This paper explores the dimension of transnational governance associated with civil business regulation. Civil regulations employ private, non-state, or market-based regulatory frameworks to govern multinational firms and global supply networks. While the notion that companies have a responsibility to ‘society’ is more than a century old, historically corporate social responsibility (CSR) was associated with initiatives by firms to address social problems at the community level, often through corporate philanthropy. More recently, CSR has become more international in scope; it now increasingly focuses on the impact of global firms and markets on working conditions, environmental quality, community development, and human rights, especially in developing countries. Civil regulations seek to imbed international markets and firms in a framework of global rules and norms by establishing standards for responsible business conduct as well as mechanisms for promoting compliance with them.

The research project which produced this volume of essays grew out of the central issue addressed in Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy by David Vogel, namely the impact of economic globalization on national regulatory policies. While popular opinion tends to assume that global economic competition produces a “race to the bottom,” virtually all scholars who have examined this issue challenge this claim. Vogel goes a step further, arguing for the existence of a “California effect,” e.g. a “race to the top” or toward stringency. This introductory essay reviews the extensive scholarly literature on this subject and then summarizes and analyzes the contributions of the ten essays in this volume to this debate as well as to the related question of the impact of globalization on regulatory convergence/divergence. On balance, these essays report both continued regulatory divergence as well as movement in the direction of more stringent standards.

Whether human rights can be promoted and promulgated with persuasion or coercion has been much debated in the literature. But coercive measures, such as economic sanctions, for human rights purposes are often viewed with skepticism because of their inconsistent use and application. Against this backdrop, some economically dominant states have been increasingly attaching social clauses to trade agreements. These clauses stipulate standards that must be upheld if the beneficiary state is to continue to receive preferential market access.

In this dissertation I examine and quantitatively evaluate the operation of so-called "hard" law enforcement mechanisms. I ask whether the observed pattern of enforcement is consistent with a concern for human rights violations or do other factors, such as economic or strategic relationships, offer a better explanation. In particular, I focus on the operation of the US Generalized System of Preferences because it is one of the longest running trade agreements with a clearly articulated formal annual review and suspension process should a beneficiary state violate standards. Moreover, the set of eligible beneficiary countries is geographically broad.

I collect information from original source documents produced by the US Trade Representative in order to compile a unique dataset detailing enforcement proceedings over the last twenty-five years. This extensive dataset provides numerous cases of enforcement (and non-enforcement) from which I draw inferences about the factors influencing the US decision to punish violating states and thereby assess the institutional credibility of the GSP.

The extant literature on the operation of the US GSP has been qualitative in nature. This dissertation contributes by offering the first quantitative cross-country empirical assessment. I offer formal inferences, as opposed to anecdotal evidence, and in doing so I uncover new insights about the review and enforcement process. While I find that, for the most part, economic and strategic factors are an important part of the explanation for the enforcement pattern, they are not the only determining factors. The level of violations does play a role, albeit a small role at a key juncture in the review process --- a juncture that is overlooked and obscured by previous studies. In addition, I find domestic politics also plays a role, in particular, the composition of Congress.