Theories of distinctions surface some of the most fundamental elements of metaphysical and logical inquiry. For many medieval philosophers, theories of distinctions provided some semblance of rational order and unity to metaphysical, logical and theological questions. The two philosophers on which I focus, John Duns Scotus and William Ockham, discuss distinctions and metaphysical adjuncts in a variety of philosophical and theological contexts. When discussing Scotus, I emphasize his development of a robust theory of identity and distinction. I give special attention to his accounts of what he calls qualified non-identity or qualified distinction, which he surprisingly says is compatible with real identity. When I turn my attention to Ockham, I focus on his use of the real distinction in the context of the common fourteenth century disputes about universals.

The question of separability has long been a central one for various theories of distinctions. Students of medieval philosophy who have interacted with Scotus's theory of distinctions have generally assumed two distinct claims: (1) that the real distinction entails separability; and (2) that the formal distinction entails inseparability. I raise concerns for both of those claims. The rejection of assumption (2) depends on a careful (and controversial) reading of Scotus's account. On the other hand, the rejection of (1) is comparatively straightforward, though perhaps still controversial.

Ockham's interesting claims about universals make reference only to the real distinction (or its denial). Thus the emphasis in what follows is on Ockham's account of the real distinction and the proper conditions for separability when such a distinction obtains. Because Ockham's account of the distinctions is simpler than Scotus's in important ways, the discussion of separability might initially seem like it ought to be simpler as well. Surprisingly, Ockham's account of separability in relation to the real distinction - the only relevant case, since he denies the general usefulness of the formal distinction - is complicated, and he seems to deny that separability is possible in every case in which a real distinction obtains.

This dissertation offers three accounts as a way of answering three questions. The questions are: (1) What is indoctrination? (2) Why is it harmful? (3) Is there a role for indoctrination in a proper education? The three accounts that are offered are an account of indoctrination and its harms, an account of meaningfulness that grounds a life worth living in intersubjective value, and an account of education in which at least one of the more important purposes of education is coming to possess the tools for living a meaningful life.

Indoctrination has classically been characterized as something that necessarily is concerned with the instilling of beliefs. I argue that indoctrination, taken as such, is at least as much about values and deliberation as it is about the holding of beliefs, and that a successful indoctrination shapes the way in which a subject approaches evidence ex ante. I argue that indoctrination is harmful to the extent that it prevents a person from authentically expressing themselves, and in inhibiting that expression, prevents a person from living a truly meaningful life, but that any such harm is also contingent on the particular pre-existing values of the subject and how those particular values relate to the facts of and content of the indoctrination in question. Finally, I argue that the living of a meaningful life is most certainly one of the proper ends of education, and that while indoctrination can certainly thwart that goal when it is employed in such a way as to cause its characteristic harms, indoctrination also remains the only way to accomplish that goal in the first place. Indeed, the very enterprise of institutional education is indoctrinative in its very conception.

The first chapter argues that certain axioms are equally justified as first principles for practical reasoning as they are for theoretical reasoning. In each case, these axioms should be accepted by anyone seeking to answer theoretical or practical questions because doing so is necessary if one is to have any hope of answering these questions. The second chapter confronts anticipated objections to this view, especially to the objectivism that it entails. The third chapter uses these axioms to consider what goods constitute basic reasons for action. The fourth chapter explores what practical norms emerge from recognizing these goods as reasons for action, in particular the rational error of acting for the sake of anything other than these goods, the failure to respond appropriately to the possibility of achieving goods in others, and the error of acting so as to impede these goods, which leads to a discussion of the Doctrine of Double Effect. Finally, the fifth chapter argues for an understanding of Warren Quinn’s revised Doctrine of Double Effect that aims to account for nonconsequentialist intuitions and to help nonconsequentialists understand when it is problematic to usefully involve others without their consent.

Many people have experienced a peculiar feeling of freedom, of the world being open before them. This is the feeling evoked by phrases like “free as a bird,” “the freedom of the open road,” and “free spirits.” Drawing on a study of literary characters, I develop a phenomenological profile of spontaneous freedom, arguing that we experience spontaneous freedom when we feel that our actions are not fully settled in advance by our own consciously endorsed practical identities, plans, or prior decisions or those of other agents. I argue that the experience of spontaneous freedom is valuable because it is a necessary precondition for the creation of a certain sort of beautiful, creative art—the art that Kant calls works of “genius”—and because it helps us to confront existential anxiety by seeing that we extend beyond our rational, deliberative natures. Appreciating the value of spontaneous freedom requires rejecting or amending some prominent strands of contemporary ethical theory: “integrity theories,” such as Christine Korsgaard’s theory of self-constitution, contend that in order to be a good agent, or in order to be an agent at all, one must constitute oneself through rational deliberation and planning. Such views rule out experiences of spontaneous freedom for well-constituted agents because experiencing spontaneous freedom requires acting in a manner not antecedently fixed by one’s own plans, decisions, or consciously endorsed practical identities. I further argue that respecting the value of spontaneous freedom requires organizing political and social institutions to ensure that there are not large swaths of people’s lives in which they are completely cut off from experiencing spontaneous freedom. Respecting its values also requires that political and social institutions avoid trying to control or manage how people behave in those domains, like artistic creativity, where the value of spontaneity is at its peak. Finally, I suggest that certain sorts of social practices and institutions can predictably occasion experiences of spontaneous freedom, even though such experiences cannot be brought about at will. By encouraging play, games often provide at least a limited experience of spontaneous freedom.

This is a study of the anonymous Destructions of the Modes of Signifying (DMS). Produced in the mid- to late fourteenth century and occasionally attributed to the famous French cardinal Peter of Ailly (1351–1420), the DMS is one of very few surviving texts representative of late medieval anti-modist polemics. A fundamental tenet of modism is what I call 'the Modist Correspondence Thesis' ('MCT'), which asserts that the syntactic features of language are grounded in the ontological properties of the world. The DMS argues forcefully against MCT and offers an alternative theory that grounds syntax in mental language. Part 1 of the dissertation is an essay addressing the issue of authorship. Part 2 is an essay focusing on MCT and the negative project of repudiating modism. Part 3 provides a Latin edition and English translation of the text of the DMS.

A normality judgment is a type of generalization that ascribes a normal feature or property to a kind. The explanatory link account of normality—an account of what it is to be a normal feature or property and therefore an account of the content of a normality judgment—is defended in this dissertation. According to the explanatory link account, a feature is normal for a kind if and only if an individual’s possession of that feature is explained by its being a member of that kind. The account is inspired by the Aristotelian notion that being a carpenter explains one’s house-building activities whereas being a grammarian wouldn’t explain the same. The second chapter defends this form of explanation—called herein “kind explanation.” The dissertation closes with a study of the extensional relationship between normality and statistical regularity, and finally with a study of the inferential profile of normality judgments.

The present study is an investigation into a little studied aspect of the thought of Thomas Aquinas, namely, his view of the nature and experience of beauty. Aquinas has defined beauty, provisionally, as “that which pleases when seen.” This study is structured around the three key components of the definition: (1) the things themselves, including the formal constituents of beauty found in things, (2) Aquinas' philosophical psychology of perception, and (3) desire and pleasure. My aim is to examine the connection between Aquinas' account of desire and pleasure and their relation to his moral thinking, on the one hand, and his account of aesthetic pleasure and its implications for his moral thinking, on the other. From this discussion, as well as from a careful examination of select texts from his commentary on Dionysius' De divinis nominibus, I shall argue that Aquinas holds spiritual or moral beauty to be his primary aesthetic concern, and only derivatively does he concern himself with natural or physical beauty. The study concludes with a comparison between the commentaries of Aquinas and his mentor, Albertus Magnus, highlighting the great similarity between the two accounts as well as what appears to be a significant dependence of Aquinas's thought upon that of his teacher with respect to this subject. This study also highlights one area, namely beauty, in which Aquinas' thought is significantly more Platonic than Aristotelian.

This dissertation interprets Leibniz’ notion of perception through abilities, agency, and action. In chapter 1, I characterize the differences between kinds of Leibnizian perception by considering their relationship to different abilities. I focus on lower cognition, where Leibniz distinguishes bare perception from sensation by their degrees of distinctness and memory. I read this relationship, between kinds of perception and qualities of perception, through actions. I begin with complete lacks of distinctness and memory and how they relate to stupors as an inability to act. I then turn to a range of incrementally more advanced cases of perceptions and actions to highlight the role of distinctness and memory in each. The cases reveal how differences in kinds of action depend on differences in kinds of perception in Leibniz’ system. My approach breaks with traditional readings that invoke consciousness to account for the differences, and it builds in some ways on readings that lead with representation. I also comment on the prospects of such an abilities based approach for 21st century theories of perception.

In chapter 2, I articulate the point of view or perspectival nature of Leibnizian perception through expression and agency. I establish some conditions that Leibniz sets on perspectival expression for individual perceivers, and on the particular way that perceptions belong to their perceivers in Leibniz’ system. I argue that spatial, geometrical notions of perspective, though useful, ultimately give way to a deeper, agential notion for Leibniz. I make a case for including the agential side perception in POV, beyond the phenomenal flow of perception. I then articulate how agency is unique and fundamental to Leibniz’ notion of perspective or point of view, both in internal action and in the activity and passivity of external action.

In chapter 3, I ask about the limits of perceivers in Leibniz’ system—where they arise and where they don’t. I set the question adjacent to the celebrated mill argument. I consider readings of the argument that invoke action, and build on them to include questions about how action relates to interaction in different kinds of perceivers. One question concerns the lack of perception in primary matter, and another concerns the lack of perception in an aggregate of secondary matter. After milling through some considerations, I settle on a notion of organic unity, underpinned by a notion of action, that can draw lines between Leibnizian perceivers and non-perceivers.