The aim of this paper is to import basic concepts from information theory into the epistemological debate about probabilistic measures of coherence. Rather than putting forward and defending a new measure, this paper will sketch an account of `external' coherence, which will be defined as a relation between a target variable of interest, sources containing (more or less) information about the target, and a rule or theoretical hypothesis that postulates the relevant connections between source and target. Relations with and potential insights for standard notions of coherence in formal epistemology are explored. More generaly, the paper explores the potential benefits of applying information theory to the epistemological debate about coherence.

There is no guarantee that the set of possible theories that boundedly rational agents consider contains the true theory. And yet, these agents update their beliefs as new evidence comes in, leading to a conclusion about a particular domain. In this paper, we investigate under which conditions such agents arrive at sufficiently accurate beliefs compared to ideal agents. In doing so, we work within the framework of objective Bayesianism and draw on the literature on novel predictions in philosophy of science.

In this paper, we explore the objective-Bayesian principle of minimum information and Maximum Entropy as a solution to the problem of awareness growth: how should rational agents adjust their beliefs upon becoming aware of new possibilities? We introduce the Maximum Entropy principle as a theoretical solution to the problem of awareness growth and present the results of two experiments conducted to compare human reasoners' responses with the theoretical prescriptions of the Maximum Entropy approach. We discover that, although the MaxEnt method may appear computationally demanding, participants' responses are largely consistent with the theoretical prescription.