Recent dual process models proposed that the strength of competing intuitions determines reasoning performance. A key challenge at this point is to search for boundary conditions; identify cases in which the strength of different intuitions will be weaker/stronger. Therefore, we ran two studies with the two-response paradigm in which people are asked to give two answers to a given reasoning problem. We adopted base-rate problems in which base rate and stereotypic information can cue conflicting intuitions. By manipulating the information presentation order, we aimed to manipulate their saliency; and by that, indirectly the activation strength of the intuitions. Contrary to our expectation, we observed that the order manipulation had opposite effects in the initial and final response stages. We explain these results by taking into account that the strength of intuitions is not constant but changes over time; they have a peak, a growth, and a decay rate.

A great deal of reasoning research indicates that individualsare often biased by intuitive heuristics. However,contemporary results indicate that individuals seem sensitiveto their biases; they seem to detect conflict with reasoningnorms. One of the key remaining questions is whether thisconflict sensitivity is domain general. To address thisquestion, we administered a battery of five classical reasoningtasks to a large sample of subjects and assessed their conflictdetection efficiency on each task by measuring their responseconfidence. Results indicate that conflict detection is, in mostsenses, not domain general, though there are compellingexceptions.