This article examines the origins of the California Energy Crisis through the lens of economic and political theory. The key turning points leading up to deregulation of the State’s energy markets are reviewed. The origins of the crisis are then framed in free market ideology and the garbage can model of political decision-making. Specifically, it is argued that California’s case exemplifies a process of deregulatory capture. A few interest groups used a window of political opportunity to shape the rules governing the process and create new economic opportunities, while shielding themselves from economic risk. These insights regarding the origins of the crisis highlight the need to enrich planning discourse with positive theories of market and polity interaction, and to adopt a more entrepreneurial role for planners during periods of dramatic reform of public infrastructure and services.

Karen Christensen's Cities and Complexity is a remarkably non­ partisan foray into the structural and analytical details comprising intergovernmental relations in the United States. Informed by years of work with the U . S . Department of Housing and Urban Development, teaching and research with the University of California at Berkeley, and a vast body of literature regarding organizational theory, this is a particularly multi-dimensional, yet practical, impression of the sprawling institutions we call "government".

This study uses institutional economics to shed light on many of the issues plaguing the evaluation of design-build contracting. The purpose is to assist lawmakers in the State of California as they contemplate the adoption of enabling legislation. In institutional economic terms, design-build involves the switch from public to private ordering of design services such that the design firm, which used to serve as the public client’s advocate during construction, is instead at the service of a general contractor or constructor. California is relatively rich in institutions supporting union agreements and environmental protection. In the transition to design-build dramatic changes to procedures, roles, and responsibilities ensue, which may include impacts to organized labor. Existing research suggests that design-build shortens delivery schedules by allowing construction to begin before design is complete, but the benefits of shortened schedules may come at the expense of public participation if design information presented during environmental review is inadequate.

Should California use design-build? Picture a planner responsible for deciding whether a stretch of highway should be developed with design-build or design-bid-build procedures. Which process is more efficient? If design-build is more efficient, do such gains come at the expense of organized labor and environmental compliance? These questions were addressed through a transaction-cost economic analysis of recently completed design-bid-build and design-build projects in several states, with attention to variations in the institutions governing transportation delivery from state to state.

This research is a transaction-cost economic analysis of recently completed transportation projects, informing a comparative evaluation of the institutional change in public contracting from design–bid–build to design–build project delivery. Design–build, in which design and construction services are bundled together, is an alternative form of public contract recently adopted by transportation departments in more than 30 states. With this method, timely delivery arises from compact funding allocations and concurrent engineering. Such savings, however, may come at the expense of organized labor and environmental review, and could reflect higher transaction costs than traditional methods. At issue is the question of whether California ’s Department of Transportation should also engage in design–build contracting.