When evaluating interpersonal transgressions, people take into account both the consequential damage and the intention of the agent. The intention and consequence, however, do not always match, as is the case with accidents and failed attempts. We combined an interactive game and functional MRI to investigate the neural substrates underlying the processing of intention and consequence, and its bearing on reactive punishment. The participant interacted with anonymous partners, who decided to deliver pain stimulation either to himself/herself or to the participant to earn a monetary reward. In some cases, the decision was reversed by the computer. After pain delivery, the partner's intention was revealed. Unbeknownst to the partner, the participant was then allowed to punish the partner by reducing his/her monetary reward. Behaviorally, the punishment was lower in the accidental condition (unintended harm relative to intended harm) but higher in the failed-attempt condition (unintended no-harm relative to intended no-harm). Neurally, the left amygdala/hippocampus was activated in the conditions with blameworthy intention (i.e., intentional harm and failed attempt). The accidental (relative to intentional) harm activated the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the anterior inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), while the failed attempt (relative to genuine no-harm) activated the anterior insula (AI) and the posterior IFG. Effective connectivity analysis revealed that in the unintentional conditions (i.e., accidental and failed attempt) the IFG received input from the TPJ and AI, and sent regulatory signals to the amygdala. These findings demonstrate that the processing of intention may gate the emotional responses to transgression and regulate subsequent reactive punishment.

Helping acts, however well intended and beneficial, sometimes involve immoral means or immoral helpers. Here, we explore whether help recipients consider moral evaluations in their appraisals of gratitude, a possibility that has been neglected by existing accounts of gratitude. Participants felt less grateful and more uneasy when offered immoral help (Study 1, N = 150), and when offered morally neutral help by an immoral helper (Study 2, N = 172). In response to immoral help or helpers, participants were less likely to accept the help and less willing to strengthen their relationship with the helper even when they accepted it. Study 3 (N = 276) showed that recipients who felt grateful when offered immoral help were perceived as less likable, less moral, and less suitable as close relationship partners than those who felt uneasy by observers. Our results demonstrate that gratitude is morally sensitive and suggest this might be socially adaptive.

Abstract: In some cultures, merely exerting effort is considered virtuous, even when the effort is inefficient. Our study examines how this moral attitude towards effort (relative to efficiency) has evolved historically across two distinct sociopolitical and linguistic contexts: the People’s Republic of China and the United States, using natural language processing techniques. Specifically, two formal political corpora were used—the People’s Daily (1950–2021) and the Congressional speeches for the U.S. (1873–2011). We developed dictionaries for each concept based on pre-trained word embedding models in both languages. Moral attitudes towards effort and efficiency were calculated on a year-by-year basis as the cosine similarity between the dictionaries of these concepts and an existing dictionary of morality. We benchmarked the fluctuations of moral attitude towards inefficient effort against critical historical events in the two countries. Additional time series analysis and Granger tests revealed the association and potential directionality between the evolution of moral attitude towards inefficient effort and critical socio-cultural variables such as collectivism and cultural looseness. Our research sheds light on the historical and socio-cultural roots of moralization of effort and has implications for historical psychology research on moral attitudes.

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by difficulties in social processes, interactions, and communication. Yet, the neurocognitive bases underlying these difficulties are unclear. Here, we triangulated the 'trans-diagnostic' approach to personality, social trait judgments of faces, and neurophysiology to investigate (1) the relative position of autistic traits in a comprehensive social-affective personality space, and (2) the distinct associations between the social-affective personality dimensions and social trait judgment from faces in individuals with ASD and neurotypical individuals. We collected personality and facial judgment data from a large sample of online participants (N = 89 self-identified ASD; N = 307 neurotypical controls). Factor analysis with 33 subscales of 10 social-affective personality questionnaires identified a 4-dimensional personality space. This analysis revealed that ASD and control participants did not differ significantly along the personality dimensions of empathy and prosociality, antisociality, or social agreeableness. However, the ASD participants exhibited a weaker association between prosocial personality dimensions and judgments of facial trustworthiness and warmth than the control participants. Neurophysiological data also indicated that ASD participants had a weaker association with neuronal representations for trustworthiness and warmth from faces. These results suggest that the atypical association between social-affective personality and social trait judgment from faces may contribute to the social and affective difficulties associated with ASD.

Humans adjust their behavioral strategies based on feedback, a process that may depend on intrinsic preferences and contextual factors such as visual salience. In this study, we hypothesized that decision-making based on visual salience is influenced by habitual and goal-directed processes, which can be evidenced by changes in attention and subjective valuation systems. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a series of studies to investigate the behavioral and neural mechanisms underlying visual salience-driven decision-making. We first established the baseline behavioral strategy without salience in Experiment 1 (n = 21). We then highlighted the utility or performance dimension of the chosen outcome using colors in Experiment 2 (n = 30). We demonstrated that the difference in staying frequency increased along the salient dimension, confirming a salience effect. Furthermore, the salience effect was abolished when directional information was removed in Experiment 3 (n = 28), suggesting that the salience effect is feedback-specific. To generalize our findings, we replicated the feedback-specific salience effects using eye-tracking and text emphasis. The fixation differences between the chosen and unchosen values were enhanced along the feedback-specific salient dimension in Experiment 4 (n = 48) but unchanged after removing feedback-specific information in Experiment 5 (n = 32). Moreover, the staying frequency was correlated with fixation properties, confirming that salience guides attention deployment. Lastly, our neuroimaging study (Experiment 6, n = 25) showed that the striatum subregions encoded salience-based outcome evaluation, while the vmPFC encoded salience-based behavioral adjustments. The connectivity of the vmPFC-ventral striatum accounted for individual differences in utility-driven, whereas the vmPFC-dmPFC for performance-driven behavioral adjustments. Together, our results provide a neurocognitive account of how task-irrelevant visual salience drives decision-making by involving attention and the frontal-striatal valuation systems. PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: Humans may use the current outcome to make behavior adjustments. How this occurs may depend on stable individual preferences and contextual factors, such as visual salience. Under the hypothesis that visual salience determines attention and subsequently modulates subjective valuation, we investigated the underlying behavioral and neural bases of visual-context-guided outcome evaluation and behavioral adjustments. Our findings suggest that the reward system is orchestrated by visual context and highlight the critical role of attention and the frontal-striatal neural circuit in visual-context-guided decision-making that may involve habitual and goal-directed processes.

Humans face a fundamental challenge of how to balance selfish interests against moral considerations. Such trade-offs are implicit in moral decisions about what to do; judgments of whether an action is morally right or wrong; and inferences about the moral character of others. To date, these three dimensions of moral cognition-decision-making, judgment, and inference-have been studied largely independently, using very different experimental paradigms. However, important aspects of moral cognition occur at the intersection of multiple dimensions; for instance, moral hypocrisy can be conceived as a disconnect between moral decisions and moral judgments. Here we describe the advantages of investigating these three dimensions of moral cognition within a single computational framework. A core component of this framework is harm aversion, a moral sentiment defined as a distaste for harming others. The framework integrates economic utility models of harm aversion with Bayesian reinforcement learning models describing beliefs about others' harm aversion. We show how this framework can provide novel insights into the mechanisms of moral decision-making, judgment, and inference.

People feel bad for inflicting harms upon others; this emotional state is termed interpersonal guilt. In this study, the participant played multiple rounds of a dot-estimation task with anonymous partners while undergoing fMRI. The partner would receive pain stimulation if the partner or the participant or both responded incorrectly; the participant was then given the option to intervene and bear a proportion of pain for the partner. The level of pain voluntarily taken and the activations in anterior middle cingulate cortex (aMCC) and bilateral anterior insula (AI) were higher when the participant was solely responsible for the stimulation (Self_Incorrect) than when both committed an error (Both_Incorrect). Moreover, the gray matter volume in the aMCC predicted the individual's compensation behavior, measured as the difference between the level of pain taken in the Self_Incorrect and Both_Incorrect conditions. Furthermore, a mediation pathway analysis revealed that activation in a midbrain region mediated the relationship between aMCC activation and the individual's tendency to compensate. These results demonstrate that the aMCC and the midbrain nucleus not only play an important role in experiencing interpersonal guilt, but also contribute to compensation behavior.

Neurotypical (NT) individuals and individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) make different judgments of social traits from others faces; they also exhibit different social emotional responses in social interactions. A common hypothesis is that the differences in face perception in ASD compared with NT is related to distinct social behaviors. To test this hypothesis, we combined a face trait judgment task with a novel interpersonal transgression task that induces measures social emotions and behaviors. ASD and neurotypical participants viewed a large set of naturalistic facial stimuli while judging them on a comprehensive set of social traits (e.g., warm, charismatic, critical). They also completed an interpersonal transgression task where their responsibility in causing an unpleasant outcome to a social partner was manipulated. The purpose of the latter task was to measure participants emotional (e.g., guilt) and behavioral (e.g., compensation) responses to interpersonal transgression. We found that, compared with neurotypical participants, ASD participants self-reported guilt and compensation tendency was less sensitive to our responsibility manipulation. Importantly, ASD participants and neurotypical participants showed distinct associations between self-reported guilt and judgments of criticalness from others faces. These findings reveal a novel link between perception of social traits and social emotional responses in ASD.

Extant research has demonstrated the positive intrapersonal effects of mindfulness training. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying the effects of mindfulness training on interpersonal processes are less clear. Here, we combined a randomized control mindfulness training design with computational approach to moral decision-making and moral judgments. Participants were randomly assigned to a Training group (N = 32) who received an 8-week mindfulness training or a Control group (N = 26) who waited for the same period of time. Before and after the 8-week period, participants completed a moral decision-making task, where they made tradeoff between money for themselves and unpleasant electric shocks to another person, and a moral judgment task, where they evaluated the blameworthiness of someone else's choices in the same moral decision-making task. Trait mindfulness, as measured by the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, significantly increased from the pre- to post-training session for the Training group, but not the Control group, demonstrating the effectiveness of the mindfulness manipulation. For the Control group, participants' moral preference in both the decision-making task and the judgment task declined over time, exhibiting a "slippery slope" effect. In contrast, for the Training group, mindfulness training prevented moral preferences from declining. Computational modeling revealed that mindfulness training specifically reduced the increase in the weights of money over time in both the decision-making and judgment tasks, thereby curbing the "slippery slope" effects. These findings provide a cognitive account of the prosocial effects of mindfulness training on moral decision-making and moral judgments.

Unlabelled

Although economic theories suggest that punishment threat is crucial for maintaining social norms, counterexamples are noted in which punishment threat hinders norm compliance. Such discrepancy may arise from the intention behind the threat: unintentionally introduced punishment threat facilitates, whereas intentionally introduced punishment threat hinders, norm compliance. Here, we combined a dictator game and fMRI to investigate how intention modulates the effect of punishment threat on norm compliance and the neural substrates of this modulation. We also investigated whether this modulation can be influenced by brain stimulation. Human participants divided an amount of money between themselves and a partner. The partner (intentionally) or a computer program (unintentionally) decided to retain or waive the right to punish the participant upon selfish distribution. Compared with the unintentional condition, participants allocated more when the partner intentionally waived the power of punishment, but less when the partner retained such power. The right lateral orbitofrontal cortex (rLOFC) showed higher activation when the partner waived compared with when the computer waived or when the partner retained the power. The functional connectivity between the rLOFC and the brain network associated with intention/mentalizing processing was predictive of the allocation difference induced by intention. Moreover, inhibition or activation of the rLOFC by brain stimulation decreased or increased, respectively, the participants' reliance on the partner's intention during monetary allocation. These findings demonstrate that the perceived intention of punishment threat plays a crucial role in norm compliance and that the LOFC is casually involved in the implementation of intention-based cooperative decisions.

Significance statement

Does punishment threat facilitate or hinder norm enforcement? So far, cognitive neuroscience research offers equivocal evidence. By directly manipulating the intention behind punishment threat, we demonstrate that intention modulates the effectiveness of punishment threat. Moreover, we show that inhibition or activation of the right lateral orbitofrontal cortex (rLOFC) decreased or increased the effect of punishment threat in the intentional context, but not in the unintentional context, suggesting the casual involvement of the rLOFC in intention-based cooperative decisions.