Judgement bias testing has emerged as a potential tool for assessing affective states in animals. Researchers infer an animal's affective state based on an animal's response to an ambiguous stimulus that is intermediate to both the rewarded and punished conditioned stimuli. Animals can be classified as "optimistic" or having a positive affective state if the animal displays behaviors that suggest an increased expectation of reward in the face of ambiguous stimuli. Alternatively, animals can be classified "pessimistic" or having a negative affective state if the animal displays behaviors that suggest an increased expectation of punishment in the face of ambiguous stimuli. Recent reports in multiple species question what factors influence performance in judgement bias testing, and which may allow for erroneous conclusions regarding individual affective state. In order to better understand this concern, 25 female swine were subjected to behavioral assessments at critical rearing stages to determine response variability. These same individuals were then assessed for physical measures of welfare and judgement bias using the "go/no-go" task as breeding adults. Sows which were more aggressive approached the ambiguous, but not the positive, stimulus significantly faster than others. Both optimistic and pessimistic biases were observed despite all sows living in enriched housing, and, sows with more positive physical welfare measures (fewer skin lesions and healthy body condition) did not exhibit more optimistic judgement biases. Our data demonstrate that behavior traits, such as aggressiveness, can affect a sow's performance in a judgement bias test, while measures of physical health did not. We suggest that individual differences in behavior (e.g., bold-aggressive behavioral syndrome, or, proactive coping style) generate different emotional responses and can contribute to the animal's overall affective state more so than physical ailment. Our findings highlight the complexity of how different factors impact an animal's overall affective state and support the need for complementary measures in future JBT studies, including personality assessment.

The experiences associated with remembering, including metamemory feelings about the act of remembering and attempts at remembering, are not often integrated into general accounts of memory. For example, David Rubin (2022) proposes a unified, three-dimensional conceptual space for mapping memory states, a map that does not systematically specify metamemory feelings. Drawing on Rubin's model, we define a distinct role for metamemory in relation to first-order memory content. We propose a fourth dimension for the model and support the proposal with conceptual, neurocognitive, and clinical lines of reasoning. We use the modified model to illustrate several cases, and show how it helps to conceptualize a new category of memory state: autonoetic knowing, exemplified by déjà vu. We also caution not to assume that memory experience is directly correlated with or caused by memory content, an assumption Tulving (1989) labeled the doctrine of concordance.

Roughly two-thirds of all people report having experienced déjà vu-the odd feeling that a current experience is both novel and a repeat or replay of a previous, unrecalled experience. Reports of an association between déjà vu and seizure aura symptomatology have accumulated for over a century, and frequent déjà vu is also now known to be associated with focal seizures, particularly those of a medial temporal lobe (MTL) origin. A longstanding question is whether seizure-related déjà vu has the same basis and is the same subjective experience as non-seizure déjà vu. Survey research suggests that people who experience both seizure-related and non-seizure déjà vu can often subjectively distinguish between the two. We present a case of a person with a history of focal MTL seizures who reports having experienced both seizure-related and non-seizure common déjà vu, though the non-seizure type was more frequent during this person's youth than it is currently. The patient was studied with a virtual tour paradigm that has previously been shown to elicit déjà vu among non-clinical, young adult participants. The patient reported experiencing déjà vu of the common non-seizure type during the virtual tour paradigm, without associated abnormalities of the intracranial EEG. We situate this work in the context of broader ongoing projects examining the subjective correlates of seizures. The importance for memory research of virtual scenes, spatial tasks, virtual reality (VR), and this paradigm for isolating familiarity in the context of recall failure are discussed.