The oil and gas sectors in Colombia are significant components of the Colombian economy, attracting approximately 20% of the FDI, and providing almost a fourth of total government revenues. These sectors of critical infrastructure have suffered systematic targeting from guerrilla internal conflict. For example, the hydrocarbons infrastructure was attacked 829 times between 2007 and 2015. With data from the Ministry of Defense and data from CINEP (Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular), we compare spatial patterns of pipeline attacks with violent activity of the two main leftist guerrilla groups, the ELN and the FARC. We use local indicators for spatial association (LISA) to determine overlapping among high activity and presence (hot spots) of guerrilla presence and pipeline attacks. We identify vulnerable areas of the pipeline infrastructure that the government should prioritize for protection, and examine if areas of attacks are related to the general presence and activity of guerrilla groups or if there is evidence of strategic targeting of the pipelines.

To effectively protect critical infrastructure, it is essential to identify vulnerable areas for priority protection. The use of geographic information systems has increased over the last few decades for crime activity and the identification of delinquency hotspots. This study analyzes the areas of a power grid that are exposed to a higher than the average risk of terrorist attacks. One of the concerns for operation managers and policy makers is that subversive groups may have “inside” information to perform the attacks and create a critical failure that puts more pressure on the operational condition of the power grid. We use exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) and information from the Colombian power grid to prompt the question: why hotspots emerge in some parts of the power grid, but not in others? The theoretical framework of attacks in the power grid operation exists but need to be corroborated with historical events that reflect such possible way of action. To this end, we perform a Getis-Ord Gi* hotspot analysis to direct attention to areas that are both under attack and critical in terms of operational risks that could affect the reliability and provision of critical services such as power generation and distribution. This subnational case study of Colombia uses data from XM and InterColombia (managers and operators of the Colombian power grid) to identify the areas of electrical infrastructure that have been most attacked and explain the motivations at the local level that the subversive groups have had to attack these areas.

Although Colombia is well known for its persistent leftist guerrilla conflict, the country also suffers from paramilitary violence. This study examines the potential factors related to persistent paramilitary violence in the form of human rights violations. How has paramilitary activity, and its causes, changed over time? Why does it persist in some areas after Uribe’s demobilization process but not in others? We use multilevel modeling to explore the determinants of paramilitary human rights violations. A varied range of aspects potentially associated with the paramilitary presence at the municipal level for the period 2002–2015, such as state presence, resources, greed, grievances and conflict are analyzed. The study uses information about paramilitary human rights violations from the Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP). Results suggest that the demobilization process reduced the initial paramilitary motivation to fight against leftist guerrilla. However, other factors such as coca cultivation or ranching remained significantly related to the paramilitary activity. The analysis at the municipal level provides clear warnings for continued violence cycles threatening any undergoing or future peace processes or demobilizations and calls for a more nuanced concept of state capacity to understand paramilitary violence.