Written constitutions, though designed to endure, are remarkably fragile, with a mean lifespan of only 17 years across all countries since 1789. This paper draws on the literature on endogenous constitutions to explore the determinants of constitutional durability among nation states. It first examines the relationship between constitutional change and regime change, analyzing the causes of constitutional demise. It then considers the role of state-level structural characteristics as well as features of constitutional design in allowing constitutions to withstand exogenous shocks. The findings suggest that certain features of constitutional design do make a difference, and can help constitutions endure: in particular, the inclusiveness of the adoption process, the flexibility of the amendment process, and the specificity of the document are crucial features promoting endurance.

This article surveys the history and practice of providing constitutional advice. It first examines antecedents, then looks at the contemporary political economy of the process, drawing on the transnational legal order (TLO) framework to evaluate whether or not it can be characterized as a TLO. The answer is a partial yes. We focus on one feature of the modern situation, the presence of corporate actors—including the United Nations, NGOs, and international organizations—in an increasingly dense social field. This development has laid bare tensions and competition among actors, moving the field toward a nascent TLO that is nevertheless unlikely to fully consolidate or institutionalize. We conclude that the field evidences aspects of a transnational legal order but also serves as an arena in which other TLOs contest over outcomes.

In recent decades, many countries around the world have institutionalized judicial councils of some sort. These institutions are designed to maintain an appropriate balance between judicial independence and accountability. However, they differ in attributes and competences across the world. Our paper has two aims. First, we provide an economic theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which they differ. Second, we test the extent to which different designs of judicial council affect judicial quality. We find that there is little relationship between councils and quality. We also offer a positive explanation for why judicial councils nevertheless remain attractive institutions. Finally, we discuss several experiences from the perspective of our theory.