The cognitive revolution in psychology brought with it renewed interest in consciousness and unconscious mental life. Automatic processes are unconscious in the sense that they are inaccessible to phenomenal awareness and independent of voluntary control. Studies employing “priming” paradigms reveal dissociations between explicit (conscious) and implicit (unconscious) perception, memory, learning, and thinking. Beyond unconscious cognition, there is evidence of automatic and unconscious emotional and motivational states.

Motives may be said to be unconscious in a variety of ways. They may be automatically and unconsciously elicited by consciously perceptible situational cues; they may be instigated by cues that are themselves excluded from conscious awareness, as expressions of implicit perception or memory; or the person may be consciously unaware of his or her actual motivational state. The paper reviews the evidence pertaining to all three aspects of unconscious motivation, with emphasis on conceptual and methodological questions that arise in the study of motives which are not accessible to phenomenal awareness or voluntary control but nonetheless influence the individual's experience, thought, and action.

Theoretical models of memory retrieval have focused on processes of recollection and familiarity. Research suggests that there are still other processes involved in memory reconstruction, leading to experiences of knowing and inferring the past. Understanding these experiences, and the cognitive processes that give rise to them, seems likely to further expand our understanding of the neural substrates of memory.

The status of hypnosis as an altered state of consciousness (ASC) has long been controversial. The classic phenomena of hypnosis, such as sensory anaesthesias, analgesia, amnesia, and posthypnotic suggestion, provide prima facie evidence of altered consciousness, but some theorists contend that these are the products of normal mental processes, such as suggestion and expectation. In this article, hypnosis is viewed against a general framework for describing ASCs in terms of four converging operations: induction procedure, subjective experience, behavioural correlates, and physiological correlates. Although ʼneutral’ hypnosis, in the absence of specific suggestions, has few distinctive characteristics, many of the classic phenomena of hypnosis involve dissociations between explicit and implicit memory, or perception, such that percepts, memories, and thoughts influence ongoing experience, thought, and action outside conscious awareness and control.

It has long been speculated that there are discrete patterns of responsiveness to hypnotic suggestions, perhaps paralleling the factor structure of hypnotizability. An earlier study by Brenneman and Kihlstrom (1986), employing cluster analysis, found evidence for 12 such profiles. A new study by Terhune (2015), employing latent profile analysis, found evidence for three such patterns among highly hypnotizable subjects, and a fourth comprising subjects of medium hypnotizability. Some differences between the two studies are described. Convincing identification of discrete "types" of high hypnotizability, such as dissociative and nondissociative, may require a larger dataset than is currently available, but also data pertaining directly to divisions in conscious awareness and experienced involuntariness.

Jussim's critique of social psychology's embrace of error and bias is needed and often persuasive. In opting for perceptual realism over social constructivism, however, he seems to ignore a third choice - a cognitive constructivism which has a long and distinguished history in the study of nonsocial perception, and which enables us to understand both accuracy and error.

Four variants on Tulving's "Remember/Know" paradigm supported a tripartite classification of recollective experience in recognition memory into Remembering (as in conscious recollection of a past episode), Knowing (similar to retrieval from semantic memory), and Feeling (a priming-based judgment of familiarity). Recognition-by-knowing and recognition-by-feeling are differentiated by level of processing at the time of encoding (Experiments 1-3), shifts in the criterion for item recognition (Experiment 2), response latencies (Experiments 1-3), and changes in the response window (Experiment 3). False recognition is often accompanied by "feeling", but rarely by "knowing"; d' is higher for knowing than for feeling (Experiments 1-4). Recognition-by-knowing increases with additional study trials, while recognition-by-feeling falls to zero (Experiment 4). In these ways, recognition-by-knowing is distinguished from recognition-by-feeling in much the same way as, in the traditional Remember/Know paradigm, recognition-by-remembering can be distinguished from recognition-without-remembering. Implications are discussed for dual-process theories of memory, and the search for the neural substrates of memory retrieval.

Three experiments studied recognition during posthypnotic amnesia (PHA) employing confidence ratings rather than the traditional yes/no format. As the criterion for recognition was loosened, an increase in hits was accompanied by an increase in false alarms, especially to distractor items that were conceptually related to, or semantically associated with, targets. Nevertheless, hits exceeded false alarms at every level of confidence. In addition, amnesic subjects had difficulty identifying the particular list on which recognized items were presented for study or the correct order in which targets appeared on the study list. Taken together, these findings support the conclusion that successful recognition during PHA is more likely to be mediated by a priming-based feeling familiarity than conscious recollection.

In hypnosis, the subject responds to suggestions given by the hypnotist for imaginative experiences involving alterations in perception, memory, and the voluntary control of action. Individual differences in hypnotizability, assessed by standardized behavioral tests, are only weakly correlated with personality traits such as absorption. The most successful clinical applications involve the control of pain. Claims for enhanced physical strength and endurance, or the recovery of forgotten or repressed memories, are not supported by controlled scientific research. Experimental studies of hypnotic alterations of perception and memory, including hypnotic deafness, blindness, and anesthesia, have contributed to our understanding of unconscious mental life.