With rapid population growth and urban development, traffic congestion has become an inescapable issue in large metropolitan regions. Research studies have proposed different strategies to control traffic, ranging from roadway expansion to transportation demand management programs. Among these strategies, congestion pricing and incentive offering schemes have been widely studied as reinforcements for traffic control in traditional traffic networks where each driver is a “player” in the network. In such a network, the “selfish” behavior of individual drivers prevents the entire network to reach a socially optimal operation point. In future mobility services, on the other hand, a large portion of drivers/vehicles may be controlled by a small number of companies/organizations. In such a system, offering incentives to organizations can potentially be much more effective in reducing traffic congestion rather than offering incentives directly to drivers. This research project studies the problem of offering incentives to organizations to change the behavior of their individual drivers (or individuals using their organization’s services). The incentives are offered to each organization based on their aggregated travel time loss across all their drivers. This step requires solving a large-scale optimization problem to minimize the system-level travel time. We propose an efficient algorithm for solving this optimization problem. To evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm, multiple experiments are conducted by Los Angeles traffic data. Our experiments show that the proposed algorithm can decrease the system-level travel time by up to 6.9%. Moreover, our experiments demonstrate that incentivizing organizations can be up to 8 times more efficient than incentivizing individual drivers in terms of incentivization monetary cost.

View the NCST Project Webpage