Background

People incarcerated in US prisons have been disproportionately harmed by the COVID-19 pandemic. That prisons are such efficient superspreading environments can be attributed to several known factors: small, communal facilities where people are confined for prolonged periods of time; poor ventilation; a lack of non-punitive areas for quarantine/medical isolation; and staggeringly high numbers of people experiencing incarceration, among others. While health organizations have issued guidance on preventing and mitigating COVID-19 infection in carceral settings, little is known about if, when, and how recommendations have been implemented. We examined factors contributing to containment of one of the first California prison COVID-19 outbreaks and remaining vulnerabilities using an adapted multi-level determinants framework to systematically assess infectious disease risk in carceral settings.

Methods

Case study employing administrative data; observation; and informal discussions with: people incarcerated at the prison, staff, and county public health officials.

Results

Outbreak mitigation efforts were characterized by pre-planning (e.g., designation of ventilated, single-occupancy quarantine) and a quickly mobilized inter-institutional response that facilitated systematic, voluntary rapid testing. However, several systemic- and institutional-level vulnerabilities were unaddressed hindering efforts and posing significant risk for future outbreaks, including insufficient decarceration, continued inter-facility transfers, incomplete staff cohorting, and incompatibility between built environment features (e.g., dense living conditions) and public health recommendations.

Conclusions

Our adapted framework facilitates systematically assessing prison-based infectious disease outbreaks and multi-level interventions. We find implementing some recommended public health strategies may have contributed to outbreak containment. However, even with a rapidly mobilized, inter-institutional response, failure to decarcerate created an overreliance on chance conditions. This left the facility vulnerable to future catastrophic outbreaks and may render standard public health strategies - including the introduction of effective vaccines - insufficient to prevent or contain those outbreaks.

Purpose

This study aims to characterize the June 2020 COVID-19 outbreak at San Quentin California State Prison and to describe what made San Quentin so vulnerable to uncontrolled transmission.

Design/methodology/approach

Since its onset, the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed and exacerbated the profound health harms of carceral settings, such that nearly half of state prisons reported COVID-19 infection rates that were four or more times (and up to 15 times) the rate found in the state's general population. Thus, addressing the public health crises and inequities of carceral settings during a respiratory pandemic requires analyzing the myriad factors shaping them. In this study, we reported observations and findings from environmental risk assessments during visits to San Quentin California State Prison. We complemented our assessments with analyses of administrative data.

Findings

For future respiratory pathogens that cannot be prevented with effective vaccines, this study argues that outbreaks will no doubt occur again without robust implementation of additional levels of preparedness - improved ventilation, air filtration, decarceration with emergency evacuation planning - alongside addressing the vulnerabilities of carceral settings themselves.

Originality/value

This study addresses two critical aspects that are insufficiently covered in the literature: how to prepare processes to safely implement emergency epidemic measures when needed, such as potential evacuation, and how to address unique challenges throughout an evolving pandemic for each carceral setting.