cooperation in zero-sum games, but participants in non-zero-sum games typically stand to do better by cooperating with each other than by singly pursuing their individual interests. And human life, competitive as it is, is full of non-zero-sum situations. From our hunter-gatherer beginnings to the contemporary global economy, the total pool of goods is larger when people cooperate, divide labor, and specialize. In fact, competition increases the value...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6wt1k6qf</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6vj7k404</link>
      <description>In this paper, I challenge an influential understanding of naturalization according to which work on traditional problems in the philosophy of law should be replaced with sociological or psychological explanations of how judges decide cases. W.V. Quine famously proposed the “naturalization of epistemology.” In a prominent series of papers and a book, Brian Leiter has raised the intriguing idea that Quine’s naturalization of epistemology is a useful model for philosophy of law. I examine Quine’s naturalization of epistemology and Leiter’s suggested parallel and argue that the parallel does not hold up. Even granting Leiter’s substantive assumption that the law is indeterminate, there is no philosophical confusion or overreaching in the legal case that is parallel to the philosophical overreaching of Cartesian foundationalism in epistemology. Moreover, if we take seriously Leiter’s analogy, the upshot is almost the opposite of what Leiter suggests. The closest parallel in the legal...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6vj7k404</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Troubles for Content I</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6vc1j6c3</link>
      <description>It is widely accepted that thinkers can have thoughts involving concepts that, intuitively, they incompletely grasp. I argue, however, that the import of the phenomenon for the theory of linguistic and mental content has not been adequately appreciated: prominent theories of content, even if they specify modal determinants or grounds of content, lack an account of what it is for a representation to have content. The problem is easiest to see with respect to conceptual-role theories of content. And once we distinguish genuine incomplete understanding from mere error, we see that appeals to ideal conditions or a competence/performance distinction are no help with respect to incomplete understanding. Covariation theories are vulnerable to a parallel problem, for thinkers need not have a disposition to discriminate the relevant property in order to have the concept. An appeal to deference to other people cannot rescue conceptual role and covariation theories. A proviso about deference...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6vc1j6c3</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Prism of Rules</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6pv9528f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Most legal theorists, including almost all positivists and many others, take for granted or are implicitly committed to an assumption that is not an official part of positivism. The assumption is that the content of the law is determined by the contents of legally authoritative pronouncements. I call it the Pronouncement View (PV, for short). The kind of determination at issue here is constitutive, not epistemic. That is, PV concerns what makes the content of the law what it is, not how we ascertain the content of the law.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;PV is more of an organizing principle or core idea, than a precise doctrine. I have introduced PV in an unqualified form, but there are a variety of ways in which its claim could be moderated. For example, a qualified version of PV could hold that the contents of legally authoritative pronouncements play a central or predominant role in determining the content of the law.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The debate between positivists and anti-positivists is often framed in a...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6pv9528f</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>An Alternate Approach to Channeling?</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6j19658j</link>
      <description>Intellectual property law has developed a variety of doctrines to police the boundaries between various forms of protection. Courts and scholars alike overwhelmingly conceive of these doctrines in terms of the nature of the objects of protection. The functionality doctrine in trademark law, for example, defines the boundary between trademark and patent law by identifying and refusing trademark protection to features that play a functional role in a product’s performance. Likewise, the useful article doctrine works at the boundary of copyright and patent law to identify elements of an article’s design that are dictated by function and to channel protection of those features to the patent system. These are important doctrinal tools, and they play valuable roles in the overall intellectual property system. These channeling doctrines, however, reflect an incomplete sense of the interplay between various modes of intellectual property protection. Because they focus on subject matter,...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6j19658j</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Back to the Future: Rediscovering Equitable Discretion in Trademark Cases</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6hz5f73w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Courts in recent years have increasingly made blunt use of their equitable powers in trademark cases. Rather than limiting the scope of injunctive relief so as to protect the interests of a mark owner while respecting the legitimate interests of third parties and of consumers, courts in most cases have viewed injunctive relief in binary terms. This is unfortunate, because greater willingness to tailor injunctive relief could go a long way to mitigating some of the most pernicious effects of trademark law’s modern expansion. This Essay urges courts to reverse this trend towards crude injunctive relief, and to re-embrace their equitable discretion as a means of achieving greater balance in the trademark system.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6hz5f73w</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Beyond Textualism</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6h9415xz</link>
      <description>This paper was the basis for my Fordham University Natural Law Colloquium lecture in September 2019.More than 20 years ago, Justice Scalia wrote of “the great degree of confusion that prevails” in the field of statutory interpretation. Today, Scalia’s textualism is ascendant. Over the past three decades, textualism has expanded its influence both in both the courts and in the scholarly literature. (I’m using the term textualism to encompass textualism in both statutory interpretation and constitutional interpretation. The latter is also called public meaning originalism.)In the first part of my talk, I’ll show that despite the confidence with which it is propounded, textualism is deeply confused.In the second part of my talk, I suggest a new way of thinking about legal interpretation from the ground up. Behind the familiar question of what method of interpretation is the right one, lies a more fundamental question: what does legal interpretation, by its nature, seek? I will argue...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6h9415xz</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Irrelevant Confusion</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6ff0v0w5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Trademark law centers its analysis on consumer confusion. With some significant exceptions, the basic rule of trademark law is that a defendant’s use of a mark is illegal if it confuses a substantial number of consumers and not otherwise.As a general matter, this is the right rule. Trademark law is designed to facilitate the workings of modern markets by permitting producers to accurately communicate information about the quality of their products to buyers, and therefore to encourage them to invest in making quality products in circumstances in which that quality wouldn’t otherwise be apparent. If competitors can falsely mimic that information, they will confuse consumers, who won’t know whether they are in fact getting a high quality product and therefore won’t be willing to pay as much for that quality. I won’t pay as much for an iPod if I think there is a chance it is a cheap knock-off masquerading as an iPod.The law of false advertising operates as an adjunct to trademark...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6ff0v0w5</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Lemley, Mark A.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Comparative Political Process Theory</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6f6230cx</link>
      <description>What, if anything, do recent constitutional court decisions requiring a legislature to create a customized presidential impeachment procedure, invalidating a government's prorogation of parliament, rejecting the disbanding of an independent anti-corruption unit, and striking down legislation for inadequate deliberation, have in common? They are all examples of courts protecting the political processes of representative democracy against threats or failures. Yet none of these various types of failure appear in the work that is synonymous with a political process theory of judicial review: John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust. This article argues that when we look beyond the United States and at the comparative context generally, a political process theory has a great deal of relevance and application to constitutional law and courts around the world, both descriptively and normatively. Especially now when the structures and processes of representative democracy are under assault...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6f6230cx</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Gardbaum, Stephen</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Testing Modern Trademark Law's Theory of Harm</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/68z0j4cw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Modern scholarship takes a decidedly negative view of trademark law. Commentators rail against doctrinal innovations like dilution and initial interest confusion. They clamor for clearer and broader defenses. And they plead for greater First Amendment scrutiny of various applications of trademark law. But beneath all of this criticism lies overwhelming agreement that consumer confusion is harmful. This easy acceptance of the harmfulness of confusion is a problem because it operates at too high a level of generality, ignoring important differences between types of relationships about which consumers might be confused. Failure to differentiate between these different relationships has enabled trademark owners to push the boundaries of trademark protection, as they have been able to characterize virtually every use of their marks in consumer confusion terms.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This Article begins the process of distinguishing types of confusion by focusing on the supposed harms to producers...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/68z0j4cw</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Implications of Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/67n013cb</link>
      <description>In a circulated but heretofore unpublished 2001 paper, I argued that Leiter's analogy to Quine's "naturalization of epistemology" does not do the philosophical work Leiter suggests. I revisit the issues in this new essay. I first show that Leiter's replies to my arguments fail. Most significantly, if – contrary to the genuinely naturalistic reading of Quine that I advanced – Quine is understood as claiming that we have no vantage point from which to address whether belief in scientific theories is ever justified, it would not help Leiter's parallel. Given Leiter's way of drawing the parallel, the analogous position in the legal case would be not the Legal Realists' indeterminacy thesis, but the very different position that we have no vantage point from which to address whether legal decisions can ever be justified. I then go on to address the more important question of whether the indeterminacy thesis, if true, would support any replacement of important legal philosophical questions...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/67n013cb</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Structural Wall of Separation and the Erroneous Claim of Anti-Catholic Discrimination</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/61s057fn</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This essay focuses on the American Wall of Separation and consists of two parts, each premised on a recognition that the separation of church and state entails fundamental structural principles that organize a liberal democratic regime. Section I discusses the U.S. Constitution of 1789 and the First Amendment and identifies five key structural elements of its Wall of Separation: democratic legitimacy; non-delegation: limiting power, liberating governance; polity and its anti-balkanization principle; countervailing powers in civil society; and rational deliberation.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The next section begins with Justice Thomas' plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms, facilitating direct aid to religious schools by proposing a wall-lowering equal protection-inflected interpretation of the Establishment Clause, while linking some elements of a structural understanding of that clause, as it limits aid to religious schools, to anti-Catholic animus. This essay rejects this historical claim that...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/61s057fn</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Goldstein, Robert</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Intersectionality at 30: Mapping the Margins of Anti-Essentialism, Intersectionality, and Dominance Theory</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5sc1k9xm</link>
      <description>2019 marks thirty years since the publication of Kimberlé Crenshaw’s groundbreaking article, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. While scholars across the disciplines have engaged intersectionality from a range of theoretical and normative vantage points, there has been little effort to analyze intersectionality in relation to two other enormously influential theoretical frameworks: Angela Harris’s critique of gender essentialism and Catharine MacKinnon’s dominance theory. This Essay endeavors to fill that gap. Broadly articulated, our project is to map how anti-essentialism, dominance theory, and intersectionality converge and to articulate the places where they do not. In the context of doing so, we advance three core claims. First, scholars erroneously conflate intersectionality with anti-essentialism and thus erroneously perceive a strong opposition between intersectionality...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5sc1k9xm</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Harris, Cheryl I.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Carbado, Devon W.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Presidential Nomination Reform: Legal Restraints and Procedural Possibilities</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5338r3h1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The drawn-out contest for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008 may temporarily mitigate but is not likely permanently to end pressure to halt or reverse the front-loading of presidential primaries and caucuses, including pressure for action by Congress. In this essay, written for publication in a forthcoming Brookings volume, REFORMING THE NOMINATION PROCESS edited by Steven S. Smith and Melanie J. Springer, I take no position on the desirability of reform, other than to support a ban on nominating events prior to a specified date in February or early March. Rather, the essay concentrates on congressional power to regulate the timing of nominating events. I argue that some commentators have underestimated the structural arguments against any implied power by Congress to regulate presidential nominations. However, relying on the 12th Amendment, I come to the same conclusion as most commentators, that Congress does have the implied power. With respect to possible limitations...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5338r3h1</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Lowenstein, Daniel</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Money and Punishment, Circa 2020</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4cp3n5w5</link>
      <description>Money has a long history of being used as punishment, and punishment has a long history of being used discriminatorily and violently against communities of color. This volume surveys the literature on the many misuses of money as punishment and the range of efforts underway to undo the webs of fines, fees, assessments, charges, and surcharges that have been used as sources of funds for governments at all levels. Whether in domains that are denominated “civil,” “criminal,” or “administrative,” and whether the needs are about law, health care, employment, housing, education, or safety services, racism intersects with the criminalization of poverty in all of life’s sectors to impose harms felt disproportionately by people of color.These materials are lengthy because of the proliferation of research on this subject, as well as the need to bridge legal and public finance analyses. The first segment, using “Ferguson as a Frame,” reflects the impact of the killings of Michael Brown in...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4cp3n5w5</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Highsmith, Brian</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>VanCleave, Anna</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Resnik, Judith</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Selbin, Jeffrey</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Foster, Lisa</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Duncan, Hannah</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Garlock, Stephanie</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Petchenik, Molly</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Reading&amp;nbsp;&lt;em&gt;Ricci&lt;/em&gt;: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4bf154tt</link>
      <description>This Article posits that the Supreme Court's decision in&amp;nbsp;Ricci v. DeStefano&amp;nbsp;does not evaluate all claims of discrimination on a level playing field but rather "whitens" discrimination and "races" test fairness. The authors explicate how&amp;nbsp;Ricci&amp;nbsp;whitens discrimination by reframing antidiscrimination law's presumptions and burdens to focus on disparate treatment of whites as the paradigmatic and ultimately preferred claim;&amp;nbsp;Ricci&amp;nbsp;races test fairness by finding that efforts to use of job-related assessment tools that correct racial imbalance and better measure merit constitute racially disparate treatment of whites. Under&amp;nbsp;Ricci&amp;nbsp;all forms of racial attentivenes - like attending to the racial impact of promotional exams - become racial discrimination. This conflation derives in part from the application of the colorblindness/race-consciousness dyad, which obscures the more finely grained distinctions between racial attentiveness and inattentiveness...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4bf154tt</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Harris, Cheryl I.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>West-Faulcon, Kimberly</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Standard Picture and its Discontents</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/404084fb</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I argue that there is a picture of how law works that most legal theorists are implicitly committed to and take to be common ground. This Standard Picture (SP, for short) is generally unacknowledged and unargued for. SP leads to a characteristic set of concerns and problems and yields a distinctive way of thinking about how law is supposed to operate. I suggest that the issue of whether SP is correct is a fundamental one for the philosophy of law, more basic, for example, than the issue that divides legal positivists and anti-positivists, at least as the latter issue is ordinarily understood.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The goals of the paper are fourfold: 1) to identify and articulate in some detail the Standard Picture; 2) to show that SP is widely held and has important consequences for other debates in the philosophy of law; 3) to show that SP leads to a serious theoretical problem; 4) to sketch an alternative picture that promises to avoid this problem. I emphasize the modesty...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/404084fb</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2h93v2k8</link>
      <description>The consumer search costs theory has dominated discussion of trademark law for the last several decades. According to this theory, trademark law aims to increase consumer welfare by reducing the cost of shopping for goods or services, and it accomplishes this goal by preventing uses of a trademark that might confuse consumers about the source of the goods with which the mark is used. This conceptual frame is wrong, and it is complicit in most of trademark law’s extraordinary expansion. “Search costs” is not sufficiently precise; many types of search costs are irrelevant to consumer behavior, and even when search costs are relevant, it is not clear that consumers always want them reduced. Yet precisely because the category of search costs is so broad, and because courts’ traditional focus on consumer confusion seemed so compatible with search cost language, courts overwhelmingly have equated confusion and search costs. As a result, they have felt compelled to respond whenever a...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2h93v2k8</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Explaining Legal Facts</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2fs3v8zg</link>
      <description>This paper was presented at the American Philosophical Association's 2007 Berger Prize session. It is a reply to Jeffrey Brand-Ballard's comment on my paper, How Facts Make Law, which was awarded the 2007 Berger Memorial Prize for the outstanding paper in philosophy of law published during 2004 and 2005.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2fs3v8zg</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Whiteness as Property</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2cf1156w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Issues regarding race and racial identity as well as questions pertaining to property rights and ownership have been prominent in much public discourse in the United States. In this article, Professor Harris contributes to this discussion by positing that racial identity and property are deeply interrelated concepts. Professor Harris examines how whiteness, initially constructed as a form of racial identity, evolved into a form of property, historically and presently acknowledged and protected in American law. Professor Harris traces the origins of whiteness as property in the parallel systems of domination of Black and Native American peoples out of which were created racially contingent forms of property and property rights. Following the period of slavery and conquest, whiteness became the basis of racialized privilege - a type of status in which white racial identity provided the basis for allocating societal benefits both private and public in character. These arrangements...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2cf1156w</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Harris, Cheryl I.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Governing the Company Town</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2bv6d8z3</link>
      <description>This Article explores the forms of public and private governance that facilitate localized corporate domination. Researchers have documented the oppressive employment relationship that characterized historical “company towns,” but few accounts yet have examined these communities as local governments. I use archival research to identify institutional continuities between corporate fiefdoms like George Pullman’s model town outside Chicago (1880-1898) and Disney’s self-governed district near Orlando (1967-2023). I demonstrate that local government law has contributed to the recent reemergence of company-dominated enclaves, namely by deferring to private governance and facilitating jurisdictional fragmentation.During the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, proprietors of company-owned towns exercised absolute control over workers through the private law of property and contract. Mining bosses and industrial barons like Pullman intentionally rejected the municipal form, using dismissal...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2bv6d8z3</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Highsmith, Brain</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>On Practices and the Law</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2830w97h</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In a recent paper, "How Facts Make Law," I launch an attack on a fundamental doctrine of legal positivism. I argue that non-normative facts cannot themselves constitutively determine the content of the law. In a response published in this journal, Ram Neta defends the view that non-normative social facts are sufficient to determine normative facts, including both moral and legal facts. Neta's paper provides a useful opportunity to address a spelled-out version of this view, which in various forms is widely held in philosophy of law and other areas of philosophy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I begin by addressing Neta's attempts to show that descriptive facts can alone determine moral and legal facts. First, Neta's account of why it is wrong to break promises fails. In addition to other problems, it begs the question by taking for granted that a person's desires or other motivational states necessarily justify the actions that they motivate. Next, I turn to Neta's attempt to provide a counterexample...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2830w97h</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>American Indians and 'Preferential' Treatment</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/27t147pt</link>
      <description>Preferences and benefits for American Indians predate the American policy of affirmative action, and are grounded in a very different set of rationales. Nonetheless, Indian preferences are the latest targets in the battle against affirmative action. Opponents of Indian preferences and benefits have long deployed the rhetoric of "equal rights" to attack treaty rights and other manifestations of the special legal status that Indians enjoy under federal law. Today, however, the anti-Indian element has joined forces with the anti-affirmative action forces to produce the most intensive challenge yet to Indian rights. The tribes' most effective defense has been to emphasize the grounding of these special rights in their governmental status rather than in race or ethnicity. However, the changing nature of federal benefits, along with the changing demographics and politics of Indian country, has made this strategy difficult for tribes to sustain. This paper offers and assesses three alternative...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/27t147pt</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Goldberg, Carole</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Trump's Corrupt Use of the Pardon Power</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/23z6s2qd</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In no aspect of his presidency has Trump acted more immorally and done more damage to the rule of law and constitutional norms than in his exercise of the pardon power. He has granted only five pardons, far fewer than any modern president at a comparable stage. And the immediate practical consequences of these pardons have been modest relative to the havoc he has wreaked with other endeavors — for example, his all-out assault on federal law enforcement institutions. But his pardons violate core principles of justice and appear designed to settle scores with enemies and to encourage allies to resist cooperation with the Mueller investigation. At times, Trump appears almost gleeful about using the pardon power in a manner directly contrary to its purpose.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Three of his pardons — the recent surprise grant to conservative political commentator Dinesh D’Souza; the April grant to Scooter Libby, former adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney; and the pardon of Sheriff Joe Arpaio...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/23z6s2qd</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Litman, Harry</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Communication Theory of Legal Interpretation and Objective Notions of Communicative Content</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/21n8475c</link>
      <description>In a recent paper,&amp;nbsp;Legislation As Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Communication, I criticize an approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation that I call the&amp;nbsp;communicative-content theory of law, or, for short, the&amp;nbsp;communication theory. According to this approach, our best theories of language and communication teach us that the full linguistic meaning of an utterance is what the speaker or author communicates by the utterance – call it&amp;nbsp;communicative content&amp;nbsp;– which may go well beyond the literal meaning of the words. The communication theorists conclude that a statute's contribution to the content of the law is its communicative content. They thus draw a conclusion about the way in which statutes affect legal obligations from the study of language. In&amp;nbsp;Legislation As Communication, I argue that the communication theory fails. Because it restricts itself to linguistic considerations, it lacks the resources to draw any...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/21n8475c</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Owning Mark(et)s</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1sj1x48q</link>
      <description>Trademark owners regularly rely on claims that the defendant is “free riding” on their mark by making money using that mark, foreclosing an opportunity for the trademark owner to capture that revenue. We analyze those free riding claims and find them wanting. The empirical data shows that defendants in unrelated markets can benefit from using a well‐known mark, but that neither mark owners nor consumers suffer any injury from that use. A legal claim that a defendant is unjustly benefiting by using a plaintiff’s mark is hollow unless it is accompanied by a theory of why that benefit should rightly belong to the plaintiff. And unlike real property, or even other types of intellectual property, trademark law has no such theory. The result is that free riding claims fall back on empty circularity. Those free riding arguments are - explicitly or implicitly - behind the most problematic expansions of trademark law in recent years. We suggest that trademark law needs a theory of trademark...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1sj1x48q</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Lemley, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Intergenerational Progress</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1kq165f0</link>
      <description>This Essay prepared for the Wisconsin Law Review’s symposium on Intergenerational Equity lays the groundwork for a broader understanding of the goals of IP law in the United States by arguing that there is room for a normative commitment to intergenerational justice. First, we argue that the normative basis for IP laws need not be utilitarianism. The Constitution does not require that we conceive of IP in utilitarian terms or that we aim only to promote efficiency or maximize value. To the contrary, the IP Clause leaves open a number of ways to conceive of Progress; courts’ and scholars’ overwhelming acceptance of the utilitarian approach reflects nothing more than a modern policy choice. Second, we argue that acceptance of the utilitarian frame has led too easily to reliance on markets as the exclusive mechanism for achieving Progress, which has had a dramatic impact on the path of IP law and discourse. Specifically, we argue that, because it relies so heavily on the market,...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1kq165f0</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Frischmann, Brett</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Incomplete Understanding, Deference, and the Content of Thought</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0vz81956</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Tyler Burge's influential arguments have convinced most philosophers that a thinker can have a thought involving a particular concept without fully grasping or having mastery of that concept. In Burge's (1979) famous example, a thinker who lacks mastery of the concept of arthritis nonetheless has thoughts involving that concept. It is generally supposed, however, that this phenomenon - incomplete understanding, for short - does not require us to reconsider in a fundamental way what it is for a thought to involve a particular concept. In this paper, I argue that the real significance of incomplete understanding has not been appreciated.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;To the extent that theorists of content address the phenomenon of thoughts involving incompletely grasped contents at all, they tend to assume that some hand-waving about deference to other thinkers who fully grasp the relevant concepts will take care of the inconvenient cases of incomplete understanding. The main lesson of Burge's arguments...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0vz81956</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Troubles for Content II: Explaining Grounding</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0g89k0b5</link>
      <description>In this paper, I address the question whether it is adequate for a theory of linguistic or mental representation to provide a specification of modal determinants or, differently, grounds of content. (I focus on grounding, but my arguments generally apply to modal determination as well.) I first show that a specification of the grounds of a phenomenon is not an account of the nature of the phenomenon and does not permit straightforward derivation of such an account. I then argue for the claim that, in general, what grounds a phenomenon can be explained by an account of the nature of the phenomenon. Theorists of content have often assumed that an appeal to deference to other people can explain how a thinker with incomplete understanding of a concept can have thoughts involving the concept. In a companion paper, "Troubles with Content I," I argue that, once a theory of content appeals to deference, it no longer offers a unified account of what it is to have content. In the present...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0g89k0b5</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0dv8b2qs</link>
      <description>According to a view – really a family of related views – that has considerable currency at the moment, philosophy of language and linguistics have a direct bearing on the content of the law. I call this view the communicative-content theory of law or, for short, the communication theory. According to the communication theorists, the study of language and communication reveals that the full linguistic meaning of an utterance is what the speaker or author communicates by the utterance – call it communicative content – which may go well beyond the literal meaning of the words. (On the standard understanding, communicative content is constituted by the content of certain specific communicative intentions of the speaker.) The communication theorists conclude that a statute's contribution to the content of the law is its communicative content. In this chapter, I grant many of the assumptions of the communication theorists and then argue that there are many candidates for a statute’s...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0dv8b2qs</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can Trump Obstruct Justice?</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0b1950g6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Can a president commit obstruction of justice by terminating a criminal investigation? This question has become critical to the future of the Trump presidency.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;When considering whether it is possible for the president to commit obstruction of justice by terminating an investigation, legal experts feel the pull of two conflicting ideas. On the one hand, it seems clear that a president who orders subordinates to lie to the FBI, destroys evidence, or bribes witnesses has committed obstruction of justice. This idea leads to the straightforward view that if the president acts with the corrupt purpose required for obstruction of justice, he can be guilty of that crime just as anyone else can. This republican view of presidential powers is probably the one held by most experts.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On the other hand, one may think that surely the president must be special by virtue of the Constitution’s broad grant of executive power. The executive branch would be unduly hampered if there...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0b1950g6</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Greenberg, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Living Textualism</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9zt0w80z</link>
      <description>The Court’s landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, holding that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, was widely hailed as a triumph for textualism and a vindication of its neutrality and objectivity. Textualism has typically been associated with conservative judges; critics have argued that, at bottom, it’s a vehicle for implementing conservative policy preferences. Proponents of textualism have argued that Bostock refutes such criticisms: it demonstrates that enforcing a text’s “original public meaning” can yield progressive or conservative results, depending on what the text says.It is true that textualism can yield progressive or conservative results. Bostock demonstrates as much—but not, this Article argues, for the reasons textualism’s proponents suggest. Bostock does not demonstrate that textualism is neutral or objective, or that it enables judges to put aside contemporary...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9zt0w80z</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Franklin, Cary</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Abuse of Discretion: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Indefensible Use of Evidence in Election Law Cases</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9s62m08x</link>
      <description>This is the written version of a keynote address delivered to the Southern California Law and Social Science (SOCLASS) Forum, “Elections, Law and Democracy” Conference, Whittier Law School, March 28, 2014. Using examples from ballot access cases, campaign finance cases, redistricting cases, and election administration/voter identification cases, the address makes two arguments: First, in the Supreme Court’s election law cases, talk about “facts” and “evidence” is the tail wagging the dog. The Court is imposing value judgments in these cases, but sometimes camouflaging them behind a search for evidence, or worse yet, asserting facts about the state of the evidence which are not borne out by the evidence. This is true for both liberal and conservative Justices. Second, the Court needs to take one of two paths to correct its approach. Either it needs to get serious about facts and evidence in these cases, a change which has the potential to profoundly change our laws about campaign...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9s62m08x</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Hasen, Richard L.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Comparative Studies of Law, Slavery and Race in the Americas</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9jq4k5f6</link>
      <description>This critical essay surveys the historical research comparing U.S. and Latin American law and slavery. An earlier generation of comparative work on race and slavery, by Frank Tannenbaum and others, drew heavily on law to draw sharp contrasts between U.S. and Latin American slavery, emphasizing the relative harshness of U.S. slave law. Revisionist social historians criticized Tannenbaum for providing a misleading top-down history based on metropolitan codes, and pointed to demographic and economic factors to explain variations in slavery regimes. More recently, legal historians have begun to explore law “from the bottom up” – slaves’ claims in court, trial-level adjudications, and interactions among ordinary people and low-level government officials. While most studies stay within one national context, some scholars have begun to look at slavery and freedom in the transnational context of the Atlantic world, and others have attempted comparisons of manumission in localities across...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9jq4k5f6</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Gross, Ariela Julie</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Fuente,  de la, Alejandro</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Biological Warfare: Constitutional Conflict Over 'Inherent Differences' Between the Sexes</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9jk0q7zb</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Equal protection law no longer recognizes so-called “inherent differences” among the races as a justification for discrimination. The law takes a different view of sex. It continues to recognize “inherent differences” as a legitimate ground for treating men and women differently — as long as the differential treatment does not perpetuate women’s subordination or reinforce traditional sex stereotypes. This doctrine raises a host of difficult questions, most notably, what counts as an “inherent difference”?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Court confronted that question twice in its 2016 Term. In Pavan v. Smith, the Court had to decide whether Arkansas could treat same-sex couples differently from different-sex couples with respect to their children’s birth certificates. In Sessions v. Morales-Santana, the question was whether the federal government, for purposes of assigning citizenship, could treat non-marital children born abroad to mixed-nationality couples differently depending on the sex of their...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9jk0q7zb</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Franklin, Cary</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9d39g76m</link>
      <description>This article proposes a positive theory that explains the confidentiality rules. Our argument is that the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine offer two perspectives of a larger goal of increasing the amount of information about disputes that is available to courts and to work against the disincentives to the production of that information which would otherwise exist.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9d39g76m</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Grady, Mark F</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Allen, Ronald J</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Polsby, Daniel D</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Yashko, Michael</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Polarization and the Judiciary</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8g4814b7</link>
      <description>The period of increased polarization in the United States among the political branches and citizenry affects the selection, work, perception, and relative power of state and federal judges, including Justices of the United States Supreme Court. Polarization in the United States over the last few decades matters to the American judicial system in at least four ways. First, polarization affects judicial selection, whether the selection method is (sometimes partisan-based) elections or appointment by political actors. In times of greater polarization, governors and presidents who nominate judges, legislators who confirm judges, and voters who vote on judicial candidates are more apt to support or oppose judges based upon partisan affiliation or cues. Second, and driven in part by selection mechanisms, polarization may be reflected in the decisions that judges make, especially on issues that divide people politically, such as abortion, guns, or affirmative action. On the Supreme Court,...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8g4814b7</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Hasen, Richard L.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The housing market effects of discrete land use regulations: Evidence from the California coastal boundary zone</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8b06f033</link>
      <description>The California coast line borders most beautiful and expensive land in the entire world. The California Coastal Commission was created in 1976 to protect the coast line and to regulate land use within the coastal boundary zone. This well defined regulatory boundary offers a unique opportunity to study the consequences of land use regulation on nearby housing located in the same political jurisdiction. Using two different geocoded data sets, we document gentrification within the boundary and discuss possible explanations for these patterns.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8b06f033</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Khan, Matthew</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Vaughn, Ryan</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Zasloff, Jonathan</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>When is the Time of Slavery? The History and Politics of Slavery in Contemporary Legal Argument</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/894275g8</link>
      <description>When is the time of slavery? Is slavery a part of our nation's experience best buried in the deep past, or are its echoes still being felt today? Has our nation's trajectory been one of continuous progress from slavery to freedom, or did change happen fitfully and incompletely? And was slavery an institution defined by race, or was race only incidental to its origins and operation? Contemporary debates about racial justice, and in particular about redress for racial injustice, turn not only on moral and practical concerns, but on the answers to these questions. The jurisprudence of affirmative action and reparations draws on competing histories of slavery and its aftermath in the United States. This essay will explore the way histories of slavery have been used in judicial opinions, legal scholarship and popular political tracts arguing over racial justice, affirmative action, and reparations for African Americans. It lays out a taxonomy of conservative and liberal histories of...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/894275g8</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Gross, Ariela</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Dastar's Next Stand</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8186n4c4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A series of recent cases implicate the extent to which trademark law can be used to control creative content. The possibility of using trademark law for that purpose obviously creates a potential conflict with copyright law, which ordinarily sets the rules for use of creative material developed by others. Unfortunately, despite its attraction to boundary questions in trademark law, the Supreme Court‘s Dastar decision – its lone decision demarcating trademark and copyright law – remains controversial and its scope somewhat unclear.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This Essay argues that Dastar should be understood, or at least should be extended, to rule out any claims based on confusion that is attributable to the content of a creative work, however that claim is denominated. This approach is better than ruling out trademark protection for all copyrightable works, even though it sweeps out some claims that do not raise the same concerns about conflict with copyright. It is better both because it is more...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8186n4c4</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Donald Trump Should Remain Deplatformed from Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube Despite the High Bar That Platforms Should Apply to the Question of Deplatforming Political Figures</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/80c4k22s</link>
      <description>This short position paper, prepared for the Stanford Program on Democracy and the Internet/UCLA Safeguarding Democracy Project conference, “Should Donald Trump Be Returned to Social Media?,” October 14, 2022, argues that former United States president Donald Trump should remain deplatformed from Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube even if he declares as a 2024 presidential candidate.Platforms as private actors engaged in curating speech have a First Amendment right to platform, deplatform, or replatform candidates as an exercise of editorial discretion. In exercising that discretion, platforms as good corporate citizens should support both free speech and democratic institutions.Given the strong interest in free speech and access by voters to the speech of candidates, officeholders, and other significant political figures, platforms should impose a very high bar to the question of removal or exclusion. Candidates should face removal or deplatforming only if they pose a significant...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/80c4k22s</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Hasen, Richard L.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: The Twenty Years' Crisis</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7zg8f4kb</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This piece follows up on an earlier article, which will be published this April in the NYU Law Review. In both pieces, I argue that American foreign policy during the first half of the 20th century - much of which was directed and conceived by lawyers - was deeply influenced by the legal culture of the time. That legal culture, which I call "classical legal ideology," carried with it a set of assumptions about how law arose, why it had effective force, and how it related to social order. I suggest that this legal culture powerfully implied that US foreign policy should reject traditional balance of power strategies and instead rely on international law and legal institutions to maintain global order.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The earlier article considered how classical legal ideology influenced US foreign policy through 1920. This article carries the story into the 1920's and early 1930's, when the United States rose to pre-eminent international standing. It was also the period that marks the...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7zg8f4kb</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Zasloff, Jonathan</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Civil Right No. 1: Dr. King's Unfinished Voting Rights Revolution</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7t1541xf</link>
      <description>On March 14, 1965, one week after “Bloody Sunday” in Selma, Alabama and one day before President Lyndon Johnson delivered a now-famous speech to Congress calling for passage of the Voting Rights Act, Dr. Martin Luther King published an article in the New York Times Magazine entitled Civil Right No. 1: The Right to Vote. Dr. King not only described the severe barriers to enfranchisement that African-Americans faced in the American South and elsewhere; he also offered a vision of what full enfranchisement would mean for African-Americans. Declaring that “[v]oting is the foundation stone for political action,” Dr. King saw the vote not as an end within itself but as the means to a better life for African-Americans and other Americans. He predicted that that “[o]ur vote would place in Congress true representatives of the people who would legislate for the Medicare, housing, schools and jobs required by all men of any color.” This was consistent with Dr. King’s belief that the vote...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7t1541xf</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Hasen, Richard L.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Constitution of History and Memory</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7n7988rr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Almost twenty years ago, the historian Pierre Nora wrote about the growing number of “lieux de mémoire” - museums, monuments, and memorials - where post-modern society situates public memory of traumatic or triumphant events. Yet he devoted little sustained attention to what may be the quintessential “lieu de mémoire” today, the courtroom or truth commission hearing room. Traces of our contemporary obsession with the encounter among law, history and memory are everywhere. And so are lawyers: writing new constitutions for new republics, staffing international tribunals for war criminals, taking testimonies for truth commissions. Yet much of the enthusiasm for legal strategies to “come to terms with” the past draws on individual psychoanalytic metaphors for collective “traumas,” and relatively simplistic theories of historical practice, law, and narrative - whether that personal narrative will humanize law, or that justice will be secured by the search for historical truth.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7n7988rr</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Gross, Ariela Julie</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Roe As We Know It</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7j305565</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;It is a truism in American constitutional law that Roe v. Wade triggered a massive political backlash and caused the extreme polarization over abortion that continues to plague American politics. The conventional wisdom is that Roe truncated the democratic process by interrupting a trend toward liberalization of abortion laws at the state level. In so doing, this conventional story suggests, Roe usurped the American people’s prerogative to make decisions about abortion and deprived abortion rights of the more democratically legitimate legislative basis they might have had in the absence of the Court’s counterproductive attempt to secure them through constitutional law.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;New historical work substantially undermines this conventional account. This new work reveals that progress toward liberalization had already stalled prior to Roe, as well-organized legislative minorities, strongly supported by the Catholic Church, prevented the repeal of criminal abortion laws. In other...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7j305565</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Franklin, Cary</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Reckoning with the Undead Irreparable Injury Rule</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6xc3t6qd</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This article is written for a&amp;nbsp;festschrift&amp;nbsp;honoring the scholarship of Professor Douglas Laycock. In his most important work in the field of Remedies,&amp;nbsp;The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, Laycock made and supported a strong positive claim about the “irreparable injury” rule. He argued that the rule purportedly governing a court’s choice between granting an injunction at the time of final judgment and awarding damages to a wronged plaintiff did no actual work. Laycock also made a compelling normative case for jettisoning the rule.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;More than three decades later, the irreparable injury rule is stubbornly undead. Like a cinematic zombie that is not alive but can still do harm, the rule continues to do no work but courts go through the motions of asking about irreparable injury when deciding whether or not to grant a permanent injunction at the end of a case. Such reasoning creates confusion in the law and perpetuates a fuzziness of reasoning that Laycock...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6xc3t6qd</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Hasen, Richard L.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Illegality in a World of Predation</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6ww727c2</link>
      <description>Professor Bernadette Atuahene's theoretical framework for "stategraft" denotes actions by which state agents transfer cash or property from the people to the state in violation of the law or basic human rights norms. Because illegality is central to stategraft, attention to it may push other forms of state predation--those that are legal or whose legality are uncertain--out of the realm of reform given the dearth of funding for legal advocacy and difficulties in marshalling lawmaker attention. This response suggests, however, that consideration of stategraft provides opportunities for advocates to push back against legal, or not yet illegal, predatory practices. It does so by looking to recent advocacy efforts related to two types of predatory behaviors outside the bounds of stategraft: the use of fines and fees, and civil forfeiture practices.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6ww727c2</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Colgan, Beth A</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Price of Equality: Fair Housing, Land Use, and Disparate Impact</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6pm1s9g7</link>
      <description>What happens when local government policies run head-on into federal civil rights laws? Nowhere does this question assume greater importance than with land use and fair housing, yet in the nearly half-century since the passage of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), courts and commentators have skirted the question. With the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas, the most significant fair housing decision in the nation’s history, they can no longer do so. This Article represents the first sustained effort to show how the FHA affects land use, the most important power that cities have under American localism. The Supreme Court held for the first time that the FHA allows disparate impact liability, and outlined when such disparate impact cases can be brought. But it left many crucial questions unanswered, and this Article attempts to fill the gap. It concludes that when cities restrict affordable and multifamily housing, which often has a disparate impact...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6pm1s9g7</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Zasloff, Jonathan</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Revisiting Hate Crimes in the Shadow of Mass Incarceration</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6nc5207v</link>
      <description>Although civil rights advocates have largely supported hate crimes laws over the last four decades, growing concern over mass incarceration is now leading some to question the focus on enhancing prison sentences. This Essay explores two alternatives to the traditional sentence enhancement model that might retain the expressive message of hate crimes laws--to convey society's particular condemnation of crimes of bias--while relying less heavily on police and prisons: the reformation of victim compensation programs to help victims and targeted communities and the application of restorative justice processes to hate crimes. Each of these alternatives presents complications, but both offer sufficient potential to justify further exploration.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6nc5207v</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Colgan, Beth A</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Sinnar, Shirin</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>India's Land Title Crisis: The Unanswered Questions</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/63v6v616</link>
      <description>India's Land Title Crisis: The Unanswered Questions</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/63v6v616</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Zasloff, Jonathan</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Nature of Constitutions</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/63t5j8zs</link>
      <description>ollowing Thomas Hobbes, public-choice economists have theorized that constitutions arise from agreements among subordinates to establish private rules for their own transactions with each other. They then supposedly delegate to a sovereign the obligation to enforce these rules. The sovereign then violates the constitution by instituting wrong-headed rules to govern the subordinates' relations with each other. Instead, it seems more realistic to see constitutions as arising from subordinates' agreements with each other to resist excessive appropriations. An advanced constitution is a substitute for this original type of agreement, which only works well when the subordinates' numbers are small, as in some hunter-gatherer societies. An advanced constitution also limits a sovereign's appropriations, arises only from subordinates' threats of the sovereign, and marshals the sovereign's own instruments of force against him.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/63t5j8zs</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Grady, Mark F</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>McGuire, Michael T</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Law and Economics of Cybersecurity: An Introduction</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/60542545</link>
      <description>One of the most controversial theoretical issues of our time is the governance of cybersecurity. Computer security experts, national security experts, and policy analysts have all struggled to bring meaningful analysis to cybersecurity; however, the discipline of law &amp;amp; economics has yet to be fully applied to the issue. This introduction presents work by leading national scholars who examine this complex national security challenge from a law and economics perspective. The focus spans from a discussion of pure market solutions to public-private issue analysis, providing a valuable basis for policy considerations concerning the appropriate governmental role on the issue of cybersecurity.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/60542545</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Grady, Mark F</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Parisi, Francesco</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy)</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/600729xs</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In a remarkably prescient article in a 1995 Yale Law Journal symposium on “Emerging Media Technology and the First Amendment,” Professor Eugene Volokh looked ahead to the coming Internet era and correctly predicted many changes. In Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, Volokh could foresee the rise of streaming music and video services such as Spotify and Netflix, the emergence of handheld tablets for reading books, the demise of classified advertising in the newspaper business, and more generally how cheap speech would usher in radical new opportunities for readers, viewers, and listeners to custom design what they read, see, and hear, while concomitantly undermining the power of intermediaries including publishers and book store owners.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;To Volokh, these changes were exciting and democratizing. The overall picture he painted was a positive one, especially as First Amendment doctrine no longer had to deal with the scarcity of broadcast media to craft special First Amendment...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/600729xs</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Hasen, Richard L.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5p53h5n8</link>
      <description>Antitrust law explicitly depends on market definition. Many issues in IP law also depend on market definition, though that definition is rarely explicit.Applying antitrust's traditional market definition to IP goods leads to some startling results. Despite the received wisdom that IP rights don't necessarily confer market power, a wide array of IP rights do exactly that under traditional antitrust principles. This result requires us to rethink both the overly-rigid way we define markets in antitrust law and the competitive consequences of granting IP protection. Both antitrust and IP must begin to think realistically about those consequences, rather than falling back on rigid formulas or recitation of the mantra that there is no conflict between IP and antitrust.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5p53h5n8</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McKenna, Mark</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Lemley, Mark</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Discriminatory Animus</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5nm717gg</link>
      <description>Discriminatory Animus</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5nm717gg</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Franklin, Cary</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate Change</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5fc745zn</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This Article seeks to reconstruct the public nuisance climate change cases (Connecticut v. AEP and California v. General Motors) to show that, while hardly perfect, nuisance litigation could form a reasonable basis for climate change regulation, at least as much as some of the other imperfect alternatives so far proposed. This nuisance system has promise because, as outlined here, it essentially becomes a carbon tax - precisely the policy instrument that many economists say is the best form of regulation but is routinely dismissed as politically unfeasible. The difference is that it is judicially, not legislatively, imposed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I do not claim that the nuisance system is superior to legislation, but rather that it is a reasonable substitute in the absence of political action. More hopefully, I suggest it might provide a basis for getting this political process to respond to the climate crisis. Put another way, we might look at public nuisance litigation as a useful support...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5fc745zn</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Zasloff, Jonathan</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Power and International Law</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4wc9g16j</link>
      <description>This Centennial Essay elaborates and analyzes the range of stances on the relationship between power and international law that have appeared in the "American Journal of International Law" in the last century. While views of the relationship between power and international law are diverse, and many approaches straddle heuristic lines, they can be grouped into four intellectual movements: classical legal thought; realism (of which there are three variants); law matters (sociological, rationalist-institutionalist, and liberal views); and constructivism. Each major intellectual movement may be seen as a reaction to the ideas that preceded it, and each may be better understood in the context of international developments contemporaneous with their emergence. In recent years, each major movement has evolved to employ elements from earlier theoretical traditions; articles increasingly focus less on establishing the primacy of one particular meta-theory, and more on using the heuristics...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4wc9g16j</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Steinberg, Steinberg H</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Zasloff, Jonathan M</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Tiebout and tax revolts: Did Serrano really cause Proposition 13?</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4vw546tn</link>
      <description>In this article, we examine the relationship between Serrano v. Priest, the landmark school finance equalization decision of the California Supreme Court, and Proposition 13, the state's famous property tax revolt. As school finance litigation continues in several states, opponents of equalization schemes have argued that Serrano "caused" Proposition 13. Prior to Serrano, the argument goes, California's local public sector resembled a "Tiebout equilibrium" in that local property taxes approximated market prices. Serrano destroyed that equilibrium, giving voters new reason to oppose the property tax. This theory has been offered as an explanation for why voters swung from rejecting a property tax limitation in 1972 to embracing Prop 13 only six years later. We present new statistical and historical evidence challenging the connection between Serrano and Prop 13. Using multiple regression analysis, we demonstrate that Serrano had little actual effect on Prop 13 and that the swing...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4vw546tn</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Stark, Kirk</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Zasloff, Jonathan</name>
      </author>
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