This information ranges from appreciating category membership to evaluating more enduring traits and dispositions. These aspects of social perception appear to be highly automated, some would even call them obligatory, and they are heavily influenced by two sources of information: the face and the body. From minimal information such as brief exposure to the face or degraded images of dynamic body motion, social judgments are made with remarkable efficiency and, at times, surprising accuracy.

Our social world is populated by groups—students in classrooms, co-workers in teams, soldiers in platoons, and more. Social psychological research on person construal has established the processes and consequences of perceiving an individual, yet, we know less about our perception of groups. Here, I integrate person construal theory with vision science findings on ensemble perception to outline a framework of people construal, or how we make inferences and judgments about visually perceived groups. Overall, I propose that people construal relies on both social categories (e.g., a group’s gender ratio) and visual cues to within-category variability (e.g., facial masculinity or femininity). Study Set 1 examined whether perceivers were sensitive to a group’s gender ratio and whether this gender ratio impacted evaluative judgments. Studies 1 and 2 showed that within a half second, perceivers were relatively accurate in estimating the number of men within a twelve-person group, and that as a group’s gender ratio shifted from men to women participants associated the group with more threat, measured both explicitly and implicitly. Study 3 revealed that group threat evaluations were derived from participants perceived number of men and not inferences about men's perceived cohesiveness within the group. Study 4 underscored the influence of visual cues to men's gender typicality on group evaluations. Results showed that groups of masculine men, compared to feminine men, were rated as having more men and as more threatening. Study Set 2 shifted to questions of social category activation and social categorization. Study 5 revealed that group gender ratio and men’s gender typicality interacted to influence subsequent social category activation. Specifically, groups of majority masculine men facilitated activation of the category “man” to a greater degree than groups of majority feminine men. Study 6 revealed that participants categorized majority masculine men groups as “majority men” with higher accuracy and in a faster, more direct manner, compared to majority feminine men groups. Together, these results build a framework of people construal, advancing research beyond our perception of the individual to reveal insights into the role social categories and visual cues play in our perception of groups.

People form evaluative judgments of others after mere glimpses of them. Although the consequences of these judgments have been well documented, the proximal factors that give rise to them remain less clear. Here, I integrate research from the social, cognitive, and vision sciences to argue that visual exposure guides impression formation. Specifically, I propose that perceivers visually adapt to others’ appearances, forming preferences for phenotypes they encounter frequently and prejudices against phenotypes they encounter infrequently. Study Set 1 tested this theory with regard to gendered facial features. In Study 1, visual adaptation to feminine faces caused feminine features to appear increasingly normative whereas visual adaptation to masculine faces caused masculine features to appear increasingly normative. Studies 2 and 3 extended these findings to evaluative judgments: Visual adaptation to feminine faces exacerbated a baseline bias against targets with masculine relative to feminine features, whereas visual adaptation to masculine faces mitigated it. Studies 4 and 5 revealed that popular media can act a naturalistic form of exposure that molds preferences for gendered facial features, insofar as perceivers who reported a high degree of exposure to media depicting hyper-feminine women (Study 4) and perceivers who were experimentally exposed to media images of hyper-feminine women (Study 5) espoused especially strong biases against masculine female faces relative to feminine female faces. Study Set 2 extended my initial findings to evaluative judgments related to body weight. In Study 6, exposure to thin bodies lowered the threshold for labeling others as fat whereas exposure to fat bodies heightened the threshold for labeling others as fat. Study 7 linked these threshold shifts to social evaluations, indicating that exposure to thin bodies exacerbated biases against fat targets relative to thin targets whereas exposure to fat bodies mitigated them. Using eye-tracking technology, Studies 8 and 9 revealed that perceivers unintentionally gazed at thin bodies more than fat bodies when presented with both simultaneously, which heightened evaluative preferences for thin bodies relative to fat bodies. Study 10 showed that this tendency to gaze at thin bodies can be overcome with a simple gaze manipulation in order to reduce prejudice against fat targets. Collectively, these findings offer new insights into the perceptual underpinnings of impression formation while emphasizing visual exposure as a cost-effective method for reducing prejudice against social groups that are stigmatized on the basis of their physical appearance.

Black and White Americans show relative agreement on the extent of anti-Black racism before the 1960s but diverge in perceptions of racial progress made since. Here, I propose how Black and White Americans perceive the self in relation to others influences cognitive representations (temporal distance, indirect consequences) of history highlighting anti-Black racism (critical Black history). Overall, I propose that when engaging with critical Black history, Black Americans construe the self more interdependently with familial ancestors, while White Americans construe the self less interdependently. And, I propose this self-construal difference mediates racial differences in the perceived temporal distance and indirect consequences of critical Black history. Study Set 1 examined how (a) manipulating self-construal shapes temporal perceptions of past events and (b) how manipulating the racial content of history motivates White Americans to defensively shift perceptions of self and history. Results indicated that participants made to think about their connection to family perceived one year ago (Pilot Study) and, to an extent, certain recent race-relevant events (Study 1) as closer to the present. Further, White Americans with strong anti-Black attitudes who engaged with critical Black history reported less interdependence with familial ancestors and perceived this history as further from the present (Study 2). Study Set 2 tested for—and examined whether self-construal explained—racial differences in perceptions of the Tulsa Race Massacre of 1921. Engaging with this critical Black history elicited Black Americans to perceive more interdependence with familial ancestors, but White Americans to perceive more interdependence with non-specific others—and this differential shift in interdependence focus mediated Black Americans perceiving this history as more temporally proximal and consequential than White Americans (Study 3). While manipulating the critical content of this history had minimal effects on history cognitions (Study 4), manipulating critical Black history to appear proximal to the present threatened White Americans, reflected in their history cognitions and restorative justice support (Study 5). These results highlight new insights into how the temporal location and perceived indirect consequences of critical racial histories are motivated social cognitions, in part facilitated by perceived connection to familial ancestors, with implications for support for restorative justice.

Historically, women have been at a disadvantage in U.S. politics. Recently, social-cognitive researchers have begun to investigate how gender and partisan stereotypes operate through politician appearance. Here I test the hypothesis that the gendered nature of the two major political parties in the United States manifests itself in the sex-typicality of politician appearance and has consequences for evaluations of female and male politicians. I draw from basic social cognition theory and the prejudice and stereotyping literature to propose a novel approach to understanding the consequences of gender stereotypes for perceptions of politicians (Chapter I). I specify a model documenting how partisan stereotypes and party-based adherence to traditional gender roles impact politician perceptions. The central tenets of this model are tested in Chapter II, Chapter III, Chapter IV, and Chapter V, and focus on a range of outcomes--trait evaluations, issue competencies, leadership ability, vote choice, and electoral success.

In the study described in Chapter II, I describe how politicians' gendered appearance impacts trait evaluations. I find that when politicians' appearance is congruent with their partisan stereotype that they fare better in their evaluations of warmth and competence. Moreover, perceived warmth varies as a function of gendered appearance for counter-stereotypic groups. Thus, gendered appearance impacts assessments of male politicians' warmth and evaluations of female politicians' competence.

In the study described in Chapter III, I test whether partisan stereotypes influence perceptions of politicians' issue competencies. I find evidence that partisan stereotypes drive perceptions of politicians' issue competencies such that a more feminine appearance compels more favorable evaluations of Democrats' ability to handle compassion/women's issues; a more masculine appearance compels more favorable assessments of politicians' ability to handle economic/military issues.

In the study described in Chapter IV, I describe how politicians' gendered appearance impacts leadership ability assessments. The pattern of result remains unclear. A feminine-appearance benefits perceptions of female Democrats' and female and male Republicans' leadership ability; however, a masculine appearance benefits perceptions male Democrats' leadership ability. These findings are not in line with my prior research and other published findings regarding gendered appearance and perceptions of leadership ability. Therefore, additional research is warranted to fully understand the influence of gendered appearance on assessments of leadership ability.

Sexual orientation has two key aspects: actual sexual experiences (e.g., attraction, fantasy, and behavior) and beliefs about those sexual experiences (self-perceived sexual orientation). It is self-perceived sexual orientation that is most often measured and used to understand the mental, physical, and behavioral correlates of sexual orientation. While evidence suggests that features of the social context (e.g., social norms) are related to self-perceived sexual orientation, to date there is no theoretical model which explains the psychological mechanisms by which the social context influences these two aspects of sexual orientation. I draw from basic social psychological theory of motivated cognition to propose a novel approach to understanding both between-person and within-person variability in self-perceived sexual orientation (Chapter I). I propose that individuals are motivated by various social contextual, cultural, and individual factors to hold a particular conception of their sexual orientation, prompting them to interpret their sexual experiences in a way that is consistent with that motivated self-perception. For instance, a man from a socially conservative family who has a same-sex experience at a party might be motivated to avoid interpreting that same-sex experience as relevant to his sexuality. He might state that it only happened because he was drunk, allowing him to maintain the self-perception that he is exclusively attracted to women. Critically, I propose that the impact of motivation on self-perceived sexual orientation is contingent on an individual's ability to interpret their sexual experiences in a way consistent with those beliefs. Thus, a man who has only ever been attracted to men and has only experienced sexual behaviors with men will have a difficult time interpreting his sexual experiences to support the motivated belief that he is heterosexual. The central tenets of this approach are tested in the studies described in Chapters II and III.

In the three studies described in Chapter II, I tested whether heterosexually identified men and women who are exposed to cues likely to motivate particular beliefs about their own sexual orientation would show differences in their self-perceived sexual orientation. Across three studies using both explicit and implicit manipulations, different measures of self-perceived sexual orientation, and both adult and college-aged participants, I found that participants exposed to cues indicating that same-sex sexuality was stigmatized in their social environment reported less self-perceived same-sex sexuality than did participants exposed to cues indicating that same-sex sexuality was supported in their social environment.

In the study described in Chapter III, I tested whether the relationship between a motivational cue (i.e., the perception that significant others experience same-sex sexuality) and self-perceived sexual orientation was moderated by the amount of same-sex experience participants had. I found that heterosexually identified male and female participants with at least some same-sex experience (e.g., same-sex fantasies, kissing) showed a positive relationship between their perceptions of the amount of same-sex attraction experienced by significant others in their life (e.g., mothers, average citizen from their hometown) and their self-perceived same-sex sexual attraction. However, those participants with no same-sex experience showed no relationship, indicating that they had no same-sex experiences to interpret as indicating they experienced same-sex attraction.

Finally, in the study described in Chapter IV, I tested two important implications of the proposed motivated cognition approach: that self-perceived sexual orientation is weakly predictive of future sexual experience and that more specific measures less likely to be influenced by motivational factors are better predictors of future sexual experience. Among a sample of heterosexually identified men and women, I found that self-perceived sexual orientation predicted only 18% of the variance in future same-sex sexual experience. However, more specific measures of the likelihood of engaging in specific same-sex experiences predicted between 51% and 69% of the variance in future same-sex sexual experience.

In conclusion, the theoretical paper and accompanying studies offer a novel, social psychological perspective on between-person and within-person variability in self-perceived sexual orientation. Self-perceived sexual orientation, like other beliefs about the self, is subject to the influence of motivational factors. The influence of those factors is contingent on an individual's ability to interpret their sexual experiences in a motivated fashion. This approach offers insights into the psychological mechanisms underlying variability in self-perceived sexual orientation; highlights the weak relationship between self-perceived sexual orientation and actual sexual experience; and offers empirically testable predictions for future research.