Background

Little is known about the weight distribution to the remaining limbs for amputee dogs that undergo orthopedic surgery. The objective of the paper was to describe stance and weight distribution after tibial plateau leveling osteotomy (TPLO) in forelimb and in hind limb amputees (Amp_TPLO) and to compare them to four-legged TPLO patients (4L_TPLO) and amputees without TPLO (Amp). Weight bearing distribution at a stance was compared between groups. Joint angles of forelimb and hind limb joints in a sagittal plane, hind limb orientation in a frontal plane, and pelvic orientation in a transverse plane (pelvic tilt) were measured and compared between groups.

Results

Joint angles, hind limb abduction, and pelvic tilt of Amp_TPLO and Amp did not differ statistically. Mean weight bearing in the operated hind limb was higher for Amp_TPLO than 4L_TPLO. Mean weight bearing for thoracic limbs of Amp_TPLO and 4L_TPLO did not differ statistically. Weight bearing of the hind limb of Amp_TPLO and Amp did not differ statistically.

Conclusions

The position of the center of mass and posture of Amp_TPLO and Amp does not differ. The weight distribution and posture of Amp is not impacted negatively by TPLO.

Conscious awareness to the events and stimuli around us is a central part of our everyday experience. Yet, are humans the only species that experiences conscious awareness? Since non-verbal species cannot report their internal states, philosophers and scientists have long debated whether the question of animal consciousness is empirically testable, and it still remains a topic of speculation (Dawkins, 2015; Gutfreund, 2017). In the large spectrum of views, some advocate that consciousness may require complex processes like language, a capacity that is unique to adult humans (Dennett, 1995) or a human-like theory of mind (Carruthers, 1998), which may extend to only a few selected species such as great apes (e.g., Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, & Tomasello, 2016; but see Horschler, MacLean, & Santos, 2020). In contrast, others have used neuroanatomical similarities to argue that a number of species (including some birds and octopuses) are likely to be capable of generating conscious experience (see, for example, the Cambridge declaration on consciousness, 2012). Others argue that non-human animals are conscious on the basis of intelligent behaviors which, at least in humans, seem to coincide with conscious awareness as supporting evidence for animal consciousness. These include behaviors such as planning (Osvath & Osvath, 2008), or metacognition (Hampton, Engelberg, & Brady, 2020; Rosati & Santos, 2016), for review see Boly et al., 2013; Griffin & Speck, 2004. Yet, since many complex human behaviors and high-level functions can be performed outside of conscious awareness (i.e., Hassin, 2013), it is difficult to determine whether non-human animals that display intelligent behaviors are indeed conscious or not (Carruthers, 2018). Furthermore, given the ambiguity and difficulty in disentangling conscious from non-conscious processes in non-verbal species, many consider the question of animal consciousness as far from having been resolved (Dawkins, 2015; Gutfreund, 2017). For many, the gap in evidence needed to unambiguously infer animal consciousness is considered “as wide as ever” (Dawkins, 2012).