The practice of free-riding -- consuming service without providing
equivalent service in return -- is a well-documented problem in contemporary
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks that undermines the key advantages of service
distribution, including scalability, availability and robust ness under attack.
Existing approaches to the free-riding problem fall into two rough categories:
reputation systems and commerce systems. To a first approximation, reputation
systems appear better suited to managing actively greedy users in a reactive
fashion, while commerce systems are more natural for pro-actively implementing
appropriate incentives among passively self-interested users. We believe this
l atter property represents a more pressing requirement for large-scale
peer-to-peer systems and consequently focus on the commerce system approach. We
propose in this work a design for the technical infrastructure necessary to
implement a commerce-based resource sharing policy. There are two key
components to any such infrastructure: an accounting mechanism to securely
store the currency held by individual users and a settlement mechanism to
fairly exchange currency for services. Traditionally, such systems have relied
on the use of a single trusted third-party. Such a centralized solution,
however, is at odds with the goals of P2P networks, which are by their nature
highly distributed. Instead, we offer an alternative design that hinges on an
accounting scheme based on the use of a distributed set of peers as accountants
providing accounting functionality for each user in the system. We also
propose several settlement protocols that leverage this accounting facility.
Finally, we show that our design distributes accounting and settlement
functions widely, providing powerful incentives without depending on a
centralized trusted third-party to mediate each transaction.
Pre-2018 CSE ID: CS2003-0751