What is the relationship between trust and perceived agency? The present study experimentally investigated the effect of people’s perception of a robot’s compliance (and resistance) to social norms on their evaluation of a robot’s perceived agency, performance trust, and moral trust. Participants reported a norm-conforming robot to have higher perceived agency and a greater sense of trust than a robot that violated social norms. We also found that perceived agency, regardless of how much a robot followed norms, was correlated with trust. We interpret this finding as evidence that as people see a robot as having agency, they trust it more.

Past research has found that interruptions change the relationship between confidence and accuracy. However, it is unclear how interruptions affect confidence-accuracy calibration. In this study, we used a rule-based procedural task called UNRAVEL and compared confidence-accuracy calibration between interrupted and uninterrupted trials. Results showed that participants were better calibrated in the interruption condition than in the no interruption condition. We interpret this novel effect as a result of changes in the validity of internal cues for confidence between conditions. Specifically, we explore response time as one potential mediating factor.

The relationship between confidence and accuracy has been modeled many times. This paper compares and contrasts three decision-making mathematical models (2DSD, Poisson, RTCON2) of confidence and investigates how each model predicts the effects of interruptions on accuracy, decision response time, confidence, and confidence response time.

In two studies we investigated the effect of resumption practice following an interruption at the same step in a Computerized Physician Order Entry system (CPOE). The results of both studies showed that error rate decreased with increasing amounts of resumption practice. One reason people may have resumed more accurately following an interruption is improvement in a general resumption process. If true, we would expect that participants could be interrupted at any step in a task and show improved resumption with increased practice. Instead, our results suggest that repeatedly resuming from the same step likely produces associative priming between a specific task, interruption, and step. The associative priming allowed participants to resume more successfully with additional interruption practice, but only for that task-interruption-step triplet.

Drift diffusion models of decision-making offer some of the most robust predictions of response time for a number of memory manipulations. Some drift diffusion models have been extended to explain confidence judgments. Many of these models assume that confidence judgments are independent and are not systematically related to other task items. In this paper the authors report a relationship between confidence judgments in procedural tasks and how the Memory for Goals model would explain this relationship.

We describe two different cognitive process models of a wellknown experiment on social influence (Salganik, Dodds, &Watts, 2006). One model, the social influence model,reproduced the choices that participants took by modelingboth the cognitive processes the participant engaged in andthe social influences that the participant saw. The secondmodel, the pure cognitive model, used only cognitivecapabilities and did not model any social influences that theparticipant saw. Somewhat surprisingly, the two modelsshowed no difference in quality of fit (the pure cognitivemodel actually fit slightly better than the social influencemodel), suggesting that social influence models should takecognitive functions into account in their theories.