BackgroundCOVID-19 pandemic mitigation measures, including travel restrictions, limited global circulation of influenza viruses. In Australia, travel bans for non-residents and quarantine requirements for returned travellers were eased in November 2021, providing pathways for influenza viruses to be re-introduced.AimWe aimed to describe the epidemiological and virological characteristics of the re-emergence of influenza in Victoria, Australia to inform public health interventions.MethodsFrom 1 November 2021 to 30 April 2022, we conducted an epidemiological study analysing case notification data from the Victorian Department of Health to describe case demographics, interviewed the first 200 cases to establish probable routes of virus reintroduction and examined phylogenetic and antigenic data to understand virus diversity and susceptibility to current vaccines.ResultsOverall, 1,598 notifications and 1,064 positive specimens were analysed. The majority of cases (61.4%) occurred in the 15-34 years age group. Interviews revealed a higher incidence of international travel exposure during the first month of case detections, and high levels of transmission in university residential colleges were associated with return to campus. Influenza A(H3N2) was the predominant subtype, with a single lineage predominating despite multiple importations.ConclusionEnhanced testing for respiratory viruses during the COVID-19 pandemic provided a more complete picture of influenza virus transmission compared with previous seasons. Returned international travellers were important drivers of influenza reemergence, as were young adults, a group whose role has previously been under-recognised in the establishment of seasonal influenza epidemics. Targeting interventions, including vaccination, to these groups could reduce future influenza transmission.

BACKGROUND: Influenza circulated at historically low levels during 2020/2021 due to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic travel restrictions. In Australia, international arrivals were required to undergo a 14-day hotel quarantine to limit new introduction of SARS-CoV-2. METHODS: We usedtesting data for travelers arriving on repatriation flights to Darwin, Australia, from 3 January 2021 to 11 October 2021 to identify importations of influenza virus into Australia. We used this information to estimate the risk of a case exiting quarantine while still infectious. Influenza-positive samples were sequenced, and cases were followed up to identify transmission clusters. Data on the number of cases and total passengers were used to infer the risk of influenza cases exiting quarantine while infectious. RESULTS: Despite very low circulation of influenza globally, 42 cases were identified among 15 026 returned travelers, of which 30 were A(H3N2), 2 were A(H1N1)pdm09, and 10 were B/Victoria. Virus sequencing data identified potential in-flight transmission, as well as independent infections prior to travel. Under the quarantine strategy in place at the time, the probability that these cases could initiate influenza outbreaks in Australia neared 0. However, this probability rose as quarantine requirements relaxed. CONCLUSIONS: Detection of influenza virus infections in repatriated travelers provided a source of influenza viruses otherwise unavailable and enabled development of the A(H3N2) vaccine seed viruses included in the 2022 Southern Hemisphere influenza vaccine. Failure to test quarantined returned travelers for influenza represents a missed opportunity for enhanced surveillance to better inform public health preparedness.

A globally implemented unified phylogenetic classification for human respiratory syncytial virus (HRSV) below the subgroup level remains elusive. We formulated global consensus of HRSV classification on the basis of the challenges and limitations of our previous proposals and the future of genomic surveillance. From a high-quality curated dataset of 1,480 HRSV-A and 1,385 HRSV-B genomes submitted to GenBank and GISAID (https://www.gisaid.org) public sequence databases through March 2023, we categorized HRSV-A/B sequences into lineages based on phylogenetic clades and amino acid markers. We defined 24 lineages within HRSV-A and 16 within HRSV-B and provided guidelines for defining prospective lineages. Our classification demonstrated robustness in its applicability to both complete and partial genomes. We envision that this unified HRSV classification proposal will strengthen HRSV molecular epidemiology on a global scale.