Retrieval of an appropriate analogy ftora memory is often difficult because the structure common to two analogous domains is embedded in specific contexts that differ at the surface level. The present study examines an aspect of domain representations that may affect the access of analogs in memory. Subjects were asked to identify analogies between new and previously learned passages. Passages varied in the manner in which analogous relations were described. In all passages the relations were embedded in a particular context that was dissimilar at the surface level between analogs. However, the expression of relations within a passage varied in level of abstraction. In "abstract" passages relations were lexicalized with relatively abstract terms and were described with litde domain specific detail. In "specific" passages more specific terms were used and extensive domain specific detail was given about how relations were instantiated within the domain. In "mixed" passages both abstract and specific descriptions of relations were given. Subjects reading abstract passages were best at identifying analogies. The present results suggest that even though analogous relations are embedded in dissimilar contexts, the way in which those relations themselves are represented can affect analogical access. Subjeas are relatively successfiil at analogical access when the relations are represented in a relatively general and sparse form.

This research concerns the effect of learning history for a general principle on the ability to apply the principle to novel situations. Adult subjects learned general problem solving principles under three alternative conditions:(a) abstraction of principles from diverse examples (b) study of explicit general statements of principles and (c) practice in mapping given statements onto examples. The specific aim of this research was to explore how examples given during learning a general principle affect its application to novel problems which do not share "surface" features with the examples.Results showed that examples did not significantly facilitate application of principles over learning only a given general statement. Moreover, subjects who abstracted principles from examples, although they had abstracted the relevant information, were significantly worse at application than subjects who learned only the general statement or who learned the given statement and examples. These subjects had particular difficulty accessing and selecting the appropriate principle for a problem.Results suggest that the representation of specific information from examples may interfere with efficiency at matching a principle to a novel problem. Whether such interference occurs may depend on the relationship between the principle and its examples in the memory representation. This relationship may be influenced by the way examples are initially encoded.