There are a class of examples that appear to show that one can gain knowledge via reasoning from a falsehood. The problem that such examples pose is to explain why knowledge can be acquired in such cases given that in general drawing inferences from false beliefs, even if the inferred belief is true, does not result in knowledge. A safety-based rationale is offered in this regard, along with the kind of motivation for safety offered by anti-risk epistemology. It is maintained that such a rationale is at best incomplete, however, and that for a fuller account of how knowledge can be acquired from error we need to turn to the theory of knowledge offered by anti-risk virtue epistemology.

What does it take to convert the deliverances of an extended cognitive process into knowledge (i.e., extended knowledge)? This question is explored in the context of anti-luck virtue epistemology. It is argued that what is key to extended cognitive processes is how they are cognitively integrated within the cognitive character of the agent. In this context, anti-luck virtue epistemology is shown to be comfortably able to accommodate cases of extended knowledge; it is also explained that such a theory of knowledge can allow for a relatively broad range of instances of extended knowledge, including cases that do not essentially involve the manifestation of intellectual virtue, and cases that involve positive epistemic dependence. Finally, it is argued that while the threshold for extended knowledge may be relatively low, this should not preclude generally preferring an extended knowledge that involves an epistemic standing that extends far above that threshold.

Abstract: It is argued that the general structure of knowledge is along the lines set out by anti-risk virtue epistemology. Since such a proposal makes no essential demand that one’s cognitive success be significantly supported by reflectively accessible rational support, epistemic externalism about knowledge results. Nonetheless, anti-risk virtue epistemology offers an account of knowledge that is entirely built around a conception of cognitive responsibility. This ensures that it is able to accommodate supposedly internalist intuitions about the relationship between knowledge and cognitive responsibility. Moreover, it is argued that this proposal is entirely consistent with the idea that the knowledge possessed by cognitively developed agents characteristically involves a significant level of reflectively accessible rational support. Indeed, it is claimed that not only does the knowledge possessed by cognitively developed agents enjoy such rational support but also, in line with epistemological disjunctivism, such reflectively accessible rational support will often include factive reasons.

An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of the special value of understanding is presented, which flows from the account given of its nature. In terms of the nature of understanding, it is argued that it essentially involves a strong kind of cognitive achievement. This explains the distinctive relationship that understanding bears to epistemic luck and thus how it diverges from propositional knowledge, such that it is usually a more demanding epistemic standing but not always (as in cases of environmental epistemic luck). It is then shown how treating understanding as a strong cognitive achievement can account for its special value, both in broad terms and in terms of epistemic value specifically.