# Your search: "author:Bergstrom, Ted"

## filters applied

## Type of Work

Article (111) Book (0) Theses (0) Multimedia (0)

## Peer Review

Peer-reviewed only (76)

## Supplemental Material

Video (0) Audio (0) Images (0) Zip (0) Other files (0)

## Publication Year

## Campus

UC Berkeley (1) UC Davis (0) UC Irvine (0) UCLA (0) UC Merced (0) UC Riverside (0) UC San Diego (0) UCSF (0) UC Santa Barbara (110) UC Santa Cruz (0) UC Office of the President (0) Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (0) UC Agriculture & Natural Resources (0)

## Department

Department of Economics (99)

## Journal

## Discipline

Social and Behavioral Sciences (17) Medicine and Health Sciences (1) Physical Sciences and Mathematics (1)

## Reuse License

## Scholarly Works (111 results)

William Hamilton developed the biological theory of kin selection before game theory became familiar to biologists. Thus he implicitly confined his analysis to a rather special subclass of games, with linear structure. This paper shows that while Hamilton's rule does not apply to a more general class of games, there is a useful generalization that does apply. This paper also generalizes results in my 1995 AER paper on sibling interaction from symmetric two-player games to multiplayer games that may be asymmetric.

If Persons A and B are both benevolent to C, then a gift from A to C also benefits B. Thus C's income is like a public good to A and B. What happens with lots of people whose affections are entangled? This paper shows that a "distributional Lindahl equilibrium" exists and leads to an efficient income redistribution.

This paper was written in the form of two puzzles. One puzzle concerns Romeo and Juliet who love spaghetti and each other. They wear flimsy clothing and have abdominal hedonimeters. The other puzzle asks who benefits from tax deductions to the rich for charitable deductions.

The paper generalizes theorems of Ky Fan and Hugo Sonnenschein on the existence of maximal elements for non-transitive relations. I used these results to show that a binary relation could be constructed whose maximal element must be a competitive equilibrium. Thus proving the existence of competitive equilibrium under somewhat more general conditions than had been done previously. In 1975, I thought this was a useful extension of the Gale Mas Collel existence theorem. Journal referees then didn't agree with me, so I let it ripen in my desk for 15 years. I still think it is worth looking at if you are interested in the existence of competitive equilibrium or in maximization of funny preference orderings.

Alexander Field was not convinced of a result that I claimed in my JEP 2001 paper that in "haystack models" with non-assortative mating, if the number of descendants of founding group members is determined by an n-player prisoners' dilemma game, then the population will converge to a population of defectors. He thought that the result applied only if the groups were large. I respond with a more detailed discussion and show how the result works even when groups have only two members.

Suppose that each person's utility depends on his or her own consumption as well as on the utilities of others. We consider the question of when a system of interdependent utility functions induces unique utility functions over allocations and identifies the class of transformations on interdependent utility functions that are equivalent in the sense of inducing the same preferences over allocations. We show that well-behaved systems of this kind can be studied by means of the theory of dominant-diagonal matrices and that the theory of dominant-diagonal matrices with finitely many elements extends in a satisfactory way to denumerable matrices. The theory of denumerable dominant diagonal matrices allows an elegant analysis of systems of intergenerational benevolence. We also revisit and extend the theory of two-sided altruism as formulated by Kimball and by Hori and Kanaya.

The alpha-core is defined to be the set of feasible allocations such that no coalition can do better for its members by selecting alternative strategies given “worst-case” assumptions about the behavior of other players. This paper explores the way that the alpha-core of a game is affected by restrictions on the legally admissible strategies of the players. It also explores the relation between Lindahl equilibrium and alpha-cores with suitable restrictions on strategies.

This paper argues that since the supply of oil in the ground is inelastic, the incidence of a sales tax on oil, maintained forever at a fixed rate, would fall entirely on the oil-suppliers. In the world economy, however, the elasticity of supply of oil to a single country depends on that country's imports as a share of world output and on the elasticity of demand for that country. The paper calculates optimal tax rates for a country as a function of these variables and estimates optimal oil tax rates for the U.S., for some OECD countries separately, and for the U.S. plus the OECD collectively. Current U.S. tax rates are shown to be far below optimal values.