Spread of activation and interaction between dififerent types of knowledge representations in the mental lexicon were investigated in three semantically mediated phonological priming experiments, conducted on both English and Chinese. Facilitatory effects were found in naming not only for words (e.g., boy) that were semantically related to their primes (e.g., girl), but also for words that were homophonic to the semantic targets (e.g., buoy). The amount of priming varied according to whether homophone targets were also orthographically similar to semantic targets. An inhibitory priming effect was also found for words that were orthographically similar to but phonologically different from semantic targets. It is concluded that spread of activation between words sharing semantic properties is not encapsulated in the semantic system. The phonological and orthographic representations of words receiving spread of semantic activation are also automatically and immediately activated, even though they are not supported directly by sensory input.

The nature of sublexical processing in reading logographic Chinese was investigated in three primed naming experiments. Experiment 1 showed that phonetic radicals in low frequency complex characters are automatically decomposed and used to activate their own phonological representations. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that the semantic properties of these phonetic radicals are also activated. It is argued that sublexical processing in reading Chinese is both a phonological and a semantic event and there is no fundamental difference between sublexical processing of phonetic radicals and lexical processing of single and complex charaaers. The implications of these results for theories of lexical processing are discussed.

We argue for a view that, for written Chinese, direct visual access is the only way to access information stored in the mental lexicon. Phonology plays no role in initial lexical access and has limited effect on access to lexical semantics. Evidence supporting this view is adduced from three sets of experiments that either failed to detect any phonological effect in lexical access, or failed to prove that the phonological effects obtained are pre-lexical in nature, or demonstrate successfully the presence of orthographic effect in lexical access. We conclude that words in the lexicon can be accessed in different ways, depending on the general configurations of the writing systems in different languages.

When evaluating interpersonal transgressions, people take into account both the consequential damage and the intention of the agent. The intention and consequence, however, do not always match, as is the case with accidents and failed attempts. We combined an interactive game and functional MRI to investigate the neural substrates underlying the processing of intention and consequence, and its bearing on reactive punishment. The participant interacted with anonymous partners, who decided to deliver pain stimulation either to himself/herself or to the participant to earn a monetary reward. In some cases, the decision was reversed by the computer. After pain delivery, the partner's intention was revealed. Unbeknownst to the partner, the participant was then allowed to punish the partner by reducing his/her monetary reward. Behaviorally, the punishment was lower in the accidental condition (unintended harm relative to intended harm) but higher in the failed-attempt condition (unintended no-harm relative to intended no-harm). Neurally, the left amygdala/hippocampus was activated in the conditions with blameworthy intention (i.e., intentional harm and failed attempt). The accidental (relative to intentional) harm activated the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the anterior inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), while the failed attempt (relative to genuine no-harm) activated the anterior insula (AI) and the posterior IFG. Effective connectivity analysis revealed that in the unintentional conditions (i.e., accidental and failed attempt) the IFG received input from the TPJ and AI, and sent regulatory signals to the amygdala. These findings demonstrate that the processing of intention may gate the emotional responses to transgression and regulate subsequent reactive punishment.

People feel bad for inflicting harms upon others; this emotional state is termed interpersonal guilt. In this study, the participant played multiple rounds of a dot-estimation task with anonymous partners while undergoing fMRI. The partner would receive pain stimulation if the partner or the participant or both responded incorrectly; the participant was then given the option to intervene and bear a proportion of pain for the partner. The level of pain voluntarily taken and the activations in anterior middle cingulate cortex (aMCC) and bilateral anterior insula (AI) were higher when the participant was solely responsible for the stimulation (Self_Incorrect) than when both committed an error (Both_Incorrect). Moreover, the gray matter volume in the aMCC predicted the individual's compensation behavior, measured as the difference between the level of pain taken in the Self_Incorrect and Both_Incorrect conditions. Furthermore, a mediation pathway analysis revealed that activation in a midbrain region mediated the relationship between aMCC activation and the individual's tendency to compensate. These results demonstrate that the aMCC and the midbrain nucleus not only play an important role in experiencing interpersonal guilt, but also contribute to compensation behavior.

Extant research has demonstrated the positive intrapersonal effects of mindfulness training. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying the effects of mindfulness training on interpersonal processes are less clear. Here, we combined a randomized control mindfulness training design with computational approach to moral decision-making and moral judgments. Participants were randomly assigned to a Training group (N = 32) who received an 8-week mindfulness training or a Control group (N = 26) who waited for the same period of time. Before and after the 8-week period, participants completed a moral decision-making task, where they made tradeoff between money for themselves and unpleasant electric shocks to another person, and a moral judgment task, where they evaluated the blameworthiness of someone else's choices in the same moral decision-making task. Trait mindfulness, as measured by the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, significantly increased from the pre- to post-training session for the Training group, but not the Control group, demonstrating the effectiveness of the mindfulness manipulation. For the Control group, participants' moral preference in both the decision-making task and the judgment task declined over time, exhibiting a "slippery slope" effect. In contrast, for the Training group, mindfulness training prevented moral preferences from declining. Computational modeling revealed that mindfulness training specifically reduced the increase in the weights of money over time in both the decision-making and judgment tasks, thereby curbing the "slippery slope" effects. These findings provide a cognitive account of the prosocial effects of mindfulness training on moral decision-making and moral judgments.

Unlabelled

Although economic theories suggest that punishment threat is crucial for maintaining social norms, counterexamples are noted in which punishment threat hinders norm compliance. Such discrepancy may arise from the intention behind the threat: unintentionally introduced punishment threat facilitates, whereas intentionally introduced punishment threat hinders, norm compliance. Here, we combined a dictator game and fMRI to investigate how intention modulates the effect of punishment threat on norm compliance and the neural substrates of this modulation. We also investigated whether this modulation can be influenced by brain stimulation. Human participants divided an amount of money between themselves and a partner. The partner (intentionally) or a computer program (unintentionally) decided to retain or waive the right to punish the participant upon selfish distribution. Compared with the unintentional condition, participants allocated more when the partner intentionally waived the power of punishment, but less when the partner retained such power. The right lateral orbitofrontal cortex (rLOFC) showed higher activation when the partner waived compared with when the computer waived or when the partner retained the power. The functional connectivity between the rLOFC and the brain network associated with intention/mentalizing processing was predictive of the allocation difference induced by intention. Moreover, inhibition or activation of the rLOFC by brain stimulation decreased or increased, respectively, the participants' reliance on the partner's intention during monetary allocation. These findings demonstrate that the perceived intention of punishment threat plays a crucial role in norm compliance and that the LOFC is casually involved in the implementation of intention-based cooperative decisions.

Significance statement

Does punishment threat facilitate or hinder norm enforcement? So far, cognitive neuroscience research offers equivocal evidence. By directly manipulating the intention behind punishment threat, we demonstrate that intention modulates the effectiveness of punishment threat. Moreover, we show that inhibition or activation of the right lateral orbitofrontal cortex (rLOFC) decreased or increased the effect of punishment threat in the intentional context, but not in the unintentional context, suggesting the casual involvement of the rLOFC in intention-based cooperative decisions.

Apology from the offender facilitates forgiveness and thus has the power to restore a broken relationship. Here we showed that apology from the offender not only reduces the victim's propensity to react aggressively but also alters the victim's implicit attitude and neural responses toward the offender. We adopted an interpersonal competitive game which consisted of two phases. In the first, "passive" phase, participants were punished by high or low pain stimulation chosen by the opponents when losing a trial. During the break, participants received a note from each of the opponents, one apologizing and the other not. The second, "active" phase, involved a change of roles where participants could punish the two opponents after winning. Experiment 1 included an Implicit Association Test (IAT) in between the reception of notes and the second phase. Experiment 2 recorded participants' brain potentials in the second phase. We found that participants reacted less aggressively toward the apologizing opponent than the non-apologizing opponent in the active phase. Moreover, female, but not male, participants responded faster in the IAT when positive and negative words were associated with the apologizing and the non-apologizing opponents, respectively, suggesting that female participants had enhanced implicit attitude toward the apologizing opponent. Furthermore, the late positive potential (LPP), a component in brain potentials associated with affective/motivational reactions, was larger when viewing the portrait of the apologizing than the non-apologizing opponent when participants subsequently selected low punishment. Additionally, the LPP elicited by the apologizing opponents' portrait was larger in the female than in the male participants. These findings confirm the apology's role in reducing reactive aggression and further reveal that this forgiveness process engages, at least in female, an enhancement of the victim's implicit attitude and a prosocial motivational change toward the offender.

Gratitude is a typical social-moral emotion that plays a crucial role in maintaining human cooperative interpersonal relationship. Although neural correlates of gratitude have been investigated, the neurocognitive processes that lead to gratitude, namely, the representation and integration of its cognitive antecedents, remain largely unknown. Here, we combined fMRI and a human social interactive task to investigate how benefactor's cost and beneficiary's benefit, two critical antecedents of gratitude, are encoded and integrated in beneficiary's brain, and how the neural processing of gratitude is converted to reciprocity. A coplayer decided whether to help a human participant (either male or female) avoid pain at his/her own monetary cost; the participants could transfer monetary points to the benefactor with the knowledge that the benefactor was unaware of this transfer. By independently manipulating monetary cost and the degree of pain reduction, we could identify the neural signatures of benefactor's cost and recipient's benefit and examine how they were integrated. Recipient's self-benefit was encoded in reward-sensitive regions (e.g., ventral striatum), whereas benefactor-cost was encoded in regions associated with mentalizing (e.g., temporoparietal junction). Gratitude was represented in perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (pgACC), the strength of which correlated with trait gratitude. Dynamic causal modeling showed that the neural signals representing benefactor-cost and self-benefit passed to pgACC via effective connectivities, suggesting an integrative role of pgACC in generating gratitude. Moreover, gyral ACC plays an intermediary role in converting gratitude representation into reciprocal behaviors. Our findings provide a neural mechanistic account of gratitude and its role in social-moral life.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Gratitude plays an integral role in subjective well-being and harmonious interpersonal relationships. However, the neurocognitive processes through which various components and antecedents of gratitude are integrated remain largely unknown. We developed a new interpersonal paradigm to independently and parametrically manipulate two antecedents of gratitude in a helping context, namely, the benefit to beneficiary and the cost to benefactor, to examine their representation and integration in the beneficiary's brain using fMRI. We found the neural encoding of self-benefit and benefactor-cost in reward- and mentalizing-related brain areas, respectively. More importantly, by examining effective connectivity, we showed that these componential signals are passed to perigenual anterior cingulate cortex, which tracks trial-by-trial gratitude levels. Our study thus provides a neural mechanistic account of gratitude.

Previous studies have shown that brain regions for mentalizing, including temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), are activated in understanding the nonliteral meaning of sentences. A different set of brain regions, including left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), is activated for dealing with pragmatic incongruence. Here we demonstrate that individuals' cognitive empathic ability modulates the brain activity underlying the processing of pragmatic constraints during sentence comprehension. The lian … dou … construction in Chinese (similar to English even) normally describes an event of low expectedness; it also introduces a pragmatic scale against which the likelihood of an underspecified event can be inferred. By embedding neutral or highly likely events in the construction, we created underspecified and incongruent sentences and compared both with control sentences in which events of low expectedness were described. Imaging results showed that (i) left TPJ was activated for the underspecified sentences, and the activity in mPFC correlated with individuals' fantasizing ability and (ii) anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was activated for the incongruent sentences, and the activity in bilateral IFG correlated with individuals' perspective taking ability. These findings suggest that brain activations in making pragmatic inference and in dealing with pragmatic failure are modulated by different components of cognitive empathy.