BackgroundInterseasonal influenza outbreaks are not unusual in countries with temperate climates and well-defined influenza seasons. Usually, these are small and diminish before the main influenza season begins. However, the 2018/19 summer-autumn interseasonal influenza period in Australia saw unprecedented large and widespread influenza outbreaks.AimOur objective was to determine the extent of the intense 2018/19 interseasonal influenza outbreaks in Australia epidemiologically and examine the genetic, antigenic and structural properties of the viruses responsible for these outbreaks.MethodsThis observational study combined the epidemiological and virological surveillance data obtained from the Australian Government Department of Health, the New South Wales Ministry of Health, sentinel outpatient surveillance, public health laboratories and data generated by the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza in Melbourne and the Singapore Agency for Science, Technology and Research.ResultsThere was a record number of laboratory-confirmed influenza cases during the interseasonal period November 2018 to May 2019 (n= 85,286; 5 times the previous 3-year average) and also more institutional outbreaks, hospitalisations and deaths, than what is normally seen.ConclusionsThe unusually large interseasonal influenza outbreaks in 2018/19 followed a mild 2018 influenza season and resulted in a very early start to the 2019 influenza season across Australia. The reasons for this unusual event have yet to be fully elucidated but are likely to be a complex mix of climatic, virological and host immunity-related factors. These outbreaks reinforce the need for year-round surveillance of influenza, even in temperate climates with strong seasonality patterns.

In response to the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern, the global scientific community, through unprecedented effort, has sequenced and shared over 11 million genomes through GISAID, as of May 2022. This extraordinarily high sampling rate provides a unique opportunity to track the evolution of the virus in near real-time. Here, we present outbreak.info , a platform that currently tracks over 40 million combinations of Pango lineages and individual mutations, across over 7,000 locations, to provide insights for researchers, public health officials and the general public. We describe the interpretable visualizations available in our web application, the pipelines that enable the scalable ingestion of heterogeneous sources of SARS-CoV-2 variant data and the server infrastructure that enables widespread data dissemination via a high-performance API that can be accessed using an R package. We show how outbreak.info can be used for genomic surveillance and as a hypothesis-generation tool to understand the ongoing pandemic at varying geographic and temporal scales.

The threat of an influenza A virus pandemic stems from continual virus spillovers from reservoir species, a tiny fraction of which spark sustained transmission in humans. To date, no pandemic emergence of a new influenza strain has been preceded by detection of a closely related precursor in an animal or human. Nonetheless, influenza surveillance efforts are expanding, prompting a need for tools to assess the pandemic risk posed by a detected virus. The goal would be to use genetic sequence and/or biological assays of viral traits to identify those non-human influenza viruses with the greatest risk of evolving into pandemic threats, and/or to understand drivers of such evolution, to prioritize pandemic prevention or response measures. We describe such efforts, identify progress and ongoing challenges, and discuss three specific traits of influenza viruses (hemagglutinin receptor binding specificity, hemagglutinin pH of activation, and polymerase complex efficiency) that contribute to pandemic risk.

Assessing the pandemic risk posed by specific non-human influenza A viruses is an important goal in public health research. As influenza virus genome sequencing becomes cheaper, faster, and more readily available, the ability to predict pandemic potential from sequence data could transform pandemic influenza risk assessment capabilities. However, the complexities of the relationships between virus genotype and phenotype make such predictions extremely difficult. The integration of experimental work, computational tool development, and analysis of evolutionary pathways, together with refinements to influenza surveillance, has the potential to transform our ability to assess the risks posed to humans by non-human influenza viruses and lead to improved pandemic preparedness and response.

Infection with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is initiated by binding of the viral Spike protein to host receptor angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2), followed by fusion of viral and host membranes. Although antibodies that block this interaction are in emergency use as early coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) therapies, the precise determinants of neutralization potency remain unknown. We discovered a series of antibodies that potently block ACE2 binding but exhibit divergent neutralization efficacy against the live virus. Strikingly, these neutralizing antibodies can inhibit or enhance Spike-mediated membrane fusion and formation of syncytia, which are associated with chronic tissue damage in individuals with COVID-19. As revealed by cryoelectron microscopy, multiple structures of Spike-antibody complexes have distinct binding modes that not only block ACE2 binding but also alter the Spike protein conformational cycle triggered by ACE2 binding. We show that stabilization of different Spike conformations leads to modulation of Spike-mediated membrane fusion with profound implications for COVID-19 pathology and immunity.

Genomic sequencing is essential to track the evolution and spread of SARS-CoV-2, optimize molecular tests, treatments, vaccines, and guide public health responses. To investigate the global SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance, we used sequences shared via GISAID to estimate the impact of sequencing intensity and turnaround times on variant detection in 189 countries. In the first two years of the pandemic, 78% of high-income countries sequenced >0.5% of their COVID-19 cases, while 42% of low- and middle-income countries reached that mark. Around 25% of the genomes from high income countries were submitted within 21 days, a pattern observed in 5% of the genomes from low- and middle-income countries. We found that sequencing around 0.5% of the cases, with a turnaround time <21 days, could provide a benchmark for SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance. Socioeconomic inequalities undermine the global pandemic preparedness, and efforts must be made to support low- and middle-income countries improve their local sequencing capacity.