Do they walk the talk? gauging acquiring ceo and director confidence in the value creation potential of announced acquisitions
- Author(s): Devers, CE
- McNAMARA, G
- Haleblian, J
- Yoder, ME
- et al.
Published Web Locationhttps://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2011.0555
We explore whether acquiring CEOs and directors act consistently with the idea that their newly announced acquisitions will increase long-term firm value. Specifically, we examine postannouncement adjustments to CEOs' equity-based holdings and find acquiring CEOs tend to exercise options and sell firm stock following acquisition announcements. Moreover, positive short-term market performance exacerbates this effect. Further, we find directors tend to grant their acquiring CEOs stock options, after acquisition announcement, presumably to more tightly align CEO-shareholder interests. These findings suggest that when CEOs and directors manage acquiring CEOs' equity-based holdings, they do not appear to anticipate long-term value creation from their acquisitions.
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