A current theory of attention posits that several micro-indices of attentional vigilance are dependent on activation of the locus coeruleus, a brainstem nucleus that regulates cortical norepinephrine activity (Aston-Jones et al., 1999). This theory may account for many findings in the infant literature, while highlighting important new areas for research and theory on infant attention. We examined the visual behaviors of n = 16 infants (6–7 months) while they attended to multiple spatially distributed targets in a naturalistic environment. We coded four measures of attentional vigilance, adapted from studies of norepinergic modulation of animal attention: rate of fixations, duration of fixations, latency to reorientation, and target ‘hits’. These measures showed a high degree of coherence in individual infants, in parallel with findings from animal studies. Results also suggest that less vigilant infants showed greater habituation to the trial structure and more attentiveness to less salient stimuli during periods of high attentional competition. This pattern of results is predicted by the Aston-Jones model of attention, but could not be explained by the standard information processing model.

An adult-like concept of intention includes a deliberate action to achieve a goal and a belief that one’s action (if successful) will cause the desired outcome. For example, good outcomes caused by accident or by chance are not believed to be caused intentionally. In two experiments, we asked whether children understand this connection between intentions and outcomes. Children played two games in which actions could produce unintended outcomes (i.e., causes were unplanned). Children sometimes received a desirable reward independent of intention. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year- olds mistakenly claimed they had intended the desirable outcome even when it was unexpected. Four-year-olds judged that they had not intended a deliberate action if it did not yield a rewarding out- come. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 6-year-olds seldom make these errors. The results suggest that 4- and 5-year-old children have not yet attained an adult-like concept of intention. Their inac- curate judgments regarding their intentions, given a rewarding yet unexpected outcome, can be explained by a positivity bias.

All sciences use models of some variety to understand complex phenomena. In developmental sci- ence, however, modeling is mostly limited to linear, alge- braic descriptions of behavioral data. Some researchers have suggested that complex mathematical models of developmental phenomena are a viable (even necessary) tool that provide fertile ground for developing and testing theory as well as for generating new hypotheses and pre- dictions. This article explores the concerns, attitudes, and historical trends that underlie the tension between two cul- tures: one in which computational simulations of behavior are an important complement to observation and experi- mentation and another that emphasizes evidence from behavioral experiments and linear models enhanced by verbal descriptions. This tension is explored as a dialogue among three characters: Ed (Experimental Developmen- talist), Mira (Modeling Inclusive Research Advocate), and Phil (Philosopher of Science).

The current study employed a modified gambling task, in which probabilistic cues were provided to elicit positive or negative expectations. Event-related potentials (ERPs) to ‘‘final outcome’’ and ‘‘probabilistic cues’’ were analyzed. Difference waves between the negative condition and the corresponding positive condition were examined. The results confirm that feedback related negativity (FRN) amplitude is modulated by the interaction of outcome valence and expectancy by showing larger FRN difference waves for unexpected than expected outcomes. More interestingly, the difference wave between ERPs elicited by positive and negative expectations showed a negative deflection, with a frontal midline source density around 280 ms after onset of the predictive cue. Negative expectations were associated with larger FRN amplitudes than positive expectations. This suggests that FRN is elicited by probabilistic cues to pending outcomes.

Infants gradually learn to share attention, but it is unknown how they acquire skills such as gaze-following. Deák and Triesch (2006) suggest that gaze-following could be acquired if infants learn that adults’ gaze direction is likely to be aligned with interesting sights. This hypothesis stipulates that adults tend to look at things that infants find interesting, and that infants could learn by noticing this tendency. We tested the plausibility of this hypothesis through video-based micro-behavioral analysis of naturalistic parent–infant play. The results revealed that 3- to 11-month-old infants strongly preferred watching caregivers handle objects. In addition, when caregivers looked away from their infant they tended to look at their own object-handling. Finally, when infants looked toward the caregiver while she was looking at her own hands, the infant’s next eye movement was often toward the caregiver’s object-handling. In this way infants receive adequate naturalistic input to learn associations between their parent’s gaze direction and the locations of interesting sights.