This research project has two parts. First, I argue that empathy is not necessary and not sufficient for morality. I use autistic individuals and individuals who suffer from psychopathy as my primary examples to show that empathy is not a significant source of morality. I review the literature in moral psychology and emotion research to show that emotions other than empathy, primarily disgust, are responsible for morality. Second, I provide initial findings from my meta-analysis to show which emotions are most prominent in moral judgment and moral behaviour.

Epistemologists have argued that there are three basic sources of belief: perception, testimony and inference. These three belief sources correspond directly to the way in which many languages mark statements morphologically for sources of evidence for the statements (evidentiality). In this paper, we connect generalizations from the fields of epistemology and evidentiality. We also introduce a new method for investigating how reliable people find different types of evidence to be. A study based on this method indicates that speakers of English rank different sources of evidence according to the same criteria that govern the use of grammaticalized evidential marking