I examine the representational formats of perceptual states andcognitive states related to perception, such as perceptual beliefsstored in long term memory, and argue, first, that despite theirimportant differences they both have an iconic ingredient.Then, I explain how this common iconic component ofperceptual and cognitive contents allow cognitive states tomodulate perceptual processing focusing on a recent argumentmade by Burnston (2017) to the effect that owing to theirdiffering representational formats cognition cannot affectdirectly perception.

Newen and Vetter (2016) argue that cognitive penetration (CP) ofperceptual experience is the most possible account of the evidence.They target both the weak impenetrability thesis that only some earlyvisual processes are cognitively impenetrable (CI), and the strongimpenetrability thesis that all perceptual processes are CI. Since Iagree that perceptual processing as a whole is CP, I will concentrateon their arguments against the weak CI thesis. In attacking weak CI,the authors take aim at Raftopoulos’ arguments supporting the CI ofearly vision. Their main argument comes from studies that, Newenand Vetter think, show that early vision is CP by demonstrating theexistence of cognitive effects on early vision. I examine the sameempirical evidence that Newen and Vatter discuss and argue thissame evidence strongly supports the view that early vision is CI.