We consider the effect of various organizational resources on political contributions. Using a unique data set of soft money contributors from 1997 to 1998, our resource-based model examines how capital, membership, and experience influence the decision to give money to political parties. By observing decision making in a relatively unconstrained regulatory environment typified by the soft money regime, we demonstrate the conventional wisdom that financial resources determine the size of political contributions. Financial wealth, however, does not predict whether an organization will make a contribution in the first place. Instead, we show that a lack of alternative resources makes it more likely that organizations will spend money on politics. These findings have important implications for determining who benefits under various campaign finance rules.

This study catalogues party finance laws in multiple countries and identifies institutional factors that correspond to laws countries choose to adopt. Using data from international sources, we assessed differences in the regulation of money in elections in over 120 states. We classified countries into four types of party finance regimes along two axes: one that reflects regulations affecting party income and a second that reflects rules intended to make party finance more transparent. We found that two institutional factors are associated with the extent of government regulation in financing politics: the type of legal system and the use of proportional representation. Our study provides a new conceptual framework to categorize party finance regimes based on various types of regulations and the linkages between institutional factors and the extent of regulation. This conceptual typology offers a method to assess relationships between finance systems and political outcomes.