The ability to chain together sequences of information and action is pivotal to everyday acquisition of skills. Despite extensive research of sequence learning, little focus has been given to individual performance in standard tasks measuring this capability. As a result, little is known regarding what knowledge participants gain during such tasks. In the current work, an individual- and item-based analysis is performed of eye movements that occur during a spatial sequence learning task and reflect anticipation of upcoming target locations. We show that the knowledge participants acquire during the task is tightly linked to a-priori response biases they bring into the experiment. Results suggest that a-priori biases may be a sizeable influence on performance in learning experiments, that tends to be overlooked. Implications for designing and reading studies of sequence learning are discussed.

Newly formed memories are not passively stored for future retrieval; rather, they are reactivated offline and thereby strengthened and transformed. However, reactivation is not a uniform process: it occurs throughout different states of consciousness, including conscious rehearsal during wakefulness and unconscious processing during both wakefulness and sleep. In this study, we explore the consequences of reactivation during conscious and unconscious awake states. Forty-one participants learned associations consisting of adjective-object-position triads. Objects were clustered into distinct semantic groups (e.g., multiple fruits, vehicles, musical instruments) which allowed us to examine the consequences of reactivation on semantically-related memories. After an extensive learning phase, some triads were reactivated consciously, through cued retrieval, or unconsciously, through subliminal priming. In both conditions, the adjective was used as the cue. Reactivation impacted memory for the most distal association (i.e., the spatial position of associated objects) in a consciousness-dependent and memory-strength-dependent manner. First, conscious reactivation of a triad resulted in a weakening of other semantically related memories, but only those that were initially more accurate (i.e., memories with lower pre-reactivation spatial errors). This is similar to what has been previously demonstrated in studies employing retrieval-induced forgetting designs. Unconscious reactivation, on the other hand, benefited memory selectively for weak cued items. Semantically linked associations were not impaired, but rather integrated with the reactivated memory. Taken together, our results demonstrate that conscious and unconscious reactivation of memories during wakefulness have qualitatively different consequences on memory for distal associations. Effects are memory-strength-dependent, as has been shown for reactivation during sleep. Results support a consciousness-dependent inhibition account, according to which unconscious reactivation involves less inhibitory dynamics than conscious reactivation, thus allowing more liberal spread of activation. Our findings set the stage for additional exploration into the role of consciousness in memory structuring.

Consolidating memories for long-term storage depends on reactivation. Reactivation occurs both consciously, during wakefulness, and unconsciously, during wakefulness and sleep. While considerable work has examined conscious awake and unconscious sleep reactivation, in this study, we directly compare the consequences of conscious and unconscious reactivation during wakefulness. Forty-one participants learned associations consisting of adjective-object-position triads. Objects were clustered into distinct semantic groups (e.g., fruits, vehicles) such that we could examine consequences of reactivation on semantically related memories. After an intensive learning protocol, we systematically reactivated some of the triads by presenting the adjective as a cue. Reactivation was done so that it was consciously experienced for some triads, and only unconsciously processed for others. Memory for spatial positions, the most distal part of the association, was affected by reactivation in a consciousness-dependent and memory-strength-dependent manner. Conscious reactivation resulted in weakening of semantically related memories that were strong initially, resonating with prior findings of retrieval-induced forgetting. Unconscious reactivation, on the other hand, selectively benefited weak reactivated memories, as previously shown for reactivation during sleep. Semantically linked memories were not impaired, but rather were integrated with the reactivated memory. These results taken together demonstrate that conscious and unconscious reactivation have qualitatively different consequences. Results support a consciousness-dependent inhibition account, whereby unconscious reactivation entails less inhibition than conscious reactivation, thus allowing more liberal spread of activation. Findings set the stage for additional exploration into the role of conscious experience in memory storage and structuring.