The aim of this work is to demarcate, develop, and defend the commitments and
consequences of metaethical minimalism. Very roughly, this is the position that a
commitment to objective moral truths does not require any accompanying ontological
commitments. While there are few, if any, who call themselves “metaethical minimalists”, I
endeavor to uncover existing articulations of metaethical minimalism which have been
presented under different names, attempting to identify the common ground between
them. As I interpret the position, all metaethical minimalists are committed to the same
positive pair of claims (what I call the Objectivity Thesis): “a) Moral truths are strongly
mind-independent; b) there are moral truths.” Taken by itself, however, this pair of claims
is not sufficient for differentiating their view from the moral realist’s. Consequently, the
minimalist must also articulate that which they are denying about the non-minimalist
approach, or what I call the “negative ontological thesis”. I offer my own version of this
negative thesis and argue for its dialectical advantages.
In Chapters 3 and 4, I focus my attention on attacks on the viability of metaethical
minimalism in the form of two “challenges” that aim to problematize a commitment to
objective moral truths absent any accompanying ontological commitment. The
big-picture takeaway from these chapters is that minimalism can defend itself by playing to
the dialectical advantage I find for it in Chapter 2 as well as by being creative about
minimalist constructions/reworkings of plausible principles/lines of reasoning that seem
to contradict it.
The temptation to embrace quietism is strong among minimalists, but in Chapters
5, 6, and 7 I aim to show that there is a positive alternative available for the minimalist
interested in developing a full picture of their position. Chapter 5 is aimed at providing an
adequate understanding of the distinction between the objects of purely normative
thoughts and objects of thoughts about reality. Building on this are Chapters 6 and 7,
which argue in favor of an account of the relationship between emotion and evaluative
knowledge that is consistent with metaethical minimalism.
