Organizations have idiosyncratic norms and practices that govern the exercise of power. Newcomers learn these unwritten rules through organizational socialization. In organizations with dominant and subordinate groups, structural power can shift between groups as the resources they control ebb and flow. We examine how entering the organization in a dominant group affects (1) the ability to exert influence following subsequent structural shifts in power and (2) the rate at which people learn to wield influence. On one hand, entering in a dominant group may boost self-efficacy and cat-alyze social learning about effective influence tactics. On the other hand, entering in a dominant group may make people susceptible to the adverse psychological consequences of experiencing power, which inhibit social learning. We examine these dynamics in the context of the U.S. Senate from 1973 to 2005. We find partial support for both accounts: (1) senators who entered in the political majority were less effective than their counterparts who entered in the minority at converting subsequent structural shifts of power into influence; however, (2) majority entrants learned how to wield influence following such shifts at a faster rate than did minority entrants. We discuss implications for research on power, learning, and socialization.

This article reconciles two seemingly incompatible expectations about interpersonal interaction and social influence. One theoretical perspective predicts that an increase in interaction between two actors will promote subsequent convergence in their attitudes and behaviors, whereas another view anticipates divergence. We examine the role of political identity in moderating the effects of interaction on influence. Our investigation takes place in the U.S. Senate—a setting in which actors forge political identities for public consumption based on the external constraints, normative obligations, and reputational concerns they face. We argue that interaction between senators who share the same political identity will promote convergence in their voting behavior, whereas interaction between actors with opposing political identities will lead to divergence. Moreover, we theorize that the consequences of political identity for interpersonal influence depend on the local interaction context. Political identity’s effects on influence will be greater in more divided Senate committees than in less divided ones. We find support for these hypotheses in analyses of data, spanning over three decades, on voting behavior, interaction, and political identity in the Senate. These findings contribute to research on social influence; elite integration and political polarization; and identity theory.

We theorize that the gain or loss of power produces corresponding shifts in influence; however, these effects are contingent upon people's experiences with power and conflict at the time of organizational entry. We evaluate and find support for these propositions in analyses of the U.S. Senate from 1973 to 2009.

This paper extends niche theory to develop an intraorganizational conceptualization of the niche that is grounded in the activities of organizational members. We construe niches as positions in a mapping of individuals to formal and informal activities within organizations. We posit that positional characteristics in this activity-based system are critical determinants of members' access to information and relationships-two of the vital resources for advancement in organizations. Because activities are difficult to observe, we propose a novel empirical strategy to depict niches: we exploit a census of memberships in electronic mailing lists. We assess three niche dimensions-competitive crowding, status, and diversity-and show that these attributes affect the allocation of rewards to employees. Propositions are tested in two empirical settings: an information services firm and the R and D division of a biopharmaceutical company. Results indicate that people in competitively crowded niches had lower levels of attainment, whereas those in high status and diverse niches enjoyed higher attainment levels. We conclude with a discussion of email distribution lists as a tool for organizational research.

What qualities make a political leader more influential or less influential? Philosophers, political scientists, and psychologists have puzzled over this question, positing two opposing routes to political power--one driven by human virtues, such as courage and wisdom, and the other driven by vices, such as Machiavellianism and psychopathy. By coding nonverbal behaviors displayed in political speeches, we assessed the virtues and vices of 151 U.S. senators. We found that virtuous senators became more influential after they assumed leadership roles, whereas senators who displayed behaviors consistent with vices--particularly psychopathy--became no more influential or even less influential after they assumed leadership roles. Our results inform a long-standing debate about the role of morality and ethics in leadership and have important implications for electing effective government officials. Citizens would be wise to consider a candidate's virtue in casting their votes, which might increase the likelihood that elected officials will have genuine concern for their constituents and simultaneously promote cooperation and progress in government.