Recently, some authors have begun to raise questions about thepotential unity of 4E (enactive, embedded, embodied, extended)cognition as a distinct research programme within cognitivescience. Two tensions, in particular, have been raised: (i) thatthe body-centric claims embodied cognition militate against thedistributed tendencies of extended cognition and (ii) that thebody/environment distinction emphasized by enactivism standsin tension with the world-spanning claims of extendedcognition. The goal of this paper is to resolve tensions (i) and(ii). The proposal is that a form of ‘wide computationalism’ canbe used to reconcile the two tensions and, in so doing, articulatea common theoretical core for 4E cognition.

Talk of levels is everywhere in cognitive science. Whether it isin terms of adjudicating longstanding debates or motivatingfoundational concepts, one cannot go far without hearingabout the need to talk at different ‘levels’. Yet in spite of itswidespread application and use, the concept of levels hasreceived little sustained attention within cognitive science.This paper provides an analysis of the various ways the notionof levels has been deployed within cognitive science. Thepaper begins by introducing and motivating discussion viafour representative accounts of levels. It then turns to outliningand relating the four accounts using two dimensions ofcomparison. The result is the creation of a conceptualframework that maps the logical space of levels talk, whichoffers an important step toward making sense of levels talkwithin cognitive science