UC Berkeley

This dissertation delves into the weaponization of history and the performance of national belonging in Crimea and Russia. Drawing on nearly two years of ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2017 and 2021 in Crimea, Ukraine, and Russia, it examines the social, cultural, and political conditions preceding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and how the annexation of Crimea and subsequent war in Ukraine have reshaped the embodiment and understanding of Russian citizenship. The dissertation argues that while the Russian state developed new political discourses to legitimize the annexation of Crimea—presenting it as a 'reunion' and a 'return home'—it also redefined 'Russianness' for the entire country. By promoting militarized forms of patriotism, supporting war games, and portraying Russian history as a series of conflicts, Russia crafted a dichotomous worldview dividing the 'Russian World' from Western civilization. My research aims to offer fresh perspectives on Crimea as a space between Russia and Ukraine. Fieldwork evidence indicates that prior to the conflict, despite predominantly using the Russian language in daily life, people readily switched between Russian and Ukrainian depending on context. Being Crimean meant navigating fluid identities of 'Russian-ness' and 'Ukrainian-ness,' which were not mutually exclusive. Following the annexation, state-sponsored militarization and patriotic narratives increasingly swayed Crimeans towards Russian allegiance, shaping their identities through state performances and participation. Centering performance in my analysis, I explore how war narratives, history, and myths become embodied in people’s actions. Since 2014, history has evolved into a cornerstone of Russian state politics, not merely legitimizing Crimea's annexation but informing broader international and domestic policies. The Kremlin’s emphasis on historical 'restoration' serves as both a motto for international relations and a unifying force domestically, motivating actions in Eastern Ukraine and beyond. Crimea was an entry point to Russian politics in general. Since 2014, Russia has been developing a political toolkit in Crimea that I observed between 2017 and 2024: support of pseudo-democratic forms of popular expression (such as referendums and state-supportive mass gatherings), suppression of alternative political positions, control of language and vocabulary of self-expression, and the development of social security in exchange for giving up political freedoms. By 2022, the Kremlin had begun to apply this toolkit to control the rest of Russia as well as the newly occupied territories of Ukraine. In addition to Russia’s use of such tactics, both Russia and Ukraine have developed mechanisms for fostering patriotism and nationalism by turning the historical past into a weaponized discourse in the present.