This thesis proposes a unique approach to haptic feedback, based on a hand-worn electronic device that amplifies the sense of touch. By capturing and reproducing touch elicited vibrations in real time, the feeling of otherwise natural finger-object interactions can be altered, while preserving temporal and spectral properties of the signal that are unique for every interaction and thus impossible to display without sensing and processing in real time. In order to shed light on the physical mechanisms through which such a device can operate, this thesis undertook an empirical investigation of the propagation of touch elicited mechanical vibrations (elastic waves) in the finger, and their dependence on the spatial pathway and frequency of excitation. Next, the thesis proposes a novel touch amplification system informed by these results, and addresses factors affecting the performance of the device, including the stability of the system at high gain levels. The results suggest promising applications in augmented reality and human-computer interaction.

This dissertation focuses on the transcendental unity of apperception in the work of two major German philosophers: Kant and Hegel. The transcendental unity of apperception was first described by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, where he gave it pride of place in his system of transcendental idealism. There, it was posited as a condition on the subject’s representations, such that they must form a necessary unity in order to constitute experience of an object. While Hegel does not make the phrase ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ a central one his work, he and other post-Kantian German idealists can be read as transforming this central Kantian insight. Specifically, as I argue in my second chapter, Hegel criticizes Kant’s construal of the unity of apperception as a condition among representations alone, and several commonly distinguished Hegelian criticisms of Kant can be understood as consequences of this central objection. Hegel’s criticism of Kant on this point also creates a valuable point of entry into his own sometimes-obscure positive philosophical claims. In the third chapter, I make use of this by identifying Hegel’s conception of Thought as the successor concept to the transcendental unity of apperception in Kant. By reading Thought as a transformation of the unity of apperception - a transformation that takes it from a condition on representations to a condition on reality as a whole - I am able to provide a reading of Hegel that does justice to his more metaphysically-loaded texts as well as to his claims to be doing properly post-Kantian metaphysics.

In chapter 1, I develop an account of inquiry I call “naive inquiry”. This approach to defining inquiry simply takes the aim of the activity (answering one’s question) to be the sole defining feature of the activity. I contrast my approach with views of inquiry which look to the attitudes of inquirers to define inquiring activity. In chapter 2, I turn to wellbeing. I first argue that inquiry contributes finally to wellbeing when it is an achievement. I then outline the three predominant theories of wellbeing (hedonism, desire satisfaction, and objective list), and contend that none of them adequately account well for the final value of inquiry. In chapter 3, I turn to perfectionist theories of wellbeing. According to perfectionist theories of wellbeing, activities that develop or manifest the capacities or skills of a kind are final contributors to wellbeing. I argue that perfectionist theories of wellbeing are well equipped to account for the final value of inquiry. A full perfectionist theory requires that one identify a kind, the relevant capacities, and the relevant activities. Having already shown that inquiry is finally valuable, I use the majority of chapter 3 to identify the relevant kind and capacities. I identify “Rational Being” as the relevant kind as and “rationality”, understood as a capacity for understanding, as the relevant capacity. The result is that inquiries are finally valuable when they are manifestations of the capacity for understanding. The set of inquiries identified as valuable is also shown to be similar or identical to the set of inquiries that are achievements. In chapter 4, I join my naive view of inquiry to Margaret Gilbert’s social ontology in order to offer the a basic account of joint inquiry. I argue that while any number of approaches to social ontology could be used to generate a theory of joint inquiry, Gilbert’s provides a very natural way to scale up every aspect of individual inquiry to the joint level.