A problem arises when the assumption that the higher the Pf and Cf, the greater the pressure will be to reduce one or both confronts a reality where Pf is high because Cf is high, and Cf is high because no one has been able to agree over what to do about the critical infrastructures in question. The impasse arises because of the zero-sum nature of the high-stakes conflict, which in turn leads to long-term inaction where thereby increases the probability of something awful happening when disaster finally strikes. Reliability of the critical infrastructure, accordingly, ceases to be the driving priority in decisionmaking. This note examines how to address such a problem within the interactive framework for the risk assessment and management (RAM) the instruments of a Quality Management Assessment System (QMAS) and a System Analysis Risk Assessment System (SYRAS).
Solving the wrong problem precisely (error of the third kind, E3) means having a very good idea about just what that “problem” is that is being solved in the RESIN initiative. This paper presents a framework for understanding major errors of the first, second and third kinds (E1, E2 and E3, respectively) and their implications for the RESIN Technology Delivery System (TDS) and the Risk Assessment and Management (RAM) methods, namely, the instruments of a Quality Management Assessment System (QMAS) and a System Analysis Risk Assessment System (SYRAS). Two cautions identifying further areas of study conclude the paper.
What are: interdependent, interconnected and interactive critical infrastructures systems? Chokepoints and the relationship to I3CIS? What for that matter are their “interactions,” “resilience,” and “sustainability?” In giving initial definitions and descriptions of these concepts and terms, other issues related to the RESIN conceptual model, its eco-infrastructure element, and the probability and consequences of infrastructure failure are also addressed.