Does political affirmative action undermine or promote development, and for whom? We examine Scheduled Areas in India, which reserve political office for the historically disadvantaged Scheduled Tribes. We apply a new theoretical framework and dataset of 217,000 villages to evaluate the overall impact of affirmative action on development, as well as its distributional consequences for minorities and non-minorities. Examining effects on the world’s largest employment program, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, we find that reservations deliver no worse overall outcomes, that there are large gains for targeted minorities, and that these gains come at the cost of the relatively privileged, not other minorities. We also find broader improvements in other pro-poor policies, including a rural roads program and general public goods. Contrary to the expectations of affirmative action skeptics, our results indicate that affirmative action can redistribute both political and economic power without hindering overall development.

How do we improve the quality of representation in new democracies? This paper studies candidate selection by party leaders and asks whether poor information about public preferences can lead elite choices to diverge from mass opinion. Working with a political party in Nepal, we show that while elites value voter preferences, these preferences only explain one third of elite candidate selection. Next, we embed an experiment in actual candidate selection deliberations for this party and find that party leaders not only select different candidates when polling data are presented to them, but that their updated decisions also improve the party’s vote share. By opening the black-box of candidate selection, this paper demonstrates that closing the information gap between elites and voters has the power to improve the quality of representation.

Over 40% of countries around the world have adopted limits on campaign contributions to curb the influence of money in politics. Yet, we have limited knowledge on whether and how these limits achieve this goal. With a regression discontinuity design that uses institutional rules on contribution limits in Colombian municipalities, we show that looser limits increase the number and value of public contracts assigned to the winning candidate’s donors. The evidence suggests that this is explained by looser limits concentrating influence over the elected candidate among top donors and not by a reduction in electoral competition or changes in who runs for office. We further show that looser limits worsen the performance of donor-managed contracts: they are more likely to run over costs and require time extensions. Overall, this paper demonstrates a direct link between campaign contribution limits, donor kickbacks, and worse government contract performance.

Why do administratively competent states sometimes leave substantial swathes of their territory ungoverned? We explore this question in the context of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) in Pakistan, a British Colonial law only abrogated in 2018, that left legal decisions up to local customary councils. This contrasts with areas where the British and Pakistani state built modern political and bureaucratic institutions. Using primary legal documents we create a dataset of when and where FCR applied between 1901 and 2012. Exploiting spatial variation in the Green Revolution’s impact in the 1960s, we show that governance was preferentially extended to places where the state stood to benefit the most in terms of land revenue. Our results show that technological changes which shift the returns to control influence where states choose to govern.

In 2015, after a decade-long conflict and nine years of negotiation, Nepal promulgated a constitution that replaced its 240-year-old monarchy by a federal republic. The subsequent 2017 local elections ushered more than 30,000 first-time politicians into office. Using a census of 3.68 million Nepalis (2.56 million of whom are of voting age) covering eleven districts, party nomination lists and party candidate selection committee surveys, electoral data and information on conflict incidence, we document that castes that were historically excluded from political representation achieved representation without a significant representation-ability trade-off: improved social representation among politicians is accompanied by positive selection on education and income. Triangulating across multiple data sources, we show that the entry of the revolutionary Maoist group as a post-conflict mainstream party played an important role. Finally, political representation of non-elite castes improved their policy inclusion as measured by individual access to earthquake reconstruction transfers. These gains, however, vary with the extent of social connections to the elected mayor and point to a continuing need to balance power by supporting institutions that provide all citizens political voice.