We study the stabilization of networked control systems with asynchronous sensors and controllers. Offsets between the sensor and controller clocks are unknown and modeled as parametric uncertainty. First we consider multi-input linear systems and provide a sufficient condition for the existence of linear time-invariant controllers that are capable of stabilizing the closed-loop system for every clock offset in a given range of admissible values. For first-order systems, we next obtain the maximum length of the offset range for which the system can be stabilized by a single controller. Finally we illustrate the results with a numerical simulation.

We solve a linear quadratic optimal control problem for sampled-data systems with stochastic delays. The delays are stochastically determined by the last few delays. The proposed optimal controller can be efficiently computed by iteratively solving a Riccati difference equation, provided that a discrete-time Markov jump system equivalent to the sampled-data system is stochastically stabilizable and detectable. Sufficient conditions for these notions are provided in the form of linear matrix inequalities, from which stabilizing controllers and state observers can be constructed.

We consider a multi-adversary version of the supervisory control problem for discrete-event systems (DES), in which an adversary corrupts the observations available to the supervisor. The supervisor’s goal is to enforce a specific language in spite of the opponent’s actions and without knowing which adversary it is playing against. This problem is motivated by applications to computer security in which a cyber defense system must make decisions based on reports from sensors that may have been tampered with by an attacker. We start by showing that the problem has a solution if and only if the desired language is controllable (in the DES classical sense) and observable in a (novel) sense that takes the adversaries into account. For the particular case of attacks that insert symbols into or remove symbols from the sequence of sensor outputs, we show that testing the existence of a supervisor and building the supervisor can be done using tools developed for the classical DES supervisory control problem, by considering a family of automata with modified output maps, but without expanding the size of the state space and without incurring on exponential complexity on the number of attacks considered.

We introduce a scalable observer architecture to estimate the states of a discrete-time linear-time-invariant (LTI) system whose sensors can be manipulated by an attacker. Given the maximum number of attacked sensors, we build on previous results on necessary and sufficient conditions for state estimation, and propose a novel multi-modal Luenberger (MML) observer based on efficient Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solving. We present two techniques to reduce the complexity of the estimation problem. As a first strategy, instead of a bank of distinct observers, we use a family of filters sharing a single dynamical equation for the states, but different output equations, to generate estimates corresponding to different subsets of sensors. Such an architecture can reduce the memory usage of the observer from an exponential to a linear function of the number of sensors. We then develop an efficient SMT-based decision procedure that is able to reason about the estimates of the MML observer to detect at runtime which sets of sensors are attack-free, and use them to obtain a correct state estimate. We provide proofs of convergence for our algorithm and report simulation results to compare its runtime performance with alternative techniques. Our algorithm scales well for large systems (including up to 5000 sensors) for which many previously proposed algorithms are not implementable due to excessive memory and time requirements. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of our algorithm on the design of resilient power distribution systems.