People often form impressions of others in contexts where both relatively static demographic cues (e.g., age, race, gender) and situationally flexible, dynamic cues (e.g., emotion expressions) are available. We examined whether and how attending to gender (male, female) versus emotion expression (neutral, smiling) affects threat-based person impressions. In three experiments, we heightened the salience of either gender categories or emotion categories in a sequential priming task. Category salience consistently moderated the use of both categories in threat impressions. The effect of gender (emotion) categories was stronger when attention was directed to gender (emotion) than when attention was directed to emotion (gender); however, category salience did not eliminate the use of either category. Implications for models of person construal and bias in person impressions are discussed.

Although research findings are increasingly accessible to the public, people may choose to rely on anecdotal over evidence-based information when making important decisions. Thus, a key challenge facing the scientific community is to develop effective strategies for increasing people’s reliance on research evidence in their decision-making. Focusing on the critical context of cancer-screening decisions, we find that a brief, distance-based intervention can influence people’s intentions to follow evidence-based rather than anecdotal information. Specifically, in a preregistered and well-powered experiment (N = 224), participants who set a screening schedule for the next 10 years before considering a decision for an upcoming appointment were more inclined to follow the implications of evidence-based screening guidelines (vs. an anecdote), compared to participants who only considered the upcoming appointment. The success of this distance-based intervention represents an important first step in translating decades of laboratory research on distance into practical interventions for more complex and consequential decisions.

Stereotypes can influence social perception in undesirable ways. However, activated stereotypes are not always applied in judgments. The present research investigated how stereotype activation and application processes impact social judgments as a function of available resources for control over stereotypes. Specifically, we varied the time available to intervene in the stereotyping process and used multinomial modeling to independently estimate stereotype activation and application. As expected, social judgments were less stereotypic when participants had more time to intervene. In terms of mechanisms, stereotype application, and not stereotype activation, corresponded with reductions in stereotypic biases. With increasing time, stereotype application was reduced, reflecting the fact that controlling application is time-dependent. In contrast, stereotype activation increased with increasing time, apparently due to increased engagement with stereotypic material. Stereotype activation was highest when judgments were least stereotypical, and thus, reduced stereotyping may coincide with increased stereotype activation if stereotype application is simultaneously decreased.

Initial evaluations generalise to new contexts, whereas counter-attitudinal evaluations are context-specific. Counter-attitudinal information may not change evaluations in new contexts because perceivers fail to retrieve counter-attitudinal cue-evaluation associations from memory outside the counter-attitudinal learning context. The current work examines whether an additional, counter-attitudinal retrieval cue can enhance the generalizability of counter-attitudinal evaluations. In four experiments, participants learned positive information about a target person, Bob, in one context, and then learned negative information about Bob in a different context. While learning the negative information, participants wore a wristband as a retrieval cue for counter-attitudinal Bob-negative associations. Participants then made speeded as well as deliberate evaluations of Bob while wearing or not wearing the wristband. Internal meta-analysis failed to find a reliable effect of the counter-attitudinal retrieval cue on speeded or deliberate evaluations, whereas the context cues influenced speeded and deliberate evaluations. Counter to predictions, counter-attitudinal retrieval cues did not disrupt the generalisation of first-learned evaluations or the context-specificity of second-learned evaluations (Experiments 2-4), but the counter-attitudinal retrieval cue did influence evaluations in the absence of context cues (Experiment 1). The current work provides initial evidence that additional counter-attitudinal retrieval cues fail to disrupt the renewal and generalizability of first-learned evaluations.